this period ended with the april 2004 uprising across south-central iraq. uprisings that were in the case of the south-central iraq, was put down by the first armored division, a unit of which i was brigade commander. and we dealt the army a significant blow. in fallujah the marines were on the way in giving a blow to the insurgents when they were told to stop because the press, era press conference from it against what was happening and there was a lot of misinformation about civilian casualties and so forth. and when they were ordered to stop, then the situation in fallujah spiraled downward. certain insurgents ended up seizing the city -- seizing the city and holding it until the second battle of fallujah in november 2004, which killed 2000 surgeons and about half of the city and the process. we didn't take advantage of the opportunities that we had there in the spring 2004. for military successes on the battlefield. instead we withdrew from the city. we withdrew our forces from the basis inside baghdad and other cities and put them on the periphery. i kn

uprisings started and they were in the case of the south central iraq was put down by the first armored decision, the unit i was bir commander of. the arab press was against what was happening and there was a lot of misinformation about civilian deaths and so forth. when they were ordered the stop, the situation in fallujah spiraled until the second battle that killed 2, 000 surgeainsurg burns -- and burned half the city. we withdraw from the cities and withdrow forces from their basis, inside baghdad, and put them other places. we went to four major ford bases. this was a mistake. we were a virus that infected iraq society. we were there longer and the more anti-bodies we would create. the problem is no matter how many mounted patrols we launched, we could not control the neighborhoods from the peripheral and the result is the people with the power who were positioned locally rose up and began to control the urban terrain of iraq and that was the insurgency increasingly and the shiites malitia. different units have different approaches to counter insurgency. i talked about one approach

uprisings started and they were in the case of the south central iraq was put down by the first armored decision, the unit i was bir commander of. the arab press was against what was happening and there was a lot of misinformation about civilian deaths and so forth. when they were ordered the stop, the situation in fallujah spiraled until the second battle that killed 2, 000 surgeainsurg burns -- and burned half the city. we withdraw from the cities and withdrow forces from their basis, inside baghdad, and put them other places. we went to four major ford bases. this was a mistake. we were a virus that infected iraq society. we were there longer and the more anti-bodies we would create. the problem is no matter how many mounted patrols we launched, we could not control the neighborhoods from the peripheral and the result is the people with the power who were positioned locally rose up and began to control the urban terrain of iraq and that was the insurgency increasingly and the shiites malitia. different units have different approaches to counter insurgency. i talked about one approach

south-central barak. uprisings that were this the case of the south central iraq were put down by the first armored division, the unit of which i was brigade commander, and we dealt with the army a fairly significant blow. in fallujah the marines were on the way to dealing a blow to the insurgents when they were told to stop. because the press, especially the arab press, was firmly against what was happening, and there was a lot of misinformation about civilian casualties ask so forth. and so forth. and when they were ordered to stop, then the situation in fallujah spiraled downward. and, in fact, insurgents ended up seizing the city and holding it until the second battle of fallujah in november 2004 which killed 2,000 insurgents and destroyed about a third to a half of the city in the process. we didn't take advantage of the opportunities that we had there in the spring of 2004 for military success on the battlefield. instead, we withdrew from the cities, and we withdrew our forces from their bases inside baghdad and other cities and put them on the periphery. i know in baghdad we went to four major operat

the political dynamics underway in iraq, iran, afghanistan, north korea, venezuela, south sudan, central african republic among others reflect internal tensions, economic stress, sectarian conflicts and global ambitions. russian and chinese strategic pursuits in both their near and far abroad demand the constant attention and vigilance of our national security experts. ukraine provide a real-life example why it is so important to preserve our intelligence capability to stay on top of the world's events in their totality rather than just a few key issues. over the past several months the cia and its intelligence community partners have closely followed events in ukraine, keeping policymakers informed of unfolding developments on the ground. scenarios, for escalating tensions and options available to ukrainian, russian and other world leaders. now i know that many of you would like the cia to predict the future such as will crimea secede and be part of russia and will russian forces move into eastern ukraine? the plain truth with virtually all events around the globe, future events includi

the political dynamics underway in iraq, iran, afghanistan, north korea, venezuela and a south sudan, centralafrican republic reflect internal tensions come economic stress, sectarian conflicts, and global ambitions. strategicd chinese pursuits demand the constant attention and vigilance of our national security experts. ukraine provides a real life example of why it is important to maintain our capabilities say on top of the world in its totality rather than just a few key issues. over the past several months, the the cia and its intelligence hardness have closely followed events in ukraine keeping policymakers informed of unfolding developments on the ground. escalatingor tensions and options available to ukrainian, russian, and other world leaders. i know that many of you would like the cia to predict the future such as will cry me a secede and will russian forces move into eastern ukraine? the plain and simple truth is with virtually all events around the globe, future events including ukraine are shaped by numerous variables and yet to happen developments as well as considerations and de