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The Council on Foreign Relations
And The American Decline

by James Perloff

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The Council on Foreign Relations
And The American Decline

by
James Perloff

WESTERN ISLANDS

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PUBLISHERS
APPLETON, WISCONSIN

First printing, October 1988 10,000 copies

Second printing, March 1 989 5,000 copies

Third printing, June 1989 5,000 copies

Fourth printing, November 1989 25,000 copies

Fifth printing, June 1990 15,000 copies

Published by

Western Islands

Post Office Box 8040

Appleton, Wisconsin 54913

414-749-3783

Printed in the United States of America
ISBN: 0-88279-134-6

Contents

Foreword vii

Chapter 1 A Primer On The CFR .3

Chapter 2 Background To The Beginning . . . 19

Chapter 3 The Council's Birth And Early

Links To Totalitarianism 36

Chapter 4 The CFR And FDR . . . . . 53

Chapter 5 A Global War With Global Ends . . 64

Chapter 6 The Truman Era 81

Chapter 7 Between Limited Wars 101

Chapter 8 The Establishment's War In Vietnam ..,..,., 120

Chapter 9 The Unknown Nixon .,......;... 141

Chapter 10 Carter And Trilateralism . . .154

Chapter 11 A Second Look At Ronald Reagan , : . ... ,, . .167

Chapter 12 The Media Blackout 178

Chapter 13 The CFR Today 191

Chapter 14 On The Threshold Of A New

World Order?. . , 199

Chapter 15 Solutions And Hope .210

Footnotes , 223

Index # 239

Acknowledgements •:.....,- ••♦■*■ 253

Foreword

There is good news and there is bad news. The good news is, this
book has been written, The bad news is, it's true.

Certain people in high places are going to dispute the validity of
this book, they will probably try to discredit it, because they have
a vested interest in concealing their activities and agenda.

But I encourage anyone who reads The Shadows of Power to note
its painstaking documentation. This is no opinion piece; it is an
assembly of hard facts that state their own conclusions.

You can check information in this book against its sources, which
are noted. One thing I find interesting is that its revelations are not
new. They have always been available — but available like a news
story that is tucked under a small headline on page 183 of a Sunday
newspaper, Anyone who goes to a fair-sized library can probably
find copies — however dusty — of Admiral Theobald's The Final
Secret of Pearl Harbor, or Colin Simpson's The Lusitania, or From
Major Jordan's Diaries. John Toland's epic Infamy is on bookstore
shelves today. And though it may mean microfilm, you can obtain
access to the old Congressional Record. Lots of powerful stories are
buried there, and I mean buried, because the mass media ignored
them.

The book is especially unique because it not only describes scores
of underreported events, but elucidates them by showing their com-
mon thread: the influence of the internationalist Establishment of
the United States. If the Establishment is elusive in its identity, it
certainly has a perceptible face in the Council on Foreign Relations,
and that is what the author has centered on.

The Shadows of Power

This is not juat a book about an organization. It is a book about
history. You might call it "the other side of American history from
Wilson on" because it tells the "other side" of many stories that even
the self-proclaimed inside information specialists, such as Jack An-
derson and Bob Woodward, didn't or wouldn't report.

It has been said that those who do not know the past are condemned
to repeat it. But how can we truly understand an incident in our
American past if we are confined to the headline version, designed
for public consumption in the interest of protecting the powerful and
the few? The Shadows of Power has resurrected eight decades of
censored material. Don't let anyone censor it for you now. Read the
book and decide for yourself its merit. Your outlook^ and perhaps
your future itself, will never be the same.

James E. Jeffries

United States Congressman (Ret.)

vui

THE SHADOWS OF POWER

Chapter 1

A Primer On The CFR

Speaking before Britain's House of Lords in 1770, Sir William Pitt
declared: "There is something behind the throne greater than the
king himself," thus giving birth to the phrase "power behind the
throne-*

In 1844, Benjamin Disraeli, England's famed statesman, pub-
lished a novel entitled Coningsby, or the New Generation. It was
well known as a thinly disguised portrayal of his political contem-
poraries. In it, he wrote: TT]he world is governed by very different
personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the
scenes."

Felix Frankfurter, justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, restated this
in an American context when he said: "The real rulers in Washington
are invisible, and exercise power from behind the scenes." 1

Frankfurter was not alone in that assessment. During this cen-
tury, the existence of a secret U.S. power clique has been acknowl-
edged, however rarely, by prominent Americans.

On March 26, 1922, John F, Hylan, Mayor of New York City, said
in a speech:

The real menace of our republic is the invisible government which,
like a giant octopus, sprawls its slimy length over our city, state and
nation. At the head is a small group of banking houses generally
referred to as "international bankers," This little coterie of powerful
international bankers virtually run our government for their own
selfish ends. 3

The Shadows of Power

In a letter to an associate dated November 21 1 1933, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote:

The real truth of the matter is, as yon and I know, that a financial
element in the large centers has owned the government ever since the
days of Andrew Jackson . . . 3

On February 23, 1954, Senator William Jenner warned in a
speech:

Today the path to total dictatorship in the United States can be
laid by strictly legal means, unseen and unheard by the Congress, the
President, or the people. . . . Outwardly we have a Constitutional gov-
ernment. We have operating within our government and political sys-
tem, another body representing another form of government, a bu-
reaucratic elite which believes our Constitution is outmoded and is
sure that it is the winning side ... All the strange developments in
foreign policy agreements may be traced to this group who are going
to make us over to suit their pleasure .... This political action group
has its own local political support organizations, its own pressure
groups, its own vested interests, its foothold within our government,
and its own propaganda apparatus. *

The Establishment

There is, of course, in America, what we have come to call "the
Establishment," This expression was popularized by English writer
Henry Fairlie in an article about Britain's ruling circle. It was used
in the U.S. during the Vietnam War as a term of scorn. Today it is
a legitimate word in its own right, defined by the American Heritage
Dictionary as "an exclusive group of powerful people who rule a
government or society by means of private agreements and deci-
sions," The idea of such an arrangement naturally rankles most
Americans, who believe that government should be of the people at
large, and not a private few.

Who or what is the American Establishment? A few books have
depicted it, but these have rarely attained much circulation or pub-

A Primer On The CFR

licity — perhaps for no other reason than the Establishment prefers
to remain "behind the scenes."

Columnist Edith Kermit Roosevelt, granddaughter of President
Theodore Roosevelt, described it as follows:

The word "Establishment 11 is a general term for the power elite in
international finance, business, the professions and government,
largely from the northeast, who wield most of the power regardless
of who is in the White House,

Most people are unaware of the existence of this "legitimate Mafia."
Yet the power of the Establishment makes itself felt from the professor
who seeks a foundation grant, to the candidate for a cabinet post or
State Department job. It affects the nations policies in almost every
area. 6

In the public mind, the American Establishment is probably most
associated with big business and with wealthy, old-line families. The
sons of these families have long followed a traditional career path
that begins with private schools, the most famous being Groton.
From these they have typically proceeded to Harvard, Yale, Prin-
ceton, or Columbia, there entering exclusive fraternities, such as
Yale's secretive Skull and Bones. Some of the brightest have traveled
to Oxford for graduate work as Rhodes Scholars. From academia
they have customarily progressed to Wall Street, perhaps joining
an international investment bank, such as Chase Manhattan, or a
prominent law firm or brokerage house. Some of the politically in-
clined have signed on with Establishment think tanks like the
Brookings Institution and the Rand Corporation. As they have ma-
tured, a few have found themselves on the boards of the vast foun-
dations — Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie. And ultimately, some
have advanced into "public service" — high positions in the federal
government.

