sistani not so bad. here's where the problem comes in.the iranians want to co-opt images and co-op personalities of shia clerics. they been doing this since the start. they co-opted sistani in one of the foundational argument they made to send fighters area. they said sistani called saying he would pour shia fighters going over to syria. he's quite supportive. there's quite a few images that they would take was out of context and put it in there and say you should call up whatever office and join the fight to defend the faith that. i put this picture of how many which is an interesting one for me since he is very anti-iranian on the speeches. it is technically a satirist organization and uses images to push their moves. another development here within sistani's own view, i think he views this as something that's not really going to go away. the imac, also an element that is now essential again the so-called islamic state. what are you going to do? this doesn't mean he hasn't been using this great press and to push certain pressures on the

there is potential that the shia militias particularly those under the control of ayatollah sistani, and it's important that shi'ite militia are not one group. there are ones that are iraq first and those that are iranian backed that may be part of the problem. the ones pro-iraq might know that what we need are local tribes people and restore security and after that restore autonomy to the locals rather than moving in ourselves. >> how significant is the fall of ramadi itself. it was a couple of days ago that the prime minister said he wouldn't let the city fall. >> yes, i mean significant. firstly because of what the grandmother -- prime minister said. there's a lot of opposition and rivalries from been his own example. maliki saying he's not right for the job. those closer to iran. it will likely play in off to prove it is an effective leader. there was a huge dispute previously. it is something that can be handled. there needs to be better cooperation between the iraqis. there is, perhaps, a glimmer of hope. this may bring them together insofar as you have sunni, shi'as and americ

. >> people pick up the arms based on sistani. that is in the framework of the state. situation followed on a sign that they are working under the government and the direct command and control of the prime minister. >> the people mobilization versus the iraqi militias. why is there a shortage of iraqi government. >> let's correct that. there's entities tribes were working with government with central government with people mobilization forces. there are units that are sunni, i think the fight we all have is now it needs to be clear, this is not a sunni-shia problem. there may be sectarian narratives in the region we are not denying that. the scale of the destruction that i.s.i.s. is causing. it has already caused the sunnis more problems more than 2 million sunni arabs, based on your division you talked about are displaced. they are the first victim of i.s.i.s. >> because the success is mostly in areas populated by sunnis going back to the iraqi forces in general, the reality is there has been troubles integrating the security forces to have sunni, shia and kurds. form

and of course this is the grand view of the grand ayatollah sistani is this iraq is an arab country. it's not a persian country and they do not want to be dominated by persians. however, the most effective shiah militia forces are part of the iranian military defacto. they are run by hadi al-almawri to take hezbollah run by mohandas reports to their commander of the coast force. and we have seen this repeatedly. it's not a shiah problem, there are no longer even proxies. they're extensions of the iranian military forces and throws the lems that are leading the charge into ramadi which is unacceptable. they also help get us off track by launching the attack onity crit -- on tikrit which then failed and we had to bail them out which is an enormous positive turning point because it demonstrated the iranian-controlled militias to take this fight to the enemy. we just not only undone that benefit that we gained from that but moved many steps back. and if in fact, these are successful in taking part of ramadi when the troops that we backed failed it will demonstrate the viability of these

more than 100,000 men joined up after revered cleric ayatollah ali al sistani, issued a fatwa callingose who could to join the fight. nassriya, 200 miles south of baghdad, has a long history of fighting. at 17, ali jabber hussein is the youngest recruit here. his father was wounded fighting against saddam. two of his uncles were killed. >> ( translated ): our father told us to volunteer. he said "why are you sitting here with me? you have to go and defend your country." >> reporter: the south of iraq has particularly close ties with neighboring iran. many fighters fled there in the 1990s after the u.s. urged iraqis to rise up against saddam hussein but then stood by when his regime killed thousands. the chaos of the u.s.-led invasion in 2003 only deepened the conviction among many here that the united states was trying to destroy iraq. like many iraqis, this commander is convinced the u.s. arms the islamic state group. >> ( translated ): the expertise is british, the intelligence is jewish and the weapons are american. the islamic state attacks are part of a british plan. >> reporter:

and of course this is the grand view of the grand ayatollah sistani is this iraq is an arab country. it's not a persian country and they do not want to be dominated by persians. however, the most effective shiah militia forces are part of the iranian military defacto. they are run by hadi al-almawri to take hezbollah run by mohandas reports to their commander of the coast force. and we have seen this repeatedly. it's not a shiah problem, there are no longer even proxies. they're extensions of the iranian military forces and throws the lems that are leading the charge into ramadi which is unacceptable. they also help get us off track by launching the attack onity crit -- on tikrit which then failed and we had to bail them out which is an enormous positive turning point because it demonstrated the iranian-controlled militias to take this fight to the enemy. we just not only undone that benefit that we gained from that but moved many steps back. and if in fact, these are successful in taking part of ramadi when the troops that we backed failed it will demonstrate the viability of these