uranium enrichment will be scaled down significantly. for the next 15 years, no uranium will be enriched beyond 3.67%. to put that in context, this is a level that is appropriate for civilian nuclear power and research but well below anything that could be used possibly for a weapon. for the next ten years, iran agreed to only use its first generation centrifuges in order to enrich uranium. they agreed to disconnect centrifuges. those installed will be closely monitored rnd program and none will be used to produce enriched ewe rain numb. iran has also agreed to stop enriching uranium for the next 16 years. it will not even use or store thistle material on the site during that time. instead, it will be transformed into a nuclear physics and technology research center. it will be used for example, to produce isotopes for cancer treatment and subject todayly inspection. and it will have other nations working in unison with the iranians within that technology center. so when the deal is implemented, the two uranium paths iran has toward thist

using the facilities to enrichment uranium. it will reduce storage by 96% and will move or modify the core of the heavywater nuclear reactor in iraq so that it no longer -- billions of dollars in international sanctions relief. the negotiations were long and arduous. >> the relief among the negotiators was tangible. after a decade of negotiation deadlines to contain iran's deep in her program, a deal that many are calling historic. >> this is very much needed in these times. >> as someone who has been part of this for 10 years, the german prime minister said i am happy we have reached a point where an agreement has been reached that will make the middle east and the yen to her a bit safer. >> it is a step away from the specter of conflict and toward the possibility of these. >> the agreement is to ensure tehran is not able to build atomic weapons. one allowing for the domestic use of nuclear power. stocks of enriched uranium are to be reduced and inspectors from the atomic agency are to be granted full access to all power plant

using the facilities to enrichment uranium. it will reduce storage by 96% and will move or modify the core of the heavywater nuclear reactor in iraq so that it no longer -- billions of dollars in international sanctions relief. the negotiations were long and arduous. >> the relief among the negotiators was tangible. after a decade of negotiation deadlines to contain iran's deep in her program, a deal that many are calling historic. >> this is very much needed in these times. >> as someone who has been part of this for 10 years, the german prime minister said i am happy we have reached a point where an agreement has been reached that will make the middle east and the yen to her a bit safer. >> it is a step away from the specter of conflict and toward the possibility of these. >> the agreement is to ensure tehran is not able to build atomic weapons. one allowing for the domestic use of nuclear power. stocks of enriched uranium are to be reduced and inspectors from the atomic agency are to be granted full access to all power plant

folks when we began our negotiations we faced an iran that was already enriching uranium up to 20%. already had a facility built in secret underground in a mountain that was rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium. when we began negotiations they had enough enriched uranium for 10 to 12 bombs. already they had installed as many as 19,000 nuclear centrifuges and nearly finished building a heavy water reactor that could produce one to two bombs a year. experts put iran's breakout time when we began, which remember is not the old breakout time that we used to refer to this any context of arms control, breakout time as we have applied it is extraordinarily conservative. it is the time it takes to have enough fissile material for one bomb it's not the amount of time to the bomb. so when they say they'll have one year to a certain amount of material they still have to design the bomb test do a whole bunch of other things and i think you would agree no nation is going to consider itself nuclear capable with one bomb. so if this deal is rejected folks -- by the way, the existing -- when we sta

uranium enrichment. this agreement would violate all six of those resolutions. >> absolutely. that's a real feature here. the obama administration position is weaker than the u.n. security council, hard for many americans to figure but that's the fact. i believe the administration the president himself, his secretary of state john kerry, his predecessor hillary clinton have believed from the outset that if they could simply convince iran that america wasn't their enemy, that iran would begin behaving like belgium or the netherlands, give up its nuclear weapons program and become like a western state. i think that's 180 degrees the opposite of reality, but that's the delusional bubble that they are operating in. >> boy, talk about a delusional bubble. what about the ayatollah khamenei no inspections into sites and this has been watered into parts in the military facility barred from u.n. inspections where it's suspected they researched nuclear development. what is it if you have managed inspections and is that acceptable to make sure iran is not building nuclear weapons? >> i t

