stearns. but this one gave this a very close inside look at the actions of the federal reserve to of particular focus of been bernanke. now, you start this book with that climactic weekend in september of 2008 which is actually only a little bit more than a year ago. it's hard to realize that it was not long ago. the weekend when they let lehman brothers fail and then they bailed out aig. then you go to the run-up of the crisis and proceed more or less chronologically with through with a whole step by step thing until last summer. now, you're basic judgment as i get it is that many people, including ben bernanke and his predecessor, alan greenspan should have seen the potential for the meltdown that happened in the financial system and acted quote to head it off but they didn't. and once the crisis happened, ben bernanke was the right man in the right place, so he is something of a hero of this. so let's start by talking a little bit about bin bernanke and why you think this was true. what did

you say in the book there was before bear stearns and after bear stearns, and now we are in the early 2008. why was that so significant? >> guest: so in january 2008 the fed cuts interest rates buy quite a bit, 1.5 percentage points in a matter of days. pos could you describe that as an bernanke weeks up. >> guest: and then i think dan bernanke brings a sigh of relief and thinks we are ahead of this and then they are kind of surprised by the bear stearns episode. i think it's significant for two respects. one is it happened and institutions that had collateral which had some problems but had collateral couldn't borrow short-term. >> host: let's be clear it wasn't a commercial bank with deposits. it wasn't really an institution for which the fed felt responsibility. >> guest: the first thing is it happened. bear stearns was in trouble and that was a surprise. bernanke judged it was a surprise for which the markets were not ready and hank paulson at the treasury and tim geithner at the fed agreed and then secondly the fed decided as you point out quite rightly to help a bank for which i

stearns: i thank the gentleman. to you folks when you hold up that glass, there's another glass in texas that is willing to take this lower radioactive waste. you should know that-- mr. gordon: reclaiming my time. has that site been certified? mr. stearns: i think it's in the process of being certified. mr. gordon: it hasn't been certified. mr. stearns: if you don't mind i'm going to yield to your colleague from tennessee. he has a question for you. mr. gordon: i'll be happy to yield. mr. roe: just one question. thank you for yielding. is it a problem to have the waste brought into this country and then shipped out? back to the country of origin or wherever it's disposed of. we have a country -- mr. gordon: i understand that. i'm sympathetic to the company and talked to them. the difficult -- difficulty is whether that waste has been separated. i talked with them personally and they have said they don't ship it all back. they keep some of it here. and once you combine an a level with a b or c level there are additio

stearns: madam speaker, we reserve the balance of our time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from michigan. mr. conyers: madam speaker, there are no requests for speakers on this side. i enjoyed myself and had my full say. i yield back the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman yields back. the gentleman from florida. mr. stearns: madam speaker, it's my pleasure to as much time as he may con-- she may consume to the gentlelady from tennessee, marsha blackburn. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlewoman is recognized. mrs. blackburn: thank you, madam speaker. i do rise in support of this bill and for those individuals that live in rural areas like my seventh district in tennessee. fixing a short market problem which we have heard discussed on this floor tonight is much more than just a convenience or i want to see tv issue. for us it is an issue of health and security and public safety. . and by working to expand the unserved customer, which we have done on a bipartisan basis in this bill, my constituents in rural west t

citibank, while cobia, not those things did get us into a lot of trouble, but bear stearns, bear stearns, aig, these are outside the banking system. the money market funds. they pose the same threat that conventional banks did. so that's why the president is proposed and most of the people who don't agree with the president on the specifics that you need a broader thing. the financial system has to be regular. we understand why that is. both of us to. and we can't set up a system where people go around and say i'm going to shop for a regular and constantly put the regular against a. suppressant has chosen not to smoosh all this together into one agency unhittable if you try to make it less attractive to banks to shop around. and finally, banks and have more capital than they had coming in. capital is cushioned that the shock of door where you take your losses so you don't have to go by grubbed or on bid me to the government. we have to find a way to make sure the banks have more capital, they have better shock absorbers. >> my question is a little bit broader. in a sense it's more cultur

