officer stearns and sgt. kane could have done nothing. officer came and started o'malley also could have decided not to. each of these officers showed restraint in not firing their weapons where a suspect provocative action would normally end in shooting. these officers were awarded the gold medal of valor. [applause] >> a sgt. paine, who could not be here tonight, was also awarded the gold medal of valor. >> it is with great pride that we honor these individuals for their valor. every day, officers put their lives at risk and do very good police work and we do not do enough to thank them for that. i am brought to be part of a ceremony where we can point to these heroes and thank them publicly, the way that we should do so every day publicly. so thank you again. [applause] the police commission and the park would would also like to think the diversity of california's san francisco for its generous support in co- sponsored tonight's event. we would like to single out the community relations office and the conference center office for putti

larger than bear stearns would be eentially bailed out. so when lehman brothers was not bailed out, the shock to the market was overwhelming. i don't think that this particular issue at this stage can be a shock. most everybody i know and indeed the markets themselves, there are a lot of technical indicators like credit default swaps and the like, which are -- it's not likely to have consequences that lehman brothers did. >> rose: bringing the questions back home, what's wrong with t american economicecovery? >> it's very simple. if you want to look at wre the numrs are this economy is n growi very fast. it's very sluggish. i know we're going to move into a double dip so, to speak but we're growing at a-- rate t is very simple. construction which has been every other recovery since 1949 has been extraordinary, positive and very supportive of the economy, has barely moved recently. the consequence-- . >> rose: because there's no new housing or commercial construction? >> no, basically because if you dig down into the numbers and try to look

looking back at that situation, i think the original problem was at bear stearns. they created expectations. lehman brothers was an investment bank. we did not have direct involvement in that. but i do think it surprised me when i saw the market reaction because the fate -- the place was so fed for so long and i thought everybody understood, and they did not. i wonder if that is because bear stearns had a government- assisted deal done for it. even though they took some lost, they were still kept alive and nobody else was protected. hindsight is 2020 -- 20/20, but one of the other problems with the bankruptcy in general was the way the derivatives contracts were traded. we can actually require derivatives counterparties to perform in a bankruptcy. -- to perform. in a bankruptcy, they have the right to pull their collateral out. perhaps the best lesson learned is trying to fix that going forward, which is what we tried to do. i have tried to work on getting continuity in the operations that you just do not get in bankruptcy. >> the gop has a been accused of having w

stearns of florida. the chair will reduce to two minutes the time for any electronic vote after the first vote in this series. the unfinished business is the request for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from connecticut, ms. delauro, on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote. the clerk will redesignate the amendment. the clerk: amendment offered by ms. delauro of connecticut. the chair: a recorded vote has been requested. those in support of the request for a recorded vote will rise and be counted. a sufficient number having risen, a recorded vote is ordered. members will record their votes by electronic device. [captioning made possible by the national captioning institute, inc., in cooperation with the united states house of representatives. any use of the closed-captioned coverage of the house proceedings for political or commercial purposes is expressly prohibited by the u.s. house of representatives.] the speaker pro tempore:

one of the factors on but it's not the primary factor it's the nature of the risk whether your bear stearns which probably wouldn't have been caught on the size limit is the nature of the rest your bringing on that brings this pause giving sifi if we can do to giving them what i will call marginal capital requirements above the would be fine but i don't have any faith in it all because it would be coopted within three years in the recovery for a simple we are already -- the resistance to 7% equity or tier one equity, and then a kind of add-on to that is atrocious, and once the economy turns around and these institutions are thought to be sound again we will start rolling those capital requirements as we have in every instance in the past. but separating out the nature of the rest is a more stable economy over time, and enforce the rules more clearly. one of the difficulties in terms of supervision is there are so horribly complex the directors don't understand it and the managers don't understand it and the supervisor certainly can't deal with all the issues sciu to simplify the system and

