the case of ubs for example where eventually they were looking at the super senior products primarily through models with disastrous effect in using a very one dimensional way wasn't the case in jpmorgan even though ironically jpmorgan had invented it. they said it is kind of use will but it is only useful as part of the set of techniques measuring risk. so i think that contributed to the stand it. the other key thing about diamond it was he was prepared to face up to the analysts on wall street and say no and that is critically important because from 2005 onwards at chile's jpmorgan worked brilliantly and there was a huge chorus of criticism from equity analysts saying why are you lagging behind? we thought diamond was this wonder kid he was going to come in and solve the problems, in fact, it revenues ain't that great. now there were other banks who were responding to that intense shareholder stock market pressure and saying, yes, we have got to try and start chasing after credits revenues as fast as we can and there was this real what people used to call goldman and become everyone

accounting rules and make it seem as if the risk could magically disappeared which is basically what ubsnd merrill were doing but actually the genuine risk having disappeared because if there was ever a situation bad enough to blow up the super senior it could modelize too it was intellectually stupid to use model lines to protect yourself from super senior risk. >> what about in order to respond -- i mean, that wasn't again in a way similar to in concept of citigroup with all its cbos and they were buying cbos from all kinds of banks and jp morgan and that's why he went on to be the biggest to the hedge fund because they had sold them the cbos but it came back to them because they had loaned 90% of the money it was supposed to pay them. >> steve black and others would say over and over again, we made mistakes. and they're very scared thinking they lived too well. in japan the last decade nobody wanted to look at a profit because guess what? they get too much attraction so, in fact, in the course of interviewing they kept saying we made mistakes and they'd list all their mistakes just in

the accounting rules and make it seem as if the risk magically disappeared which was basically what ubs and merrill was doing but the genuine risk hadn't disappeared but if there was a situation to blow up the super senior it was intellectually stupid to use monolines to protect yourself from super senior risk. >> but what about the exposure to the bear stearns risk and how citigroup put all its cbos. they were buying ceos from all banks including jp morgan which was one of the exposed to the hedge funds because they had sold them the cbos but they came back to them because they had loaned 90% of the money they were supposed to pay them. >> yep. they would say over and over again, we made mistakes and they're very scared of people thinkingrñ they didn't do well. it's been like japan in the last decade. nobody wants to stick up above the carpet because they'll get too much attraction. but they said we made mistakes too and they listed all their mistakes just in case i hadn't gotten them all done and i mentioned them in the book. you can look at the results. you can look at who made the b

morgan have made are nowhere near the scale up marrow, ubs, morgan stanley, which is one reason why,they are not being able to raise a bunch of capital now. you probably still got more questions but thank you very much for coming along. [applause] >> gillian tett was named trelles of the year for coverage of the market decline in 2008. she was also awarded the wincott prize for financial journalism in 2007. right now she runs the global market coverage for "financial times" newspaper. to find out more on the author please go to ft.com. >> the c-span civics buses traveling the country, visiting libraries, bookstores, festivals and authors. here are some of the people and places we visited. >> we are here with susan levine at the university of illinois, chicago to talk about her book, "school lunch politics" the surprising history of america's favorite welfare program. susan, why did you think it was important to expose the behind-the-scenes scene of the school lunches? >> well, i think that everybody who goes to school in america eats a school lunch and at some point in their life, an

caller: there was a lot of information about money being funneled of the united states and given to ubs. they were then find and went before congress and said i am sorry, i wanted again. recover said ok. the 24 -- 24,000 people that funneled money out of the united states, they only had to give two hundred 50 names to the irs. i was wondering what the media never covered that story? or covered it in a limited way. guest: the caller has a good point. one of the things that undermined it hoover was say finance corp., which was an idea to pump money into failing banks, and railroads. it was used very well by the roosevelt administration during the new deal. a badly undermined -- by the people running it. they gave a huge amount of money to banks. there is a huge risk of both perception and reality with having the entire financial deregulation going on now, being done by these people with very close ties with people to wall street like geithner and sommers. there is a feeling that the deregulation does not have any teeth in it. these are not being properly addressed by regulations going on

so for example, the scale of super senior risk build on the balance sheets such as merrill lynch and ubs which have such utterly disastrous implications toward the end of 2007, that was not being debated but it wasn't on the agenda and there was very little way to detract back. and on the regulation issue, this is critical and something i think the new york vetted grapples with about the cbs market in 2005 and 2006 and i talk about this in the book relating to some of the initiatives that geithner was involved with and the creditor this market. the theory that somehow in a market all the actors have a self-interest in behaving in a sensible way for the long term and in the pressures will somehow lead the system of the whole beginning rationally has just not turn out to be true in the credit world and you can see that in a very tangible way in the issue of settlements in the cdl space because if you had a pretty rational free-market you'd have a situation where every bank would say i have an incentive of making sure i don't have a huge backlog of paper building up in my office because of

fast forward to ubs, citigroup, merrill lynch, and a very different decision was taken. jpmorgan basically cut its credit lines to sivs in 2002, 2003 because they thought those structures didn't make much sense. again, a very different decision was made by other banks, and i say that not because i think jpmorgan were somehow superior beings and geniuses who have ducked every bullet, nothing could be further from the truth. but it's become far too easy to assume that all bankers were stupid, all bankers were risky. and that was not the case. one of the things that had had become clear to me by doing the research is just how different the different banks were in terms of their treatment of some of the risk analysis which brings me to my crucial point, and this is really where we start to come towards the disaster, if you like, section of the book which is we're now faced with a tremendous choice. clearly, the financial system has imploded to a terrifying degree, and many of the ideologies and principles on which finance has been based in the last three decades stand very d

obama administration, deutsche bank posted swell the bank of america's ties performing executives and ubs yes compensation increases as high as 200%. this is a swiss bank, to hire away financial advisers. the greatest risk to the safety and soundness of the nation's banking system is not compensation but short-term thinking. compensation is up companies may motivate executives to look short term but the real question is why do companies pursue short-term goals in the first instance? the wide except the convention of predicting quarterly earnings drives the short term approach. pension funds, mutual funds and company issuers all expressed dissatisfaction with the pressure to predict quarterly earnings but companies feel that voluntarily opting out will be taken as an negative signal. pressure to make quarterly predictions about earnings, companies frequently feel pressure to cut corners to meet those predictions. i would recommend that the treasury department lift executive compensation restrictions for those companies and banks that adopt a bylaw to rehabbed quarterly guidance. if this co