my son also served in usaid.this does not make me an expert in the military or in the state department. i want to say that. i try to have many discussions with my son about this. he runs a wine bar incidentally. you can see he has changed his direction. here is what i want to say -- when i read this memo from our chair lady, thank you for the memo, one thing that jumps out to me is that sigir says that dod manages an amount of the reconstruction fund. that should be a red alert that duty should not be managing reconstruction. i am very proud of the military. you mentioned how they are professional and trained. but i question whether or not their training is in redevelopment. my son trade to be an artillery officer, which he was. it is a different job and training to do redevelopment. theink that is one of mistakes he made. having the defense department manage reconstruction. number two, you talked about usaid and maybe what i would respectively suggest is that maybe of that bureaucracy, usoco, i think one of the

, but they should do so in close cooperation with the usaid. so that it is not the permanent responsibility of dod to do that. the reason dod started doing this stuff is they were the only ones there, the only ones with the money and the only ones in a position to do it and sort of figured out as they went. the military secures an area and it's not a seamless transition to say it's all good, now late slide in development guys. you need a transition area and improves the cooperation between the two. now, it's really tough because dod guys have got to have greater respect for the development and the other people, which is you know, in iraq and afghanistan didn't always happen. it was like, hey, we're doing this, get out of here. i think that has changed a lot in the last decade. your average dod person has developed a greater respect for what development and diplomacy people doom that's the key element. i wouldn't say that that's something that dod should stop doing. it's too integral to a long-term mission. >> you said that wassure first questio

where is that in the pentagon or at the stage or usaid? >> i will take a shot at the dot perspective. i'd like to think anyone in that particular chain of command has the ability to say stop. don't do that. i can tell you from the contract king perspective that i am responsible or zero when i held my job, a when we find contracts that are clearly inappropriate we do say stop. i do believe the undersecretary of defense has said stop on a variety of locations. it is a leadership issue. we certainly make mistakes. >> i am not critical of mistakes. it is much like fraud. we have the recent newspaper articles where we sentenced the individual 20 years. at the end of the day we attempt to have separation of power the person who sees the contract and pays it are separate so midweek end up collapsing those increases the risk. when people do not follow the ethical compass bad things will happen. i think the ig has helped us when they do do think we take action. but from my standpoint it is questionable for when they find those things if they have t

i think the vast majority of the development community sees the need for change. >> usaid did not respond to our request for an interview. the agency pushed through a new rule a year ago allowing untied aid, but for food aid, the new rule doesn't apply, and other organizations are crying foul. >> there are people in the u.s. to like the system the way it is now, that benefit from the system the way it is now. and our constituents and political supporters like the way it is now. that is largely the u.s. agriculture industry and the u.s. shipping industry. we are at a point now where the inefficiencies in that are no longer tenable. >> american humanitarian policy is shifting toward the european model, but congress is still not convinced. report in 2006 estimated that tied aid adds 30% to cost. a plan that supports the european position. brussels opted for untied aid, meaning european humanitarian products don't benefit its farmers. >> the annual budget has been gradually creeping up in recent years. it has gone in the past two years from just under zero billion biros per year -- under of b

special operations command is there, but so is usaid. and our troops there do not, have not fired a shot or been involved in conflict. what they've done is they've trained the local security forces in how to provide adequate security, and they've worked with usaid and other development agencies to build schools and drill wells and create the atmosphere where people don't want to be part of an insurgency. i think one of the greatest misunderstandings or misstatements that i've heard in a long time is it's become somewhat popular to say that poverty has nothing to do with instability and terrorism. and people make that argument because they look at people like ohs ma bin laden -- osama bin laden and say these people are way above middle class, it's the intellectuals that start terrorist movements, and i think a's unquestionably true. we have a seemingly endless supply of people who are convinced they have developed the one true philosophy that will save us all, and they feel it is their obligation to jam it down our throats. those will alw

with the same law kennedy founded usaid the u.s. organization responsible for international development which would administer civilian foreign aid. is. the u.s. government for spreading many foreign policy through human dignity and. systems. during the cold war large quantities of food were sent to countries of strategic importance to the united states like india indonesia and pakistan. likewise large cargoes were sent to eastern asia during the korean and vietnam wars. during the seventy's a large bulk of food aid went to the middle east. during the ninety's after the fall of the berlin wall so today it was directed to countries the former eastern bloc the same pattern was repeated in afghanistan and iraq during the war on terror . if you have took aboard diplomacy it's a very subtle way of pushing a national agenda. to another country you know because if you if you've seen even more so because the training elephants to their training even cheap and since they use food is that if you don't train much upon such a dance like a human