over the course of the years come to my career began at bear stearns of all places. [laughter] in the '80s, not during the recent demise. i also workday number of years at the international monetary fund. that background also with the imf is where ken and i first worked together back in 2001. and during that period what we call a this time is different syndrome as a possible way of understanding why we keep having a crisis from the last two years. basically, the premise is simple, it means crisis happens to other people in 10 other places and other times. they do not happen to us. the rules of valuation is the stock market soaring? are we borrowing from the rest of the world? of those rules. normally that would be a red light those rules apply to someone else, but not to us. it is universal. it is universal and it is common. let me begin across time. when we submitted the manuscript to princeton university press for review, peter who we think added knowledge we were lucky enough to get him the excellent device, he sent me a copy of an advertisement for standard stati

stearns: mr. speaker, i yield myself such time as i may consume. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized. mr. stearns: mr. speaker, i rise in support of h.r. 2221, the data accountability and trust act, and i am very pleased and gratified that we're considering this bill today. i've taken an active part and interest in data privacy, i'm happy that the house members will now finally have an opportunity to vote on this important legislation which frankly i introduced in its original form in the 109th congress. as former chairman of the subcommittee on commerce, trade and consumer protection, ctcp, the energy commerce committee held two hearings in 2005 on identity theft. and security breaches involving personal information. these hearings led me to introduce the data accountability and trust act which would require any entity that experiences a simple breach of security such as a business to notify all those folks in the united states whose information was acquired by an unauthorized pe

or bear stearns should have been involved in this.hat experience with their broad market -- knowledge of the financial markets makes us well- suited to be the supervisor for non-banking institutions as well barrett ar. second colony systemically important institution does approach failure, government policy makers must have tools other than a bailout or shattering bankruptcy. the congress should create a new resolution urging analogous to the regime currently used for the fdic for failing banks that would put that the government to want them a troubled firm in a way that protect financial stability and that imposes losses on shareholders and creditors of the failed firm without cost to the taxpayer. imposing losses would help address the yoo big to fail problem. -- tooo big to fail problem. third, a regulatory structure requires a better mechanism for monitoring and addressing emerging risk to the financial system as a whole. because of the size, diversity, and complexity of our financial system, that task may exceed the capacity of a

stearns: let me just perhaps move a little forward. the gentlelady from california mentioned several people said, well, why does congress need to get involved? that has been brought before me before. and i would say -- and this is the compliment to the gentlelady from california, what she did with her bill, a bill originally directed the f.c.c. to write its own rules. but she reached out to industry and engaged them, which is a commendation for her, and asked them, well, how can we solve this? for those people that says, why can't industry solve this? she was an impetus to do this. now industry developed a subgroup. the subgroup came up with the technology to be able to solve the problem. and now she's saying basically, let industry solve the problem and let the f.c.c. adopt what they've come up with. another thing that i think came through the process, which is also, i think, a compliment to her that she was willing to realize that some of the industry, some of the smaller companies might have a financial problem with this. so she was

and bear stearns, not possible, illegal under this bill. if a company fails, it will be put to death. we have death panels, but they have the death panels in the wrong bill. they are in this bill and we will spend the money to get rid of them in ways that will minimize damage, money that will come from the financial community. . we heard it's going to have a restriction on credit. it's true, many were opposed to the credit card bill. many voted for it. they say there's a credit czar. that one is too odd to put any meaning behind. i'd like them to point to the sections that do it, maybe if it's too much to read all at once they can divide it up. there's 177, if they each read eight pages i think they could get the whole bill done. maybe then they could find the credit czar in there. i can't. we do say that if you're identified by the systemic risk council as overleveraged and you're big we will step in and tell you as the gentleman from pennsylvania's amendment said, you're too big, raise your tap tal. maybe that's a credit czar. maybe when

stearns. the gentleman from new york, mr. wiener, is recognized for 5 minutes. >> thank you.e developing crumb, which is your -- research -- chrome, your browser. wouldn't it be possible through that vehicle so that when you download it, your first page is to tell us what information you would like to know about the pages you are visiting and what information's that you would like to share, and maybe a collection of boxes you can check or not check? it is similar to what facebook tries to do, although they do not do it right in your face. that seems to be an even better place to think about the true gateway for the experience. if i wanted to do that through chrome, would not be able to do that in some way? i know i can erase the cookies and i can erase my browser history, but cannot do something like that? >> thank you for that question. i am at a disadvantage because i am not an engineer, just a lawyer, and our engineers do amazing things. i do not know if there is any limitation on what they can do. i know they are working hard to build privacy controls. >> maybe mr. felten