that includes the sizable reduction of iran's stockpile of enriched uranium and number of center fuges that it operates and it also guaranteed that iran's breakout time the time it would take for iran to speed up its enrichment and produce enough material for just one nuclear weapon that time will increase to at least one year for a period of at least ten years years. and contrary to the assertions of some this agreement has no sunset. it doesn't terminate. it will be implemented in phases beginning within 90 days of the u.n. security council endorsing the deal and some of the provisions are in place for ten years, others for 15 years, others for 25 years and certain provisions including many of the transparency measures and prohibitions on nuclear work will stay in place permanently. but most importantly this agreement addresses iran's potential pathways to material for a bomb exactly as we said it would, with appreciate limitations and transparency in order to assure the world of the peaceful nature of iran's nuclear program. now, let me explain exactly how it will accomplish that go

i don't know what the outcome is going to be in terms of enriched uranium tactile in iran. will it remain in the enriched uranium beyond the 300 permitted kilograms. the radiance has said no. we have said yes. you choose which one you believe. we will see what the outcome is i'm not. we also have an open question about what happens to the enriched uranium at 20%. what's going to happen with that? maybe it will be resolved but we are told it hasn't been resolved as of yet for at least before the last round of negotiations. for those three reasons all of which the saudis are aware of, there is no credibility for four extending the breakout round. we may fool ourselves that we may fool the american public, but we will not pull the other gulf countries. i was in the uae earlier this year. let me say the sense that the united states is having abandoned the region, the lack of credibility of the administration is palpable. they hold us in contempt. they hold american policy and the same. let's face it for what it is. that is the message and our performance in the negotiations is o

remember that two years ago when our negotiation began, we faced an iran that was enriching uranium up to 20% at a facility that was secret and buried underground, and they were rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium, they were building a heavy reactor, that could produce one to two bombs a year and experts assessed that the breakout time as a result the integral required to produce one nuclear weapon was about two to three months. if this deal is rejected we return immediately to this reality. accept that the diplomatic support that we have built with all of these other countries, that we have disappear overnight. let me underscore, the alternative to the deal that we have reached is not what i have seen some ads on tv suggesting it isn't a, quote, better deal? some sort of unicorn arrangement, involving iran's complete capitulation. that is a fantasy, plain and simple and our own intelligence community will tell you that. every single department of our intelligence community will reinforce that. the choice we face is ensuring that iran's program is limited, rigorously scrutinized, and

remember that two years ago when our negotiations began, we faced an iran that was enriching uranium up to 20% at a facility that was secret and buried underground. and they were rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium and had installed nearly 2,000 nuclear centrifuges. they were building a heavy water reactor that could produce weapons grade plutonium at a rate of enough to produce one or two bombs per year and experts assess that the breakout time then as a result the interval required to rush to be able to produce enough material for one nuclear weapon was about two to three months. if this deal is rejected, we return immediately to this reality. accept that the diplomatic support we have built with these countries that we have accumulated would disappear overnight. let me underscore the alternative to the deal that we have reached is not what i've seen some ads on tv suggesting disen disingenuously. some sort of unicorn arrangement involving iran's complete capitulation. that is a fantasy plain and simple. at our own intelligence community will tell you that. every single department

what iran has at the moment is 12,000 kilograms of low enriched uranium. that low enriched uranium. it's a percentage around 5%. you have to enrich that up a significant amount to get it up to sort of weapons grade, 90%. so that 12,000 kilograms you reduce to a smaller amount by enriching it up but the amount that you're left with from that original 12,000 kilograms is enough we understand to build that weapon plus of course a heavy water reactor plant making weapons grade plutonium enough each year to make one or two weapons there. the agreement to reduce that stockpile from 12,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms, that's a 98% reduction, and that 300 kilograms of what we're told is 3.6, 3.7 low enriched eweuranium, that's a level of enrichment you need for nuclear power stations. you would need to take that 300 kilograms and reduce it massively to enrich it up to weapons grade. there simply isn't enough to the 300 kilograms to make a bomb. that's the sort of numbers we're talking about here carol. >> nic robertson, many thanks for that. you know i always like to deal in facts. thank you

uranium is going to be sent somewhere else. the potential to enricheapons grade is down and their ability to have themselves checked exists in a way it did not before. how does it make it more likely this deal that they get a weapon. >> chris, let's start with enriching uranium in centrifuges. they are using the most basic kind of centrifuges. in eight to ten years, they will have advanced research and development. it will help them master the process to enrich uranium. they don't need to develop it now. they can wait eight to ten years to develop it. of course they can do the same in a covert facility. the text of the deal explicitly says the west will help iran protect their nuclear capabilities from sabotage. that is a direct quote. imagine the fact we are going to help iran develop their capabilities to protect what could be elicit facilities from the sabotage their facilities faced in the past. i think this is a bad deal. >> there's no language that reads elicit facilities but they want insurance in the name of inspection the iaea or others would

