senator. >> welcome, director mueller. in a follow-up on senator klobuchar's last point on our cybervulnerability. let me preface our remarks by saying that from my viewpoint on the intelligence committee, for my viewpoint on this committee, from going out and seeing folks in action at the end jci ts and actions put together, i am very impressed with the ability and the dedication of the forces who have deployed against our cyberthreat. .. >> private sector observers, like the latest mcafee report, use again the same language. here we are, assuming that to be true on the losing end of the biggest transfer on the history of humankind, and i want to ask your continued support for my offices office's efforts to try to get a real understanding of what our fbi and doj resources are dedicated to this problem. you have to really drill below the numbers. because i can ask doj, and they consider is a cyberperson dedicated in every u.s. attorney's office. and i know perfectly well from having been an attorney, that person may be doing no cybercases at all. they may be the designated with a conference call on mute while they are doing other work. just that number doesn't really help. we are trying to work through who is really on to the cyberproblem and how, within the fbi, are there people who are designated in your local offices who are in the same mode when there is a conference call, the do they take it when their workload is elsewhere? other folks whose role is forensic cleanup, when you raid a place and they grab computers and do a download -- that's important, but it's not really the cyberbattle. one of the things that i am concerned about is that when you look at the metrics of cases that are produced, again, i see some great cases, but i don't see a ton of them. in terms of beating down the bobcats that attack our systems through service attacks, you guys helped, i think take down a record flood and other.net. that made a measurable dent in the amount of spam that is out there on the internet. but there is still a ton of that stuff going on, and it is great cases but not a lot of cases. if you look at international property theft through cyber, hacking into an american company's computer, accessing their data and their formulas and secrets, xl trading that out and then using math to compete them, we have made zero cases. in all of the cybercases and intellectual property cases, we have seen the link. a guy who is downloading and putting the disc into his pocket -- my impression from everything is that they are standing in front of a fire pose, trying to put out a bunch of work. when i hear from private sector people is that they would love to have more fbi and more federal support. nine times out of 10, they don't even know they have been hacked. they get told when your folks or homeland security comes knocking on their doors. they say you might want to look at this file. once they do know, having more supported from you guys, i think, i think you're doing a great job with the resources you have. but i know that we are at a stage where this has become a big problem, as a national security problem, to our electric grid, our financial systems, our communications networks, if someone decides to take those downs, and an industrial espionage problem, nothing privacy problems. there is someone in this room right now his credit card and social security information is on some estonian gangsters website for sale. there is so much of it for sale right now. there are all of these issues. i feel that we need, in the same way that we need to move from having a couple of aircraft in the united states army years ago, we have to have an air force on this one. we need to be thinking about really what the next step is. how should we structure this? is not just enough to add incrementally. we need to go game on, on this. i would like your thoughts on that point. i know that omb is a hazard for folks when they are being asked to argue about your allocated budget, but i would like to ask you to participate, willingly and helpfully come and continue to, because we have had good support so far -- or trying to get something into the cyberbill that will put a structured into analyzing what our law enforcement posture should look like, how should it be resource for the future. we have bea, we have atf, we have secret service or it may be we should be thinking of building something for cyber-- as we look out. >> what are your thoughts? >> i am struck by saying that i share your concern about putting the country and the federal bureau of investigation in a posture to address this. it will take a substantial realization of the bureau to address this. in terms of personnel, and one of the things that we too often do is retake pockets of the cyberissue, and we forget about them. within the bureau, there are a number of initiatives we have taken over a period of time but have fallen under the cyberumbra left. i think the [inaudible] is one of the most important. also, every one of the 56 field offices are doing cyberwork. there are intrusions. and there are cases of the images. as we grow, intrusions are more important. you hate to say that, but they are more important because they need a different scale and different effort. my discussions with our people is that we really have to address cyber-- we have to do it in the same way we address counterterrorism. that means beefing up our cybersquads and making them taskforces. so we should know where the cyberintrusion is going to occur, and you need to be able to do the forensics so you can start the attribution, much less the criminal case. consequently, it has to be distributed across the country, and the expertise has to be distributed across the country. it takes more of a headquarters role, because inevitably, in most of these, whether it be a botnet or what have you, it may have been started