if we look at times that have changed our nation, september 14, 2007, had to do with bear stearns andrs. that brought to our attention a long-term deficit trend as well as a short-term tremendous blow to our economy. for the people in here, should that date symbolize -- the along the lines of the berlin wall, 9/11, that it affected our nations in that way? it looks like a trend that will happen for a while. se>> this goes back to john owen 's first question about how we know when we are in one of these moments. if you are analyst, it is important to set yourself benchmarks for rethinking fundamental assumptions. i would answer your question in a negative. i do not see the financial crisis as such a moment. i have an old fashioned way of thinking about things. i made the victim to the same scholarly problems i talked about. -- i made the victim to the same scholarly problems i talked about. -- i may be a victim to the same scholarly problems i talked about. if the entities with the most capability are not altering their strategic remarks -- frameworks, we do not have evidence for being

the great depression in order to spend $30 billion of your money to subsidize the purchase of bear stearns by jp morgan chase and the u.s. economy was beginning to slow precipitously. but even a year ago, it seemed very unlikely that we were about to tumble into anything that resembled the great depression. and then in september and october of 2009, we came closer

the first day i was sworn in was the day the federal government saved bear stearn subpoena in the firstple of months i realized this country would probably see a recession, the likes of which we hadn't seen in 80 years. in the 20 months i've been governor, i have cut over $31 billionov of the deficit. >> larry: that also brings pain, does it not? >> it brings a lot of pain. issues i've worked on for 20 years i've had to curtail. i vetoed a bill i sponsored in the state senate. and you should have heard what the co-sponsors said to me that day. >> larry: dual beleaguered? >> no. it's very exciting. it's a challenge. these are not the kinds of circumstances in which i would have wanted to be governor, but these are the times that define people. and i guess in difficult times, you find out who wants to step up and confront a crisis. and who sticks their head in the sand and shirks responsibility as a lot of people have. >> larry: you already announced that you will run for election this year. but there are reports that president obama doesn't want you in the race. so let's get to brass tac

stearns is indeed my friend, we are classmates. he conveniently left out the four years when bill clinton left a balanced budget to america. when the deficits were eliminated and the debt was coming down. that's the key consideration in this debate. this is about paying for our veterans' hospitals, paying for the war in iraq, paying for the war in afghanistan and making sure the social security checks get out on january 1. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from nevada is recognized. mr. heller: may i inquire about the time remaining on each side? the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from nevada controls 8 1/2 minutes, the gentleman from massachusetts 5 3/4 minutes. mr. heller: thank you, madam chair. if i may yield two minutes to the gentleman from michigan, mr. mccotter. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized for two minutes. mr. mccotter: i thank the gentlelady. a quick point raised by our esteemed colleague from massachusetts about how president clinton left four years of balanced budgets, it was with the as

daughter aig nor bear stearns was subject to strong consolidated supervision.egulator of bank holding companies, already supervises many of the largest and most complex institutions in the world. that experience, together with our broad knowledge of the financial markets, makes us well suited to serve as the consolidated supervisor for systemically important nonbank institutions as well. in addition, our involvement in supervision is critical for ensuring that we have the necessary expertise, information, and authorities to carry out our essential functions of promoting financial stability and making monetary policy. second, when a systemically important institution does approach failure, government policymakers must have an option other than a bailout or a disorderly, confidence- shattering bankruptcy. the congress should create a new resolution regime, analogous to the regime currently used by the fdic for failing banks, that would permit the government to wind down a troubled pla systemically important firm in a way that protects financial stability but that

exactly that type of risk but on some with a much greater skill because aig unlike lehman, unlike bear stearns had written a bunch of different types of savings vehicles to the retail community across the country and around the world and if those, if those policyholders have lost confidence in the system as a whole than the damage could been much greater so it sounds like of course the entire system was at risk and if the system has collapsed no institution in the united states or around the world would have been intolerable to the collapse. >> mr. secretary if goldman sachs could have withstood these losses-- >> only the direct effects. is not the right way-- >> they still could it paid off all the parties in turn that they owed money to. this will not cause goldman sachs to collapse. >> chairman, you understand this. when you decide it is necessary to prevent default, you prevent the fault. if aig had not met its contractual obligations to its counterparties it would have defaulted. it would have been downgraded and the company would have collapsed and would have been to what they did in the