and most experts have given it a two to three-month time frame to have enough enriched uranium for one bomb. i'd like you to talk a little bit about their nuclear expertise, and if left unchecked, how quickly can they ramp up to greater production, to more highly enriched uranium excluding this deal arrangement? and then after you describe that, i would like you to describe what the ramp-up time would look like post-8, 10 15 years. because what i understand from reading the agreement is that you've spent a lot of time identifying what can be changed and modified in the three existing facilities so that they don't run a military risk. and so i'd like that more fully described. and obviously, and the last point i want you to address is my constituents are very concerned about clandestine operations. to the extent you can talk about it in this setting, i would like you to address how you detect a clandestine ebbnrichment facility during at greemt. >> quite a few questions, senator. in terms of their current capacity, well they have again, demonstrated the capacity to rehn itch uranium, th

uranium enrichment will be scaled down significantly for the next 15 years, no uranium will be enriched%. to put that in context, this is a level that is appropriate for civilian nuclear power and research but well below anything that can be used possibly for a weapon. for the next ten years iran has agreed to only use its first-generation centrifuges in order to enrich uranium. iran has further agroo agreed to disconnect the -- part of a constrained and closely monitored r&d program and none will be used to produce enriched uranium. iran has also agreed to stop enriching uranium at the facility for the next 15 years. it will not even use or store thistle material on the site during that time. instead, it will be transformed into a nuclear physics and technology research center. it will be used for example to produce isotopes for cancer treatment and it will be subject to daily inspection. and it will have other nations working in unison with the iranians within that technology center. so when this deal is implemented, the two uranium paths iran has towards thistle material for a weapon

remember that two years ago when our negotiation began, we faced an iran that was enriching uranium up to 20% at a facility that was secret and buried underground, and they were rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium, they were building a heavy reactor, that could produce one to two bombs a year, and experts assessed that the breakout time as a result, the integral required to produce one nuclear weapon was about two to three months. if this deal is rejected, we return immediately to this reality. accept that the diplomatic support that we have built with all of these other countries, that we have accumulated would disappear overnight. let me underscore, the alternative to the deal that we have reached is not what i have seen some ads on tv suggesting, it isn't a, quote, better deal? some sort of unicorn arrangement, involving iran's complete capitulation. that is a fantasy, plain and simple, and our own intelligence community will tell you that. every single department of our intelligence community will reinforce that. the choice we face is ensuring that iran's program is limited, rigor

there is also an open question about what happens to the enriched uranium at 20%. what will happen to that? maybe it will be resolved, but we have not been told that it has been resolved, at least before the last round of negotiations. for those reasons, all of which the saudis are aware of, there's no credibility and extending the breakout time. we may fool ourselves and the american public, but were not going to for the saudis and the other gulf countries. i was in the uae the sense of the united states of having abandoned the region, the lack of credibility of this administration is palpable. they hold us in contempt. they hold american policy in disdain. let's face it for what it is. that is the message. our performance in the negotiations is just one measure of that. the other one was mentioned. that is failing to respond to the red line when bashar al-assad use chemical weapons. that had a profound affect on the united states. abandoning mubarak in egypt. it had a profound effect on how we are perceived. this is a fertile ground for proliferation. i think you

wanted a purely peaceful program there's no need to enrich uranium. in the past when south africa and libya gave up their nuclear programs to be welcomed into the world of nations in a more normal fashion like iran supposedly wants, they completely gave up their enrichment. they dismantled that. that's what we demanded correct? >> i believe so certainly with southd africa. they had a weapons program that was dismantled. >> if i may add the documents the iaea in south africa in a full nuclear weapons dismantlement program, remained confidential. >> are you familiar with the emp commission's 2008 report? >> no, i am not sir. >> you're not? do you know what emp is? >> you'll have to explain it to me. >> etloerkal magnetic pulse. >> no, i'm not sir. i'm just not. i apologize. i can respond for the record if you have a question there. >> i'll send you a number of questions. the recommendations were for the department of homeland security and department of energy. we just held a hearing. are you familiar with a dr. richard garwin. >> yes everyone is. >> he t

