and stimson tells him more about the project. it's interesting, too, that in those 82 days as vice president truman did not know about the manhattan project. it takes him becoming president before he is told about the project. of course, at this point they have not done a successful test. but the work has been going on in two or three different locations actually. as they start to develop the atomic bomb that we'll hear more about during the rest of this evening's presentation. so this is the first document i wanted to share with you out of the ten artifacts i'm going to share tonight because it really provides the context of when truman first finds out about the manhattan project and those interesting anecdotes that he didn't know while he was vice president he would come closer to it as a senator and it's about two weeks after he's president where stimson sits down and gives him all the detail. now, stimson, who had actually obviously worked in the fdr administration is really the person that's in charge of the whole operation.

>> it was secretary of war stimson. he was crucial. not only did he head up the manhattan project overseeing, he was grove's supervisor in a sense, to use our modern day technology for that. he was obviously very much the first person to find out what was happening at the manhattan project but he was also a close confidante to truman. you saw my first document in the presentation. he's the one that tells truman about it. when the interim committee meets not making the decisions, but certainly at the forefront of those decisions and was a really key player. i wouldn't say one person over another made those decisions. in the top five he was one of those who truman goes to for advice and leans on for suggestions of what to do. he was involved in discussions latder about sharing information with the soviets and the set up of the atomic energy commission. all these things he was seeing what the war would look like when the war was over. he was rather far reaching in that regard. >> all right. we have time for a few more questions. our next

but if you close in on this one, it is from stimson to the president. he is talking about the recent ultimatum that was made at potsdam and the dramatic results of the tests. suggestions made by the british of which the secretary of state burns is well aware. he is giving a recommendation of what to do. i'm going to talk about the context of this in a minute. this is a two page are, because you can see and dark type, truman writes on the back of this memo. he says the secretary of war, reply, this is the number of the memo. suggestions are released one ready. he is talking about the atomic bomb, this is about the statement that is going to be released rather than the releasing of a bond. that's why the confusion. i meant to do this before. that's why the confusion. and then to do this before. form one zero one one. that's the number of the memo. truman uses puts that in the back. we better get the statement approved because once the bomb is dropped we will need a statement immediately. that is why there is a bit of a rush here. going back and forth in t

mark: secretary of war stimson was crucial. not only did he head up the manhattan project, he was the supervisor in a sense. he was obviously very much the first person to find out what was happening with the manhattan project but he was also a very close confidant to truman. he is the one that tells truman about it. stimson is really the one that is not making the decisions but at the forefront of those decisions and was a really key player. i would not say one person over another meadows decisions but it is in the top five. he leans on him for suggestions on what to do. stimson is involved in discussions later on about sharing information with the associates. stimson was already seeing what the world would look like after the war was over, what would we do with this power? stimson was rather far-reaching in that regard. >> a few more questions. our next one says how did truman's family react to the dropping of the atomic bomb? mark: this is a harder question. there is not a great deal of evidence. we as historians and educato

had to be used, something stimson did not feel that strongly about during 1945. but he shut on the conversation until the 1960's when he began to slowly open. and it is still not widely open in american dialogue. although in many parts of the world, what we are talking about today, is widely understood. >> i would like to take a crack at it also. a lot of it had to do with the veterans. the veterans believed the atomic bomb saved their lives. they thought they were going in, and many of them or be killed. from princeton, but a book, called thank god for the atomic bomb, saying he was one of the once was going to go in, saying we cried with joy and relief when the bomb was dropped. that idea has persisted. 2019, had an late op-ed in the new york times and said her father was ready to go over and truman dropped the bomb and ended the war. and her father did not have to go. i think this idea is central to the whole notion of american exceptionalism. it is what marty was getting at in terms of the cold war, against the soviets. u.s., truman dropped the atomic bomb in

