war was based on the fear of world war iii, which was constructed in the shuttle of world war ii. so therefore, the reality of the cold war as a global confrontation, not just as a diplomatic stumble for europe, but the cold war as a global confrontation was a local understanding of the war. however shared wide ly. we also cannot ignore the issue of preconception. prejudice, at the time, about asia, particularly, about the chinese. of being helpless, superstitious, for one. but after all, north korea and china entreinto the war was seen as based on their own decisions, the logical world war iii couldn't be maintained. however, because of this common preconception, their entry, china's entry in particular, couldn't be seen as being made under their own decisions. instead, a common logic of the time maintained like this, there must have been a significant push from outside, mainly, the communist soviet union. and yet, this kind of image, this kind of narrative, whether it's actually true or not, was used to power an illusion. once us imagine, it became commonsense knowledge of the war. so in this way, the global cold wa

what was the cold war? his answer, as you've just heard, is that the cold war was "an imagined reality." a gigantic social mechanism that operated to tranquilize chaotic post-war situations worldwide by putting an end to social conflicts and culture wars at home. whose home? well, professor masuda is interested in east asia and north america specifically and he's focused on this period between world war ii's end and the korean war which he explains is when this imagined reality started to feel more and more real to more and more people in these various locales. now, it's not easy to say something original about the 1940s and the early 1950s but "cold war crucible" pulls it off and i'll do two things. first, i'll make a pair of observations about the book and second i'll ask professor masuda some questions which will hopefully get our q&a rolling. so opt separation one is that the book is simultaneously original and very familiar. if you are a political scientist, one label to toss at professor masuda's work

of howext, the author the korean war time challenges our common understanding of the cold war. the national university of singapore history perfecter argues that the cold war was not only a global conflict between the u.s. and soviet union, but also, like many countries in the west and east, to crack down, crackdowns encourages and supported not only by policymakers but by ordinary people in popular culture at the time. this 90 minute event. introduceeased to masuda.or the history of american foreign relations and the modern history of east asia. he received his phd from cornell university in 2012 and is currently an assistant professor in the department of history at the national university of singapore. history at the national university of singapore. where he teaches courses on the modern history of japan, student movements in asia, decolonization and the cold war. in addition to his new book, cold war crucible, dr. masuda has published a number of articles which is be found in journals such as diplomatic history, the journal official contemporary history, the journal of cold

now while i have the opportunity today is to focus on an aspect of the undoing of the cold war because we have one of the principles with us on the platform here. i do think one aspect the ending of the cold war to be underplayed by most scholars is a relationship between the state department in the soviet ministry of foreign affairs with secretary shultz who is with us today and foreign minister. you only have to think for two seconds about this to see why this was a crucial factor. president reagan had many other things to think about n mchale gorbachev had more things to think about because the use of governance was much more extensive than the grasp of government for an american president in the u.s. said was engaged on a massive transformation of his country so with fell to the foreign policy managers this secretary of state and the foreign affairs minister to cope with the consequences generally agreed policy of the american government and the soviet bureau for reasons that the cold war was altogether too dangerous the u.s.s.r. had the additional reason without ending it would be

. -- and the end of the cold war. did the men make the moment ordered the moment make the individuals? james graham wilson: -- or did the moment make the individuals? james graham wilson: these individuals, and i talk a lot about secretary of state george schultz, there were structural changes, the recovery of the russian economy, the collapse in the price of oil which had a devastating effect on the soviet economy, the technological revolution, these things were more important. even more important or decisions made by individuals in power, including reagan and gorbachev. at the end of the day, the individuals made the moment. >> how did mikael gorbachev become adaptable and how did ronald reagan engage? james graham wilson: gorbachev, because of his time in the 1970's traveling to western europe, and elsewhere, he saw that the promises that he was told -- and he believed in communism -- that other societies were enjoying a higher standard of living. he was embarrassed by a lot of the stagnation, anti-semitism on the p

