we certainly look at the vietnam situation. but right now i would like to think of the implications. you touched on this briefly, but we were interested in depleted uranium. we want to test something with that in the film and we were told there was absolutely no empirical evidence available to put a case for word to look at this in the film but in terms of the science that we gathered to test for this coming they were not really being conducted in a way that would give scion's a chance to say something about this. i think from the point* of view of the future of preventing some of these things it needs to be considered. >> i think clay could probably best address that. >> depleted uranium is an issue that comes up all lot and is also an incredibly popular element in the munitions light tanks and take shells and artillery. there is a decided interest against pursuing that tough question. the issue is there is a lot of incidental information and lots of reyes nor increase of morbidity and disease rates were it was used and a lot

vietnam relations. .. has done a number of studies in vietnam will to try to determine where indeed it in remains and the environment and basically they came up with this concept of hotspots, places where the concentration levels are high. a generally due to basically spillage and loss during the movement, not areas sprayed by and large studies have found that the residuals in this parade areas, even heavily sprayed areas are not of the international threshold for opposing extended danger. whether or not those studies are comprehensive as a whole issue but as a result there is a focus on these hot spots. there appears to be somewhere in the 20 to 30 house lots are on the country. but three of them have become the prominent focus of the efforts to date on this issue and oddly enough they are all free around what used to be u.s. military bases. excuse my vietnamese pronunciation i've been there but i'm not a very good at vietnamese. [speaking in vietnamese] -- and was a primary base for military operations d

it was vietnam. on awful lot of social turmoil growing up in those times, was both very educational and instructive, very instructive to me because in particular in this job, and senior jobs recently, and in this job that i have right now, and two words that you are very much aware of. and that time back then in my own experience in vietnam, which was the first war i was in. impacted me and influences how i think about things today. and in the specifics of that are, that was a war where the american people evolves to a point where they didn't support our men and women in uniform. so when these wars started, one of the first things i learned on was the need and to try to have an understanding for the american peoples support of the men and women in uniform and their families, and in fact, the american people across the full spectrum support our men and women in uniform. and that has been incredibly important, and also satisfying. because the military really does carry out the will of people from a sta

-vietnam relations. i boil this down to remade asian, dealing with the environmental damage that's been caused by the dioxin. second, the healthcare issues that are associated with people who have been exposed to dioxin and agent orange. and third, an area that sometimes doesn't get enough consideration, which is a continuation of scientific research about the effects of dioxin and agent orange on people. let me go through these as quickly as i can, but to try to be concise. in terms of environmental remade asian, hatfield consultant says, a canadian company, has done a number of studies in vietnam to try to determine where indeed dioxin and agent orange remains in the environment. they came up with hot spots, generally due to basically spillage and loss during the movement of agent orange. by and large, studies have found that the residuals in sprayed areas, even heavily sprayed areas, are not at the international threshold for posing extendeded danger. whether or not those studies are comprehensive is

vietnam relations. .. has done a number of studies in vietnam will to try to determine where indeed it in remains and the environment and basically they came up with this concept of hotspots, places where the concentration levels are high. a generally due to basically spillage and loss during the movement, not areas sprayed by and large studies have found that the residuals in this parade areas, even heavily sprayed areas are not of the international threshold for opposing extended danger. whether or not those studies are comprehensive as a whole issue but as a result there is a focus on these hot spots. there appears to be somewhere in the 20 to 30 house lots are on the country. but three of them have become the prominent focus of the efforts to date on this issue and oddly enough they are all free around what used to be u.s. military bases. excuse my vietnamese pronunciation i've been there but i'm not a very good at vietnamese. [speaking in vietnamese] -- and was a primary base for military operations d

in vietnam? there was chaos in vietnam. we were bombing vietnam into eternity. we were destroying vietnamese villages. we were destroying their land. we were killing their people. ultimately 2 million people died in vietnam and we must not leave because there will be chaos in vietnam? zoe state. we didn't leave in 1967 when a few of us were calling for withdrawal. we stayed in what was the result? another 30,000 americans dead, another 1 million vietnamese dead. said the same arguments the resonate, we mustn't leave iraq as a fire presidents in iraq-- presence in iraq is preventing civil war. the question is is our present preventing civil war is our presence provoking civil war? i think the answer is clear. just looking at the history of these four years of occupation in iraq, iraq is a mess after four years. and the numbers of iraqis dead and wounded are enormous, into the hundreds of thousands. so yes the history is useful. and, not the history he would get in the traditional textbooks, but the history that a citizen learns for himself or herself and when the