by james burns -- he was briefed i stimson and james burns -- by stimson and james burns. he was fully briefed within about 24 hours from assuming the presidency on the state of the manhattan project. host: it is the 75th anniversary of the bombing of hiroshima. we are talking about it with ian toll, whose new book is coming out in september, "twilight of the gods: more on the weston pacific, knight -- western pacific, 1944-1955." the lines the same as they were last hour, mountain and pacific, (202)-748-8001. easton, (202)-748-8000. for those who are world war ii veterans or family, (202)-748-8002. and our line for japanese-americans, (202)-748-8003. ian toll, one of the questions that came up a couple of times last hour is why didn't the u.s. do some sort of demonstration of the bomb to show the japanese its power instead of actually using it on a city? mean, i think that is a hard question. view, the really hard questions when it comes to the atomic bomb is not so much should we have used the bomb or not, given the circumstances in the summer of 1945, the urgent need to

and mccloy asked henry timson his boss -- stimson, and he saws, go ahead.says, i think we ought to have our heads examine if we don't at least discuss the bomb. and that was literally in his war cabinet the first time in this meeting. they'd been talking about the casualtieses and the length of the invasion and how blood duh, and nobody -- bloody it was going to be, but nobody said, yeah, but we might have the bomb until he said it x. basically it was dismissed largely because it had never been tested. wasn't tested until july 18th, just 21 days before the bomb was used against hiroshima. and at that point back in june, truman viewed it as a science project. if it worked all right, if out didn't, you know, we had to go ahead. >> so many historical moments you wrote about, chris. i wonder, i know you're a student of history, what is it that made you choose this particular moment? >> well, it's a funny story. i had the idea of doing exactly what i talked at about, take a key moment in history and try to put you in it,, you know, at the time they didn't know a

mccloy turns to stimson and says can i? and stimson says, go ahead.e says i think we ought to have our heads examined if we do not discuss other options. then he does something in the previous 45-50 minutes had not been done. he mentions the bomb for the first time. bomb, andhere's this i think we ought to consider that, which might, you know, might obviate the need for an invasion. there is a discussion of it, but not a terribly serious or detailed discussion. because again, they had never tested it and they do not know if it is going to work. as i said the end of that chapter, at that point truman basically regarded it as a science project. he goes on to pottstown, where he has the summit -- potsdam, where he has the summit meeting with church hill -- winston churchill and stalin. he has these meetings all over again. with the u.s. war cabinet. with the british war cabinet along with winston churchill. at this point in july, they have tested the bomb and they know that it works. there is again a discussion, and he basically decides i'm going to drop

eisenhower says that at potsdam, stimson told him they were going to drop the bomb.ot offer did anything because my work was over in europe. , and i told him i was against it on two counts. the japanese were ready to surrender, and i hated to be the first country to use such a weapon. macarthur says in an exchange with former hoover, who had urged truman to change cerner terms, and macarthur said that if truman followed hoover's advice, the japanese would have surrendered happily. p implies it would have been as early as may -- p implies it would have been early as may. we told him we have a horrible new weapon, the soviets are about to come into the war. we could have ended the war possibly a month or two earlier and saved more lives, american lives, japanese lives, chinese lives. on instead, we drop the bomb august 6 in order to prevent an invasion that is supposed to begin november 1, an invasion which many of the military leaders did not want to see happen at all, especially naval leaders. the logic behind this escapes me. host: did stalin know? guest: yes. promi

truman, he has a meeting with his war cabinet on june 18 and henry stimson, secretary of war is there george marshall the general of the army is there, all the top brass and discussing the nazis have surrendered on may 8 how they are going to finish and win the war against the japanese. for about 45 minutes there is a long discussion of the invasion of japan how many troops it will take, how long it will prolong the war, how many hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides at the end there is a subsistent secretary of war, john mccoy, who ended up becoming major figure in midcentury america, the high commissioner to germany, he was a member of the warren commission, head of the world bank and he was a junior guide and truman said, nobody gets out of the room without telling what they think. his boss says go ahead he says, i think we ought to have our heads examined if we don't at least discuss the bomb. it was literally in the war cabinet the first time in this meeting they been talking about the casualties and the length of the invasion and how bloody it was gonna be a nobody e

he challenged stimson on and a stimson said he understood it truman was a senator but he could not share-sident that he explained it was explained to him a what the manhattan project was. one thing truman is interested in is getting a handle on what his new responsibilities are. he is interested in a reset of relations with the soviet union. truman things if he can look at the soviet leaders in the eyes, he can deal with them. he wants soviet help in defeating japan in the pacific theater. he wants to make sure the soviet union will participate fully in the united nations and he wants to create a balanced europe that will mean the u.s. does not have to send an army back to europe before a third world war. thean tried to delay potsdam conference for as long as he could to give himself time to get up to speed on all these issues and hope only to give new mexico a little more time to work on the manhattan project. the potsdame about conference this sunday at 8:00 p.m. eastern here on american history tv. >> is american history tv on c-span3 where each week and we feature 48 hours of program

