the u.k. was co- response will in iraq. -- responsible in iraq. ecause i understood or was told by my own legal adviser that there might be questions about the uk + responsibility for the detention facilities in mmd se, i got my legal adviser to purloin a writ -- a copy of the report from his contacts in the cpa, go through it, while i was away on a visit elsewhere, and check what was relevant for british concerns and make sure that those parts were reported back to london and to the ministry of defence which you did. he did not go through the rest of the report or give me any other indication that there were general questions here about the overall administration of iraq that might arise and so i missed an opportunity to focus on that. >> the senior british officers did not convey this to you? >> they did not. >> you were not able to give london and a warning that this issue is likely to blow up but some time? >> i do not know whether london of the west got a full copy of the report. i think we sent them the parts of the report that affected briti

it had been the work of iraq. er members of the administration? >> i had conversations with him in particular. he was quite convinced that there was a connection, a strong connection, between saddam hussein and al

guest: there's a book about the war in iraq called "fiasco" and it still state that the war in iraq was the biggest mistake in the history of american foreign policy. even now, we only have a dim sense of what its ultimate cost to this country in blood, treasurer, credibility and influence. i do not think the war in iraq is over. i think we may only be halfway through watching this play out. i think next year in iraq is going to be a worrisome year. host: explain that quickly. guest: in iraq next year, you are bringing down american troops very quickly. you are trying to all national elections, and you have iraqis posturing themselves for a post- american future. all of the ingredients for a civil war in iraq before the surge are still there. the only thing in the equation is americans there to stop the civil war. that is declining. host: what are the parallels to afghanistan, given what you just said about iraq? guest: i do not see a lot of parallels to afghanistan. i see it is a very different country and a difference -- and a different set of problems. i am more optimistic in the lon

he was over in iraq, different time of the occupation, a different area of iraq. so i kept meeting more and more veterans. at this point realized, there is something going on here. i am going to look into this. i kept meeting more and more people. the more people i talk with i heard more and more variations of the same. i met a guy who was with the striker brigade. he was up in northern iraq about a year after the first couple of folks i talk with about their search and avoid missions. he said, we found actually a different way to do search and avoid missions. we figured out how to get into the computers in the humvees. we actually found a way to get into the computer and move our little blip around doing to virtual patrols. so we would leave the guy in the house the doing that and we would go have soccer games with iraqi kids. iraqis up to invite you into their house and serve you gallons of tea. so we would go to that. i thought, wow, that is pretty amazing. at first i didn't believe it. how did you get into a humvee and get into the computer and move the blip ar

and i know in the iraq experience, we were attempting to do that, but when unsuccessful. e ambassador could communicate to the iraq government, and wait a minute, they are serious. this dynamic is helpful, not hurtful. >> both politically and militarily side, there would be benchmarks? >> yes, one thing that is fundamental to the insurgence is for the military to develop capacity. >> how concerned are you for the military deployments over the forces over the eight to nine years? >> the strain is significant, we owe a great deal to the men and women of our armed services. they are remarkable. one thing that has happened over the last years is that there is a dependent-well period. my friend's son just got back from iraq and he can expect two years back at fort bragg, and before it was 18 months. that's been stabilized. but still the strain is significant. and it's played out in what you are seeing now in terms of divorce rates and mental health issues. we have to be conscious of that and very concerned. and that's one of the factors that has motivated the president to not o

that means being a party to the progress being made in iraq. so you can see that president bush is thinking very much of the practical input of the u.n. but under the leadership of the u.s. as the controller of the political scenario. >> but the point i wanted to really get at, did the u.k. -- did president bush shift in his thinking from where he was from the point he made that statement at hillsboro? >> yes, because from the prime minister's input, we wouldn't have gotten the word vital. rather an american -- the u.n. would be so useful that we must make sure they are encouraged to be useful. >> we are going to move to baghdad but before we do that, you're in a unique position at that time because you have an insight to the thinking at the united nations. you have been negotiating with the ambassador. you have an understanding what the u.k. thinking is but in preparing for your role in baghdad, were there any outstanding issues that you found out before you went? we heard about your meeting with the prime minister in september but were there a

to upset the american military, the mission, of administering iraq after the war was over.n my view, general tommy franks was given the long mission to invade iraq, get rid of the saddam hussein and her turn it over to the minister is bridge he should have been given the mission of getting rid of saddam,'s of fighting iraq, making sure that iraq was a secure military area and then handing over to civilian administrators. there was an under-resources and of the mission from the very beginning. london was not in the position or did not question that setting up missions. control of the security situation was lost from the earliest days after april 9 and was never recovered. you cannot do a political process or an economic process without security. in addition to that, as far as the political process was concerned, no iraqi leadership was identified in reality and with justification as being the leadership to which we would hand over in the face four. . phase four perios. london was not sufficiently consulted on the setting of missions, on the change from oha to the cpa, from,