For the latter, there has long been a requisite: membership in a
New York-based group called the Council on Foreign Relations —
CFR for short. Since its founding in 1921, the Council has been the
Establishment's chief link to the U.S. government. It is the focus of
this book.

The Shadows of Power

What is the CFR?

Historian Arthur Schiesinger, Jr. has called the Council on For-
eign Relations a "front organization" for "the heart of the Amer-
ican Establishment/* 6 David Halberstam, in his acclaimed book
The Best and the Brightest, dubbed it "the Establishment's un-
official club." 7

Newsweek has referred to the CFR's leaders as "the foreign-policy
establishment of the U.S." 8 Richard Rovere, writing in Esquire mag-
azine, saw them as "a sort of Presidium for that part of the Estab-
lishment that guides our destiny as a nation." 9

The Council describes itself as a "nonprofit and nonpartisan mem-
bership organization dedicated to improved understanding of Amer-
ican foreign policy and international affairs." It is headquartered in
the elegant Harold Pratt House at 58 East 68th Street in New York
City. As of June 1987, the CFR had 2,440 members, including many
prominent persons in business, government, law, and the mass me-
dia. Membership is by invitation only.

The Council holds frequent meetings and dinners which feature
a speech by a guest — usually a ranking statesman from Washington
or a foreign country — followed by a discussion with members. These
meetings follow a rule of "non-attribution," meaning that everything
is off the record. Violation of this rule is considered grounds for
dismissal from the CFR. The Council explains that its no-quote pol-
icy is to encourage candor, but economist John Kenneth Galbraith,
himself a former member, has called it "a scandal" "Why," he asks,
"should businessmen be briefed by Government officials on infor-
mation not available to the general public, especially since it can be
financially advantageous?" 1 "

Pratt House also conducts fifteen to twenty study groups every
year. Each is assigned a particular foreign policy topic, and meets
regularly to deliberate it. The findings of a study group are custom-
arily published, often in book form.

Five times a year, the Council puts out a journal called Foreign
Affairs. In addition to serving as a mouthpiece for CFR members,
it carries articles — some ghostwritten — by American and foreign
dignitaries. Although notorious for being boring, Foreign Affairs is
widely read by those involved with making foreign policy, and has

A Primer On The CFR

been called by Time magazine "the most influential periodical in
print." 11

The CFR undertakes other activities, such as its "Corporate Pro-
gram" that indoctrinates businessmen in international matters. The
Council's annual budget is about $8,5 million, which is mostly funded
by foundation grants, members' dues and contributions, and pub-
lication revenue. And it has affiliates called "Committees on Foreign
Relations" in thirty-eight cities around the United States.

More Than Just a Club

The Council, while remaining largely unknown to the public, has
exercised decisive impact on U.S. policy, especially foreign policy,
for several decades. It has achieved this primarily in two ways. The
first is by directly supplying personnel for upper echelon government
jobs.

Few Americans know how a President chooses his administrators.
The majority probably trust that, aside from an occasional political
payoff, the most qualified people are sought and found- But the CFRs
contribution cannot be overlooked. Pulitzer Prize winner Theodore
White said that the Council's "roster of members has for a genera-
tion, under Republican and Democratic administrations alike, been
the chief recruiting ground for cabinet-level officials in Washing-
ton." 1 ^ The Christian Science Monitor once observed that "there is
a constant flow of its members from private life to public service.
Almost half of the council members have been invited to assume
official government positions or to act as consultants at one time or
another/'™

Indeed, Joseph Kraft, writing in Harper's, called the Council a
"school for statesmen." 14 David Halberstam puts it more wryly:
"They walk in one door as acquisitive businessmen and come out
the other door as statesmen -figures." 15

The historical record speaks even more loudly than these quotes,
Through early 1988, fourteen secretaries of state, fourteen treasury
secretaries, eleven defense secretaries, and scores of other federal
department heads have been CFR members.

Defenders of the Council say such enumerations are misleading
because some officials are invited into the Council after appointment

The Shadows of Power

to government. However, close inspection does not reveal this to be
a particularly extenuating factor. Every secretary of state since 1949
has been a member of the Council, and of these, only one, William
P. Rogers, joined the CFR subsequent to appointment.

That an individual enrolls in the Council after entering public
service does not purge bis membership of significance, because the
organization may still influence him considerably while in office.

CFR men who earn high government ranks often staff their de-
partments with Council colleagues. As Anthony Lukas related in
the New York Times in 1971:

[E]veryone knows how fraternity brothers can help other brothers
climb the ladder of life. If you want to make foreign policy, there's no
better fraternity to belong to than the Council.

When Henry Stimson — the group's quintessential member — went
to Washington in 1940 as Secretary of War, he took with him John
McCloy, who was to become Assistant Secretary in charge of personnel,
McCloy has recalled: "Whenever we needed a man we thumbed
through the roll of the Council members and put through a call to
New York"

And over the years, the men McCloy called in turn called other
Council members.**

According to the CFR itself, as of June 1987, 318 of its members
were current U.S. government officials.

The second major way in which the Council affects policy is in
formulating and marketing recommendations. The CFR disputes
that it actually does this. Its annual report for 1986 emphatically
stated: 'The Council on Foreign Relations does not determine foreign
policy . . ." 1T The 1987 report declared: 'The Council takes no insti-
tutional position on issues of foreign policy . • ." 1S

It is true that the Council does not officially advocate policies per
se; however, through its books and Foreign Affairs articles, ideas
certainly are pushed, even if accompanied by statements that a given
work only represents its author's viewpoint.

J. Robert Moskin, writing in the March 1987 issue of Town &
Country, said the CFR "has long sought to influence U.S. foreign

A Primer On The CPR

policy." 19 In his article for Harper's, Joseph Kraft noted that the
Council "has been the seat of some basic government decisions, has
set the context for many more . , . n2 ° Indeed, it is alleged that if you
want to know what the U.S. government will be doing tomorrow,
just read Foreign Affairs today!

Admiral Chester Ward, former Judge Advocate Genera) of the U.S.
Navy, was invited into CFR membership and was shocked by what
he discovered. Although he remained in the organization for nearly
twenty years, he became one of its sharpest critics. In a 1975 book
he coauthored with Phyllis Schlafly, Ward wrote:

Once the ruling members of the CFR have decided that the U,S.
Government should adopt a particular policy, the very substantial
research facilities of CFR are put to work to develop arguments, in-
tellectual and emotional, to support the new policy, and to confound
and discredit, intellectually and politically, any opposition. 21

The Council counters that it is a "host to many views, advocate
of none/ 722 In other words, it is supposedly like a professor who allows
his students to thrash out all sides of an issue; he reveals no prej-
udice* exerts no censorship. Foreign Affairs has never changed a
word in the disclaimer of bias that has prefaced its pages since 1922:

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS do not represent any consensus
of beliefs .... we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS can do more to inform American public opinion by a
broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself
with one school.

The CFR claims to be pluralistic — however, because one can join
only through the nomination of others already in the Council, the
group naturally tends to remain homogeneous. J. Robert Moskin
recounts of the CFR's early days: ** Although the Council itself never
took a position, its members' bias was apparent to all." 23 Richard
Barnet, himself a CFR member, wrote in 1972 that "in recent years
a few symbolic policy critics have actually been recruited, but failure
to be asked to be a member of the Council has been regarded for a

The Shadows of Power

generation as a presumption of unsuitability for high office in the

national security bureaucracy. 1 * 24 And even the New York Times,
itself regarded as an Establishment organ, has acknowledged that
the Council has "a uniform direction," 25

If the CFR does possess a distinct viewpoint, Americans should
know about it — because officials of the U.S, government, drawn so
frequently from the Council's ranks, are apt to take that viewpoint
to Washington with them.

