of the 29 regiments were veterans of vicksburg. i should say that the contingent numbered about 9000 men at the time of the battle of nashville. they were in a brigades organized into three divisions. it had 29 infantry regiments that they mentioned and 16 of those 29 had actually fought in the vicksburg campaign. 28 of the 29 regiments were from the valleys of the ohio or mississippi river. they were considered western troops. one exception was the 178 new york, and i don't know how those guys that in there, but with the exception of them, there were nine regiments from illinois, for each from iowa and minnesota, each from indiana, wisconsin and missouri, and two from ohio. regiments, athese smattering of them, had been with the army of the tennessee, grants army and sherman's army from way back. one regiment in smith's contingent had actually been present for the surrender of fort henry way back in february of 1962. -- of 1862. for them that had fought at fort donaldson nine days later when that great union victory had been won,

the vicksburg siege there was another mine attempt there as well. didn't succeed. in your research, is there any conversation that has been recorded where grant reflects back the vicksburg and said, you know, we tried it there, didn't work, maybe we should not try here. just as a lessons learned. because, again, one big thing, all militaries do, you capture your lessons learned, try not to repeat mistakes. >> i spoke with terry when he was still at vicksburg. i can't find any evidence of grant saying anything about this vicksburg mine that was a disaster. when the petersburg mine came around. because he's not overly enthusiastic about it, i think in the back of his mind he's, this might work and it might not work and whatever. but i don't get any real sense he's really reflective about it. yes? >> you mentioned several times about the additional fortifications built behind the salient that the union was not aware of. one of the new technologies that arrived in the civil war was balloon observations. were there any balloons that they might have used

naches to vicksburg. vicksburg to memphis. memphis to cairo. we build a dike a thousand miles long. and mules, mules and mud. mules and mud a thousand miles up the mississippi. a century before we bought the great western river the spanish and french built dikes to keep the mississippi out of new orleans at flood stage. we continue to levee the entire length of the delta. the valley built up for centuries by the old river spilling her floods across the bottom of the continent. a mud delta of 40,000 square miles. men and mules, mules and mud. new orleans to baton rouge, naches to vicksburg, memphis to k cairo a thousand miles up the river. down through the boom trace. down through cumberland gap over from georgia and south carolina. over from the tide water. over from the old cotton land west of the big river. west of the steam boat highway. down the highway to the sea. ♪ corn and oats down the missouri, tobacco and whisky down the ohio. down from pittsburgh, down from st. louis. hemp and potatoes, pork and flour. we send our commerce to the sea. ♪ we made cotton king. we rolled a mi

confederate states of america, just three months after the ntha surrender of the garrison of ft vicksburg, to return most of those men surrendered there on the mississippi to the field.

the vicksburg siege there was another mine attempt there as well. didn't succeed. in your research, is there any conversation that has been recorded where grant reflects back the vicksburg and said, you know, we tried it there, didn't work, maybe we should not try here. just as a lessons learned. because, again, one big thing, all militaries do, you capture your lessons learned, try not to repeat mistakes. >> i spoke with terry when he was still at vicksburg. i can't find any evidence of grant saying anything about this vicksburg mine that was a disaster. when the petersburg mine came around. because he's not overly enthusiastic about it, i think in the back of his mind he's, this might work and it might not work and whatever. but i don't get any real sense he's really reflective about it. yes? >> you mentioned several times about the additional fortifications built behind the salient that the union was not aware of. one of the new technologies that arrived in the civil war was balloon observations. were there any balloons that they might have used

the grants 1863 victories at vicksburg and chattanooga had made in venice. when grant came to washington in march it to 64 wing kin and were secretary edward stanton for the first time he was the object of intense curiosity. granted not look the part of a great general. he was medium height, medium weight. he wore a private some nondescript blue uniform with his general stars and some on the shoulders. one man said that he was an ordinary, scrubbing looking man with a slightly seedy look. someone else had something different to say. the look of a man determined to drive his head through a brick wall. disliking washington and its show business, as he called it, grant chose to direct all the armies on the field with the army of the potomac. with the exception of a great victory at gettysburg a hard luck army who was well equipped, large, and slow. the army's sprawling winter camp in northern and virginia rant but in every available eastern unit until he had over a hundred thousand men. across the river was the army of northern virginia. weaponry. his army thou