its fissile material, 93% of the enriched uranium shipped out, isn't the u.s. in a better position than it was before this deal? >> if the agreement is adhered to by the iranians and all the provisions carried out the president is right, that the current time line for iran to get a nuclear device which is two to three months, would be pushed back to a year. that's the good news. the bad news is, even if it's pushed back a year, iran could go down that road. they did it before up to 2013. secondly, the problem is, iran will, after ten years, largely and after 15 years, almost completely, be exempt from the strictures that limit it to one year to go to a bomb. and it will be free of all sanctions and all criticism by the international community. because it will be given a more or less clean bill of health. that's the political problem that's tied up in this agreement but yeah it does push back the time line for treun ge iran to get a bomb if iran adheres to it. >> thank you ambassador. >> thank you. >> president rouhani campaign message in 2013 but so was improvi

remember two years ago when our negotiations began, we were facing in iran that was enriching uranium in a facility that was secret and buried underground. and they were never the stockpiling enriched uranium and had installed nearly 20,000 centrifuges. they were building a heavy water reactor that could build weapons grade plutonium. and experts assessed that the breakout time that as a result the interval required to rush to be able to produce enough material for one nuclear weapon was about two to three months. if this deal is rejected, we return immediately to this reality. except that the diplomatic support that we have built with all these other countries, that we have accumulated, or to secure -- would disappear overnight. let me underscore the alternative to the deal we have reached is not what i have seen on some ads on tv suggesting disingenuously. it is not a, quote, better deal. some sort of unicorn arrangement involving iran's complete capitulation. that is a fantasy, plain and simple. and our own intelligence community will tell you that. every single department of our i

once it mastered the complex signs of uranium enrichment. they can break out in a time of their choosing. >> there is poorly advised concessions that we made and that was the central mistake. >> you are obviously not in favor of the deal that seems to be about to be signed here. and congress has to approve it though, does that give you heart? >> and remember the most congress can do is prevent obama from waiving u.s. sanctions. there will be a vote in the u.n. security council and obama will vote in favor of them. once they are reskinneded europe and china and the rest of the world will lift their sanctions and iran will trade with them and invefment and new contracts and we'll be back in the world of 2005 and 6, when iran faced very little economic inhibition to the continued pursuit not only of nuclear weapons but terrorism. >> and what about the deadlines and lifting them and going beyond the original time frame to get the deal done to what advantage. >> setting a deadline can help everybody engage in a little self discipline. you set the

uranium enrichment will be scaled down significantly. ed beyond 3.67%. this is a level appropriate for civilian nuclear power and research well be the nat possibly for a weapon. the next 10 years, iran has agreed to only use the first-generation centrifuges to enrich uranium. iran has further agreed to disconnect all of it offends centrifuges and most remain installed will be part of a constrained and closely monitored r&d programs and then used to produce enriched uranium. iran has agreed to stop enriching uranium for the next 15 years. it will not even use or store fissile material on site during that time. instead, will be transformed into a nuclear physics and technology research center. it will be used, for example, to produce isotopes for cancer treatment and will be subject to daily inspection and will have other nations working said with every iranians in effect there. when the deal is implemented, the two uranium paths iran has towards fissile material for weapons will be closed off. same is true for the plutonium path. we've agr

you'll not only be giving iran a free pass to double the pace of its uranium enrichment to install new and more efficient centrifuges, but they will do it all without the transparency measures that we have secured. everything that we have tried to prevent will now happen. now what is worse? if we walk away we walk away alone. our partners are not going to be with us. they'll walk away to the sanctions that brought iran to the table in the first place, and we will have squandered the best chance he had. president obama has made it clear that he will never accept a nuclear-armed iran and he is the only president who has asked for and commissioned the design of a weapon that has the ability to take out the facilities and who has actually deployed that weapon, but iran has already mastered the fuel cycle. they have mastered the ability to produce significant stockpiles of fissile material and you can't bomb away that knowledge any more than you can sanction it away. i was chair of the committee when we -- a lot of us joined together and put most of the iran sanctions in place, and i know w

iran has 10,000 kilogram of enriched uranium. that 10,000 can be turned to 300, 98% of it's going to be gone. iran has been spending time obuild a react orin arak, the city of arak. two-thirds of the enriched uranium is going to be stored somewhere. iran is getting a lot of restrictions on its nuclear program. the price of that is lifting of sanctions. >> the example is that the u.s. treasury uses when talking about effective ways to deal with governments that they don't li like. they have been very effective. tell us about this. the banking sanctions mean, if it's medicines or spare parts or automobiles, money to purchase these things to sell in iran cannot be transferred to other businesses. >> you know one of the sanctions that we got two years ago almost, was we could not use the swiss system. >> the international banking transfer system. >> transfer system. so no matter what we wanted to buy we couldn't. because we couldn't transfer the money. and in reality, the iranian banks were cut off from the international banking syste

