officer stearns and sgt. kane could have done nothing. officer came and started o'malley also could have decided not to. each of these officers showed restraint in not firing their weapons where a suspect provocative action would normally end in shooting. these officers were awarded the gold medal of valor. [applause] >> a sgt. paine, who could not be here tonight, was also awarded the gold medal of valor. >> it is with great pride that we honor these individuals for their valor. every day, officers put their lives at risk and do very good police work and we do not do enough to thank them for that. i am brought to be part of a ceremony where we can point to these heroes and thank them publicly, the way that we should do so every day publicly. so thank you again. [applause] the police commission and the park would would also like to think the diversity of california's san francisco for its generous support in co- sponsored tonight's event. we would like to single out the community relations office and the conference center office for putti

jerry stearns is an attorney and a lawsuit just filed has caught his attention.lfc was the owner of a yemeni air jet that crashed in the indian ocean in 2009, killing off but one passenger. the suit against ilfc claims yemeni air had such a poor and well documented safety record that they were negligent in leasing them an aircraft. it is very similar to a land mark $165 million settlement sterns helped win of the families of the victims of this april 2002 air philippines crash. >> it averaged out $1.5 million per passenger. >> reporter: in that case, sterns and others did not go after the foreign company flying the plane, but aar, the american company leasing it to them. you see, after being flown for more than 30 years by southwest airlines, the boeing 737 had been retired to an arizona bone yard. a kind of airplane graveyard where old jets go to be picked over for parts or scrapped. but this plane didn't stay. it was bought by aar, then leased to the startup philippine carrier. the lawsuit even uncovered an inspection done of the plane and the inspector's concl

jason stearns had a big baggie manuscript and clive said there's a book in here and we're going to findand they honed the book. clive's claim for the book you can't understand anything in the newspaper in the congo if you haven't read this book because the story is that complicated and the news stories are such a tiny piece of the whole of what's really happening there. and the reviews have bourne this out, the "wall street journal," the economist, i could go on and on but the reviews of this book have been just an amazing response. and we're really seeing people not backing away but saying, i want to know about this story. i want to hear more about the congo. >> dr. paul farmer. >> well, paul farmer, as everyone knows, partners in health. and has worked so hard to develop health care in places like haiti. has a very interesting, you know, medical school kind of organization and practicing medicine on the ground in places like haiti. and the effect of the earthquake in haiti and the work they've done and the level that they got to know haiti, he just said, i want to write about it. i wa

larry cabbage, stearns school of businessed and mr. smith, chief operating council of public employees retirement association. i would remind you your written statements are made part of the record and you will be recognized five minutes. mr sharma. >> thank you, members of the subcommittee. good morning. my name is deven sharma and i am president of standard and poor's and served in that capacity since 2007. i am pleased to appear before you today. much has changed with regard to credit rating agencies over the past several years. both in terms of how we go about the work and the regulatory framework in which we operate. for our part we at standard and poor's have undertaken a variety of initiatives in recent years designed to further our fundamental mission of providing high-quality independent benchmarks about credit worthiness of debt security. these initiatives include measures to strengthen governance and control framework and have the analytics and criteria for you to raise issues and issuers and clearly communicate the rational

stearns and put together a bipartisan bill that make the requirement? >> letters for two commissioner kovacic. >> commissioner bart and i like to chorus that will make do with that compels us to do. i was a junior casey and learned that the ftc for the first time in 1879 and i think it has think it has been in the dna of the agency internally, probably because of our large team of economists to do this kind of introspective work, as long as i've known the agency. but emphasize that i think what would be very good is two things, first for us to have perhaps a more frequent conversation inside insight is with yourself about what we do. in 2008, 2000 we did a comprehensive self-study by regency in benchmark ourselves counterparts overseas. we talked extensively with counterparts at the federal state government. get a substantial assessment of what we redoing. i think it would be helpful on one friend to have a congressman speak about measures we do take that aren't obliged. in the second as if you have mentioned. >> i've got 20 seconds left and i have one