stearns. >> good morning and thank you, mr. chairman. mentioned these bills and you talk about what they do, so we are very pleased to have this hearing. i am a co-sponsor of both of these bills, original cosponsor. it is very clear the united states will need additional spectrum to meet the growing demand for wireless bought and. -- for wireless broadband. we may be victims of our own success. the united states currently leads in the world and wireless, wireless providers leading in innovative voice and services. the number has passed the number of wireline customers. the number of bob and custer's -- broadband customers has increased exponentially. cell sites become constrain for capacity. as a result, providers need more spectrum, especially in order to increase the speed of local of local broadband services. we are facing a looming spectrum crisis. for example, a voice call requires approximately 10,000 bits per second. while up loading and downloading video requires millions of bits per second three countries will need 1.3 or 1,300,

or bear stearns were healld to strong supervision. this makes as well suited to serve as the consolidated supervisor for all of the nonbanking institutions as well. in addition, our involvement in the supervision is critical for ensuring we have the necessary expertise, a 32. as an essential functions of promoting financial stability and of making monetary policy. second, when a systemically importance to should does approach failure, government policy makers must have an option other than a bailout or confidence shattering bankruptcy. they should greet a new resolution regime currently used by the fdic that will permit the government to wind down systemically important firms in a way that protect financial stability and also imposes losses on shareholders and creditors of the failed firm without cost to the taxpayer. imposing losses and creditors -- to systemically important firms by restoring market discipline and levels the playing field for smaller firms while minimizing the destructive effect of the failure of the financial syste

large financial institutions like bear stearns, a.i.g. got into trouble before anyone knew it. had these provisions been in place, the government wouldn't have had to spend billions to rescue a.i.g. from sending shockwaves throughout the financial system. the compromise was the agriculture and financial services reach was to bring greater transparency and oversight to these markets. we must provide necessary jeefer sight. this compromise strikes a careful balance and protects use of derivatives by so-called end users who hedge the cost of their operation. whether dealing with grain, energy, steel or financing, american companies use derivatives to lock in prices to plan for the future. when the agriculture committee first considered this, i offered an amendment to require mandatory clearing. i'm pleased to see this compromise with the chairman maintains this concept. clearing exposes a credit risk which up until now has been hidden behind closed doors. while every derivative does not need to be cleared, it will be make sure that will all classes have the clearance. it ranges fr

and bear stearns. we do take a fund not from the taxpayers.and as i went along with along with the republican leadership with the house and senate because i didn't think we had an option, but we will assess the financial institutions for that fund, but the fund is not used to bail out any failing institution. the bill specifically says the money only comes to put that institution to death. there is nothing in here that allows a failing institution to be continued with federal money. there is a dissolution fund. and it does say that to dissolve this in an orderly way, as oppose todd lemman brothers that you need to pay off some of the states that may be hurt because they got into investments they shouldn't have got into, that's the only fund. here's another difference. . the bailout fund does zero to prevent institutions from getting to that point. they will monitor institutions and monitor active aand if we see an institution getting to that point we say, raise your capital, stop selling -- giving mortgages to people who shouldn't get them. di

daughter aig nor bear stearns was subject to strong consolidated supervision. the federal reserve, as the regulator of bank holding companies, already supervises many of the largest and most complex institutions in the world. that experience, together with our broad knowledge of the financial markets, makes us well suited to serve as the consolidated supervisor for systemically important nonbank institutions as well. in addition, our involvement in supervision is critical for ensuring that we have the necessary expertise, information, and authorities to carry out our essential functions of promoting financial stability and making monetary policy. second, when a systemically important institution does approach failure, government policymakers must have an option other than a bailout or a disorderly, confidence- shattering bankruptcy. the congress should create a new resolution regime, analogous to the regime currently used by the fdic for failing banks, that would permit the government to wind down a troubled systemically important firm in a way that protects fi

and bear stearns, not possible, illegal under this bill. if a company fails, it will be put to death. we have death panels, but they have the death panels in the wrong bill. they are in this bill and we will spend the money to get rid of them in ways that will minimize damage, money that will come from the financial community. . we heard it's going to have a restriction on credit. it's true, many were opposed to the credit card bill. many voted for it. they say there's a credit czar. that one is too odd to put any meaning behind. i'd like them to point to the sections that do it, maybe if it's too much to read all at once they can divide it up. there's 177, if they each read eight pages i think they could get the whole bill done. maybe then they could find the credit czar in there. i can't. we do say that if you're identified by the systemic risk council as overleveraged and you're big we will step in and tell you as the gentleman from pennsylvania's amendment said, you're too big, raise your tap tal. maybe that's a credit czar. maybe when

