the fold, shall we say. a lot of those membership are coerced into being taliban. they're either illiterate, have no opportunity the for employment, this is an opportunity to the work, or they're terrorized. you will join, or you will die. so their recruitment effort, the taliban, those in charge, their recruitment efforts are not, you know, are not as benevolent as, say, other places are. so getting into -- their hope would be that these lower level taliban would be reeducated, i guess, the taliban if they could actually get a solid government that was not so corrupt like the karzai government is at least accused of being and that they could get a good, stable democratic government set up there. >> i think one of the things that henry just touched on, too, is the fact that the book, when this whole thing happened and the story of the eight westerners, there was a number of people within the system -- guards, taliban prosecutors that knew of the injustice that was being done to these eight and decided to help them, and that's classic to me. you know, when there's ty

the taliban and al qaeda have become siymbiotic. the lesson of the afghan's message is that time is on their side, with a western defeat, they could regain their strength and maintain a victory as long as their senior leadership lives and can continue to attract followers and funding. rolling back the taliban is now necessary, even if not sufficient to the ultimate defeat of al qaeda. at the same time, one cannot separate the security situation in afghanistan from the stability of pakistan. a nuclear armed nation of 175 million people now also explicitly targeted by islamic extremists. giving the extremists breathing room in pakistan, led to the resurgence of the taliban, and more coordinated sophisticated attacks in afghanistan. providing a sanctuary for extremists in southern and eastern afghanistan would put more pressure on a pakistani government already under attack from groups operating in the border region. indeed, the pakistan taliban in just the last year oar so has become a real threat to pakistan's own domestic peace and s

it is to reverse the momentum of the taliban. it is to deny them control of territory in afghanistan. it is to degrade their military capabilities, and at the same time grow and strengthen the capabilities of the afghan national security forces so that they can manage the internal security of their own country because they are dealing with eckert capabilities on their side and degraded capabilities on the taliban site. this allows us to pull the bulk of combat troops out and return in terms that senator feingold put it to more of a counterterrorism mission because we don't have to worry about the security situation inside afghanistan. you cannot do pure counterterrorism unless you have a government or provincial and local government that create a hostile environment for the taliban and that allow us to gather the information and intelligence that we need to do the counter intelligence -- the counterterrorism. >> thank you very much. >> you stepped out for a second. >> i am happy to do that. >> we are going to have a second round.

i think it would be very capable against the taliban with mobility and training and fire support and those things, but there will be continuing logistical support. the key element is combat forces will begin to come out. >> is this going to take a decade that they will need u.s. troops or helicopter lifts? is it something that is going to be that long? >>4w we are going to have to hae a presence and foundation in afghanistan for a long time, because it is a critical area. al qaeda is still on the border between afghanistan and pakistan. it is very disruptive boast to the pakistan knees and the afghanis. -- pakistanis and the afghanis. it is an area where were have to have a presence, but it should not be combat troops. it should be trainers and support elements. we will get to the point where afghan forces are able to handle their own security with some limited assistance. >> on a related note, where you see that civil society portion of this in 2011? some of your more progressive colleagues have concerns about the government right now, its legitimacy and whether it will affect our mi

how many members of the taliban are there? think it's -- we'd like to know how many of the enemy we're trying to defeat. how many of them are there, general? >> congressman, it varies, based upon their popularity. we assess between 24 and 27,000 members of the taliban. but, i believe, as momentum has turned, that affects their ability to retain their force. so, i think it -- it's not people with long-term enlistments. i think it's more flexible than that. >> i haven't been on the pakistan/afghanistan border and talking to just regular troops, just my opinion is that the pakistan government isn't doing enough to ratchet up protecting their side of the border. that the taliban come over into afghanistan if, woe be to them -- i mean come over into afghanistan and woe be to them if they do because the military is going to find them. but, they run back over to pakistan and have sanctuary and that appears to me we know where they are, pakistan gives lip service to doing something about it. met with their people and i'm not convinced

the taliban are clever. we would not be in the situation we are in if we did not face and adaptable and clever adversary. they recognize that the reason they are not in power right now is because they allowed al qaeda to launch the attack against the united states. so every now and then you will see some reporter that the taliban is saying let's downplay the. now we have the taliban pakistan, the taliban in pakistan whose target is the pakistan government and who are working closely with al qaeda along with their compatriots in afghanistan. >> in addition to the inspirational and aspirational role that al qaeda plays, they provide very specific services. they help provide funding. they help provide targeting and training and equipping. very often they have their planners working closely with the elements of the taliban and both afghanistan and it is in order -- certainly are on presence and our troops. i do not think there is any doubt in the longer that there has been a developing senega of terror. those ten