which is to manufacture and to enrich uranium for power stations 3.4% enrichment and to be able to enrich to 20% which is for this which the americans turned down and blocked in 2010 upon agreement of iran and brazil to be provided with this. so achieving the nuclear processes. and some concerns they are going to close 10,000 center fuges and that doesn't mean anything because they forfeited the right to manufacture fuel for power stations and russia will have to do it for iran and therefore if they close the center fuge that doesn't mean much and doesn't need them any more and then after 5 1/2 years of negotiations iran has been enriching enriching uranium and we are going to send it to others and therefore it's a good bargaining chip and they have now their fuel for the research reactor and 20% rich and for the power reactors 3 1/2 percent so to me i understand it. it is a great step forward for iran and the world and iran persistently and major negotiator managed to get this agreement and after following the program for 40 years since i was in rack in 1974 and now i am convinced and th

we know it will not have conducted advanced r&d that will allow them to enrich uranium. we know that for 15 years, they will shift 98% of their stockpile of enriched uranium out of the country and they will limit their enrichment to one facility. and again, we know their different pathways to weapons will be cut off. we know that's in place and we know that verification measures are in place to see if they are violating that deal. what we don't know is how iraq will evolve in these 15 years. if it will stick and be worth doing, if iran can sustain that in 15 years, we also know that a deal makes it more likely that iran will have an incentive to evolve in a different direction. we are not counting on that, charlie. that's what the deal is all about. charlie: let me just understand that. critics suggest that after 10-15 years, the iranians will have a chance to go build a nuclear weapon, that they want to do which they've given up the right to do in the initial agreement. ben: charlie, absolutely not. in addition to the limitation and the stockpile limitations for 15 years

because of this deal iran will not produce the highly enriched uranium and plutonium that form the rawaterials necessary for a nuclear bomb. because of this deal, iran will remove two-thirds of its installed centrifuges. the machines necessary to produce highly enriched uranium for a bomb and store them under constant international supervision. iran will not use its advanced centrifuges to produce enriched uranium no for the next decade and iran will get hid of 98% of its stockpile of enriched uranium. to put that in perspective, iran has a stockpile currently that could produce up to ten nuclear weapons. because of this deal that stockpile will be roofededuced to a fraction what is to produce a single weapon. this stockpile will last 15 years. because of this deal iran will modify the core of its reactor in iraq so that will not produce weapons grade plutonium and it has agreed to shift the spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the lifetime of the reactor. for at least the next 15 years iran will not build any new heavy water reactors. because of this deal we will for the

none will be used to produce enriched uranium. op enriching uranium at the facility for next 15 years. it will not even use or store material on the site during that time. instead fordo will be transformed into a nuclear physics and research center. it will be used for cancer treatment and subject to daily inspection. it will have other nations working in unison with the iranians within that technology center. so when this deal is implemented, the two uranium paths iran has towards fisle material will be closed off. we agree iran's heavy water reactor at our rock will be rebuilt based on final design the united states and international partners will approve so that it will only be used for peaceful purposes. iran will not build a new heavy water reactor or reprocess fuel from existing reactors at least 15 years. this agreement is not only about what happens to iran's declared facilities. the deal we have reached also gives us the greatest assurance that we have had that iran will not pursue a weapon covertly. not only will inspecto

it will only enrich uranium to a level of three-point 67% well below the 90% level of enrichment considered necessary for a nuclear weapon. at its stockpile of low-enriched uranium would be limited to 300 kilos down from over seven times at present with the balance being afforded to russia. it's research and develop an activity will be constrained so that would not be able to enrich with advanced centrifuges for at least 10 years. additionally, no uranium enrichment enrichment r&d or nuclear material will be permitted at iran's underground for to nuclear sector could agree but also cuts off the plutonium route to developing a nuclear bomb -- fordow. the heavy water research -- research reactor at arak with the recent -- mr. speaker, given the historic levels of mistrust that have built up between iran and the international community, a strong inspections regime and a framework for addressing concerns about past military dimensions to iran's nuclear program are vital to building trust and providing us with the confidence that the rent is meeting its commitments. some of the gross margin and

