briefings on the soviet union. soviet internal pg. a 15 minute fame from 1985 details detail attention the vast system of indoctrination and which dischurj individualism and encourage kremlin rule. >> the soviet communist party has not face add serious internal threat to its political rule since the 1920s. yet after years of forced san franciscos by the population, shortages of food and clothing persist. housing remains inadequate. intellectual and artistic expression were striefld. and corruption reaches all levels of society. the soviet people respond with public displays of sinnism. but almost never openly challenge the leadership. the soviet regime doesn't hesitate to enforce rule through the violent of suppression of individual liberty. but prefers to use less onnerous methods of control such as propaganda techniques. the use of propaganda from cradle to grave by the kremlin has helped to ensure at least the passive acceptance of rule by the soviet people. the soviet regime disseminates propaganda through a vast network operating

-soviet relations in the 1960s and '70s. i'm not going to chair the panel, but i will turn the duties over to my colleague here at the miller center, professor barbara perry, who is going to anchor the panel. barbara is herself a noted scholar of the '60s and of the kennedy era and the kennedy clan. she is also the director of presidential studies here at the miller center. she is a very seasoned expert oral historian as well as a written historian, and for many years she helped lead the oral history program here at the miller center, which was one of the signature undertakings that we do in interviewing the leading members of presidential administrations from the four years on up until the present. or at least i should say the recent past. we have completed oral histories under her leadership and russel riley's leadership of every administration through the george w. bush administration and we are planning to lay siege to the obama administration and we'll find out what the trump administration -- what their attitude is tow

that's what i think partly drives the story of the soviet union, because the soviet union is not able to adapt. two, critical for the reference for today, the domestic economic revivals were combined with international adaptations in the 1980s. without taking the detail, let me just mention these that took place in trade. they take place in monetary policy and exchange rates, g-7 policy coordination, developing country debt and reforms. and so this economic revival was not based on a narrow economic nationalism, or it also wasn't based on another idea that was current and is faded in history, which is the new international economic order, which was an international economic sort of planning model. the geopolitical analysis who now move into the economic sphere often pay attention to economic strength but what they have a very hard time recognizing is there is a dynamic element to the power. part of it is systemic ability to adapt and to change. third, the ussr could not adapt. it was very dependant on energy resources and prices. that's still true today. i note in the paper, my rough

soviet volumes. to be working on a similar project that puts forward about 90% of the top level conversations and internal memoranda of u.s. policymakers from 1917 to 1991 when it comes to u.s. and russia. here are mypressed own and don't necessarily reflect those of the department, state, or u.s. government. with that, i would pick up on -- heroic factor that led that have been raised, and talked a little bit about what i potential lessons are of ronald reagan and the soviet union when it comes to u.s./russia today and in the future. amply put, don't wait for gorbachev. reagan didn't. there is a common misconception at the time, later, and even today, that reagan came into office focusing entirely on building up u.s. and allied strength. deferred negotiations until a new type of soviet leader emerged. togan attempted early on engage with brezhnev and his successors. at times, giving real emphasis on the role of history in russian foreign policies. the russian role of history and the lives of the rus

-soviet cooperative world order. then you compared it to putin's illusion or delusion of the beginning of putin's first administration. i found that very interesting. first believed that a cooperative world order was possible. can i push you to the moment where that illusion or delusion starts to dissipate and why and try to make the sink comparison between brezhnev and putin? this is not a question about personality. this is a question about their vision of how world order might work, that it would be corporative and why it does not work this way? is there any similarity? we all know this history after 9/11, when putin calls all kinds ofrs things, a strategic partnership of sorts. he definitely ask at the time when there is already -- how strong, i don't know -- but anti-americandy consistence around moscow elites -- anti-american consensus around moscow elites. and putin overrules that. that is the role of the individual. and he overrules it in that yeah, it is heroic. as long as i reach out to the american leader,