al qaeda may, in fact, be the architect of such an attack but the taliban will be the bricklayers. hough hardly a uniformed body, taliban groups have grown bolder and more sophisticated. we saw that just a few months ago in the valley where taliban forces attacked outposts using what i would call almost conventional, small unit tactics. their fighters are bert organized and better equipped than they were just one year ago. in fact, coalition forces experienced record high violence this past sum we are insurgent attacks more than 60% above 2008 levels. and through brutal intimidationt taliban has established shadow governmentings across the country, coercing the support of many locals and challenging the authority of elected leaders in state institutions. indeed, we believe the insurgency achieve add dominant influence in 11 of afghanistan's 34 provinces. to say that there is no serious threat of afghanistan falling once again into taliban hands ignores the audacity of even the insush general sy's most public statements. teen argue that should they have that power the taliban would n

it is a documentary about the post taliban. it really brings home a good sense of the diversity and the viciousness of afghan culture. -- the by viciousness of afghan culture. -- but vivaciousness of the afghan culture. we're not going to change the culture of afghanistan, and if the local people say we want the taliban, fine, you can have the taliban in your province. i think eventually they will fall away. but you do not want the perfect to be the enemy of the good. you want a good enough to compromise. it's a taliban is willing to come in and be part of the government and to stop the fighting, is that great? no, but it is a compromise. host: why did you live in afghanistan? guest: my father wound up teaching at harvard as a psychologist and the 1960's he was teaching at columbia university and got tired of all of the riots and wanted to go overseas. i was a teenager. i just love the country. i knocked all around it. my parents were kind of irresponsible. are knocked off a round of afghanistan by bus and visited nall over. i w

rather than the pakistani taliban? >> i was talking about al qaeda and the threat posed in the united kingdom by terrorist plots either organized or in collaboration with people who are members of al qaeda in pakistan. i think the evidence is that many of the plots we have had to deal with, including the most recent plots, are inspired by instructions that come from al qaeda operatives. my point about the taliban is this, that if al qaeda were back in power, there would be a greater danger not just in the region but on the streets of britain. >> the prime minister mentioned the whole country and the whole country will be reassured by his statement today. was it not appropriate to remind the house that we are there in the united nations -- 43 nations are in the coalition and eight other countries have pledged troops? would it not be appropriate for the secretary-general of the united united nations to name these countries? >> my friend is absolutely right. this is a unique venture. it is difficult to look back on this wh

the taliban came in, al qaeda with them. t-period, the taliban came back and morphed with al qaeda. now we're doing something somewhat serious. it has a fighting chance of success. >> larry: michael, are you pessimistic? >> well, no, i'm not. i mean, do i see hope. but i mean, honestly, larry, it's going to take a couple of miracles, a sprinkle of magic and a good dose of some good luck. i mean, ultimately, pardon the expression, i'm waiting to see the whites of president obama's eyes. this war can be won -- not that it can be won but this war can still be a success if he's prepared to do what has to be done. now, tonight, he took one step in that direction. promising another 30,000 troops. but in his speech tonight, apart from that promise of the additional troops, you can throw the rest of the speech away. we've heard it all before. let's wait and see if he can follow through on the myriad of other things that he has to do. the building blocks that go into place. this war, american troops are bleeding and dying, because pak

omar and the taliban, i do not believe that is what he is saying. e are prepared to let you leave, more or less gracefully. the emirate of afghanistan will be created and we will talk to our fellow afghans about what the situation will be. to the contrary, he says karzai is a trader and deserves a traders' response. -- and he is a day traitor and deserves a traitors response. i believe parts of the taliban maybe but -- may be prepared to break. they will not do it now. no one in their right man is going to break because you will be dead tomorrow morning and so will your family. if the momentum is shifted, we can offer security and protection to people who break from the caliban then we begin to see fissures within the movement. if we do something simple like paying soldiers up more money at the taliban days we might also find that many people did many people will switch over. that is part of what i mean that we will know in 18 months. by then we will see whether the villagers are likely to develop in the taliban. we will see whether the resources we