it had been the work of iraq. i had conversations with him in particular. he was quite convinced that there was a connection, a strong connection, between saddam hussein and al qaeda. there was constant reference to the fact that muhammed, one of the guys responsible for 9/11 had meant iraq -- met iraqi agents in prague. apparently, it is rubbish. but you could not dig it out of the blood veins -- out of the veins of the american administration. somewhere in northern iraq, on the border with iran, there was then al qaeda camp that saddam was allowing to happen. apparently, that was not true either. they were not an al qaeda operation. in the end, as you probably know, the defense department became so irritated with the perceived bias of the cia against the intelligence which the department of defense wanted to believe, they created their own in-house intelligence operation that ran as a rival to and replacement of the cia. the background to all of this -- god knows what was going on in london. there is not simply:

partly because the iraq the arab-iraq-kyrgyzstan dichotomy was a vital part of the whole substance partly because of the british relationship with the kurdish nation, but i also did work with the senior members of the governing council to get on the shiah side who wanted another channel of political discussion. than the administrator. which was viewed with some distaste, i think, by some members of the american members of the c.p.a. and by the administrator. but i was there with an independent remitt and i had my government's authority to do that. and they couldn't prevent me from doing that. in fact your function of not having become a deputy? >> yes. that i couldn't i think if i'd been a deputy i would have still participated. but those conversations helped to ease the members of the governing council around bremmer's -- and was loyal to the overall mission of the administrator. and helped him achieve both the 15 of november agreement and later the transition into administrative law. >> looking back to your time there, what exactly was the most important achievement in making progress u

but while we have achieved hard- earned milestones in iraq, the situation in iraq -- in afghanistan has deteriorated. after escaping across the border to pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al qaeda's leadership established a safe haven. although a legitimate government was elected by the afghan people, it has been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, and underdeveloped economy and insufficient security forces. over the last several years, the taliban has maintained a common cause with outright as they both seek an overthrow of the afghan government. -- with al qaeda as they both seek an overthrow of the afghan government. gradually, they have begun to control additional portions of afghanistan while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating attacks of terrorism against the afghanistan people. -- against the afghani people. the troop levels there remain a fraction of what they were in iraq. when i took office, we have just over 32,000 americans serving in afghanistan compared to 160,000 in iraq at the peak of the war. commanders in afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with t

the intervention in iraq was a disaster. it took a situation that was bad, it certainly was bad under saddam hussein and made it much worse. afghanistan was certainly in a very bad situation under the taliban who were doing some terrible things and the situation now is a good deal worse with no end in sight. and the taliban at the very least there was security for most of the country. now there's a generalized insecurity. it seems to be getting worse, not better. so again, there's lack of consideration for the potential of humanitarian intervention to do tremendous harm. another problem with humanitarian intervention is cost. acts of war are extremely expensive. in the case of yugoslavia it was relatively cheap. a mere of tens of billions of dollars. the current estimate for the long-term cost of war in iraq is about $3 trillion. that's from linda billman's of harvard and george stiglitz of columbia. for afghanistan, i haven't seen any estimates but it also undoubtedly would have to be at least in the hundreds of billions. an

did you report this as the first signs of iraq coming into view? >> i don't have the reporting telegram in front of me, but we were watching this stuff like cox we almost got too close. there was no doubting the for an office with this kind of reporting. i remember the press conference pretty well. of course we did. without having it in front of me, i can't believe -- i don't think the foreign office can claim ignorance the way the wind was blowing. they made it extremely plane. -- plain. on the fifth of november, i could not find in the archives, they lay all this out. -- laid all this out. we were may be overly deciduous -- assiduous. >> this is the moment to take a break. we will come back in 10 minutes. if members of the public need to leave the room, that is fine. please come back in 10 minutes, or the doors will be shut and that will be had for the morning. thank you very much. we will begin again in 10 minutes. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] >> let us resumed, i

cutting off war funding for the iraq war, that did not happen. there were high-profile showdowns with president bush. now that president obama is in the white house, democrats are very concerned. they thought that this president would get out of iraq quicker. and get out of afghanistan quicker. then there are others that note that osama bin laden is still on the loose and how are they going to get him if there is not a large presence in afghanistan? others counter that point and say that he is probably not in afghanistan, he is likely in pakistan. host: cambridge, andrew. good morning. caller: i am calling to say that in minnesota rehouse the largest -- hello? we house of the largest headquarters of the national guard. we are very upset with this. we feel that our troops have been used and abused enough. we are starting groups that will pay for the impeachment of president barack obama. he ran on shutting down these wars and saying that we have to have an entire congress and senate to get laws passed to shut down these wars. he has that even bothe

