he is the charging official. if the charging official lies under oath, what does that say about this entire proceeding and you determined that we did not care. the definition is so broad, what can rise to level of official misconduct? what rises below it? >> we need to determine that. i agree that it is confusing. with respect to the sheriff, the sheriff and the mayor in -- are in different positions. testimony is relevant to whether or not official misconduct occurred. we're talking about vastly different types of testimony. the way to give to the sheriff's testimony and the effort to impeach is much more critical to what ever the mayor had to say. even if the mayor had the worst motives to bring this before the sheriff, if the conduct does rise to let all, official misconduct, i think we're obligated under the charter to find official misconduct occurred. if he had the purest of motives but the conduct does not rise to the level of official misconduct, it is irrelevant as to whether he thought you was doing the

lpor the removed official -- >> in other words, let's assume in the case of public official, it's an act that would constitute official misconduct, and between the time he commit the act or she commits an act and when the mayor exercises his discretion, can he take into account what happened in between in regard to that public officials conduct relating to the investigation for example? >> i believe the mayor can take into account. he or she can exercise discretion. the question is, is the discretion reasonable? the mayor can take into account any kind of conduct. the question is, was it reasonable or is it reasonable to suspend an elected official for the alleged misconduct? whether it was that misconduct that occurred in one point in time or how the accused official dealt with that afterwards. >> i would appreciate your explaining what you think our role and what the ethics committee responsibility is. some of what i am hearing sounds like this palawan's -- belongs in a court of certain circumstances took place and our job is to make a recommendation. >> thank you, commissioner. i

whether the official misconduct 9csprovision would capture all f the reprehensible conduct that we thinkour officials should not be engaged in, that is a question, perhaps, for amendment. in >> but isn't it a fair reading -- of the drafters were focusing on two things, one is come up performance in office and misconduct relating to that -- one is, performance in office and misconduct relating to that. the other is the kind of conduct that any public official ought to abide by. >> i'd think the greater includes the lesser. the duties of office include that ethical code. part of the duties of office and the relationship of duties of authors -- of office is maintaining that of the gold standard. someone could look at the main clause and say, what is wrong for behavior by a public officer? it is not upholding what we expect by a particular officer. and the use of the wording tells us that includes things like conduct that falls below the decency standard. it is not limited to that, nor is it limited to of a mandatory duty. it is related to the office -- the duties of office, including these

voters intended official misconduct to be something narrow because it provides the mayor with a very strong tool that really could disrupt an elected official. i do not think the mayor engaged in anything improper here or that there is any improper political motive. but you could certainly see that possibility, especially if we interpret this in a way that is so broad as to encompass any number of -- any amount of personal misconduct that does not relate to one's job duties. >> maybe we should take option #2, the tougher, higher standard and then see where we are with that and see if we need to discuss option #1 some more. chairperson hur: i think that is a good idea. under option #2, i am guessing, based on what i am hearing, that the debate is going to be about whether the relationship to the duties has to be a direct relationship, meaning something that is performed on the job or purporting to be on the job under color of law. lpor whether it instead must merely affect the elected official's ability to perform a duty. i probably should have not use the word "merely." i

officials. it can take close to a year to remove the public official, but that is the democratic way to do it.s is far too susceptible to politics. to g>> the voters knew all thatn theory. they understood there was a recall option available and said we need this. it is not a week or the supervisor or the state said you need to do something different and override the recall provision, why does this not harmonize with the voters sent we want an additional tool or process, and we will design and put it into place, because in our view of the recall is not sufficient? whenever the reasons for why they wanted to do this, it is the voters decide we want another tool, not some third party or our determination that adds this. >> well, to be fair, i do not think they created this for almost 100 years. the power to remove for official misconduct has been in the charter. they treat the procedure a bit, creating the ethics commission. >> exactly. to answer your question, i think you have to assume the voters were aware of the state of the law. the state of the law has not been in the state of california th

