why wouldn't it be natural they may want a weapon. >> we must not allow iran to have a nuclear weapon. >> it could lead to a nuclear arms race in the middle east. >> they are a designated state sponsor of terrorism. >> this is a state threatening to annihilate israel. [ chants ] >> we can't get on iran's back and say you can't have nuclear arms, but we can. >> a nuclear armed iran would bring stability to the region. >> you'll never be invaded if you have nuclear weapons. >> who presents an existential threat to all. >>> we have ambassador, former iranian nuclear negotiator and ambassador to germany, and ambassador lincoln bloomfield, former assistant secretary of state under president george w. bush. thank you for joining us, gentlemen. ambassador, before you think we are insane with the premise, we are asking the question why shouldn't iran have nukes or why can't they. fully understood iran says it does not want nukes. we are asking the question. it's a fair question. if everybody else can, if other countries can, why can't iran j nuclear weapons. >> two reasons why is religious is

every pathway to a nuclear weapon is cutoff. and the inspection and transparency regime necessary to verify that objective will be put in place. because of this deal iran will not produce the highly-enriched uran i um that formed the materials necessary for a nuclear bomb and because of this deal iran will remove two thirds of its installed center fuges, machines necessary to produce highly enrichedus raniun for a bomb and they will be under constant supervision and will not use center fuges for uranium for the next decade and get rid of 98% of its stockpile of en enriched uranium and they currently have a stockpile for ten nuclear weapons and it will be a fraction of what will be required for a single weapon. this stockpile limitation will last for 15 years. because of this deal iran will modify the core of its reactor in iraq so it will not produce weapon's grade platunium and spend fuel out of the country for the lifetime of the reactor. for the next 15 years iran will not build any new heavy water reactors because of this de

have we cut off all pathways for iran to obtain a nuclear weapon? particularly the oh -- covert nuclear operations. that's where the work that the iaea, our international inspectors they have great credibility in this area. will they have the access that we need. because we do need to know about their prior military dimension in order to be able to go forward to make sure we can contain any covert operations. these are questions that we are going to ask. we have read the agreement, and we still have questions, and we hope we'll get answers as to whether we have effectively prevented iran the ability to make nuclear weapons. are the snapback proposals adequate? that's an issue that i hope we will have a chance to talk about. at the end of the time limits in the agreement, iran will have the capacity to expand -- as the chairman rightly pointed out, to an industrial capacity. they can get to their uranium enrichment. that they can do. do we have sufficient capacity knowing their commitments for non-proliferation, knowing the requirements of the additi

-- cheap weapons.ollaboration is that i have to launch weapons ery potential pinpoint because i do not knowow whichch ones willet shot down. if my weapapons couldollaborate and talk to one anotother as they are making theirir way to the target, if all of the weapons that were going to target were lost in the course of the defenses, i could redirect weapons and allow em go to go to that target. vago: talk to us abt hypersonic energy. what is the e potential role o these are systems? >> we are talking about individual aircraft sorties being abable to strike will target for sorting. what if the warheadsf the future, each one can strike scores of target, such as a cruise missile wita high-powerered microwave warhead that is a counter electronics capability? "go through contested territory have great effecon the sysystem's pow. vago: how do the platforms change the equation? >> what we'reaying is if you're going to increase the standoff from an enemies operational area and a out of the region, then you need

weapons are against islam. they could be lying. i am libertarian, and that is my default opinion of all politicians. we have sit saddam hussein who used chemical weapons, and iran's leadership wanted nuclear weapons to counteract the other weapons. they insisted, no weapons of mass destruction. to contrast that, the israeli prime minister, has come over the last 19 years, predicted the eminent breakout of nuclear weapons. he published a book with precision saying that within three years, iran with would have nuclear weapons. it strikes me that terms of credibility of the major players in the middle east that would have overblown this threats. guest: what we do know now is the potential breakout time for iran developing a nuclear weapon would be to-three months. maybe you are right, maybe they wouldn't, but they do have the capacity and the fuel that at this moment could provide for what the president said in the morning, could be 6-8 nuclear weapons. it is no reason for us to take chances with iran. what this d