eisenhower says at potsdam stimson told him we were going to drop the bomb. so they told me they were going to drop it on the japanese. i listened, i didn't volunteer anything. after all my wa r was over in europe, and it wasn't up to me. and i was getting more and more depressed just thinking about it. then he asked me for my opinion. i told him i was against it on two counts. first, the japanese was were ready to surf render. mcarthur says in an exchange with former president hoover who had written to truman urging him to change his surrender terms in may, mcarthur said that if truman had followed your wise advice, the japanese would have surrendered and happily, and mcarthur imapologiplies that it have been as early as may. the poblssibility if we had tol the japanese they'd be able to keep the emperor, we told them we had a horrible new weapon, we could have ended the war possibly a month or two earlier and saved more lives, american lives, clous fuchs, theodore hall were the two most prominent who were doing so, and so stalin knew the americans were deve

he was from awful to horrific and he chose what these secretary of war stimson called choice inbhorrent terms of these events. host: this is the seventh of anniversary of the second bombing. august 6, hiroshima being the first. what was the difference between those two days and what the truman administration was looking at? what made them just tied to drop the second bomb three days later? guest: there is no specific decision about the second bomb. mr. truman -- there is no further check back. another aspect about this controversy that people, i think, don't understand. the problem with the notion that one bomb would have done it is this. you have to look at the japanese side. their reaction was aced on the fact that they had our atomic bomb program which is not produced a bomb but it had educated the top levels of japanese leadership. and it was stupendously difficult. when news of hiroshima came and mr. truman's announcement was atomic bomb, the imperial bomb not knowy -- we will that they have one bomb until we have an investigation. have onesaid, they bomb, but there can't be that m

secretary of war stimson was almost all of truman's close advisers urged him to change the surrender terms. the main impediment was jimmy burns. and truman relied on burns more than anybody else. from the day he becomes president, the first day in office, april 13th, until july 3rd when he named burns secretary of state, he's relying on burns for advice. burns told him that you'll be politically crucified if you let the japanese keep the emperor. stimson and the others were doing everything they could to convince him to change the surrender terms. and leahy, admiral leahy said we may not be able to get the japanese to surrender. how do we know that? we were intercepting their telegr telegrams. for example, july 13th, the telegrams were in tokyo to ambassador sato in moscow. in the middle of may, the japanese decided that the best way to get better surrender was to ask the soviet union to intercede on their behalf. so then the cable traffic went back and forth. and said things like this. july 13th, his majesty the emperor mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater e

stimson was rather far reaching in that regard. >> all right. we have time for a few more questions. our next one says, how did truman's family react to the dropping of the atomic bomb. >> not a great deal of evidence that we have. we like as historians and archivers to rely on evidence for a response. everything i've read about best truman and margaret truman is they were entirely supportive of truman. not too many decisions i found that they may have disagreed with truman on. if they did, they didn't express it publicly. unfortunately i mentioned all those letters truman wrote we have in the museum and library collection. we really don't have the letters after the time he was senator. when he's vice president, when he's president, we don't have any of bes's letters, they were burned. we don't have evidence to say what she thought about it but i can only imagine she was supportive of him and the war was over quickly after that. i can't imagine there would be any criticism of what he did as president in this particular ca case. >> our last quest

stimson and the others were doing everything they could to convince him. and admiral leahy said, maybe no one will get the japanese to surrender if we demand unconditional surrender. how did we know that? we've broken their code. we intercepted their telegrams. tokyo torams were from moscow. thehe middle of may, japanese decided the best way to get better surrender terms was to get the soviets interested in their behalf. amp work,jesty, the the present war brings greater evil and sacrifice on the people . mayesires from his art it be quickly terminated. unconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace. truman refers to the intercepted telegram as the telegram from ap emperor asking for peace. those are truman's words. that thetant rights president, admiral leahy, and earns -- burns agreed that the japs were looking for peace. we got those cables, not only truman, but also far install, mccoy, others agreed with that assessment. the japanese know they are defeated. they knew that they were defeated since the battle of 1944. in and the three-time former