Charges have been repeatedly leveled at the Council that it holds
two particularly unwholesome doctrines.

Of Globalism

The first of these is that the CFR advocates the creation of a world
government, The ultimate implication of this is that all power would
be centralized in a single global authority; national identities and
boundaries (including our own) would be eliminated. It is said that
while the CFR does not always espouse this idea directly, it does at
least insinuate it, as by suggesting measures that would serve as
stepping stones toward this end.

The charge is easily substantiated. Anyone who cares to examine
back issues of Foreign Affairs will have no difficulty finding hundreds
of articles that pushed — whether zealously or by "soft sell" — this
concept of globalism. But he will be hard pressed to locate even one
essay opposing it. This, of course, deflates Foreign Affairs' claim of
"a broad hospitality to divergent ideas."

According to Admiral Ward, the CFR has as a goal "submergence
of U + S, sovereignty and national independence into an all-powerful
one-world government." He wrote that "this lust to surrender the
sovereignty and independence of the United States is pervasive
throughout most of the membership . - ." And he added: a In the entire
CFR lexicon, there is no term of revulsion carrying a meaning so
deep as 'America First/ " 2B

Rather than stand on allegations, let us draw samples from the
CFR's own works.

• An article in the inaugural issue of Foreign Affairs (September
1922) condemned what it called ^he dubious doctrines expressed in
the phrases 'safety first* and 'America first/ J * 27

A Primer On The CFR

• An article in the second issue (December 1922) declared:

Obviously there is going to be no peace or prosperity for mankind
ao long as it remains divided into fifty or sixty independent states , . .
Equally obviously there is going to be no steady progress in civilization
or self-government among the more backward peoples until some kind
of international system is created which will put an end to the dip-
lomatic struggles incident to the attempt of every nation to make itself
secure . , . The real problem today is that of world government^ 8

• A 1944 Council publications American Public Opinion and Post-
war Security Commitments, noted:

The sovereignty fetish is still so strong in the public mind, that
there would appear to be little chance of winning popular assent to
American membership in anything approaching a super-state orga-
nization. Much will depend on the kind of approach which is used in
further popular education/^

• In 1959, the Council issued a position paper entitled Study No.
7, Basic Aims of U.S. Foreign Policy. This document proposed that
the U.S. seek to "build a new international order." The steps it cited
as necessary to achieve this were:

1. Search for an international order in which the freedom of nations
is recognized as interdependent and in which many policies are jointly
undertaken by free world states with differing political, economic and
social systems, and including states labeling themselves as "socialist."

2. Safeguard U.S. security through preserving a system of bilateral
agreements and regional arrangements.

3. Maintain and gradually increase the authority of the U + N.

4. Make more effective use of the International Court of Justice 1 ju-
risdiction of which should be increased by withdrawal of reservations
by member nations on matters judged to be domestic.

• In 1974, Foreign Affairs carried an article by Richard N. Gardner
called "The Hard Road to World Order." Gardner complained that

The Shadows of Power

"We are witnessing an outbreak of shortsighted nationalism that
seems oblivious to the economic, political and moral implications of
interdependence.** He outlined a strategy by which " the house of
world order' will have to be built from the bottom up rather than
from the top down." He explained that "an end run around national
sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece, will accomplish much more
than the old-fashioned frontal assault." 30

• And in the Fall 1984 Foreign Affairs, Kurt Waldheim — former
Secretary-General of the UN and former Nazi — writes:

As long as states insist that they are the supreme arbiters of their
destinies — that as sovereign entities their decisions are subject to
no higher authority — international organizations will never he able
to guarantee the maintenance of peace, 31

Review of the CFR's publication history unearths countless state-
ments similar to the foregoing.

Naturally, everyone would like to see world harmony and peace. But
if the United States traded its sovereignty for membership in a world
government, what would become of our freedoms, as expressed in the
Bill of Rights? How would the rulers of this world government be
selected? And how could a single, central authority equitably govern
a planet that is so diversified? These are unanswered questions that
have darkened the Council's crusade for globalism.

Of Communism

A second, more controversial accusation against the Council is
that it has been "soft** on Communism — so soft, in fact* that its
members have often exerted their influence on behalf of the inter-
national Communist movement. This charge would appear unten-
able at first — considering that "the Establishment," centered on
Walt Street, is conventionally regarded as the antithesis of the rad-
ical left.

But here again, review of the CFR's house organ, Foreign Affairs,
proves very instructive. One finds that dozens of Marxists and so-
cialists have published articles m that journal — even such titans
of Communism as Leon Trotsky, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev,

A Primer On The CFR

and Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito. Indeed, when Trotsky died, he was
eulogized in Foreign Affairs as follows:

He gave us, in a time when our race is woefully in need of such
restoratives, the vision of a man. Of that there is no more doubt than
of his great place in history. 32

On the other hand, if one searches Foreign Affairs for an American
author whose name is popularly associated with patriotism or anti-
Communism, he looks all but in vain.

Lenin so admired the first issue of the publication that he under-
scored passages in some of its articles. 33 The Council today proudly
possesses Lenin's original copy.

The CFR's annual report for 1986 noted: "LWJe were intrigued to
read news reports that Mr, Gorbachev himself was reading articles
excerpted from Foreign Affairs in preparation for the meetings with
President Reagan [the Geneva summit of November 19851 " M The
Soviets were even placing ads for their airline, Aeroflot, in Foreign
Affairs, twenty years before glasnost.

Affinity has always existed between Marxists and the Council,
Quick proof of this is found in the yearly roster of guest speakers
at Pratt House. The 1959 report, for example, listed such leftist
luminaries as Fidel Castro, Anastas I. Mikoyan of the USSR, Oskar
Lange of Poland's state council, Yugoslavia's Marko Nikezic, and a
variety of other socialists. The 1984 report noted the following among
the year's speakers: Robert Mugabe, Marxist prime minister of Zim-
babwe; Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua; Guillermo Ungo, leader of the
El Salvador revolutionaries; Petra Kelly of Germany's far- left Green
party; and three officials from the People's Republic of China.

To be sure, many non-Communists also appear at the Council;
but the hosting of Marxists shows that the CFR has no aversion to
them — and vice versa.

In February 1987, a delegation of top Council members traveled
to the USSR at Moscow's invitation, meeting Gorbachev and other
Soviet officials. The visit was closely followed by the New York Times.

Perhaps nothing demonstrates the rapport between the CFR and
Soviet Union more graphically than a 1961 photo appearing in The

The Shadows of Power

Wise Men, a book published in 1986 by Simon and Schuster. The
picture shows John McCloy — then chairman of the Council — and
Soviet dictator Nikita Khrushchev, swimming together at the lat-
ter's private dacha on the Black Sea. A grinning Khrushchev has
his arm around a grinning McCloy who, according to the text, was
wearing swimming trunks loaned him by the premier himself.

The Council's defenders say the amicable exchanges with Marxists
are simply an indication of its broad-minded pluralism. They point
out that CFR members were among the Cold War's vanguard, and
that Foreign Affairs has printed a multitude of articles criticizing
Communism and the Soviet Union.

