, ., :: , southwark.d 70s he was here. when _ southwark. in the 1960s and 70s he was here. when he _ southwark. in the 1960s and 70s he was here. when he was _ southwark. in the 1960s and 70s he was here. when he was studying . southwark. in the 1960s and 70s he was here. when he was studying hej was here. when he was studying he was here. when he was studying he was attached to a parish in surrey and in the 1970s when he was back with the theological fund based in bromley, the world council of churches, the development fund, he was attached to saint augustine's and people still talk about it with love and affection. when the new rector was put in by me four years ago he wrote the most beautiful letter to her saying how she and he and therefore micro—children had been transformed. and indeed he said he owed to england and king's couege he owed to england and king's college london the ability and the place and the space to discover and find himself how he truly was, setting the foundations for his wonderfu

joining me now here at london's southwark station is lilli matson from tfl.d is tfl about the forecast of more frequent extreme rainfall in a warming world? we're very aware that london's climate is changing. we're seeing warmer weather winters, drier, hottersummers. this all puts a lot of stress on our transport network and it's something we're really planning for now and taking account of so that we're ready as the climate becomes more extreme in future. there was some significant flash flooding in london in the summer. of course we saw those horrific scenes on the metro system in china. how much has this been an alarm call for tfl? we looked with real serious concern at what happened, notjust in china, but also closer to home in countries like germany, where we saw really extreme flooding. and i think that is a real wake—up call. we know that we can have extreme rain of the kind we had in germany here in london now. and we do need to make sure that our assets, our transport system, but all of london's infrastructure, is ready to cope. in terms of infrastru

southwark, south london, 2009.ale. today at the public inquiry, governments going back decades were accused of knowing there were safety concerns but not acting. the result is a prolonged period of concealment by government, which should properly be regarded as one of the major scandals of our time. in 2010, the new coalition government wanted to build more homes, but was accused today of an unbridled passion for cutting red tape to make that happen, and putting lives at risk. former ministers are expected to give evidence here. it is in the interests of the inquiry's work and so in the public interest, that these bodies fully embrace their obligations of candour and openness and face up to the stark realities that they reveal. one question, why did government guidance seemingly allow flammable cladding to be used on tall buildings for decades? it took this for change to happen. the government banned flammable materials on tall buildings after the grenfell tower fire and the loss of 72 lives. another question, a co

and a third in southwark, south london.the outside, lives put at risk, lives lost. but, did the government and other public bodies spot the risk? take action? that, and much more is what the grenfell inquiry will investigate in its finalfive months. this inquiry is not a game of cat and mouse where core participants might hope that their witnesses might smuggle something past counsel the inquiry or that counsel to the inquiry might miss a trick. core participants including the government and other industry bodies. a key question, why a fire classification known as class zero remained in place for decades. cladding panels rated class zero were allowed on tall buildings, but class zero included materials which catch light easily so, after grenfell, all the cladding had to be removed. the grenfell disaster is a predictable yet unintended consequence of the combination of a laudable desire to reduce carbon emissions, coupled with an unbridled passion for deregulation. in particular, a desire to deregulate and boost the housing

southwark, south london, 2009. back decades were accused of knowing there were safety concerns but not acting. the result is a prolonged period of concealment by government, which should properly be regarded as one of the major scandals of our time. in 2010, the new coalition government wanted to build more homes. but it was accused today of an unbridled passion for cutting red tape to make that happen, and putting lives at risk. former ministers are expected to give evidence here. it is in the interests of the enquiry's work and so in the public interest that these bodies fully embrace their obligations of candour and openness and face up to the stark reality is that they reveal. one question, why did government guidance, seemingly allow flammable cladding to be used on tall buildings for decades? it took this for change to happen. the government banned flammable materials on tall buildings after the grenfell tower fire, and the loss of 72 lives. another question, a coroner investigating the fatal lakanal house fi

and a third in southwark, south london.eading up the outside, lives put at risk, lives lost. but, did the government and other public bodies spot the risk? take action? that, and much more is what the grenfell inquiry will investigate in its finalfive months. this inquiry is not a game of cat and mouse where core participants might hope that their witnesses might smuggle something past counsel the inquiry or that counsel to the inquiry might miss a trick. core participants including the government and other industry bodies. a key question, why a fire classification known as class zero remained in place for decades. cladding panels rated class zero were allowed on tall buildings, but class zero included materials which catch light easily so, after grenfell, all the cladding had to be removed. the grenfell disaster is a predictable yet unintended consequence of the combination of a laudable desire to reduce carbon emissions, coupled with an unbridled passion for deregulation. in particular, a desire to deregulate and boost th

southwark, south london, 2009.iry might miss a trick.— might miss a trick. core participants _ might miss a trick. core participants including i might miss a trick. core l participants including the government and other industry bodies. a key question, why a fire classification known as class era remained in place for decades, cladding panels rated class era were allowed on tall buildings but class zero included materials that catch light easily and after rand fell all the cladding had to be removed. the grenfell disaster is predictable but unintended consequence of that combination of the laudable desire to reduce — combination of the laudable desire to reduce carbon emissions, coupled with an _ to reduce carbon emissions, coupled with an unbridled passion for deregulation. in particular, a desire — deregulation. in particular, a desire to _ deregulation. in particular, a desire to deregulate and boost the housing _ desire to deregulate and boost the housing and construction industry. ciadding _ housing and constr