see how future financial ceos are going to be taking excess risks because they look back at bear stearnsaig or think the same thing would be fine for their institutions. the moral hazard problem should be viewed through the realistic lines and not as a bumper sticker. let me note also the cost of financial breakdown of not stepping in and would have made recession we're in now even worse. in other words, despite the many mistakes along the way the fed and the treasury made several steps toi prevent a total breakdown of the financial sector. one of the things the movie too big to fail got correct was the serious and imminent danger of economic collapse faced in the fall of 2008. we are now in a situation where our financial institutions are even more concentrated than they were before the crisis having merged under pressure from the treasury. among these ures large institutions would be even harder to deal with than before. and we have limited the power of the fedh and the treasury to del with them. the second question with dodd-frank is whether it, in fact, is creating an unwieldily stru

stearns: i thank the gentleman. all the time given on the amendment which he has very little time to look at. again, this happened and i'm pleased he's supporting this amendment. obviously i will not call for a vote and appreciate the appropriators supporting my amendment. mr. dicks: i yield back. the chair: the gentleman from new jersey yields back. the question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from florida. those in favor say aye. those opposed, no. in the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. the amendment is agreed to. for what purpose does the gentleman from texas rise? >> i have an amendment at the desk. the chair: the clerk will report the amendment. the clerk: page 31, line 17, after the dollar amount, insert reduced by $13 million. after the dollar amount insert increase by $10 million. page 34, line 1, after the dollar amount insert increase by $10 million. the chair: the gentleman from texas is recognized for five minutes. mr. sessions: thank you, mr. chairman, mr. chairman, first, i'd like

>> bear stearns was a big player and the leverage the firms coupled take on was something henry paulsonowed, to increase the leverage that the firms could take on their books, and that really led them dop the path to fruition because only a small loss was magnified by the leverage that they had. there was tremendous amount of profitability and risk taking relating to mortgages on wall street. look at country wide, look at bank of america -- it's in trouble now because of its lending practices. >> yeah, i mean, you also have to remember that the residential mortgage was the lowest risk asset from a capital perspective, okay? that's a big piece of why they went into this, why they lev ramminged it -- lev ramminged it and when you didn't have buyers for them, you took the tranches and bundled them into more debt obligations and then multiplied that further and further, and if you looked back in the e-mail files of the financial cry, one of the things you find is that there are other institutions that would have gone down because they retained risk. you have a risk retention rule saying we

through france and switzerland two germany and went to see the foreign minister to talk about peace stearns and asked him what what may be the terms of peace went back to england and saw people in the british government and tried to suggest peace terms to them. it was an impossible lone wolf mission of diplomacy that failed. but over the course of four and a half years, the worst conflict the world had seen with 20 million dead, she was the only person in europe literally traveling from one side to the other in search of peace. she had great influence on a young cousin of hers, stephen hophouse he refused the draft and thrown into solitary confinement because he was leading a protest against the rule of silence her. he said and said i will speak to my fellow human beings whether prisoners or guards whenever i feel like nobody can stop me and threw him into solitary purpose he has three brothers in uniform, two were at the front one was later killed but before he was coming he sent a message back to the parents telling them tell steven not to lose heart. the very interesting relationship. ju

when bear stearns failed, it was leveraged at 34-1. lehman brothers, about 30-1. now the government can stop that and is instructed to stop that. that's what's really in the financial reform bill. and it says, by the way, if somehow they get around us and they fail again, no more bailouts, here's an orderly procedure for bankruptcy so the management and the shareholders have to eat the loss. in other words, the democrats passed the bill, which was designed to stop future meltdowns and future bailouts and people were voting against them thinking they were the bailout parties. then they cut medicare. that's the most interesting thing of all. the republicans ran to the left of the democrats on medicare until they got in. they reduced the amount of increase given to certain medicare services, particularly the medicare advantage program, which is a private company insurance managed program, and use the money to close the doughnut hole in the senior citizens drug program, and to add years to the life of the medicare trust fund. but nobody knew it. and now, one of the mo