subsequently, battlefields at antietam, shiloh, gettysburg, and vicksburg will be created in the first era of preservation and commemoration of the civil war, on the very ground where it occurred. today, this national military park, with its units at the chickamauga battlefield, on lookout mountain, the small areas preserved here on missionary ridge still tells this story, a vital story in the course of our nation's history, an important part of deciding how the civil war turned out. you can read about our countries but here youoks, can walk some of the very ground where those decisions were made. even though here on the chattanooga battlefield today you are mostly in an urban environment, you can still stands near to where ulysses s. grant stood. look at that profile of missionary ridge. a little bit about the difficulties he faced in dealing with the confederates on that formidable piece of terrain . amazed, whenng, union troops charged up that steep slope. you can drive along crest road and see the monuments markers along missionary ridge. how those union troops could charge up the

the vicksburg siege there was another mine attempt there as well. didn't succeed. in your research, is there any conversation that has been recorded where grant reflects back to vicksburg and said, you know, we tried it there, didn't work, maybe we should not try here. just as a lessons learned. because, again, one of the big things all militaries do, you capture your lessons learned, try not to repeat mistakes. >> i spoke with terry when he was still at vicksburg. i can't find any evidence of grant saying anything about this vicksburg mine that was a disaster. when the petersburg mine came around. because he's not overly enthusiastic about it, i think in the back of his mind he's, this might work and it might not work and whatever. but i don't get any real sense he's really reflective about it. yes? >> you mentioned several times about the additional fortifications built behind the salient that the union was not aware of. one of the new technologies that arrived in the civil war was balloon observations. were there any balloons that they might have

allowed the confederate states of america, just three months after the surrender of the garrison of vicksburg, to return most of those men surrendered there on the mississippi to the field. for grant and sherman, at chattanooga, it was some of these same surrendered, paroled, reorganized and reequipped vicksburg troops who had helped, as we've heard from craig just a few minutes ago, they had helped patrick clay burn what was supposed to be grant's main effort. much of carter stevenson's division on the missionary ridge battlefield just south of where clayburn's brigade was located. the georgia brigade, and the alabama brigade, they had helped stop sherman's men. firing into the flank of sherman's assaulting columns on tunnel hill, was rome georgia's artillery, rearmed with products of the confederate military industrial complex. and less than five months after their surrender to the very troops who were assaulting them on that november 25, 1863, were now firing to stop those very assaults. this military industrial complex was the capacity that cause d one -- or someone walking the line of co

after his home in the fall of vicksburg he told them it couldd move peacefully without having a civil war on his hands and much to discredit of the president impact his best friend from college is the gentleman that we have heard of it when he dedicates his book it becomes controversy. it's compromise to setting up the dedication. appears of course is a very unpopular figure. millard fillmore who starts out as a strong supporter well end up opposing him after emancipation. no one was more willing to fight to construct as it had been. no one was willing to fight for the destruction of slavery. they were coming there in the fall of 1862 and formerly on january 11863 now broadened the effort from the reunification of the country to the destruction of slavery. you know that it's focused on the effort to get it passed. they would turn him against him and john tyler has the most interesting course of the civil war. he would try to drive virginia out of the union and opposed by the poor president who uses his influence and persuasive ability to drive virginia out of the union. after the unio

if you look at chickasaw bluffs during the vicksburg campaign in december of 1862 or december 1862, if you look at chattanooga and missionary ridge, sherman's, the attacks that sherman has launched in those battles have been piecemeal. they've been repulsed. he doesn't have a particularly impressive record on the battlefield. sherman's reputation then today rests primarily on what he did in 1864 and 1865 to implement grant's grand strategy. sherman targeted not only the army of tennessee, but also, the ability of the southern confederacy to wage war. of course, this is part of grant's larger strategy, too. during the campaign in the spring and summer of 1864, the city of atlanta symbolizes the way that the confederacy waged war. the city was a vital rail center in the deep south and was filled with important war industries. dj-niforms and shells and g out accoutrements for the confederate army. sherman also sought to demoralize the civilians, to prove to the people the government could no longer defend them. sherman said, war is cruelty and you cannot refine it. sherman's an imminently

i cannot find any evidence of grant saying anything about vicksburg mine disaster.when a petersburg mine came around because he was not every dish overly enthusiastic about it, and the back of his mind, it might work and it may not work and whatever. but i do not get any real sense he is really reflective about it. >> you mentioned several times about the fortification behind the salient. one of the new technologies that arrived in the civil war was balloon observations. was there any? >> no balloons used by the federal's or confederates for that matter. pete has a question. so robert e lee is the question. can we hold robert e. lee accountable for the killing of u.s. colored troops after they stopped the battle? lee is very near the battlefield the whole time, less than a quarter of a mile. with general bogart, they come out onto the field and we are not really clear and it is my observation that they must have seen some killing. i do not know -- what i hold accountable for and grant and meade is they leave their wounded, and in the battlefield in the 100 plus degr