and the soviet and thee united states soviet union. as frank mentioned, once the american homeland gets threatened, it raises questions about the extent to which extended deterrence is real. will americans actually put new york at risk for the sake of paris? that happens because of sputnik. you have these two destabilizing events that are happening in the 1950's. it is that world that khrushchev and kennedy are seeking to now, khrushchev's approach that world is not what america ns anticipated. there is so much nuclear danger about that statesmanship involves reducing the threat of nuclear war, that as we see with khrushchev, he is all about disruption. he is a disruptor. he is interested in crisis. and it is why he is interested in crisis that i think is the essence of understanding his behavior, not simply in 1961, but in 1962. talk to you about a summit conference in 1961 that people don't talk about. the one that everyone talks about is vienna. i am working on a book about kennedy. for me, the more interesting the de gnference is a

he said to the soviets let's do this together. soviets weren't interested. then he goes publicly and tells it to the world. before he's actually offering it to the soviets first. so the back channel to me is more reflection of what kennedy is thinking than it says anything about the soviets. khrushchev, yes, does use it to pollute the relationship in the summer of 1962. one of the -- one of kennedy's mistakes was that this back channel was very dangerous in this regard. he didn't share, bobby kennedy rarely wrote up notes about the meetings. there are a few, but mostly he didn't. he just told his brother orally. and his brother didn't share this, not only with dean rusk, that's less important, but with john mccohn, head of the cia. so the cia analysts didn't know anything about what the soviets were saying to the kennedys in the back channel. i assure you, because i have looked at this, which is that if the soviet analysts had heard in august of 1962 that the soviets were asking -- khrushchev was asking the president not to undertake surveillance of their sh

to share that with the soviets. not directly by giving him a corona document, but by having a public statement, by killpatrick, the under-secretary of defense. the u.s. government does that thinking that if the soviets know that they're behind, they will stop this risk-taking. they will just realize they shouldn't be doing this. it has the opposite effect. because this takes from khrushchev his basic strategic approach to the international system. he can't be a puffer fish anymore. everybody knows he's small. and that leads, i believe, to the cuban missile crisis. the more research i do on the cuban missile crisis, the less important i think cuba is. that's just the way -- and in 1962, khrushchev attempts two different strategies for dealing with american power. the first is the meniscus strategy where he decides to increase at mount of -- he says the international system is a -- it's a -- it's a goblet, and what you do is you fill water right to the brim. you don't -- and you bring it to the point where you have a

it was the whole region through the soviet union. phil and i keep emphasizing, you know, in some ways because germany worked out okay, we don't see that as a big problem, if we realize in history there's a german question as much as a russian question. that was part tof the issue. with eastern europe, that is related to germany. they're as anxious about germany as they are about russia and the soviet union, and so i don't recall the particular facts that we had about supporting eastern europe as the soviet union, and the reality of the united states is whether you think that it is too narrow of a vision. and remember, that bush did a budget deal with what that time we thought that it was a big deficit and ended up costing him the re-election, and the idea that i remember thinking that in the case of german unification, that we are willing to help do all of the things we didn't feel that we should pay for it. now we were very sup pportive o the germans paying for it. in the gulf war baker gets the saudis to give additional contributio

soviet relationship. but it opens up the possibility for the soviets and khrushchev to -- khrushchev sees it as a source of opportunity. the other is a soviet achievement and that is -- and that changes the relationship. as frank mentioned, once the american homeland gets threatened. that raises questions about the extent to which the extended deterrence is real. real americans actually put new york at risk for the sake of paris. and that happens because of sputnik. so you have these two destabilizing events that -- that are happening in the '50s and it's that world that khrushchev and kennedy are seeking to manage. now, khrushchev's approach to that world is not what americans anticipated. the sense that kennedy has coming into office is that there's so much nuclear danger about that wise statesman ship involves reducing the state of nuclear war. as we see with khrushchev, khrushchev is all about disruption. he is a disrup tor and interested in crisis. and it's why he is interested in crisis that i think

