and that's what don verrilli is. in addition to being an extraordinary lawyer, he is, he has these incredible personal skills, and he is an incredible problem solver. and, and he has this sort of total professionalism and integrity that, of course, the best lawyers have. and i see that all the time. i hear about it, you know, i was sg myself, and i got to know the folks in the sg's office pretty well and still talk to them. and i sort of hear stuff about what's going on in the solicitor general's office. and i have to say i get sometimes a little bit envious, because everybody in this solicitor general's office talks about don like they have never seen his like. and i kind of think, well, you know, what was i, you know? [laughter] chopped liver or, you know? but the way that the people in the solicitor general's office feel about don is just such a testament to what leadership can be. and then in the court we see not only month in and month out his fantastic lawyering skills, but also this kind of consummate professi

general verrilli? >> mr. chief justice, and may it please the court, the interpretation of the recess appointments clause that respondent urges would repudiate the constitutional legitimacy of thousands of appointments by presidents going back to george washington, and going forward, it would diminish presidential authority in a way that is flatly at odds with the constitutional structure the framers established. respondent simply has not advanced the compelling case that would be needed to strip presidents of their traditional authority to make appointments during intra-session recesses and to fill preexisting vacancies. >> you say that it would repudiate the constitutionality of appointments. you don't suggest that those -- the actions of those appointees would be invalid going back however far you want to go back, do you? >> no, but they -- no, i don't, mr. chief justice, but it certainly would repudiate the legitimacy of those appointments. >> why not? >> how did it affect the -- how many board decisions

general verrilli? >> mr. chief justice, and may it please the court, the framers gave the federal government exclusive control over the treaty function to ensure that it could knit the nation together as one and allow it to be fully sovereign in the conduct of foreign affairs. petitioner's ad hoc "too local" limit on the treaty power can't be squared with a judgment the framers made, this court's precedent, or consistent historical practice since the time of the founding, and it would compromise foreign affairs and national security interests of the first order. >> general, let's suppose there's a multilateral treaty, the -- the international convention to ensure that national legislatures have full authority to carry out their obligations, i.e., that the national legislature has the police power. and congress passes a statute saying we have the authority to prosecute purely local crimes pursuant to this international convention that the president has signed. any problem with that? >> there may well be. let m

general verrilli, six minutes. >> thank you, mr. chief justice.egin with a couple of points on the intrasession recesses. with respect to the question that justice alito raised, it would have been perfectly familiar to framers that a legislative body could take an intrasession recess. jefferson's parliamentary manual, written while he was vice president and provided -- presiding over the senate specifically refers to recesses adjournment that occurn a session, and the session resumes when they're over. the adjournment clause itself contemplates the need for approval by the other branch for a period longer than three days during the session. i think it's difficult to imagine that if, as justice alito's hypothetical suggested, that the senate had in the first years under president washington decided to take a two month intrasession break, that president washington wouldn't have been able to staff the offices of the fledgling republic using are recess appointment power. >> if we agree with you on the first question, then there needs to either be a nu

don verrilli responded we're talking about constitution we were talking of the constitution of the of illinois you know the case that for now. you have a bunch of justices that often go when they do go on television say they get that question are you a political group and they were course not or were justices we just look at the law and then you hear them argue from the bench the politics of it instead of the constitution it's pretty mind boggling what one of the larger implications of this case. i think it's quite narrow but it's going to have an impact you have unions that are already under attack for it and they also in the end they need funds to operate to do all of the things they do for union members in nonunion members and they have to represent so that in this case they lose three point six million dollars and that that particular union or the us like it the question is will well other states that have in other towns that have republican leadership will they try to figure out a way to create more of these quasi union. employees will you try to make the public union people more

verrilli to get you off track and catch you in awkward moments. think it is offensive and i think it has for the public discourse. members who are seeking office or politicians who seek office or those who hold up this need to be accountable for what they believe. i think that the deliberate, almost provoking someone into a statement is wrong. >> what was it that happened to you? >> i just recall so many of the incidents. you have to think through it. not happening the cycle, it was intense in my first race. someone present in my second. it was intense in the first race. every family went to an event, we had to think through it. more often than not, i might have been in a different car than my target. i might slip out of back door or something. not because i am afraid of engaging the public. >> you don't want to be attacked? >> right. it is not right. this is part of what is wrong in america. i share with people, regardless of party, humility is not weakness. we must elevate qualtiy. ity. this does not help. >> they have been very effective, have

general verrilli. >> mr. chief justice and may please the court. to ensure that it could knit the nation together as one and allow it to be fully sovereign in the context of affairs. commissioners ad hoc camp he squared with the judgment the framers made this court precedent or historical practice since the time of the founding and it would compromise foreign affairs and national security interests of the first order. >> general let's suppose there's a multilateral treaty. the international convention to ensure that national legislatures have full authority to carry out their obligations i.e. the national legislature has police power. congress passes a statute saying we have the authority to prosecute local crimes pursuant to this international convention that the president signed. any problem with that? >> there may well be. let the walk. the analysis you have to go through. first i would make the point mr. chief justice that seems unimaginable that a convention of that kind would be ratified by two-thirds of the senate. >> it seems unimaginable t

general verrilli? >> mr. chief justice, and may it please the court, the touchstone for resolving this case is the principle justice jackson articulated in prince v. massachusetts. as he said, "limitations which of necessity bound religious freedom begin to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide with the liberties of others or of the public. adherence to that principle is hat makes possible the harmonious functioning of a society like ours, in which people of every faith live and work side by side." >> that's a statement that is inconsistent with rfra, isn't it? he whole point of rfra is that congress wanted to provide exceptions for the religious views of particular -- including proprietors, individuals. >> no, mr. chief justice, i don't think so at all. in fact, the although i was of course, i was referring to justice jackson's words for their wisdom because it wasn't the opinion of the court. ut see, jackson -- >> yeah. but the wisdom you cited is the idea that you don't have imposed, on th

it's certain this context, it's certainly susceptible of being interpreted to mean -- >> general verrillie taken you off your starting point. your starting point was what is it -- what constitutes a recess. and your position is that it can be an intra-session recess. but if we look back historically, congress met and they met continuously. and then they went on horseback back home and they were away for 6 months, even 9 months. today, there's nothing like that. the inter-session recess could be, could be an hour. so what do we do with that? there was the vision of a long recess running for months and today, the inter-session recess might be momentary. >> so i think i have two points to make in response to the question of what to do. the first one is that, with respect to the original understanding, we do think that the term "recess" and the phrase "the recess" certainly at the time of the founding did encompass recesses that occurred during a session of congress, during a session of the legislature, and not just in between sessions of the legislature. i would point the court to jefferson'

general verrilli, isn't that really a question of theology or moral philosophy, which has been debated for by many scholars and adherents to many religions. a does something that b thinks is immoral. how close a connection does there have to be between what b does that may have some that may provide some assistance to a in order for b to be required to refrain from doing that that action? >> it's true that it's a difficult question. but it isn't -- >> it is a religious question and it's a moral question. and you want us to provide a definitive secular answer to it? >> no, but i do think the problem, justice alito, is that this court has recognized, and certainly the courts of appeals have recognized, that there is a difference. you accept the sincerity of the belief, but the court still has to make a judgment of its own about what constitutes a substantial burden, or otherwise, for example, the tax thing would be a substantial burden. or we cited a d.c. circuit case in which prisoners objected to giving dna samples and the court said -- we accept the sincerity of that belief, but it's