. >> well, certainly, bear stearns is a huge player in the mortgage market, and the fact that the leverage that these firms were allowed to take on which was something that henry paulson importuned the sec to allow, it was to increase the leverage that these firms could take on their books. that really led them down the path to perdition because only a small loss really was magnified by the leverage that they had. there was a tremendous amount of profitability and risk taking related to mortgages on wall street. look at countrywide, look at bank of america. it's in trouble now because of its lending practices. >> yeah, i mean, you also have to remember that the mortgage-backed security, well, the residential mortgage was the lowest risk asset from a capital perspective. okay? and that's a big piece of why the banks went head first into this, why they leveraged it, why you took mortgage-backed securities, and then when you didn't have natural buyers for them, you took the tranches and bundled them into more leveraged instruments, collateralized debt obligations, and then multiplied that fur

finally we brought down bear stearns and the lehman brothers. it's only then like the citigroups and washington mutuals and bank of americas, you know, saw their very lives threatened and so you call this introduction by saying that the penalty we're going to talk about is ask the question with all our attention focused nowadays in the regulatory arena on the banking system whatever happened to the shadow banking system? you know, where all the problems began? and you can sort of think of this in two ways, at least i think of it in two ways. there's two opposing forces at work. the -- the immediate force is the flight of safety force which basically is that in the aftermath of the crisis, the weakest have all collapsed. the ones who are most associated with the excesses that brought on the crisis. they're gone. they're gone or they have been bought out or changing their charter. and if that's the case then we don't really to have worry about a shadow banking system because it basically imlated itself. there's another way as time goes on memories

if you mean the kind of intervention that kept edgy going or that kept bear stearns alive and was sold, no, below is very clear. if any large financial institution whose demise would have broader consequences failed, that is when the death penalty -- the death panels, to place. that institution is deval. the shareholders will be wiped out. the executives would be fired and the mine have to pay back up to two-years of salary. the question for federal officials will be -- if you -- but none of it is debts, would that have affects that reverberated throughout the economy in a negative way? if so, the institution is in power under the law to pick and choose and pay as little as is necessary to avoid further damage. what hank paulson as for in the spring of 2008, had he predicted this was the case that he had a choice when lehman brothers and a i g -- as he read the law at the time -- you either pay all the debt or none of the debts. they paid none of the debts of lehman brothers and it paid all the debts for aig and it was neither situation was good. the fdic wanted to pay some of the debt

it is the nature of the race, whether you're bear stearns, which probably wouldn't have been caught underneath the size limit. it is the nature of the risk that you're bringing on that gives us pause. and second of all, giving sifis, if we can do at giving them what i'll call a marginal capital requirements above, i think that would be fine, but i don't have any faith in it at all because it will be co-opted within three years of the recovery. on all kinds. for example, the resistance to 7% equity or tier one equity and then kind of an add-on to that is ferocious. once the economy turns around and institutions are now out to be found again and we'll start a road in this capital requirements just as we have in every instance in the past. so i don't have a last. for separating the nature of the risk will give you a more stable economy over time the new appeal to enforce the rules were clearly. one of the difficulties in terms of supervision of these sifis is they are so complex they don't understand it and the supervisors can't deal with the issues. they have to simplify the system and i think i

when bear stearns failed in his 30 to one. lehman brothers about four to one. that's what's really in a financial reform bill. and by the way, if somehow they get around this and fail again, nomar bailouts. here's an orderly procedure for bankruptcy in the management and shareholders have to beat the loss. in other words come the democrat would prevent future meltdowns and future bailouts and people were going and voting against them thinking they were the bailout party. then there was they cut medicare. remember that one? that was the most interesting thing at all. republicans reach the last on medicare until they got in. they reduce the amount of increase given to certain medicare services, particularly the private company insurance manage program and use the money to close the doughnut hole and the drug program and add the rest of the life of the medicare trust fund, but nobody knew it. and now to your business, one of the most important does the president signed and supported the secretary of education arne duncan supported with a both a radically reformed