writes that burns and stimson said that within four months we will have a weapon, one of which couldtroy an entire city. they could determine the future of human civilization. me jump in and take a phone call, because we have plenty of callers waiting to talk to you. 's director of the nuclear studies institute at the american university. .eff for peter kuznick go ahead. caller: thank you for taking my call. mr. kuznick, i agree with everything you said. i actually anticipating answering the last question. there is also a moral depravity that should be spoken about with the use of an atomic weapon. it is not just a new weapon. dness to a certain goo the way the city was made. not only was it understood that this may be a problem with nuclear war going forward, but they said at the time it could cause a chain reaction in the atmosphere of the earth and destroyed the world or just a weapon that was a little more powerful than the one they tested in the desert here in the united states. to take that type of chance, , it reallywing how can people rationally make a decision about using a

in on april 12th, 1945, but stimson only told him just the rudiments, just the bare minimum. we have a new, very powerful new weapon i need to brief you on it. it wasn't until almost two weeks later that stimson and general groves gave my grandfather a full briefing on the manhattan project. not long after grandfather formed the interim committee, scientists and leaders in the field and including some of the -- including some of the scientists who had worked on the bomb including mr. oppenheimer, dr. oppenheimer, to decide if the weapons should be used; and if so, how. so it -- and i never learned about any of this from grandpa, as i said. i found out about this in school. i learned in school like everybody else. i learned from my textbooks. for me, the dropping of the bomb has always been much more of -- it's what you do afterward. it's how grandpa felt about it. it's how we deal with the as paul said, this continues to be debated. people still write books about this. people still talk about it, and it goes back and forth. in 20 -- i guess my son wesley, this must have been

i mentioned the fact that stimson takes him aside on the day he is sworn in and says, i'm gonna tellout this project but he knows truman is overwhelmed. he just become the president. he said i'm going to give you some time to settle in and then i will come back. on april 25 13 days later he comes into the oval office to brief president truman now that he has settled in, not even quite two weeks. meanwhile general leslie groves who is the real military commander of the manhattan project is snuck in through underground tunnels and one of the reasons was they'd given this a lot of thought at the pentagon they thought of the two come in through the front door together that people are gonna wonder what if groves, who built the pentagon, he was the big mission man, what they were doing together so he snuck in and they gave truman a detailed document to read which really explained the manhattan project in historical detail and technical detail and truman complained he said i don't like reading long documents like this and groves said, mr. president, we can't say it any more briefly or simpl

truman has a meeting with his work cabinet june 18 and henry stimson, the general of the army, all of the top brass discussing how the nazis surrendered may 8 and how they will finish the war against the japanese and there is a long discussion of the invasion of japan how many troops it would take and how long it prolongs the war, hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides and then the assistant secretary of war ended up becoming a major figure as the high commissioner to germany , member of the warren commission and head of the world bank. but he was a junior guy and he says nobody gets out of the room without telling what they think. so he asked his boss and said go ahead. he said we should have our heads examined if we don't at least discuss the bomb. literally that was the first time in this meeting they were talk about the casualties and the length of the invasion but nobody said anything about the bomb and then basically it was dismissed at that point because it had never been tested. and against at hiroshima because in june it was a science project. >> and then what made

to mention the fact that stimson takes him aside and says i will tell you about this project but he knowstruman is overwhelmed and has just become the president i will let you settle in and then come back but then 13 days later he comes into the oval office to brief president truman and meanwhile the real military commander of the manhattan project snuck into an underground tunnel because they thought that they come to the front door together people will wonder the big mission man and what they were doing together. so he snuck in and gave truman a detailed document to read which explained the manhattan project in historical and technical detail. he said i don't like reading long documents like this. they said mr. president, we cannot say they were briefly it is a complicated project. that is how out of touch he was with it. but when it counted he had mastered all of it. >> 125,000 americans were working on the manhattan project and not a word gets out. that is amazing. >> exactly. people say you covered trump and up stand downs and ins and outs what was it like writing the book? one of th

