the soviet occupation.iet occupation was not just jdr, but also all this part. so the soviets got good part of germany, and what was decided -- there was demarcation lines, that's to the question about the general and prague and so on and so forth. already demarcation lines from 1944, and the expectation was that if the soviet troops or the american or the british troops would cross that line, they would withdraw. that's what actually was happening. now the question on the reparations. asking for 20 billion, got permission to take 10 billion. they couldn't take all of that because with the start of the cold war. and the factor -- the creation of western germany, western sphere of occupation and eastern germany here, the soviets lost access through the equipment and other things that were in rural and in other areas, which were in western part of germany. they ended up occupying mostly agricultural areas. and when the marshall plan kicked in, molotov said, okay, we can't -- we can't keep taking more and more

so the soviet sphere of gd, but also this park. the soviets gotçzoá1lç a good pf germany.n, what was decided, there was a kind of demarcation line. that's to the question of prague and so on and so forth. there were already demarcation lines starting in 1944. the expectation was that if the soviet troops, or the american and the british troops, would cross that line, then they would withdraw. that's actually what was happening. there were withdrawals. now the question on the reparations. they were asking for 20 billion, they got permission to take ten billion. they could not take all of that because the start of the cold war. also, the creation of western germany in the western sphere of occupation and eastern germany here, the soviets lost access to the equipment and other things that were in the western part of germany. they ended up occupying mostly agricultural areas. when the marshall plan kicked in, molotov said we cannot keep taking more and more from our sphere of occupation because we have to keep them to -- competitive to a degree. the u.s. was pouring money in.

-soviet question. part of the reason i feel i can get away with this focus is that it mirrors the present and this is the policy issue, the foreign policy issue in particular, which has his fingerprints the most on. is beyond a tragic and itf american policy was allowed to become that by the vicious cycle of a degree of indifference on the part of reagan, but an overall ideological tenor which he sets which says that fighting communism is a good thing. aides in regional or functional roles say, i want to fight communism and i'm going to do that in latin america because that is my purview. then there is the element of the thinking in athe lot of american government circles at the time, and this is not unique to the reagan administration, that there is more room for maneuver because latin america, the united states ' backyard, the feeling that what is acceptable there -- things are acceptable they are which might not be acceptable elsewhere. in a bigger book, this might feel like a less positive book abo

because they felt they needed to deal with the russians and the soviets directly since the soviet his in munich so they couldn't blame the soviets and i think that explains to a good part their election results in 1946, but you were right, and to you a third army was already some american soldiers and i knew one of them had been over across the border in czech towns, but they would stop to go on to prague even though they could have liberated prague, but it was the same decision and a river in germany had to do with the fact that there was wartime agreements that the military leadership, eisenhower, marshall didn't want to break with the soviets. so since the soviets had already liberated slovakia by beginning of may 1945, it was not far for them to get to prague. prague is an interesting city in the sense that it has suffered very little destruction during world war ii, and it was destroyed very heavily and churchill early on had wanted to liberate those cities and remember, he had a so-called strategy and the gap -- if i can get a sort of down here, and the capital of slovenia. you

the soviet documents looked like a black box because there is no access to the soviet archives. so she was actually trying to create stalin at yalta not only as good or as bad as western politicians, but also to a degree the argument is there that stalin was really robbed of his victory by the western maneuvering. then the cold war brought access to the soviet archives. that allowed us to look at the yalta conference not just from the perspective of the sources that we have from the western side, but also from the soviet side. and not to surprise many to find out that stolen was actually quite dishonest in the positions he was taking and the way he was playing the game, the fact that the premise sees were bogged, that all this information was reported to him and so on and so forth. that was in many ways another major correction to our understanding of how the game of diplomacy was played at yalta. i will skip that. let's now go through a number, i cannot cover everything that was discussed at yalta. after all, it took eight days. i got roughly 40 minutes. i will try to do my bes