it was the whole region through the soviet union. phil and i keep emphasizing, you know, in some ways because germany worked out okay, we don't see that as a big problem, if we realize in history there's a german question as much as a russian question. with eastern europe, that is related to germany. they're as anxious about germany as in the soviet union. i don't recall the particular facts you mentioned with supporting eastern europe with the soviet union. the reality with the united states is, whether you think this is too narrow of a vision, remember, bush did a budget deal with that time we thought was a big deficit and ended up costing him re-election. the idea that, i remember thinking in the case of german unification, we're helping to do all the things but we didn't think we should be paying for it, okay? now, we were very supportive of the germans calling for it. in the gulf war baker getsed saudis to give additional contribution of funds. and for a minute, he needed to be a better person for the transition on this. you kno

-soviet relations. this actually goes back to what is the history of the cold war, which is the soviet army occupying west -- eastern europe. if you could start to get the forces start to leave eastern europe, that might also affect politics. it also aligns the united states close it with germany, but it had the benefit of being a real cost reduction for the soviet union as well. the other little benefit of this that takes place is it clearly establishes bush as the advance leader. thatcher did not like this proposal. bush had to make a decision over thatcher's preference. you can compare administrations cover -- administration's, but you have a change of the focus on the lines. i was involved in the central american negotiations, which baker starts in february. so it's the first month you this was -- month. this was a way of testing soviet seriousness, whether it would be inconceivable that you can help gorbachev in any financial way if the soviets were seen as continuing to put money into cuba or nick

and soviet union second? and for -- do you think gorbachev understood in 1991 that he would never get massive western aid, and if he did, why did he continue to behave as if he would? >> i didn't hear that. what did he say? >> did he understand in 1991, did gorbachev understand in '91 that he was not going to get western aid. >> if he didn't, why did he keep acting as if he did? >> well, i guess he understood after a while he wasn't going to get it. i mean, it took a great deal, i think, of determination and courage to ask for it in the first place. you know, initially, i think it was other people around him who named numbers. and gorbachev always put it more generally, like if you spent x-billion dollars in the gulf war, can't you spare anything to change, you know, the soviet union in this crucial way? that was highway of asking for it. but i think he understood, and he didn't always behave in a way as to make it more likely. his response to the gambit was to send primakof to washington, rather than another

he doesn't go quite to that extent with the soviets. but there is a similar desire in what he thinks of rooseveltian terms to meet with the other side, to sit down, as he said, and talk things through man to man and that phrase turns up time and again, the perception that the elites are the effete, femme recognized individuals and these are the -- nixon meets with the soviet counterpart more times in his relatively short presidency than throughout the interdecade before. kennedy and johnson, each have one meeting with the soviet counterpart. nixon has three. his meetings are more extensive, much more focused upon personal interrelations, much more secretive also, emphasis on making these relationships nimble, and an emphasis, and this is very important, upon negotiation. and, again, in what nixon sees as rooseveltian terms, that everything is negotiable. and that you can make tradeoffs, kissinger gives this the fancy terminology linkage. everybody studying negotiating recognizes this is the horse trading that goes on in any serious nego

not the soviet union. and they offered the alliance to china because it expoli explici directed to the soviet union. now moving to putin. putin is a very different person than khrushchev but it's also very different person in comparison to brezhnev. there's some similarities. there's not differences. let's go through them. for those that didn't have a chance to read the paper. putin like brezhnev is deeply e-liberal. he respects force, supporting military, venerates fatherland war like bresch nevada and promotes state. to reduce him to a kgb man is a height of -- it's deeply wrong. he had a deep learning curve. he learned a lot, what does it mean when the is state is destroyed? and russia was flooded by highly unpleasant realities. so he accepted fundamental failure of communist as economic dock dri doctrine. he does not want to rebuild a soviet empire. his project is to improve russia's place in the existing world order, not to create a new one and here comes the rub. if you think about it, if you talk to