stearns said. the patchwork of state laws, the different jurisdictions complicated your ability to respond, you didn't say that, is that what i heard? >> i responded to the issue about the notification obligation. >> right. >> there are some conflicting obligations there. >> sigh federal standard would be -- >> that would preempt the states would be extremely helpful. >> i just want to get the nature -- so, epsilon is a vendor for you. vendor for sony. so did the hacker go to epsilon? or sony to epsilon to get to the other? >> let me clarify. these are two completely separate breach events. so the activity at epsilon was completely unrelated to, as far as we know, what happened at sony. >> so you're not a vendor with epsilon. oh, ok. so the other customers -- oh, ok. a apologize. so your other customers, they came -- epsilon, they got to your system, and then through your system, were able to -- at least the companies you notified, verizon that was mentioned earlier, that's how that breach worked.

you know, i don't come even looking back at that situation, i think the original problem as bear stearns but they predicted expectations. we were -- we were far from philemon bankruptcy investment bank it had a couple of banks that actually are still solvent and operating within the bankruptcy, and so we didn't have direct involvement in that but i do think it did surprise me when i saw the market reaction because the place was so sick for so long i thought everybody understood and they didn't come and i wonder if part of that is because of the expectation bear stearns had the assistance in the deal done for it and even the shareholders took losses they were kept alive and free but he was protected. so, you know, hindsight to 20/20 but going forward this is when we push so hard for resolution of authority. one of the other problems of the bankruptcy in general is the way that of its contracts were traded. so we can also require the dirt of the parties to continue to be forming a bankruptcy they have a right to close up the positions and pulled the collateral out. that is a lot of the dis

. >> has come and dance in the glory of monsters about the congo by jason stearns.al are caught this book in from a friend of jason -- the wonderful journalist who has written also about africa she said you know, there's nobody in this is much as stearns. you should talk to him. jason stearns had a big pack of manuscripts, books i'd read it and said there is they will both here and we're going and he and jason went to work together to hone the book. my claim for this book is you can't understand anything in the newspaper about the congo if you haven't read this book because it is that complicated in the news stories are such a tiny piece of the whole and what's really happening there. and the reviews have worn us out. "the wall street journal," "new york times" book reviews, "financial times." i could go on and on, but the reviews of this book has been just an amazing response. and you're really seeing people not backing away, but saying i want to know about the story. i want to hear more about the congo. >> dr. paul farmer. >> dr. farmer as you know partners than h

see how future financial ceos are going to be taking excess risks because they look back at bear stearns, aig or think the same thing would be fine for their institutions. the moral hazard problem should be viewed through the realistic lines and not as a bumper sticker. let me note also the cost of financial breakdown of not stepping in our enormous and would have made the recession we are in now even worse. in other words, despite many mistakes along the way, the fed and the treasury did the right things in supporting financial markets and financial institutions in order to present the total breakdown of the financial sector. one of the things the movie to big to fail correct was a serious danger of economic collapse faced in the fall of 2008. we are now in a situation where a our financial institutions or even more concentrated than they were before the crisis on the treasury. multiple failures among these large institutions would be even harder to deal with them before and limited the power of the fed and the treasury to deal with them. second question with dodd-frank is whether it is

. >> tom: the details surrounding the federal reserve's rescue of bear stearns in the spring of 2008 will remain sealed. a federal appellate court ruled today the central bank's board of governors does not have to release those records. a former f.d.i.c. official had sued to make them public. he wanted details on why the fed thought bear's emergency funding was necessary, but the court said revealing that information would undermine the federal reserve's ability to function. as we heard earlier, the job market may have slowed, but that hasn't spoiled the stock appetite of tonight's "market monitor." stephen wood is back with us. he's chief market strategist at russell investments. so he's back at it now with an investment strategy. what does your slower growth outlook mean for strategy, stocks versus bonds? >> yeah, you're probably in a lower return environment and a slower economic growth rate. we don't think it's going to be a recession but it will be a more difficult environment. and i think what that's going to look at it is a globally diversified portfolio, one. and i think also

two of the three judges from the giving the knowledge of the home field but over the game irishman stearns had since two thousand and seven. laws where we leave the sport for the weather's next and roy is here with all the news at the top of the r.c. shortly. twenty years ago the largest country in. the degree to. which had been trying. to teach began a journey. where did it take to.

