those were all quotes that were made by secretary tauscher on march 29. but these assertions, mr. president, are incorrect in two ways. one, not only are there specific limits on some missile defense options, and i would note article 5, paragraph 3, of the treaty text itself, but secondly, when viewed together with the treaty's preamble, russia's unilateral statement, and statements by senior russian officials, it all provides the potential for russia to intimidate the united states by threatening to withdraw from the treaty if the united states seeks to increase its me feel defense capabilities. now, the treaty supporters are going to argue that the limit on converting offensive silos for missile defense is meaningless because we don't have any such plans. but the question i would come back to, mr. president, is simply this, why is there a limitation at all on missile defense in a treaty that was meant to deal with nuclear weapons? why did we concede to the russians on this important point? and can we be sure we'll never have such plans? after all, we've converted offensive silos

we thought this was about, as secretary tauscher, about strategic weapons. well, it turns out that the russians, of course, want to make it also about missile defense. one way they make it about missile defense is by article 5, section 3 -- or paragraph 3, specifically constraining a particular way that we would develop missile defense. that is what we object to here, that relinkage. why is that important? because the russians have always wanted to limit u.s. missile defenses and this now gets the foot in the door for them to argue that under the tre treaty, they would have a right to withdraw if we improve our missile defensesmen defenses --e defenses. that gets to the real issue here and that's the preamble to the treaty. i want to quote from richard pearl and ed middle east, both m served in the reagan administration. and he was with president reagan at reykjavik, a seminole moment in arms control history and for the reagan administration, a time when president reagan decided that missile defenses for the united states were so important that he would walk

[laughter] tauscher evin i wasn't working she asked me to issue tickets for granted someday i would getck to it and this helped me form a line in my early days as a mother so. and frazzled, so far away from myself. she often told me like most of us here what to read and what not to read the in fact i think she wants to get out of my hand saying no, no, don't read that one and pulled me to a table to hand me something better. but far from undermining my confidence she bolstered it. i felt she believed in me as she did so many of us here and elsewhere and that, coming from someone as well read, wise and interested and committed to the literary life as carla meant more than she possibly could have realized. i have my share of memories as we all do and then the or the other memories of this place she and barbara created. i remember how my husband and i walked up with our newborn daughter in her stroller and fell into the chairs while she slept. i remember the mornings in the coffeehouse with my brothers, also from college. that type of time when there is nothing to do but complain about you

ellen tauscher, under secretary of state for arms control, international security, has stated, "it is my calculation that we need to get this done now because every day that we don't is a day that will not only -- that not only don't we have boots on the ground but it's also a day we can't move on to other parts of the agenda." this was the new start treaty but it's also the start of the reset of the relationship and is a very big agenda." we have other issues -- tactical nuclear devices which the russians may have and former countries in the soviet union may have; we have a whole set of issues; we have issues with respect to iran, north korea. if we can ratify this treaty, we now have momentum to move forward on these other issues. but we all know that the proliferation of nuclear weapons threatens more than the security of just russia and the united states. indeed, this treaty is val to the continued need for worldwide effort to control nuclear weapons. it is every president's worst nightmare that somewhere in the world a nuclear accident will occur, a rogue state will obtain nuclea

we thought this was about, as secretary tauscher, about strategic weapons. well, it turns out that the russians, of course, want to make it also about missile defense. one way they make it about missile defense is by article 5, section 3 -- or paragraph 3, specifically constraining a particular way that we would develop missile defense. that is what we object to here, that relinkage. why is that important? because the russians have always wanted to limit u.s. missile defenses and this now gets the foot in the door for them to argue that under the tre treaty, they would have a right to withdraw if we improve our missile defensesmen defenses --e defenses. that gets to the real issue here and that's the preamble to the treaty. i want to quote from richard pearl and ed middle east, both m served in the reagan administration. and he was with president reagan at reykjavik, a seminole moment in arms control history and for the reagan administration, a time when president reagan decided that missile defenses for the united states were so important that he would walk

tauscher states "the urgency of the treaty because we currently lack verification measures with russia. the more that goes on, the more opportunity there is for misunderstanding and mistrust." in a letter to senator kerry addressing cheating by secretary gates -- let me commend the senator from massachusetts for his extraordinary leadership on this issue -- no one knows more about the details of this treaty, the ramifications, the nuances than senator kerry. no one has been more articulate, no one has talked with more wisdom, more experience, and more compelling logic than the senator from massachusetts when it comes to the ratification of this treaty. i thank him for his leadership. thank you, senator. but secretary gates wrote to senator kerry to remind us that the survivability and flexibility of u.s. strategic posture planned for new start will help deter any future russian leaders from cheating or breakout from the treaty, should they ever have such an inclination. finding, ratifying the -- signing, ratifying the new start treaty will provide the structure to prevent cheating than

here is what under secretary of state ellen tauscher said on march 29, 2010, and i quote, "the treaty does nothing to constrain missile defense. this treaty is about strategic weapons. there is no limit on what the united states can do with its missile defense systems." but then for some reason, after being told that this treaty was not about missile defense, the senate was then told that there would be a reference to missile defense after all. but that it would only be in the preamble of the treaty which, of course, is not legally binding. this was -- that was worrisome enough, but then we saw the treaty and not only was there a reference to missile defense in the preamble, but there was also a limit taoeugs our -- limitation to our missile defense deployments in the body of the treaty itself in article 5. this may not be a meaningful limitation, but it is a limitation nonetheless and a legally binding one at that. this sets a very, very troubling precedent. but what i want to focus on this morning is the reference to missile defense that appears in the preamble this afternoon. what

himself and president medvedev were very active in the negotiations in my abd at -- immediate loss tauschernyway thank you all very much for this opportunity to talk to you today. it has been a great opportunity for me and i am sure jim would say the same. >> in fact i will say the same and i will say that one thing for me that was totally expected but not typical was the type of open communication and incredibly effective team play by the lead negotiator, assistant secretary gottemoeller and it allowed allowed the department of defense to express its views and to have, to ensure that the treaty was in always something better senior leadership was aware of and it ends and that had worked through all the issues. i think if you read the history of arms control negotiations on a number of occasions in the past, that was not always the case. and it is something that allowed this to treaty to be accomplished quick weight. the u.s. national security interest so a great credit to you, rose. [applause] >> up next a conversation on china's economy its energy needs in the country's role on the korean

it repudiate the signing statement of the united states department of state issued by secretary tauscher? which, of course, conflicts with the letter and is the official position of the united states government? does it conflict with the briefing in lisbon where the phased adaptive approach was discussed and revealed deployment of the first three phases but the fourth phase only being available. whether he will the deployment occur? the letter apparently says we will have effective defenses, whatever that means. what does that mean and when would those effective defenses be deployed? iran, intelligence tells us, will have an icbm by 2015. an icbm that would require something like the g.b.i. to intercept. but we're told the g.b.i. -- sa*, we're not told whether the g.b.i. is a contingent backup plan and, b, we're not told will be ready for 2017. we already have, i think it's four g.b.i.'s in alaska and california. i don't know why we can't build some more to deploy in russia -- in europe. i don't know what to make of this letter. obviously it comes at the last minute. it hasn't been sent