for a variety of reasons, the sea wall that was installed in and around fukushima was underdesigned for the tsunami that reached the shore there. the emergency disels that are the back up in case off site ac power is lost were placed in the basement of the turbine buildings facing the pacific ocean. you ask why were they placed in the turbine buildings in the basement? because they wanted to protect them from a seismic event. then some gaps in regulatory oversight. the sea pumps, in addition to the disel generators were located in a location below the level of a potential tsunami. so, the accident in my view was not the inevitable consequence of a rare act of god. but certainly if in fact through sound practices of engineering, sound regulation, periodic inspections and evaluations, certainly that's something that i think in the future, certainly we can prevent. causes of fukushima obviously as we all know, the earthquake knocked out the six external transmission lines. ensuing tsunami that follows about 40 minutes later. there was a series of waves, seven all together. knocked out 11 o

we must strive for the right balance between the dangers of over designation and underdesignation. there will be an economic cost to designated firms. therefore, we should do so whenever the safety benefitsout weigh the costs but only when they do. this has been around to question whether firms may benefit from being named. i would emphasize a point, which is that which is if it's true that funding costs will be lower after designation, the primary beneficiaries of that will be the managements and the sha shareholders of these companies. i've been heavily lobbied by the companies to take the positions they shouldn't be. i'm sure you as members of congress have been levied much more heavily. someone will make an argument that you shouldn't do something to their advantage. i do not believe for that and other reasons that there would be a significant funding cost advantage. fourth. the additional oversight we need to avoid overlap, conflicting requirements and gaps where no one regulates. similar activities should be regulated in similar ways. with similar safety margins, to the exten