actually, the same was true in iraq. t is just been at this need with respect to these ratios is about right for afghanistan. >> that is one of the reasons why they added contributions from our allies and partners are so important. basically we want them to take responsibility for the northern and western parts of afghanistan so that we can concentrate and focus our efforts in the southern and eastern parts of the country. >> secretary gates, i think one thing that all of you sit in your opening statements is we need of better participation by the iraqis and by the non american coalition. we all agree with that. i happened to be over there in 2003 when we were turning over the training of the ana to the afghans. it was the oklahoma 45th guard unit that was in charge of that. they contend that they are great warriors, and yet you look around and see so many of these young, healthy afghans that are walking the streets who ought to be in the military. what can we do differently to encourage greater participation with the ana

>> we have increased the troop levels, not by some of the figures from when iraq started. we anticipated the need for more forces. it took a long time to even get the increase we have now. what we are trying to do to ease the strain is ensure that the commanders have the resources for all of the quality of life services that are so necessary. when a soldier first deploys, it helps to know that the schools back on the post are functioning, the day care centers, hospitals, the family support groups are in place. the other thing we have to do is make sure there is a much closer connection between the veterans administration and the department of defense, so that soldiers, sailors, and marines coming back do not fault the screen and not get the help they need when they are back home. >> you have mentioned in the past that afghanistan has been starved for resources. is that no longer the case, and if it is the case, what do troops need that they are not getting? >> as soon as president obama came in, there was a decision in march to send 20,000 more forces there, which was a str

>> the situation, the surge in iraq -- the situation was tempered in iraq because we were able to buy off enough of the people who were killing us. now, if we do that in afghanistan, if we can provide more money to the poppy growers and the people running the heroin trade out of afghanistan, one of those people according to "the new york times" and our own cia happens to possibly be the brother of the president of afghanistan, if we're able to outbid the heroin guys, yeah, maybe we can have some impact. but for him to say that -- i mean, i can understand why republicans and some of the people on the right are like, what are you doing setting a deadline? it's crazy. if they're truly the enemy, you don't say we're going to fight you until 2:00 on july 2nd, 2011. i mean, it's like if they're the ene enemy, you fight them until you're done, thyou win and they lose. that's not what he said. he just provided, i think, more fodder for his opponents by giving a deadline. if somebody is trying to kill you, if that's the case that people in afghanistan are trying to kill us, then how can you se

my question, the prime minister of iraq has said that most of the slaughter occuring in iraq is becausehe neighboring countries supporting those terrorists. how long will the united states continued dialogue with countries that are small -- slaughtering civilians in iraq? before they take some action to put a stop to these terrorists? guest: thank you for your question. did there have been recent discussions about what has caused these recent attacks. the prime minister, as did -- prime minister credited the recent attacks to al qaeda. but there is another insurgent movement in iraq. it is a nationalist movement. it is focused on the former regime. there is support for them from the neighboring countries. i know that the united states is working diplomatically with neighboring countries to try to work that out and get that stuff resolved. host: what was the worst thing about being in iraq? guest: the worst thing? good question. i think that the worst thing was seeing the sacrifice of our young men and women, going through the moral services and working through that. the good part was to

actually, the same was true in iraq. just been at this need with respect to these ratios is about right for afghanistan. >> that is one of the reasons why they added contributions from our allies and partners are so important. basically we want them to take responsibility for the northern and western parts of afghanistan so that we can concentrate and focus our efforts in the southern and eastern parts of the country. >> secretary gates, i think one thing that all of you sit in your opening statements is we need of better participation by the iraqis and by the non american coalition. we all agree with that. i happened to be over there in 2003 when we were turning over the training of the ana to the afghans. it was the oklahoma 45th guard unit that was in charge of that. they contend that they are great warriors, and yet you look around and see so many of these young, healthy afghans that are walking the streets who ought to be in the military. what can we do differently to encourage greater participation with the ana? >>

and all the problems in iraq were caused by a single individual, saddam hussein. i think there's an effort in sudan as a single individual is the cause of the problem. not to whitewash the actions of these people all of whom were, indeed, criminal persons who did very criminal things, but to suggest that certainly the case of yugoslavia there were many villains, and this was a very complex war which cannot be reduced to single personalities. but never the less, there was an effort to simplify it by reducing it to single personalities because that plays much better in public relations terms. what's very striking is not that it