welcome, your opening statement. >> chairman stearns, ranking member, and members of the committee. thank you for allowing me to testify on this issue. all executive branch agencies to submit plans for review on regulations on their books. our add min straiters had progress of the initial review at the agencies. the report was encouraging as they identified a substantial number of obvious leets and unnecessarily costly regulations. at the same time, the reforms proposed so far constitute only a very small step towards the rolling back of the red tape the american economy needs. much more substantial reform is required. this is not a new issue. it's been increasing over the past three decades to republican as well as democratic administrations. during the present administration, however, the rate of increase reached unprecedented levels. according to figures from data from the government accountability office, federal agencies promulgated an unprecedented 43 major regulations during fiscal 2010 alone imposing annual cost calculated by the agencies themselves at at least $28 billion.

diagnosed with contra syndrome yet he still has a few years before the damage becomes that rapper bill stearns believed to save their son. has to step in. and no single family can deal with this disease on its own the cost of the drug is simply unreal the local authorities often refused to cover the costs for this one thing the state has to house. out of about two hundred fifty children of a hunter syndrome in russia less than half are receiving medical treatment out of about two hundred fifty children to be conscious in germany or russia less than half are receiving medical treatment it's a postcode lottery bailable in reach or areas like moscow and almost unimaginable in poorer towns and that despite the fact that when it comes to these citizenship they're all supposed to be playing on this. kind of like an artsy. stay with us for the business news here not just a few times. i was you know warm welcome to business our team eighteen year long bid to join the world trade organization is coming to an end and it's hoped i was sounding issues would be resolved by the end of july we have talks pas

also on line right now the senate is not laughing out loud as approval from frank stearns paxton's its website posting internal data on twitter and find out about the group's other targets that are its new dot com plus see eyepatch and video of our you tube channel and. it. is. the official g.o.p. convention. from the. video on demand. and omissions for you know in the palm of your. call it's the largest theft of funds in national history that's what american auditor say about six point six billion dollars of missing aid money for iraq the pentagon is closing the books on a reconstruction program and the war torn country but still cannot account for the missing cash a former bush administration official and author of the book america's failure in iraq michael o'brien claims the money went missing under a general petraeus as watch. all of this stuff was going on while david petraeus was the commander of the multinational security transition command in iraq or min sticky you know four or five and this is the same period of time that one hundred ninety thousand a k forty seven and nine mi

gattuso, welcome. >> chairman stearns and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. four months ago the president issued an executive order instructing all executive branch agencies to review regulations in their book. next week and this morning our administrators initialed progress of the review of agencies this report was encouraging as agencies identify the potential of unnecessarily costly regulations. at the same time it proposed to constitute only a small step toward the rollback of red tape in the american economy. much more substantial reform is required. the burden of regulation steadily increased in the last three decades through republican and democratic administrations. during the present administration the rate of increase reached unprecedented levels. according to figures by the heritage foundation data provided by the accountability office, federal agencies got an unprecedented 43 major regulations in fiscal 2010 alone. .. themselves of at least $28 billion. in the same period, a handful of rule makings were completed that reduced burdens o

the narrow liening facilities of the fed employed during the crisis such as the bear stearns and aig facilities were created because there was no other government authority at the time that could be used to protect the financial system for the disorderly failure of large, interconnected financial institutions. the orderly liquidation authority in title ii provides a superior set of tools to manage the resolution of a failing financial firm in crisis, so i don't think we're shedding any tears over our loss of our narrow 13-3 authority. the resolution will be managed by the fdic, but the fed can move a resolution under alt-a along with the treasury which must consult with the president. i believe the fed's role has been strengthened, but it has also strengthened the fdic and other arms of the federal government. now more than ever our success at meeting safety and soundness and financial stability objectives will be dependent on our ability to cooperate with those other regular lay ors -- regulators in the united states and, indeed, with other regulators abroad. thank you. [applause] >