the british and french specialized but no cold war before the cold war had the capacity to threaten human and other animal life adversely around the planet. now why have the opportunity to do today is to focus on an aspect of the ending of the cold war because we have one of the principles with us on the platform here. and i do think that one aspect of the ending of the cold war is being underplayed by most scholars is the relationship between the state department and the soviet ministry of foreign affairs specifically between secretary shultz and the late you only have to think for two days to see why this was a crucial fact. president reagan had many other things to think about them just how he dealt with the soviet union. mikael gorbachev had many more things to think about because the grasp of the government in the ussr was much more extensive than the grasp of the government in the foreign american presence in the u.s.. he was engaged on a massive transformation of his country and therefore felt to the foreign-policy mashers, the secretary of state and the foreign affairs minister to

they had many hot wars with each other but the cold war, the war that we know as the cold war, that was the most dangerous war of all and thank god it never became. a hot war. there were wars between the principle allies of the principle agents of the cold war, mainly the soviet union and the united states of america. there were wars in many states of africa between allies on one side and allies on the other side of america and the ussr never went to war with each other. even though it came very close to that at times, for example in 1962 and again in 1983. the accounts at the end of the cold war tend to be one-sided, tend to concentrate either predominantly on the american side or predominantly on the soviet side and the reason i thought it was worth writing a new book about the end of the cold war was that it seemed to me that very few people had looked at the end of the cold war as a two-sided process, as a bilateral process and looked properly at the interaction between the two superpowers. that's extremely important because the cold war didn't end with a peace treaty because there

the new war in a sense. because within the next few months and effectively within the next two years the cold war is deeply under way. and in that confrontation with the soviet union that will last until 1990-91, for the first several years of that war, the united states has a nuclear weapon and the soviets don't. now, what does this weapon do? well, it blows up. massive amounts of force. but there was a test. and there were small is tests beforehand. there was a clear understanding of what the bomb would do in theory. and then in practice it did. it realized its potential in a sense. the bomb is designed to emit massive amounts of blast force. the bomb is designed where heat pushes that force and temperatures rise to multiple thousands of degrees fahrenheit. a fireball, if you will, pushed by force. it's going to emit a whole lot of radiation that by this point in 1945 we know is deadly. we know in our testing, in our lab work, in new mexico, we know that massive releases of radiation will kill a human being, and some of our people are killed. yes. why did we use the atomic bomb on tokyo? because who would surr

the cold war would be the most important one. 968 or 1972, liberal democrats had more or less abandoned the idea of fighting the cold war. however, the thing they grabbed onto kennedy and turned him into the liberal icon was the kennedy style. david has mentioned this. this the thing they admired. kennedy was wealthy. he spoke beautifully. he wrote books. with the help of ted sorensen, he cited ancient writers. his wife was beautiful. his children are beautiful. he was sophisticated. this is what many liberals saw as the essence of kennedy's liberalism even as they abandoned much of his substance. the term "liberal" is not really used much in american political discourse until the turn of the 20th century. example,incoln, for would probably be qualified as a lincoln but the term -- never used the term, nor did anybody use the term at the time , liberal versus conservative. controversies in political life were constitutional, not ideological. liberalism as a term begins to be used by the progressives in the late 19th, early 20th ce

we have the bomb and we know the kould war becomes sort of crystallized. the cold war becomes the cold war over this next few years. by 1949, it's what we say hardened. the lines in europe are drawn. harry truman is saying in truman dauk doctrine, we must contain. we have these important documents, the long telegram and the mr. x article, winston churchill saying there's an iron curtain, all of this while the united states has nuclear weapons and the soviet union does not. yet, the weapons aren't used. again, good. but we know clearly, we discuss obviously, that it won't stay this way. our greatest fear is when the soviets will get the bombs. but one thing that the soviets do is work that much harder to get the bomb, not simply in their own science, not simply in their own technology, not simply in their own military, but they start to use espionage, and the cold war becomes a war that relies very heavily on spying on espionage. and our manhattan project gets penetrated even greater, even further. some of our secrets become part of what the soviets use to finally p