on the nature of the soviet he is doing what matlock called soviet union 101. he is doing lengthy seminars with discussion papers talking about not just the nature of the new leader but the nature of the soviet union. on the nature of the new leader, reagan writes a memo with his own thoughts on this in october of 1985, he dictates a memo with his thoughts on the matter, in which, again, we see the evolution from 1985 to 1989. reagan is saying, the soviets would not have let this guy be in charge if they thought he was going to give away the farm, so obviously, he is a skilled political operator within the soviet context and he is committed to the soviet cause, perhaps reagan says the communist cause. so reagan is on the record on this debate and at this point, he is saying, gorbachev, there are some things that make him look more appealing, also things that make them more dangerous. this is a guy who can do pr, this is a guy who is sort of glamorous but also engaging and personable, which you cannot necessarily say -- so this is dangerous. what makes him new m

the soviets hadn't been -- they couldn't blame the soviets, i think that explains to a good part thereion result in 1946, but you are right, patent and the u.s. army, where one of the u.s. soldiers had already been across the border, they were stopped to go to, prague even though they could've liberated prague. but that is the same kind of decision. remember the river in germany had to do with the fact that there were wartime agreements that the military leadership, eisenhower, marshall didn't want to break with the soviets. the soviets had already liberated slovakia by the beginning of may, 1940, five it wasn't far for them to get prague. prague is interesting city in the sense that it had suffered very little destruction during world war ii. fiona and bit of past were destroyed very heavily and of course churchill early on had wanted to liberate those cities himself, by the west. remember he had as so called strategy. the gap is down here. it's the capital of slovenia. slovenia is well known in the united states and now, it's the home country of the first lady. so the strategy is a s

the soviet union had sort of rode the oil high but oil prices had declined dramatically forcing the soviet union because of their loss of revenues to come to the table. and so reagan and gorbachev decide to meet at geneva in 1985. and like i tell my students not a great deal was accomplished at geneva in terms of policy outcomes, there were no reductions or anything like that. but what happened at geneva is that gorbachev and reagan got into the same room together and begin to talk to one another. and they develop a relationship with one another. and they began to sort of develop this relationship and this trust that would matter so much, so much until the end of the cold war. as reagan said, right, we don't have these weapons because we hate one another necessarily. we have these weapons because we mistrust one another. we don't trust one another. if we can have the trust then we can start to really work towards some type of agreement. but reagan leaves geneva and the administration is hopeful, schultz is hopeful this went better than expected. reagan got along with gorbachev and i'm sure

very combative take to the soviets?t it has a need major destabilization effect on the relations. the year fear, right that's what i called it. and i called your fear, for several reasons, one of which is as the eye. which presented a real real danger. at least in the minds of the soviet union. and because of the shooting down of a flight k, l zero zero seven. the korean airliner straight it straight into the soviet air praise airspace, where it strayed for two hours. soviet sent fighters because they thought it was an american spy plane initially, and i'm not sure what they were thinking, it's interesting because i had windows, there were lights it looks like a commercial airliner. nonetheless the soviets shoot down the plane, and on board there were 269 passenger, including 63 americans. including a congressman. a conservative congressman. they all die in the shooting down of it. and a response to that, conservatives the conservative activists amy holder press conference, denouncing the soviet union and calling on ron

getting precise numbers is never easy for a soviet operation because the soviets were always all overhe place in their numbers. it was often part of disinformation campaigns about how big these operations had been. but let us say, roughly a million and a half men, i'm going about 500,000 per month. 20,000 guns, 3,000 aircraft arrayed for a single operation. the japanese force defending manchuria. usually in japanese propaganda terms, the great army, it's almost always referred to that by the japanese. they had been sitting in occupation duty, counter insurgency for over a decade. its best units had been bled off for the fight in the pacific by august of 1945. it was far below its authorized strength. the ranks were filled with raw recruits with light or obsolete equipment. the soviet mechanized assault on august 9th simply blew it away. that's not a technical military term. the soviet operation simply smashed the army. i think back to june of 1944 which is not only d-day, of course, but is also the anniversary -- up to that point, the greatest soviet operation of the war, the russian

