the state, sorna requires a lot of things. provide your motor vehicle information, provide your dna, provide your photos, do periodic show-ups. there's no dispute, i think, that the state registries at the time sorna was passed were not equipped to do all of that. so congress looking at that said look, we've got hundreds of thousands of people out there. we want to bring into this system. we know they can't all come in on day one. there's going to be some transitional issues that we are going to have to work out. and the person to work those out is the person who, for the last 12 years, has been dealing with exactly that subject and interacting with the states and at the end of the day, that's really much more about implementation than it is about policy judgment. i mean, it really is inside of the fahey because you have an intelligible principle anchored in the text of the statute, not always true in some of those cases like fahey, and you really had what's much closer to a classic executive function because it just specifies

sorna's efficacy, if petitioner prevails, will not just be sharply curtailed. it will arguably be thoroughly gutted as a matter of how this federal law works. and if it is possible, and we think it is not just possible but the most natural interpretation of the attorney general's authority to say this is a narrow authority, to specify the applicability of requirements in an on/off way in order to get people into the system, and that interpretation avoids constitutional problems, right, it's constitutional, if we read it to say do it as to the extent you can, then, as petitioner concedes, i think if that's -- if it's possible to read the statute that way, that's constitutional and that's what we would urge the court to do. if there are no further questions. justice roberts: thank you, mr. wall. ms. baumgartel, you have four minutes remaining. ms. baumgartel: thank you. just to pick up where my friend left off, i want to emphasize that prior to sorna's enactment, every single state had an existing sex offender registry and those will continue to exist and to requ

chief justice, and may it please the court, sorna's delegation provision grants unguided power to the nation's top prosecutor to expand the scope of criminal laws and to impose burdensome, sometimes lifetime registration requirements on hundreds of thousands of individuals. it combines criminal law-making and executive power in precisely the way that the constitution was designed to prohibit. this delegation is unconstitutional. this delegation can be distinguished from every delegation that has previously been upheld by this court due to a combination of its total lack of standard and the nature and power -- nature and significance of the delegated power. unlike other delegations that this court has approved, sorna has no standard to guide the attorney general's exercise of discretion. justice roberts: well, the government says that they do have a standard and it's the -- apply the prohibition or the requirements in the law to the maximum extent feasible. ms. baumgartel: your honor, that language does not appear anywhere in the statutory text, nor can it be derived from the sources t