. >> however, they are shia, and with thexception of iraq -- >>hich creates more complication in all of this type of fine, but also, do not forget that i you put in e fact that the united states, because of the support of the shah, whoas regardeds the greatatan and still is to a degree, it is potically palatable to oppose anything the united stas is 4. >> l's get back to the ide of recognition. i word -- we were talking about the recognion factor he said something at was really -- that has rlly stuck with m he was studyingermany after wod war i, anhe said that countries thatre humiliated d are not rognized and have tremendous sense of the culture and nationality tend to make war. he was lookingt that in terms of where theuture wars may be. iran is test case of that has been humiliated. it has a tremendous sense of nationalism and identy, a it is a countryhat is no recogniz -- >> does that mean we should stanby and let it get a nuclear weapon? i want to know howou think it wilnot get a nuclear weapon. >> that is a very good response. >>he answer will be some successful intelligee efft

. >> we were always well aware that the shias did particularly badly in the distribution of whatever finance the regime had. you could always assume that the south would do a lot worse. the levels of poverty and malnutrition and so on in the south were always much higher among some of shia and they were in the center of the country. >> we are coming up to a lunch break fairly soon, but we just need to cover a few more questions before we get there. i would just like to make sure that we are clear about what it was we did anticipate and what we did not anticipate. when did we actually realize that we were going to be in charge in the south in the posed conflict face -- the post- conflict phase, before we even decided we would do the third option? the third option carried with it the recognition that we would be responsible for this out as part of the plan. >> that is autumn of 2003. in terms of the planning process, that was part of the assumption running through deliberations, but the decision, yes, toward the end of october. >> did we realize at that stage that we would be the occup

. >> i don't know if you are my shia reminded me of lurleen ledbetter. >> host: are there other women we should know about that you write about in wheys we didn't necessarily recognize up the time? >> guest: there is a woman who was in washington just typical, so typical of her generation she was a lawyer who broke through but had no expectations the world was going to change. she wanted to work for the tax department and some second and d -- said in a way promoting guys before her. she started working for the women's groups for equal rights for the era and she was the one of all of these people that was the champion letter writer and you forget what the world is like before computers and xerox machines. >> host: facebook. [laughter] >> guest: somebody told me she would have a huge longline of letters and had a sponge and she would let all of the envelopes and she did this for ever. any time something came up in congress should mobilize all of these women and they would send letters and she's standing there on the alert and a woman like this nobody has ever heard of and gave me so muc

speeches and about saddam's brutality to which you were saying just now about aziza wmd on kurds, on the shialy said it a.b. in the chicago speak unturned speech or else well. there were many regimes of actors due to the back of but you can't go through them and remove all the dictatorships. people often say to me about mukai beat in zimbabwe and the burma regime and so on. but you have to have a basis that is about a security threat. so yester absolutely right. my assessment of the security threat was intimately connected with the nature of the regime. when you actually read the destruction descriptions of what happened with chemical weapons in halabja village and by some accounts of many as 5000 people died and there is some people in iraq but that the consequences of that. to me that indicated a mindset that was terrific. it's horrific whether or not he then uses weapons of mass destruction if there's any question question of using it, it's a mindset that indicates this is a profoundly wicked and i would say i'm a psychopathic man. we were obviously worried that after his two sons seem to

. >> the only thing i'd say is i think we were always well aware that the shias did particularly badly in the distribution of whatever finance the regime had. you could always assume that the south would do a lot worse, so the levels of poverty and malnutrition and so on in the south were always much higher amongst the shia than they were in the center of the country. >> [inaudible] >> right. we're going to come up to a lunch break fairly soon, but i think we just need to cover a few more questions before we get there, so i'll turn to sir roderic. >> just like to make sure that we're clear about what it was that we did anticipate and what we didn't anticipate. when did we actually realize that we were going to be in charge in the south in the postconflict phase? >> from when we decided, well, even before we decided that we would do the third option. the third option carried with it the recognition that we would be responsible for the south. that was part of the, that was part of the plan. >> the southern box of four provinces, that was clear? >> yeah. >> so that's autumn of 2003. >> i