martha: jail time already served, over 1,000 days will count towards her stearns.at math that means wednesday will be her last day in jail. casey served a total of 2 years and 10 months in jail. she is ordered to pay more than $46,000 in fines and court costs. so that is where that stands. we'll watch her walk out on wednesday. so riveting new reaction from one of the jurors who decided casey anthony's fate. her name is jennifer ford. watch this. >> there wasn't enough evidence -- wasn't anything strong enough to say exactly -- i don't think anyone in america could tell us exactly how she died. if you put even just the 12 jurors in one room and write down how caylee died, nobody knows, we would be guessing. >> so it was cause of death? >> how can you punish someone if you don't know what they did. >> the prosecution wasn't able to give you a solid enough picture? >> i have no idea. they didn't even paint a picture for me to consider. how did she die. if you are going to charge someone with murder, don't you have to know how they died, or motive. >> she does not rep

going or kept bear stearns or preserved what was involved, no. no. the law is very clear. if anyone's financial institution whose demise would have broader consequences failed, that's where the debt panels come into place. that i.n.s. institution dissolved. its shareholders are wiped out. its executives are fired. they might well have to pay back some of their last two years of salary. the i.n.s. is over. then the question -- the institution is over. if it paid none of its debts, would that have effects that reverberate throughout the economy in a negative way? if so, institutions have the power to pick and choose and pay as little as as is necessary to avoid further damage. what hank paulson asked for in the spring of 2008, more than three years ago. he predicted, and this was the case. he had a choice when lehman and a.i.g. -- as he -- as he read the law at the time. he even paid all the debt and none of the debt. both were bad situations. so yes, there is an ability on the part of financial institutions, the fdic, to make some payment of some of the debt. they can pay p

stearns that also had a line of questions about how long it's been taking to free up the spectrum andt out so that the private sector can be utilizing it. the cost of private industry that i worry about, i know other members worry about. they're thinking, ok, if we're going to have this, how much time do we have to get this out to market so they're not creating something today that -- my greatest fear is i never look in the paper to see what these things are on sale for, it's usually the week after i buy it, they're 50% off. you know, i think the same thing is happening in technology, that things lose so quickly. you know, again, if you could elaborate more on more on how we can assure business to get this spectrum to them so that it can utilize it, so that it can get developed. i don't care if it's new laptaps or you name it, or in your testimony, you list the different areas that folks will be using smart phones, tab lets, and tap tops, but we want to make sure they can develop it today knowing it can be out there. >> it's a very good question. the first thing i would refer you to i

when bear stearns failed it was leveraged at 34-1. lehman brothers about 30-1.tructed to stop that. that is what is in the financial reform bill. and if somehow they get around this and fail again no more bailout. here's an orderly procedure for bankruptcies of management and shareholders have to eat the loss. the democrats have passed the bill which was designed to prevent future meltdowns and future bailouts and people were going in voting against them thinking they were the bailout party. then there was -- they cut medicare. remember that? that was the most interesting thing of all. republicans ran to the left of democrats on medicare until they got in. what they did was to reduce the amount of increase given to certain medicare services particularly the medicare advantage program which was a private insurance managed program and used the money to close the doughnut hole and to add years to the life of the medicare trust fund but nobody knew it. now to your business. one of the most important bills the president signed and supported and secretary of education

stearns and put together a bipartisan bill that would make it a requirement? >> well, let me defer to commissioner kavacic because i know he wants to add something here. >> congressman barton, i quarrel with your suggestion that we do only what the gun at the head compels us to do. i was a junior case handler at the f.t.c. for the first time in 1979. and i think it's been in the d.n.a. of the agency internally, partly because of our structure, partly because we have a large team of economists to do this kind of introspective work. as long as i've known the agency. and i would emphasize that i think what would be very constructive would be two things. first is for us to have perhaps a more frequent conversation in settings like this with your staff about what we do. in 2008 and 2009, we did a comprehensive self-study of our agency. we benchmarked ourselves with 40 of our counterparts overseas. we talked extensively with our counterparts at the federal and state government and we did a substantial publicly available assessment of how we're doing. i think it woul