in 1980, we were losing the cold war. by 1989, we were winning the cold war. as jeane kirkpatrick said about the san francisco democrats "from the fall of sigh gone in 1975 to january 1981, soviet influence expanded dramatically in laos, libyan, syria, madagascar, seychelles, nicaragua, grenada." not all were pro soviet and anti-american to be sure. there are many good anti-american democrats. but for whatever reason a number of democrats in the 1980s, call them fellow travelers or fifth columnist or deconstructionist or pro srobg tours. or lennon's phrase useful idiots. these were the san francisco democrats to which kirkpatrick was referring. from lobbyist clark clifford to van hoffman, anthony lewis, robert dollic, many other liberals either spoke up for soviet communism or denounced reagan of consigning it to history. the soviets at the times called their policy i reversibility. soviet surveillance was everywhere. their embassy in washington was regarded a little more than a forward operating post for the kgb. even president carter, who i believe is a very

in 1980, we were losing the cold war. by 1989, we were winning the cold war. as jeane kirkpatrick said about the san francisco democrats "from the fall of sigh gone in 1975 to january 1981, soviet influence expanded dramatically in laos, libyan, syria, madagascar, seychelles, nicaragua, grenada." not all were pro soviet and anti-american to be sure. there are many good anti-american democrats. but for whatever reason a number of democrats in the 1980s, call them fellow travelers or fifth columnist or deconstructionist or pro srobg tours. or lennon's phrase useful idiots. these were the san francisco democrats to which kirkpatrick was referring. from lobbyist clark clifford to van hoffman, anthony lewis, robert dollic, many other liberals either spoke up for soviet communism or denounced reagan of consigning it to history. the soviets at the times called their policy i reversibility. soviet surveillance was everywhere. their embassy in washington was regarded a little more than a forward operating post for the kgb. even president carter, who i believe is a very

. >> did the end of the cold war make this project possible? cindy: the end of the cold war was the signal to ramped down the nuclear weapons complex. there was funding provided to clean up the environmental contamination at the former weapons sites. some of them are still active today. the cold war got it started. >> tell us a little bit about the people behind the manhattan project. did they know what they were doing? cindy: the manhattan project must have employed something like 600,000 people over the course of the three years that it operated. it was a very short project, but it built the equivalent of the panama canal. they were laborers recruited from all over the country. they were construction workers. none of those people knew what they were doing. all of these hundreds of thousands of people kept the secret because they didn't know what the secret was. they came to work because after the depression many people were just subsistence farmers or driven off their firms in the midwest. to have a steady paycheck was an attractive propositio

the secrets tolkachev passed a one help if the soviet radar during the cold war. >> tonight we will behearing from david hoffman about his new boat, "the billion dollar spy: a true story of cold war espionage and betrayal". a gripping tale that engages the reader in the first few pages of the prologue. "the billion dollar spy" focuses on the intriguing story of a spy in the soviet union who assisted the cia for more than 20 years. true to us to other nonfiction books including the 2010 pulitzer prize-winning title, that hand, the untold story of the cold war arms race in the dangerous legacy. he's a contributing editor to the "washington post" where he covered the white house during presidencies of ronald reagan and george h.w. bush. he has served as diplomatic correspondent in jerusalem correspondent from 1995 to mac 2001, served as moscow bureau chief and later as foreign editor and assistant manager editor for the foreign news. please join me in welcoming the david e. hoffman to the louisville free public library. [applause] >> thank you all for coming here tonight. it is a weeknigh