my son also served in usaid.this does not make me an expert in the military or in the state department. i want to say that. i try to have many discussions with my son about this. he runs a wine bar incidentally. you can see he has changed his direction. here is what i want to say -- when i read this memo from our chair lady, thank you for the memo, one thing that jumps out to me is that sigir says that dod manages an amount of the reconstruction fund. that should be a red alert that duty should not be managing reconstruction. i am very proud of the military. you mentioned how they are professional and trained. but i question whether or not their training is in redevelopment. my son trade to be an artillery officer, which he was. it is a different job and training to do redevelopment. i think that is one of the mistakes he made. having the defense department manage reconstruction. number two, you talked about usaid and maybe what i would respectively suggest is that maybe of that bureaucracy, usoco, i think one of

to respectfully stir just, and i would like to hear your comments, maybe usaid is not funded, maybe usaiddoes not have the authority it needs, was in chargesaid of reconstruction, maybe we would have a different outcome. with that said, i am not sure fully fundedsaid or professionalized to the degree we would like it to be that our reconstruction efforts were worthwhile either in iraqi or afghanistan, but we could save that for another day. >> thank you. valid question, whether a new bureaucracy is required. my opinion is usaid existed 40 years ago, it was engaged in vietnam. have been able to do reconstruction in iraq or afghanistan better than ourselves. conceivably you could re-create substantial resources. you would have to hire more professionals. you would have to institute a drastic cultural change. the assistant community in the united states and the world believes in assistance for sake as opposed to drug support of national interests. most of them believe that. that is not the type of culture that we are dealing with directly. saidense is given how u functions today you would pr

with the same law kennedy founded usaid the u.s. organization responsible for international development which would administer civilian foreign aid. is. the u.s. government forced spread of many foreign policy through human dignity and. systems. during the cold war large quantities of food were sent to countries of strategic importance to the united states like india indonesia and pakistan. likewise large cargoes were sent to eastern asia during the korean and vietnam wars. during the seventy's a large bulk of food aid went to the middle east. during the ninety's after the fall of the berlin wall food aid was directed to countries the former eastern bloc the same pattern was repeated in afghanistan and iraq during the war on terror. if you have took aboard diplomacy it's of a subtle way of pushing a message on agenda. to another country you know because if you if you've seen even more so because the training elephants for their training even cheap and since they use food is that if you want to train the cheap ones who can dance like

according to the law usaid is allowed to procure up to seventy five percent american products and transport them only on american ships. and that means that the shippers have a lot of interest in food aid policy and have been an incredibly effective lobby to fight for the status quo of sourcing in and shipping from the united states the u.s. government is the only government in the world that hasn't made substantial movements in the direction of enabling local procurement of food aid in developing countries in order to respond faster and more cheaply to food emergencies as they arise. so even today the food must first be balt then loaded on a ship in american harbor and then travel for several months in order to reach africa. that would be approximately four to six months from when it has been termed that we want to participate in in a particular road appeal and so when the food arrives. the g.a.o. where mr alito works issued a report which presented the problem to congress president bush tried to change the system so that a portion of the food would be procured from local markets and arriv

you will hear and overview from a representative of usaid.two hours.rly >> a good afternoon, everyone. our turnout was than we expected. our apologies to folks in the back you may not have a seat but we hope you will hang out with us. i direct the africa program here at the center for strategic and international studies. i want to welcome you all to csis and it's nice to have all of you here to talk about the outcomes of president obama' to africa and the power africa initiative. this is part of a series of speaker event in part of a larger initiative here under the leadership of our leadership and development program which -- which looks at the role of the private sector and development, how u.s. development can harness the energy of the private sector and maximize development impacts. we are very grateful to the chevron corporation for their support. i would also like to thank christia perkins who has done a great job and has worked very hard to bring this big event together today. as most of you know, president obama traveled to africa fro

according to the law usaid is allowed to procure up to seventy five percent american products and transport them only on american ships. and that means that the shippers have a lot of interest in food aid policy and have been an incredibly effective lobby to fight for the status quo of sourcing in and shipping from the united states the u.s. government is the only government in the world that hasn't made substantial movements in the direction of enabling local procurement of food aid in developing countries in order to respond faster and more cheaply to food emergencies as they arise. so even today the food must first be balt then loaded on a ship in american harbor and then travel for several months in order to reach africa. that would be approximately four to six months from when it has been termed that we want to participate in in a particular appeal and so when the food arrives. the g.a.o. where mr alito works issued a report which presented the problem to congress. president bush tried to change the system so that a portion of the food would be procured from local markets and arrive. a

according to the law usaid is allowed to procure up to seventy five percent american products and transportthem only on american ships. and that means that the shippers have a lot of interest in food aid policy and have been an incredibly effective lobby to fight for the status quo of sourcing in and shipping from the united states the u.s. government is the only government in the world that hasn't made substantial movements in the direction of enabling local procurement of food aid in developing countries in order to respond faster and more cheaply to food emergencies as they arise. so even today the food must first be balt then loaded on a ship in american harbor and then travel for several months in order to reach africa.