between the astonishingly awful to the horrendously horrific, and he chose what secretary of war stimson would call the least abhorrent choice. >> this is the anniversary of the nagasaki bombing. august 16 the first one, hiroshima. what was different between those three days and what was the truman administration looking at? the destruction and hiroshima, what made them decide to drop a second bomb? >> there was no specific decision on the second bomb. the authorization order released the people to start dropping bombs and keep dropping bombs. we talk about the two bombs, this is another aspect that people, i think, don't understand. the problem with the notion that one bomb would have done it or a demonstration would have done it is this -- we have to look at the japanese side. their reaction was based upon the fact that they had an atomic bomb program which had not produced a bomb, but it had educated japanese leadership in the fact that producing vision -- fissionable material was difficult. the imperial army immediately responded, well, we can see they have one bomb. the imperial nav

by james burns -- he was briefed i stimson and james burns -- by stimson and james burns.e was fully briefed within about 24 hours from assuming the presidency on the state of the manhattan project. host: it is the 75th anniversary of the bombing of hiroshima. we are talking about it with ian toll, whose new book is coming out in september, "twilight of the gods: more on the weston pacific, knight -- western pacific, 1944-1955." the lines the same as they were last hour, mountain and pacific, (202)-748-8001. easton, (202)-748-8000. for those who are world war ii veterans or family, (202)-748-8002. and our line for japanese-americans, (202)-748-8003. ian toll, one of the questions that came up a couple of times last hour is why didn't the u.s. do some sort of demonstration of the bomb to show the japanese its power instead of actually using it on a city? mean, i think that is a hard question. view, the really hard questions when it comes to the atomic bomb is not so much should we have used the bomb or not, given the circumstances in the summer of 1945, the urgent need to e

vaccines a highly promising new one is to be approved already in august and that was littered with to stimson. but both vaccines were only tested on less than $100.00 volunteers the important phase 3 of the testing will only be done with a few 100 people. there yet this is highly irresponsible he has already researched many vaccines at the research institute. says that. it's possible to develop a vaccine within one week one month or half a year and as it is the case now that it's impossible to prove in this time frame when it is going to be harmless and. russia plans to produce $30000000.00 vaccine doses by the end of the year. another 170000000 a supposed to be manufactured and brought russia wants to be the 1st country to introduce a vaccine to the world market possible risks one stand in its way critics say. that of. course the jones deal is being 3 news right now in the something completely new look at the when the judge is back and saying we're done with this is we don't know how they're going to act with them but it gets nothing to do with what i do we also don't know how long the immun

army on, the challenged the secretary of warm allen stimson and he understood that true plan was a senator but he could not share what that was for. it is after truman became president that stimson pulled him aside and explained what the manhattan project was. that is what truman had stumbled on early on in the war. so one thing that harry truman is certainly interested in is trying to get a handle on what his new responsibilities are. he's interested in what we would today call a re-set of rel relations with the soviet union. truman thinks if he could look the soviets in the eyes he could cut a deal with them. he was soviet help in defeating yaip in the pacific theater and be sure that they will participaty in the united nations an the other organizations that the united states is trying to build and create a balanced europe that will mean that the united states does not have send an army back to europe for a third world war. it is for this reason that true moon tried to delay the potsdam conference as long as he could. to give himself time to get up to speed on all of the issues and to g

secretary of war stimson said i do not want the u.s. to get the reputation for outdoing hitler's -- hitler's when it comes another top general described this as one of the most ruthless and barbaric killing of noncombatants in history. this is about the decision to drop the bomb. we have got a section about the reasons for using the bomb. the official narratives has stated the decision to drop the bomb was to expedite the end of the war. truman says that an american invasion would cost a half lives. million the number keeps going up. there is no record of that anywhere. there would have been a lot of americans lost in an invasion. a lot of japanese killed. that is the official narrative. that we dropped the bomb to avoid an invasion. the bomb ended the war in the pacific. there is no truth to that. in -- toittle too not be a little truth in that in truman's mind. the japanese from the battle of saipan onward new they cannot win. they hoped to get one more victory for better surrender terms. the big obstacle was the emperor. they wanted

