i was looking at tsa data. apparently last month they reportedly confiscated 200 guns. help me understand, what do i make of that and how does that fit in with the discussion we had here today? >> you want to take a crack at it? >> when you look at probably the vast majority of those confiscations, and i get the reports on those, too, where somebody inadvertently leaves it in their bag, i don't know the difference between somebody accidentally doing or testing the system, but the fact those are caught doesn't mean things aren't getting through. that's just what's been caught. we have issues in the airline industry also with the dea examining how many drugs are being brought onboard an aircraft. if something can be smuggled on an aircraft fill in the blank what you want it to be. it could be narcotics, a firearm, it would be an edged weapon. it could be a lot of things. to assume we're catching 100%, we're not infallible in this case. a lot of the case what is you're seeing are probably people, there is a large number of them, that simply have a concealed carry and forge

on may 31st, 2011, tsa completed the required data collection phase of the twic reader pilot. tsa gathered information from seven points, 13 facilities and four vessel operations that collectively installed 156 readers of various types and models best suited to their business needs. these sites provided reader performance and reliability as well as through-put data and pedestrian access points. the final report was submitted to congress february 27th, 2012. this data provides a clear picture of the likely impacts of using readers at maritime facilities and on vessel operations. the twic reader pilot concludes that twic reader systems function properly when they are designed, installed and operated in a manner consistent with the characteristics and business needs of the facility or the vessel operation. thank you for the opportunity to testify today. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. mr. lord? >> thank you, mr. chairman and other members of the committee. thank you for inviting me here t progress and relatedhallenges in deploying three key security programs. my ob

on may 31, 2011, we completed the required data collection phase. tsa gathered information from seven ports, 13 facilities. these sites provide data. the final report was submitted to congress february 27, 2012. this data provides a clear picture of the likely impact of using readers at maritime facilities. this pilot conclude that system's function properly when they are designed, installed, and operated in a manner consistent with the characteristic and business state of the vessel operation. thank you for the opportunity to testify. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the progress and related challenges and deploying three t security programs. my observations are based on a large body of work. i would first like to note that tsa have made some notable achievements since the 9/11 attacks. as the witnesses noted today, some remaining challenges still exist. the first program of like to discuss is the behavior detection program. also called spot. this program consist

systems, the data collection systems, we're going to have to build the appropriate budget oversight. but that appeared to be missing. >> could i ask you a question about the -- hats-off. tsa procures for federal agencies, doesn't it? if you want to order something, you order knew the gsa. can it be this program where they awarded electronic cameras and ipods and the like, got out of hand because gsa ran this -- the procurement of these electronic devices and with little oversight from the top, simply regarded these stores as something that grew on its own as something that they could use to award to their own employees. how does -- in other words, i'm looking for the link between their own procurement authority and using that authority within the agency for its own employees in a way that i have never seen done in federal agencies elsewhere. >> so from what i understand, and this is from the ig report, mr. miller's report on the hats-off program, that that was focused with the electronic equipment, the gpses was focused around region 9 and just region 9. >> yeah, i'm talking about region 9. >> the program operated throughout the agency. from what i also understand, what w

data. we will follow that as we move forward. one last question, have they ever pulled over cars or vans? >> i am not aware of a tsa assets on a team pulling over a car or a van. >> i would love to have that answer. there is no terrorist that has ever driven a semi truck. we find it very curious the method that was being employed with the team's. you can go look at the example. >> thank you very much. we will now start our second round of questioning. i will give it a go for five minutes. and then we will go to mr. cummings. >> as we talk about the spot program, if an agent were able to see something they considered to be a suspicious behavior, what is the follow-up? what can they do? did they engage the person in conversation? what is the procedure? is there something they can do? can you tell me what that is? >> in our spot program, our officers are trained to observe the behavior and engaged in casual conversations with individuals. if the circumstances warrant, they can engage local law enforcement for further follow- up. >> if they detected something suspicious, i can stop them from boarding the plane? >> if t