u.s. cybercommand, whose head is lieutenant general keith alexander, who is also the director of the national security agency. so now he has come at last count he had about four or five different hats that he wore. but u.s. cybercommand has the responsibility of defending our nation's telecommunications and computer infrastructure. which i always thought was part of nsa's original mandate, you know, it was usually called imitation security, they became information security. somehow we needed a new command, a new layer of bureaucracy on top of, you know, what already exists to handle the cyber threat from abroad. i'll tell you what, when these lovely offers coming from nigeria asking me to give them my bank account, information, when they stop, then another cybercommand is working. but i mean, cybercommand may have some meaningful affect, or not, on protecting our nation's, the government communication system. it's never been proven to my satisfaction that, you, there are about 15 different organizations engage in various degrees or another in cyber defense or and it is the hottest contracting

u.s. cybercommand as a sub-unified command under u.s. strategic command. our examination revealed that there are substantial and we some gaps in the policy and guidelines needed to govern u.s. military operations in cyberspace. senior department and defense officials testified to this fact and issue the committee that the secretary of defense understands the situation well and intends to have answers to many, if not all, of a major policy questions by the end of the calendar year. these are just a few of the unresolved issues. first, rules of engagement and authority for various command echelons, including cybercommand itself. second, how to the escalation. third, what constitutes use of force in an act of war in cyberspace, including compliance with the war powers act. fourth, the lack of a deterrence doctrine, what deters cyberattacks. a status and process question -- what is the status of the secretary's said the policy review, and is the department on track to fulfill the year-end commitment to complete the review that was given to the committee during

u.s. cybercommand.he mission of cybercom is for the amusement of some, actually codified in a 128 cryptographic hash that actually means a series of numbers that appear in the seal of the organization that actually stands for the 58 ward mission statement of cybercom. a mission that includes a defensive but also an offensive component to cyberspace operations. now, to seriously think of offensive and defensive cyberstrategies pursued by u.s. department of defense by the u.s. department of defense is really to think about legal and other dilemmas ahead. the effort to do this is certainly underway for both of the adequacy and an adequacy of legal regimes by various specialists. among the legal frameworks discussed, one proposal is the use of armed conflict as a possible platform from which to draw further insights on the legality of cyberwarfare by states. serious advocates of this agree that even if we take into account the principles of armed conflict to guide us in the cyberdomain, these analogy effort

u.s. cybercommand and the components that fit that.there's much for me to learn here if confirmed, and i would be delighted to dig into this further. my understanding is you defined the issues very well. in my mind this is about authorities, responsibilities, oversight, doctrine, all of the pieces that need to be put in place to drive forward on where we need to be postured in cyberspace. that work is underway, and you and the committee are aware that the department of security and department of defense signed a memorandum outlining roles and responsibilities and other steps taken to partner together. those are positive steps, and there's much more to do. my understanding is that the work on the report that you're referring to is continuing and in preparation for my confirmation hearing i was told the expectation is that they will be delivering that on time. >> thank you. last year the secretary of defense and the joint chiefs with the support from the combat and commanders unanimously recommended the so-called phased adaptive approach