into vietnam?uest: you hear the criticism in comparing afghanistan to vietnam and people say this is not vietnam. that is true in certain ways, but in many more ways it is just like vietnam and becoming more like vietnam. the biggest problems we had early on were a failed government from a corrupt central government. we had an army in south vietnam that we could not build large enough to contain the insurgency. this is occurring in afghanistan now. one of obama's goals was to increase the afghan army from about 95,000 to about 143,000 to the end of this year. if that does not happen, that will be a tip -- terrible failure. but we could not get them for 150,000 tonight -- to 170,000 in 1972. there are traders reporting that the afghan troops are not good fighters and not willing to fight. the terrain is very similar. we have mountainous terrain and we had joggles. this is not like iraq. this is not like the plains of normandy. but the biggest lesson is counterinsurgency. this is not a set piece batt

in vietnam? there was chaos in vietnam. we were bombing vietnam into eternity. were destroyed vietnamese villages. we were destroying their lead. we were killing their people. ultimately, 2 million people died and it noncom and we mustn't leave because there will be chaos in vietnam? so we stay. in 1967 when a few of us were calling for withdrawal, we were stated and what was the result? another 30000 american dead, another 1 million been amazed at. so same arguments today. we mustn't leave iraq, as if our presence in iraq is preventing civil war. the question is, is our presence preventing civil war or is our presence of provoking civil war? and i think the answer is clear, just looking at the history of these for years of our occupation in iraq, iraq is a mess after four years. and the numbers and numbers of iraqi dead and would are enormous, into the hundreds of thousands. so yes, the history is useful. and not the history that you get in the traditional textbooks, but the history that a citizen learned or himself or herself when he says and goes to the libra

into vietnam? guest: you hear the criticism in comparing afghanistan to vietnam and people say this is not vietnam. that is true in certain ways, but in many more ways it is just like vietnam and becoming more like vietnam. the biggest problems we had early on were a failed government from a corrupt central government. we had an army in south vietnam that we could not build large enough to contain the insurgency. this is occurring in afghanistan now. one of obama's goals was to increase the afghan army from about 95,000 to about 143,000 to the end of this year. if that does not happen, that will be a tip -- terrible failure. but we could not get them for 150,000 tonight -- to 170,000 in 1972. there are traders reporting that the afghan troops are not good fighters and not willing to fight. the terrain is very similar. we have mountainous terrain and we had joggles. this is not like iraq. this is not like the plains of normandy. but the biggest lesson is counterinsurgency. this is not a set piece ba

in vietnam it was a catastrophic failure. in 1963 we orchestrated the overview of south vietnam's president. he was better than a lot of people and the people after him were a lot worse. the war went downhill drastically. lots of people were purged from the government. a milder form of action that was used was used in el salvador funneling money into the political campaign. that proved to be a blessing for the counterinsurgency. a more recent example has been disclosed. in 2006 the united states, pressuring various means orchestrated the removal of iraq's first democratically chosen prime minister. i hasten to add he deserved to be kicked out. he created secret prisons and killing people for sectarian reasons and during one critical meeting where lots of things had to be decided, whether tomato paste should be introduced as part of the rations for ramadan. another saying that worked well is promising additional aid. this works better than withdrawing aid. and we use the promise of extra aid -- the person that was installed tu

my first book on the phoenix program in vietnam had a great deal of that in part of how i got into this was i was talking to these intelligence officers who worked in vietnam and they said, which areas where you get more intelligence? where did you have the cooperation supporting you are helping umar and it always came back to the with the south vietnamese district chief or what have you come so i think it is critical there. in terms of the larger strategic intelligence, are you talking about in terms of understanding culture or in a country? >> , charrie really putting our efforts into doing the intelligence? >> i think, i think we are doing what needs to be done and i think as i mentioned battlefield circulation with commanders is a big part of this because if you have someone like general mcchrystal who is going out and talking to people in the field, he tends to learn more that way then if he sits back in his headquarters like general sanchez did for example in iraq. i mean, certainly there's a lot of other intelligence stuff out there that we don't know about but i think if he were

about the needed to win the vietnam war. this relationship is really important to understand how everything goes down in the next decade. kramer, strangely enough, this is a broad view, a kissinger never served again and government after 1976 when the ford administration lost to carter but kramer continued to be a force until the died in 2003. that is what was a remarkable to see the names like chaney, wolfowitz, rumsfeld, saying he is the keeper of the flame and to use the words provocative weakness when he was defense secretary. we even see it today with the back-and-forth between president obama and former vice president cheney. what cheney is really saying is when you don't use like words like war on terror or use of words you are therefore projecting weakness and in 518v attacks. it is no-space and 40 years and during through that journey and a cast of many who started in 69 are 70 and reached the limit in 2009. that is a key element to understand this and kramer's role is unique. he opens a door to the nixon administra