the happy war yar. i think ronald reagan was the happy cold warrior. he fought the cold war, but he was not a%jwuz ledgeant, negati man. he was a man of strong conservative principals, but he had a moderate personality in the sense of not being closed to -- he was close to people instead of being closed to people. which was why he was able to reach out to people politically. who haven't voted for -- it is not a coincidence that a whole new political term entered the vocabulary, reagan democrat. starting in the '80s. at any rate, those were some of the things that made it possible for him to do what he did. a review just ran in the washington times a few days ago, tuesday, about abraham lincoln. but lincoln was a master of the words. in fact, i entitled the review abraham lincoln, a man of his words, with an "s," because, as i'll explain in a minute, i think ronald reagan was one of ever of few others that was a president of his words. a r as i was doing the lincoln book, i started thinking more and more about lincoln. most presidents define about by whi

it got much more sophisticated as the years went by. cold war came, radar became very, very important in the cold war. and i'll explain that in a minute, but let's just pause to think a little bit about tolkachev's life. at a secret institute to build radar which he was assigned after the university, he met a young woman named natasha. natasha worked in the antenna department. tolkachev was an engineer. and-and-a-half natasha had had h life. her mother had worked in the timber ministry in stalin's moscow in the 1930s. she was a communist party member working in a government ministry. one night the secret police showed up at her apartment. she was arrested on the spot and taken away. it was september 1937, the middle of stalin's purges. enemies were perceived to be everywhere. natasha's mother was accused of being a subversive, and she was shot. natasha's father was scared. he ran to to a friend's house, and he hid in his friend's apartment for a week. her father was a newspaper editor. he was editor of a party newspaper. a week later he, too, wa

sense that a lot of the more active, or the more, you might say, reckless things sure you did in the cold war for some time -- the cia did in the cold war for some time to get curtailed. i think the church and pike committees change the environment in which the cia was working. it knows that there are some people looking at it now. is a minorly: this point but it has only been relatively recently that if you call in northern virginia at you virginiaent northern you can identify where the cia is. they were developed after world war ii. what did we do? david hadley: you have military intelligence agencies. the office of naval intelligence or the bureau of medical intelligence -- army intelligence. they are focused on the tasks that are deemed important for their specific services. they did not talk to one another very well. the state department had something called the black chamber that was actually pretty effective in reading diplomatic mail and intercepting cables. but it gets closed by the secretary of state henry stimson, who says, at least according to the story, the gentlemen do not read

. >>> coming up on american history tv, the cold war. next, real america with the 1964 army a film about exercise delawar, a joint u.s.-iran armed forces operation to prevent the soert soviet invasion of iran. later, post war sold and the cold war with how the cold war let countries to crack down on perceived threats to their own citizens. >>> c-span is at the iowa state far. live coverage on c-span, c-span radio and c-span.org as the candidates walk the fairgrounds and speak at the des moines register's candidate soap box. here is the schedule. saturday, republican rick santorum at noon followed by democrats lincoln chafee at 12:30 and senator bernie sanders at 3:00. on sunday afternoon, republicans ben carson at 5:00 and george pataki at 5:30. c-span's campaign 2016 taking you on the road to the white house. >>> each week american history tv's real america brings you archival film that help tell the story of the 20th century. in april a 1964, american and iranian armed forces conducted a series of joint military exercises designed to se

it's comforting because the cold war ends the same way every time.i refer to my colleagues who are involved the in the current impressions. i would just say in response that one should think about in the reagan administration and maybe looking back and outside of the particular experience is a role that the relationship between conception emphasis of strength and when to negotiate. yes, i agree that the deployment of imf in the fall of '83 was tremendously important. it still gave a perception of strength. there was in the uk and throughout western europe the members that it was not at all popular at that point. on the up swing was the crisis, what the purposes are talking about more clarity and talking about western civilization was to show to the protest movements who believes reagan was a warmonger that, in fact, there was not an equivalent between the soviet union and the united states. it is a very big moment for the administration in terms of perceptions of strategic vulnerabilities, sudden, you know, land based mobile missiles, soviets, that b