is behind the taliban, the u.s. is behind al qaeda. the caller sounds like he would be happy in pakistan but let me say that it is easy to have conspiracy theories about afghanistan and pakistan because a lot is opaque. but as scott wilson rightly pointed out, this is not about energy. were a pipeline to be built from central asia down to pakistan and india, the u.s. would certainly not get rich off that. this is not the reason that people are in the country dying. and, yes, much has been written about president karzi's brother. he is not the biggest drug dealer by far in that count pri but in actual fact drug production has gone down by 30% in the past year and in part that is because of agricultural programs that have been pushed by a good governor there and with u.s. help. so things can change. and as far as the previous caller, he's absolutely right that economic aid would have made a big difference early on. what one needs to do is help afghans help themselves. back in the 1960s, u.s. aide had a wonderful program in afghanistan wh

the taliban has no widespread constituency. ey have a history of failure in power and they lack an appealing vision. third, where the strategy is applied, we began to show that we can help afghanistan establish more credible governance. the afghans do not regard this as occupiers. they do not desire for us to remain for ever, but they do see us as a necessary bridge for future stability. i have been back in afghanistan for six months. i believe that with the president's decision and ongoing reforms, of efforts now have a greater sense of clarity, capability, a commitment, and confidence. the president's recently completed review of our strategy questioning all assumptions and recommendations has created greater clarity of our mission and objectives. we have greater clarity on the way forward. additional forces will deploy shortly. by this time next year, knut securit will be clear to us thae insurgency has lost the momentum. by the summer of 2011, it will be clear to the afghan people that the insurgency will not win. that will

so, the taliban is their hedge against indian encirclement. some evidence reported by our intelligence folks that the pakistan pakistanis, who are assisting the afghan taliban, are providing them sanctuary in border cities, are now moving them to safety. guest: we reported this. guest: into karachi to get them out of the gun sights of the predator missiles. it preserve the afghanistan and taliban leadership so that they can have this hedge policy in afghanistan. host: to both of you for your expertise and your background, jonathan broder defense and foreign policy senior editor >> next on q&a, omar wasow. another chance to see the bbc record review. >> tomorrow is the start of the campaign management institute work for republican and democratic strategists discuss a variety of issues. the 2010 senate races from a campaign strategy and polling techniques. that is live at 9:00 a.m. eastern on c-span t2. this thursday on c-span, a day of tributes to world leaders. then, new year's day, a look at what is ahead for the new year. what is ahead for t

we have allowed the taliban to reconstitute itself. d the frustration is not only the americans but with the afghan's. we thought we would help to achieve more quickly stable governance, etc. but we have to recognize this can't go on the same way. and that's why i think the president decided not only would we provide these additional resources and accelerate growth of the afghany army, and we understand there will be a point of transition, and that's in 2011. and the other part of the frustration of the american people is also the economy. that puts us in a different context than 2002 and 2003, and now people are saying, and they should be saying, can we afford? how do we pay for this? >> this is your forum, not ours. but i want to follow up what you said, the president referred to, the days of the blank check is over. what do you back that up with? >> to the notion that we are in afghanistan for our own purposes and not to help the afghan people. and that's lack of the coordination of the afghans and particularly by president karzai. a

because unemployment is the biggest recruiter for the taliban right now. ability to get back the fabric of life, when people have something to lose, they are much less interested in having insecurity in their area. so it's what makes security durable. >> thanks to both of you. in my remaining time, i guess i just want to make a comment about the pakistan connection here. because obviously i'm a little bit -- still a little bit confused as to sort of what our strategy entails with respect to pakistan. i understand there's only so much that can be said in open session. i'm looking forward to the hearing. i thank the chair for that this afternoon at 3:00. but i have a lot of the same concerns about pakistan, i should say, that my colleagues do on both sides of the aisle. and specifically, how it is the case that in the near term, and going forward, our strategy is going to deal with the problems of pakistan. i understand entirely the sovereignty issue. obviously pakistan is a sovereign nation state, just like the united states is. we have to be careful about o

the afghan taliban and the pakistan taliban and they are really one taliban in many ways, a whole bunchher groups whose names change but who we know are the same basic characters are a syndicate of terror. they don't have a single leader. they don't have a single agenda, but they cooperate with each other. individuals within these movements move back and forth within organizations. they do not respect the lanes that we try to impose on them. and most of all, none of them in eight years have been willing to turn on al qaeda and give up its core leadership. what is remarkable when you look at it is that more than any other individual, it is omar that the syndicate pledges his allegiance to. and he claims to be commander of the faithful, a title which if you think about it for a minute shows a man with a remarkable ego, commander of the faithful of 1.6 billion muslims worldwide. i'm very skeptical we can negotiate with the taliban and skeptical that we can negotiate with someone who is inflated with his own importance. al qaeda is embedded in this larger syndicate of terror, which is why i