-soviet relations and this goes back to what is the history of the cold war which is the soviet army occupying eastern europe and there was a political implication to all of this, if you can start to leave eastern europe that might also affect the politics. it also aligned the united states closely with germany, but it did have the benefit of being a real cost reduction for the soviet union, as well, and the other little benefit of this that takes place is it clearly establishes bush as the alliance leader and margaret thatcher didn't like the proposal and there was a conflict that bush had to make the decision over thatcher's presence. so again, you can compare with administrations within the first four or five months wea've had conventional forces that changes the focus of the alliance. in addition, i was very much involved with the central american negotiations which baker starts about sort of in february and it's the first month and this was a way of also testing serious soviet seriousness about whether -- and frankly from a political point of view, it would be inconceivable that

briefings on the soviet union. soviet internal pg. a 15 minute fame from 1985 details detail attention the vast system of indoctrination and which dischurj individualism and encourage kremlin rule. >> the soviet communist party has not face add serious internal threat to its political rule since the 1920s. yet after years of forced san franciscos by the population,

that is what i think partly drives the story of the soviet union because the soviet union is not able to do that. two, critical in reference to today, the domestic economic revivals were combined with international adaptations in the 1980's. without taking to detail, let me mention this took place in trade, monetary and exchange rates, policy coordination, developing country debt and reforms, and so this economic revival was not based on a narrow economic nationalism. it also wasn't based on another idea that was current and has faded in history the , international set of economic planning model. the geopolitical analysis that move into the economic sphere often they attention to economic strength. what they have a hard time recognizing is that there is a dynamic elements to the power. part of it is a systemic ability to adapt and to change. third, the ussr could not adapt. it was very dependent on energy resources and prices. that is still true today. i note it in the paper. by rough recollection, it is their20% of gdp, 50% of urgent and 80% of their act words, a huge dominance in th

so he's a more normal soviet man to me. they are many more in the soviet establishment. it is pretty unique if you think about it. however, you begin to realize it hit it's limitations, in a few years. it's definitely by 1975, everyone understands something went wrong. this is not only that, this is many other things piling up. my argument is very, very simple. the idea of huge number of soviet communist official that there could be some inevitable conceptual frame work where the two powers would form a stable world order and was based on fundamental misperception of what america is about and how america wanted to build the world with u.s. leadership and only u.s. leadership. so when russia meets, already half drunk in the watergate stage, that's in crimea and at the last meeting he raises a toast to the doctrine of lasting and universal peace. that's a joke. but there's something deeper behind this joke. so i would argue that he could never fully realize that a u.s. soviet world order is one. they never wanted to create such a world order. they wanted to prevail in the

. >>> the soviets shootdown american spy planes during the cold war.ncis gary powerer's son speaks how it jackie: as an 18 year old, i let my mistakes kind of take over my life. i was point-five credits away from completing high school and i didn't do it. angela: i got pregnant and i was the main one working so, i did what i had to do to survive. jocelyn: sentía que la escuela no era para mí. karim: most of my family they never graduated high school or even let alone go to college so i'm trying to break that barrier. jackie: my family never stopped pushing for me to be better because they knew what i could become and who i could become as a person. karim: everyday after work i went straight to school, studied hard, and it paid off. jocelyn: sentía como que si quiero cambiar el mundo tengo que cambiara mi primero. group: surprise! surprise! surprise! angela: i could not have gotten my diploma without my family. jocelyn: mi consejera, ella fue lo máximo para mí porque me ayudó mucho con todo. jackie: i've been given an opportunity and i'm just thankful f

i think it was same in soviet union. despite stalin was supposed to be single dictator which he was on one hand. on the other hand, he created or was promoted by new class which was actually the way of old bureaucracy, but at least peasants come to st. petersburg and moscow. a lot of their habits and ways effected the course of the soviet union. my impression is that this kind of structure is coming in vicious circles. why is it coming repetitiously, even after major upheaval of major revolutionary events which look on the surface as a major revolutionary event like in 1970 or 1980, and in all times that's for my mind a little different mystery of history. it's not political, just what happened. history, history. that's what i can offer as degree of soviet and failed democratic regime in russia. thank you. >> wla do you think of corporate pieces in the paper. what is the meaning for development going forward, your take please. >> thank you. first of all, delighted to be here. thank you for the lead. i think corporate ass