, once home to the strategic air command, which controlled intercontinental miss aisles during the cold war. >> the might and strength of the military at that time which controls all the bombers now moved to omaha and made omaha a national site on the psyche of the cold war. announcer: later, how omaha and the railroads helped take -- overtake chicago as the stockyards. >> south omaha was basically the stockyards much the city was incorporated in 1884 and it was called the manley city because people literally thought it bloomed overnight. announcer: first up, we will visit the durham museum, housed in the former union train depot. it tells the story of a once-thriving industry in omaha. >> we're standing in the main room of the union station in omaha. e architect, william stanley underwood, wanted to make a statement about the strength of the railroads. in his mind it was strength, masculinity and that's what he really wanted this bl to embody. omaha really started out as a frontier town, typical frontier town. actually citizen from council bluffs decide they wanted to found the city on thi

the two countries have now? >> well, i think that relationship comes out of world war ii itself, and the postwar settlement happened during the cold war. so there was the soicht threat t and it made it necessary for u.s. and japan to counter that threat. really the reliance and the relationship comes out of that relationship. the united states looks at 70 years as 70 years of good history rather than focusing on what happened in the 1930s and 1940s. >> so how has the u.s. been able to manage its relationship with various asian countries who actually themselves don't always get along? >> certainly. well, the united states as you know has strong allies in asia. it has five very close allies, japan, korea are two of the most important and it's critical for washington to try and get korea and japan to work together. we face a number of challenges that north korea and china leaders in seoul and in tokyo have to work with their washington counterparts on. so it's absolutely invaluable for the united states to try and get their allies to work together. >> going forward what do you see as the future of u.s.-japan relations? >> i think the

timothy is the co-head of the cold war center. i think you should have a discussion about are we confronting a second cold war? what does that mean for the future of not just this country but -- >> i don't -- i -- i don't believe we are entering a new cold war, but that doesn't mean there aren't people who want one. the difference now is that the challenge is not one that could involve our extinction. this is not -- our differences with russia, which are i believe great are not at the level that they were when the united states and the soviet union were superpowers. >> i would disagree but that's a different debate. i think there were rules then and i think in some cases the rules are not set in the ways and there is reckless talk of use of tactical nuclear weapons because people have forgotten and are distanced. anyway action reque"the nation" played an important role. this is a congealed consensus right now about u.s./russian relations and "the nation" as it has through time is at least challenging that, it's seeking debate, one

which was interesting because nixon was so gratified to see the end of the cold war. he began his political career at the beginning of the cold war and lived to see the end of it. he was so gratified because he thought everything he stood for, all of the anti-communist platforms were vindicated so it was nice to be there. >> we have a short minute video clip from a book note we did with the president when he was here. >> did you write this book? >> yes, i would say those unfortunately who criticize the style, and it justifies criticism generally say it sounds like me. the reason it sounds like me is after i take all of the -- and i point out the author's note that i had excellent people watching with me, i had the chief editor in the book who made a great contribution and monica crowley who is in my office now and joe marks who were two full-time assistance and a number of others wrote various papers on the subject. but the final product, i had to not just do the editing but get it in my words so it sounded like me. as i often said to people working with me when i woul

relationship between the two of them and it was really founded early on in the common understanding of the cold war struggle that the united states is facing this new threat after world war ii and the soviet union. and in the early days, there was a really strong sense that they had to work together to advance american interests. but over time, that really declined. starts, as iness institution, pushing back against the cia more, that is when the agency really got into trouble in a big way. mr. scully: how so? mr. hadley: well, by 1975, the cia, which has for most of its existence been trying really hard to avoid permanent congressional investigation of its activities finds itself under investigation by two different committees and the two houses of congress, the church committee and the senate and the house of representatives, that really turn out a lot of the cia's, what we might call, dirty laundry. there is a cia report that was called the family jewels that basically was a collection of illegal or at least questionable cia activities that had gone on from 1959 until 1972. because therely is a