on one hand, they do not want to seek the return of taliban. they understand long-term historical linguistic and religious ties. they are playing a constructive role as far as building a roads, help with education, and assisting the afghan government. because of the tension that exists, they are keeping destructive options active. if there is a complication of relation between iran and washington, we would be paying a price. they are playing both constructive and a destructive role in afghanistan. we would like to be more constructive. we would be better off if iran continued to be constructive. we have been asked very clearly, our friends, and to leave their differences out of afghanistan. it would serve the best interests. the role they are playing is to fall. you are right with the increased tension. -- the role is to wofold. they remind us that other options in afghanistan. >> thank you. >> give your name. >> i am the correspondent from spain. you look at the map of afghanistan. it is very different from the soviet union. the war is pretty m

the al-qaeda, the pakistan taliban, the afghan taliban, the network they have joined an terrorist networkthat shares the same goals including destabilizing afghanistan and destroying the pakistani state. fortunately, there appears to be a growing recognition in pakistan that it is impossible to differentiate between different terrorist groups. and that the same people killing americans, international, and afghan troops are now arming suicide bombers in the streets and markets of pakistan and killing pakistani civilians. we sympathize with the plight of the pakistani people who have suffered great losses from the growing number of terrorist attacks in that country. as reflected in the legislation recently passed by congress, we are committed to doing what we can to improve their economic and physical security. as all of our witnesses emphasized in last week's hearing, the president's military strategy in afghanistan can only succeed if it is accompanied by a robust, civilian surge designed to improve governance, strengthen the rule of law and promote economic development in both afghanista

i think it tells the taliban that they can wait out the situation. from a tactical military standpoint it is wrong for the commander-in-chief to do that in any circumstances. host: here is this of line. -- this headline. those that send a signal based on your experience to the troops in afghanistan that this president has taken ownership of this war and that he is in charge in making decisions? and this is how he wants to proceed? guest: not only a message to the troops in the field, but also a message to the american people that in fact this is the way the president wants to go ford. it is certainly his war. he has inherited a pretty bad situation from the prior administration. the energy was diverted to iraq in every way. the president was correct on all his comments about what he inherited.. he is in a tough situation. yes, we have been there for eight years, but it has only been holding action. host: next up, reno, nevada, from jeryl opposes the president's action. caller: we need to get out of there. i'm glad that the president has a ton on. as

certainly not the afghan taliban. th respect to how do they eventually take those on, i think frankly that the effort to demonstrate a sustained substantial commitment to pakistan. pakistani counter insurgency fund also very important given the history we have with the country and having left it a couple times before. this is process of building trust. building mutual confidence and building a relationship in which the mutual threats we face are addressed by those on the ground. as i mentioned and as you mentioned we have to recognize the enormous sacrifices that the pakistani military frontier corps and police have made recently. and also the losses their civilians have sustained. but it's about building a partnership that can tran send the issues we have before where we have left after supporting one operation or the other. >> as you answer, could you also tie into it the question of the political reforms? because as you know in order to sustain stability you have to have reform. fundamentally the pakistani military

the taliban can deliver a predictable justice. it is a brutal injustice which includes the chopping off of heads. very predictable justice. but it is a feudal, brutal justice that includes the chopping off of heads and hanging of so-called defenders in the market squares. that is not a brand of justice that the afghan people aspire to see return to their country. every poll that has been taken still since 2002 when afghanistan was liberated by the united states military forces and our allies, every poll still shows the taliban to be deeply unpopular. but when you reach a point in parts of afghanistan where the alternative is an absolutely repatience or brutal government alternative, then, of course, the taliban will find an opening. so our challenge and indeed the government of afghanistan's challenge is to construct legitimate alternatives to what is a very brutal taliban way of life and governance. >> all right. let me ask you then, general. i think i'll ask you to take my question for the record and let me see if i can squeeze i

-- to the taliban that we will not see this through? can we assure the people that any discussion of timetables will be based on information on the ground? >> mr. prime minister? >> mr. speaker, first of all, i want to thank the leader of the opposition for his continuing support for the work of our forces in afghanistan. i think we should get this in proper perspective. first of all, we are fighting terrorism, fighting al qaeda and pakistan, but to do so successfully, we have to prevent them having space in afghanistan. our time is up -- it is not simply a military strategy, it is a political strategy that all the time the afghan people can take more responsibility and more control over their own affairs. i do not think i could've been clearer in saying that our objectives are not limited by dates. achievements. it is the achievement of afghan control and the ability of afghan people to take responsibility for their security that is the determining issue in all of this. this is not a time-specific commitment. it is a task-to civic commi