you think it was all undone because of vietnam? >> let me give you an example. 1965 everything looks better and then the money starts to go for vietnam. you know, if i can just take one more minute. if you read the notes of his meetings, he used to call them the tuesday cabinet meetings. they were up on the second floor of the white house in the family dining room. often with just four people. mcnamara, george bundy, and chairman of the chiefs of staff. you suddenly say, gee, we don't have money for these programs. that's the tragedy. i don't think it's an overreach. >> look, we've got two wars going. that is expensive. it costs so much. whatever is done in iraq and in afghanistan, it will continue to be awfully expensive and it will continue, i think, to crowd out not only financially but almost in the public imagination. great new expansions that he might want and desire. we are going to see what his decision is on afghanistan and we will see if he decides to increase troop strength very seriously and obviously commit to a great

and then the money starts to go for vietnam. you know, if i can just take one more minute, if you read the notes of his meetings, he called them the tuesday cabinet meetings, on the second floor of the white house and the family dining room, off enwith four people. mcnamara, george bundy, chairman of the choynlt chiefs of staff. he was suddenly -- you will suddenly see gee, we don't have money for these programs. that's the tragedy. yank that it is an overreach. >> look, we have two wars going. that's expensive. it costs so much. whatever is done in iraq and in afghanistan, it will continue to be awfully expensive. it will continue, i think, to crowd out not only financially but almost in the public imagination. great new expansions he mate want. and desire. we are going to see what his decision is on afghanistan. and we will see if he decides to increase troop strength of very seriously and obviously commit to a great deal of time there. of course, it will be financially expense. >> do you think he is driven? >> i depart from s

vietnam was bipolar. you know, the country was either inform support of what had been the republican of vietnam and alliance with the united states or was in support of the legacy of min. i think there was a reluctant reliance with the soviet block. they were united with -- they became united around an anti-colonial ideology. they were willing to take -- they were disciplined enough to take enormous losses. and in the end, they were able to put together a conventional force. we were never defeated by the vietcong. they drove tanks in. i don't dot math on how many partners there were. and i would argue that what's going to happen -- i might take issue with marc on this. it might depend on as much as what happens in afghanistan as it does on what happens in washington. afghans in their multiplicity of institutions and associations and relationships really want what almost anyone wants. that is security and the opportunity to protect and grow one's family. we're in trouble in the south of the country right n

afghanistan is not vietnam. it's completely irrelevant to vietnam.but the news media is making it so. >> well, as we get a little closer to the end of this session, let me come back to a more general question, bruce, you were quoted at the newspaper maybe in september saying that a successful counterinsurgency strategy required a partner who's viewed as legitimate. and you have said that, you know, it's a illegitimate government. and yet you also for quoted in the paper as saying the administration should give mcchrystal what he wanted. now can you explain your thinking about why you think counterinsurgency is necessary and why the more limited counterterrorist strategy of going after terrorist leaders with special forces is not going to be sufficient? >> certainly. it's -- i'm not the only person who has said the successful counterinsurgency requires a partner. i think that's kind of the essence of the whole theory of counterinsurge -- counterinsurgency. the national community's handling of the afghanistan presidential election was a major, major se

the problem for david pitts is he can't prove he was even in vietnam. brief assignments were under verbal orders, and he was told there are no records of his having been in the country. >> david pitts: you had people and equipment just flooding into korea, and suddenly tet happens. and it was just... it was a period of mass confusion. >> byron pitts: record keeping wasn't a priority at the time? >> david pitts: no. record keeping was not any type of priority at the time. >> byron pitts: in recent years, pitts says he tried to find his former commanding officer from korea, plus a hometown friend he says he ran into while in vietnam, but both had died. without corroboration or records, pitts never applied for the benefit. then, in november of 2008-- out of the blue- the v.a. sent him this letter. it says, "according to records with the department of veterans affairs, you were stationed in the republic of vietnam during your military service." >> david pitts: right. >> byron pitts: and you got this letter, you thought what? >> david pitts: well, somebody h

i have been working on the vietnam war for quite some time.but coming in there, we began an overhaul of the curriculum that involved putting much more emphasis on to counterinsurgency because we had a lot of new marines coming in from iraq, the new director who came in and actually served in the first battle of falluja where the one where american marines went and and were stopped halfway. and i was put in charge of a course that focused on counterinsurgency and looked particularly at foreign cultures, and interagency operations. in order to do that i had to go through the outside my comfort zone and look at a lot of other insurgency that it wasn't all that familiar with. and ended up for the course picking a lot of the cases that actually appear in the book. so we tested some of them, found some work better than others. and i've include the ones that i think are most helpful. in the course of teaching this, i got to talk to lots of marines. would also have a lot of army, air force, navy civilian international students. and it was really an ey