making sure that get a nuclear weapon. the deal by our allies, our partners the p5+1, achieves that goal. it achieves our top priority. making sure that iran does not get a nuclear weapon. we have always recognized that even if iran does not get a nuclear weapon iran still poses challenges to our interests, and our values both in the region and around the world. so when this deal gets implemented we know that we will have dismantleed the immediate concerns around iran's nuclear program. we'll have brought their stock piles down to 98%. we'll have significantly reduced the number of centrifuges that they operate. we'll have installed unprecedented inspections regime, and that will remain in place not just for ten years but for, for example on the stock piles will continue for 15 years. iran will have pledged to the international community that it will not develop a nuclear weapon, and now will be subject to an additional protocol a more vigorous inspection and monitoring regime that lasts imperpetuity. we will have disabled

nuclear weapons. in an interesting way, the russians have not broken consensus despite the fact we're sanctioning them on ukraine. this is the time for negotiations. reflecting on the history of the 9/11 era, we should exhaust diplomacy. if it fails, we always have the military option. that is the proper sequence. >> one of my concerns was raised by ambassador burns. you addressed your opinion on this. the idea that this agreement would result in saudis and gulf states moving forward. they are at the one yard line to getting to the nuclear program. there is no doubt in my mind going 99 yards, they are going to do it. if they are going to get it anyways, wouldn't any decision wouldn't they have done it anyway? is not any agreement that is going to make them go forward with their own nuclear programs. the absence of an agreement they are going forward anyway can at least i believe that. i think it is kind of a moot point about the other countries moving forward. any of their panelists have a view on tha

invest in nuclear weapons. that is a -- that makes the middle east even more literally explosive. officials within the saudi government have already said to people if an agreement enables iran to become a nuclear weapon's power, they will not wait until that happens. they will build up their own capacity. the fact that, i looked at this from the point of view of america. is as much more risk for america and reward for iran than it should. governments in the middle east are also making the same calculations throughout the arab world. they will take actions. if we think it is a bad deal, they will think it is a terrible deal. it is their neighborhood. the result will be exactly the opposite of what was hoped for here which is a more peaceful middle east. it will be a much more violent and potentially explosive, middle east. >> the more the administration argues if this deal is a vote for war, the more you take off the table to use military power. i don't think anyone believes that is a realistic option of the mom

every pathway to a nuclear weapon is cut off. the inspection and transparency necessary to verify that objective will be put in place. because of this deal iran will not produce the highly enriched uranium and plutonium that give the necessary to build a bomb. the machines necessary to produce highly enriched uranium for a bomb and store them under constant international supervision. iran will not use its advanced centrifuges for enriched uranium for the next decade. they will get rid of 98% of their eweuranium. they have a stockpile that could produce up to ten nuclear weapons. because of this deal it will be reduced to a fraction of what is required for a single weapon. this stockpile limitation will last for 15 years. because of this deal iran will modify the core of its reactor in iraq so it will not produce weapons grade plutonium and it has agreed to shift the spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the lifetime of the reactor for at least the next 15 years, iran will not build any new heavy water reactors. becau

every pathway to a nuclear weapon is cut off. the inspection and transparency regime necessary to verify the objective will be put in place. because of this deal, iran will not the produce the highly enriched uranium and weapons based plutonium that form the raw materials necessary for a nuclear bomb. because of this deal iran will re move two-thirds of the installed centrifuges, the machines necessary the to produce highly enriched uranium for a bomb and store them under constant international supervision. iran will not use its advanced centrifuges to produce enriched uranium for the next decade. iran will get rid of 98% of the stock pile of enriched europe. to -- uranium. iran currently has a stock pile that could produce up to ten nuclear weapons. that will be reduced to a fraction of what would be required for a single weapon. this limitation will last 15 a years. because of the deal the iran will modify the core of the reactor in iraq so it will not produce weapons-grade plutonium. it has agreed to ship spent fuel from are t

speakers ] >> -- hin obviously is a very potent weapon. it would kill tens of millions of americans -- >> that would depend -- >> but it could -- >> i said it is highly variable.