, the afghan taliban, the akani network, l.e.t. and others have joined together in an extended terrorist network that shares the same goals, including destabilizing afghanistan and destroying the pakistani state. fortunately, there appears to be a growing recognition in pakistan that it is impossible to differentiate between different terrorist groups. and that the same people killing american, international and afghan troops are now arming suicide bombers in the streets and markets of pakistan and killing pakistani civilians. we sympathize with the plight of the pakistani people who have suffered great losses from the growing number of terrorist attacks in that country. as reflected in the legislation recently passed by congress, we are committed to doing what we can to improve their economic and physical security. as all of our witnesses emphasized in last week's hearing, the president's military strategy in afghanistan can only succeed if it is accompanied by a robust civilian surge. designed to improve governance, strengthen th

-- to the taliban that we will not see this through? can we assure the people that any discussion of timetables will be based on information on the ground? >> mr. prime minister? >> mr. speaker, first of all, i want to thank the leader of the opposition for his continuing support for the work of our forces in afghanistan. i think we should get this in proper perspective. first of all, we are fighting terrorism, fighting al qaeda and pakistan, but to do so successfully, we have to prevent them having space in afghanistan. our time is up -- it is not simply a military strategy, it is a political strategy that all the time the afghan people can take more responsibility and more control over their own affairs. i do not think i could've been clearer in saying that our objectives are not limited by dates. achievements. it is the achievement of afghan control and the ability of afghan people to take responsibility for their security that is the determining issue in all of this. this is not a time-specific commitment. it is a task-to civic commi

the taliban can be divided clearly into three groups. the majority of them are not ideological as i was saying. then there are people who fight in organized units on a local basis and then there is the hardcore. the leadership of the hardcore is, as we already said, in pakistan. our goal is going to include reaching out to what is sometimes called the reconcilable elements. that is the reintegration program. now, one of the main reasons we were not able to do that effectively since january 20th is the kind of 800-pound monster that sat over our heads from january 20th until november 19th. from the day we took office until the day hamid karzai was elected. the elections hung over everything else we did. and in some areas they had very little effect like agriculture and counternarcotics and several specific -- and many specific programs that weren't controversial. but in certain areas, including this one, including rule of law, including anticorruption, they were so integrated with the political system that we couldn't get them going. in ka

they couldn't decide whether they should kill them or not because they were afraid it would alert the taliban to their mission and they would all be killed. they decide after an argument, lieu trel said we trust them they won't say anything. 15 minutes later, 200 of the taliban and the al qaeda came across, killed him, killed his partners and left him for dead. 16 navy s.e.a.l.s came in the

not resist the taliban. the second view, however, is the one i take, that the taliban have very limited public support and the people of afghanistan. all opinion polls and evidence that we have is that the public do not want the taliban to return. they know the damage that they did in the past. they know the threat to women's rights. they know the damage that was done to children's education, and they know that justice that was meted out unfairly particularly against women. our best estimate is that the people of afghanistan by a very substantial majority do not want the taliban to return to government. they want to be assured that there is security guaranteed by afghan forces and by the alliance forces working together. over time they will want to see the security kept by afghan army, afghan police, and afghan security services. that is what our strategy that we have been applying for some time is working toward. so i don't accept his initial premise that the taliban have anything like the support he suggest

in pakistan, or the pakistani taliban, i should say. we have evidence that al-qaeda is helping them pick targets, do operational planning, helping them in their effort to try to destabilize the pakistani government. the other piece of this that does not include the taliban -- or a part from the taliban is we he also know that al-qaeda is helping the terrorist group that carried out the bombings in mumbai. al-qaeda sees using the taliban in pakistan and groups like l.e.t. as ways to destabilize pakistan and invoke and inflict problems within india. >> if the opposite were true, if we were to either fail in this offensive mission against the taliban and al-qaeda in afghanistan or not embark on it, what would be impact be on the stability of the pakistani government in your opinion. >> let me just ask admiral mullen, we've seen what happens when the pakistanis made deals with the tribes of various groups on the western -- on the northwestern frontier, it created a sanctuary and safe haven in which taliban which had been knocked back on its

al qaeda's base was in afghanistan where they were murdered by the taliban. this after it was ravaged by years of soviet occupation and civil war and after the attention of america and our friends had turned elsewhere. just days after 9/11, congress authorized the use of force against al qaeda and those who harbored them. an authorization that continues to this day. the vote in the senate was 98 to nothing. the vote in the house was 420 to one. for the first time in its history, the north atlantic treaty organization invoked article 5, the commitment that says an attack on one member nation is an attack on all. the united nations security council endorsed the use of all necessary steps to respond to the 9/11 attacks. america, our allies and the rest of the world were acting as one to protect our common interests as one. and only after the taliban refused to turn over osama bin laden we sent our troops into afghanistan. within a matter of months, al qaeda was scattered and many of its operatives were killed. the taliban was driven from power and pushed back on