It is true that such articles have found space in Foreign Affairs,
some of them sincere beyond doubt. In 1980 the periodical even ran
a piece by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. However, in looking over the
anti-Communist articles from the Cold War period (when the bulk
of them appeared), it is apparent that the gist of their conclusions
was this: that the best defense against Communism would be a new
world order — a stronger UN, regional alliances, and other building
blocks of world government. To the CFR, then, the threat of Com-
munism seems to have been little more than a marketable rationale
for its globalistic aims.

Here is how Edith Kermit Roosevelt summed it up in 1961:

What is the Establishment's view- point? Through the Roosevelt,
Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations its ideology is con-
stant: That the best way to fight Communism is by a One World
Socialist state governed by "experts" like themselves. The result has
been policies which favor the growth of the superstate, gradual sur-
render of United States sovereignty to the United Nations and a steady
retreat in the face of Communist aggression^

Senator Jesse Helms 5 after noting the CFK's place within the
Establishment, put it this way before the Senate in December 1987:

The viewpoint of the Establishment today is called globalisrn* Not
so long ago, this viewpoint was called the "one-world" view by its
critics. The phrase is no longer fashionable among sophisticates; yet,

A Primer On The CFR

the phrase "one-world" is still apt because nothing has changed in the
minds and actions of those promoting policies consistent with its fun-
damental tenets.

Mr. President, in the global is t point of view, nation-states and na-
tional boundaries do not count for anything. PoliticaJ philosophies and
political principles seem to become simply relative. Indeed, even con-
stitutions are irrelevant to the exercise of power ....

In this point of view, the activities of international financial and
industrial forces should be oriented to bringing this one- world design
— with a convergence of the Soviet and American systems as its
centerpiece — into being. 36

This book contends that the accusations against the Council on
Foreign Relations — the pursuit of world government, and recep-
tiveness to Communism — are true. It further contends that due to
the Council's heavy presence in Washington, these factors have acted
mightily upon the course of American foreign policy in this century
— a course frequently damned by disaster, that has seen the United
States eroded in strength, and its allies sometimes vanquished al-
together.

We have thus far quoted a number of references to the Council in
well-known publications such as Esquire and the New York Times.
However, mass media comment on the CFR is extremely rare. No
feature article about the group appeared in any major journal or
newspaper during its first thirty-six years. Today, probably not one
American in five hundred can identify the CFR, despite the fact that
it is arguably the most powerful political entity in the United States,
This by itself should raise questions, let alone eyebrows.

Knowing the Councirs record of action and influence demystifies
a number of otherwise puzzling episodes in U.S. history. We shall
proceed to inspect that record, but it is instructive to first know
something about the people and events that led to the Council's
founding in 1921.

I'll »f»*

'■'

The Councirs headquarters on New York City's East 68th Street

FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

i* if

1 FOREIGN

■ AFFAIRS

*« ■'■ fV

\ . , :::*■,,.■.-.. . .„ <, r ,- — , ; , ,, ,■ ,- ,,,

ilMHIHHM^BHHHHMMHMI^HHHfli

Foreign Affairs issues from 1926 and 1986:
little change in cover or content

Foreign Affairs logo includes
Latin word for "everywhere."

Richard N. Gardner calls

for "an end run around

national sovereignty. 11

Admiral Chester Ward (right) swearing in William Frankey as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Ward, a longtime Council member,
said that the CFR seeks "submergence of U.S. sovereignty and
national independence into an aH-powerfut one-world government."

Fidel Castro and Daniel Ortega have been guests at Pratt House.

Senator Jesse Helms and Edith Kermit Roosevelt are
among those who have defined the Establishment.

Chapter 2

Background To The Beginning

International Bankers and Central Banks

An "international" banker is one who, among other things, loans
money to the governments of nations. Lending to governments can
be particularly profitable for several reasons. First, a government
borrows far more than an individual or business; second, a govern-
ment has unique tools with which it can guarantee repayment —
such as the levying of taxes; third, a government may requite its
debt through a medium more desirable than cash — by granting the
banker certain privileges, for example, or giving him a say in policy,

No turn of events is more lucrative for an international banker
than war — because nothing generates more government borrowing
faster.

International banking was probably best epitomized by the Roths-
childs, Europe's most famous financial dynasty. Meyer Amschel
Rothschild (1743-1812) retained one of his five sons at the home
bank in Germany and dispatched the other four to run offices in
England, France, Austria, and Italy, The Rothschilds harvested
great riches during the nineteenth century by loaning to these and
other countries. Sometimes they, or their agents, financed both sides
of armed conflicts — such as the Franco -Prussian War and the War
Between the States, As national creditors, they earned tremendous
political influence,

Essential to controlling a government is the establishment of a
central bank with a monopoly on the country's supply of money and
credit. Meyer Rothschild is said to have remarked: "Let me issue and
control a nation's money, and I care not who writes its laws." As
Gary Allen related in his bestseller None Dare Call It Conspiracy:

The Shadows of Power

The Bank of England, Bank of France and Bank of Germany were
not owned by their respective governments, as everyone imagines, but
were privately owned monopolies granted by the heads of state, usu-
ally in return for loans J

Georgetown professor Dr. Carroll Quigley, who was himself close
to the Establishment, dealt extensively with central banks in his
1966 book Tragedy and Hope. He wrote:

It must not be felt that these heads of the world's chief central banks
were substantive powers in world finance. They were not. Rather,
they were technicians and agents of the dominant investment bankers
of their own countries, who had raised them up and were perfectly
capable of throwing them down.*

Quigley further noted:

[T]he powers of financial capitalism had another far-reaching aim,
nothing less than to create a world system of financial control in
private hands able to dominate the political system of each country
and the economy of the world as a whole. This system was to be
controlled in a feudalist fashion by the central banks of the world
acting in concert, by secret agreements arrived at in frequent private
meetings and conferences. 3

The Rothschilds, as the foremost "power behind the throne" of
Europe's central banks, savored the thought of a similar arrange-
ment in the United States. According to Gustavus Myers in his
History of the Great American Fortunes;

Under the surface, the Rothschilds long had a powerful influence
in dictating American financial laws. The law records show that they
were the power in the old Bank of the United States, 4

However, the Bank of the United States (1816-36), an early at-
tempt to saddle the nation with a privately controlled central bank,
was abolished by President Andrew Jackson. He declared:

Background To The Beginning

The bold effort the present bank had made to control the govern-
ment, the distress it had wantonly produced . , * are but premonitions
of the fate that awaits the American people should they be deluded
into a perpetuation of this institution or the establishment of another
like it. fi

America heeded Jackson's warning for the remainder of the cen-
tury. The tide began to turn, however, with the linking of European
and U.S. banking interests, and the growth in power of America's
money barons, such as J. R Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, and Ber-
nard Baruch,

In 1902, German banker Paul Warburg, an associate of the Roths-
childs, migrated to the United States. He soon became a partner in
America's most powerful banking firm: Kuhn, Loeb and Company,
He was married to the daughter of Solomon Loeb, one of its founders.
The head of Kuhn, Loeb was Jacob Schiff } whose family ties with
the Rothschilds went back a century.

While earning an annual salary of $500,000 — a tidy sum even
by today's standards — Paul Warburg lectured widely and published
pamphlets on the need for an American central banking system.

The Panic of 1907 was artificially triggered to elicit public ac-
ceptance of this idea. Snowballing bank runs began after J. P.
Morgan spread a rumor about the insolvency of the Trust Com-
pany of America.