weapon you just defined which the potential of them having a nuclear weapon. and if indeed, they are translating their slogans into policy of death to america and death to israel, then getting the nuclear weapon is everybody's first imperative here. that is what we focused on. because we knew you could get tangled up one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist. you could be fighting forever on the issue of sunni, shia, definitions of who is protecting whom and you won't get anywhere. you will literally not get there. and that is why we separated those activities. that does not reduce our commitm as we've defined here again and again to push back on every one of those activities. but it is easier to push back an iran that doesn't have a nuclear weapon than one that doesn't. >> senator manchin has one question i believe. >> just one question very quick. and i read and i want to go over this and any reaction you may have far he'd zachary and i rode this back home. let's imagine the opponents of the nuclear agreement with iran get their way. the united st

than having to build their own weapon? >> of course. >> of course. >> always watching the north koreans. we saw them build a plutonium reactor in the eastern syrian desert and it was detected just at the last minute, and just to spin off what senator lieberman talked about with regard to the sunnis and how they will respond to this. one very possible scenario is the saudis will go to the pakistanis in order to get nuclear devices to balance what they view to be the iranian threat. >> so what we have is basically a situation where we have not refrained from supporting the democratic elements in iran, which is the real solution, and it's getting rid of the mullah regime and getting a democratic government in there that doesn't seek to possess nuclear weapon, but, of course, we have actually undermined that opportunity by -- over these last six years, and in fact this agreement may undermine it further and i thank you all for your testimony today and i think that you have given us a lot to think about, and i would hope that a

israel if iran obtains nuclear weapons j. >> they won't obtain a nuclear weapon. i'm confident that they're not going to secure a nuclear weapon. >> is that in part of your statement that this administration is willing to use whatever means necessary of a military nature to prevent iran from having nuclear weapons? >> that's the backup to it, but i believe all the elements to this agreement if implemented fully, again if implemented will prevent them from even getting near that possibility. >> on occasion you used the phrase all options are on the table. do those options to prevent iran from having nuclear weapons include the use of nuclear weapons by the united states? >> i have never asked--i've never asked--i know of no president of the united states who has ever taken all military options available to them off the table. but i also don't know of any any realistic situation which that would pre-sent a very feasible strategy given the process i want of great friends of ours in iran, i don't think they have taken--there is no option that has been discussed. >> wh

north korea in 2003 the country's blatant pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic weapons, courtney kealy has more. >> reporter: north korean state television shows pictures of massive rallies in pyongyang in support of north korea's withdrawal from the nuclear arms treaty which became effective january 11th, 2003. this news conference says the united states as our enemy and vowed to bring north america into a see sea of fire and hell. then secretary of state colin powell called that a sad statement of what north korean leaders think of their own people. >> their failure to comply with their own obligations and their failure to do what they were supposed to do under not only international agreements but the framework with the united states. we hope the north korean leadership will realize the folly of its action he will realize that the international community and the united states will not be intimidated. >> reporter: north korea had threatened for years to drop out of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty when they finally did it took less than a month to announce the reactivation o

this guy has chemical weapons. this guy has a biologic weapons production capability and this guy is reconstituting his nuclear weapons program. that is what the analysts believe. they turned out to be wrong. all of these people who looked at this question turned out to be wrong and we can talk about why but it turned out to be wrong. the reason i apologize to colin powell was twofold. one is i think colin powell is a remarkable man. i think he served his country with great distinction in job after job after job after job. he deserves the stellar reputation that he had going into this u.n. speech. this u.n. speech and he did not say anything at the u.n. that the cia and the rest of the intelligence community did not believe. this u.n. speech tarnished his reputation. he's the first person to tell you that i've heard him say that the iraq wmd presentation at the u.n. is going to be on his tombstone. he has carried this with them. i've also heard him say that nobody from the cia ever apologize to me. i was the number

the preliminary deal reached with foreign mediators covers tanks and smaller weapons systems, those weaponsuld have already been pulled out under february's ceasefire but both sides have accused each other of continue to go use them. >>> women's rights groups in india are calling for a ban on instant divorces by muslim men. currently men can divorce their wives simply by saying the word tala k three times and some even use facebook or skype to do it. faiz jamil reports from new delhi. >> reporter: she has been looking for answers, her husband who was working in saudi rain i can't phones her one night and said the word three times. that was all it took for him to divorce her. >> translator: it's not fair that men say it and it's all over. the wife should also have a say. end ago i marriage by just saying it. alak isn't right. >> reporter: the is let's i can civil loud is protected under the interim i can't understand constitution. so the indian government is working on them some indian women's groups say that needs to change. >> many, many such issues involved when you just do it abruptly. t