so they couldn't blame the soviets.nk that explains to a good part their election result in 1946, but you're right, patton and the u.s. third army were already some american soldiers, i knew one of them had already been over across the border, but they were to go on to prague, even though they could have liberated prague. that was kind of the same decision, a river in germany had to do with the fact that there was wartime agreements that the military leadership, eisenhower, marshal didn't want to break with the soviets. so since the soviets were already -- had already liberated slovakia by beginning of may 1945, it was not far for them to get to prague. you know, prague is an interesting city in the sense that it has suffered very little destruction during world war ii, vienna and budapest were destroyed very heavily, and of course churchill early on had wanted to liberate those cities himself by the west. remember, he had a so-called lubliana gap strategy. the lubliana gap is sort of down here, the capital of slovenia,

the soviets back down.intelligence and signals intelligence monitor the removal of soviet missiles from cuba. during the crisis, a u2 was shot down. kennedy refuses to escalate and instead he responds to khrushchev's repose all that in exchange for removing, he soviets removing the missiles, the u.s. pledges not to invade cuba. so, the cuban missile crisis comes to a satisfactory ending, which means the world not end. that's good. but the kennedy brothers obsession with castro continues. the momentum continues to pressure cia, to get rid of castro. a senior cia official met with a cuban agent in paris on the 22nd of november, 1963, to give poison to kill castro. that was the day that kennedy was in dallas and was killed. in the time we have left, i want to address the all too popular story that kennedys's massenet shun in dallas was the result of a cia operation or conspiracy to kill the president. my bottom line opinion, it's a myth, it's a canard, it's a lie. it is logically almost impossible to prove a n

getting the precise numbers is never easy for a soviet operation, because the soviets were always allover the place. it was often part of a disinformation campaign about how big operations had been. but let's say roughly 1 million and a half per front. 20,000 guns, 5000 tanks, 3000 aircraft. the japanese force defending manchuria, the gong deng army, usually a japanese propaganda term would be the great long deng army, sitting in occupation duty, counter insurgency, for over a decade. it's best most elite units had been blood off for the fight in the specific by august 1945. it was far below its authorized strength. the ranks were filled with raw recruits and cohen scripts with obsolete equipment. the soviet mechanized assault simply blew it away. i'm trying to think of another way that isn't technical. the soviet operation simply smashed through the kwantung army. i think back to june of 1944, the anniversary of the greatest soviet operation of the war, the russian offensive that smashed the german army group center. if you could use it as a verb, the great kwantung army was the same

to cut it off from the soviet union would strike a big blow indeed. for most of the soviet union the 2nd world war was about fighting the invaders of their land. but it wasn't quite so simple for ukraine the truth is ukraine has never been a united country. when world war 2 broke out a large part of western ukraine's population welcomed the german soldiers as liberators from the recently forced upon them soviet rule and openly collaborated with the germans. the real scale of collaboration was not announced for many years after the war but we now know that whole divisions and battalions were formed by ukrainian collaborators such as s.s. c. and not to go and roll into battalions. just in the beginning of the war more than $80000.00 people from college cina region voluntarily enrolled into division s.s. galad seen in a month and a half notorious for their extreme cruelty towards the polish jewish and russian people on the territory of ukraine. members of these military groups came mostly from the organization of ukrainian nationalists b.-o. un founded i

the soviets surrounded berlin and attacked from all sides.o finally the sector, the center, the citadel in the heart of berlin, until we got down to that point then it is one mile separating the two spearheads. it took a week of solid fighting to cross that final mile. there was going to be difficult finding however you did it. it bears in mind who the defenders of berlin were at this point. there was in ss division, norwegians and daines. there were french fascists fighting in hitler's cause. there were dutch fascists. you where are the nazis? they are in normandy. even those motley defenders managed to hold out for a week and inflicted severe damages on the soviets. if this -- if the question is, if the american army went up against the russians in 1945, because this was a favorite pastime of my generation growing up. our fathers would very often say, after a drink or two, they should have listened to patton. if that battle had taken place, the soviets had a lot more units. the western allies would have had an air power of the sort that the