bear stearns and had government assisted deal done for it and even though its shareholders took some loss they still were kept alive and everybody else was protected. so, you know, hindsight is always 20, 20. this is going forward why we push so hard for resolution authority. one of the other problems of lehman bankruptcy and bankruptcy in general is the way derivatives contracts are treated. so with our process we can actually require derivatives counterparties to continue to perform. in a ups about they have the right to close out the positions and pull their collateral out and that led to a lot of the disruption with the lehman bankruptcy. i think perhaps the best lesson learned how to fix that going forward what we tried to do with providing broader powers for what we call title 2 fdic style resolution authorities that con provide continuity of operations you just don't get in bankruptcy. >> okay. one question, someone says efforts among republicans now to water down some of the reforms as one a member of gop yourself are you particularly disappointed about that? >> watered down?

aig, lehman brothers, bear stearns, and other organizations all had these on the balance sheets before the crash. that did not perform well and the financial crisis because they typically contain ongoing obligations to make cash payments. they are seen as debt obligations that would not provide a cushion in the way that real equity would. but the resulting loss and instability is borne largely by the public and not the banks themselves. what is the bottom line? the best solution is a broader corporate tax reform effort that would eliminate the debt equity distortion altogether, including eliminating the deduction for interest, and the deduction for corporate equity, or moving to a corporate cash flow or consumption system. if congress is interested in moving more immediately on this, i suggest to focus on financial institutions. there were the problem is. the have the most excessive leverage. and the failure imposes enormous social costs. one approach would be to eliminate the deduction of interest by financial institutions to the extent the debt equity ratio exceeds five- one. the goa

and the run in the repo market around the time of lehman and really, before that, bear stearns is whatprecipitated most immediately the crisis. has anything changed? there's certainly been no regulatory change, but is there any reason to think that the repo market is less vulnerable to a run, is there any more market discipline in who financial institutions will lend to through the repo market? um, well, professor, bullard -- professor bullard, you talked about the possibility of run in money market, money market funds. have you given any thought to that? >> >> i don't, i don't follow the repo market as such, but the problem with the repo market is it gives a superficial sense of confidence in that it looks like something that's almost immediate cash. t easy to forget that what stand behind it is a single counterparty which presents issuer risk. rule 207 has long regulated repos in, i think, the right way by understanding you have an issuer standing behind that repo. and i'm not aware of any problems in the money market world that have stemmed from repo liquidity or value as butch. >>

stearns: facing our nation's debt onto the backs of our country's children and grandchildren is irresponsible. comparable reductions would be in the amount of $2 trillion. but as that does not even cover the interest on the debt, a $4 triion spending reduction would be appropriate. and that's what we should be working on. today we must ask ourselves, is this blessed country of ours disciplined enough to solve the debt problem through austerity and productivity? i think we can. i believe we can. but only if we break from the tradition of spending and raising our debt limit. instead we must pass h.r. 2560. the cut, cap and balance act. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from maryland. mr. van hollen: mr. speaker, i reserve. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from new jersey. mr. garrett: with that i yield one minute to the gentleman from north dakota. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from north dakota. >> thank you, mr. speaker. we've been down this road before. our country faces unprecedented debt. bergburg the house has worked to cut spending an

stearns: i make a point of order against the gentleman's amendment. mr. chairman -- mr. young: i make a point of order against the gentleman's amendment. the amendment may not be considered en bloc, section 3j of house resolution 5, the 112th congress, because the amendment does not merely propose to transfer appropriations among objects in the bill but also proposes language other than the amounts. and i ask for a ruling on the point of order. the chair: does any other member wish to be heard on this point of order? the chair will rule. to be considered en bloc pursuant to section 3j1 of house resolution 5, an amendment must propose only to transfer appropriations from an object or objects in the bill to a spend regular ducks account. because the amendment offered by the gentleman from vermont proposes other changes to the bill, namely changing the level of limitation, it may not avail itself of section 3-j-1 of house resolution 5 to address the spending reduction account. the amendment is not in order. for what purpose does to the gentleman from new york rise? >> mr. c