guest: there's a book about the war in iraq called "fiasco" and it still state that the war in iraq wasthe biggest mistake in the history of american foreign policy. even now, we only have a dim sense of what its ultimate cost to this country in blood, treasurer, credibility and influence. i do not think the war in iraq is over. i think we may only be halfway through watching this play out. i think next year in iraq is going to be a worrisome year. host: explain that quickly. guest: in iraq next year, you are bringing down american troops very quickly. you are trying to all national elections, and you have iraqis posturing themselves for a post- american future. all of the ingredients for a civil war in iraq@@@@@@"': -- i think the next year in iraq, 2010, will be like 2003 and 2007, a real turning point year. . run about afghanistan that i am about iraq for two reasons. first, iraq does not strike me as having a coherent national identity. it is still very much its part, the kurds, shiites, sunnis. and afghans do still have a national identity, despite their years of warfare. the sec a

my question, the prime minister of iraq has said that most of the slaughter occuring in iraq is because of the neighboring countries supporting those terrorists. how long will the united states continued dialogue with countries that are small -- slaughtering civilians in iraq? before they take some action to put a stop to these terrorists? guest: thank you for your question. did there have been recent discussions about what has caused these recent attacks. the prime minister, as did -- prime minister credited the recent attacks to al qaeda. but there is another insurgent movement in iraq. it is a nationalist movement. it is focused on the former regime. there is support for them from the neighboring countries. i know that the united states is working diplomatically with neighboring countries to try to work that out and get that stuff resolved. host: what was the worst thing about being in iraq? guest: the worst thing? good question. i think that the worst thing was seeing the sacrifice of our young men and women, going through the moral services and working through that. the good part w

and i certainly agree with everything you said about the impact of the war in iraq on this venture inghanistan. >> we have a question over here. wait for the mike, please. >> you've already had one question today, sir. let's let people who haven't asked questions. >> i'll make it fast. i'm a journalist. you contrasted the situation in afghanistan facing us now with the situation facing the russians. the soviets before. i really hate to ask this question but you sort of begged it with the comparison. the other comparison that's often made is the situation that obama is facing with what johnson faced in vietnam. so you know the question. >> the ghost of vietnam haunts this administration. it walks through the corridors of today's white house every day. it certainly walks through the corridors of the united states congress constantly. but afghanistan 2009 is not vietnam 1965 or not even 1961. it's a very different situation. we were attacked from afghanistan. the most successful foreign attack on the united states of america bar one wha? the royal navy's attack on our capital in 1814 was

nothing was not the right answer either. in iraqn 2003, as i have described in my written testimony, the stated policy was all travel outside the green zone required full military escort. i arrived with the first surge of civilian advisors and it was quickly apparent that such escort wasn't available to the majority of the civilian advisors although we needed to travel to our respective ministries, especially in the early and chaotic period. many of us considered a several-vehicle military convoy with civilians wearing armored vests and helmets projected a high profile target and it was safer to travel quiet lly under the radar, avoiding timetables and taking other security measures, so we did that in order to do our job. fortunately, no disaster occurred. my personal experiences there and in other posts lead me to suggest first the need for more and better internal dialogue or communication between the policy and security sides of the state department on what is the best security posture. secondly, that the one size fits all approa

the landscape. there is a very interesting case with iraq. d up to the war with a short window for scholars to develop their arguments. it was only late in the game that it became clear that the invasion was likely to happen. the window for scholars to figure out what was happening and come up with arguments was smaller than you might think. the scholars who opposed this were exactly the same people who exhibited what in hindsight seem to be shortsighted analysis in the previous cases. they argued that this was a bad idea primarily on the following four arguments. the policy of containment and sanctions can work. they were defenders of the policy in washington that was discredited. they said that war would be very costly. saddam hussein probably use wmds engaged in urban warfare. war is very costly. third is the china shop argument. you invaded. you own it. it will be difficult to hold together. it will probably be a prolonged occupation. fourth, it will divert resources from the important struggle against al qaeda in afghanistan. those were t

that's one of the things that made my eyes cross. in iraq it was just not clear who was the one that was going to be held accountable when things went badly. and let me ask this because one of the things that happened in iraq was the lead army corps of engineers that kind of layered in there. and it was interesting to me because i would go in iraq to talk to the army corps of engineers and i would hear one set of facts then i would move to somewhere else and i would hear completely different set of facts. and so, where's army corps of engineers in here if at all? >> man, i was going to see the army corps of engineers is the other component of this. i'll take a question for the record to get an accurate dollar count for you. some of this is still slightly unknown because requirements are going to be generated through out this timeframe, but we would get the accurate figures for you from the army corps of engineers. >> what will the army corps of engineers be doing? cannot obviously, ma'am, construction projects permanent building type constru