folks, when we began our negotiations we faced an iran that was already enriching uranium up to 20%. they already had a facility built in secret under ground in a mountain that was rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium. when we began negotiations they had enough enriched uranium for 10 to 12 bombs. already. already they had installed as many as 19,000 nuclear centrifuges and they had nearly finished building the heavy water reactor that could produce weapon's grade plutonium at a rate of one to two bombs per year. experts put iran's braektdeakout time when we began which remember is not the old time with arms control. breakout time as we have applied it is extraordinary conservative. it is the time it takes to have enough fissile material for one bomb. but for one potential bomb. it is not the amount of time to the bomb. so when we say they will have one year to a certain amount of fissile material, they still have to go design the bomb, test do a whole bunch of other things. and i think you would agree no nation is going to consider itself nuclear capable with one bomb. so if this dea

rob will not use its advanced centrifuges to produce enriched uranium for the next decade. iran will get rid of 98% of its stockpile of enriched uranium. to put that in perspective iran currently has a stockpile that could produce up to ten nuclear weapons. because of this deal that stockpile will be reduced to a fraction of what would be required for a single weapon. this stockpile limitation will last for 15 years. because of this deal iran will modify the core of its reactor in iraq so that it will not produce weapons guede plutonium and it has agreed to ship the spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the lifetime of the reactor for at least the next 15 years, iran will not build any new heavy water reactors. because of this deal we will for the first time be in a position to verify all of these commitments. that means this deal is not built on trust. it is built on verification. inspectors will have 24/7 access to iran's key nuclear facilities. iran will have access to iran's entire nuclear supply chain. its uranium mines and mills, its conversion facility an

uranian enrichment will be scaled down significantly. for the next 15 years, no uraniumiched beyond 3.67%. to put that in context, this is a level that is appropriate for civilian nuclear power and research but well below anything that could be used possibly for a weapon. for the next 10 years, iran has agreed to only use its first generation centrifuges in order to enrich uranium. iran has further agreed to disconnect nearly all of its advanced centrifuges and those that remain installed will be part of a constrained and closely monitored are in the program, and none -- r&d program, and none will be used to produce enriched uranium. iran has also agreed to stop producing uranium at its -- facility. it will not use or store fissile mrs. material on that site. in set, it will be turned into a physics and technology research center. it will be used, for example, to produce isotopes for cancer treatment, and it will be subject to daily inspection. and it will have other nations working in unison with the iranians within that technology center. so when this deal is implement

folks, when we began our negotiations we faced an iran that was already enriching uranium up to 20%. they already had a facility built in secret under ground in a mountain that was rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium. when we began negotiations they had enough enriched uranium for 10 to 12 bombs. already. already they had installed as many as 19,000 nuclear centrifuges and they had nearly finished building the heavy water reactor that could produce weapon's grade plutonium at a rate of one to two bombs per year. experts put iran's braektdeakout time when we began which remember is not the old time with arms control. breakout time as we have applied it is extraordinary conservative. it is the time it takes to have enough fissile material for one bomb. but for one potential bomb. it is not the amount of time to the bomb. so when we say they will have one year to a certain amount of fissile material, they still have to go design the bomb, test do a whole bunch of other things. and i think you would agree no nation is going to consider itself nuclear capable with one bomb. so if this dea

voluntarily, they will destroy 98% of the stockpile of the enriched uranium and dismantle two-thirds of the installed centrifuges and take out the existing heavy reactor and fill it with concrete. iran has agreed to refrain from producing our requiring highly enriched uranium and plutonium for at least 15 years and if they began to do that ernie moniz will tell you, we will know it, immediately. iran has also agreed to accept the addition at protocol and that is an outgrowth of the failure of the north korea experience which put in additional access requirements proseissly so we do know what iran is doing and they have to ratify it before the u.n. sanctions are lifted at the end of this process, they have to have -- they have to have passed it. they have agreed to live by it from day one. they are going to live by the additional protocol. in addition, there are additional transparency measures we can go into in the course of this hearing. now, if iran fails to comply we will know it, and we will know it quickly and we will be able to respond accordingly by reintroducing safrpgss and n