the soviets never used that. but he called his book "august it's my understanding that's why we refer to this operation as august storm. if the manchurian strategic offensive operation is the alternative, maybe we are better off with august storm. whatever you call it, it was one of the war's most massive and successful blows with three fronts, the soviets used the term front in the way that we or the germans use army group. we use front in sort of an indefinite way. soviets have a technical use for it, army group. three great army groups or fronts array around the arc of the great manchurian bulge. here. the second far eastern front and the first far eastern front. getting precise numbers is never easy for a soviet operation because the soviets were always all over the place in their numbers. it was often part of disinformation campaigns about how big these operations had been. but let us say roughly 1.5 million men. i'm going about 500,000 per front. 3,000 aircraft, tavengs for a single operation. japanese forc

but the soviets read it differently, this particular soviet captain in submarine p 59. he says they're trying to kill us. we are not going to be the disgrace of the soviet navy. we are going to take them with us. loaded the nuclear torpedo. and there are anywhere, according to how the story is told, it's told by different people, anywhere between one minute and three minutes or five minutes where a nuclear torpedo was about to be fired. and there is by chance, by lock, another soviet naval officer equal in rank who is a much cooler head and who realizes as a result of a particular circumstance which is too complicated to explain now, that it's in the book, realizes that the americans are not trying to kill the submarines. they are trying to bring it to the surface, and he talks the captain out of firing that submarine. so it had nothing to do with christian and kennedy's desire to avoid a war. there was lock involved in the voting that war. that was the closest call. it was not the only call. >> what if that nuclear torpedo had been fired? what with the likely course of

a victory of soviet intelligence. but it set up so says the visitor they know what . you do so i would the societies i'm a bit into pneumonia but i have that sloth and that's a huge in the e.u. to dismiss this miracle at the beginning or. to disclose the. syndicate wasn't only a child when he came to damascus with his father leonid mcgill officially a task journalist an officially a soviet intelligence operatives it was his father a soviet spy from whom he got his 1st knowledge about syria it's now possible to speak publicly about it i mean it was the senior glove the simple. i mean to be opposed to put on say i'm going to. buy the moon. at the 1000000000. dollar syria did not give up on the blessings of western civilization that is clearly seen in bonnie's lukins footage there were american british and french cars on the streets of damascus driven by diplomats as well as spies and military specialists serviette military specialists are a special cost not only were all of them highly experienced but they've also repea

britain, france in the soviet union.em to say yes if we need to, but you need to do something for me. something you can already predict is, you have to make sure a unify germany remains in nato. because without germany, nato can't survive. it is the biggest man power supplier, the second biggest material supplier, that's where all the good bases are. without nato, why are we in europe? and remember, first principles, the europeans can't take care of themselves.í+7:>t1 so no matter what happens in this future, bush is determined to ensure that we have an american presence. and kohl accept this deal. in fact, the british and the french accept the deal. everyone except the deal except for the soviets. they too were finally negotiating to accepting this deal. but in a way that has lasting consequences for today. that is to say, mikael gorbachev had come up with this idea that we were going to demilitarized, normalize relations and be accepted by the west. he ultimately agreed that he would allow the germans to unify. he had

the plan was to save the soviet union, to revitalize the soviet union the way i just mention and thento do something else that was real quite critical. he began to talk about a common european home which is to say we know we can't keep up with the west, not because of what they are doing, yeah, they might be bothering us a little bit with these buildups but it doesn't change what they already knew before they started and we're going to try to save military spending for better things that we can invest it in like infrastructure and reindustrialization and we're trying to lower tensions so we can justify decreasing military spending, but we're really after this common european home in which he said he could finally remove the barriers that separate us east and west, the iron curtain, the berlin wall and find a fusion of soviet socialism and western european democratic socialism in which we will take care of the individual but frankly be much more successful at it, and all we want to do is show how good and positive and positively european we are so that ultimately we will be asked to jo

