we also have the example of silicon valley bank and first republic bank, one of the triggering events there. obviously risk management was very poor in that respect, and they got on the wrong side of interest rates. but there were also some failures of issuers who had huge deposits at silicon valley, i believe. and at signature. maybe both of them. the suddenness of their collapse caused a run for the exits. and luckily, with a scramble, we were able to save that situation so it didn't create a greater contagion. but are there steps that we can take that would strengthen our ability to respond to that type of collapse as well? >> yes. in the wake of silicon valley bank, we did work with many medium-sized banks that had any of the characteristics we saw. you mentioned a long position in a long-term securities that was underwater, along with a very unstable deposit base made up of uninsured deposits. in the case of silicon valley bank, it was a lot of similar private equity and venture capital and hedge fund companies where they all pulled the money out. bank runs are very destructive w

the failure of silicon valley bank, the chairman brought this up. i'm just curious, we recognize a lot of banks out there look at this and it cost the other banks a lot of money. nobody has been fired, but you did indicate that it was a failure in the playbook. at the playbook been revised or can we expect that it will be revised? >> in a lot of ways it has been revised, yes. i could go into some detail. one thing that didn't happen was for example, the supervisor didn't follow through aggressively enough on things they'd said. if they had done that, that could well have been enough to stop it. but a lot of it was just not focusing enough directly on what was a very large amount of interest rate risk, a large portfolio of long-term securities matched up with an unstable funding base. and somehow people wrote about that, not the fed but others wrote publicly about this, and somehow we don't expect bank runs throughout set prices in this country and that is what it was. bank runs are incredibly damaging. i think everyone learned a lot from that and is

and 95% of people, how it distinguishes itself is really its brand other companies, silicon valley bankssilicon valley bank they they collapsed two years ago as you might recall. and what's interesting if you are a bank, i mean, your biggest risk are essentially your interest rate risk. and your liquidity risk. that's the biggest risk you have yet. silicon valley bank, they had, i believe it was eight different committees that were dedicated to climate risk in green transit and risk and high risk and you name it risk. so it was too much of a focus, i would think on risk that had always kind of been there. but now the sun there was more performative. you have to tell again, you're blackrock state street's vanguard's, tell all of them about what you were doing specifically all these risk and heightening those relative to anything else in the same way we talk about this, you know, shareholder of or stakeholder piece, you know, you're shareholder always used to be the people that you would hold above else. of course, you have to have employees and them. well, of course you have to have suppl

we also have the example of silicon valley bank and signature bank, first republic bank, one of the triggering events there. obviously the risk management was very poor in that respect, and they got on the wrong side of interest rates, but there were also some failures of issuers who had huge deposits at silicon valley, i believe, a -- or signature, maybe both of them. and the suddenness of their collapsed a run for the exits. and luckily, with the scramble, we were able to sort of save that situation so it didn't, it didn't create a greater contagion. but are there steps that we can take that might strengthen our ability to respond to that type of collapse as well? chair powell: yes. in the wake of silicon valley bank, we did work with many, many medium sized banks that had any of the characteristics that we saw. and you mentioned a long position in long term securities that was underwater along with a very unstable deposit base made up mostly of uninsured deposits and in the case of silicon valley bank, it was a lot of similar private equity and venture capital and hedge fund companies where

the failure of silicon valley bank and the chairman brought this up. st curious, recognizing a lot of banks out there looked at this. it cost the other banks in the system a lot of money to pick up the costs involved in the losses. nobody's been fired. but you did indicate that it was a failure in the playbook. has the playbook been revised, or can we expect that it will be revised? >> in a lot of ways, it's been revised. yes. i can go into some details. i mean, we're one thing that didn't happen was, for example, we didn't the supervisors didn't follow through aggressively enough on things that they'd said. if they'd done that, that that could well have been enough to stop it. but a lot of it was just not focusing enough directly on what was a very large amount of interest rate risk, a large portfolio of long term securities matched up with a an unstable funding base. and somehow people wrote about that and not the fed. but others wrote publicly about this. but somehow we don't expect bank runs outside of a crisis in this country. and that's what that

crypto winter in a whole host of crypto dainl asset companies, and celsius early 2023 saw silicon valley bankso playing a huge role. maria: joining me former chairman silver gait bank, voluntarily like dedicated in 2023 because of regulatory requirements following collapse of ftx we so treasure your time tell us what happened. >> thanks for having me here, pretty simply story, what happened regulators changed policy with regard to crypto killed business modeled, so silver gait you heard somewhat accurate some not accurate what congressman said up there did become entirely focused on crypto over a decade worked closely with regulators to get done in a proud and safe sound way has done run on bank followed, ftcompetent collapse, so, survived, so i should not say easily we survived that poised ready to regrou regulators said that bits model is not acceptable to us any longer had effect of shutting down silvergate bank it led to windown of silver gait, you were first told by regulators, your business was such that you could do crypto and, by the way, because you were in crypto, you became the pois

look at the mess that the fed made of the silicon valley bank. i contend that there is a lack of understanding that is deliberate on the part of the fed with respect to digital asset policy. so, the constitution says congress is your boss. but somehow, your staff have not gotten that message. so, chairman powell, do you commit on behalf of yourself and the federal reserve staff's to comply fully with all document demands issued by this committee in a timely manner? chair powell: sure. sen. loomis: will you instruct your staff to their responses and not to obstruct the oversight functions of this committee? chair powell: we always work with the committee to be responsive to your requests. sometimes they are beyond our capacity to respond. you have to do that, but we always responsive to committee requests. sen. loomis: i will look forward to engaging with you when you feel that our requests are outside the scope of the oversight we have over the fed. do you come -- commit to disciplining and removing staff found to have engaged in the banking acti

