things have been brought in the ukraine -- bras in ukraine. -- rough in ukraine. even though they had experienced a real political difficulties -- experienced real political difficulties, they have decided to decide their own destiny. they may decide to move ahead with the european union. >> here is more from our 20- year-old interview. >> if i was going to lead by as the soviet government from a financial point of view, what they can do to take part, i would tell them to put their money where their mouth is. i think that the soviet union's only claim to credibility with western financial types is to provide collateral behind a currency. in fact, i think it would be a rather brilliant coup on their part to come out with a currency. they have mythical currencies, not that they do not exist, but bankers is get round when they think of soviet gold reserves -- bankers eyes it round when they think of soviet gold reserves. >> what has happened to their gold and the ruble in the past 20 years. they should have done that. i wish i had fought harder. i went over with a st

he rose to lead to ukraine toward nato and the european union. things have been rough in ukraine. i was going to advice the soviet government, what they could do to take part of the international monetary system. i think the soviet union's only claim to credibility with western financial sight is to provide collateral behind a currency >> what happened to their gold in the last 20 years. they should is done that. i wish i would have fought harder. it was tho august everything fell apart by december 1991, the soviet union was no more. they gave people a very bad taste for capitolism. throughout the 1990s, russia was re real really grasping with disaster. it turned out we were worst off under so-called capitolism. i think even now if your currency has integrity, you can build on it. russia had a disaster in 1999. ÷ there was a complete default. it put russia on the lifeline to the imf, which is also respented >> what is the imf. jo the international monetary fund. it was set up a week after pearl harbor was bombed. everyone tried make their currencies cheap so that they would have a

but he rose to lead ukraine, to head ukraine toward nato, toward the european union. now, things have been rough in ukraine. the economy has really spiraled downward. it's a very difficult situation around the border with russia. but even though they've experienced real political difficulties and economic difficulties, i still think that they have said "it's better to be independent, and we will decide our own destiny." and probably, even leaders who we might now say were too pro- russian at one time, they likewise say, "no, we may decide to move ahead with european union integration." >> here's more from our 20-year- old interview. >> now, if i was going to advise the soviet government from a financial point of view, what they could do to take part in the international financial system, monetary system, i would urge them to put their money where their mouth is, so to speak, and come up with a gold-backed ruble. i think that the soviet union's only claim to credibility with western financial types is to provide collateral behind a currency. in fact, i think it would b

paul talked a little bit about the differences over ukraine this morning. think that was actually a very important point. if you read secretary baker's memoirs you find he was completely angry about the a leak in the fall of 1991 about interagency differences in the ukraine. he said i was feeling sand bagged not by cheney but by those who had been the initial source and there was no question it was it was women won the following story and was first leaked. >> the other part that i think was important was as a number of scholars pointed out the rise of the vulcans and david calahan, this was one of the few efforts to step back and take a really long look. and george hairing in his imagine starle history of foreign policy argues the same thing. how does the gpd hand up and whest i first, on the national security strategy, i'll let film speak to that with more detail as he does in his paper. my recollection was that that was largely an effort driven by condi rice and pen on the issue. and both the office of the vice president and the office of the secretary of

paul talked a little bit about the differences over ukraine this morning. i think that was actually a very important point. if you read secretary baker's memoirs, you find that he was extremely angry about the leak in the fall of 1991 about interagency differences over ukraine. he said he was furious and felt sandbagged. there's no question that secretary baker's anger was quite real, and i'm sure it was still lingering the bawling spring when the dpg was first leaked. the other part i'd think that is important here is that as a number of scholars have pointed out, this is one of the very few efforts to step back and take a really long look. george sharing in his recent kind of material history of american policy history argues the same thing. how does the dpg stand up, and what is its relationship to the 1992 national security strategy? first, on the national security strategy, i will let philip speak to that in more detail, as he does in his paper. my recollection is that that was largely an effort driven by condi rice and steve hadley with a look at thei

there is a terrible salmon in the ukraine where millions died because of soviet policy. 1933, the depression. u.s. recognized the soviet union. it doesn't say we approve of every aspect of it, but we respect it as a sovereign nation. 1930s, among other things there is a purge trial. the reign of terror in the soviet union putting the revolutionaries stalin's own peers go on trial. that's what kessler is running out in darkness at noon. 1939, stalin makes a pact with hitler and hitler instantly invades poland. so they are both together and we are watching most on the other side, but watching. 1941, hitler invaded russia. suddenly soviet russia switches from an enemy to perhaps an ally, becomes an ally. we are allies in world war ii. these great conferences setting how europe will be after the war. we are working with russia in this period and then after the war, from 45 on the world war ii is over. the cold war is beginning. we are beginning to realize russia is not the kind of ally we would imagine. the point is, the u.s. the only relationship, flip-flops a lot. and americans are going throu

trotsky, there's terrible famine in ukraine where millions died because of servile policy. 1933, it's the depression, the u.s. recognizes the soviet remember it as a sovereign nation. 1930's, well among other things there are the purge trials, the reign of terror in the soviet union putting the old revolutionaries, stalin's peers go on trial. that's what kessler is writing about in darkness and noon. 1939 stalin makes a pact with hitler and hitler invaded poland, so they are both together, and we are watching mostly on the other side, but watching. 1941 hitler invaded russia. suddenly soviet russia switches from an enemy to perhaps an ally becomes an ally. we are allies in world war ii. there are these great conference is selling hauer europe will be after the war, to iran yalta and potsdam were working with russia in this period, and then after the war 45 on world war ii is over, the cold war is beginning, we are beginning to realize russia is at least not the kind of ally we had imagined, so the point is this relationship, the u.s.-soviet relationship flip-flops' a lot and americans

how we respond to the independence referendum in ukraine?said if ukrainians vote for independence, we should support it. the white house state department at the time, as i remember, was we should talk about earned recognition, which was to have certain conditions the ukrainians would have to me before we would recognize independence, one of which to you -- one of which was to abandon nuclear weapons which they eventually did. during the clinton administration, it finally happened. it was not going to happen overnight. dick cheney's view -- he was a one are doing this -- was that we should not delay. delay is going to be harmful. at the end of the day, on the eve of the vote, bush made it clear, i have forgotten whether it was publicly or in a leak, that we would recognize ukraine. gorbachev was very upset about this and you did as a betrayal. robert gates says it was a victory of domestic policy over principle. i would like to think it's a victory of one principle over another. the principle is a change is happening here. if we try to stand

if you look predictions in the early 1990's, you know, potential nuclear war between russia and ukraine, for example, and as part of that, one of the most breathtaking things that happened was the extraordinary conversion of those countries and east europe. almost all of them almost overnight to democracy and at least a degree of capitalism. it also destroys a lot of political science theories about how difficult it is to become a democracy. as americans, we surely know by now any dimwit can do democracy. basically all you have to do to do democracy is a kid of votes in you can complain. you know how to complain, right? you can also organize and peacefully overthrow the government of the one. that is not very complicated in country after country has done is virtually overnight including when american and places like paraguay or countries like bulgaria who never had any experience and never read thomas jefferson and never had any large middle- class. the dollar still is extremely easy to basically put together by and large unless it is put down with someone with guns. burma would be a de