En 1949, historian Frederick Lewis Allen reported in Life maga-
zine:

[CJertain chroniclers have arrived at the ingenious conclusion that
the Morgan interests took advantage of the unsettled conditions dur-
ing the autumn of 1907 to precipitate the panic, guiding it shrewdly
as it progressed so that it would kill off rival banks and consolidate
the preeminence of the banks within the Morgan orbit."

Allen himself did not accept this explanation, but he noted: "The
lesson of the Panic of 1907 was clear, though not for some six years

The Shadows of Power

was it destined to be embodied in legislation: the United States
gravely needed a central banking system."

Congressman Charles Lindbergh, 8r. t father of the famous avia-
tor, declared in 1913: "The Money Trust!*] caused the 1907 panic,
and thereby forced Congress to create a National Monetary Com-
mission. . . " 7 Heading the Commission was Senator Nelson Aldrich.
Aldrich was known as the international bankers' mouthpiece on
Capitol Hill, His daughter married John D. Rockefeller, Jr.; his
grandson, Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller, who became Vice President
in 1974, was named for him.

After the Commission spent almost two years studying central
banking in Europe, Aldrich met secretly with Paul Warburg and top
representatives of the Morgan and Rockefeller interests. This took
place at Morgan's hunting club on Jekyll Island, off the coast of
Georgia. There the plan was formulated for America's central bank:
what would come to be known as the Federal Reserve.

One of those in attendance at Jekyll Island was Frank Vanderlip,
president of the Rockefellers* National City Bank. Twenty-five years
later, Vanderlip wrote in the Saturday Evening Post:

|T]here was an occasion, near the close of 1910, when I was as secretive
— indeed as furtive — as any conspirator .... I do not feel it is any
exaggeration to speak of our secret expedition to Jekyl [sic] Island as
the occasion of the actual conception of what eventually became the
Federal Reserve System

We were told to leave our last names behind us. We were told further
that we should avoid dining together on the night of our departure.
We were instructed to come one at a time and as unobtrusively as
possible to the terminal of the New Jersey littoral of the Hudson,
where Senator Aldrich 's private car would be in readiness, attached
to the rear end of the train for the South.

Once aboard the private car, we began to observe the taboo that
had been fixed on Last names.

*The term **Money Trust/* in popular use at the tiroe T referred to the coterie of finance monopolists
based on Wall Street, It included, among others, Rockefeller, Morgan, Warburg, and Schiff.

Background To The Beginning

Discovery, we knew, simply must not happen, or else all our time
and effort would be wasted. 8

After the Jekyll Island meeting, Senator Aldrich proposed the plan
to Congress, His connections to the banking establishment raised
enough suspicion that the Aldrich bill did not pass, but a similar
measure, under another name, was subsequently pushed through.
The Federal Reserve became law in December 1913. Ostensibly, the
system was to act as guardian of reserves for banks; it was granted
control over interest rates and the size of the national money supply.
The public was induced to accept the Fed by claims that, given these
powers, it would stabilize the economy, preventing further panics
and bank runs. It did nothing of the kind, Not only has our nation
suffered through the Great Depression and numerous recessions,
but inflation and federal debt — negligible problems before the Fed
came into existence — have plagued America ever since.

Congressman Lindbergh was one of the most forthright opponents
of the Federal Reserve Act. He warned the Congress:

This act establishes the most gigantic trust on earth . T • ♦ When the
President signs this act the invisible government by the money power,
proven to exist by the Money Trust investigation, will be legalized . . . .

The money power overawes the legislative and executive forces of
the Nation and of the States. I have seen these forces exerted during
the different stages of this bill

This is the Aldrich bill in disguise , . .*

Later, Congressman Louis McFadden, who chaired the House
Committee on Banking and Currency from 1920 to 1931, would
declare:

When the Federal Reserve Act was passed, the people of these
United States did not perceive that a world banking system was being
set up here.

A super- state controlled by international bankers and international
industrialists acting together to enslave the world for their own plea-
sure.

The Shadows of Power

Every effort has been made by the Fed to conceal its powers but
the truth is — the Fed has usurped the government. tD

The average American probably does not know — or even think

— very much about our Federal Reserve System, but a few things
should be noted about it.

• Although it is called "Federal," it is privately owned.

• It has never received a meaningful audit from an independent
source.

• It makes its own policies and is not subject to the President or
the Congress. Private banks within the system select two-thirds of
the directors of the twelve Federal Reserve banks; the Federal Re-
serve Board chooses the rest.

• As to the Federal Reserve Board itself, its members are appointed
by the President and approved by the Senate, but, once in office,
they serve fourteen-year terms. Fed Chairmen have routinely come
from the New York banking community, on its recommendations,
and the great majority have been members of the CFR. Paul War-
burg was appointed to the original board, and Benjamin Strong of
the Morgan interests, who had been at Jekyll Island with him,
headed the New York Fed, the system's nucleus.

How did the Federal Reserve benefit the financiers who secretly
designed it? First, in its capacity as overseer and supplier of reserves,
it gave their banks access to public funds in the U.S. Treasury,
enhancing their capacity to lend and collect interest.

Furthermore, by staffing the Federal Reserve's management with
themselves or their associates, the international bankers gained
effective control over the nation's money supply and interest rates

— and thus over its economic life. Indeed, the Fed is authorised to
create money — and thus inflate — at will. According to the Con-
stitution, only Congress may issue money or regulate its value. The
Federal Reserve Act, however, placed these functions in the hands
of private bankers — to their perpetual profit. Congressman Lind-
bergh explained:

The new law will create inflation whenever the trusts want inflation.
It may not do so immediately, but the trusts want a period of inflation,

Background To The Beginning

because all the stocks they hold have gone down , . . Now, if the trusts
can get another period of inflation, they figure they can unload the
stocks on the people at high prices during the excitement and then
bring on a panic and buy them back at low prices ....

The people may not know it immediately , but the day of reckoning
is only a few years removed. 11

That day of reckoning, of course, came in 1929, and the Federal
Reserve has since created an endless series of booms and busts by
the strategic tightening and relaxation of money and credit.

Finally, the Fed was empowered to buy and sell government se-
curities, and to loan to member banks so that they might themselves
purchase such securities, thus greatly multiplying the potential for
government indebtedness to the banking community.

However, if Washington was to incur debts, it had to have some
means of paying them off. The solution was income tax. Prior to
1913, there was no income tax in America (except during the War
Between the States and early Reconstruction period). The U.S. gov-
ernment survived on other revenue sources, such as tariffs and ex-
cise taxes. As a result, it could neither spend nor borrow heavily.

Because income tax had been declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in 1895, it had to be instituted by constitutional
amendment. The man who brought forward the amendment in Con-
gress was the same senator who proposed the plan for the Federal
Reserve — Nelson Aldrich.

Why did the American people consent to income tax? Initially, it
was nominal: a mere one percent of income under $20,000 — a figure
few made in those days. Naturally, there were assurances that it
would never increase!

Another pitch used to sell the tax was that, being graduated, it
would "soak the rich." But Senator Aldrich's backing of the amend-
ment implied that "the rich" desired it. America's billionaire elite,
of course, are notorious for sidestepping the IRS. The Pecora hear-
ings of 1933, for example, revealed that J, P Morgan had not paid
any income tax in 1931-32. When Nelson Rockefeller was being
confirmed as Vice President under Gerald Ford, the fact arose that
he had not paid any income tax in 1970.