stimson and the others were doing everything they could to convince him.al leahy said, maybe no one will get the japanese to surrender if we demand unconditional surrender. how did we know that? we've broken their code. we intercepted their telegrams. tokyo torams were from moscow. thehe middle of may, japanese decided the best way to get better surrender terms was to get the soviets interested in their behalf. amp work,jesty, the the present war brings greater evil and sacrifice on the people . mayesires from his art it be quickly terminated. unconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace. truman refers to the intercepted telegram as the telegram from ap emperor asking for peace. those are truman's words. that thetant rights president, admiral leahy, and earns -- burns agreed that the japs were looking for peace. we got those cables, not only truman, but also far install, mccoy, others agreed with that assessment. the japanese know they are defeated. they knew that they were defeated since the battle of 1944. in and the three-time former prime thes

of war stimson said to president truman, "i do not want the united states to get the reputation for outdoing hitler's in atrocities." another general called this the most ruthless killing of noncombatants in history. cities, kill civilians. this is about the decision to drop the bomb. theofficial narrative says u.s. dropped the bomb in order to expedite the end of the war without having to invade. truman says an american invasion would cost half a million lives. the number keeps going up. of thousands of lives, then quarter of a million lives, then half a million lives. there would have been a lot of americans lost in an evasion -- and invasion. truth to that. maybe a little truth to that, but no basic truth to that. the reality was the japanese from the battle of saipan onward they could not win but they hoped to get one more victory and then sue for better surrender terms. the big obstacle for them was the emperor. he wanted to keep the emperor. they issued a background briefing in december that said to the hanging of the emperor to them would be like the crucifixion of christ to us. all w

are they going to be our allies, you tell the story of stimson who suggested that we share atomic secretsith the russians to develop trust because they are going to figure them out anyway. some of the other extraordinary proposals being made at the time, people were not settled into the cold war mentality yet. >> it felt like a wartime washington. there was a situation in israel, about to be born as a country and had to figure out what to do. was he going to support the jews, the jews were clamoring for support but the state department and defense department were saying no way. african-americans were demanding support from truman, very powerful senators and governors were saying no civil rights. the cold war, these were unsolvable situation i don't think any president could have handles, truman happened to be in the white house and took the brunt of it. >> host: george marshall was in charge of the state department and being very influential was against supporting israel for political reasons. there were a lot of rational reasons for going against what we now consider get instinct, should

you told the story i think it was stimson who suggested we share the atomic secrets with the russianso develop trust because we can figure them out anyway. so should be habits? some of the other extraordinary proposals that are being made at the time. people really weren't settled in the cold war mentality yet. >> order on mount washington. israel was about to be bored as a country. or they can support the jews. jews were clamoring for support from administration. that state department and the defense department were saying no way. african-americans were demanding more from support from truman. very powerful senators and governments were saying no. and of course the cold war. these were unsolvable situations that i don't think any president could've haven't truman happened in the white house and eight took the brunt of the blame. >> george marshall i think was in charge of the state department. and he was very influential. he was against supporting israel for a lot of political reasons. there were a lot of rational reasons for going against what we now consider gut instinct, of course

he challenged the secretary of war, henry stimson on. he understood that truman was a senator but he could not share what that was for. it was only after truman became president that stimson pulled him aside and explained to him what the manhattan project was. that's what truman had stumbled upon earlier in the war. one thing truman is interested in is trying to get a handle on what his new responsibilities are. he's interested in what we would today call a reset of relations with the soviet union. truman thinks if he can just look the soviet leaders in the eyes, he can cut a deal with them. he wants soviet help in defeating japan in the pacific theater. he wants to be sure that the soviet union will participate fully in the united nations and in some of the other organizations that the united states is trying to build, and he wants to create a balanced europe that hopefully will mean that the united states does not have to send an army back to europe for a third world war. it's for this reason that truman tried to delay the potsdam conf