officials decided to use section 1303 of the federal reserve to provide funds for the creditors of bear stearns and for a.i.g. itself, that was not being legally possible under the bill we put forward. similarly we have funds that come not from the taxpayers but from an assessment on large financial institutions which can be used explicitly not for any failed institution but can be used when that is being put out of business in case it is necessary to prevent that fail you are -- failure from having negative destabilizing -- effects. the republicans don't want to do that. there's another difference. we have a number of provisions in here to make it less likely that that will happen. yes, if a big institution gets overly indepetted and fails, it ought to be allowed to fail and we'll have to deal with the consequences but it's also better not to say, let them fail, let's try to stop it. i yield two minutes to the gentleman from illinois, mr. gutierrez. the chair: the gentleman from illinois is recognized for two minutes. mr. gutierrez: thank you, mr. chairman. i'd like to take that time to enter

these include aig, bear stearns, citigroup, lehman brothers, and merrill lynch.deposits to insure their investment. consequently they severed liquidity crisis when the creditors became aware of the magnitude of the investment losses. these liquidity crisis for the modern version of bank runs. computer clicks replaced queues of depositors withdrawing their money. last the goal had prevented commercial banks -- glass- steagal had been in commercial banks from these problems. i have a number of questions for the panel. what changes should be made to the risk-capital standards for banks? should congress require all banks to spanish standards? should they be established for other like a highly leveraged financial institution? should all banks and other highly leveraged financial institutions be subject to simple limits on leverage in addition to any risk based capital standard. should fannie and freddie be restructured or fully privatize? should any of those funds to be transferred to the federal housing administration and the place transparently on the federal budget

he is a sports promoter he has got degrees from san diego university, and the stearns school of business you. welcome to our hearing, sir. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you chairman conyers. thank you ranking member smith and distinguished members of the committee. i would like to thank you for inviting me to appear to discuss on lange screening including pirated live sporting events, to true honor for me to be here and i am pleased to explain how unlawful streaming of our pay-per-view events adversely impacts our business. the piracy of live sporting events is illegal and kills jobs and threatens the expansion of u.s. based companies. in 20001 my brother and i along with their friend dana white purchased the ufc. we saw great potential in ufc when many thought we were crazy. we took a great risk but today the ufc is a phenomenal success creating an impacting thousands of jobs for athletes licensees partners and affiliates. that success is threatened by the retransmission of our live pay-per-view events which account for nearly half of our revenues. our copyright production works are

and finally, other relative documents, the bailout of aig, bank of america, citigroup, bear stearns, lehman brothers, general motors, chrysler, cit and gmac. instead of those documents, what i got in return was a folder full of paper that printed off the fed web page. just in case anybody was wondering, those documents did not provide any new or useful information. that kind of response is not only disrespectful to the senate, but it raises the question of what they are trying to hide. i think we should know the answers to that question before we move forward on this nomination and every member of this committee should demand the same. while it turns out we actually may have an opportunity to find out some is of the information. i hope every member of the committee listens to this. earlier this week i was informed that despite the fed's refusal to provide individual senators or the public with the information i requested, they have let committee staff of this very kesse some documents related to the aig bailout. when my staff asked what was in the documents, we were informed that we

september 14, 2007, which had to do with bear stearns and laymen for those of you who are not trackinge states. brought to our attention both a long-term deficit trends that we've had as well as a short-term tremendous blow to our economy. should i ask bob zoellick this, but i didn't get a chance to. but for the people in here i'll ask for any comments. should that date symbolizing that the aps along the lines of the berlin wall, 9/11, that have affected our nation in that way. because it looks like a trend that's going to happen for a wild. >> sure, well i think it's important for us -- this goes back to john owens first question. how do we know when were in one these transformative moments? and they think is important if you're an analyst to consistently set yourself benchmarks and say look, if i see this come about in the other thing than i think i'm in one of these moments and start rethinking fundamentalist associations. if you want my own answer to your question i would answer that in a negative that i don't see the financial crisis of such a moment. and the reason is perhaps a p

