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Dec 30, 2014
12/14
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steven d. lee later wrote, john bell hood was so physically incapacitated while acting in the role of an in-field commander that he never should have been selected as the army's commander. hood's lack of endurance and vulnerability to fatigue makes far more sense in explaining why he wasn't on the front lines at spring hill to make critical decisions when needed. a succession of generals and curriers had to make their way back and forth from the hood headquarters at the thompson house to convey data and get instructions. this was the real boondoggle for the confederates at spring hill. and while hood could give authority to frank cheatham for these operations he could not delegate the responsibility. hood was thus directly to blame for what happened despite the confusion, mistakes and omissions of others particularly frank cheatham who was very much a culprit. a dire result of skofield's army escaping hood's trap by marching past the confederates at spring hill that night resulted in the obvious ca
steven d. lee later wrote, john bell hood was so physically incapacitated while acting in the role of an in-field commander that he never should have been selected as the army's commander. hood's lack of endurance and vulnerability to fatigue makes far more sense in explaining why he wasn't on the front lines at spring hill to make critical decisions when needed. a succession of generals and curriers had to make their way back and forth from the hood headquarters at the thompson house to convey...
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Dec 29, 2014
12/14
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steven d. lee later wrote, john bell hood was so physically incapacitated while acting in the role of an in-field commander that he never should have been selected as the army's commander. hood's lack of endurance and vulnerability to fatigue makes far more sense in explaining why he wasn't on the front lines at spring hill to make critical decisions when needed. a succession of generals and curriers had to make their way back and forth from the hood headquarters at the thompson house to convey data and get instructions. this was the real boondoggle for the confederates at spring hill. and while hood could give authority to frank cheatham for these operations, he could not delegate the responsibility. hood was thus directly to blame for what happened despite the confusion, mistakes, and omissions of others, particularly frank cheatham who was very much a culprit. a dire result of schofield's army escaping hood's trap by marching past the confederates at spring hill that night resulted in the obviou
steven d. lee later wrote, john bell hood was so physically incapacitated while acting in the role of an in-field commander that he never should have been selected as the army's commander. hood's lack of endurance and vulnerability to fatigue makes far more sense in explaining why he wasn't on the front lines at spring hill to make critical decisions when needed. a succession of generals and curriers had to make their way back and forth from the hood headquarters at the thompson house to convey...
199
199
Dec 30, 2014
12/14
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steven d. leeng in the role of an in-field commander that he nevere should have been selected as the army's commander. of hood's lack of endurance and vulnerability to fatigue makes bn[[&gga far more sense in explaining whyn he wasn't on the front lines at spring hill to make critical e decisions when needed.[-09Ñ a succession of generals and th f curriers had to make their way back and forth from the hood headquarters at the thompson vey house to convey data and get 51h,iuq%=9m9ñí ondoggle this was the real boondoggle for the confederates at spring hill. and while hood could give authority to frank cheatham for nxl8i these operations, he could not delegate the responsibility. hood was thus directly to blame for what happened despite the ;qbap r(t&háhp &hc% confwp+<1j ()qák nd omissions of others, particularly frank cheatham who éyx a a dire result of schofield's d's army escaping hood's trap by rap marching past the confederates at spring hill that night the resulted in the obvious cause t for the
steven d. leeng in the role of an in-field commander that he nevere should have been selected as the army's commander. of hood's lack of endurance and vulnerability to fatigue makes bn[[&gga far more sense in explaining whyn he wasn't on the front lines at spring hill to make critical e decisions when needed.[-09Ñ a succession of generals and th f curriers had to make their way back and forth from the hood headquarters at the thompson vey house to convey data and get 51h,iuq%=9m9ñí...
157
157
Dec 30, 2014
12/14
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primarily based on recently discovered personal papers written by former army steven d. lee.a conversation with general a.p. stewart. stewart heard on the 30th of oh november. he felt remorse for failure at spring hill. due to the decision not to launch an attack there on the 29th. stewart believed, and i quote immediately afterwards and said no such wait should be on his mind. in that feeling lost soon afterwards. brown's and lee's accounts have to be treated with a degree of caution. both were written after the war in the context of an acrimony use dispute as to who was to blame for the events at spring mill. suffice it to say whatever cleburne felt he must undoubtedly have been disappointed and angry at the chance missed.]%÷ as he surveyed the fortified union positions from winstead hill that disappointment must have been magnified. as cleburne waited for the troops to arrive that day, he whiled away the time with@5umuz of checkers with a member of his staff. the last down time of his life. the general gathered different colored leaves to use for gaming pieces. it wasn't l
primarily based on recently discovered personal papers written by former army steven d. lee.a conversation with general a.p. stewart. stewart heard on the 30th of oh november. he felt remorse for failure at spring hill. due to the decision not to launch an attack there on the 29th. stewart believed, and i quote immediately afterwards and said no such wait should be on his mind. in that feeling lost soon afterwards. brown's and lee's accounts have to be treated with a degree of caution. both...