thank you. >> thank you, and your opening statement. >> chairman stearns, ranking member, degette, and distinguished members. we were to submit plans for review and regulations on their books. last week and this morning, our administers reported initial progress of the review at the various agencies. the reports was encouraging as they have a number of obsolete and unnecessarily costly regulations. at the same time, the reforms proposed so far constitute only a very small step towards the roll back of red tape the american economy needs. much more substantial reform is required. this is not a new issue. it's been steadily increasing over the last three decades to republican as well as democratic administration. in the present administration, this reached unprecedented levels. according to figures compiled at the heritage foundation based on gay that given by the government accountability office, federal agencies promulgated an unprecedented 43 major regulations during fiscal 2010 alone proposing annual cost calculated by the agencies themselves of at least $28 billion. in the same peri

, that bear stearns sold mortgage-backed securities and pursued claims against the originators of the mortgages to buy the mortgages back and instead of making them buy it back, took a monetary damage -- monetary damages. even though they no longer had equitable -- excuse me beneficial title and beneficial ownership of the mortgages, they kept that money and said not a word to the investigators. that lawsuit appears to be pending. it's moving to trial that fall. how has jpmorgan chase moved for that litigation? >> i'm generally familiar with some of the litigation in that area. i don't know off of the head the exact way that they have assessed the potential and possible liability under that case which as you noted originated originally with activities that bear stearns pursued, but will certainly be happy to get back to you and give you a specific answer. >> the gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from arizona, mr. chic core? >> thank you. our favorite pop culture phrase is regulatory arbitrage. i want to start with mr. scott, the international, will you give me international,

stearns, thank you for your leadership. i started way back when we used to say don't collected if you can't protected. remember we used to say that? i think we are still saying that. and what a stress but since that time is we haven't had the safeguards. we haven't had to review and a protections of course, and we just have what have we had? we've had more breaches. i like to think have a have something in place we would not have the occurrences that have transpired recently. commissioner ramirez, thank you very much for being here today. my question is going to go to information brokers. and if you want to compare past efforts with the present effort and hopefully we can even improve what we have in the initial draft. h.r. 2221 had a lot as related to information brokers. and i just want to get your opinion as to whether any new version of legislation should maybe also include some of these responsibilities that information brokers should be charged with. we had accuracy access, dispute resolution, aspects or provisions wh

stearns, for five minutes. mr. stearns: good morning, mr. speaker. in march of 2006 then senator obama was on the senate floor and this is what he said. quote, the fact that we are here today to debate raising america's debt limit is a sign of leadership failure. increasing america's debt weakens us domestically and internationally. leadership means the buck stops here. instead washington is shifting the burden of bad choices today on to the backs of our children and grandchildren. america has a debt problem and a failure of leadership. and america deserves better, end quote. but now, mr. speaker, a few short years later, president obama now takes the opposite approach. calling for an increase in the debt limit and threatening doom otherwise. president obama has failed to send to congress a budget that will realistically solve our nation's financial problems. he calls for plans that spend too much and borrows too much and taxes too much. when congress reasonably rejected his plan and proposed a budget with responsible cuts, he turned a political rhet

that bear stearns sold mortgage-backed securities but then pursued claims against the originators ofthe mortgages to buy the mortgages back, and instead of making them buy it back, took a monetary damage, monetary damages. even though they no longer had equitable -- excuse me, beneficial title, beneficial ownership of the mortgages, they kept that money and said not a word to the investors. that lawsuit appears to be pending, it's perhaps moving to trial this fall. how has jpmorgan chase reserved for that litigation? >> um, i'm generally familiar with, you know, some of the litigation in this that area. i don't know off the top of my head the exact way that we have assessed the potential and/or possible liability under that case which, as you noted, you know, originated originally with activities that bear stearns pursued. but we'll certainly be happy to get back to you and give you a specific answer. >> okay. >> gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from arizona is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, madam chairman. this morning, and i don't know if any of you were able