The Shadows of Power

One of the leading devices by which the wealthy dodge taxes is
the channeling of their fortunes into tax-free foundations. The major
foundations, though commonly regarded as charitable institutions,
often use their grant-making powers to advance the interests of their
founders. The Rockefeller Foundation, for example, has poured mil-
lions into the Council on Foreign Relations, which in turn serves as
the Establishment's main bridge of influence to the U.S. government
By the time the income tax became law in 1913, the Rockefeller and
Carnegie foundations were already operating.

Income tax didn't soak the rich, it soaked the middle class. Because
it was a graduated tax, it tended to prevent anyone from rising into
affluence. Thus it acted to consolidate the wealth of the entrenched
interests, and protect them from new competition.

The year 1913 was an ominous one — there now existed the means
to loan the government colossal sums (the Federal Reserve), and the
means to exact repayment (income tax). All that was needed now
was a good reason for Washington to borrow.

In 1914 t World War I erupted on the European continent. America
eventually participated, and as a result her national debt soared
from $1 billion to $25 billion.

Many historians would have us believe that this trio of events —
the income tax, the Federal Reserve, and the war — was a coinci-
dence. But too often history has been written by authors financed
by foundations, in books manufactured by Establishment publishing
houses.

Many more "coincidences" were yet to trouble the American people
in this century.

Wilson and House

In 1913, Woodrow Wilson became President. His book, The New
Freedom, was published that same year. In it, he wrote:

Some of the biggest men in the United States, in the field of com-
merce and manufacture, are afraid of something. They know that there
is a power somewhere so organized, so subtle, so watchful, so inter*
locked, so complete, so pervasive, that they had better not speak above
their breath when they speak in condemnation of it. ia

Background To The Beginning

Wilson knew this force — intimately.

His predecessor, Republican President William Howard Taft, had
been against a central bank, saying he would veto a bill proposing
one. For this reason, the international bankers sought to replace
Taft with a submissive candidate. Woodrow Wilson was rocketed
from president of Princeton University to governor of New Jersey
in 1911, to the Democratic Presidential nominee in 1912, Among
his weighty financial backers were Cleveland Dodge of the Rocke-
fellers* National City Bank; Jacob Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb; and Ber-
nard Baruch.

According to one eyewitness, Baruch brought Wilson to Demo-
cratic Party headquarters in New York in 1912, "leading him like
one would a poodle on a string." Wilson received an "indoctrination
course" from the leaders convened there, during which he agreed,
in principle, to do the following if elected:

• support the projected Federal Reserve;

• support income tax;

• lend an ear to advice should war break out in Europe;

• lend an ear to advice on who should occupy his cabinet. ia

Polls showed incumbent President Tail as a clear favorite over
the stiff-looking professor from Princeton. So, to divide the Repub-
lican vote, the Establishment put money behind Teddy Roosevelt on
the Progressive Party ticket. J. P. Morgan and Co, was the financial
backbone of the Roosevelt campaign, 14

The strategy succeeded. Republican ballots were split between
Taft and Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson became President with
only forty-two percent of the popular vote.

During his White House terms, Wilson was continuously guided
by a front man for the international banking community, Colonel
Edward M. House {House did not serve in the military; his title was
strictly honorary). The President's top advisor, he was called "As-
sistant President House" by Harper's Weekly.

So close was the relationship between the two that Wilson said of
House:

Mr. House is my second personality. He is my independent self His
thoughts and mine are one. If I were in his place I would do just as

The Shadows of Power

he suggested . . . . If anyone thinks he is reflecting my opinion by
whatever action he takes, they are welcome to the conclusion. 15

Under House's watchful eye, Wilson paid off as arranged. House
was reported to have handpicked his cabinet. At Wilson's first cab-
inet meeting, Franklin K. Lane introduced himself, saying: "My
name is Lane, Mr. President, I believe I am the Secretary of the
Interior." 16

Wilson's first year in office, 1913, saw institution of both income
tax and the Federal Reserve, although the former slightly preceded
his inauguration,

According to Charles Seymour, House's biographer, the Colonel
was "the unseen guardian angel" of the Federal Reserve Act, He
was regularly in touch with Paul Warburg while the legislation was
being written and maneuvered through Congress,

In light of President Wilson's dependence on his advisor, it is
instructive to know something about House's convictions. According
to another of his biographers, Arthur D. Howden Smith, House be-
lieved that

the Constitution, product of eighteenth-century minds and the quasi-
classical , medieval conception of republics, was thoroughly outdated;
that the country would be better off if the Constitution could be
scrapped and rewritten. But as a realist he knew that this was im-
possible in the existing state of political education. 17

House wrote a novel, published anonymously in 1912, entitled
Philip Dru: Administrator. Later, he acknowledged the book as his
own. The novel's hero, Philip Dru, rules America and introduces a
variety of radical changes. Among these are a graduated income tax
and a central bank.

George Viereck, in The Strangest Friendship in History (1932),
wrote of Philip Dru.

Out of this book have come the directives which revolutionized our
lives . « , The Wilson administration transferred the Colonel's ideas
from the pages of fiction to the pages of history. 1S

Background To The Beginning

What may seem surprising is that the character Philip Dru was
attempting to install what he called "Socialism as dreamed of by
Karl Marx." This becomes less incongruous when one realizes that
income tax and central banking were both called for by Marx in his
Communist Manifesto, which laid out a ten-plank plan for estab-
lishing a Communist state. Plank two was "A heavy progressive or
graduated income tax." Plank five was "Centralization of credit in
the hands of the State, by means of a national bank with state capital
and an exclusive monopoly/'

Thus, in 1913, America adopted two of Marx's precepts. This is
certainly not to imply that House and Wilson were Communists;
however, it does once again demonstrate that finance capitalism has
a great deal in common with the ideology that is supposedly its
opposite.

World War I and the League of Nations

Another objective specified in Philip Dru was a "league of nations,"
This, of course, was precisely the name given to the world body
created at Woodrow Wilson's suggestion during the 1919 Paris Peace
Conference. Just as the 1907 Panic was employed to justify a central
bank, so was World War I used to justify world government-
It is certainly true that a number of America's money barons,
including Wilson campaign backers, profited from the war. The Pres-
ident appointed Bernard Baruch head of the War Industries Board,
a position never authorized by Congress. As such, Baruch became
the economic czar of the United States, having dictatorial power
over the nation's businesses. He, like the Rockefellers, is said to
have reaped some $200 million from the war. 19 Top Wilson backer
Cleveland Dodge shipped munitions to the allies, and J. P. Morgan
supplied them with hundreds of millions in loans — which, of course,
U.S. entry into the war helped protect.

But profit was not the only evident motive behind our participation
in the conflict. Well before our declaration of war, the idea of a world
government to ensure peace was being promoted in America.

In the 1950 5 s, U.S. government investigators examined old records
of the powerful Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a long-
time promoter of globalism, They discovered that, several years be-

The Shadows of Power

fore the outbreak of World War I, Carnegie trustees had hoped to
involve the United States in a general war to set the stage for world
government. 20

Prior to 1917, America had stayed clear of European wars. George
Washington, in his Farewell Address, had warned the nation against
entangling foreign alliances. This counsel was heeded only too hap-
pily by the American people, millions of whom had come to this
country to escape oppression overseas. And naturally, no one wanted
to fight in a war of dubious origins.

It was therefore necessary to devise an incident that would supply
provocation. This occurred when a German submarine sank the Brit-
ish ocean liner Lusitania, on its way from New York to England.
128 Americans on board perished, and this tragedy, more than any
other event, was used to arouse anti-German sentiment in the
United States.

Certain facts, however, were denied the public. Thanks to the work
of British author Colin Simpson in his book The Lusitania, much of
the truth is known today.