joe dimond shia was his hero because his excellence and grace on the ball field and he was a lifelongtistics almost as great as his knowledge of evolutionary biology and you throw it into an essay on biology every now and then. and our other big hero was schnozzola because he main gulf english on the other end of the spectrum. but i was asked. we had a tribute to gould while he was alive and i was asked why michael schirmer of the skeptics to write a song for steve and he wanted it to be a song i had been done yet and he wanted it to summarize all of steve's sa's in one gilbert and solomon song. you may know that i was the editor of his column for some years. and i had been away from him 25 years and when we met again and i said to him i wrote him and i said you have inherited huxley for teaching to a new generation, do you remember me and he wrote back blood may be thicker than water but junior high school friendships are thicker than anything so we met again and now he was a harvard professor with a great darwinian view of life. ♪ >> stevan gould is my name and fossils' and sells or

with iran been of course measured with a sunni shia which is not trivial and which i've very serious political implications. and it's taken a minute to tell you this, maybe longer than i showed, that as those of you who know the area, no it's not some complicated. and i try to do it as quickly as they could. >> jim, you mentioned having worked closely well with the previous administration, the bush administration. that administration got some criticism when it first came into office and later for not engaging with the israeli-palestinian conflict. certainly that is something that the obama administration cannot be accused of, but it has gotten some criticism for having engaged at the get go, but not having been able to develop much traction. what's your own assessment of how the obama administration has handled the situation and its first year? >> i think the initial statements were timely, accurate, and correct. it was to say this is one of the key issues that we need to resolve, that were going to get into it and we need to deal with it and they appointed and not moral person in ge

as you mentioned there was, there was real tension within the shia community. al-sadr making a bid for control and power probably under some iranian influence as well. so there were a range of range of different causes for the problems, and i think, the challenge for us really was how did we, how do we deal with that in security terms. >> one of the reasons why iraq did not split into three smaller countries, was that there is a sense of iraqi nationalist. it has to make them whole. this is a sense on which people are iraqi first and shiite or sunni second. and that focus eventually never typically turns against foreign soldiers. the ultimate solution is to train iraqi security forces. that takes time. >> yes. >> and so in this period when the securities deteriorating, really increasingly, quite rapidly. and we're waiting for an ultimate period when we've got iraqis here to do the job. what did you feel we should be doing about it? >> well, we needed to maintain our ability to deal with the outbreaks of violence, which i think we did very successfully, and to g

i am more pessimistic because i look over iraqi history and a sea so many kurdish and shia rates rebelingagainst the city government and also the history of these types of things and other sectarian problems with violence it seems to come back all the time so i think anytime you trained forces of one side or the other even if nominally iraqi army or whatever you risk that happening after you leave and of course, the u.s. leaves the situation sooner or later unless you talk about three or germany. we have time for one more question. right here. >> an open question may be chock wants to address it why should anybody put any credibility in the pledge of the above the administration to withdraw by mid 2011 given the recent testimony of secretary gates that so withdrawal is not dependent on the military commanders on the ground which is a dodge? >> any time a president says we will withdraw this is true in iraq under the bush a administration it is to both in iraq and afghanistan under obama, it is conditional the president did not say unconditionally we will start withdrawing troops in 18 mon

and as i said, the split within the arab community, the suni-shia split has within it, i think, also seeds of some difficulty. so i hope very much that my successes and all the people that are training at brookings will come up with much better ideas than my generation had and that this thing can be resolved, and that there will be an arab leadership that is far-seeing and that can bring about a greater balance. >> thank you, jim. we have about 10 minutes or so for some questions. if you have a question, there's a gentleman right over there, please identify yourself and wait for the microphone. >> thank you very much for your remarks. my name is michael hager, president of the education for employment foundation. which is active in five of the middle-eastern countries including west bank and gaza. i would like to know, sir, what is the policy of the quartet with respect to gaza? my understanding has been from the beginning that the quartet hoped to show the citizens of gaza that there was a better life in the west bank and that the hamas should be rejected. i remember being in gaza c