where we documented -- similarities to the coalition around the iraq war. this time around, we heard president obama's say in his west point speech, when he spoke about the escalation, he talked about a coalition of 43 nations participating with us. he did not identify them. the nation of georgia has one soldier in afghanistan. iceland has two. ireland has four. jordan has seven. bosnia, 10. there are three or four countries, the u.k., australia, can live up -- canada, and italy, with syria's troops. the rest of there for political, not military support. it is embarrassing to call it an international coalition when it is nothing of the sort -- there rest of them there are political, not military. caller: thank you very much for your astute research. i want to ask you, do you see any correlation with this military expansion, the movement from a draft service to an all- volunteer service in the sense that americans do not have any skin in the game anymore? people volunteer for military services for their own agendas and motives. guest: i think there's a big co

iraq. i wrote a book called, "fiasco" about the war in iraq. it states and i still believe that the war in iraq was the biggest mistake in the history of american foreign policy. and, even now, we only have a dim sense of its ultimate cost to this country in blood, treasure, credibility and influence. i don't think the war in iraq is over. and, i think we, may only be halfway through watching this play out. i think actually next year in iraq is going to be a very worrisome year. >> host: explain that real quickly. >> guest: in iraq next year you're bringing down american troops very quickly. you're trying to hold national elections, and you have iraqis posturing themselves for a post-american future. all the ingredients for civil war in iraq that were there before the surge, which the surge interrupted, are still there. so the only thing in the equation that is changing the american ability to stop civil war is declining. so i actually think next year in iraq, 2010, will be like 2003, and 2007, a real turning point year. >> host: what are the pa

there was a popar surge for the war of originallin iraq. there has never been t same as fars afghastanas concerned. if amecan casualtieto start to mountyou will watchhe president's numbers and the democratic suprt for this war, asells republican support, declined dramatilly. >> i wonder what will do in terms ofrones. the pakisnisn the one hand have protested in a token way. on the otherand, it has caused difficties. evan tls me that the cia is dog new things -- >> they are using guys with riflesnot just drones. it was receny reported that we went in and ot -- cia snipers got seven or eigh guys, i believe in paktan. th is really a difficult covert action tpull off. the capacity has increased so we can more of this. having sd that, i am always eptic about this, because presiden are always tempted -- we don't have to send in a whol armies, which does get w smart guys ino get it done. it is tempting for a predent to go for the option, andt works sometimes, but often i es not. >> the ironys that the one timet worked is the initial war in afghanis

corruption of iraq, the occupation of iraq and i confused it with one of the other books i had read. i haven't gone over my notes in a long time. i remember the book now, it was absolutely spellbinding. you couldn't put it down. it was a thick book. we appreciate you calling in and along those lines if you want more background on the u.s. involvement in the war on terrorism cash this one is called a growing up bin laden, his wife and son take us inside the secret world. another 20 online publication. curious illinois. this is is it john? go ahead, john. >> caller: mary christmas to you. >> host: thank you. >> caller: i would like to point out the book review, after lysol lessons in disaster on your program, i went to chicago public library to order it for myself and there were 12 people waiting to read that book and to groups of books i would suggest people read is any book by a medal of honor recipient and any book by p.o.w.. 37 books have been written by the amount veterans, the imam p.o.w. and i think i've read them all. i've been out of work since december and those two groups of

allow we were the iraq secretary of defense was on and they were talking about his book, the corruption of iraq. and occupation of iraq. and i confuse them with one of the other books i had read. i hadn't gone over my in a long time. i remember his book now. it was absolutely one you couldn't put down. it was a duck. i had to read it three times just to understand a lot of it. >> host: well dorris we appreciate you calling in. along those lines if you want more background on the u.s. involvement of the war on terrorism, this one is called growing up in london. a psalmist wife and son take us inside their secret world. another 2009 publication. this is john. >> caller: merry christmas to you, bill. i like to put your book review after you guys have lessons in disaster on your program. i went to the chicago public library to order this book for myself and there were 12 people waiting to read that book. and there were two groups of books i would suggest people to read it any book via medal of honor recipient in any book by pow. many books have been written by vietnam veterans pows and i th