chairman stearns? indicated to congressmen bart and i don't have any specific recommendation for you will certainly anything the committee decided to draft we would be happy to work with you in any way. >> commissioner bixby 16? >> i think a government with rick healey if and legislative should review the legislation's, so with that in order i would certainly endorse that and then as the transit, i have a specific example about hydropower licensing i'm happy to provide greater with the complicated given the number of the federal laws involved but in the help we can provide and would be happy to do so. >> also happy to work with you all well as my colleague pointed out i think only four rules that we have actually are within right flanks, but we do the reviews and i will repeat to my colleague petraeus connect dave, already these days. enormous value of having committees and the congress has assessed before the fact the likely impact and regulation of the legislative adopted you are developing in this h

now, let's for instance take bear stearns and laymen, two of the most famous examples. they had regulators on site while lehman was transferring money offshore a day before the reports of measuring and the money -- they were bringing identity before they report. they were taking it back -- barring it enlisting in this capital the day after their quarterly reports, moving it off short. you had regulators on site should have picked that up. if you have 20 regulators in an institution and there were between 12 and 20 regulators inside that institution when they were violating the rule, what good does it do to bring claymore regulators and if they violated the rules that exist had they not done that. we are now withers said prime lending that those are unregulated institutions. all your institutions to get around the law and that included wells fargo. that included -- they haven't unregulated subprime operation. what brought waconia or bank of america to the edge where they purchased sub prime lenders, countrywide, great western or golden western. so those are unregulated i

when bear stearns failed, it was leverage that 34-1. lehman brothers, about 30-1. now the government can stop that and they have been instructed to stop that. and, by the way, if somehow they get around us and fail again, there is no bailout so the shareholders have to eat the loss. in other words, the democrats to pass the bill that was designed to prevent future meltdowns and future bailouts and people were going into the against them thinking that they would the bailout party. then they cut medicare. remember that one? the republicans ran to the left of medicare until i went in. they want to reduce the amount of increase given to certain medicare services, particularly the medicare advantage program, which is a company-managed program -- and use the money to close the doughnut on the senior citizens drug program and add years to life of the medicare trust fund. but nobody knew it. one of the most important bills the president signed and supporters and that arne duncan supported was a bill that radically reformed the student loan program. by making a national sys

share of revenues and rollback existing contracts and the players want to call into question david stearnesand the players oppose the hard salary cap, and they would also like to see increased revenue sharing between the teams. kiran and ali, this is where we stand. the lockout. unprecedented really in u.s. sports as both the nfl and the nba have gone this route. >> you better let me know early if you want a piece of my yankees tickets. they will be worth a lot more come fall. >> no doubt. >> you can still catch a baseball game and hockey game for now. >> good to see you, mark. thanks. >>> a shocking story. nadia suleiman known as the octomom, she has maybe gone over the edge. her stunning comments in a recent interview. >>> we know that casey anthony will not be testifying in her own defense. did both sides do enough to try to prove their case? >>> coming up, amazing video. a piece of it. divers encounter a 25-foot long whale shark. >> pretty amazing. >>> also ever wonder what it would look like when a mold of a jell-o explodes? personally, no. we will show it to you. the most unique fourt

stearns: facing our nation's debt onto the backs of our country's children and grandchildren is irresponsible. comparable reductions would be in the amount of $2 trillion. but as that does not even cover the interest on the debt, a $4 trillion spending reduction would be appropriate. and that's what we should be working on. today we must ask ourselves, is this blessed country of ours disciplined enough to solve the debt problem through austerity and productivity? i think we can. i believe we can. but only if we break from the tradition of spending and raising our debt limit. instead we must pass h.r. 2560. the cut, cap and balance act. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from maryland. mr. van hollen: mr. speaker, i reserve. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from new jersey. mr. garrett: with that i yield one minute to the gentleman from north dakota. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from north dakota. >> thank you, mr. speaker. we've been down this road before. our country faces unprecedented debt. bergburg the house has worked to cut spending

