>> so judge sentelle -- sorry. >> called tower type information. >> tower information is not included in this metadata. the courts have specified that it's not included. in passing reference, they suggested there's something about trunk identifiers. trunk identifiers are not like cell tower information in the sense that they could be used to identify a location. they just identify where a call is routed and interconnected within the network but not in the same details or closely way to cell tower information. and so because the fisc orders, the judicial orders that authorize this program and impose limitations on it specify the type of metadata, the court in that case, in the many orders that it has issued, has specified that it has concluded this kind of metadata is within the supreme court decision in smith. so that's the judicial determination by the fisc itself. we think that supreme court's decision is therefore depositive of this case and requires reversal of the injunction because this is not a search under the fourth amendment as the supreme court emphasized. there's no reason

sorry.udge sentelle -- >> tower information. >> tower information is not included in this metadata. the courts have specified that it's not included. in passing reference, they suggested there's something about trunk identity fires. trunk identity fires are not like cell tower information in the sense that they could be used to identify a location. they just identify where a call is routed and interconnected within the network but not in the same details or closely way to cell tower information. and so because the fisk orders, the judicial orders that authorize this program and impose limitations on it specify the type of metadata, the courts -- the court in that case, in the many orders that it has issued, has specified that it has concluded this kind of metadata is within the supreme court decision in smith. so that's the judicial determination by the fisk itself. we think that supreme court's decision is therefore depositive of this case and requires reversal of the injunction because this is not a search under the fourth amendment as the supreme court emphasized. there's no reas

>> well, judge sentelle, i think it does in some senses but not in a material way. >> leave it as it is. we'll be the judges in materialality. you tell me what it is. [laughter] >> i think the question becomes, is there any way in which the particular metadata that's been authorized by the foreign intelligence surveillance court is different from the metadata that was at issue in smith? it was required by a pin register. it was the number dialed from the subjects, the defendants. -- defendant's phone. in this case, that information is included as well as the number of the phone that's calling or the -- both calling and receiving numbers are acquired. so in that sense it's like the trap and trace device as well which is the kind of technology that's been around for a long time. it also includes the information about the call. when it was placed, how long it was before it was concluded and the date and time, for example. there are some unique identity fires about telephones that are listed in footnote 2 of the primary orders that are included in the appendix here that include things li