the numbers. i think there are four in iraq. i think it is four or five boeing 27 or 8 in afghanistan. from myxd viewpoint, we have the oversight -- going to 7 or 8 in afghanistan. >> we have one in the country. i mean the interface with that individual. in the past six months, there was a system into place to observe and reportçó back to thr staff and captor evaluation of our performance. ñr-- to capture each evaluation. there is formal oversight that goes on consistently. >> thinking. >> i think there are two aspects of oversight, formal contract oversight, and i think in our case that putting -- they are putting more people in place. Ñiçóthe more informal and less structuredñr is adequate. xd>> thank you. let me ask in terms of, and we have had some discussion about contractors having the rule to identify better practices and finding ways toÑi streamline, improved, save costs, avoid duplication, etc. in your experiences, the you have examples where you have offered up and contributed new and better ways to do things to save m

the biggest is the one we built in iraq. who in the double ever built that think? what was the basis? >> the short answer is that there is a standard and it does govern to a large degree where we put our embassies. that is the classic requirement well known for its setback between our buildings occupied and the edge of the property where the wall is, it is the essential for the most important security american mr. icahn put into place with the 170-foot setback for of course, that means you have a significant embassy and you need a significant piece of land and land of that size is often very difficult to find. it is true that new embassies as i mentioned before in my testimony, there is a lot of an embassy is boats, many of them are not right in the downtown core. putting parenthetically the one in beijing is. that is a big city but in this in town and in fact, did an area where a lot of other embassies. the new-line. i am intimately familiar. >> bed is good news to me because i told they were building at 35 for 40 minutes. >> it was not being built wait out it is

testifying on british involvement in the war in iraq. ut first, a special presentation of our documentary, "the blair house -- the president's guest house" begins. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] >> the first blair home, the original part, and that where the green awning is, that's the primary entrance. that's where presidents, our own and foreign leaders, arrive and depart from. blair house is now the entire block. today we have about 109 rooms. that's 70,000 square feet. and just to put that into perspective, we are 5,000 square feet larger than the white house is. >> its primary mission is to be a guest home for world leaders that come to visit the president. and it's used for that purpose. and in that mission it has never failed. >> since 1942, just about any world leader you can think of has walked through this door. and this is the same marble floor they've all walked across. >> when you first come into blair house, it's easy to look at it and say, wow,

the energy was diverted to iraq in every way. the president was correct on all his comments about what he inherited.. he is in a tough situation. yes, we have been there for eight years, but it has only been holding action. host: next up, reno, nevada, from jeryl opposes the president's action. caller: we need to get out of there. i'm glad that the president has a ton on. as long as we are occupiers, will be seen as such, will have to kill every afghan person before we win. no one likes occupiers. as for a centralized government, i'm surprised to see the conservative try to create a centralized government and of guinness and when all they do is complain about ours. guest: two things. general stanley mcchrystal has said we cannot kill ourselves out of this. at the end of the data has to be governance, capability on behalf of the afghans to deliver things like the rule of law to the people. then, secondly, i do think we took a wrong turn in superimposing a political process. giving them a form of government they're not familiar with

actually, the same was true in iraq. is just been at this need with respect to these ratios is about right for afghanistan. >> that is one of the reasons why they added contributions from our allies and partners are so important. basically we want them to take responsibility for the northern and western parts of afghanistan so that we can concentrate and focus our efforts in the southern and eastern parts of the country. >> secretary gates, i think one thing that all of you sit in your opening statements is we need of better participation by the iraqis and by the non american coalition. we all agree with that. i happened to be over there in 2003 when we were turning over the training of the ana to the afghans. it was the oklahoma 45th guard unit that was in charge of that. they contend that they are great warriors, and yet you look around and see so many of these young, healthy afghans that are walking the streets who ought to be in the military. what can we do differently to encourage greater participation with the ana?

nothing was not the right answer either. in iraqin 2003, as i have described in my written testimony, the stated policy was all travel outside the green zone required full military escort. i arrived with the first surge of civilian advisors and it was quickly apparent that such escort wasn't available to the majority of the civilian advisors although we needed to travel to our@@@ axd and in other posts lead me to suggest first the need for more and better internal dialogue or communication between the policy and security sides of the state department on what is the best security posture. secondly, that the one size fits all approach is not the best one for us today. thirdly, that senior officials on the ground in country should have more flexibility and take more responsibility to determine which mix of security measures is most appropriate in a given situation at a given point in time. and i second the remarks that ambassador neumann made that this can't be left to personal decision. there has to be bureaucratic support, consensus

