valukas says the s.e.c.knew that lehman was being less than truthful when it said that it had enough assets to survive the crisis. but that and other damaging information was never disclosed to investors who continued to pump billions of dollars into the firm. >> should it have been disclosed? >> absolutely. >> isn't the government, the s.e.c. in this case, the people who were supposed to protect the investors... >> yes. >> aren't they charged with informing investors? >> yes. >> why didn't they do it? >> they may not have had the expertise necessary to understand the material they were receiving. they were getting the material. whether they understood it is another question. >> the very fact that government regulators were inside the company with access to its books and records would complicate any prosecution of lehman officials. until january 2012, david kotz was the s.e.c.'s inspector general. over the previous four years, he'd issued more than 100 reports about major deficiencies in the way the s.e.c. d

>> my information is based valukas report. there's a long time when there was not a connection made between the ignition switch problem and the non-appointment of airbags. in terms of looking at the results of the report, i think it all came together for the lawyers at the time of the milton deposition in 2013 and from that point on there was enough information in the legal staff for people to have taken action and to have caused the engineering organization to take action. tragic,.'t, that was >> give me those dates again from the time you think that enough information to take action until the time you found on with five i'm basing it the definition in april of 2013. >> and you didn't know until february of 2014. i'm going to ask mr. valukas this as well, but with this kind of problem be allowed to happen again? what have you done to prevent those same set of circumstances from happening again? >> before any case can be , if it or taken to trial involves a fatality or serious bodily injury it has to come to me regardless of t

>> my information is based valukas report. there's a long time when there was not a connection made between the ignition switch problem and the non-appointment of airbags. in terms of looking at the results of the report, i think it all came together for the lawyers at the time of the milton deposition in 2013 and from that point on there was enough information in the legal staff for people to have taken action and to have caused the engineering organization to take action. tragic,.'t, that was >> give me those dates again from the time you think that enough information to take action until the time you found on with five i'm basing it the definition in april of 2013. >> and you didn't know until february of 2014. i'm going to ask mr. valukas this as well, but with this kind of problem be allowed to happen again? what have you done to prevent those same set of circumstances from happening again? >> before any case can be , if it or taken to trial involves a fatality or serious bodily injury it has to come to me regardless of t

the valukas report i have spent some time with. i find it thorough and damning. there was indifference, incompetence, and deceit among engineers in positions of important responsibility. second, it is very clear that the culture of lawyering up and wack-a-mole to minimize liability in individual lawsuits killed innocent customers of general motors. i have many questions about the failures of the legal department today. i am also interested today in hearing from mr. feinberg, who has been asked to put together a plan to compensate those who have suffered from these management failures. he is here independently of the witnesses from general motors. he is appearing independently of the witnesses of general motors, and he will exert independence in his role as he makes decisions about compensation to the many people who have suffered. and i certainly thank him for being here today in that regard. perhaps i am more interested today in understanding how in the aftermath of this report -- how in the world in the aftermath of this report did michael milliken keep his job

the valukas report i have spent some time with. i find it thorough and damning. there was indifference, incompetence, and deceit among engineers in positions of important responsibility. second, it is very clear that the culture of lawyering up and wack-a-mole to minimize liability in individual lawsuits killed innocent customers of general motors. i have many questions about the failures of the legal department today. i am also interested today in hearing from mr. feinberg, who has been asked to put together a plan to compensate those who have suffered from these management failures. he is here independently of the witnesses from general motors. he is appearing independently of the witnesses of general motors, and he will exert independence in his role as he makes decisions about compensation to the many people who have suffered. and i certainly thank him for being here today in that regard. perhaps i am more interested today in understanding how in the aftermath of this report -- how in the world in the aftermath of this report did michael milliken keep his job

the valukas report contains detailed recommendations for how the legal staff can improve. and serve an even greater role in meeting g.m.'s commitment to safety. i'm assuring the implementation of each and every recommendation. and i have made and will continue to make other changes to help improve. i have directed that before any settlement or trial of a case involving a fatality or serious bodily injury that the case be brought to me for my personal review with a focus on open engineering issues. i've reorganized the legal staff to foster sharing of information and the identification of emerging trends. including vathe a senior attorney to be the chief legal advisor to jeff hoyer, vice president of global safety, with a direct reporting line to me a d

the valukas report i have spent some time with. i find it thorough and damning. there was indifference, incompetence, and deceit among engineers in positions of important responsibility. second, it is very clear that the culture of lawyering up and wack-a-mole to minimize liability in individual lawsuits killed innocent customers of general motors. i have many questions about the failures of the legal department today. i am also interested today in hearing from mr. feinberg, who has been asked to put together a plan to compensate those who have suffered from these management failures. he is here independently of the witnesses from general motors. he is appearing independently of the witnesses of general motors, and he will exert independence in his role as he makes decisions about compensation to the many people who have suffered. and i certainly thank him for being here today in that regard. perhaps i am more interested today in understanding how in the aftermath of this report -- how in the world in the aftermath of this report did michael milliken keep his job

[ticking] >> anton valukas was the man in charge of investigating the collapse o