The Lusitania was transporting six million rounds of ammunition,
plus other war munitions, to Britain, which is why the Germans
sank it {internal explosions caused the ship to go down in just eigh-
teen minutes after a single torpedo hit 31 ). This information was sup-
pressed at subsequent hearings that investigated the sinking. Wood-
row Wilson ordered the ship's original manifest — which listed the
munitions — to be hidden away in Treasury archives, 22

Even more pertinent is evidence that the ship was deliberately
sent to disaster. Before the incident, Winston Churchill — then head
of the British Admiralty — had ordered a report done to predict the
political impact if a passenger ship was sunk carrying Americans. 23
And the following conversation took place between Colonel House
and Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister.

Grey; What will America do if the Germans sink an ocean liner
with American passengers on board?

House: J believe that a name of indignation would sweep the United
States and that by itself would be sufficient to carry us into the war; 24

Background To The Beginning

The British had cracked Germany's naval code and knew the ap-
proximate whereabouts of all U-boats in the vicinity of the British
Isles. According to Commander Joseph Kenworthy, then in British
Naval Intelligence: "The Lusitania was deliberately sent at consid-
erably reduced speed into an area where a U-boat was known to be
waiting and with her escorts withdrawn." 2 *

It should be noted that the Germans had taken out large ads in
the New York papers in an effort to dissuade Americans from board-
ing the Lusitania, Their navy was attempting to stop war supplies
from reaching England — just as the British navy was doing to
them! Who was the real aggressor in the war is a matter of debate.
Had America not participated, the belligerents of Europe would
probably have reached a settlement, as those nations had been doing
for centuries.

Woodrow Wilson was reelected in 1916 on the slogan "He kept us
out of war," but those words proved short-lived, Colonel House, in
England, had already negotiated a secret agreement committing us
to join the conflict. 36 When war was declared, propaganda went full
tilt: all Huns were fanged serpents, and all Americans against the
war were traitors. The U.S. mobilization broke the battlefield stale-
mate, leading to Germany's surrender.

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 settled the aftermath of the
war. It resulted in the Versailles Treaty, which required Germany
to pay the victors severe reparations — even the pensions of allied
soldiers. This devastated the German economy in the 1920's and
paved the way for Adolph Hitler's rise.

Woodrow Wilson brought to the conference his famous "fourteen
points." It was the fourteenth point that carried the payload: a pro-
posal for a "general association of nations." From this sprang the
League of Nations. It was the first step toward the ultimate goal of
the international bankers: a world government — supported, no
doubt, by a world central bank.

The concept of the league did not originate with Wilson. Ray Stan-
nard Baker, Wilson's official biographer, said that "practically noth-
ing — not a single idea — in the Covenant of the League was original
with the President." It was Colonel House who had written the
Covenant, According to Charles Seymour, President Wilson "ap-

The Shadows of Power

proved the House draft almost in its entirety, and his own rewriting
of it was practically confined to phraseology." 27 In 1917, House had
assembled a group in New York called "the Inquiry/* consisting of
about one hundred men. Under the direction of House's brother-in-
law, Sidney Mezes 7 they developed plans for the peace settlement.
Some twenty members of the Inquiry went with Wilson to Paris in
1919, as did House and bankers Paul Warburg and Bernard Baruch,

The League of Nations was successfully instituted; a number of
countries that enrolled had powerful internationalist forces oper-
ating within them. But the United States could not join unless the
Versailles Treaty received Senate ratification — a condition that the
U.S. Constitution stipulates for any treaty.

The Senate balked. It was clear that the League couldn't guar-
antee peace any more than marriage guarantees that spouses won't
quarrel. For the League to be strong enough to enforce world se-
curity, it would also have to be strong enough to threaten our na-
tional sovereignty — and freedom-loving Americans wanted none of
that. They had done their part to help win the war, and saw no
reason why they should further entwine their fate with the dicta-
torships and monarchies of the Old World.

John D. Rockefeller in 1911

The elder J. P. Morgan in 1904

Charles Lindbergh, Sr.,
an outspoken opponent
o! the Federal Reserve

Nelson Aldrich was among

those to attend the secret

Jekyll Island meeting.

The original Federal Reserve Board, Paul Warburg (top left)

was willing to forfeit an annual salary of $500,000 to secure

a position on it Frederic Delano is at bottom right.

Although Woodrow Wilson ran as an opponent of the Money Trust,

his 1912 campaign was financed by Wall Street bankers

such as Jacob Schrff (above with wife at Wilson inaugural).

The doomed Lusitania

President Wilson, Mrs. Wilson, and "Colonel" House

Chapter 3

The Council's Birth And Early
Links To Totalitarianism

Well before the Senate's vote on ratification, news of its resistance
to the League of Nations reached Colonel House, members of the
Inquiry, and other U.S. internationalists gathered in Paris, It was
clear that America would not join the realm of world government
unless something was done to shift its climate of opinion. Under
House's direction, these men, along with some members of the Brit-
ish delegation to the Conference, held a series of meetings. On May
30, 19 19 y at a dinner at the Majestic Hotel, it was resolved that an
"Institute of International Affairs" would be formed. It would have
two branches — one in the United States, one in England.

The American branch became incorporated in New York as the
Council on Foreign Relations on July 29, 1921.

As a note of interest, the British branch became known as the
Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIAX Its leadership was
controlled by members of the Round Table — a semi-secret inter-
nationalist group headquartered in London, The RIIA is the CFR 7 s
counterpart, and has been dominant in British politics for over half
a century. Were it the subject of this book, a great deal could be said
about it. The CFR and RIIA were originally intended to be affiliates,
but became independent bodies, although they have always main-
tained close informal ties.

In 1922, the Council stated its purpose as follows:

The Councils Birth And Early Links To Totalitarianism

The Council on Foreign Relations aims to provide a continuous
conference on the international aspects of America's political, eco-
nomic and financial problems. ... It is simply a group of men con-
cerned in spreading a knowledge of international relations, and, in
particular, in developing a reasoned American foreign policy. 1

This self-description is quite similar to many others the Council
has issued over the years — invariably conveying the idea that the
CFR is merely a chatty foreign affairs club whose aims are innocuous
and whose outlook is blandly impartial. If this is all the Council
amounts to, it is curious that the Establishment has expended tens
of millions of dollars on it.

One does not have to look very hard to determine that the CFR
in the 1920 J s was very unobjectively lobbying for American partic-
ipation in the League of Nations. An article in the first issue of
Foreign Affairs was entitled "The Next American Contribution to
Civilization/' Can we all guess what that was to be?

Our government should enter heartily into the existing League of
Nations, take a sympathetic share in every discussion broached in the
League, and be ready to take more than its share in all the respon-
sibilities which unanimous action of the nations constituting the
League might impose. 2

Of course, not every article in Foreign Affairs openly boosted world
government, which would have overstated the case. But typically
the journal printed one or two that did, mixed in with dry disser-
tations on a variety of international topics. No conspiracy lurked
behind such titles as "Singapore's Mineral Resources" or 'The Soya
Bean in International Trade." However, many of the particularized
articles did present solutions pointing toward globalisnu

Colonel House, of course, was one of the CFR's founding members.
As to the others, Robert D. Shulzinger, in The Wise Men of Foreign
Affairs; The History of the Council on Foreign Relations, noted that
"nearly all of them were bankers and lawyers." 11 This stereotype was
unchanged fifty years later. John Franklin Campbell wrote in New
York magazine in 1971 that membership in the CFR "usually means

The Shadows of Power

that you are a partner in an investment bank or law firm — with
occasional 'trouble shooting* assignments in government." 4 This
raises a question: Why should foreign affairs lie almost exclusively
in the province of these two professions?