at bear stearns mortgage-backed securities then pursue claims against originators of the mortgages to buy the mortgages back, and instead of making them not back to a monetary damage. even though they no longer have equitable or beneficial titles ownership of the mortgages they kept the money and said not a word to the investors. the lawsuit appears to be attending this fall. how has jpmorgan chase went through that litigation? >> i am generally familiar with some of the litigation in that area. i don't know off the top of my head the exact way that we have assessed the potential liability as you noted originated with activities that bear stearns pursued but would certainly be happy to give back to you and give you a specific answer. >> the gentleman's time is expired. the gentleman from minnesota. five minutes. -- before, madam chair. this morning, and i don't know if any of you were able to hear the testimony this morning but the current pop culture is regulatory arbitrage. and buyers don't start with mr. scott and go from the epidemic from the examples. >> we have on our history wh

. >> certainly bear stearns was a huge player in the mortgage market to overseas firms were allowed to take on, which was something henry paulson importuned the fcc to allow, was to increase leverage these firms could take on their books. and that really let them down the path because only a small loss really was magnified by the lenders they had. there was a tremendous amount of profitability and risk-taking related to mortgages on wall street. look at countrywide, look at bank of america. it is in trouble now because of its lending practices. >> you also have to remember that the mortgage bank security, the residential mortgage was the lowest risk asset permit capital% to, okay. that is a big piece of why the banks went headfirst into this, why they leveraged ecmo why you took mortgage-backed securities and when he didn't have natural buyers for them, he took the mess tranches and bundled them into my leveraged instruments, collateral is debt obligations multiply that further and further. and if you look further in the e-mail files, one of the things you find is that there were other

stearns, for five minutes. mr. stearns: i ask unanimous consent to revise and extend. the speaker pro tempore: without objection. mr. stearns: good morning, mr. speaker. lost mountain hyper bollic statements and -- hyperbolic statements and cause of doom, if congress doesn't raise the debt ceiling is something our nation faces, the out-of-control spending that's become epidemic here in congress. no doubt a technical default in august surely would be problematic. but much worse would be the results if republicans cave to democrats and no significant funding reforms is implemented. today, my colleagues, 68 cents of every dollar spent on entitlement programs by the year 2025 the government will spend 100% of every dollar on revenues on entitlements. the united states is over $14 trillion in debt, and without spending cuts and the deficit and our national debt we will continue to grow. we must begin to rein in spending and bring about the fiscal changes to protect our children from this growing burden of debt. mr. speaker, importantly, markets understand the difference bet

history of man by bailing out a.i.g., citigroup, all the banks every other company except lehman and br stearns that were in trouble? so moral hazard, we've been down that road. >> rose: what is the health of wall street today? >> i think it's ver healthy. >> rose: so it's recovered well? >> yes. some of the big banks which i would call commercial banks, not wall street, are struggling certainly because. bank of america, for instance. >> rose: is still in trouble? >> it's struggling more than goldman sachs. goldman sachs is doing very we. there are two different tiers. >> rose: and too big to fail? >> alive and well. >> rose: and bank of america, for example, bought merrill lynch and is bigger than ever. >> that's another paradox which is that you have banks too big to fail that were all right big, even bigger now that we are in the midst of this crisis. is. >> rose: what's going to be done about fannie maend freddie mac? >> well, congress is going to wrestle over it. it's going to be a food fight and i caot make a prediction about what's going to happen. >> rose: but what about the battle of w