. >> host: shia to skip from monticello with her children as they came flying -- this to the calgary can up the road. she had a terrifying experiences. so -- and i think this is where speculation and intuition, in that i think to some extent she blamed it on him. i don't think she screamed like a fish or for something like that but something bewailing inside her during these years. >> host: the whole notion of bringing up children in the 18th-century, childbearing, abigail adams had to bear at least one of her children alone, bourn did and she was home alone. >> guest: i think she had a midwife but he was in philadelphia >> host: martha jefferson's children one after the other were larger and larger, and i think she might have been even a diabetic. >> guest: i discussed this with some doctors and as a family tradition, it isn't anything written down that each child was bigger and bigger. this one doctor who was an expert told me that is a very strong sign of diabetes and of course they didn't even know dalia dee dee six sestak. >> host: there you were your life was just getting marri

i think it got very close to it at the height of the secretary and violence between sunnis and shia, but else hot as the fire was it also burned out fairly quickly. again iraq doesn't have a history of sectarian conflict and iraqi is basically a revolt against the violence in the midst and think it was important for us to understand the history and that there was a fairly good prospect who that a swift and decisive intervention could stabilize the situation and indeed it did. but again the knowledge of these complex situations and their own terms is critical. to take us back a bit to our own history, we of course fought an unbelievable liberals of the war ourselves. and that war didn't fly in fundamental historic differences among americans. it leaves unresolved issues involving the structure of our state and society and in particular the rights of states. this is part of the debate now in iraq so understanding other people's complex histories but perhaps informed by our own and assessing how difficult the challenges are i think is always prudent. >> next phone call fort pierce flori

and as i said, the split within the arab community, the sunni/shia split has within it, i think, alsoseeds of some difficulty. so i hope very much that my successes and all the people that are training at brookings will come up with better ideas than my generation had. and that this thing can be resolved. and that there will be an -- there will be an arab leadership that is far seen and can bring about a greater balance. >> thank you, jim. we have about 10 minutes or so for some questions. if you have a question, there's a gentleman right over there. please identify yourself. and wait for the microphone. good. you got it. >> thank you. thank you very much for your remarks, mr. wolfensohn. my name is michael hager, president of the education for employment foundation, which is active in five of the middle eastern countries including world bank and gaza. i would like to know, sir, what is the policy of the quartet with respect to gaza. my understanding has been from the beginning that the quartet hoped to show the citizens of gaza that there was a better life in the world bank. and that

know, take an important role in trying to stabilize iraq him and trying to work with the sunni and shiarship for the betterment of the entire country. so working out the oil revenue loss for example is something that is very important to all iraqis. and it will benefit all iraqis that they can be finalized. so there will be a message of both reassurance and requests about what we would like to see the kurdish leadership do going forward. >> wonderful. thank you. >> thank you. >> madam secretary, my name is a jean pierre-louis. >> picked that up, sir. >> my name is jean pierre-louis and i am a haitian-american in a foreign service officer. i'd like to thank you and ambassador shah and also president clinton for all the work you've done in haiti since the earthquake. i have lost some family members there. and soon after the earthquake, i went to my boss, ambassador john herbs and asked for permission to go to haiti if i may. he said that i may go ahead. just to be sure i checked with him again. and he said absolutely, go ahead. i volunteered. i remember of the standby member of the civili

. >> the second question, please, regardless politics differences between shia and sunni and the fournni schools, how would you categorize muslims in general? i mean, how many groups of muslims to help people in the u.s. or in the western to understand who are those muslims to not mix between muslims and radicals? and for mr. fishman, you just said that al-qaeda leadership -- they get to their positions according to their skills. they are smart. they work hard -- if you compare it with middle eastern so-called secular regime, they look like they are much better because those secular regimes -- they use nepotism. thank you very much. >> thank you. >> gentlemen? >> okay. so i'm just going to pick and choose a few things. leeann, hi. generational shift, i think totally. i guess i don't have anything brilliant to say about the relationship with other groups. i think brian is probably a lot better at that than i am. as we talked a lot about just his resonance on the forums versus -- i think it's qual-tate actively different than the old guard resonates. so i don't have anything profound to