the u.s. public tolerate that? >> well, i was in iraq labor day weekend and i was with the them and i asked the battalion commanders that question. is this appropriate? effective? and they said, once we explain to our soldiers the policy and that we not only support but it makes sense to us. and the reason is because every time a civilian is hurt, the propaganda that is generated by taliban, by al qaeda, the -- it sets us back. and soldiers understand that. the commanders on the ground understand that. one of the lessons in the soviet is hundreds of thousands of pash tunes were killed. and that hacend their departure as much as anything. actually, it generated the sympathy in the united states. i recall in my former colleague charlie wilson when he went to those camps and they talked about villages being bombed, that's what sort of moved us to step in. so i think that it's a very careful policy, and it's also a policy that originates from the military. there are some suctyls, to be politically correct, it's so far from the fact. this is

iraq. of course, there are similarities. the people of iraq and the people of afghanistan are very religious. predominantly a moslem country -- muslim country and very strong travel connections, family connections and values and that sort of thing. in terms of conditions i would say that the afghan country is a fairly poor country. where do not have the resources that we saw in iraq in terms of natural gas and oil reserves and that sort of thing. and i guess i have been impressed with two things, one, the depth and breadth of the international effort to hear in afghanistan. and we have 46 countries with representatives in our team. just yesterday, we brought in a european gendarmerie force and integrated that into our force. a policeman, 300 of them from france, italy, portugal, spain, netherlands and several other countries. what those policemen will do is go out to the afghan precincts and try to help make them better. i have been impressed with that and i've also been impressed with the afghans. the senior military leaders th

the reality is the surge in iraq lasted 14 months. the president is talking about at least 18 to 24 months with this surge. i would say that -- well, first of all, i have adamantly opposed deadlines. i opposed them in iraq, and i opposed deadlines in afghanistan, but what the president has announced is the beginning of a process, not the end of a process. and it is clear that there will be -- this will about gradual process, and as he said last night, based on kisses on the ground. so there is no deadline for the withdrawal of american forces in afghanistan. >> reclaiming my time. secretary gates, forgive me for the constraints of our time here. your line to cnn you oppose timelines and exit strategies but i'll leave that there and accept your response. admiral mullen, last night the president said in his speech "commanders in afghanistan repeatedly ask for support to deal with the re-emergence of the taliban but these reinforcements did not arrive." the secretary's predecessor donald rumsfeld this afternoon calmed that a bald misstate

at some point you have to bring in the army. in iraq we had areas where there were no security forces left at all and we literally had to bring in our forces and then iraqi army forces then to get back to the point that you could get to local police going again. >> i'll ask in the next round or submit for the next record for the local tribal militias. thank you. >> it is an important element of this. making sure the warlords don't come out, we don't need more warlords, but do enable and empower local security forces in what is called the community defense initiative. we won't have something akin to the anbar awakening of all, you know, tribal linking as this reaches critical mass and takes off and rejecting in this case the taliban. but what we can do is help -- it is a village by village, valley by valley effort and we're using some of our best special forces teams right now really to experiment with this, but we think it is something that has good potential. >> thank you. >> senator shaheen. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you to

the equipment, at 95% out of iraq. ur folks in this last rotation have been doing a magnificent job phasing down, breaking trail for the much larger army, shipment of equipment that is going to follow. evacuating are stuck both through kuwait and jordan as well. -- our stock both through kuwait and jordan as well. a lot of it is going to afghanistan. a lot of the things coming out of iraq are getting a very rapid rehab in theater and are making their way to afghanistan to be able to support the additional troop requirements there. what i told the troops in iraq is that the most dangerous thing that our corps is doing today is happening in afghanistan. the most important thing we're doing today is happening in iraq. and that is because we are sealing the win there. they are making sure that although the clock is ticking down and we are on the other guys' 5 yard line, that they do the right things to close this out. the reason that is so critically important is that it is the first battle of this extended war against extr

the iraq's geography we know. desert and sand. you get into the north and then you run into some mountains and some green and stuff there in the kurdish area but a lot of iraq looks the same to me when i see it. afghanistan, a sharper difference in the top graphy across the -- topography across the area. stone mountains to the east. around to the south and over towards the west. but also further west you go the more high plains and dust you have out there that way. it is a foboding, topography in afghanistan as compared to iraq. but the security side in iraq we have managed to, working with our partners and with the full cooperation and support of the iraqi people and the iraqi government, including president maliki, now provided a number of over 600,000 trained security personnel in iraq with iraqi security forces and police forces together. i watched them drill and watched some of their special forces operations. and even though the best that the iraqis have to offer don't match up with the best that america has to offer, they lo