i mean it was thought out there that while look, bear stearns was rescued at the beginning of 2008. lehman was next. we had to at some point let some banks fail and see where the chips fell. so at least the government didn't have to come out and make a blanket kind of blank check statement that the entire system will be bailed out. obviously the french and germans can't afford that again the risk here is that this goes from portugal, italy, ireland, greece and jumps to spain and heaven forbid it jumps from spain to france which truly has systemic exposure across the pond. >> so we're talking about potentially a number of countries, jacob kirkegaard and mainly to an american audience here. what about the affects in the united states sm. >> well, i think the immediate affects if this is-- effects if this is contained f we can avoid con stage-- con stage on to spain, the immediate effect to the united states need not be very large. because actually the u.s. financial system is not particularly exposed to greece or to ireland. >> woodruff: the banks, the bondholders. >> yeah, the banks,

when bear stearns failed and aig failed i don't think markets transparency as to how these were goingto travel in the system. we knew aig was large. we knew bear stearns was a clearing agent for all practical purposes, but we didn't have any way of knowing who was expose, how much to these risks. i suspect that the transfer in these situations have not changed much since then. if tomorrow a large dealer was to get into trouble, i'm not convinced the market knows enough about who's exposed to whom, who should pay primarily be concerned about our weather be a generalized uncertainty about this situation in a panic. so, perhaps even while the authorities getting in shape for my want to push on the transference he. the last thing i want to touch upon is fannie mae and freddie mac. dodd-frank act one sentence on gses, because the treasury should come out with a proposal by february 2011, as potentially the most systemic institutions of the country, one would have thought perhaps made a role for them in there. nevertheless the treasury has a plan, but it has three plans. a private solution

we knew bear stearns was a risk, but we did not know to what degree. i suspect the transformation has not changed much since then. if a large dealer were tomorrow to get into trouble, our primary concerns would be rude to be concerned about in a situation -- who've to be concerned about in a situation where there is panic. the last thing i want to touch upon is standing and freddie mac. dodd-fran k had one sentence on shouldhat the treasury come out with one by 2011. nevertheless, the treasury has a plan -- three plants. an affordable solution in housing through the eighth -- the fha, a private solution in good times, and equivalent of a gse to support -- to support new lending. the most important thing is they do not have a plan for the involvement of these plants. political forces suggest this will be more likely in march of 20 -- of 2013. currentlyare monetizing 90% of those that have been relocated. if we do not get private sector in this market any time soon, then most likely the united states, will gradually along the entire mortgage credit risk

. >> my time is expired but i'm going to work with chairman stearns and ranking member degette and chairmann and ranking member waxman. we are going to follow-up on this, and we are going to expect -- we are going to work cooperatively with you and your staff. but if you have any authority now is the time to exercise it. >> thank you, gentlemen. mr. solomon is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman for holding this hearing and mr. sunstein for being here. what is the process for determining whether a regulation is subject to executive order? >> the basic idea is it is significant meaning does it have $100 million annual cost on the economy or benefit by the way and $100 million in in pact dennett can be deemed significant also if it affects a factor or an area so there can be something that falls short of the $100 million threshold but nonetheless an economic effect or generates novel issues of policy or law. so the net is wide but it doesn't include routine or mechanical kind of daily monday in things. >> i have right here a proposal to a disapproval of oklahoma's implemen

stearns? >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you for holding this hearing.eiterate to my colleague to mr. hanson. we appreciate your service and your willingness to come here and to really be honest and read through your opening statement, you indicated that when you were discharged from the marine corps, you knew you healthy individual. but at the same time, you did anybody. and it was a feeling, i guess, in your own mind -- you said it in your opening statement that you felt indestructible. that because you were in the marine corps and yet you had served yet you were struggling. you suggested that perhaps everyone should realize that they should get some help and perhaps as an incentive to have compensation withheld. let me ask you this, do you think -- if you not talk about and talk about the military services, do you think the marine corps itself should have briefed you before you were discharged to say, look, it's not being less of marine if you realize you need help? and that somehow this feeling not in the marine corps but all the military, that you'r