the transregional coordination. we have combatant commanders and they are excellent about you they focus on particular regions. i looked to the chairman and he does an excellent job of balancing resources and making sure the different coms are cooperating. that's northcom and the other combat and commanders. >> congressman, to be specific, what we did back in november, we asked the special operation ppo command to take the lead because they had connective tissue in each of our combatant commands to begin development of a transregional terrorism plan and countering violent extrichlism at large. we've been working at that for a couple months now. we had a meeting friday afternoon where i convened the joint chiefs and ale of our combatant commands to look at this. critical to that is having a common operational picture and common intel picture across all of our combat and commands. second is to have a process into a single vision that the secretary of defense can see. then as the secretary alluded to, a process to make

lots of other things however, that was an era before there was a big a need as there is now for transregional and transfunctional integration. and so that's an area that couldn't have been foreseen at the time. and that we now see clearly. my own view of that, and i'll be making proposals in the next month and matters affecting what is called the goldwater-nichols basket, many which congress will have to approve, we'll be discussing that with them and hearing their ideas and trying to come up with the best possible ideas for the country going forward, the, i depend on the joint chiefs of staff and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff to do that integrating. i do that every day. i depend on them. i would like to strengthen their role in doing that. i don't want to do that in any way that subtracts from their ability to give independent military advice, which i don't favor putting the chairman in the chain of command per se. the chairman gives, i just watched this every day, gives me and the president of the united states a very valuable, independent, professional military advice. that is

these are diverse, complex and transregional threats to our military confronts every day across centcom, africom and socom lines of responsibilities. as this committee continues its review of the goldwater-nichols act we're interested to hear our witnesses' views whether the current structure best enables us to succeed in the strategic environment of global and transregional threats in the 21st century and what reforms we might consider. this is critical because there are already too many obstacles to success as it is. time and again, politically driven strategy, micromanagement and misguided reductions in defense spending have made our military's job more difficult. this has been especially true for our special operations forces. more than 15 years of continuous deployments, due in part to an overreliance on their unique capabilities, has led to unprecedented stress on the force. as the threats we face impose greater demands on our special operators and their families, we must be vigilant and provide the necessary support to maintain their vital capabilities, not just in direct action,

and frankly, the requirements for the secretary to make timely decisions in a transregional, multi domain, multi functional fight. so i think the more fundamental areas we need to look at for change with regard to gold water nichols is number one, making sure that the secretary does have the ability to make decisions in a timely manner, and making sure he does have the ability to integrate the joint force in that transregional multi domain multi functional fight. it also requires in my estimation the joint staff to take a different approach to strategy, to ensure that we write strategies, for example, the problem sets that we spoke about today, so it isn't just an aggregation of operations plans, but you have a strategic framework in which those plans are met. the military tragedy needs to be refined in order to provide that framework. the final piece of that in execution is the secretary's ability to prioritize and allocate resources in a timely manner for a fight that is ongoing in multiple combatant commands at the same time. so from my perspective, as we think about reform, we should

lots of other things however, that was an era before there was a big a need as there is now for transregional and transfunctional integration. and so that's an area that couldn't have been foreseen at the time. and that we now see clearly. my own view of that, and i'll be making proposals in the next month and matters affecting what is called the goldwater-nichols

one thing i want to ask him to elaborate on is your second point about transregional. of the things i'm looking at in connection with the goldwater-nichols issue is strengthening the role of the joint chiefs of staff and chairman in precisely this way. we have combatant commanders. they are excellent but focused on particular regions. i look to the chairman and he of this,xcellent job gen. dunford: in november, we asked special operations command to take the lead because they did have connective tissue in each one of our combatant commands. to beginning development of a terrorism plan to counter extremism at large. we most recently had a meeting friday afternoon where i convened the joint chiefs to look at this. critical to that is having a common operational and intel picture. that is the first part. the second is having an assessment process into a single vision the secretary of defense can see. as a secretary alluded to, then a process to make recommendations for the allocation of resources. much like we are trying to provide pressure across isil in iraq and syria,

our transregional plan is designed not only to integrate capabilities but also with coalition partnersthis plan will be born with a coalition perspective in mind. >> thank you. i'm very interested in the jordan initiative and will follow-up with your office if possible. chairman.ou, mr. i appreciate the panelists. the attack this morning reminds us we are still at war with an evil, determined enemy that must be defeated. earlier in the testimony today, we had discussion about restoring deterrents as well, peace through strength. i am interested in hearing first from general dunford. the rand corporation published a study on building the army we will need. we are talking about the eri initiative. rand concludes we will need three armored brigade combat forcesnd associated for a credible deterrent. i am curious if you agree with the assessment and if not what you think is necessary. for both the secretary and chief, i have a bipartisan bill which stops the drawdown for the army and marine corps. nationalhe total army, guard, army reserve, and active-duty marine corps and marine corps res

these are diverse complex and transregional threats to our military confronts every day across centcom africom and socom lines of responsibilities. is this committee continues its review of the goldwater-nichols act we are interested to hear our witnesses views as to whether the current structure best enables us to succeed in the strategic environment of global and transregional threats and the 21st century and what performance we might consider. this is critical because there are already too many obstacles to success as it is. time and again politically driven strategy micromanagement of misguided reductions in defense spending of made our military's job more difficult rate this has been especially true for our special operations forces. more than 15 years of continuous deployments due in part to to an overreliance on their unique capabilities has led to unprecedented stress on the force. as the threats we face impose greater demands on our special operators and their families, we must be vigilant and provide the necessary support to maintain their vital capabilities not just in direc

steps to strengthen the capability of the chairman and the joint chiefs of staff to help address transregional threats, threats in multiple domains and multiple threats within overlapping time frames. as you know, last fall we began a comprehensive department-wide review of organizational issues like these to identify any potential redundancies, inefficiencies, or other areas of improvement to help formulate d.o.d.'s recommendations to you. i expect its internal findings by the end of march. this work is important. though much is within our existing authority to do so, we look forward to working closely with congress to implement needed reforms. as we discussed over breakfast last week, chairman, and senator reed, i look forward to working with you on this important matter. let me close on the broader shift reflected in this budget. the defense department doesn't have as i've said the luxury of just one opponent or the choice between current fights and future fights. we have to do both. that's what this budget is designed to do, and we need your help to succeed. i thank this committee again fo

tried to keep pressure on them both the countries, it will be necessary we do the same thing transregionally. mr. larsen: move to the budget and talk about taking the long view. unfortunately for you, you don't get to be here for the implementation of the long view to help us deal with the actual long view. secretary carter: assuming when we do so we'll continue to have budget stability. if there's instability or see quester as i said, and i think the chairman just said we are going to have to fundamentally reassess our ability to meet our needs. not only in the long run but in the short run. . i hope that they continue to give us budget stability as we've had now for two years. that's what the country needs. that's what our department needs. that's what, by the way, every department trying to administrator programs needs and -- but if we snap back to the sequester cuts, we're going to have to reconsider all of these plans. we need them and therefore we need the stability. mr. larsen: thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. mr. forbes: thank you, gentlemen, for being here. general dunford, it