cases.r four it's nowadays a substitution for anti-soviet propaganda cases that existed back in soviet times. the paper, the brilliant paper, that was -- done by a well-known columnist and writer in russia, this paper for the university of the school of conomics and it was never published. they were unable to publish it. it weren't able to publish a magazine. vividly, the rise of the fsb activities, as a vehicle of iolence, is seen in all these new cases.he governors, 10 overall, the number now, the -- governments under criminal four igations, and jail ments are sitting in awaiting trials. they are under the investigation. inside the department of internal security, this has been call -- what was in the russian -- he's head of the russian biggest oil company. he has been --e, when he was the vice prime inister here, he helped to finance and to create this very inside a veryment special department who has utted investigations against nomenclature. immense corruption in russian federation and many of those under investigation had been involved in all kind of illegal activities. the quest

the soviet union was about to be dismantled. - [polyakova] people including myself who lived in the soviet union at the time didn't see it coming. people were ready for a change. they wanted western values. they wanted democracy. (epic russian music) - [yelchenko] there was a lot of hope that the new russia which also became an independent state, like every other former republic, would change. that they would become a country with normalcy, with the human rights and democracy. - [kara-murza] a new era began. an era when we had genuine freedom of the media in russia. when elections actually mattered and when the outcome of the elections was determined by how people voted. (epic russian music) - [narrator] russian president boris yeltsin faced the task of implementing an array of political and economic reforms. the seeds of which had been planted by the soviet union's last premier, mikhail gorbachev. - [sachs] almost everybody was facing extreme uncertainty and alarm at a collapsed economy, empty shelves, high inflation and tremendous political turmoil. - then under the advice and guidance o

the soviets ran these kind of operations. soviet ships would spy, and they were never captured. the bottom line for american treatmakers was to just this as part of part of this massive communist bloc. he soviets and chinese were like the puppet master pulling strings. north korea had never been like that. north korea has always been a difficult element in the communist bloc. we know now, thanks to access to the soviet bloc archives, we see now, we recognize the extent to which korea was a problem in side the communist bloc as well. policy makers today like to dismiss north korea as a pawn of china or a lunatic place. the reality is north korea has its own history, values, its own ideological precepts. what you can take from the pueblo is that a country's -- they have to be taken seriously on their own merits. until policymakers start to do that we are likely to have the same kind of unsuccessful efforts we had with the play below -- peublo. susan: going back to the story of the capture, you said there were airplanes involved. were they flown by russian pilots? mitchell: we have

mitchell: we have gotten access to the soviet bloc security. north koreans did not talk to anyone about this. none of their allies knew about it or were consulted about it in advance. we have records of the soviets and east germans farriers -- furious, publicly attacking north koreans for this. risked giving the united states american involvement in south korea. soviets are trying to get information about what is happening inside north korea in the 1960's. they can't get information because the north korean officials won't talk to them. we think of north korea as a black hole for information for the united states, and it is a black hole of information for their allies as well. mitchell: 83 crewmen were on board? susan: one of them tragically killed. what was life -- susan: what was life like for them? mitchell: horrible. for the first couple of weeks, they were beaten and tortured mercilessly. beaten with clubs, forced to sit on radiators, terrible things in order to get confessions out of them. they wanted to humiliate the united states. famil

figure out the russian foreign policy out of what existed under soviets. for instance, my understanding -- i don't want -- my understanding of this whole of desperation that putin admitted. he saw the success. of the crimea annexation in russia. he was looking for something that would prolong this effect. apparently russians give lip service to what's happening in syria. so it didn't work. i think that will be another kind of thing that we should expect. thank you so much. ambassador herbst: thank you. all our panelists thank you. thank all the audience. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2018] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> you can see this discussion any time online at c-span.org. just search atlantic council in our video library. our coverage from the republican retreat in greenbrier, west virginia continues. the president will be speaking to the group this afternoon at 12:30 eastern. we'll have that live a bit later on