the taliban are not ten fetal. ess coverage which tends to focus on the areas of conflicts and misses 2/3 of the% country is part of the issue as well as our own mistakes. afghan make mistakes but there's a lot of things to work with as long as we have patients. host: do you think it lines up with president barack obama's strategy years later? >> he maintained that afghanistan was the necessary war. i think there was then a deep gulp when they found out just what that meant. but after a very serious reflection that was disstabilize together the much of the world that saw it weak but necessary for our political process, i think he's come to a very reasonable policy. about which i would say simply the first test will be does he have the guts to stick with it. it's time to stop the gazing and show resolve overtime. not speeches but sticking with it and secondly the great deal of what counts now is moving from policy to hundreds of decisions on the ground to what people do and we're probably now going to increasingly ta

it is a documentary about the post taliban. t really brings home a good sense of the diversity and the viciousness of afghan culture. -- the by viciousness of afghan culture. -- but vivaciousness of the afghan culture. we're not going to change the culture of afghanistan, and if the local people say we want the taliban, fine, you can have the taliban in your province. i think eventually they will fall away. but you do not want the perfect to be the enemy of the good. you want a good enough to compromise. it's a taliban is willing to come in and be part of the government and to stop the fighting, is that great? no, but it is a compromise. host: why did you live in afghanistan? guest: my father wound up teaching at harvard as a psychologist and the 1960's he was teaching at columbia university and got tired of all of the riots and wanted to go overseas. i was a teenager. i just love the country. i knocked all around it. my parents were kind of irresponsible. are knocked off a round of afghanistan by bus and visited nall over. i we

al qaeda may be the architect of such an attack, but the taliban will be the bricklayers. though hardly a uniformed body, taliban troops are more sophisticated and boulder. we saw that in the valley where they attacked coalition outpost using what i would call almost conventional small unit tactics. they are fighters are better organized than they were one year ago. they experience a record high violence over the summer. through intimidation, if they have established a shadow government across the country, coercing the support of many locals in shunting the authorities of elected leaders. we believe they have achieved a dominant influence. to say there is no serious threat of afghanistan falling once again, ignores the audacity of even the insurgencies most public statements. the taliban would not tolerate the presence of al qaeda. that is to ignore both the recent past and the evidence we see every day between these factions. the cost of failure is agreed. that is why the decision for an extended surge to let afghanistan of 30,000 additional forces is so important. it gets

how many members of the taliban are there? i think it's -- we'd like to know how many of the enemy we're trying to defeat. how many of them are there, general? >> congressman, it varies, based upon their popularity. we assess between 24 and 27,000 members of the taliban. but, i believe, as momentum has turned, that affects their ability to retain their force. so, i think it -- it's not people with long-term enlistments. i think it's >> talking to just regular troops, my opinion is that the pakistan government is not doing enough to ratchet up protecting their side of the border, that the taliban come over to afghanistan and woe be to them if they do because the military is going to find them, but they've run back over to pakistan and had sanctuary. pakistan gives lip service to doing something about it. i am not convinced that pakistan is engaged in helping defeat the taliban. the duke -- can you give me some insight on that? >> sir, i believe our long-term way ahead is with a strategic partnership with pakistan. they are absol

forces are moving in and trying to push the taliban back. hat is the area that is most problematic. weÑi have good work going on. we have some good aid programs. this is the one we will have to lead into heavily to try to figure this out. we talked about clear hold and transfer. that transfer is in the far district. that is one that is the most problematic. let's>> you mentioned these different departments that we are sitting there to help the afghan government. one that you alluded to this commerce. there is the possible development of businesses within the sister -- with in these districts and the government level as well. general mcchrystal, since the release of your assessment of the region, there has been a help the debate over the number of troops being developed and deployed to afghanistan. however, i feel we should not focus solely on the number of troops along. ignoring the total number of troops proposed, my question has to do with equipment and personnel. are we sending the right personnel there with the right equipment to achieve

