since the dissolution of the warsaw pact, wisdom statesmen found it difficult to give nato a clear one. they have shilly-shallied on four major questions facing their lives. should russia be regarded as a potential threat or partner? russia may be about to answer that in clearer fashion than we would like. should nato turn its attention to out of area where most of the post cold war threats such as nuclear proliferation now lie. should nato admit the new democracies of central europe as full members with full responsibilities as quickly as prudently as possible? should europe develop its own defense identity in nato even though this is a concept driven entirely by politics and has damaging military implications. such questions tend to be decided not in the abstract, not at intergovernmental conferences convened to look into the crystal ball, but on the anvil of necessity and in the heat of crisis. that is exactly what happened in the long-running crisis over bosnia. at first, the supporters of the european foreign policy and the european defense identity declared the former yugoslavia