henry in 1862 through vicksburg, to missionary ridge in 1863.was clearly the north's man of the hour when linking ordered to take command of all federal forces. somewhere near 500,000 combat-ready sources, grand would have authority over the largest host any american officer had ever hiv. in the past grant asserted, union armies had, quote, acted independently and without concert, like a bulky team of mules, no two pulling together. and this to shift men from one sector to the other to meet the most pressing dangers. yurch generals seemed content to maneuver. that was not the road to victory, grand announced. the north had far superior numbers and materiel. it was time to -- several union armies were to take the offensive simultaneous ly a second force would head southward, a third into the mountains, and cut the vital virginia and tennessee railroad. a fourth army would advance up the james river. meanwhile, from chattanooga toward atlanta. grant himself chose to travel with mead, and he did so for a number of reasons. his presence would shield

chattanooga, it was some of these same surrendered, paroled, exhanged, reorganized and reequipped vicksburg troops who had helped, as we've heard from craig just a few minutes ago, they had helped patrick clayburn stop what was supposed to be grant's main effort. much of carter stevenson's division on tunnel hill portion of the missionary ridge battlefield just south of wherei clayburn's primary brigades wer located, in particular, the ima georgiabr brigade of cumming and the alabama brigade of edmund pettus helped stop sherman's c men. firing into the flank of sherman's assaulting columns on tunnel hill, was rome georgia'st artillery, rearmed with products of the confederate military industrial complex. and less than five months after their surrender to the very troops who were assaulting them on that november 25th, 1863, were now firing to stop those re very assaults. this military industrial complex was the capacity that caused pay one -- or someone walking the line tau of confederate cannon, captured on lookout mountain and missionary ridge, and displayedd as trophies in front of the ar

during the vicksburg campaign of , chattanooga, missionary ridge, sherman -- the attack sherman launched in those battles were piecemeal and repulsed. he does not have a particularly impressive record on the battlefield. his reputation rest primarily on 1865,e did in 1864 and the infamous grand grand strategy. sherman targeted not only the armies of tennessee, but also of the confederacy to wage war. campaign in the spring and summer of 1864, the symbolize thea way the confederacy waged war. it was a vital rail center in the deep south and was filled with important war industries, factories and mills turning out uniforms and accoutrements for the confederate army. torman also sought demoralize the confederate soldiers and civilians to prove to these people that their government could no longer defend them. war is cruelty and you cannot refine it. he is an eminently quotable individual, as many of you know. his letters are absolutely superb. i would highly, highly recommend the collected correspondence of william t sherman, one of the most important edited volumes in many decades. brooks

the battles at fort henry and donaldson, shilo, vicksburg, chattanooga. gives grant basically a two-part requirement. first, to bring organization, to bring continuity to the union war effort. and secondly, to defeat the army of northern virginia. and grant goes about making it possible to carry out that charge with a vengeance. first he puts together a program, unlike any that the war has yet seen. he realized that up to this point, battles would last a couple of days, and then the armies would pull apart for months. grant would not let that happen anymore. the union armies were to fasten on to the confederate armies and fight them until they were destroyed. he also realized that the old goal of capturing territory didn't make sense anymore. henceforth, the goal would be the confederate armies, the goal would be to destroy them, and only by doing that could the rebellion be brought to a close. finally, grant realized that the armies in the eastern and western theaters had to move together, so the confederates couldn't shift forces from one theater to the

steadily up the military ladder with resounding victories, stretching from fort henry in 1862, through vicksburgssionary ridge in 1863. he was clearly the north's man of the hour. when lincoln ordered an east early in 1864 to take command of all federal forces. the somewhere near 500,000 combat ready soldiers grant would have authority over the largest post any american officer had ever led. the new lieutenant general wasted little time in making his strategic intentions known. in the past, grant asserted, union armies had quote acted independently and without concept like a bulky team of mules, no two pulling to the. and this allowed confederates to shift men from one sector to the other to meet the most pressing danger. union generals seemed content to maneuver. but that was not the road to victory, grant announced. the north had far superior numbers, and materiel. it was time to switch games. to stop playing chess, and to start playing checkers. now several union armies were to take the offensive simultaneously under grant's new plan. the main army. the army of the potomac would move directly

steadily up the military ladder with resounding victories, stretching from fort henry in 1862 through vicksburg, to missionary ridge in 1863. he was clearly the north's man of the hour when lincoln ordered him east early in 1864 to take command of all federal forces. with somewhere near 500,000 combat-ready soldiers, grant would have authority over the largest post any american officer had ever led. the new lieutenant general wasted little time in making his strategic intentions known. in the past, grant asserted, union arms had "acted independently and without concept like a balky team of mules, no two pulling together." and this allowed confederates to shift men from one sector to the other to meet the most pressing danger. union generals seemed content to maneuver. but that was not the road to victory, grant announced. the north had far superior numbers and materiel. it was time to switch games. to stop playing chess and to start playing checkers. now several union armies were to take the offensive simultaneously under grant's new plan. the main army, the army of the potomac, would move dire