it can test these machines with uranium but it cannot use these machines to accumulate enriched uranium. so again, we are not going to see a proliferation of advanced centrifuge machines that iran can quickly use to breakout. after eight and a half years iran will be able to cast 30 ir six machines and 30 ir eight machines. at that point they can begin producing 200 of each of these models per year, but they will not reproducing their machines. around your times when iran begins to transitioned its machines, it is important to note that capacity also will remain relatively stable for the next three years. so smith capacity as a the measure of the patient to the centrifuge machine. so that made a capacity of iran's 560 centrifuges will remain constant as the machines are introduced. so if an ir six machine has 10 times the capacity of an ir one machine. they have to remove 10 ir ones. so this insured that we won't be around up in iran's nuclear capacity immediately after their tenure restrictions on just using ir wants to enrich uranium expire. it is also important to know that we start

iran will not use its advanced centrifuges to produce enriched uranium for the next decade. iran will get rid of 98% of the stock pile of enriched europe. to -- uranium. iran currently has a stock pile that could produce up to ten nuclear weapons. that will be reduced to a fraction of what would be required for a single weapon. this limitation will last 15 a years. because of the deal the iran will modify the core of the reactor in iraq so it will not produce weapons-grade plutonium. it has agreed to ship spent fuel from are the reactor out of the country for the lifetime of the reactor for at least the next 15 years iran will not build any new heavy water reactors. because of this deal we will, for the first time be in a position to verify all of these commitments. that means this deal is not built on trust. it is built on verification. inspectors will have 24/7 access to iran's key nuclear facilities. iran will have access to iran's entire nuclear supply chain, uranium mines, mills, conversion facility and centrifuge manufacturing and storage facilities. this ensures that i

remember that two years ago when our negotiations began, we faced an iran that was enriching uranium up to 20% at a facility that was secret and buried underground. and they were rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium and had installed nearly 2,000 nuclear centrifuges. they were building a heavy water reactor that could produce weapons grade plutonium at a rate of enough to produce one or two bombs per year and experts assess that the breakout time then as a result the interval required to rush to be able to produce enough material for one nuclear weapon was about two to three months. if this deal is rejected, we return immediately to this reality. accept that the diplomatic support we have built with these countries that we have accumulated would disappear overnight. let me underscore the alternative to the deal that we have reached is not what i've seen some ads on tv suggesting disen disingenuously. some sort of unicorn arrangement involving iran's complete capitulation. that is a fantasy plain and simple. at our own intelligence community will tell you that. every single department

and recognizes the right of iran to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes including uranium enrichment activities and the recent obligations of the states parties as under any international regime can only go hand in hand. obligations with honor and these regimes including the takenned only if rights could be achievable. not threats of sanction or war could help sustain in the long run if it fails to honor all of it's, including the right of nuclear energy. looking up to the future. the resolution 2231 with all the new chapter with iran in the council and the participants. iran is also iran is in position to comply fully with its commitment because it is already committed to its supreme leader who has declared all weapons of mass destruction particularly nuclear weapons the. it is encouraging all member states to cooperate with iran in the framework and the field of peaceful nuclear energy and related projects as well as it's emphasis that it is conducive to promoting and facilitateing the normal economy and strayed contacts and corporation with iran are all positive signs and all enco

remember that two years ago when our negotiation began, we faced an iran that was enriching uranium up to 20% at a facility that was secret and buried underground, and they were rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium, they were building a heavy reactor, that could produce one to two bombs a year, and experts assessed that the breakout time as a result, the integral required to produce one nuclear weapon was about two to three months. if this deal is rejected, we return immediately to this reality. accept that the diplomatic threat of i.s.i.l. in our region is removed. on the other hand while cross border operation continued, there has been and antiterror operation involving 16 provinces of turkey against i.s.i.l. dhkpc and other connected terrorist organizations. this operation or those operations were based on accurate reliable intelligence and a pinpoint target operations. we have given the go ahead early this morning and the operations still continue as we speak. and 19 people have been taken into custody in relation to the killing of police officer and 35 in another province have bee

uranium stockpile iran has by 98%. they have 10,000 kilograms will reduce it to less than 300 and cap it. i've heard nobody else a plan to get iran to give up 98% of their enrichedum stockpile. that's a positive. i have questions. some sanctions are lifted, some remain in place. how those interplay is a complicated question and that's one of the reasons we need to take the 60 days to ask the questions. but there are positives about centrifuges and uranium and questions i want to dig into to. >> woodruff: senator isakson, we heard senator kaine talk about centrifuges are cut back in number, the amount of enriched uranium iran would be able to hold on to is drastically reduced. why is that not reassuring to you? >> it's reassuring that it slows down the process they've made but also gives them incremental stems between year 1 and 15 to be back where they were before. the best day of the treaty for the united states of america appears to be the first day and the best day for the iranians appear to be after that because sanctions and requirements are lifted. i will have to read the details but a nuclear armed iran sun acceptable to me, a gnarl proliferation race in