the cold war was terrible, i'm glad it's over. many, many people died in it, and we took great risks, as we know. but after the cuban missile crisis of 1962, the lines between the two cold war camps were relatively clear and mutually understood. the exception of places like west berlin, people knew where the lines were. and it was pretty clear what an act of aggression would be across one of those lines by either of the superpower camps. that's just not true in east asia today, and that's very challenging. if we look at the political psychology work of amos -- [inaudible] a stanford professor and the nobel laureate colleague of mine at princeton, daniel conman, they show that humans are much more willing to take risks and to pay costs to defend what they believe is rightfully theirs than they are to get new things. most people. there are exceptions from history; hitler. thank god he's an exception. but most humans in most places are willing to pay higher costs and take bigger risks to defend what they believe is rightfully theirs t

his is not the cold war -- the this is not the cold war or vietnam. >> could you go into more detail about your energy plan? create plan to sustainable energy? gov. o'malley: how do we get to a 100% lean electric grid by 2050? let me give you a couple factoids. here in iowa, you're already making it happen. 15 years ago, this was not true but today it is. 30% of iowa electricity comes from clean iowa wind. [applause] that is in a short. of time. the great thing about those big plays is they are to big -- they are too big to import from china so we make them right here. the governor of hawaii just set a goal of moving hawaii to a 100% clean electric grid. the governor of california has set a goal of moving to a 50% clean electric grid. it will require new technology and submit generation nuclear, it will require new battery technology and probably some we have never heard of. in the meantime, with wind, with solar, with designing smarter that zero homes that produce more energy than they use, we can move to a 100% clean electric grid and just in the nick of time. some of the things we

the iraq war. congress is expected to negotiate the bill. american university is where president kennedy spoke in favor of nuclear disarmorment in favor of the cold war. let's bring in former deputy spokesman at the state department and former ambassador and we have vise president of the american foreign policy council and the author of iran's deadly ambition coming out soon. it is nice to have you both. it a big conversation. i will reference an interview secretary john kerry did. it is a new interview and exposes the philosophy of the plan. a question was asked: if this deal is as good as the president and secretary say it is why is it so difficult to sell to the american people? >> i don't know what secretary k kerry is saying. i don't think it is as good as they say. they say this deal is better than no deal. but that is hardly any ringing endorsement. polls have shown the american people are skeptical of the deal and the reliability and trust worthyness of iran. >> i think the ambassador is right. you are looking at not one but two trust gaps. there is a gap between the american people and iranians. there are lots of reasons not to trust wha

set up at the end of world war ii or in the early years of the cold war, these many bases and now cost more than $10 latbilli3 per year to maintain. while they are intended to shore up u.s. security they come under growing scrutinge and criticism amid concerns that they may be making america less s not e and causing more harm than guniso t critics argue the value of these bases has diminished, at the same time as the damrge they are doing to local economies and environment has worseneso t the bases are a4 o blamed for reinforcing images of the united states as an occoying power towards america. at the end of large-scale u.s. troop involvement in iraq and not aanistan, he contends contends now is a good time to react salmon the tenants of this decades-old forwa di stratnt y f stationing u.s. forces and many places overseas. a revint oer comme tes a bunik as a frank and significant

the cold war. and everyone assumes that the cold war is gosure enough, in the beginning it does. the focal point this time as cuba. and islands 90 miles off the coast of florida. like many latin american countries in this. , there are revolutions. like many. the united states tries to intervene. castro takes charge. the communist. united states tries to unseat him, but it doesn't work. bay of pigs disaster. it doesn't work at all. slowly but surely, castro goes to cuba's economy and they start taking out all the american businesses, nationalizing things like oil refineries. we start taking out american businesses. united states it's very interested. in 1962, the united states puts an embargo on cuba. we are not allowed to export or import from cuba. which of course still exists although there is much discussion about lifting it. we'll see how that plays out ultimately. funny story about the embargo. john f. kennedy really loved cuban cigars. the day before he is about to sign the embargo he asked his press secretary to buy as many cuban cigars as he could get his hands on. he get