. >> the second question, regardless of politics and the differences between the shia, sunni or the four sunni schools, how would you categorize muslims in general? i mean, how many groups of muslims in the u.s. or the west to help understand who are the muslims to not mix between muslims and radicals? one and four mr. fishman, you just said in an want that al qaeda leadership to get to their positions according to their skills there are smart, if they're smart and they will work hard and if you compare it with a middle eastern and so called secular regime, they look like they are much better because those secular regimes used nepotism. thank you very much. >> thank you. gentleman. >> i am just going to pick and choose a few things. inwood generational shift i think totally. it i guess i don't have anything to say -- right is better at that and i am but as we have talked a lot about his residence on the forms, versus -- i think qualitatively different than how al zawahiri will or the old garden with resonates so i don't have anything proud to say. i agree it's a very important point i di

. >> but they're fighting shia, they're not fighting al-qaeda yet. >> no, no, all i'm pointing is the saudi willingness to get engaged in yemen is, we saw this in just the recent months. what we haven't seen is what the saudis are willing to do to help fight al-qaeda on the other side of the border. what we do know about is the saudi rehabilitation program, efforts to export that into yemen not so successfully. but we do have a yemen expert here on my right, former ambassador. >> [inaudible] would you like to make a comment? >> i think, well, there's somebody down here with a mic. i'm fine? okay. i think barbara, first of all, thank you for making the point that to the extent the saudis. >> you said there's a mic over there? and, barbara, stand up so we can all see you. >> oh, dear. thank you, barbara, for making the point that the saudi engagement has been against -- there's generally not a problem with the saudis involving themselves in yemen, the question is whether they are a constructive force. and often they are more of a destabilizing force than they are constructive. i don't t

the ministry of the interior was a shia death squad. no matter how bad the afghan situation, it is not embroiled in a civil war, nor is the government a sectarian entity as the government of iraq was at the time. this surge is going into a much better situation that existed in iraq. and addressing the american domestic -- what -- americans do not care. let me refreeze that. americans are much more casualty of verse that most people expect. -- averse than most people expect. what americans do not like is losing. it is almost a non issue that it seems to be stabilizing. if the surge brings more security and american feels like there is more progress being made, the casualties that come with that will be dealt with politically in a way that will be handled. the worst months were six months after the surge in iraq. as the situation stabilized, the american domestic political scene changed. i think you'll see the same thing in afghanistan. >> we are leaving this recorded program to go live to the white house to hear president obama talks abo

in the south the picture was significantly different, not least because of the predominant shia population. >> i think we'll probably come back to that later on. perhaps i can just ask you one or two other questions about the way the decision to actually take the package to the largest of the options, was taken. i mean, that decision which is we've established had been taken in september, but after that in october you recommended to the prime minister that we should go for the option three, the big package. what for you for the critical factors in making that recommendation? >> well, if i could just that back a little. actually, what happened i alluded to it already, was that there was growing concern, i think my boys shared this concern, that given that given the timescale for american action was essentially january of this point, that we really had to make a decision because we would not have had time to prepare that third option. the problem was that the foreign office, downing street, were heavily engaged in negotiating a u.n. security council resolution, and they did not want any over

removed and there was advice and i called for the people papers on this later about what the sunni shia relationship would be and that was obviously an issue we raised within our own deliberations with the americans and elsewhere and so all of these things were factors the we had to take into account. but the primary consideration for me was to send an absolutely powerful, clear anb@ @ @ @ @ @ ú humanitarian intervention that you had first negative set out in a very public way in your chicago speech of april, 1999, and in april of course in 2002 after your meeting with president bush you returned in your speech at the george bush presidential library at college station when he sat talking in general of regime change not specifically in this paragraph about iraq if necessary the action should the military and again if necessary and justified issued involved regime change. i have been involved as british prime minister in three conflicts involving regime change and milosevich, the taliban and sierra leone. had you reached the point where you regarded within this philosophy removing saddam