they'll also be tied troops in vietnam. the filipinos will be in vietnam. there'll be some new zealanders, vietnam and there'll be south koreans also fighting in vietnam. i talked to some veterans from, from the north vietnamese side and they told me that they were absolutely terrified of the south korean troops they were really really scary the south koreans were really ferocious troops and eventually the communists north creates a special unit to deal with the south koreans because because they're to be so intimidating from the perspective of of communist forces. also little known fact, 35,000 canadians will volunteer to serve in vietnam. so candidates doesn't fight in vietnam, but 35,000 canadians volunteer because they think that's the good fight, which is probably why you lost the vietnam war, we're great fighters. great fighters. so so here's slide's here's 65, right. so so marines initially 3000 of them land ing in in in in in southern vietnam. they're expecting action and what they get is, is young vietnamese women with leis you that in that upper l

we ask only that north vietnam withdraw its forces south vietnam, cambodia and laos in north vietnam also in accordance with the timetable. we include cambodia and laos to ensure that these countries would not be used as bases for a renewed war. our offer provides for a simultaneous start on withdrawal by both sides for agreement on mutually acceptable timetable and, for the withdrawal to be accomplished quickly. the north vietnamese delegates have been saying in paris that political issues should be discussed along with military issues and that there must be a settlement in the south. do not dispute this, but the military withdrawal involves outside forces and can therefore be properly negotiated by north and the united states with concurrence of its allies. the political settlement is an internal matter which ought to be decided. among the south vietnamese themselves, and not imposed by outsiders. however, if our presence, these political negotiations would be helpful, and if the south vietnamese concerned we would be willing to participate, along with the representatives of hanoi,

a post war, vietnam. so when you were there as a junior political officer, could you have imagined what you find when you came back as ambassador spanned those two experiences for us. when we when we were there, i was and i began my time in vietnam in the seventies up there from 1970 to 73. i think i seven months with a private with a u.s. advisory team, one of the provinces mainly dealing ethnic vietnamese who had fled from long knoll's pogrom against in cambodia and then two years in the embassy we had a small group of seven young guys, all men all mostly in their twenties, who spoke vietnamese. and we were out there dealing with the vietnamese every day. the civil society, my kids, religious groups, veterans groups, a lot of angry student groups and we sometimes felt we were like the only americans who were doing that. there day and what we came up with was a sense, yes, there was a real civil war. there were large parts of the population, particularly the catholics, that i was dealing with. the the th

and vietnam i think the same goes for vietnam.so i think tragic legacy is that there is not today a south vietnam and this i think there certainly could have been a south vietnam that would look a lot like south korea today. so thank you very enjoyed the opportunity to speak with you for. thank you, dr. maurer. over the course of several months in 1983, historian and writer frank gannon conducted, eight interviews comprising more than 30 hours with former president nixon in washington from 1971 to 74, dr. gannon was white house fellow and special assistant. the president in san clemente from 1974 to 78, he organized the research and writing of r n the memoirs of nixon. since 1990, he has been a consultant to the nixon foundation. before we return to the second panel. here's a short excerpt about vietnam from the second and third days of the nixon gannon interviews. november 1968. you're president elect. you're looking at options for vietnam. you have been elected with a you've been given a free hand, arguably a mandate for change.

getting out of vietnam vietnam. this is also then raises the question, why are so many americans still supporting war? and one of the biggest failings of lyndon johnson, vietnam, is that he doesn't an attempt to sell american people on the war to explain why this is in our national interest. and he even says this in 1967. if history indicts us for vietnam, it will be for fighting a war without to stir up patriotism. reason he doesn't try to stir up patriotism primarily is that he wanted to be a great domestic policy president. he wanted to like fdr. he his great society, which was going to eliminate poverty and civil and war, distract people's attention from that. so it's all the more remarkable than the american are still largely supportive of the war. and i attribute that to american culture. because a lot of people by now are disenchanted with lyndon johnson, but they recognize that the nation is not a monarchy. we're dependent on a king that even if we're dissatisfied with the president, we have this larger and

the people of vietnam. but we cannot desist and we cannot shrink from this struggle and that was something certainly important for kennedy in 1961 a tough for jfk in foreign policy, in which he allegedly, after the bay of pigs after laos and the decision to pursue a neutral solution for laos after a tough, testy summit with in vienna after, the berlin wall going up in august after the tank crisis in october of 1961. i just can't take another hit essentially in 1961. and even after after the the khrushchev meeting, kennedy says james reston of the new york times, you know, now, now we have a problem of making our our power credible to khrushchev and vietnam is the place. so you hear him saying both things at the same time that it's their war, but we need to remain committed in helping them fight it. and that is a tension that they were never really to resolve. and as as the withdrawal, how to explain the withdrawal. did launch a public relations campaign of a sort after october of 1962. and i would mention i