i want to go back to march 2023 in response to the fallout of silicon valley bank. the fed is analyzing ways to create a more efficient process for financial institutions to access the discount window. one issue that has come up is that it can take extended periods of time to assess and determine the lendable value of collateral. denying the institution's ability to access liquidity quickly. >> we are looking -- so there are sort of impediments to the efficiency of the discount window and those are things we can work on and we are working hard on. there is also the question of stigma that banks are reluctant to use it because of the so-called stigma of using it and that is a very hard problem to solve and we are also working on that one. >> can you give us an update on what problems the third was able to identify? what solutions are you pursuing an what is the estimated timeline for any action? >> the city is ongoing and the work is ongoing. essentially, you touched on some of this. it is inefficient. it is slow. we need to have collateral processes that are very qu

this is a, the banks on silicon valley. this is a huge mass of power. you cannot, you cannot win with them without a huge counter power. we need a very big coalition, but we need the right kind of coalition. it has to correctly identify what needs to be changed. and my argument is that none of these very urgent but different problems that people are reacting to can be solved unless we disable this dynamic of limitless accumulation of wealth for capital explanation. how optimistic are you that will see a post capitalist society emerge as i go through cycles. i mean, a few years ago i was more optimistic than i am now. i have watched a around 2016. the emergence, well, even with occupied, going back to 2011 and the air of spring. and so i have watched movements that i thought had tremendous emancipatory potential. you know, sort of peter out or, you know, not achieve their, their goals and be hijacked. and so on and even in countries, but like spain and, and greece that tried to turn the, the occupier type movements into political parties like streets and

this is silicon valley software, social media, and wall street banking exported to the rest of the worldse money for his government. from the whole world per year — about $4 trillion — 4,000 billion. it is not far off the total value of national income taxes, about 4.5 trillion. to end up increasing prices on those imports like cars or fuel. especially when major powers, allies even, do start these you. the government to impose harsher sentences on thieves who steal tools. reflect the huge impact on victims, as ben moore reports. tradespeople are losing their livelihood, they're losing theirfamilies. these are livelihoods you are playing with. drill holes and rip doors off? this is our offices. this is where we work for them. boot sales and online. on its victims who rely on those tools to earn a living, in kent, roofer dennis was brought down to earth the latch, opened the door. literally two minutes, every single power tool you can't recover from it. four and a half minutes to empty it, and i had roughly £8,000—e15,000 as well as the financial burden, there is a human cost. the time is

this is silicon valley software, social media, wall street banking, all exported to the rest of the world is to try to persuade the president they will buy about $4 trillion, 4,000 billion. about li.5 trillion. conventional taxes over there. the challenge here is that much of the changes to tariffs are likely to end up increasing prices on those imports, like cars orfuel, it would have to be levied at a very high rate on every other the question is to what end? by the cartels in mexico. western university in canada. thank you . being with us and hm being with us and thank you being with us and i should say thank you . being with us and i should say you _ thank you . being with us and i should say you also _ thank you . being with us and i should say you also had - i should say you also had german— i should say you also had german citizenship- i should say you also had german citizenship so . i should say you also hadl german citizenship so you i should say you also had - german citizenship so you can see every— german citizenship so you can see every- i _ german citizenship so you can see

you know, like a terrible bank, like these silicon valley stories that we heard a couple years ago.ey won't admit it. if, on the other hand, you revalue golded -- gold, their certificates would push them up by $750-800 billion, and they'd be equal. they won't have money but they'd be equal, and maybe someday they could contribute $100 billion to the treasury like they used to. they're not going to bail out the cfp if b, because that thing's gone, it's dead. >> we can only hope. larry: that would a make the fed solvent. or maybe you don't want the fed to be solvent. >> i do. i think that's a better idea. i would rather see the fed in business if we're going to use them as all. it should be a going concern. scott bessent seems to to me to be a guy who can actually run the business. but at a the end of the day, would i buy the bond? maybe i would, yeah. why not? if. larry: gold bond -- question is whether they'd sell is it. but i think everybody would buy the bond. >> yeah. look at tips. larry: yes. >> almost 3- -- $3 trillion in tips out there. larry: okay. i don't want to get too tec

for in washington, and perhaps by those on wall street and silicon valley who don't necessarily want to play by the same rules as main street banks and lenders. we have to make sure there is meaningful oversight, and we know that large tech companies are eager to get into payments and banking. it's one of the reasons why the cfpb has put more focus on how they handle data and payments, to make sure there isn't errors and fraud and surveillance. and, you know, we'll see how this plays out. but at the end of the day, the work of the cfpb has been welcomed by people no matter what their political stripes are. >> you mentioned some active work that's ongoing, which agencies or which parts of the government are likely to pick up if they pick up, where where would that go? you know, agencies like the sec, i mean, there's plenty of existing ones. >> the question good question. the law gives exclusive enforcement authority on so many of these laws to the cfpb. so if there is nobody enforcing at the federal level, it is really unclear how this is going to work. and we lived that before in the in the years leading up to the financial crisi