, and the agreement with the soviet union is that germany will get half of poland and the soviet unionould get the other half. and this is precisely what happens. the germans invade poland on september 1st, and the soviets march into poland on september 17th. and that area, eastern poland and the area of galicia comes under soviet rule. soviet occupation in eastern poland between 39 and 41 decapitates elites, local elites, jewish, poland and ukrainian, destroys the economy of the region, sets very intentionally one ethnic group against another so as to sustain its own rule, deports vast numbers of people, first poles, then jews, then ukrainians into camps or into central asia, and leaves behind a powerful sense of victimization by all the groups living there, most of which believed that they were -- all of which believe that they were the main victims of soviet rule and that their neighbors had betrayed them. when the germans attack the soviet union in june 1941, the soviets murder thousands of political prisoners that they're still holding in their jails. most of these prisoners at th

the plan was to save the soviet union, to revitalize the soviet union and then do something else that was quite critical. he began to talk about a common european home. which is to say, we know we cannot keep up with the west not because of what they are doing, they might be bothering us with these buildups, but that does not change what we knew before we started. we are going to try to save military spending for better things that we can invest in like infrastructure or re-industrialization. we are really after this common european home in which, he said, we can finally remove the barriers that separate us to east and west. the iron curtain, the berlin wall and find a fusion of soviet socialism and western european democratic socialism in which we will take care of the individual, but frankly be much more successful at it. all we want to do is show how good and positive and positively european we are so that ultimately, we will be asked to join europe. which, by the way, is going through its own interesting and fundamental change at this time because europe is developing the final fr

of the soviets. he passes these things to cia, and the cia mi6 case officers, he provides high-level soviet policy papers. even tries to warn the u.s., ahead of time about berlin walls going up, but he can do so in time. above all he can vases impressions, that the soviet leadership is not as confident as they appear. they are blustering from a position of weakness, and they know it. they worry about provoking the u.s. to war, they know they do not have the strategic superiority and nuclear weapons. the national intelligence estimates at the time, the u.s. intelligence -- far fewer nuclear missiles than they were claiming. it was bluster. and then khrushchev backs down on berlin, it seems to confirm his intelligence. at the same time, pan khaki saying khrushchev medusa thing desperate. cia gave -- him the code name hero. the vast documentary intelligence that he provided, was marked with the code word -- and the oiled briefings he gave, that was the chicken de intelligence. this is what we do. we giv

it took the soviets nearly two years to find a new leader. previously he was cruschev and that's when things started to move again. >> gentlemen, the next question, bobby, two questions, who had -- who had what we had to give. >> what are all of these percentages? >> that is a good question. >> the resources. i wondered what churchill was thinking about. >> i can see myself writing that note to myself. maybe all of us can. working on your own ideas. i know this week, these ten days of discussion, they have spheres of influence, but some would say what does 10% mean? it could theoretically be just an effort to at least symbolically say hey, we're not to withdrawal entirely. we're not going to give them a free hand. if there was not a lot of thought behind it. >> i think that the spheres of influen influence, and one of these guys, but understanding what is means, it is different. he is drawing from that area. you know, it is predominantly -- we can be their, our observers can be there. and that was unacceptable. they are thinking about that, a

and at the very beginning the soviets and their allies in eastern europe and the soviet dummy lands in eastern europe. they demanded that every displaced person, except for the jews, and those who had been displaced by franco years before. every displaced person should go home. whether they wanted to or not, they had to go home. the allies said no, the americans and the british said no! people have the right to choose their own citizenship whether they wanted to go home or not. the soviets were convinced, there was a paranoia that has some basis in reality, after the great war world war i the allies tried to over throw the bolshevik regime. and stalin and some of his compatriots believed that that was a real possibility after world war ii, and what the alleys were doing with the british and the americans were doing, was creating an army of anti- soviet, anti- communist dissidents that would be available to spread anti-soviet propaganda, and or begin world war iii. >> so i want to talk a little bit about what you mentioned in passing about the establishment of these international instit