very suddenly with fdr's death, when he was elevated to the presidency, he was briefed by stimson and james burns who was the war mobilization czar, who truman subsequently appointed as secretary of state, and he was fully briefed within about 24 hours of assuming the presidency on the state of the manhattan project. >> it's the 75th anniversary of the bombing of hiroshima. we're talking about it with ian toll, whose brand-new book is coming out in september, twilight of the gods, war in the western pacific, 1944-1945. the lines as they were last hour for the eastern and central time zones, 202-748-8000. for those of you who are world war ii vets or family, 202-748-8002, and our line for japanese americans, 202-748-8003. ian, one of the questions that came up a couple times last hour is why didn't the u.s. do some sort of demonstration of the bomb to show the japanese its power instead of actually using it on a city? >> yeah, i mean, i think that's a hard question. i mean, you know, in my view, the really hard questions when it comes to the atomic bomb is not so much should we have us

stimson put the national -- what we would think of as the national guard on standby in nearby fort myers in virginia, and so when the crowd got really unruly and started basically man handling and being very aggressive towards the suffragists, that's when they literally called in the cavalry from virginia and had that group serve as the protectors of the suffragists. so it was quite dramatic in that sense because the suffragists were not expecting these huge, huge crowds. but they did upstage president wilson because the next day was his inaugural speech for his first term as president, and almost nobody showed up to his speech, and he asked, well, where is everybody? and he was told that all of the spectators had come out the day before to see the suffragists. and on my left, on your right, is the official program for women's suffrage, and you can see this is one of four existing programs that remain from the parade, and you can see how there's the joan of ark figure, and she's in these purple robes, which is the color of royalty, and she's, you know, walking down in front of the capita

mccoy asked henry stimson, his boss, of the war department and he says go ahead picky says i think we ought to have our heads examined if you don't at least discuss the bomb. that was literally in this war cabinet the first time in this meeting it been talking about the casualties and link the invasion and a bloody would be a nobody had ever said might have the bomb, until he said it, and basically it was dismissed at that point largely because david never been tested. it wasn't tested until july 18, just 21 days before the bomb was used against hiroshima. back in june truman viewed as a science project. if it worked, right, if it didn't we had to go ahead. >> so many historical moment you wrote about. i wonder, i know you were a student of history. what is it that made you choose this particular moment? >> well, it's a funny story. i had the idea of doing exactly what i talked about, to take a key moment in history and try to put you in it. at the time they did know all these when they are faced with these momentum challenges antidotes could happen. it would be like talking about rea

and the secretary of war, and re-stimson at the time was watching the parade.you literally had to call out the cavalry nearby fort myers to come in and break up the mob that existed so that the women could continue down pennsylvania avenue and finish at the treasury department, the in point of the parade. so this took place in major cities. and the reason why and this could happen in 1913, which seems like a little bit of a disaster. the reason why was that it brought great attention to the cause. and alice paul's a whole strategy was, the more i can create a spectacle, the more i can be in the media, the more i can be in the news about women's suffrage, the more people will learn about the fact that women did not have the vote all across the united states. the more people that will become sympathetic to the cause. so she was a master at expanding the scope of the conflict. >> it's also an organization called the men sleek for women 's suffrage. who was behind that and what was the mission? >> it's also a method to say that this was men versus women. in this mo

with choices between astonishly awful to the horrendously horrific and chose what secretary of war stimson would call the least horrible choice in terms of the events. >> this is the 75th anniversary of the nagasaki bombing, the second bombing. august 6th being the first one, hiroshima. richard frank, what was the difference between those three days and what the truman administration was looking at, the destruction in hiroshima? what made them decide to drop a second bomb three days later? >> there was no specific decision on a second bomb. the authorization order released people to start dropping bombs and keeping dropping bombs. there was no checkback. when we talk about the two bombs, another aspect about this controversy people don't understand, the problem with the notion that one bomb would have done it or a demonstration would have done it is this -- you have to look at the japanese side. >> their reaction to this was based on the fact they had an atomic bomb program which had not produced a bomb but it had educated the top levels of japanese leadership and the fact producing fissio

so essentially i think you did create it himself but through the war years there was henry stimson, james burns, sam roseman but after the war the figures that came up were young people mostly lawyers that he handpicked for the lot of them didn't have a tremendous amount of political experience but after the war ended by the time of the 1940 election comes around his main go to us clark clifford who wrote a lot of speeches and was on the campaign trail the entire time. truman came out and had no political experience whatsoever. specter was interesting to hear and it's interesting when you go back in the political history and you see someone come on the stage iv the first time and clerk clifford had a big role in the 1960s as well and george mcgovern was that henry wallace's first political campaign. the decision-making. i just thought that was very interesting and it's like watching a movie and someone becomes a big star later. >> all the people who came into office in 1948 who ogle by the way john kennedy nixon. >> richard nixon at the same time. it's during the campaign. who is on the h