getting out of vietnam vietnam. this is also then raises the question, why are so many americans still supporting war? and one of the biggest failings of lyndon johnson, vietnam, is that he doesn't an attempt to sell american people on the war to explain why this is in our national interest. and he even says this in 1967. if history indicts us for vietnam, it will be for fighting a war without to stir up patriotism. reason he doesn't try to stir up patriotism primarily is that he wanted to be a great domestic policy president. he wanted to like fdr. he his great society, which was going to eliminate poverty and civil and war, distract people's attention from that. so it's all the more remarkable than the american are still largely supportive of the war. and i attribute that to american culture. because a lot of people by now are disenchanted with lyndon johnson, but they recognize that the nation is not a monarchy. we're dependent on a king that even if we're dissatisfied with the president, we have this larger and

vietnam. there are so many books that on the vietnam war, on president kennedy. and of course, fred has a book on the subject. what prompted you to do another book on the subject and particularly studying the withdrawal plan? president kennedy around the vietnam war. and how is it different from other books that have come before? well, thanks for the question and thanks for creating the opportunity for me here and everybody else at the miller center not only to participate in this event, but really to help me write the book because without the miller center community, that really would have been impossible. and the book itself is a little unorthodox, as you note. there really aren't all that many books on kennedy and vietnam. there are a handful of one in 85. and then a few in subsequent decades, and some of them are quite targeted. some are thin, some are very comprehensive. what i set out to do was not to write a composite sense of account of kennedy vietnam, but really to on something much narrower, which is this withdrawal plan that was undertake and during t

the end of the war that people, soldiers wanted to go back and and see vietnam, not see vietnam, but see where they fought. and the hanoi quite sort of suspicious about this sort of had had a security officials take the americans around because they thought there doing some spying or something. later they realized that this was a source of hard currency and they should be encouraged to come back and on. and so various people got involved in giving these veterans. and one of them was a translator for, frankie and me, when we went back to vietnam and halberstam and others named control. and in in danang and mr. cohn told us this wonderful story. he early in the early days, we would take these groups of veterans and they would say, okay, we just don't want to go to the sun valley. we want to go to hill for 52, which is where we during that battle, this or this month or and so these guys were getting a little bit older these veterans and they were getting little more out of shape and so contra and and the other guys would sometimes sort of cheat a little bit they'd take them to the coast

vietnam. mark has served in vietnam. marcus was, a musician, still is. and through that experience and can talk to us about that as well. so i'd like to begin by talking imagery. vietnam was the first war that was televised. most of us who lived through it remember seeing on television every day that was different from other wars. it was not movietone news that we were experiencing, but something much more direct and profound. and mark, you're an image maker. you spent your time during this period capturing images. can you talk a little bit about your own work as a photographer? what drew you to this kind of work and how saw images in forming public opinion about the war? well, first of all, let me say i feel to be on these panels with all these people who are just you, such experts. this. i'm just a photographer. i'm not an expert on the vietnam war. i was there from the summer of 69 until the end of 72, and then i returned 75 and covered the fall of cambodia and, then the fall of vietnam. i'

and i believe in spite vietnam. but if i want to make sure i get this right, that you were one of the military who spoke out against the invasion of iraq in 2000. i read about that, indeed. okay. talk a little bit about why you as a career military officer, when once again, your president was saying we're doing this because we think it's in the best interests of the united states. why you who would never have disobeyed an order in the military stood up and said, as what you did forthrightly, that this is a mistake or whatever it was you said. talk about how you came to that view. so in that happened and i'll start off with at the war college, we send our best and brightest to at the age of 41, 42 years old, to to the war college. every service has one. and the army, when they start off with welcome practice, owners of the military are. we're going to talk about two things. one, the rest of government application to foreign policy and vital or national interests and a vital national interest or an existential interes

to prevent future vietnam. we americans are a do it yourself people and instead of teaching someone else to do a job we like to do it ourselves and this trade has been carried over to some foreign policy. in korea and then again in vietnam. the united states furnished most of the money and most of the men who help the people of those countries to help with the freedom against communist aggression. before any american troops are committed to vietnam. a leader of another asian country expressed this opinion to me when i was travelling in asia as a private citizen. he said, when you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, u.s. policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them. well, in an i -- in accordance with that. i laid down three guidelines for policy for asia. the its will keep all of its treaty commitments. we shall look at the threat of a nation or whose nation we consider vital to our security. third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furn

we want the status quo in north and south vietnam then that air power campaign could show to south vietnam. and i put it here in north vietnam and even our allies look at us resolve when we're in in this cold war environment, this our resolve against communism, then the more practical ideas are, hey, we need to do some kind of system of strategic destruction of north vietnamese ability to make war. and as we got in the text where, there are all the metaphors all the material really coming from for them to make this war. is it vietnamese industry or not? all right. so this is what but this is the idea this and not only a strategic to go after the transportation system base, but also to prevent that stuff from moving around. so that becomes that transportation line. that's the reason ford is even if stuff is coming from the outside to help prevent that from keeping north sustained, make them feel the pain of war. likewise, let's do an interdiction on operational interdiction campaign that prevents that from going from the north down to the south, and primarily through laos. right? so but so