>> i think global warming actually was not soviet inspired. it clearly came from sweden. cooked up by sweden, as i say, because they had a huge nuclear power program. what is the case is during in the 1970s the soviet union, the kremlin, exploited environmentalism. after the helsinki accords which for the west was about human rights. there was language in there about the environment. so the soviets tried to shift the argument about -- about a common home that brezhnev made a speech on the environment and signed up to a u.n. pact on acid rain. they didn't mean they that to do anything but all about demonstrating to greens in the west that soviets were on the right side of the environment. on the nuclear winter, the evidence is very clear, defector said this was -- the kgb's proudest achievement, the nuclear winter scare which was taken up by american signties, conference in washington to play up the threat and basically put -- it was really to undermine the reagan administration and the nuclear arms build up, and if they got their way, if the scientists got their way the o

-soviet relations. i think a very important priority was to make sure that the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons were safe and secure and there was a very important case of u.s.-russian cooperations, the non-lugar program where nuclear weapons were withdrawn from ukraine, belarus. the united states really came through in securing nuclear, chemical weapons, not biological. that program created real cooperation. military-to-military, politician-to-politician. it produced success, friendships and the ability of these people to connect with each other, trust each other and work together in the future. there were other priorities. certainly expanding nato was a big priority for the united states. a lot of times i think in the u.s. public statements but also internally, they treated yeltsin's resistance to the idea of the expansion as just his pr. he needs this for his pr. but if you look domestically, if you look at yeltsin himself, he basically said in 1995, in may in that summit, he told clinton for

don't try to figure out the russian foreign policy out of what existed under soviets.or instance, my understanding -- i don't want -- my understanding of this whole syria, an act of desperation that putin admitted. he saw the success of the crimea annexation in russia. he was looking for something that would prolong this effect. apparently russians give lip service to what's happening in syria. so it didn't work. i think that will be another kind of thing that we should expect. thank you so much. ambassador herbst: thank you. all our panelists, thank you. thank you to the foundation. thank you, all the audience. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2018] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> c-span's washington journal, live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up friday morning, max talks about the federal workforce under the trump administration. also, alex explains immigration reform and so cold chain migration and t

assurances that it won't invade cuba the soviets removed the missiles. cochair some men don't want their looking young if you are up at three seventy seen. effie they are made from the hash oil to our guest will give a high really you know. three mile is not. only of the us that there are men now clearly phoneme is who we are financially down the player as the new version of. the missile crisis really reveals a lot about their relationship. ever the pragmatist came around to recognizing that there was no fight to be won with the soviet union. che guevara. never really swallowed the impact of that event and this is what begins to drive something of a wedge between them politically. while chain distances himself from the soviets castro travels to the u.s.s.r. for the first time in the spring of maine nine hundred sixty three fidel is awarded the title of hero of the soviet union his visit will last forty days military and economic bonds between the two countries are strong from. dallas to give odds as young woman do any better there's a. deal she didn't ge

you can see the soviet flag, the u.s. flag and -- what was once a weapon is now a beautiful piece of art. this is all happening between the u.s. and russia as far as arm control systems, but berlin, germany is still a divided city. people are angry about that. show less text 00:09:57 unidentified speaker in 1961, almost overnight, a physical wall divided berlin. they had a minister there. with can only have one ambassador in a country so we had the u.s. minister sent specifically to west berlin to cover the national interest and protect american citizens over there. much to everyone's apprise, that wall started to come down. katie, do you went to speak more about that particular minister? the night of november 9, 1989, the u.s. minister to berlin, harry gilmore, is what was called the allied chairman and the chairmanship rotated monthly between the british, the french and the u.s. the month of november was the u.s.'s turn. people started gathering at these checkpoints. word had gotten out that supposedly the checkpoints w