the one that didn't get much attention was a vietnam. we had many arguments about vietnam. i was skeptical about the war, as was that. there were others who were gung ho, let's say. but herman looked for what i would go basically a technical solution. and he developed a lot of ideas, sort of ideas about warfare, but also about gadgetry, technological gadgetry. much of his thinking lead but later became known as mcnamara line. in vietnam, which as you know was not very successful. japan took a lot -- i wasn't aware actually of the second book in japan but the first book on japan really was sort of in hindsight, a misreading of where he went there although it adsorb public attention and people really thought that that was the country of the future. now we're doing the same with china, i think. but i'm glad to hear the second book. and then finally the year 2000, the year 2000 was decades away. 33 years i think the way. so it was really far away, and he had all sorts of little interesting aspects of the year -- what he expected the year 2000. and one was that people would walk

he was shot down over north vietnam and was the longest serving prisoner of the vietnamese and probably the most abused of those who lived and survived. >> if ever, all the rest was laundered and i shut down the previous year, kept by himself there and a longtime. >> and subsequent to his release he came to the united states and became senator from alabama and he has authored a remarkable book, it is called "when hell was in session". which is about his experiences, all those many years when this vietnamese tried to break camp here, they tried to break every betty. and it was he, admiral denton, who when forced to appear in a propaganda film, he did two things. using his eyelids he blinked out the word torture and got the word out that they were being tortured, and he said that he didn't know what was going on because he was in prison and but what everett is the government said he believed it and he supported it and that turned him even more vicious abuse. so admiral denton, congratulations. on a life of service to your country. as far as i'm concerned was way above and beyond the call

and he conveyed that impression because there was the beginning of strong opposition to the vietnam war on the part of the american people. and they blamed the reporters

normalized diplomatic relations with vietnam. the freedom of information act.e media fairness doctrine. the 1973 roe v. wade decision. the toughest environmental consumer and health safety laws that have been passed since that time. reform of the presidential primary system and delegate selection rules. union rights for public sector employees. the first collective bargaining rights for farmworkers. fundamental reform of school and university curricula. freedom of sexual desire and a decline of censorship. expanded participatory rights for many marginalize minorities. from college students to disabled americans. that's a short list. and time does wear on reform. it's not that these reforms are all that we wanted, or all that that they were in their heyday. it's a 50 year process that we have been through. but we shouldn't forget that our everyday lives have been changed in these fundamental ways. and i think that's probably why, if i can go to the second part of the book, why -- if you look back from barack obama's election, 50 years backwards, see how it all t

i was too young to be drafted or a fight in vietnam, but obviously it's going very generation.and when the ford foundation and susan barrus and that many people said, vietnam is now one of our most natural allies, but there is one big stopping it. it's the fact that we left agent orange and we sprayed it all over and we haven't cleaned it up yet and we had forgotten about it. but every day their kids with with birth defects, there's fishermen who can't fish in the legs because of the dioxin we laughed. this is where the aspen institute or other entities can come in. the american government could not easily admit all the blame for this and be liable for every birth defect or every possible, you know, illness or so in vietnam. but the american government wanted to do something. it couldn't do it directly so what we did is raise money from ford foundation, gates foundation and others. we cleaned up the dioxin and agent orange that was last at the airbase that contained it. the military has been good, the u.s. government under bush and now wonder obama has but two or 3 million each

vietnam was bipolar. the country was either in support of what had been the republic of vietnam and alliance with the united states, or was in support of the legacy of hope she men -- of hoesch seameof ho. they became united around an anti colonial ideology. they were willing -- they were disciplined enough to take enormous losses. in the end, they were able to put together a conventional force. we were never defeated by the viet cong. we are vietnamese allies and were overcome by a conventional force. afghanistan is not bipolar. i cannot do the math on how many parties there are. i would argue that what is going to happen, and i might take issue takemarc on this, -- i might take issue with marc. it depends as much as what happens in afghanistan as what happens in washington. with their multiplicity of institutions and associations and relationships, they really want what almost anyone wants, and that is security and the opportunity to protect and grow one's family. we are in trouble in that in this out o

. -- what we were trying to do in vietnam.mocratic caucus, good morning. caller: i would like -- democratic caller, good morning. caller: i would like to know what we're doing to capture bin laden. are we missing the point here? we have lost so many american lives. we have doubled the amount of casualties of 9/11. at what point will we achieve our objective? guest: with love, i am sure, to capture or kill bin laden. -- we would love, i am sure, to capture or kill bin laden. that is not our only objective. our objective is that the united states will be secure. and that can happen if the bin laden's or the taliban do not have a place from which to operate. we want to make sure that the afghan government can secure its people and can secure its territories about groups like al qaeda can operate from there to attack us here in the united states. -- cannot operate from there to attack us in the united states. the way to do that is to support the people and be sure that they are not providing a base for al qaeda. host: talking abou