union and soviet+ second war. i'm thinking about berlin and the riots of 1953 where#2e nothing, '56 in budapest and hungary. i'm thinking how we just disastrously made a mistake and misread the fidel castro phenomenon and of course bay of pigs two years later. thinking nixon was admired in vietnam in '68 but perhaps nixon could have influenced nato or the european allies, if you want to call them that, to do more with moral support or perhaps material to help the prague revolutionaries. i can't think of anymore past '68. but i'm wondering if there was a lot of opportunities missed or if presidents were just otherwise occupied or fearful or greed or what? >> well, let me put the question back on you which is to say what would you like them to have done. i want to know what would like them to have done that wouldn't have led to an immediate nuclear war. >> no troops. >> okay. >> but i think we could have had better covert support, which i don't think we gave very -- i don't think we gave any. of course the bay of pi

the cold war, the beginning, the soviets ran their allies used in europe, the soviet dominated eastern they demanded every person and those years before, every person should go home. they had to go home. they didn't know they said no, people had to write to choose their own citizenship and whether they wanted to go home or not. especially, there was a.of paranoia after there was a great work after world war i, they tried the regime and they believe that the real possibility after world war ii and with the allies were doing was creating an army of anti-soviet, anti-communist initiatives that would be available to spread anti-soviet propaganda and war to begin world war iii. >> you mentioned in passing the establishment of these international institutions that deal with this problem. first we have united nations relief and rehabilitation authorities and then the ir zero, international refugee organization and an amazing passage in your book, page 258 beginning chapter 17 where you talk about organizations and their names that he got a mission of being humane institutions to provide liter

millions in the case of the soviet union.and so i think on that note, let's leave our discussion of the yalta conference and think about what a better peace might have meant in 1945. as i always do in these affairs, i will end with the words of douglas mcarthur, these proceedings are closed. thank you. >>> weeknights this month we're featuring american history tv programs as a preview of what's available every weekend on c-span3. tonight, a discussion on slavery. and emancipation. former interpreters at the colonial willamsburg foundation talk about bringing african-american stories to life and how they felt compelled to tell their ancestor stories appropriately. panelists include american civil war museum ceo christy coleman and curator rex ellis. watch tonight beginning at 8:00 p.m. eastern and enjoy american history tv every weekend on c-span3. >>> you're watching american history tv. every weekend on c-span3, explore our nation's past. american history tv on c-span3, created by america's cable television companies and tod

lying was the stock in trade of the soviet union . i think that's really the major overarching leadership failure that complicated this catastrophe. >> you very much adam. the next question has to do more with journalism and the writing process gaining access to some very difficult information. over the course of your presentation you identify people you interviewed you travel to locations. for those that are interested in the process of writing craft of writing a story, could you explain or highlight how you gain access to some of your sources? the complexity and challenges associated and how you will together interviews, materials, secondary sources and primary sources? >> that's a very good question. the short answer is that first of all, you have to understand that this was 15 years after the breakup of the soviet union so these restrictions would have existed officially from the state level had ceased to exist. secondly, i have a lot of help. but it was hard to findthese people . so i worked with a fixer in kiev who now i worked

but the grim reality of life in the soviet sphere of influence ensures that for many, yalta remains abuy word for betrayal. even if one accepts, as one must, that the options of the allies were limited given soviet strength and sacrifice. it is hard to disagree with the conclusion of sir max hastings, who in his brilliant book armageddon wrote, while churchill's life reflected the highest ideals, he was a much less sentimental and more ruthless man than churchill. roosevelt possesses, claims his most recent biographer, a more perceptive and less romantic view of the world than churchill. hastings continues, this proposition is justified in so far as roosevelt recognized that the days of empires were done, while churchill's cart refused to accept the signals of his brain that it was so. get any claim of roosevelts superior wisdom becomes hard to sustain convincingly in the light of the president's failure to perceive, as churchill perceived, the depth of evil which joseph stalin and the soviet union represented. it may be true that the western allies lacked the military power to preven