both of the objectives of the mission in relation to the taliban and in relation to al-qaeda but also the numbers of troops a very substantial part will go into helmand province and will be dealing with the taliban there. i said on monday our troops would go in immediately so that they were more densely concentrated in the areas where there has been the greatest problem. i said that from january some of our troops would be involved in the vital task of partnering and mentoring the afghan forces. i believe that we have a situation where at the moment there are something in the order of 200,000 afghan troops and america and coalition troops in afghanistan by the end of next year, and by the beginning of 2011 that will be in excess of 300,000. it will make it possible for us to transfer the control of some of the districts and provinces to afghan security control starting in 2010. >> mr. david cameron. >> the prime minister specifically spoke about this transfer of provinces in 2010 and i want to ask him about this because at the weekend he said he was looking at transferring at least fi

certainly not the afghan taliban. with respect to how do they eventually take those on, i think frankly that the effort to demonstrate a sustained substantial commitment to pakistan. pakistani counter insurgency fund also very important given the history we have with the country and having left it a couple times before. this is process of building trust. building mutual confidence and building a relationship in which the mutual threats we face are addressed by those on the ground. as i mentioned and as you mentioned we have to recognize the enormous sacrifices that the pakistani military frontier corps and police have made recently. and also the losses their civilians have sustained. but it's about building a partnership that can tran send the issues we have before where we have left after supporting one operation or the other. >> as you answer, could you also tie into it the question of the political reforms? because as you know in order to sustain stability you have to have reform. fundamentally the pakistani militar

we must be reversed the taliban's momentum. we must strengthen the capacity of afghan security forces said they can take the irresponsibly into the future. those seem to be very clear. -- and take them responsibly into the future. i understand the frustration about 9/11, and i hope that will go forward. we have troops committed now. we have some clear signals by the president of support, and i hope the american people to try to get our troops the support they need to carry out these objectives. we will measure it periodically up through july 2011, and make some decisions. having been in this for a long time, i am optimistic in military and afghan government can pull it off. host: what is your biggest concern? guest: the legitimacy of the afghan government. can they rise to the occasion, and karzai in particular, and gain capacity to gain legitimacy with their own people? that is why we will see more pushed down for the province level. 34 provinces in afghanistan, but president karzai has a mission to clean up his act and provide

they do not like the taliban. hey know what the black years were like, and they do not want to return to it. what brings them together is their sense of being afghans. there has never been a separatist movement like with their neighbors, pakistan, iran, and the soviet union. they all have separatist movements. what they found was historical narrative, but they drove out the others, and i greatly respect that. otherwise, the country would not exist. on the other hand, its role in history has been extraordinary and dramatic, but very few people support the taliban. i would say that the united states failed to say what they were doing there when there when dinner region when they went in, particularly when when everything seemed possible and drama unfolded. as things turned the other way and civilian casualties became a dominant issue and the u.s. had no explanation as to why they were there, things turned the other way. two of the people who introduced themselves have been focused with me and with judith on this issu

the taliban are not ten fetal. necessary for our political process, i think he's come to a very reasonable policy. about which i would say simply the first test will be does he have the guts to stick with it. it's time to stop the gazing and show resolve overtime. not speeches but sticking with it and secondly the great deal of what counts now is moving from policy to hundreds of decisions on the ground to what people do and we're probably now going to increasingly talk about the wrong things. policies when we ought to talk about execution of policy. >> i was going to say in 2001 after 9/11 in early 2002 i actually worked on afghanistan here in washington at the state department. they asked me to come back and help. we were trying set up the economic reconstruction effort, which was a multi-lateral effort. the multi-lateral part got set up okay but almost nothing happened. just to back up what ron said, we saw almost no flow of õresources in that time. i was there. and a year after as far as i can tell. host: calle

the taliban and al qaeda have become symbiotic. h benefiting from the success and -- of the other. al qaeda leaders have stated this repeatedly. the lesson of the revival is the time and will are on their side. with the western defeat. they could regain their us drink and achieve a major strategic victory. as long as there leadership lives and can attract followers and funding. rolling back the taliban is now necessary even if not sufficient to the ultimate defeat. at the same time, one cannot separate the security situation from the stability of pakistan. a nuclear armed nation of 1 hedden 75 million people also targeted by islamic extremists freed giving extremists breathing room in pakistan led to the resurgence of the taliban. and to court needed, sophisticated attacks in afghanistan. this would put more pressure on the government under attack from groups operating in the border region. the pakistan taliban has become a real threat to pakistan's domestic peace and stability, carrying out without caid is help escalating bombing a

the afghan taliban, pakistan taliban, and i agree, the two are actually one taliban in many ways -- aof the groups whose names often change interchangeably but who we know are the same basic characters, are a syndicate of terror. they are not a monolith. they don't have a single leader, they don't have a single agenda. but they cooperate with each other. individuals within these movements move back and forth between organizations. they do not respect the ways we try to impose on them, and most of all, none of them in eight years have been willing to turn on al qaeda and give up its core leadership. what is remarkable when you look at it is that more than any other individual, it is mullah omar that this endecott pledges its allegiance to. and he claims to be commander of the faithful. the title, which if you think about it for a minute, shows a man with a remarkable ego, commander of the faithful 1.6 billion muslims worldwide. i'm very skeptical we could negotiate with the taliban, particularly skeptical we can negotiate with someone with such an inflated sense of his own importance.