the soviet union. the russian people and the citizens of the other countries had to live in the rubble. yeltsin and everybody else who were well-intentioned had to work with the rubble. there was no rule of law to speak of. we didn't have intra-russian mechanisms to have a totally clean democratic process. svetlana: i absolutely agree. i know you understood it at that time. you also understood how bought that election was by the oligarchs and the oligarchs control media. so, rather than -- i don't want to turn it into clinton was to blame for yeltsin being elected. yeltsin was running a dirty campaign supported by the oligarchs money. not just because of that. the oligarchs knew it, when the bank was nationalized. [laughter] strobe: the number three candidate famously said, don't worry this will be the last election you will ever have to vote in. [laughter] svetlana: he said many things. he also said he would take alaska back. can i respond to jeremy's question? privatization. >> very quickly. svetlana

these nuclear bombs were experiments by the soviet union. to the kazakh people who lived in the vicinity the motives might be little difference rewind silent phone news at this time a mountain scenery. was always telling you how famous he was going to make it that's how he presented hello my name and body without consciousness it is northwest representatives kind of. teacher put it. aside jordan member that we had the special meeting about five a little and he said no. that's not the topic and your major this is a cover up in a piece on the mail man city yet al-jazeera investigation footholds wall of silence this time more than a century ago britain and france made a secret deal to divide the middle east between them now we can draw him. but what were the last thing effects of this agreement there's a regional set to sikes because it's at those borders were drawn without consulting the people who have to live with the. psych speak of lines in the sand at this time on al-jazeera. a lot has a hard the top stories on al-jazeera the f.b.i. has i

followed tooon be soviet of planes. after three circles around the pueblo, a raised the signal flag ordering the americans to eat two or i would open fire. he said i am in international waters and will remain in the area until tomorrow. came uphe torpedo boats to them waiting to pounce. the ship headed toward open sea. provedape attempt was futile. they could go at top speed 13 knots. that is when it could go forward. the subjacent could reach 40 and the torpedo boats in excess of 50. quickly the ships were blocked and the pueblo was surrounded. the pueblo is quickly shredded. exploding glass and shrapnel swarmed over the ship leaving many injured, the antenna for high, was also destroyed. rubbledge was reduced to and cannon shells traded the hall. he ordered his men to stay below, recognizing his or was so badly outgunned that sending anyone topside to try to men the unprotected gun -- mandy unprotected gun would be suicide. he made a decision, the pueblo stopped, ready to surrender. the sub chaser rent of a flag. foll

i think it was also the same in the soviet union. stalin was supposed to be a single dictator, which he was, on one hand. but on the other hand, he created -- he was promoted by actuallyss, which was heir to the old ways and old bureaucracies, not necessarily the top level of the bureaucracy, but at least peasants brought to capitals, st. petersburg and moscow, to work. in moscow, a lot of their ways and habits affected the soviet union. my impression is that this kind of structure, is coming in a vicious circle. why is it so repetitious, even after major upheavals and revolutionary events, which look on the surface at least, as a major revolutionary event, such as in 1917, or 1918 -- that is a little bit of mystery of history. it is not political, it just so happens that history -- anyway, that is what i can offer as the debris of both debris of both soviet and he failed democratic regime in russia. thank you. host: let me ask a specific question, perhaps i should have foreshadowed this before, what do you think of the corporatist t

the soviet government poorly enormous resources into the development of nuclear weapons. an entirely new town with a population devoted to nuclear research was built on the edge of the public. that it wouldn't work with any of. you well as it would seem you. never. give up the look. for your body but you're. not really when you provide. the fifth each. syllable it cannot stop immediately the mustang is. the natural and we must marry and be the superman is complete woman can use the evil nestle knew each of us he simply got over us by going to snoop tolka which naturally them are certain interest to couper more lumber not to be hellishly police will simply throw total solutions than any other know how can we. on august twenty ninth one thousand nine hundred forty nine the soviet union exploded its first nuclear bomb. the polygon proved to be the perfect test site. going to bust them when they promised p.p.s. here. something new to look at there's a walkman at the ear off to get the seeing you chris at the top of the economy the one we just don't know when he can make up a.