to vietnam to join its first brigade already there, which we did that december. in march, 1968 in vietnam, lieutenant colonel becton and his second 17th calabresi squadron joined the brigade task force which i commanded. his airborne, freight squadron airborne now equipped with armored personnel carriers and later attached tanks had welcome power to the task force fighting alongside vietnamese army and profit units. sergeant robert patterson of the 17th calvary was awarded one of the three medals of honor, earned by members of the second brigade taskforce during the month of heavy fighting in which with our vietnamese friends we drove up the north vietnamese army and this set on january january 30th had alarmed the tet offensive and that security to the countryside. on june 22nd, 1968 the president of the republic of vietnam radicalized that task force performance by placing a bedle stream bearing the vietnamese cross of gallantry on the colors of the second brigade and figuratively on the colors of each task force units. recognizing that the credit for that awar

he had vietnam in mind. and so i find the book filled with salient points and interesting as heck, but it forced me again to think back to those early days of truman and eisenhower and kennedy and johnson and was i being as absolutely balanced as i could have been? i hope i was and i'm really not sure. but thank you for that question. >> thank you. >> we have about five or should we wrap it? >> i think we're ready to wrap. >> ok. [applause] >> thank you so much. >> my pleasure. thank you, sir. >> and we thank marvin for his participation this morning and this concludes our regular meetings and you've been a great group. all of you in our tv audience, this is the washington center seminar and it's a wonderful experience for college students from 60 colleges and universities around the country and we're all delighted to be part of it. and we thank you very much. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> coming up, remarks from

war that was fought on the ground if the whole of the vietnam and communist, the rest would quicklyfollow. the so-called domino effect. as it happened the dominoes fell not in asia in the 1970's but eastern europe in 1989. we shouldn't forget either that thanks largely to the huge population of china, more than one-fifth of humanity still live under what may be regarded as communist rule. up until 1989 there were 16 communist states as i would define them. oddly there are 36 countries today which were at one time communist. that contradiction is to be explained by the fact the soviet union, one state broke up and became 15 states and czechoslovakia and yugoslavia also broke up so there'll be were 16 communist states but there were 36 countries that were communist and today there are five common is countries, china, vietnam, laos, north korea and cuba. the first three have been developing market economies on a substantial private sectors. the hybrid regimes, political economist economically not. china has been described as a state of party cabalism. archaeologically is a world away f

how can you address the situation in vietnam?nt of not only the bloggers in vietnam, but some of the buddhist monks and nuns and others who have been subjected to harassment. vietnam has made so much progress and is just moving with great alacrity into the future, raising the standard of living of their people, and we do not believe they should be afraid of commentary that is in turmoil. in fact, i would like to see more governments -- if you disagree with what a blotter or a website is saying, get in and argue with them. explain what it is you are doing. put out contrary information. point out what the pitfalls are in the position that the blogger might be taking. i hope vietnam will move more in that direction because i think it goes hand-in-hand with the progress we have seen in the last few years there. >> thank you. up in the back. >>Ñi i am with the association r competitive technology. madam secretary, you mentioned that companies have to do the right thing, not just what is good for their profits. but what if i am a compa

prestige that i think these are similar to some of the argument that were made during the vietnam war, if vietnam went to the communists, you know, all these bad things would happen which never really happened. now i think we can continue to use law enforcement and intelligence airstrikes, special forces, to contain al qaeda and any of those potential sanctuaries, including afghanistan and pakistan if we have to. and i think containing the taliban instead of just contain al qaeda makes the problem worse because you have the foreign occupation. so, but i think we need to pressure pakistan to and get them to do what they can. now, they don't do it we can do we need to keep al qaeda contained within the least footprint available. so, do no harm should be the first u.s. objective. and i'm afraid we are not doing that. we've actually encouraging islamic militancy in the cold war years, too, as a bulwark against communism but we're still doing doing that inadvertently by occupying muslim soil. and bin laden must be pleased by both obama surge and bush's excursion to iraq. so i think we need

is this what ronnie saw in vietnam, alan wondered, it looks similar to the news reels they watched in the states. they steered the black smoke as the black smoke rose from the building casualties. the dark haze hovered above dietrich much more ominously in the smoke the ford plant puffed into the south and every day. alan wanted to get out of here, finished college and by an ice house in a neighborhood where you didn't have to take windows shut to keep the soot from coming in or worry if you keep your car outside it wouldn't turn rusty brown. ford motor company brought them all to this neighborhood this house and. italy on the wrong side of you tracks of the ford railroad. from the west with a management-led it was completely obscured from view. the south and was a neighborhood full of immigrants, children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren to read the all came on the promise of a job and pay. the work negative and always, italians, armenians, serbians and syrians were among them. the syrians came mostly from villages that in 1943 had become part of the lebanon. but only after the