stimson told him he understood truman was a senator, but could not share with that was for. it is only after truman became president that he pulled him aside and explained to him with what the manhattan project was. that is what truman had stumbled on earlier. one thing harry truman is interested in is trying to get a handle on what his responsibilities are. he is interested in what we would call a reset of relations with the soviet union. truman thinks if he can look the soviet leaders in the eyes he can deal with them. he wants soviet help in defeating japan in the pacific theater. he wants to be sure the soviet union will participate fully in the united nations, and some of the other organizations the u.s. is trying to build. and he wants to create a balanced europe that hopefully means the u.s. will not have to send an army back to europe for a third world war. it is for this reason that truman tried to delay the potsdam conference for as long as he could, both to give himself time to get up to speed on these issues, and hopefully to give the scientists in new mexico a l

about at that time and are they going to be our allies and you said or told the story i think it was stimsonho suggested that we share the secrets with the russians to develop trust because they will figure them out anyway so should we have this and some of the extraordinary proposals that were being made at the time and people really didn't want settled into the cold war mentality yet. >> but it increasingly felt like a wartime washington but that was the situation israel was about to be born as a country and truman had to figure out what to do what he support the jews and the jews were clamoring for support from the administration but the state department and the defense department were saying no way and african americans were demanding support from truman to southern, very powerful senators and governors say no civil rights in the world war these were unsolvable situations that i don't think any president could have handled but truman happened to be in the white house and he took the brunt of the blame. >> george michael i think was in charge of the state department and he would be influe

you told the story i think it was stimson who suggested that we share the atomic secrets with the russians to develop trustbecause they're going to figure them out anyway . soshould we have this ? that some of the other extraordinary proposals that were being made at the time had the work settled into the cold war mentality. >> known but it felt like a wartime washington but there was the situation of israel was about to be born as a country and truman had to figure out what to do. was he going to support the jews, the jews were clamoring for support from the administration but the defense department was saying no way. and americans were demanding support from truman for a very powerful governors and senators were saying no civil rights and of course the cold war. these were unsolvable situations and i don't think any president could have handled but truman happens to be in the white house and he took thebrunt of the blame . >> towards marshall i think was in charge of the state department and he would be very influential with the marshall plan and everything else and he was against suppor

actually, he says i have instructed secretary stimson to use this weapon against military targets and not against women and children. and i have instructed him that we will make a warning to the japanese telling them to surrender. it's odd because he didn't give that order. in his diary he seems to have believed it or perhaps he wanted to, you know, have future historians, you know, believe that the whole decision had been made differently. but certainly he had the power and one of the fascinating questions is, if fdr had lived, how would have fdr decided to use the bomb? he certainly would have been at all -- he wouldn't have heft hesitated at all to make his own decision. he was accustomed to doing that. >> let's hear from anthony on our line for world war ii veterans and families. >> caller: i'm calling for my father and his two brothers. my father went in the army in february of '41. he fought in the philippines. he fought in hiroshima and in okinawa and in the occupation of japan. he came home in 1946 but we never really found out why he -- he never talked about the war until he

he always believed that if you understood all of the he made what secretary stimson called the least abhorrent choice. message, which is really the first serious message about ending the war that has this language in it that says, the precondition they want is that the prerogatives of the morning. my father served in world war ii. i would like to ask professor frank if he reads japanese? i would like to ask him if he has read the overwhelming number waromments just after the by japanese generals and admirals that it was not the two nuclear attacks, but the entrance of the soviet union into the war. they had invaded manchuria and they were occupying the islands, which they still occupy to this day, and they were threatening do.qaeda -- hokkia this subject because i am an australian. at the timel child of the second world war. film crews documenting the aftermath of the bombings for scientific purposes. here is a look. [video] ♪ tragedy days after the visited hiroshima. august 1945. the hot summer sun shone upon the city. an area alarm was on. then it was lifted. for 2.5 hours, the war