you can see the soviet flag, the u.s.lag, and this very interesting, and quite beautiful, i think. it is evocative of turning your swords -- what was once a weapon is now a beautiful piece of art. >> and a reminder. >> exactly. this is all happening between the u.s. and russia as far as arms control systems, but berlin, germany is still a divided city. >> very much so. >> and people are quite angry about that. >> indeed they were. in 1961, almost overnight, a physical wall divided berlin. i'm so this presented a challenge for the united states. they had an embassy in journal -- germany, but they maintained the diplomatic presence with west germany. so they had a minister over there. we can only have one ambassador in a country, so we had the u.s. minister sent specifically to west berlin to cover the national interest and protect american citizens over there. very quickly, much to everyone's surprise in 1989, that walt literally started to come down. -- wall literally started to come down. katie, do you went to speak more

to cut it off from the soviet union would strike a big blow indeed. for most of the soviet union the second world war was about fighting the invaders of their land. but it wasn't quite so simple for ukraine the truth is ukraine has never been a united country. when world war two broke out a large part of western ukraine's population welcomed the german soldiers as liberators from the. certainly forced upon them soviet rule and openly collaborated with the germans. the real scale of collaboration was not announced for many years after the war but we now know that whole divisions and battalions were formed by ukrainian collaborators such as s.s. galaxy and not to go and roll into battalions. just in the beginning of the war more than eighty thousand people from college cina region voluntarily enrolled into division s.s. galut seen in a month and a half notorious for their extreme cruelty towards the polish jewish and russian people on the territory of ukraine. members of these military groups came mostly from the organization of ukrainian nationalists t

to cut it off from the soviet union would strike a big blow indeed. for most of the soviet union the second world war was about fighting the invaders of the land. but it wasn't quite so simple for ukraine the truth is ukraine has never been a united country. when world war two broke out a large part of western ukraine's population welcomed the german soldiers as liberators from the recently forced upon them soviet rule and openly collaborated with the germans. the real scale of collaboration was not announced for many years after the war but we now know that whole divisions and battalions were formed by ukrainian collaborators such as s.s. galaxy and not to golf and roll into battalions. just in the beginning of the war more than eighty thousand people from college cina region voluntarily enrolled into division s.s. galut seen in a month and a half notorious for their extreme cruelty towards the polish jewish and russian people on the territory of ukraine. members of these military groups came mostly from the organization of ukrainian nationalists b.-

it was certainly there on the soviet side. it is already the moment when the russian liberals begin to think, those people who don't see data less threatening, they began to publish articles on international affairs, saying nato -- the strengthening of nato is supplanting, it is taking away the energy from what building newas european structures, expanding the european integration, and nato is taking away or supplanting this. bigould talk about imaginary thinking, really the common european hope was to completely integrate the soviet union and russia in the family of nations. there were other possibilities rather than strengthening nato at the time. as many people pointed out, even in negotiations with gorbachev in 1990 over the german reunification. a lot of attention was given to -- what was compared to the common european. new european structure, changing the nato character to be a more political structure, the nine tonts, all of that seems quietly disappear from the attention of the u.s. policymakers in 1991 and 1992. this

and we held that line until the collapse of the soviet union. and then we expanded the western alliance, nato, the european union, all these institutions, we expanded them eastward into the former communist countries. - [narrator] washington is the largest shareholder in the international monetary fund and the world bank, giving it massive sway over the global economy. - these particular monetary institutions were enshrined after the second world war, and they are very much tied up in this notion that with better commercial ties, also comes more peace. - we were able to create a single international political and economic space in which economic and social, any one development could proceed much more rapidly and far further than ever was the case before in history. (dramatic music) - the second half of the 20th century was the most glorious period in human history ever. three billion people lifted out of abject poverty. - [narrator] to some, the collapse of the soviet union in 1991 represented the end of history, the moment when the american dem