exactly that type of risk but on some with a much greater skill because aig unlike lehman, unlike bear stearnshad written a bunch of different types of savings vehicles to the retail community across the country and around the world and if those, if those policyholders have lost confidence in the system as a whole than the damage could been much greater so it sounds like of course the entire system was at risk and if the system has collapsed no institution in the united states or around the world would have been intolerable to the collapse. >> mr. secretary if goldman sachs could have withstood these losses-- >> only the direct effects. is not the right way-- >> they still could it paid off all the parties in turn that they owed money to. this will not cause goldman sachs to collapse. >> chairman, you understand this. when you decide it is necessary to prevent default, you prevent the fault. if aig had not met its contractual obligations to its counterparties it would have defaulted. it would have been downgraded and the company would have collapsed and would have been to what they did in the

if we look at times that have changed our nation, september 14, 2007, had to do with bear stearns andrs. that brought to our attention a long-term deficit trend as well as a short-term tremendous blow to our economy. for the people in here, should that date symbolize -- the along the lines of the berlin wall, 9/11, that it affected our nations in that way? it looks like a trend that will happen for a while. se>> this goes back to john owen 's first question about how we know when we are in one of these moments. if you are analyst, it is important to set yourself benchmarks for rethinking fundamental assumptions. i would answer your question in a negative. i do not see the financial crisis as such a moment. i have an old fashioned way of thinking about things. i made the victim to the same scholarly problems i talked about. -- i made the victim to the same scholarly problems i talked about. -- i may be a victim to the same scholarly problems i talked about. if the entities with the most capability are not altering their strategic remarks -- frameworks, we do not have evidence for being

and finally, other relative documents, the bailout of aig, bank of america, citigroup, bear stearns,lehman brothers, general motors, chrysler, cit and gmac. instead of those documents, what i got in return was a folder full of paper that printed off the fed web page. just in case anybody was wondering, those documents did not provide any new or useful information. that kind of response is not only disrespectful to the senate, but it raises the question of what they are trying to hide. i think we should know the answers to that question before we move forward on this nomination and every member of this committee should demand the same. while it turns out we actually may have an opportunity to find out some is of the information. i hope every member of the committee listens to this. earlier this week i was informed that despite the fed's refusal to provide individual senators or the public with the information i requested, they have let committee staff of@@@@ we were told that this could not be told because they were protected. members of the united states senate, members -- that is a

and finally, other relative documents, the bailout of aig, bank of america, citigroup, bear stearns,rs, general motors, chrysler, cit and gmac. instead of those documents, what i got in return was a folder full of paper that printed off the fed web page. just in case anybody was wondering, those documents did not provide any new or useful information. that kind of response is not only disrespectful to the senate, but it raises the question of what they are trying to hide. i think we should know the answers to that question before we move forward on this nomination and every member of this committee should demand the same. while it turns out we actually may have an opportunity to find out some is of the information. i hope every member of the committee listens to this. earlier this week i was informed that despite the fed's refusal to provide individual senators or the public with the information i requested, they have let committee staff of this very kesse some documents related to the aig bailout. when my staff asked what was in the documents, we were informed that we cannot be told

exactly that type of risk but on some with a much greater skill because aig unlike lehman, unlike bear stearnsent types of savings vehicles to the retail community across the country and around the world and if those, if those policyholders have lost confidence in the system as a whole than the damage could been much greater so it sounds like of course the entire system was at risk and if the system has collapsed no institution in the united states or around the world would have been intolerable to the collapse. >> mr. secretary if goldman sachs could have withstood these losses-- >> only the direct effects. is not the right way-- >> they still could it paid off all the parties in turn that they owed money to. this will not cause goldman sachs to collapse. >> chairman, you understand this. when you decide it is necessary to prevent default, you prevent the fault. if aig had not met its contractual obligations to its counterparties it would have defaulted. it would have been downgraded and the company would have collapsed and would have been to what they did in the worst financial storm in gene

we had seen bear stearns, lehman brothers, merrill lynch, aig, ford, general motors, chrysler, fannie mae, freddie mac, tarp. wisn a huge a structural deficit. he walks into the office and the things he has to start with immediately and the stimulus package. it was fought by the republicans every set of the way. -- every step of the way. they started fighting for a stimulus package and then fighting with housing prices that have dropped 29%. there were mortgage foreclosures at the rate of 300,000 her month. in canada we have 10,000 per year. bailouts of financial institutions are continuing to take place. then the compensation which he and answer for it in those institutions. he introduced a health care measure which was extraordinarily difficult and would be in any country. america is deeply polarized and it is very different -- difficult. the climate is extraordinarily difficult. today, the united states unemployment is in the double digit area and has continuing reductions in house prices, the aftermath of the financial restructuring, and so on. a lot of americans are angry and fru