and not surprisingly i disagree quite a bit with selig's analysis. first of all it is to the true that there was absolutely no military provocations in the eight years of the sunshine policy. actually ten years. the 2002 there was a very distressing fav all incident in which i believe 12 south korean sailors were killed and maimed. the problem was not that president myung-bak has repute yated the sunshine policy. in fact, he actually has in the done so. when he came into office he was very careful about not doing so. the reality is it is correct that the dynamics have been existing for decades. but the military provocations, it's very clear who instigated this. this was a surprise attack. and frankly a violation of the arm i cities agreement. is. >> woodruff: so balbina hwang when the south says we are demanding the north immediately apologise and punish those responsible s that going to happen? >> well, it may or may not. what is very interesting about president myung-bak's statement here is that he is actually giving the north koreans a face-saving

alternately, when he was going to selig, i took it over to try to get it made -- he was going to sell it. after five or six years he got it made with jack nicholson playing the part and all of this. so dad always tells the story that when he was working with the usia during the cold war, he had going into it -- he had gone to czechoslovakia and said he talked to the director about this project. he sent it to him, but he never got it. he has told this story now after we got the moviegoing. now he starts up with me about "son, you did not let me play the part." this is the guy you send the book to 15 years ago and you want to talk to me about casting it. we got along really well. i remind him that with his share of the producing profits, he made more money off that movie that any picture. it was my first oscar. the reality is, it was a great part. just like in "wall street's" and then this picture "solitary man," the parts are hard to come by. tavis: i want to ask about your dad. i think i have heard you talk about this before. this town does not have a really good track record for seco

we borrowed from the sick it -- if you make alone and selig, in most cases you will have to retain five set recovers inside and takes -- if you make a loan and sell it you will have to retain 5%. you do not have any money, and you are complaining because it will -- will lead guitar for you to lend money that you do not have. the answer was yes. i was told at the world economic forum that someone needed $20 million to buy a property, and he asked banks on friday to let him know by tuesday if they could participate in that loan. by sunday, he was oversubscribed. he asked the banker why he got such a response, and they said they only had to ask one question about the purchase. can we sell the loan? they felt no need to check and see whether it was a good underlying activity. we also at a consumer protection agency. we are born to get a test of regulation. we are often told by people in any business, don't legislate too rigidly. don't go up to the line. leave us some flexibility. on the other hand, when an incident arises such as goldman sachs, and many people think that what they did was n

what happened was, when one asset class becomes a liquid, no one can selig -- no one can sell it, then people turn to another asset class. they turn to the mortgages that are salable, and pretty soon those become illiquid because everybody is trying to sell them. >> so it is contagion? >> you try to sell something that is illiquid out of fear that it cannot be sold, then it securities become correlated. >> and bear stearns said they could not deal with this. >> i would simply say that counterparties in the repo market lost confidence in bear stearns, and they were unable to borrow against certain securities. >> notwithstanding [unintelligible] >> this was a loss of confidence. others were experiencing similar problems, but not nearly to the same extent. this was focused on bear stearns. >> so it was to agree. >> let me also say to you, lending practices were very sloppy, and borrowing practices. it is one thing if i want to rico at treasury. if i am a repo -- if i want to repo the treasury. there was an assumption that you could keep borrowing at full value on these securities when the