they will make it a weapon. secretary carter one note to say : in addition, i think it's significant that the agreement codifies with the p5+1 that iran will never get a nuclear weapon. senator brown's: -- senator rounds: it appears in each time i've heard the discussion it comes back to over a period of ten years we have something in terms of the agreement that restricts them. if you intend and 15 years, we change, and in that time, they can because there is nothing in the agreement which stops them from moving back into and adding to their nuclear capabilities. if they are a threshold state today and we have delayed them that is one thing. but at -- but if they can pursue options, that is what we are trying to decide. along that line, general density, i appreciate your thoughts earlier when you said you were pragmatic with regards to your comments. it seems to me that we had an embargo in place that many of us were relying on when it came to an arms embargo and also with icbm. you indicated on july 7 of this y

for nuclear weapons forever. now, how do we enforce or verify so that that is more than words? and particularly to speak to the ranking member's question "what happens after 15 years?" what happens is forever. we have an extremely rigorous inspection verification regime. because iran has agreed to accept and will ratify prior to the conclusion of the agreement and with if they don't it is a material breech of the agreement to ratify the protocol. which requires extensive access as well as significant additional transparency measures. including cradle to grave for the country's uranium from mining to milling through the centrifuge production to the waste for 25 years. bottom line, if iran fails to comply with the terms of our agreement, our intel community our energy department which is responsible for nuclear weaponry, are absolutely clear that we will quickly know it and we will be able to respond accordingly with every option available to us today. and when it comes to verification and monitoring there is absol

he is the only president who has developed a weapon to deploy that. and iran now has -- we all don't like it, but whether we like it or not, iran has developed experience with a nuclear fuel cycle. they have developed the ability to produce the material for a bomb. and we can't bomb that knowledge away. nor can we sanction the knowledge away. remember, sanctions did not stop iran's nuclear program from growing steadily to the point that it had accumulated enough material to produce those ten nuclear weapons. by the way they didn't choose to produce them, unlike north korea that created a nuclear weapon and exploded one, and pulled out of the npt, iran has done none of that. the truth is the vienna plan will provide a stronger, more comprehensive, more lasting means of limiting iran's nuclear program than any alternative that has been spoken of. and to those who are thinking about opposing the deal because of what might happen in year 15, 16, or 20, remember, if we walk away, year 15, or 16, or 20 starts tomorrow. and without any of the long-term verif

every pathway to a nuclear weapon is cut off. and the inspection and transparency regime necessary to verify that objective will be put in place. because of this deal iran will not produce the highly enriched uranium and weapons grade plutonium that form the raw materials necessary for a nuclear bomb. because of this deal iran will remove two-thirds of its installed centrifuges, the machines necessary to produce highly enriched uranium for a bomb and store them under constant international supervision. rob will not use its advanced centrifuges to produce enriched uranium for the next decade. iran will get rid of 98% of its stockpile of enriched uranium. to put that in perspective iran currently has a stockpile that could produce up to ten nuclear weapons. because of this deal that stockpile will be reduced to a fraction of what would be required for a single weapon. this stockpile limitation will last for 15 years. because of this deal iran will modify the core of its reactor in iraq so that it will not produce weapons guede plut

weapon. a nuclear bomb. they will all be pretext will come to an end if some of the countries want to announce that we prevented iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. the whole world knows very well that manufacturing of a nuclear bomb based on a fatwa by the leader is considered -- forbidden by religion and also a wrong action. iran has never sought to manufacture a nuclear weapon and will never seek manufacturing of a nuclear weapon. in case of an agreement or absence of an agreement. so if they want to speak of any achievement, they should speak of a real achievement. the real achievement is that a new atmosphere has been created in the region for the sake of cooperation at the regional and global levels. i deem it necessary to send all those people who have played a role in order to attain this historic deal i wish to appreciate the great nation of iran for its steadfastness and resistance in the past 12 years in the face of pressure and which wish to thank the leader of the islamic revol