unlike any other about a kgb agent who operated in the united states during the last decade of the cold war. what's remarkable is that he's never spent a night in jail, the russians declared him dead a long time ago, and he's living a quiet life in upstate new york free to tell his story as honestly as a former spy ever can. did you think you were going to get away with it? >> yes. otherwise, i wouldn't have done it. >> max, agent, make me rich. thanks a lot. >> stahl: li na is one of the wealthiest female sports figures in the world. she is probably china's most famous athlete and an idol to young chinese-- not only because of her ability, but because of the way she stood up to the chinese system. >> i didn't care about the obstacles, i was just heading toward my goals. >> kroft: i'm steve kroft. >> stahl: i'm lesley stahl. >> safer: i'm morley safer. >> whitaker: i'm bill whitaker. >> pelley: i'm scott pelley. minutes." fall is in the air at lowe's... get your home ready with big labor day savings, like select shrubs or mulch 3 for $12. plus 20% off when you buy two select bags of scotts

robert is going to tell us about his new book, "the end of the cold war". he book will be published by public affairs and by great britain. he is among the world's historians and rush and author

since the end of world war ii and the early days of the cold war, when united states built or acquired most of the bases americans have considered it normal to have u.s. military installations it in other countries, and other people's lands. the presence of our bases has been long accepted and treated as an obvious good, essential to peace. perhaps these register in our consciousness when there is an anti- base or an accident in another country. quickly there forgotten though. there are no freestanding bases on u.s. soil today, around 800 bases are on foreign countries. the count of 800 comes from the can't pentagon annual counting a basis so by pentagons count there's 680 sites, it excludes well-known bases and like secretive bases in saudi arabia and israel. by my best account over the past 14 years, 800 is a reasonable estimate. although the u.s. has long been had some bases in foreign lands has been unknown in u.s. history before world war ii. now after that war there are hundred 74 bases in in germany, 113 in japan, 83 in south korea. there are hundreds more in aruba and australia

the president's pentagon chief is using language rarely heard since the end of the cold war in assessing the threat russia poses to the u.s. correspondent kevin corke tonight from the presidential vacation compound on martha's vineyard on the possibility of a new cold war. >> reporter: for russian president vladimir putin, submersible rides to the dechts of the black sea are both a subtle message to his countrymen and stern warning to the west that russia sees itself through the cold war lens as two of the remaining superpowers. >> for a quarter century or so since the end of the cold war, we have not regarded russia as an antagonist. vladimir putin's russia behaves in many respects as -- in some respects and some very important respects as an antagonist. that is new. >> reporter: defense secretary ash carter warned that russia's behavior could send the world hurtling held long into a cold war redux. putin grefd engaged u.s. military and war ships and is suspected of widespread hacking attempts of u.s. assets. add a massive nuclear arsenal, pentagon leaders say you've got all the ingredi

candidate at ohio state university to talk about the cia and the press in the early days of the cold war. this interview is from the annual meeting for society of historians of american foreign relations. it's 20 minutes. >> david hadley, graduate of gettysburg college and a doctoral candidate at the ohio state university in columbus, let's talk about times like these, the press and the cia brought in the early cold war, in researching this, what did you learn? >> well, what i really learned is that the cia and the press had a pretty at times contentious and very multivaried relationship between the two of them, and it was really founded early on in this common understanding of cold war struggle that the united states is facing this new threat after world war ii, and the soviet union, and that there's in the early days, there's a really strong sense that had to work together in order to advance american interests, but over time, that really declined, and so when the press starts as an institution pushing back against the cia more, that's when the agency really got into trouble in a big w