what was its role in vietnam? david: well, for anyone who lived through the vietnam war at any level, the heli is always known as slick because the helicopter he flew there were no guns visible. it looked like a heli and no gun ship. that was the ubiquitous level of the war. helicopters were used to transport soldiers quickly and efficiently to wherever the fighting was. because this was not a war of territory. military leaders would select the locations would where they would have battles. and then they would move large numbers of troops very quickly in these helicopters to the site of the battle where ever it was in south vietnam. they were used to wage the war. helicopters were also gun ships. they would fly to wherever the battle was and use their weapons to wage war. they were also used to clear battle site. they used agent orange to clear the foliage. they would drop these tons and tons of chemicals onto the jungle's beneath them. helicopters did all of that. ultimately, they also were used to rescue the inj

i got to vietnam. i remember getting there on a plane from vientiane, and the plane was going along and so on, and suddenly went almost vertically to a land and the we got out and they said, well, you know, they were mortaring the airport just now. and so we had to do that. so then i got through the customs and so forth, and i was met by a. friend and he said, we've got to hurry. and i said, why? he said, because i have a tennis game. and he did. so i thought, you know how, how do i write about that? and that evening we went to not he and i, but you know, the whole press corps gang went to a birthday party given by the sailors for nbc correspondent for his photographer girlfriend, and it was on the roof, the caravelle hotel and. there was roses and champagne and there were firing in the distance all the time. was of it was outgoing, but some of it was incoming. and we heard even. gunfire in the streets just below. and nobody paid any attention at all except me and i thought, well, how do i write about

in 1963 south vietnam was in disarray. the unpopular and autocratic president was deposed in a cru backed by the us, and the cab level was at the center of the war reporting action. the caravel hotel proved its usefulness and bust them to the headlines of november, 1 of the 1963 that was when there was a military coup de tom against the calvin. to present that note, and seeing which led to the assassination of the president and his brother and the costs of that action. over 24 hour period. the center of side gone was of, was own. the press retreated in effect to the carol dial hotel. and that was when many of the story is with basically of not date line. the carol, the way certainly mentioned that a lot of the we was saying was from the caravel. the u. s. military officially joining the war in 1964 and hundreds of reporters, camera crews and photographers descended on psych on hotels quickly filled up the passage 8 in building the hotel continental, the majestic and of course, the cat, ravel. it became a desirable location

in 1963 south vietnam was in disarray. the unpopular and autocratic president was deposed in a qu, backed by the u. s. and the caravel was at the center of the war reporting action. the caravel hotel proved its usefulness and burst under the headlines. november 1 of 963. that was when there was a military, coud a tar against the calvin to president node and z m, which led to the assassination of the president. and his brother, in the course of that action of 24 hour period, the center of saigon was of, was zone. the press retreated in effect to the caravel hotel. and that was when many of the stories were basically of not dateline and the caravel. we certainly mentioned that a lot of the, what we were saying was from the caravel, the u. s. military officially joined the war in 1964 and hundreds of reporters camera crews and photographers descended on saigon. hotels quickly filled up the passage in building the hotel continental, the majestic and of course, the caravel. it became a desirable location for journalists, partic

oh tell who ah ah ah, oh g min city in vietnam. once sy gone the old capital of south vietnam at its heart islam soon square, where journalists, diplomats, military staff and spies, rub shoulders in its famous hotels during the vietnam war. ah, the area around love salt square. you've got the caravel on one side, the continental on the other, the old passage, a den where the a p office was in my office, the nbc office, and the vis news office. all of these agencies were there and then down the other end of the square, the wrecks hotel. this was the nucleus of the life that we led as war correspondence. at that time. this is the sy gone that we knew a very small but very pivotal area of shy god where we sort of made our home for a number of years. 2 0, the caravel was built shortly after the 1st into china war in 1954. at 10 stories. it was the tallest building in the city. and it became a significant base for reporters who arrived in saigon in the early 19 sixty's to cover the vietnam war. joan gardner once a general manager of the

troops from vietnam. nixon had begun this process in summer of 1969, taking our troops out in increments of 30, 40, 50,000. everyone know in the peace movement said this is a trick. he's expanding the war. he's accelerating the bombing. what he's doing in cambodia, laos, vietnamization nothing great about changing the color, the corpses, and certainly there was merit in these claims. but was the fact that by the fall of 1972, the had almost no combat in south vietnam. and since both nixon and kissinger viewed arvin the south vietnamese military as lacking in effectiveness. this created a necessity for administration to make a rapid peace agreement. i also one add here that kissinger recognized the danger troops withdrawals from the outset, as did the u.s. in saigon, and also. but this was one line nixon power. he believed that these withdrawals were absolutely to counteract the piecemeal and convince the country he ending the war were one step ahead of the share was the nixon phrase. and by this he meant