. >> iran getting a nuclear weapon is unacceptable. that's why we put the sanctions in place and got this deal. but the point is this deal is far more effective than military action in preventing them from getting a weapon. so time license, the estimates are a military strike could set their program back by a year, two years, three years. it would also frankly almost guarantee they would go underground and try to develop the weapon. this deal gets ten years limitations strictest, 15 years of limitations on stockpile. that alone is more time than a military option. diplomacy is less costly than a military action and more effective in preventing them from getting a nuclear weapon. >> rose: we conclude with analysis from david sanger jeffrey goldberg, karim sadjadpour and congressman ed royce. >> it's a huge triumph for diplomacy in that three years ago these were two countries who didn't even talk to each other. now for the past year on and off, they have been sitting in the hotel rooms behind me, the coberg palace, spending more time wi

if the weapons -- six, if weapons are trafford transferred to hezbollah during the five-year period, which is a violation of the u.n. resolution, but also a violation of the interim agreement, would that constitute a violation and cause snapback? in these intervening five years, if arms are sold to hezbollah? and finally, what will happen to the u.n. security resolution specifically the listing of the arms embargo and the provisions if congress does not approve the agreement? do those remain enact? -- do those remain intact? and the last question, secretary lew, they described the process in which noncompliance in the agreement might result in sanctions snapping back to the u.n. but this would likely only work in major violations. how would the administration treat minor violations? i invite, maybe to start with you, secretary lew. the ones you can't get to, i appreciate your answers and thank you for the work you have done. >> i'll start with the snapback question. we have reserved the right to snapback in whole or in part. obviously, if there's a small technical violation, that wil

or two weapons there. the agreement to reduce that stockpile from 12,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms, that's a 98% reduction, and that 300 kilograms of what we're told is 3.6, 3.7 low enriched eweuranium, that's a level of enrichment you need for nuclear power stations. you would need to take that 300 kilograms and reduce it massively to enrich it up to weapons grade. there simply isn't enough to the 300 kilograms to make a bomb. that's the sort of numbers we're talking about here carol. >> nic robertson, many thanks for that. you know i always like to deal in facts. thank you so much. nic robertson reporting live for us. let's head to the white house and check in with white house correspondent michelle kosinski. michelle you heard john boehner say it paves the way for a nuclear iran this is a terrible deal. what are other lawmakers saying this morning? >> reporter: we're hearing a lot from them. the white house is saying that the president welcomes the opportunity to speak to congress. we know that he call

iran getting a nuclear weapon is unacceptable. that's why we put the sanctions in place and got this deal. the point is, this deal is more effective than military action in preventing them from getting a weapon. a military strike would set their program back by two or three years. it would almost guarantee they would go underground and try to develop that weapon. this deal gets 10 years of limitations that are restricted, 15 years on stockpiles. that alone is far more time than you would ever get through a military option. the diplomacy is less costly than military action and you are preventing them from getting a nuclear weapon. charlie: and you have to go to congress to get this done. the president has a veto that would be hard to overrule. tell me what it is that you see and the team at the white house sees as the most difficult challenge in convincing congress this is a good deal. ben: charlie trusts iran. that's what we hear time and again. our point is going to be, it has nothing to do with trust. the whole point is to get t

that there was weapons. we're still -- i don't want to go back -- but we're still -- i think we should learn a lesson because we're still paying for that. we didn't do everything that we could first. because if we did everything we could first, and they still had escape withes, we could have done what we did any way. so here we are again with the opportunity. i agree that this is not perfect. i don't know any perfect bill that has ever been made in this united states congress. ever in the history of our country. not one. i'm not looking for a perfect bill. >> no, no i agree. the correct question you just framed it. is this deal good enough that we should avoid sliding from that position into a position that any deal is better? >> i agree, but we also got to keep in context that we're not dealing by ourselves or doing it unilaterally. everything i hear -- most saying is -- just us. forget about the other five partners to this deal. this is what the can -- there's other negotiations. i think leadership applies