profits are coming in from opec and usaid. it is quite an interesting model in the environment that we are operating in. it feeds into some of the bipartisan support you will probably see on this. i do not see any risk right now. it is something to watch going forward in subsequent stages. thehe china competition, one saying that chris hit on adequately and the one thing i would say is that i didn't necessarily mean the u.s. government is late to the continent, just late to this particular issue. on so many other issues on the continent, but behind the curve on the power sector. pun intended. in terms of unintended consequences, one of the challenges our risks -- there are so many risks on these projects that from the one campaign's perspective we are quite worried about. i will mention one or two. now that this issue has gained so much prominence in this country in the development context, it has been in the space in germany, france, japan and other places, but not so much in america. there are some successes and this continu

career with of my usaid. if we had more like you in congress, we could go a long way to fixing things. i think there are a few key issues in the development, the big picture development. number one, you just alluded to it. public understanding of how much we spend on foreign assistance and what we do with the money, these famous surveys where we ask people how much they spend on it, and they think it is 10%. it turns out it is 7/10 of 1%. so there is a problem of getting that message out. the second issue is the politics, which you talked about, in terms of food aid programs. i wonder if you see any way of getting around as issues? you did not talk about -- alluded to the question of accountability for our assistance programs. years,ed it, over 25 where accountability became head end, rather than a way to check on what we were doing, and another resources that usaid puts into measuring things, the kinds of silly things that we come up with to measure it so that we can show results, have gotten a bit out of pr

accountability it became the end rather than to check on what we we're doing and those resources that usaid puts into measuring things like those silly things is a bit out of proportion. a and i ended stand we need to show impact and start from the bottom up such even that needs institution in building and human development in human-resources development. those are very, very hard to measure a and can take decades that will sustain the work we have been doing on the ground so had you think congress can deal with that? >> i completely agree. a very enthusiastic supporter but there is one downside but it's to assume that everything can be measured public sector always say why can't they do with like the private sector? we measure efficiency but the private sector could not possibly be simple what is the mission and? tried to make money. period you have five departments three make money into of them are not it is simple to measure. it is not the government's job to make money if it was we would charge you a hell of a lot more to drive on our roads. we would charge you more when your house caug

we have not had that sense usaid was taken apart after the vietnam war. this is the first step to reestablishing civilian capacity. the initial cost is insignificant, $25 million. you can put together a staff of 125 professionals for contingency operations. it will provide professionals ready to respond to emergencies abroad. sidewould put our civilian in the same situation as our military which was able to ramp up in an emergency and has retained the know how to conduct operations. we have created the world's greatest military. without a professional civilian counterpart, the military will not conduct stabilization operations effectively. this will help us to avoid failure tomorrow. i apologize for going over my time. >> thank you for excellent testimony. we will begin the questioning. i will recognize myself for five minutes. we have spent nearly $100 billion in afghanistan already. however, we continue to make some of the same mistakes we have done in iraq. one of the lessons learned that you pointed out is we should begin rebuilding only after establi

report i commissioned illustrated the lack of corded nation and inadequate use of funds between the usaid and the state department. in syria, we must prepare for the possibility that similar efforts may be needed in a post- era. in order to ensure that we maintain the know how to properly plan, execute, and oversee any future similar operations, we must learn from the lessons of iraq. we must centralize unity of command, advocate for better interagency coordination, and use our funds wiser, more efficiently, and more effectively. i will turn to my ranking member for his opening statement. thank you for calling today's important hearing. it has been over 10 years since the united states went into iraq under false pretenses. 4500 soldiers were killed. i think there is an unfortunate perception with so much upheaval , iraq is no longer a priority. trillion, we$2 will feel the lasting effects of this war for many years. the u.s. has spent $60 billion on reconstruction efforts. this to ensure lasting security, not just for the iraqi people, but for stability in the region and to create a relia