beat, but cleaning up the overgrown and nuggeted fortives make no mistake, a high watermark was not vicksburg or getsies burg, it was a little tollhouse, a tollgate house at the corner of georgia avenue and piney branch road. that's the fullest extent that the forces came to the afternoon of july 11th and 12th to capture in washington, changing the course of the war and the course of us today, quite frankly. the works have eroded. we don't yet really know where lincoln stood. i think he stood all over the place. lincoln never stood still. he was up on the ramp, over the ft. massachusetts portion, he was over at ft. stevens, but we really don't know for sure. they remembered seeing links. i'm 75 years of age, folks. i remember things differently at 20, 18, what have you. they wanted to mark that spot and cameron korean and brought them up there. with that bar relief, and that's their monument. to the remembrance under enemy fire. we don't know that oliver wendell holmes jr. really uttered one of those immortal words. the record suggests -- that is to say the reminiscenses and so forth suggests

he commanded the confed real area in the military vicksburg in 1863, and atlanta in 1864.quarters with jefferson davis, which is a fascinating subject in itself. but it's just a quarter between jeff davis and joe johnston. that quarrel runs like an angry scar through the history of the confederacy, and arguably one of the key reasons for a confederate defeat in the war. johnson is an absolutely crucial to confederate mitt tale history. you know, when you were there just barely for the skren tenial, i think i'll live that to them. but johnston is a man i was trying to understand and i want to off a few thoughts about i think hi most important military alexander, which was that here in georgia. president davis did not want to appoint him. by that time he and johnson thoroughly loathed each other. johnson had convinced himself that davis was trying to destroy his military reputation. but he had no choice. because there really was nobody else he could appoint to that post. all the other high ravens confed real general were either obviously failures or unable to exercise comman

subsequently, battlefields at antietam, shiloh, gettysburg, and vicksburg will be created in the first era of preservation and commemoration of the civil war, on the very ground where it occurred. today, this national military park, with its units at the chickamauga battlefield, on lookout mountain, the small areas preserved here on missionary ridge still tells this story, a vital story in the course of our nation's history, an important part of deciding how the civil war turned out. you can read about our countries but here youoks, can walk some of the very ground where those decisions were made. even though here on the chattanooga battlefield today you are mostly in an urban environment, you can still stands near to where ulysses s. grant stood. look at that profile of missionary ridge. a little bit about the difficulties he faced in dealing with the confederates on that formidable piece of terrain . amazed, whenng, union troops charged up that steep slope. you can drive along crest road and see the monuments markers along missionary ridge. how those union troops could charge up the

steadily up the military ladder with resounding victories stretching from fort henry in 1862 through vicksburgd northridge in 1863. he was clearly the man of the hour when lincoln ordered him east to take command of all federal forces. but somewhere near 500,000 combat-ready soldiers, grant would have authority over the largest host any american officer had ever led. the new lieutenant general wasted little time in making his strategic intentions known. in the past, grant asserted, union armies had, quote, acted independently and without concert like a balky team of mules, no two pulling together. this led confederates to shift men from one to the other to lead the most pressing danger. they seemed content to maneuver. but that was not the road to victory, grant announced. the north had far superior numbers and material. it was time to switch games, to stop playing ches srks and to s playing checkers. several union armies would take the offensive simultaneously under grant's new plan. the main army, the army of the potomac, would move against lee. a second force would head southward up the she

no mistake, however, a number of these union veterans, the high mark of the confederacy was not vicksburgettysburg, a little toll house, tollgate house at the corner of georgia avenue and piney branch road. that was the fullest extent that the confederate forces here at fort stevens came afternoon of july 11th and 12th capturing washington and changing the course of the war today and us today, quite frankly. works roaded. we'll hear about that in a moment. we don't yet know where lincoln stood. i think he stood all over the place. he was over at fort stevens, but we really don't know for sure despite the lovely stone at fort stevens. where the veterans remembered seeing lincoln. i'm 75 years of age, folks. i remember things differently than when i was fighting, or something like that, at 20, 18. who knows? veterans may have been mistaken. they wanted to mark that spot and got the stone out of the walter reed area, one of the ugliest monuments in washington, but that on there and that's their monument of that's this monument to the remembrance of lincoln under enemy fire. we don't know oli