was happening is that we had reservists carrying out their civilian role civilianbasra and in southern iraq. there was someone from the sea was trying to develop a new currency. there was a teacher who is trying to reorganize the ministry of education in the south. but did get quite frustrated at these people were there for military reasons that had volunteered to serve as reservists for military reasons. they were being asked to carry arab they are essentially civilian role, when in truth a probable quite enjoyed it, but that is not why they were there. i was increasingly frustrated at the failure of the government departments to supply the people who were supposed to come and take over those responsibilities. >> don rumsfeld had the overall responsible for the u.s. operation, and you are expressing frustration. in our system, there was no ministerial cabinet committee before the complex. would that help if it had a cabinet committee that would have looked at both the invasion and the aftermath? >> there was one set up pretty quickly afterward. i know the prime minister was quickly on to t

they required a further legal justification for their presence in southern iraq in order to be able to deploy their people, soldiers and others, to be able to assist assist in the aftermath. i mean, even in february, my letter said we need a u.n. mandate to legitimatize international rule to sort out sanctions. so we were very focused on that. >> so but what were your expectations about the level of likely u.n. involvement in post-conflict? i mean, focusing on the resolutions is one thing. what were your expectation isn't it so >> our expectations were that although there might be an initial disruption caused by the invasion in the sense that the u.n. might then not assist in the delivery of food, that quite quickly we would have expected to get a security council resolution and that would then allow the u.n. in a sense pretty seamlessly to carry on. and, of course, until the attack on the u.n. building, that seemed to be happening. it was the attack on the united nations that stopped all of that. up until then, that seemed to be -- seemed to be a reasonable assumption. >> but our unde

they required a further legal justification for their presence in southern iraq in order to be a will to deploy their people, soldiers and others, to assist in the aftermath. so even in february, we need a u.n. mandate to legitimize international law to sort out sanctions. we were very focused on that. >> but what were your expectations about the level of u.n. involvement in this complex? focusing on the resolutions. >> our expectations were that although there might be an initial this rupture caused by the invasion in a sense that the u.n. might then not assist in the delivery of food, quite quickly we would have expected to get security council resolution. and that would then allow the u.n., in a sense, producing p retty seamlessly to carry on. and of course until the attack on the u.n. building that seemed to be happening. it was the bombing attack on the united nations that stopped all of that. up until then that seemed to be a reasonable assumption. >> but our understanding is the u.s. was not so keen on the u.n. involvement. >> no, that is right. >> were you anticipating any con

include low-level counterinsurgency operations -- >> i want to.out -- point out the great hero of southern iraq when he tried to keep cuba from blowing up. >> there is too much influence on hearts and minds. as i tell people i don't care if you like me because i'm going home to ride my harley-davidson. by mission here is to make you like yourself. we are done. our time is short and it is not our country. the emphasis is not just capacity but confidence on their part. it is too much about hardstand minds. i find your presentation fascinating but also john's book and to talk to john at lyiength. his premise -- please comment on the role of leadership and this idea of learning organizations. >> there are aspects of the learning organization model. one of the points i make is a big mistake to throw counterinsurgency out the window. the marine corps did some instructions. it was always part of the mission. we want that to be an important part. there is a danger. if you focused on being a learning organization you tend to get too drawn into doctrine and rely on the past. certain personalities use the

i assumed before i went to kuwait to talk to the people that flying missions over southern iraq was goodraining, but it was only part of the training, and it meant they could not get back to more encompassing training required, similarly with forces in war fighting -- they had to get back to their normal routine of training and deployment when the time came, so the sooner we got them back from their war- fighting role, the sooner they could resume their normal activities. >> down in the east as we discussed, we found ourselves in charge of four provinces, and we discussed a bit the way in which this was not fully anticipated. had we actually anticipated british forces would be taking bows drawn -- taking basra? >> we anticipated we would be taking responsibility. i certainly expected others would come into this much more quickly than they did, so it was not purely a military response ability. it proved to be longer than i expected. certainly, we were likely to always have been responsible for taking basra, because this central american plan was to move to baghdad and if necessary, to byp

southern england. moore was freed in baghdad this past wednesday. he worked as a computer programmer for a private military company in iraq when he was kidnapped by insurgents more than two and a half years ago. i'm greg. now back to "pirates of the 21st century." for all the latest headlines, log on to foxnews.com. >> welcome back to fox news report "pirates of the 21st century." i'm martha mccallum. as days passed tensions and condition aboard the ce cec future grew dire. we begin with amy kellog and the mysterious ali ali. >> and there he was, standing in a hotel lobby ready to talk about the dirty business of negotiating cash for the lives of hostages held by pirates. >> how did you get involved being a neglectator. >> i got involved in activity with a couple that has been kidnapped in 2008. i was there two months. and those two months i heard a lot about piracy. >> ali claims he spent years living in the united states, including maryland and new york. in manhattan he claimed he once worked as a driver for a legendary bandleader. fox news can't confirm this but we can confirm that in memphis, tennessee he was convicted for assault with a knife in 1995.

i'm also sure that the children in southern israel who we met are still hoping and praying that iraq does not hit their home. they are still running for bomb shelters and they pray in playgrounds. it's still a very awful condition and that we make a few more points as you asked me what's changed. well, since the operation we all remember -- i don't know netanyahu and the coalition that was swept into office post operation, they certainly are there now. it is clear that israel's diplomatic position has slid backwards. they used to have a working relationship with turkey, that has been damaged. morocco, they've had relationships and has been damaged and i think diplomatically since the goldstone report has been released clearly there has been diplomatic demonstrations -- damage to israel. the practice that i think the final analysis has been catastrophic for everybody. and so we passed i think -- the credibility of the united states congress has been harmed since the operation. >> sorry to interrupt -- we will come back. >> you put me on a roll. >> it's hard to stop talking especially