notion that the taliban is at least be omar is the surea of the taliban interested in anything like negotiations with the united states. if they are, there's a simple way for them to prove theirafee give us osama bin laden. >> we've got time for two more questions. >> thank you. i'm john with the american conservative magazine. not all the opposition to the war is leftist democrats. we were against the iraq war and also. what about a defensive strategy? it's been promoted as william lind on fourth generation warfare. some of our writers, that america as a democracy we are incapable of really fighting against the guerilla's as we have been losing this consistently. the off shore balancing ideas, we should really be moving to a defensive strategy, which we could do well, et cetera. i again repeat, as a democracy, we can't with all the conflicting pressures here, have a coherent policy. for example, the settlements on the west bank. we can't stop them. >> the short answer to your question is we tried a defensive policy between 1998 when al qaeda declared war

Ñi-- who is the taliban? they will always have an influence. y were never reconcile or read the great. on the other side of the spectrum, you have the $10 per day taliban who are paid to work for the insurgents. it is easy to reconcile them. they protect the narco trade. the key in the counter insurgency is that to deny the support for the insurgents by the locals. iqet think we're moving toward a position in which that is more and more the case in afghanistan. there is increased pressure on the leadership of the insurgency. we saw more and more signs of in-fighting and it leads to a situation where you see, a couple of years ago, the insurgents moved from a conventional approach towards asymmetric tactics. there were quite effective in that. especially the use of ied's which has a huge impact. intimidating the afghan people will have a very negative impact for the insurgency by the evidence. Ñi-- by the afghans. if you're able to protect people from the insurgents, that is where you need these additional forces. you will be in a situation where

are the afghan security forces willing to take on the taliban? i mean, are they willing? >> they are, the ads will. >> there has been a lot of discussion about integrating, reconciling elements of the taliban that might be reconcilable. that has been touched on already. general petreaus had indicated previously that we lack the sophisticated understanding of the taliban to distinguish between reconcilable and irreconcilable elements. u.s. selected our retired british general to head a program of reconciliation with members of the taliban, based on some of the success he had in iraq. i wonder if you could provide some of the details of those efforts, or at least some of the broad features of the program. >> it is a partner program. it has to be an afghan program. what we would be doing is empowering them as much as we can come up with resources, some expertise and experience, and things like that. what we stood up with the general is a section in my command. there's an additional british general that has been provided, and we have a full element working with the afghan gove

the middle east. terrorist attacks were perpetrated in europe by homegrown cells. killing taliban fighters and training afghani soldiers and policemen are unlikely to substantially diminish these broader terrorist threats. moreover the results of even the most skillful civil and military campaign in afghanistan are likely to be imperfect in the long run. i do not doubt that the application of additional again hymn allied forces will result in a military setback for the taliban. during this time, it is hoped that. can be made in building afghani security forces but over the long run we should recognize the problems stemming from tribalism, corrupt governance and lack of economic opportunity in the country of afghanistan are almost certain to persist, the company's efforts to ensure the central government can effectively govern and resist the taliban when allied troops are withdrawn. even if the president's plan achieves the very best stabilization scenario, allowing for you with withdrawals on schedules he contemplates we may be responsible for most of the afghanistan defense and p

the afghan taliban are to the sure distinct from the pakistani taliban and their partner groups whichalso have close relationships with al qaeda. the pakistani pal btaliban are part of a sindt gated group. carrying out many other groups. that threatens the stability of pakistan and afghanistan and indeed the entire subcontinent. although most taliban fighters confronting our forces are local afghans motivated by local circumstances, the afghan taliban leadership is organized, ideologically motivated and a beacon and symbol for other dangerous extremist elements. as secretary gates noted, defeating al qaeda and enhancing afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions. they cannot be untethered from one another as much as we might wish that to be the case. achieving our objectives in afghanistan thus will not be easy. the taliban has in recent years been gaining strength and expanding the extent of its control of parts of afghanistan. it is important to remember nevertheless that the taliban commands significantly less support among posh kinns than other sunni or extremist groups in