stearns: facing our nation's debt onto the backs of our country's children and grandchildren is irresponsible. comparable reductions would be in the amount of $2 trillion. but as that does not even cover the interest on the debt, a $4 trillion spending reduction would be appropriate. and that's what we should be working on. today we must ask ourselves, is this blessed country of ours disciplined enough to solve the debt problem through austerity and productivity? i think we can. i believe we can. but only if we break from the tradition of spending and raising our debt limit. instead we must pass h.r. 2560. the cut, cap and balance act. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from maryland. mr. van hollen: mr. speaker, i reserve. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from new jersey. mr. garrett: with that i yield one minute to the gentleman from north dakota. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from north dakota. >> thank you, mr. speaker. we've been down this road before. our country faces unprecedented debt. bergburg the house has worked to cut spending

right to carry reciprocity act of 2011 which was introduced by my colleague, representative cliff stearns of florida. this allows any person with a state issued conceal to carry in every other state. their states will apply. in illinois, i refuse to deny visitors the right to carry weapons when they are so authorized to do so. . we must allow law-abidinging citizens to own and bear arms. we must restore, defend, and preserve this constitutional right at all government levels. i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the chair recognizes the gentleman from washington, mr. mcdermott, for five minutes. mr. mcdermott: i ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks. the speaker pro tempore: without objection. mr. mcdermott: madam speaker, over the past several weeks we have been debating ways to reduce the federal deficit. republicans have said that everything is on the table and that nothing is sacred, but that just isn't true. the republicans refuse to cut tax give aways to the wealthy and special interests in this country, and when it comes to discussing the merits of continuing our

lehman brothers and bear stearns. their budget is subject to congressional authorization.o you think they were effective regulators? >> i think the ftc has had some regulatory failures. the chamber said that changes were needed. on the other hand, if you look at the federal trade commission, many people say the federal trade commission has been a successful and effective consumer regulator. if you compare it to the antitrust division, a lot of people will say it has been an effective antitrust regulator. >> i would like to go to mr. levitin. you have heard this dialogue. what is your impression? >> mr. pincus is being kind in characterizing the ftc as a consumer protection agency. it is held on a tight leash by congress. if you think back to 1980, the ftc had advertising targeting children as unfair. congress stepped in and choked off the ftc's budget. we see congress itself acting on cigarette ads targeting children. i do not know if that is how we want to do our regulation. the most instructive comparison would be the office of the comptroller of currency. no commission

it is the nature of the risk -- whether you are bear stearns -- which probably wouldn't have the -- have been caught underneath the size limit. it is the nature of the risk that you are bringing on that gives us pause. second of all the digging -- if we could give them marginal capital requirements above, i think that could be fine but i don't have any faith in it at all because it will be coopted within three years of the recovery. for example, the resistance to 7% equity it for a tier one equity and then adding on to that. once the economy and the institutions are supposed to be sound again, we will start eroding the capital requirements just like we have in every instance in the past. so i don't think it will last. but separating out the nature of the wrist diving will give you a more stable economy over time and you will be able to enforce the rules more clearly. one of the difficulties in terms of supervision of these is it is so horribly complex their directors don't understand it, their management don't understand and and the supervisor can't deal with all of the issues. so you ha

good morning, chairman stearns, ranking members, and guests. thank you for the opportunity to testify along with my colleague on behalf of the consumer product safety commission. i had been a commissioner at the agency since august 2009. i am honor to sit in the company of so many of my fellow independent agency commissioners, and i bring you regret from chairman tannenbaum who was not able to be here today. in order for me to respond to the subcommittee was a request -- the subcommittee's request, i've briefly need to review a few critical points about will making. i do so to make the point that we have undertaken both the promulgation of the and the retrospective review this by our being exempt from the orders. so i would like to make a few observations, and i promise i will be brief. first, since 1981, the cpsc has been required under amendments to the consumer product safety act and other forces to conduct an exhaustive cost-benefit analysis when we write safety rules. under these amendments, our cost benefit approach is as comprehensive if