in romania or morocco or what have you -- consequently, the old way of allocating responsibility to the office of the first u.s. attorney -- they have and get the subpoena of the grand jury, they don't work in this environment. what we are working within the bureau is putting together a distributed. >> i am going to interject. in those cases, you don't have a criminal case. you have a civil effort to shut it off, which was done brilliantly, but it is hard to keep that up within the fbi's structure when there is no criminal case contemplated. [talking over each other] >> we look at it as national security could is is one of the problems that you have with cyber. at the time of the cyberintrusion, you do not know whether it is a state actor, you don't know whether it is organized crime or organized crime working for the a state actor, or an individual or group of individuals, who are not organized but distributing the anonymous type of attacks. or lastly, the 18-year-old who is particularly adept and wants to make his or her mark by intercepting. you cannot immediately put it into a cubbyhole, national security or this particular crime. consequently, the 18 counterparts and the distributed network, in my mind, gives us the ability to identify that intrusion, work on that intrusion with dhs protecting the infrastructure, gathering the information and hopefully helping on the identifying of the attribution for that particular attack. i do believe that something like the regional computer forensics laboratories, yes, they do exploitation, but at the same expertise that you need to do the attribution, in terms of a cyberattack. you have 16 of them. i would like to add more of those. there are other aspects of the organization -- the fbi organization that have to be integrated. you can have a cyberattack which are undertaken by terrorists, state actors or espionage, and you need in both of those, expertise as to who would undertake and the intel and intelligence agencies. and you have to merge cyberexpertise among the expertise in that area. that is what we are organizing to do. the bottom line, there is a long ways to go for all of us. but it is a sharing of intelligence and the capability to take that intelligence, and work with not only our persons in the united states, with nsa, cia and others outside, that will enable us to be successful in this arena. >> i really thank you for the excellent work that the bureau is doing on this. and i look forward to working hard to making sure that you have the resources that you need. i will close by observing that these cases are immensely complicated and difficult. if you look at the complicating factors that make a case difficult, it has virtually all of them. but the worst comforting factor of international domain, and having to work through gaps and treaties and having to work in foreign countries -- the complicating factor, as you pointed out, integration with our intelligence community and having to deal with the security and classified nature of some of that and protecting resources and methods, the cases themselves are challenging and difficult. it's difficult as any case can be. the forensics are very important. trying to figure out how this stuff actually works and be able to testify about it, clearly, and then a lot of work putting these things together because some of these things are big operations. when you combine all of that, each case could really be a huge vacuum for effort, in order to succeed. i think that is an important appreciation that i wanted to put into the record as we go. this is not by like some cases, where you can knock them off one after another. these are the kind of cases that could swamp a small u.s. attorney's office, and present immense challenges. >> that is where we pushed resources. we have to be far more flexible, we have to have virtual teams addressing these cases. we can do burritos, in these cases are competent at. one thing that often is lost is there is one body behind a computer. what you want to do, identify those individuals and arrest them and incarcerate them so there is deterrence you can talk about the networks and tracking the signature tobacco country, but then there has to be action and that is where our role comes in. >> i appreciate it. i think the last person standing in the searing. i will call it to the conclusion. i think you for coming up, as use so often done to face the committee. you have always done is professionally, and your organization is first-rate. we are delighted to have interpreted the record you here. the record will remain open for one additional week. in case there is anything that anyone wants to submit. the hearing is closed. >> thank you. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> c-span's congressional directly is your complete guide to the 112th congress. inside you will find information on senatorsouse members including contact information and district maps. plus information on cabinet secretaries, supreme court justices, in the nation's governors. pick up a copy for $12.95 plus shipping and handling. order online at c-span.org/shop. in a few moments come in medal of honor ceremony for a soldier killed in the vietnam war. in a little more than 20 minutes, a pentagon news briefing with the u.s. army chief of staff, general odierno. and later, we will be reader director robert mueller on capitol hill. president obama has awarded u.s. army specialist leslie h. sabo, jr. the medal of honor for his actions in the vietnam war. he was killed in combat in 1970. the president and first lady were joined by the family in east room ceremony. this is about 20 minutes. >> ladies and gentlemen, the president of the united states and mrs. michelle obama. [music playing] [music playing] let us pray. almighty god, the heavens tell of your glory and expands declares the work of your hands. we come