i hope that vietnam will move more in that direction.s we have seen in the last few years there. >> madam secretary, you mentioned that u.s. companies have to do the right thing, not just what is good for the profit. what if i am a company and i have a subsidiary in china and the chinese government is coming after my people? what can the state department do? >> we speak out on those individual cases. we're hoping to engage in a very candid and constructive conversation with the chinese government. we have had a positive year up very open discussions with our chinese counterparts. we have established a foundation of understanding. we disagree on important issues with them, they disagree on important issues with us. we want to encourage and support increasing openness in china because we believed that it will further add to that do not growth and the democratization on local level that we see occurring in china. -- we believe that it will add to the growth and democratization on a local level that we see occurring in china. on individual c

military in vietnam with the government is now demanding compensation for damages.to have caused serious medical conditions and american soldiers who served in vietnam. the new american foundation and washington monthly magazine hosts this event. >> thank you all for attending. we really appreciate you all being here today. my name is paul glastris. i'm the editor-in-chief of the washington monthly and a senior fellow here at the new america foundation so on behalf of the washington monthly and a new america thanks for coming. we are here today to discuss this special report just released in the current issue of the washington monthly called the "the agent orange boomerang" which you can read it washington monthly.com. am ghaffari start ridges monta thanked america come less thank the staff of the washington and the ford foundation for his support. from 1962 to 1971 the u.s. military sprayed close to 20 million gallons of the herbicide agent orange across vietnam to defoliate dense jungle in order to better protect personnel and equipment from north to south and to

he had vietnam in mind. and so i find the book filled with salient points and interesting as heck, but it forced me again to think back to those early days of truman and eisenhower and kennedy and johnson and was i being as absolutely balanced as i could have been? i hope i was and i'm really not sure. but thank you for that question. >> thank you. >> we have about five or should we wrap it? >> i think we're ready to wrap. >> ok. [applause] >> thank you so much. >> my pleasure. thank you, sir. >> and we thank marvin for his participation this morning and this concludes our regular meetings and you've been a great group. all of you in our tv audience, this is the washington center seminar and it's a wonderful experience for college students from 60 colleges and universities around the country and we're all delighted to be part of it. and we thank you very much. [applause] >> because when i come to these meetings they see the very vividly the revitalization, which is now going on in this country. first of all,

the war, vietnam, etc. civil-rights, the mccarthy period, fear. herblock died a couple weeks before 9/11. you have an extraordinary range of history captured in these cartoons. i hope you will find it of interest. it is the kind of thing that will serve as a reminder. i want to talk about herblock rhythm-and-blues great cartoonist he was, boy from chicago. it is so interesting that "the protest psychosis: how schizophrenia became a black disease" 11 was this unpatriotic liberal and so forth a. he was a boy of the middle west. herblock grew up in the political party. that was a different republican party at the time. you can look at the changes in his style. when i came to washington in 1957 i had never met herblock but my father was an admirer of his. i was from new york. herblock's cartoon that appeared every day in the new york post which was the most liberal paper. hard to believe. now it is the murdoch paper. herblock was a great figure. i met herblock when i was a young reporter and he was complimentary of what i was doing on civil-rights. wh

he had vietnam in mind. and so i find the book filled with salient points and interesting as heck, but it forced me again to think back to those early days of truman and eisenhower and kennedy and johnson. and was i being as absolutely balanced as i could have been? i hope i was, but i'm really not sure. but thank you for that question. >> thank you. >> well, we have about 5 or should we wrap it? >> i think we're ready to wrap. >> okay. [applause] >> marvin, thank you so much. >> my pleasure. my pleasure. >> this is your payola. >> oh, wow! thank you, sir. >> a nice washington center tote bag. and we thank marvin for his participation this morning. and this concludes our regular meetings. and you've been a great group. all of you and our tv audience, this is the washington center seminar. and it's a wonderful experience for college students from 60 colleges and universities around the country. and we're all delighted to be part of it. and we thank you very much. [applause] >> all right, ladies and gentlemen,

james traub on joe biden and john neumann, an author, discusses kennedy's handling of vietnam and compares it to policy in afghanistan. live, at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c- span. . . but this is what it looked like number 21st 1989 -- the speaker. this was the first televised session for the british house of commons. joining us by telephone to talk about this is the comptroller of the bbc pollard -- the comptroller of the bbc tv. what do you see looking back at this 20 years? >> we now regard the decision to televise this as a matter of inevitability. very few look back and think they did something remarkable. at that time, it was a momentous decision. it had been turned down many times, until eventually the decision was taken to go for it. >> the leadership at that time -- what was its position? emma margaret thatcher was >> margaret thatcher was against televising the house of commons. they thought it would turn it into something quite different. the vote was taken, despite her influence. >> there was an 18 month trial period. >> there was a long period after the vote before televising actua