. >>> coming up on american history tv, the cold war. next, real america with the 1964 army a film about exercise delawar, a joint u.s.-iran armed forces operation to prevent the soert soviet invasion of iran. later, post war sold >> 70 years ago on july 16, 1945. the first atomic bomb was tested near los alamos, new mexico. and a few weeks later, atomic bombs were dropped on hiroshima and nagasaki, japan. next on "reel america," "the moment in time." the manhattan project. a

the war. some postwar critics would say that you have the verge is to focus on winning the war against british.us i don't think that is true. of course, there is the cold war argument that roosevelt should have contained soviet expansion, while at the same time fight germany and japan. finally, if you authors, and i agree with them, and say that he had a definite vision for the post world world. was aestion was if he appeasest?d app roosevelt was a secretive. he didn't like diaries. he didn't like people taking notes in his meetings. there a lot of meetings where there were no transcripts. he made incompatible promises to different people. after the war, you have the outbreak of the cold war, which made wartime politics and the relationship with the soviet union a hot potato. a lot of people covered up their tracks. the official strategy of the allied strategy was germany first, which they thought about before the war started. and, they agreed to on the very first wartime conference, december, 1941. at the conference, they said they would stay on the defensive in the pacific and go on the offense of in europe. almost immediately, they deviated from tha

it seemed as though the cold war could turn into something much more dangerous, as the soviet union fellpart, as we wondered what would happen with russia's nuclear weapons, and as yugoslavia fell apart, ending in the balkan wars, which were very bloody. certainly there is a tremendous amount of risk, and it's the hour for europe's politicians to get this resolved, to come to some consensus on solidarity regarding greece, regarding other countries in financial and economic duress. where this onslaught of refugees that need to be distributed in an equitable fashion across europe. sarah: we heard from the populist. do you expect them to win out, or do you expect greater integration to win out, to cope with all these challenges? the stanza -- costanze: for the populist to win out, they would have to be much better organized and have something like a political program. the program of the populist is negative. it is criticism of a caricature of the european union as -- i don't know come the playground of decadent and fascist forces. none of that is true. still, what's necessary now his leader

. >>> coming up on american history tv, the cold war. next, real america with the 1964 army a film about exercise delawar, a joint u.s.-iran armed forces operation to prevent the soert soviet invasion of iran. later, post war sold then later a conversation about the cia and the press. you're watching american history tv on c-span3. >>> c-span is in des moines for the iowa state fair and road to the white house coverage of presidential candidates. our live coverage is on c-span, c-span radio, and c-span.org as candidates speak

during the cold war, the civil-rights tactics appealed to the international opinion.how far you get is other variables but for example, like the little rock nine. there were all watching and although very circumscribed way they could press the issues in the international forum because it is sheer hypocrisy to talk about international to human-rights when your record at home is so poor but now absent the cold war, is a different story with the connections between our local efforts and palestine for example, are so important because it isn't just here but everywhere but the moving parts in the most productive ways that our strategic. >> don't have an answer but to talk about rights and for historians that is almost taken for granted what was going on in if the union made a big change in terms of what happened with national politics in the united states. then you add that the united states is no longer in this hegemonic situation in the world. so on the one side then the importance of the soviet union and its conduct. the current issue with the confederate flag and this

even though the cold war ended 20 years ago, the cold war between the u.s. and cuba continued for 54 years plus. people here are excited. the acrimony lasted longer than most americans who are alive today have been around. >> fidel castro triumphantly entered havana days after the cuban dictator, an ally of the united states, fled the country in the early hours of knew year's day 1959. four days later, he visited the u.s. looking for help. he laid a wreath at the tomb of the unknown soldiers and met with senators and vice president richard nixon, but his anti-american, pro-soviet rhetoric was on display, praising russian leader. >> he is good friend. you leave us we sell petroleum. your leaders speak about aggression to cuba. defending cuba >>> president eisenhower avoided castro, going on a golfing trip. it may not have made a difference in light of words when asked if he was a communist. >> well, wait for the history, the history will say what we are. >> u.s.-cuba relations went downhill from there. castro following through on threats on cuba, raising taxe