the majorities of nsabb members, u.s. government agencies and the journal "science" have decided that this work should be published. i'm concerned about this, but i recognize this decision has been made. so now it's time to look ahead and anticipate the future of h5n1 transmissibility research which scientists are poised to pursue. here are some brief thoughts on benefits and risks of further pursuing this line of research. will further engineering h5n1 transmission improve surveillance? genetic mutation data is not widely collected in avian flu surveillance systems. very few sequences are annu s a in realtime. the prescribed response would still be the same. culling of infected birds, all flocks, regardless of the mutations of the virus. until we have a surveillance system in place that collects far more genetic sequence, does so in time frames meaningful and have value to lead to additional action if the field, this research seems unlike three practically improve surveillance. nor is this research necessary to making h5n

keim, do you anticipate that the nsabb may be asked to help the white house? >> we do whatever the administration asks us to do and nothing they don't. >> good standard. i thank you for that. you want to comment on that? >> if you look carefully at the dirk policy, really the part about within 60 day to give an inventory. within 90 days, determine how you're going to do a risk mitigation. that was really the first cut at making sure we know what's going on. ultimately, we are going to try and make sure that when you get down to the local level of the biosafety communities, this is where the monitoring done will be essentially automatic by well trained people. >> let me ask this question in your testimony now. the parts you discussed nih efforts to develop the influenza vaccine and the ongoing efforts to develop vaccines focused on h5n1. whether the findings will lead nih and other organizations that fund vaccine research to increase the priority that you're placing on these kinds of research efforts. >> the answer is a resounding yes. the situation, there are

the nsabb concluded that more needed to be known before the research was made public, and they asked the editors of "science and nature" to delay publication. both magazines agreed. last month, after further review, the nsabb withdrew its objections and voted unanimously to allow the university of wisconsin study to be published and by a vote -- a divided vote of 12-6 to allow the netherlands study to be published with some revisions and clarifications. one of the things that apparently influenced the board's decision was the revelation that the modified strains of h5n1 had become less lethal. but as the members of the panel know, i am sure that decision has drawn criticism from dr. michael t.osterholm, director of the center for infectious disease research and policy at the university of minnesota. and an nasabb board member himself. in a letter to the nih he wrote the nisabb had ignored the voice of scientists who believed publication of the h5n1 research was dangerous. and i quote from his letter, i believe there was a bias toward finding a solution that was a lot less about a rob

the nsabb will rarely be in the position of process after man scripts have been submitted. the process should happen early in the research process. to conclude, scientists who research diseases are are working to better the world. the u.s. needs to continue supporting entrepreneurial and ta talented scientists with the best ideas. at the same time, we need to acknowledge the consequences of accidents, special processes are needed to manage the public. this policy is a good step in that direction. >> thanks, doctor. help us just to, lay public, including me. when we hear about accident ales cape of pathogens, we get alarmed. talk more about it. does that normally happen? infection of workers? or -- >> yes. in all the cases i mentioned an

last, reaffirming the role of the nsabb. alia bald guidelines and spend energy and time on this debate. independent and strong nsabb should have a strong role in the durc policy going forward and i would hope the nsabb would rarely be in the position of getting invited in the process after manuscript have been submitted. i think we all agree in this run the risk assessment and management process should happen early in the research process. to conclude, scientists with research and forensic and other infectious diseases are working to improve our understanding and better the world. the u.s. needs to continue supporting the entrepreneurial talented scientists with the best ideas and at the same time we need to acknowledge the situations are the consequences are so serious that special process his are needed to manage the public and this new durc policy is a step in that direction. >> thanks, doctor. help us just, the public including me when we hear about accidentally skin of pathogens we get alarmed. talk a little more about i

we made use of the nsabb seven experiments of concern. we've always looked at the select agent program to make sure that we are in accordance with the requirements and reporting requirements. so we do that tiered process in order to make sure that experiments do full and fall -- full compliance with the bwc. what we've done, though, because of the alignment of the 29 march policy and the work that we have done previously, we essentially have a leg up on the implementation of the 29 march policy. >> okay. and just to take this one step further. on the board on which you sit, is this to determine governmentwide policy or also to approve particular projects or to evaluate particular research projects? >> these are internal boards that are designed to look at the department's experimentation. the projects that we're to be conducting. >> okay. and then finally, just give us a sense, and i don't think you have to get into too much detail here, about how widely dual-use research projects are being carried out or funded in the federal government.

the majority of the nsabb minister and u.s. s and the journal of science have decided this work should be published. i'm concerned about this but i recognize this decision has been made so now it's time to look ahead, anticipate the future of h5n1 research which scientists are now poised to pursue. here are some brief thoughts on benefits and risks of further pursuing this line of research. will further engineering age five and one viruses help improve surveillance? in my view, in the short term it's unlikely. genetic mutation data does not want connect 18 flu system but very few sequences are analyzed in real-time. even if we could identify excremental mutations in birds in real-time, prescribed response would still be the same. culling of infected birds, all flocks regardless of the vice. into every service has been a place that collects far more genetic sequence does so in time things are meaningful, and i predicted by is sufficiently to additional action infield is researching's unlikely practically improve surveillance. nor

kooim, to you anticipate the nsabb may be asked to help the white house in these reviews >> we do whatever the administration asks us to do and don't do anything they don't. >> good standard. thank you for that. dr. fauci, do you want to excellent on that. >> i agree with what dr. ger steen said, if you look carefully at the policy, the 60 days to give inventory, 90 days to determine how you do a risk mitigation, that was the first cut at making sure we know what's going on right now. i think this will be an evolving process. ultimately we will try and make sure that when you get down to the local level of the institutional biosafety committees a lot of the kinds of monitoring that will be done already essentially automatic by well-trained people. >> i agree. let me ask this question. in your testimony, dr. fauci you discuss nih funded efforts to develop a universal influenza vaccine and dr. ingalls focusing on h5n1 and i wonder whether they will lead organizations that fund vaccine research to increase the priority that you're placing on these kinds of research efforts. >> the answer is a

in march 2012, the government passed nsabb. gators about their research. the board received information about their risks and benefits from the public health community as well as from the united states government intelligence community. in a briefing from council and counter-terrorism center representatives, the border and assessments of the global ramifications associated with these papers. the details of these briefings are classified but many of the board that was left impression it did not increase publication and there is a high likelihood of an undesirable consequences to not publishing. the u.s. government has issued new guidelines targeting a consequence durc and the seven categories of special consideration and high consequence passengers. it is in this context that they arrived at different recommendations. one paper was recommended for fall publication of the other was recommended by a split vote of " 26. balancing the risks against the benefits in the context of additional information and policy, the board shifted it

i think the composition and responsibilities of the nsabb will be very important. so asking questions, reasonable questions of government about how this is working as we involve it is very important. and i think in particular paying attention to the very specific case of h5n1 mammalian transmisabout research, i agree that while the decision has been made to move on to publication for this experiment -- which i am concerned about -- i think the next issue is going to come up relatively soon unless there's a change in course. i think that will come up again, so i think you have to pay attention to that. >> thank you. dr. keim? >> so i guess i would reiterate what tom just said, that the new policy and how it's implemented is going to be very key. one thing that i think was an important role that the nsabb played here was we are an independent body. we were nongovernment. >> right. >> i think it's very important that you have external eyes as part of this new policy. there are inherent conflicts of interest between the funding agencies and the investigators, and the in