but in 2006, iran said it would start enriching uranium and it's program sped up significantly.ates three uranium enrichment facilities at two sites housing nearly 20,000 sen at this final buzz iran has always maintained its nuclear development is for peaceful purposes. >> joining me now from teheran say political science professor at teheran university. and he joins me now to talk more about this. thank you for being with us. first of all what does this deal mean for the people of iran, do you believe? it means a great deal. let's begin with the immediate psychological effect on millions of iranian people. millions of iranian people have been wait, waiting and waiting to hear words from vienna during the past two weeks and it's a psychological, more than anything else, it would be a psychological effect on millions of iranian. they would feel relieved of waiting and expectation anxiously to see whether or not the country's negotiating team have struck a deal with five plus one. >> and, i mean, we heard there from the -- the israeli prime minister netanyahu giving is his what's

folks, when we began our negotiations we faced an iran that was already enriching uranium up to 20%. they already had a facility built in secret under ground in a mountain that was rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium. when we began negotiations they had enough enriched uranium for 10 to 12 bombs. already. already they had installed as many as 19,000 nuclear centrifuges and they had nearly finished building the heavy water reactor that could produce weapon's grade plutonium at a rate of one to two bombs per year. experts put iran's breakout time when we began which remember is not the old time with arms control. breakout time as we have applied it is extraordinary conservative. it is the time it takes to have enough fissile material for one bomb.ec6cp but for one potential bomb. it is not the amount of time to the bomb. so when we say they will have one year to a certain amount of fissile material, they still have to go design the bomb, test, do a whole bunch of other things. and i think you would agree no nation is going to consider itself nuclear capable with one bomb. so if this de

they can test uranium that cannot accumulate enriched uranium. we are not going to see a proliferation of advanced centrifuge machine that iran can use. after 8.5 years, iran will be able to test 30 ir6 and ir8 machines and can produce 200 of each model per year. they will not be producing rotors for these machines. iran, year 10, when they transition the machines, it's capacity will remain relatively stable for the next three years. i am getting to the capacity. that is the measure of efficiency of a centrifuge machine. the capacity of iran's 5060 ir1 centrifuges will remain constant as new machines are introduced. if an ir6 has 10 times the capacity of an ir's1, if they introduce an ir6, they have to remove 10 ir1's. this ensures we will not see a ramp up in activity. it is important to note we should not view any of the elements in isolation. in addition to the restrictions on the number of machines being produced, iran's procurement of materials that can be used for centrifuge development will be monitored by the joint commission set up throu

they say iran has met a benchmark of reducing enriched uranium. critics say they've been secretive and duplicitous. they're researching nuclear explosions that has been off limits to the nuclear inspectors. it hid secret enrichment work and hid it very deep into a mountain and a full extent of its nuclear covert program was not known to the world until first exposed by the national council of resistance of iran back in 2002. foreign policy magazine ominously puts it quote, world powers have long feared iran has moved closer to obtaining the means and resources to build a nuclear bomb even as the islamic republic insists its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes. that is an innocuous stance iran's leaders have always maintained. >> do you want to pursue a nuclear bomb? >> translator: is there a law that tells me i must swear to convince others? i have said on numerous occasions that we do not anatomic bomb. >> why should we believe you? you are violating four u.n. resolutions, you've kicked out u.n. inspectors. why should the world believe a

the -- in terms of the current capacity well they have demonstrated the capacity to -- to enrich uranium, that's clear. but i do want to emphasize that they have also demonstrated that they have enriched to 20% enrichment. 20% is the cutoff that the iaea uses for low enriched and high-enriched uranium, but the point is the amount of work needed to get to 20% is nearly all the work you need to get to 90%, which would be weapons grade. so they have the capability as i already mentioned, they already have full cascades running of the next gin ration fy times more powerful disagreement will have those dismantled at the time of implementation. so what is critical is we are rolling them back in every dimension of their program for at least a considerable period. now in terms of the breakout time again, the president was very clear and our p5-plus-1 partners were very clear that a quantitative criterion for the negotiation was there had to be at least a one-year breakout time in terms of fissile material for at least ten years. we have accomplished that with this agreement. our lab scientists a