weapons sanctions will remain in place for five years. economic sanctions will be lifted in return for iran cutting back on its nuclear program. >>> at least one person was killed and 11 are missing following flash flooding in eastern kentucky. the water moved so fast it swept a house off its foundation. more wet weather is expect today. >>> an autopsy finds no evidence b.b. king was poisoned before he died in may. tests by the las vegas coroner show the cause of death was alzheimer's disease. two of the blues legends adult children claimed he had been murdered. they believe king's business manager and personal assistant sped up his death at 89. >>> 50 cent says he doesn't have a dime to his name this morning. the rapper and actor whose real name is curtis jackson iii filed for personal abruption protection. it comes days after he was to pay $5 million in a lawsuit. he owns a 50,000 square foot mansion. >>> this morning fans of author harper lee are delving into her new being. lee's much anticipated novel "go set a watchman". some partici

if the weapons -- six, if weapons are transfers to hezbollah during the five-year period, which is a violation of the u.n. resolution but also a violation of the interim agreement, would that constitute a violation and cause snapback? in these intervening five years, if arms are sold to hezbollah? and finally, what will happen to the u.n. security resolution specifically the listing of the arms embargo and the provisions if congress does not approve the agreement? do those remain enact? and the last question, secretary lew, they described the process in which noncompliance in the agreement might result in sanctions snapping back to the u.n., but this would only work in major violations. how would the administration treat minor violations? i invite, maybe to start with you, secretary lew. the ones you can't get to, i appreciate your answers and thank you for the work you have done. >> i'll start with the snapback question. we have reserved the right for snapback in whole or part. obviously, if there's a small technical violation, that will not bring back the whole sanctions regime. th

or weapons program as of 2003. they continue to enrich but believe the weapons development specifically stopped years ago. this is what americans diplomats would tell you. they had a covert program enrichment that's really raised concerns, really raised issues but that is why you had those difficult statements from secretary kerry that officials tried to walk back a few weeks ago saying when he said he know what they did in the past, we're worried about their future, we don't want that coming clean, as bret said it's not so much coming clean they're not asking that because that basically would be too difficult for iran to do in the negotiations. but they want some questions and some form of the answer here. >> one of the things, the number i think is 18, they have a list of 18 scientists that they want to question about the past programs, but what iran is saying, this seems to be a very important issue for iran, they're saying, listen in the past we gave you names of sign tills and they were killed. >> rose: exactl

it's their weapons trafficking.can get into human rights violations and all the other things they are guilty of and an ayatollah sending a tweet out that has the image of -- some said it's the president. some said it's american and someone wearing an american lapel pin. these are evil people and they'll continue to expand in areas they can be. they've violated 27 international agreements or treaties. they've violated some of the terms of the nonproliferation treaty. some of that language is similar n the agreement we have here today. they are dangerous. i understand why you'd be concerned with the nuclear threat because it could limit other options if it existed. so my question is if this deal goes through what does our posture look like in the middle east and with our partners over the next two years? what looks measurably different to make us feel like we're in a position to make it untenable to the iranian leadership to move forward with a nuclear weapon. >> when we talk about iran, it's really the regime. >> no

that is not weapons grade. they will not have the weapons grade uranium to make a nuclear device because of the restrictions of the plant. right now the obama administration has said publicly that iran maybe two to three months with from a nuclear weapon. with a steal and there's no dispute about this, for the next 10 years as the program is frozen iran will be a year away from a nuclear weapon. something the administration can make a case whether you agree with him or not on the ultimate deal that the program is going to be frozen. the plutonium and uranium enrichment programs and that i think is an important attribute of this deal. second, iran will now be subjected to inspections that is never been subjected to before, 25 years under the additional protocol of the iaea inspections. third, should iran cheat, i assume they will try given the past record where they have lied to us, to the united nations in the past, then we have the ability to impose sanctions congress would, but then it would have the opportun

