the most important industry in the whole deal was the pharmaceutical industry, which is why the ustr, the u.s. trade representative insisted on putting the provisions zahara heckscher was talking about, why the agency was willing to hold up the entire deal to try to extract more concessions for big pharma. as your viewers and listeners know, this is a deal negotiated in secret over a period of five years -- seeger from the american public, secret from the public in the countries that were negotiating, but not secret the giant corporations who it aims to benefit. the ustr as a system of advisory committee soma desk committee, so it runs ideas from almost all eff affected industries. they absolutely new in the waning days of the negotiation were u.s. -- ustr nature they were in constant conversation about what was going on, but now with people like zahara or environmental organizations or consumer groups. as a result, we have a deal that comes out that prioritizes the needs and and is a multinational corporations, gives them special rights, gives them special powers, and entrenches a fa

but begin this political rationale for the ustr failing, we make a couple of suggestions in our paper which is online. we were told that procurement is next up, february 2016 supposedly they'll start discussion. so what we would see as one possible solution is that some states should band together where they have a common interest versus europe and put forward that common interest through the ustr in exchange for opening their procurement. in other words, the states participate in the negotiation. that probably would be a horrible thought to the ustr, but that would be one way to make some forward progress. another way, which is more top-down and is eminently feasible because we do it all the time, is that when the federal government provides a substantial amount of funds for state or municipal projects, that there ought to be a tracing mechanism, and that procurement should then be open to european competition and the ttip as part of the bargain. and a final suggestion i've offered for a couple of years now -- it hasn't gotten much traction, possibly never will -- but that europeans

to be part of a deal through agreements that develop value chains, and this is something which the ustr has said many times. ofagree to a certain kind situations which otherwise would not be as attractive. think both of the u.s. and the eu would like others to follow the system now the system is they would like to emphasize in order to create a fair and level in terms ofd standards on environment and labor. the so-called competitive neutrality conditions. if that is the case, they have andalance those issues greater acceptance by those who are also objective of the entire system. berefore i expect there to some kind of mechanism for this to be extended to include others. that was actually and advice to q-tip -- ttip negotiators. i think that is very good advice. on the other hand, as far as multilateralization -- when we think of multilateralization we have to think of the poor and then the rest, and then i think the systems -- which are agreed -- you could see what ever it is as ais agreed in ttip recommendation package. there are many ways it could be done provided the free rider prob

shanghai but the software of trade the standard setting, the regulation setting and the hard work for the ustr is doing, that's something that china is not good at and these trading partners recognized united states really is the premier partner are we doing a little fear-mongering than the obama administration says if you don't pass the tpp china's going to take the lead? >> first of all it seems to me that tpp is important because it's in the u.s. interest to have influence on relative -- relevance in asia. the fastest growing region in the world and the wealthiest region in the world. we have strong alliances. where bound militarily to asia so the last thing we would want to see happen is a reduction in u.s. imports, a reduction in the agenda setting powers of united states and an inability of the united states to lead and to assist in the reform of asian economies and a way that's compatible with u.s. interests. these are things we must pursue, actually must pursue sub .1 is tpp as an agreement is critical for all of those things to come to pass. put aside china. tpp is critical for our co

ustr havee folks at argued they can walk and chew gum at the same time. there is a question of retention in political pressure as well. one of the things you have seen in ttp is the building urgency over the last two years. 6-9most of the last months, if not here, the ttp negotiators have been meeting weekly. they have been on the phone, they have been closing -- especially the u.s. japan negotiators have been on the road constantly for most of the past year. so, i don't see that in ttip right now. i don't see that accelerated schedule there. the other point is that the political timeline ahead is getting very interesting. ttip isthink in 2016 going to drop quite the opposition or the heated debate u.s., fors in the obvious reasons. i am not sure that in the context of the anti-trade remarks we are hearing on both sides, in both parties right now, that even a deal with europe is going to be immune to that, or some kind of blowback. that putin argument has syrian endeavors and his ventures and ukraine can make his geopolitical case and the congress. is som

i don't think it's a zero sum game, and clearly the folks at ustr have argued for a long time they can walk and chew gum at the same time, but there's a question of attention and political pressure as well. one thing you have seen in tpp is a building urgency over the last two years for most of the last six to nine months, if not year, the tpp negotiators have been meeting weekly essentially, and intercessional agreements. they've been on the phone, been closing a few -- especially the u.s. and japan negotiators, have been on the road constantly for most of the last year. so, i don't see that in ttip right now. i may me missing something but i just don't see that accelerated schedule there. i think the other point is that the political timeline ahead is getting very interesting. i don't think in 2016 ttip is going to draw quite the opposition or the heated debate that tpp is here in the u.s. for obvious reasons. but i'm not sure that in the context of the antitrade rhetoric we're hearing on both sides, in both parties right now, that even a deal with europe will be immune to that or so

part of a deal through agreement specific development of value chains and this is something which the ustr has said many times that it will create much better conditions for value chains amongst us. to agree to certain kind of disciplines which otherwise would not be as attractive. so -- but in ttip, i think both u.s. and eu would like others to follow the system, which now the system which they would like to emphasize in order to create a fair and level playing field. in terms subsidies to state enterprises, in terms of standards on environment and labor, so that the so-called competitive neutrality conditions are maintained. and if that is the case, s have to balance the issue which you talked about, and greater acceptance by those who are also the objective of that entire system. and, therefore, they've -- i expect there to be some kind of mechanicism for this to be extended to include others. profess e professors agarwal actually mentioned as advice to ttip negotiators. i think that's very good advice to keep that in mind. on the other hand, as far as multilateralization is concerned,

i particularly want to acknowledge the hard work of the lead negotiators at ustr who have sacrificed for years to bring this agreement to conclusion. i also want to acknowledge that over time they made a great deal of progress on a variety of fronts. but now that the administration says that it's reached an agreement, it's time for congress to intensify its review of t.p.p. the primary standards by which i and i would hope all of my colleagues will judge this trade agreement are set forth clearly in our t.p.a. statute. as one of the original authors of the current t.p.a. law, i worked hard to ensure that it just didn't -- that it didn't just represent my priorities for trade agreements, but those of a bipartisan majority in both the house and the senate. the congressional negotiating objectives that we included in the statute spell out in detail what must be included in the trade agreement in order for it to get congress's approval. the negotiating objectives we included in our t.p.a. law aren't just pro forma. they aren't suggestions or mere statements of members' preferences. they