the participating agencies are pem, axim, department of treasury, usaid. usda.rtment of transportation. uzz african development foundation and if there is anyone i left off let me know. it's a big number. the country we're focusing in now or kenya, answer the knee i nigeria na, liberia, and either open i can't. now the amount of buzz that . wer africa has generated >> ghana, tanzania. either open i can't. nigeria, can't -- liberia and kenya. there are six of them. >> i was proud of myself for remembering them all. what we've seen already is we're seeing multiple not just other embassies and other u.s. aid missions who want to be part of power africa but other countries that want to be part of it. what does it mean to be part of power africa? it's meant to compment a lot of activities that are already doing great things from the u.s. government and other agencies. you have the department of ate had is managing the u.n. initiative in ghana. the millennium coorgs is in the ghana sector. have you the partnership for growth in ghana and answer the knee i can't. you h

a very modest portions coming from usaid, the african build a foundation a couple of others, which is actually quite an interesting model in the austere and burma. that feeds into some of the bipartisan support the policy on this. so i don't see any risk right now, but it's something to what's going forward in subsequent stages. on the chinese competition, the one thing that i just think chris said on adequately, the one thing would say is i did not necessarily think that the u.s. government comes to this particular issue. so many other issues. behind the power curve on the sector. unintended. in terms of the unintended consequences, one of the things that -- challenges are risks, there's so many risks on some of these projects from 01 campaign perspective where word about. of this mission wondered to. first is now that this issue has gained so much prominence in this country, the development context, it has been in the space of germany and france and japan and other places, but not so much in america. there are some successes and that this continues to go forward and to be incorporat

profits are coming in from opecic -- opic and usaid. it is quite an interesting model in the environment that we are operating in. it feeds into some of the bipartisan support you will probably see on this. i do not see any risk right now. it is something to watch going forward in subsequent stages. on the china competition, the one saying that chris hit on adequately and the one thing i would say is that i didn't necessarily mean the u.s. government is late to the continent, just late to this particular issue. ben is a leader on so many other issues on the continent, but behind the curve on the power sector. pun intended. in terms of unintended consequences, one of the challenges our risks -- there are so many risks on these projects that from the one campaign's perspective we are quite worried about. i will mention one or two. now that this issue has gained so much prominence in this country in the development context, it has been in the space in germany, france, japan and other places, but not so much in america. there are some succe

the bill makes it clear to vietnam that the only factor limiting usaid is positive action by the vietnamese government on political and human rights. the vietnamese government has an important choice, will it protect human rights and provide religious freedom to its citizens or shirk those responsibilities and foresake the closer relationship it wants with the united states. i would like to see a closer relationship with vietnam but we have principles and the vietnamese have to respect those principles. we respect them, they need to respect us. i urge my colleagues to support this legislation. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from new york reserves. the gentleman from california is recognized. mr. royce: i yield such time as he may consume to mr. smith, chairman of the foreign affairs committee on africa, global rights an international organizations and the author of this ill be. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from new jersey is recognized. mr. smith: thank you, mr. chairman, thank you madam chair as well. i want to thank you for your kind remarks but also for moving this legi

usaid, the lead agency of this effort, certainly doesn't need to be taking on new projects when it can't get croil of its -- control of its current projects. and really of far more importance and what is so deeply troubling, mr. chairman, is what is stated at the close of that same par gratch. -- paragraph. quote here, in some instances these projects may result in adverse counteru.s. is -- counterinsurgency efforts. let that sink in. the inspector general is making it clear to us that the american axpayers' dollars may be funding infrastructure projects that actually work against our counterinsurgency efforts. it goes on to state both reasons why that might occur. first, these projects create an expectations gap among the affected population. and second, they lack citizen support. look, even the afghanistans don't want some of these projects. the harsh reality is this, mr. chairman, while we're furloughing hardworking americans who work alongside and support our men and women in uniform, we have poured not millions but literally billions, $89.4 billion, in reconstruction efforts really

included the state department ig, department of defense, sigar, sigir and i was intricately involved in usaid as well. fbi, was very involved in working this case. case. i supervise, also is deputy chief of the front section at the time in many of those cases were provided to folks in my section. so i supervi a lot of the prosecution involved in iraq and afghanistan, and they involved corruption, bribery, all sorts of contract fraud. so i'm very familiar with that. >> good, that's because and i didn't do kabul in that realm. >> in late march the state department's oig notified the department is going to start a special review of the accountability review board process in order to determine, i think the effectiveness of the whole process, but also specifically mentioned recommendations regarding are convening in the aftermath of benghazi. i would love to talk about how that worked as progressing or you are not there yet, what would be your hope in terms of continuing that work and looking at the accountability and how they can be made most helpful to the department, also to congress and the pu