luther king jr., for instance, you know, also was a critic of racism, and he protested against the vietnam war and called attention to urban and rural poverty, and he had a different actual life than often is described and remembered as kind of this figure the who, you know, somehow gave this great i have a dream speech, but there was some hard edge parts of dr. king's portfolio. >> guest: that's an important point. and especially one worth mentioning. we're about to celebrate dr. king's birthday, january 18th. dr. king has really been shorn of his complexity and really his radical edge. i mean, king is one of the most vociferous critics of american democracy. he describes america as the piggest purveyor of violence in the world by 1967. and we have to take note that his riverside speech april 4, 1967, in new york city when he first comes out against the vietnam war in a very robust, public way is given one year to the date before he's assassinated in memphis. so when we think about king tweps between 1965 and '68, even two years before riverside, by the time king is going to chicago, and

[laughter] >> prexy, you go first. >> i think that was a very important one, and that was the vietnamnd the relationship and clarity the panther party about resisting the vietnam war, and the other one just very briefly, i am very-- i don't think a lot of people know how deeply it really went, but since i was a bit involved in that it was a very close relationship between the panther party here and the mozambique liberation front. the current president of most lumbee, armando gib lucette talks to this day about meeting the leadership of the panther party over on the west side on medicine avenue and in fact he said to me not long ago, he said prexy, is there a monument to the panther party on the west side of chicago? and i said, no mr. president there is no monument. and i am just thinking, what is it that we have got to do to put up a serious monuments on the west side to the panther party. [applause] >> i guess i think most prominent influence was probably-- because the panther party embraced the notion that violence is a kind of a catalyst to evolution come to kind of the certifica

is expanding the war and beginning to bomb the capital of north vietnam. this particular reporter did not report that story. i think he did the right thing. let us say in another circumstance less dramatic and politicians on capitol hill, this did happen to me, following a meeting at the senate foreign relations committee came to me as we were walking out and said, marvin, this is off the record, but let me tell you that the democratic majority is going to try to move a resolution condemning this particular aspect of policy. i said thank you, senator, thank you very much. i walked away. he had said this was off record. now we are all clear -- i have to go to a close year -- off the record means you're not to use the information under any circumstances off the record. there is then on the record which means go with it as best if you wish. then there are two intermediate categories. one is background and one is deep background into a government official in the city says to a reporter this is on background what the official really means is use the information

the division was preparing to move by air to vietnam to join its first brigade, already there, which we did that december. . . earned by members of the second brigade task force, during the month of heavy fighting, in which with our vietnamese friends, we drove out the north vietnamese army units that on january 30, had launched the at the time owe -- tet offensive and brought security to the countryside. on june 22, 1968, the president of the republic of vietnam recognized that task force performance by placing a battle streamer, bearing the vietnamese cross of gallantry with palm on the colors of the second brigade and figuratively on the colors of each task force unit. recognizing that the credit for that hayward goes to our soldiers, -- award goes to our soldiers to truly earned it, julius and i wore that decoration with pride. so those few months in 1968 are just part of the remarkable life in and out uniform of julius becton. for whose lifetime achievements the association of the united states army presented to him two years ago the george catlin marshal award. so here to descr

that was the vietnam one. and the relationship and clarity of resisting the vietnam war.the other one very briefly, i don't think a lot of people know how deep it really went. since i was involved in that, it was a very close relationship with the mozambique liberation front. the current president of mozambique talks to this day about meeting the leadership of the panther party over on the west side on madison avenue. he said to me not long ago, is there a monument on the west side of chicago? and i said there is no monument. i am just thinking one of the things we have got to do is put up a serious monument on the west side. [applause] >> i think the most prominent influence was the panther party really reached the notion that violence is a catalyst to revolution to assert your agency in the face of overwhelming oppression. this provided a way for the panthers to theorizes that. to a certain extent my own state -- the panthers -- his book was required reading for panthers. when you go to meetings we had to read certain portions of the red book, trying to acquaint us with

in vietnam he heard a higher call. his ultimate sacrifice saved the lives of several of his fellow soldiers by selflessly absorbing an explosion of an enemy grenade within his own body. it was an act of valor and heroism for which the medal of honor was created and for which it is solemnly reserved. today the medal of honor retains pride of place on mary langhorn's wall as a tangible symbol of the respect and honor her son earned from the american people. passing h.r. 3250 today affirms the pride of riverhead by remorializing one of its most distinguished citizens. as they conduct business each day, the people of riverhead who visits the post office will be reminded of p.f.c. langhorn and can reflect on the true value of freedom. they will know that p.f.c. garfield m. langhorn is a national hero and the values for which he gave his life, honor, loyalty and family, will begin forever be memorialized. mr. speaker, i'm grateful to awful my colleagues and the new york delegation for co-sponsoring this -- to all of my colle