but while we have achieved hard- earned milestones in iraq, the situation in iraq -- in afghanistan has deteriorated. after escaping across the border to pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al qaeda's leadership established a safe haven. although a legitimate government was elected by the afghan people, it has been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, and underdeveloped economy and insufficient security forces. over the last several years, the taliban has maintained a common cause with outright as they both seek an overthrow of the afghan government. -- with al qaeda as they both seek an overthrow of the afghan government. gradually, they have begun to control additional portions of afghanistan while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating attacks of terrorism against the afghanistan people. -- against the afghani people. the troop levels there remain a fraction of what they were in iraq. when i took office, we have just over 32,000 americans serving in afghanistan compared to 160,000 in iraq at the peak of the war. commanders in afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with t

we respectfully disagreed on the last surge in iraq. i think we respectfully disagree on this surge. our concern is now that the president has put this arbitrary timetable to begin the process of withdrawal in july of 2011 that we're going to see many democrats who oppose the use of military force there as they did in iraq to try and impose legislatively artificial timetables on withdrawal and we'll be opposing that very strongly. >> lehrer: what about congressman mcgovern's point that he just made that he thinks this is a meaningless target date. >> well, you know, has been encouraging since our hearing before the foreign affairs committee last week some of the testimony we heard today is that we're hearing both the secretary of defense, the secretary of state and now general mcchrystal himself suggesting that july, 2011, is not a hard date for beginning to withdraw, that there's flexibility there. we welcome that. but i'm somebody that believes it's never a good idea to tell the enemy when you're going to quit fighting on a battlefield

iraq, two years later? >> well, you know, when the indictment came down, people in iraq were talking about the death penalty, as sort of, you know, to many people in iraq this is sort of the hallmark this is the signature moment for you know, the u.s. -- u.s. contractors slaughtering innocent civilians. so you know, because of the time zone we don't have any reaction yet out of baghdad but you can be sure this is being watched very closely there. and it will be very interesting to see how this is taken both by the government in baghdad and sort of, you know, the average iraqi on the street. >> suarez: matt apuzzo of the associated press, thanks for joining us. >> hey, thanks a lot. >> brown: now, for the other news of the day. here's hari sreenivasan in our newsroom. hari. >> sreenivasan: five americans will face terror charges in pakistan, according to an announcement from pakistani police today. the court date for the five men was set for january 4. police plan to charge them with terrorism and seek life sentences. the young muslim men were all arrested at this house in central pakistan earlier this month

the bottom line is not interference in iraq's affairs unless they open the door and leave them exposed and vulnerable at any point to iraq's interference in their affairs. the same with regard to iran. if there is no discussion about iran's elections, no discussion about fraud or free or fair open or transparent processes, no discussion about, and john's prospects -- , didn't jo[uninte] to interfere in their societies to any greater degree than iran has over the last 30 years. with regard to yemen at this time, yes, they did address yemen. in a unanimous support for saudi arabia's position as well as the yemen government's position. going over and beyond much of what has passed for conventional wisdom or stablish thought or informed opinion regarding what has been happening and has not been happening in yemen, you have something profoundly different and probably less than what the media has made out to be. the word crisis of our advisedly used -- are advisedly used. the crisis pales into insignificance by comparison and contrast to five previous crises that dimon has dealt with over 80

the u.s. forces in iraq, it will be compelled by the situation in afghanistan.we will not have the option of doing both at once. one great line that has been exposed in the last decade is this -- the united states military can fight two medium- sized conflicts at the same time. we cannot do that. if you are involved in one, do not start another one. it has implications in other places. the notion that the united states today could use military force against iran while it is bogged down in afghanistan and is trying to get out of iraq is lunacy. we could not afford to do that. we simply could not. that has implications for the future of iran's nuclear development policy. the president is going to take the military option off of the table. -- president is not going to take the option off of the table. mr. president, if you want to do that it is your nickel, but here is my racket -- my resignation. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you, bruce. [applause] >> he will be available to sign copies of his book. he will remain outside. clocks while embedded in afgha

and afghanistan, the u.s. and iraqight importance to the united states, and issues of great importance to muslims or populations in other parts of the world. to me, it appears it appears to me, the most important issue to the united states is to prevent another attack. a viable exit from afghanistan and iraq and to make sure there is security of the world's energy supplies and oil supplies. for muslim communities, and we have had several questions on this. one of the issues that is off great concern is justice for the palestinians. another is kashmir. and then aslam has pointed a disconnect between supporting democracy and our alliance with the saudi monarchs or the dictatorships in egypt. those issues team to be of more importance to muslim communities. let me get to the question. to what extent are the goals are issues that are important to the united states and the issues that are of importance to muslim communities zerget that there is not -- dwirget -- dwirgeent to the point they overlap. >> i think you posed that