but private and public does not mean the same thing as official. firmly believe that the people intended official misconduct to be something limited, because of the concern that it could be used in the political process. i also understand that the evidence likely showed that the sheriff is going to have a hard time performing his duties, going forward. a sheriff who commits an act of violence, i think, in my mind does fall below the standard of decency i would expect of a public official. but, again, i do not think it is our job to determine what his level of efficacy is going to be, going forward. i implore my fellow commissioners to take a narrow and principled view of this clause that will enable those who use it, going forward, to apply it in a consistent way. there is a reason why we have only gone through this once. i do have concerns that a broad reading of this statute could potentially lead to hearings like this, that are potentially used for improper purposes. i welcome the views of my fellow commissioners. >> i do agree that there must b

we break it down into the four elements of official misconduct. the sheriff has made an argument that because he committed his misconduct -- or initiated his misconduct a week before his inauguration, that does not count. our response to that is simple. it may have been a week before the inauguration, but two months after the election. that is what is significant. the definition of the misconduct answers the shares claim. it says what it means. and the second part of that, by a public officer. there is no statement in the charter about what the definition of public officer means. but there is no reason to restrict who a public officer is and say that it clear -- it includes elected officials, but only after they're sworn in. the reason for this is the very purpose of the official misconduct provision. provision is meant to deal with wrongdoing that comes up after the voters have voted, hour after an official has been appointed to their position. it when the voters went to the polls nov., 2011, and a marked their ballots, they did not say, i am cast

but the minutes regarding the official misconduct charges against mr. mirkarimi, i think we should -- welcome public comment on this matter. >> commissioners, i wanted to comment on the regular meeting minutes. in a minute of the march 26, 2012 meeting there is an example i feel they 150 word summarized discussed jet -- during general public, it is important trade and made public comment which was summarized on page 3 of this minutes as follows. he reviewed and accounting report issued march 1, 2012 by the friends of the library. right. i came here, waited for hours for a chance to make comment on item number five, and i only commented on the fact that i reviewed the county report. i did not say why i reviewed the report, i did not say anything about what i found in the review, i did not relate wife felt that review was relevant to the agenda item, what an idiot i am. i think most of the members of the public, if they were viewed the minutes and summer is done by the staff of not just this body but any public body, they would find nothing they said. it i

the possibility of official misconduct that does not warrant permanent removal. >> how do you reconcile that with the provision that he read? >> this is how i reconcilable. the charter says, with all due respect, that if you sustain the charges, claro, the removal has to happen. you have already determined that it appears that you're going to reject a least some if not most of the counts. if you are rejecting some of the accounts, by the clear language of the charter, you are not going to sustain all of the charges. therefore, if you're not going to sustain all the charges, then there can't the removal. by the clear language of the charter, it doesn't give the option to pick one charges and not another one. if you are not prepared to accept that very narrow reading, it seems to me that the commissioners point where you can make your recommendation as nuanced as you would like for it to be, you can recommend the three charges be sustained in three be rejected. it does not warrant removal. or none of them more and removal. but yes, one of them may be official misconduct or wrongful conduc

four of us seemed to agree that there was a violation of the official misconduct. ing to the charging document, looking at it and wondering which one of the charges for which one of the charges are we so stating. -- are we sustaining? some of which included the impeding witnesses and things of that nature that we think have found there was not sufficient evidence. it seems to me that we have to have, in fairness to the share of and in fairness to the board, some clear statement of the charge that we say we are sustaining. going through the charges, 1-6. there are a number of them, certainly towns to have a 3. we have said we did not think that there was sufficient evidence. and the others, as i say, they are sort of mingling. many of the factual statements we have rejected. whereas i was suggesting that i believe that the conviction and the circumstances that led up to ahead is what is the official misconduct? >> is that count four? >> count one, domestic violence. count four, except for the fact that they incorporate 1-46, it has a lot of statements about which we