csis grew throughout the 1960's as the vietnam conflict grew incrementally. we committed half a million men with body counts, incrementalism, light at the end of tunnel, burke was beside himself with his strategy, national security visor walt came over and we had the young president here and he said, the areas just over the horizon. we're about to break off here in the takeout. that was two weeks before attack. we had an after action on todd. there is a three-star general back from vietnam that came to that end he assured admiral burke that we have actually one in south vietnam because the infrastructure had been destroyed and burke said the general has not aimed at stop yet. using that the battle at washington and the president has decided not to run as commander-in-chief. burke do not maximum the pulliam of three to one psychological human factors, napoleon thought were three times more important than his armies. i was pulled into the assistant into the assistant secretary of state for congressional relations in 1970. he didn't like that, gave me an ultimat

he said the other supporters of vietnam were ready to match. and it is still studying the work and the rest of the world is too quick to pass judgment on them. and you just now said confucius still guides. i don't believe that confucian taught is still the most prevalent because the chinese young people are much more in common with the young people across the globe that inside of china. and also, it is to say that confucian was probably the first theater is, is once again to exhibit the western inability to comprehend the world history and makes it as disconnected as ever. the contemporary areas of other parts of asia, there were thinkers far more profound than confucian. y. that we do that people do not make it is because there are civilization which are much more inward looking. i have one more thing to say. and china's trouble in the future, particularly when china's importing beginning to import far more than it's going to export, and that will be reached quite so big that china has already given controls over to the outside area than withi

>> the vietnam era, they always grew mustaches. when-shaped his mustache and the next day he got shot down. he was not going to say that, he shaved it, and he got shot down. >> what about guys it cannot grow moustaches? >> that is too bad. >> i saw some wearing fake mustaches. >> free-lance journalist david axe was in afghanistan in october and november. you can find these on our web site, c-span.org. in the search box in the upper right-hand corner, type a x e. >> delicate international workers looking for people buried in the rubble of the united nations -- united nations mission. [applause] >> media, move back. >> on 3. >> move it, move it. >> there are two more people stuck under there. >> still alive? do you know? did you speak to them? >> i do not know. it was about 36 to 48 hours ago. >> what was it, tapping? >> it was tapping. >> do you know what direction? to your right. >> on 3. >> watch your step there. >> got it? >> how you feel? >> feetfirst. [inaudible] >> the u.s. house returns tomorrow at 2 eastern to debate a numbe

i want to point out that jesse alcozer is a vietnam veteran. we all know our country did not do vietnam veterans right when they came home, and jesse was listed once in missing action, wounded seven times during the vietnam war. thought to be dead. well he is definitely not dead, because he testified and helped us pass a law not that long ago called "let them rest in peace." we believe in honoring all of those would given their lives. we make sure that their funerals are reverent and dignified. any group that seeks to heckle or disrupt a funeral has to stand aside. that is what the members of the general assembly did not that long ago. this law has worked very well to ensure that we have reverence and dignity of our military funerals. i thank you for that. in closing, i think it is important to understand in our state that that there are those among us who will never be on the front page of the paper or on tv. they are the heart and soul of illinois. their kids to the ones who answer the call to duty. they go for it in the face of danger to def

luther king jr., for instance, you know, also was a critic of racism, and he protested against the vietnam war. he called attention to urban and rural poverty. he had a different actual life than often is described and remembered, as kind of this figure who, you know, somehow gave this great "i have a dream" speech. there were some hard-edged parts of dr. king's portfolio. >> guest: that is an important point. we are about to us celebrate dr. king's birthday, january 18th. king is one of the utmost critics of american democracy. he describes america as the biggest purveyor of violence in the world by 1967. we have to take note that his riverside speeds, april 4th 1967 in new york city when he first comes out against the vietnam war in a very robust public day is one year to the day before he is assassinated. when we think about king, by the time king is going to chicago. he is in chicago to try to transform the slums. he talked about a slum clearance campaign. he is talking about poverty. he is talking about economic marginal losses in a poor people. laborers. king makes a very famous spee

but in other wars, whenever anybody has considered using them, korea or vietnam or afghanistan or whatever, they hardly come up, because there's no good reason to use them. there aren't good targets. korea was relatively smaller in number, they wanted to save them for the big war in western europe. in many respects, when you start thinking about it, you see it's very difficult to see good reasons for them. collin powell is joint chairman of the chief of staff did a study. he sort of looked at it. can we use nuclear weapons in this war? is there -- from a strictly military stand point to do serious damage to just one armored division would require considerable number of stall tactical weapons. if i had any doubts before, this report clenched them. basically, if you are going to have to hit tanks, it's much easier and better to do with conventional weapons. there's no reason to use nuclear. they have no value. the weapons have not been -- the countries that have the weapons, they couldn't figure out a good reason to use them. albert einstein is very famous for having made this statement. he'