of a nuclear weapon. i understand they still have obligations under their nonproliferation treaty and they still have obligations with the additional proceeded calls under the nbt but can you tell us how much lead time we will have, what a breakout looks like after the 15 years and what assurances do we have that we will be able to detect and take action before iran becomes a nuclear weapon state after the 15 years? >> first of all, senator, after -- throughout the entire life of the agreement, the additional protocol provides for the right of access, and that is where the 24-hour notice access comes from and they have to respond to it. so if we had any intelligence regarding a suspicious activity or suspicious site i might add among many, israel, countries in the region, we will have an incredible amount of sourcing for this and we would be able to put the ask to them and they have to respond to that and if they don't respond to that we have the ability to convene and vote and put back in place sanctions

was to be pursued just had nuclear weapons. geraniums are genuine when they say they are not seeking to develop nuclear weapons. >> mr. speaker, president rouhani the supreme leader will make the weapons he has. there will be some within the iranian power structure including some as the military structure i'm sure was still after the idea of nuclear weapons at some point in the future. >> jerry corbin. >> i'm pleased the agreement has been reached. a huge step forward. as a result, does the foreign secretary think there is a possibility of holding the middle east weapons of mass destruction conference in the last treaty review supported by all parties including iran and this is surely a great opportunity to push forward to and proliferation in the whole region. >> the honorable gentleman has been a supporter of the approach for a long time. the government supported the u.k. has been advocating this conference and moving forward on this agenda. removing the arabian issue i don't think it tells was of the problems we have in brin

weapons. on heavywater, iran has agreed to have no reprocessing. if you have no reprocessing, it is impossible to make a nuclear bomb from heavywater. i run has agreed to export spent fuel iran has agreed to export spent fuel. if you are exporting fuel, it is impossible to make a nuclear bomb. iran has agreed to reduce plutonium to one kilogram, which would be non-weapon grade plutonium. all major measures assuring that iran would not make nuclear bombs from heavywater is already agreed. then we go to enrichment. on enrichment also iran has , agreed to confidence building measures on non-diversion of uranium enrichment to facilities. iran has agreed to in ridge below 5%. as long as enrichment below 5%. iran has agreed to reduce. iran has agreed not to have enrichment activities. therefore, i would say all measures assuring that uranium iranian heavywater and enrichment facilities would not direct toward weaponization. although all of these measures are beyond npt, and iran has agreed to measur

weapons. iran has agreed to have reprocessing. if you have no reprocessing, it is impossible to make a nuclear bomb from heavywater. if you are exporting fuel, it is impossible to make a nuclear bomb. iran has agreed to reduce plutonium to one kilogram, which would be non-weapon grade plutonium. all major measures assuring that iran would not make nuclear bombs from heavywater is already agreed. then we go to enrichment. iran has agreed to confidence building measures on non-divers and of uranium -- by version measures -- non-diversion measures. iran has agreed to reduce. iran has agreed not to have enrichment activities. therefore, i would say all measures assuring that uranium heavywater facilities, and enrichment facilities would not direct toward weaponization. all of these measures are beyond -- iran has agreed to measures beyond npt as a goodwill. the problem is with excessive demands, far beyond protocols. charlie: you are opposed to this deal. bret: the reason my iran is being put to t

one weapon was located in the vehicle and two weapons were located on his person. two additional weapons were recovered at the scene. those weapons belong to service members and they were -- at least one of the weapons was discharged at the subject. whether he was struck by those individuals is unclear at this time. the autopsy results are pending and once we get those we'll make that determination. >> reporter: weapons? >> as far as any authorization of weapons it's not relevant to our investigation. that's an investigation that will be conducted separately by the military and they will address it at some point when they have completed their investigation. >> reporter: miguel al mamaguer with nbc news. i'm curious if ballistic reports have come back that all of the victims were shot by the gunmen and not officers responding trying to take down the shooter. >> i can tell you -- and the question is and i'm not sure you had the mic up high enough for everybody to hear. were the ballistic reports returned that would indicate whether or not the shooter -- the victims,

they agree with us that iran can't have a nuclear weapon. and so we don't have diplomatic leverage to eliminate every vest img of a peaceful nuclear program in iran. but we do have the leverage to make sure they don't have the weapon. that's exactly what we have done. so to go back congress i challenge those who are objecting this agreement to number one read the agreement before they comment on it. number two, to explain specifically where it is that they think that the agreement does not prevent iran from getting a nuclear weapon. and why they are right and the experts are wrong. why the rest of the world is wrong. and then present an alternative. and if the alternative is that we should bring iran to heel through military forces those critics should say so and that will be an honest debate. all right. >> prime minister netanyahu said you have a situation that iran can delay 24 days. >> i am happy, that is a good example. let's take the issue of 24 days this is swirling today, and the notion that this is insufficient in terms of inspection

