>> on april 15 when we discovered the most recent breach we reported that two u.s. certand to -- >> to? >> u.s., the computer emergency readiness team dhs. spent you did it to dhs. did you report to congress to? >> we reported to the fbi and we made our business required notification to congress as well. >> that was april 15. what about the first one? >> for the first breach, again dhs notified us of that activity in our network and so they already knew about that one. and yes we made notifications to congress about one as well. >> when? >> i'm sorry i don't have that date in my notes. i would be happy to get you -- >> could you please get back to the committee for us? did you notify the contractors of the breach? >> at the first breach there was not an awareness of of what the adversaries were targeting and that this may go beyond opm. i know that our staffs at my staff my security staff had conversations with the security staffs at the contractor organizations. i also know that the indicators of compromise that dhs had were provided to other government organizations, w

key point immediately began implementing the issues identified by u.s. cert, and concluded the malware was not functioning correctly and because of errors. i recently attended a classified briefing at opm where i learned more about the opm breach and in the opening setting i cannot go into details presented in that briefing however i can reiterate we have seen no evidence between the incursion of key point and we are always striving to make sure our defenses are as strong as possible. we have also been working closely with opm to improve our information security posture in light of the new advanced persistent threats. we have been working diligently to make our systems more resilient and stronger by implementing the recommendations and a number of the most significant improvements have been full deployment of the authentication, and enhanced intrusion detection systems and network information and improved network segmentation and many more. we have been working with all of our customers to update our atos, and this includes an audit from an independent party.

key point immediately began implementing the issues identified by u.s. cert, and concluded the malware was not functioning correctly and because of errors. i recently attended a classified briefing at opm where i learned more about the opm breach and in the opening setting i cannot go into details presented in that briefing however i can reiterate we have seen no evidence between the incursion of key point and we are always striving to make sure our defenses are as strong as possible. we have also been working closely with opm to improve our information security posture in light of the new advanced persistent threats. we have been working diligently to make our systems more resilient and stronger by implementing the recommendations and a number of the most significant improvements have been full deployment of the authentication, and enhanced intrusion detection systems and network information and improved network segmentation and many more. we have been working with all of our customers to update our atos, and this includes an audit from an independent party.

key point immediately began implementing the issues identified by u.s. cert, and concluded the malware was not functioning correctly and because of errors. i recently attended a classified briefing at opm where i learned more about the opm breach and in the opening setting i cannot go into details presented in that briefing however i can reiterate we have seen no evidence between the incursion of key point and we are always striving to make sure our defenses are as strong as possible. we have also been working closely with opm to improve our information security posture in light of the new advanced persistent threats. we have been working diligently to make our systems more resilient and stronger by implementing the recommendations and a number of the most significant improvements have been full deployment of the authentication, and enhanced intrusion detection systems and network information and improved network segmentation and many more. we have been working with all of our customers to update our atos, and this includes an audit from an independent party.

don't want to discuss or ask about anything classified in the course of your own investigation, u.s. cert into key points data breach, did you find hackers were able to move around the company network prior to detection? >> in the case of the key point investigation? >> yes. >> yes ma'am, they were able to move around in the key point network. we had an interagency response team that spent time reviewing the key point network -- >> even to the domain level? >> correct. they had access -- we were there in august of 2014 and the on-site assessment team was able to discover -- >> what does that allow the hacker to do to get to the domain level. >> they had access to the level -- >> key point. >> key point. from that point in time through the fall of 2013. so during that time they were able to leverage certain mal-ware to escalate privileges for the entry point. so they entered the network. and we're not sure how. >> the gentle lady's time is expired. >> just final thing. >> can you finish that. >> can they get background on federal employees. >> no they could not. there was a p.i. loss aocea

cert. >> to who? >> to u.s. -- the computer emergency and readiness team, and dhs. >> did you report it to congress. >> we reported it to the fbi and then we made the his ma required -- fisma required notification as well. >> that was the second one. what about for the first one. >> again dhs notified us of that activity in our network and so they -- they already knew about that one. and yes ma'am we made notifications to congress of that one as well. >> when? >> i'm sorry ma'am, i don't have the date in my notes. would you be happy to. >> would you get back to the committee for us. now did you notify the contractors of the breach? >> at the first breach, there was not an awareness of -- of what the adversaries were targeting and that this may go beyond opm. i know that our staffs -- my staff, my secret staff had -- security staff had conversation with the security staff at the contractor organizations and the compromise that dhs had that other organizations were put into einstein as well as communications that

u.s. marshal's special operations group. you have s.w.a.t. teams that also have been searching, and the corrections department. their certrlier from major guest, that they did believe the men were in the area in the franklin county area and that they had credible evidence they said there had been no physical sightings, but the evidence they were getting and the dna they had let them to believe they were close, that they were moving in a northwest direction a north-northwest direction up towards the canadian border but now we are getting information that law enforcement reporting that richard matt has been shot and david sweat is now running, being chased by law enforcement. jake? >>> just to reiterate these are the two fugitive killers who escaped i believe 21 days ago from clinton correctional facility. we are being told deborah feyerick reporting that richard matt one of those two fugitives has shot. david sweat, i believe she had, in police custody. let's go to jean cazaras. >> reporter: they're flying away from the command post. earlier today, what we had learned through new york state police is they is believed thes

u.s. special operations command was also tweeting with the attackers who tried to storm a free speech, in any event garland texas. and president obama's claim that the most respected nation on cert. russian is embarking on the military buildup. and fox business contributor mark is here. apart from the particular episode with the russians, i think it's fair to say that russia doesn't suspect '14 us that happen of. how does it affect us in our day-to-day lives. >> it's really about safety. it's affecting every american. let's take, for example ucriterion. it would be good politics, it would be good foreign policy, but it would also be good business for to americans sell hardware military equipment to the ukrainians. they're asking for it. they are our allies. can you imagine what this would do for the defense industry here if we were able to approve and say we're going to give the ukrainians everything they're asking for again, stuart? this is not only good for business but it's the right foreign policy move -- stuart: we don't sell those to ukraine because we're scared of putin. is that what you're saying. >> we're scared of putin. we're letting the europeans kind of cave on issu