you can't have a nuclear weapon. and they're not in a stronger position to get a nuclear weapon at that point. they're in a weaker position than they are today. and, by the way, we haven't given away any of our military capabilities. we're not in a weaker position to respond. so even if everything the critics were saying was true that at the end of ten years or 12 years or 15 years, iran now is in a position to decide it wants a nuclear weapon that they're at a breakout point, they won't be at a breakout point that is more dangerous than the breakout point they're in right now. they won't be at breakout point that is shorter than the one that exists today. and so why wouldn't we at least make sure that for the next ten, 15 years they are not getting a nuclear weapon and we can verify it? and afterwards if they decide if they have changed their mind we are then much more knowledgeable about what their capabilities are, much more knowledgeable about what their program is and still in position to take whatever actions w

for nuclear weapons forever. now, how do we enforce or verify so that is more than words? and particularly, to speak to the ranking members question, what happens after 15 years? what happens is forever. we have an extremely rigorous inspection verification regime because iran has agreed to accept and will ratify prior to the to the conclusion of the agreement. and if they don't, it's a material breach of the agreement to ratify the additional protocol, which requires extensive access as well as significant additional transparency measures. including cradle to grave accountability for the country's uranium. from mining to milling through the centrifuge production to the waste for 25 years. bottom line if iran fails to comply with the terms of our agreement our intel community, our energy department, which is responsible for nuclear weaponry are absolutely clear that we will quickly know it and we will be able to respond accordingly with every option available to us today. and when it comes to verification and mon

weapons. with this agreement, the core will be removed and iran will not produce any weapons grade plutonium. without this agreement, the i.a.e.a. would not have definitive access to locations suspected of conducting undeclared nuclear activities. with this agreement the i.a.e.a. will be able to access any location declared or undeclared to follow up on legitimate concerns about nuclear activities. there can be no question that this agreement will provide a stronger, more comprehensive and more lasting means of limiting iran's nuclear program than any realistic, realistic alternative. those who criticize and those who spend a lot of time suggest that go something could be better have an obligation to provide an alternative that in fact works. let me add this. while the nations that complies the p5 plus one obviously don't always see eye to eye on global issues, we are in full agreement on the quality and importance of this deal. from the very beginning of this process, we have considered not o

i cannot agree it does not dismantle iran's ability to produce a nuclear weapon. the iaea will be permitted to use advanced technologies technologies that due national laboratories have in fact developed. much has been made about a 24-day process for ensuring inspectors getting access to undeclared sites. in fact the iaea can request access to any suspicious location with 24-hour notice. the jcpoa goes beyond that baseline recognizing that disputes could arise, and provides a crucial new tool for resolving such disputes within a reasonable amount of time. again, this is the first time that there actually is a cut off in time. but of course most important is environmental sampling provides extremely sensitive measurements of micro skropic traces of nuclear material. the combination of the agreements technical measures and the coherence of the p5-plus-1 dramatically increase the ability to detect movement towards nuclear material. the -- blocking the covert path i should emphasize will also rely on the work of the american intelligence community and those of our fri

for one weapon? talking about enriching uranium. 14 years, given the limitations on the types of centrifuges they are operating and the numbers and the stockpiles they have in their country, the breakout timeline to get enough fissile material will go to at least a year. there's a second breakout timeline which is how long did it a two build a device, weapon to put that material into. charlie: i think the president insisted that if everything else fails, the military option is ill write on the table and he is prepared to use it. ben: absolutely. iran getting a nuclear weapon is unacceptable. that's why we put the sanctions in place and got this deal. the point is, this deal is more effective than military action in preventing them from getting a weapon. a military strike would set their program backed by two or three years. it would almost guarantee they would go underground and try to develop that weapon. this deal gets 10 years of limitations that are restricted, 15 years on stockpiles. that alone