The CFR's founders were specialized in yet another way: associ-
ation with J. P. Morgan and Company. Dr. Carroll Quigley, referred
to earlier, had unique insight into the Council's founding. He was
very close to members of the Round Table, which was the core of
the CFR's counterpart group in Britain, In the early 1960's, he was
allowed to inspect its secret records. Quigley termed the CFR "a
front group for J, P. Morgan and Company in association with the
very small American Round Table Group," 5

The founding president of the CFR was John W. Davis, who was
J. P. Morgan's personal attorney and a millionaire in his own right.
Founding vice-president was Paul Cravath, whose law firm also
represented the Morgan interests. Morgan partner Russell Leffing-
well would later become the Council's first chairman- A variety of
other Morgan partners, attorneys and agents crowded the CFR's
early membership rolls.

Conscious of such uniformity, the Council's steering committee
moved to distinguish the roster by adding college professors. How-
ever, most of these had been members of Colonel House's Inquiry,
Furthermore, they hailed from campuses beholden to J. P. Morgan.
As Dr. Quigley observed: 'The Wall Street contacts with these pro-
fessors were created originally from Morgan's influence in handling
large academic endowments." 6

Bolshevik Connections

Another denominator common to many of the early CFR members
was support — material or moral — for the Bolsheviks in Russia.

A revolution, like any other substantive undertaking, cannot suc-
ceed without financing. The 1917 Russian Revolution was no excep-
tion. It is now well known that the Germans helped Lenin — who
had been exiled by the Czar — into Russia in a sealed train, carrying
some $5 million in gold. The Germans, of course, had an ulterior
motive: Czarist Russia was fighting them on the side of the Allies,

The Council's Birth And Early Links To Totalitarianism

and a successful revolution would mean one less adversary for Ger-
many to contend with.

Less widely known is the U.S, contribution. Probably the best
reference on this is Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution by
Antony Sutton, former fellow at Stanford University's Hoover In-
stitution. It is based on assiduous research, including a deep probe
into State Department files. While Sutton's focus is not on the CFR,
comparing his findings with the Council's early rosters proves re-
vealing indeed, His book was actually part of a trilogy, the other
two volumes examining Wall Street's links to Franklin D, Roosevelt
and to Nazi Germany.

Just when American patronage of the Bolsheviks began is prob-
ably unknown. But an excerpt from Colonel House's prophetic Philip
Dru is not a bad place to start the story.

Sometimes in his day dreams, Dru thought of Russia in its vastness,
of the ignorance and hopeless outlook of the people, and wondered
when her deliverance would come. There was he knew, great work for
someone to do in that despotic land, 7

Leon Trotsky, who was living in New York City at the time Czar
Nicholas abdicated, was able to return to Russia only because Wood-
row Wilson intervened to secure him an American passport.* On
November 28, 1917, with the Bolsheviks newly in power, House
cabled Wilson that any newspaper accounts describing Russia as a
new enemy should be "suppressed," 9 On that same day, Wilson de-
clared there should be no interference with the revolution. Although
the Bolsheviks' atrocities prevented the U.S. from officially recog-
nizing their new government, Wilson continued to express his sup-
port for them, to the shock of many people.

Jacob Schiff, the head of Kuhn, Loeb and Co., heavily bankrolled
the revolution. This was reported by White Russian General Arsene
de Goulevitch in his book Czarism and the Revolution. The New York
Journal-American stated on February 3, 1949:

Today it is estimated even by Jacob's grandson, John SchifT, a prom-
inent member of New York Society, that the old man sank about

The Shadows of Power

$20,000,000 for the final triumph of Bolshevism in Russia. Other New
York banking firms also contributed.

SchifT died before the CFR's incorporation, but his son Mortimer,
and his partner. Federal Reserve architect Paul Warburg, both be-
came founding Council members.

By "founding member** we refer to anyone who appeared on the
Council's original 210-man membership roll in 1922. Examination
of that list unveils a rogues* gallery of Bolshevik supporters.

• In the summer of 1917, to the city of Petrograd — nerve center
of the Russian Revolution — came one of the strangest Red Cross
missions in history. It consisted of fifteen Wall Street financiers and
attorneys, led by Federal Reserve director William Boyce Thompson,
plus a small contingent of doctors and nurses. The medical team,
discovering that they were but a front for political activities, re-
turned home in protest after one month. The businessmen remained
in Petrograd. la

The mission supplied financing, first for the socialist regime of
Aleksandr Kerensky, and then for the Bolsheviks who supplanted
him. In his biography of William Boyce Thompson, Hermann Hage-
dorn produced photographic evidence that J. P. Morgan cabled
Thompson $1 million through the National City Bank branch in
Petrograd — the only bank in Russia the Bolsheviks did not na-
tionalize.

What became of the $1 million? The Washington Post of February
2, 1918, supplies the answer. Under the headline "GIVES BOLSHE-
VIKI A MILLION," it noted:

William B. Thompson, who was in Petrograd from July until No-
vember last, has made a personal contribution of $1,000,000 to the
Bolsheviki for the purpose of spreading their doctrine in Germany
and Austria.

Mr. Thompson had an opportunity to study Russian conditions as
head of the American Red Cross Mission, expenses of which also were
largely defrayed by his personal contributions, . . .

Mr, Thompson deprecates American criticism of the Bolsheviki. He
believes they have been misrepresented . , - 11

The Council's Birth And Early Links To Totalitarian ism

Thompson also authored a pamphlet praising the Soviets that was
published in the United States.

Three of the Wall Streeters in the Petrograd Red Cross mission
— Thompson, Alan Wardwell, and Robert Barr — went on to become
founding members of the CFR; three others — Henry Davison,
Thomas Thacher, and Harold Swift — joined the Council in sub-
sequent years.

• In May 1918, Thompson helped found the American League to
Aid and Cooperate with Russia. Three of the group's executives —
Oscar Straus, Charles Coffin, and Maurice Oudin — became CFR
founding members. The League's president, Frank Goodnow, en-
tered the Council in 1925.

• In June 1918, the State Department received a memorandum from
a committee of the War Trade Board advocating "closer and more
friendly commercial relations between the United States and Rus-
sia." 12 The committee consisted of three individuals: Thomas
Chadbourne (CFR founder), John Foster Dulles (CFR founder),
and Clarence Woolley (CFR 1925), State Department files reveal
that later in 1918, Chadbourne was instrumental in securing
$10,000 for George Lomonossoff, a Soviet emissary sent to the
United States. 1 *

Among the other Bolshevik abettors in the CFR's original mem-
bership were the following:

• Morgan partner Thomas Lamont, who helped persuade the Brit-
ish government to accept the new Soviet regime, and whose family
became a financial backer of extreme left-wing organizations, in-
cluding the Communist Party;

• Paul Cravath, the aforementioned vice president of the CFR, who
urged recognition of the Bolsheviks in Foreign Affairs, u and whose
law firm helped make that goal an eventual reality; 15 and

• Ivy Lee, the public relations man who spruced up the Soviets*
image in the USA.

In 1923, the Council signed on Aver ell Harriman. A pioneer in
trading with the Russian Communists, Harriman formed a joint
shipping firm with them, obtained a multi- million dollar concession
from them to operate the manganese mines of the Caucasus Moun-
tains, and nearly swung a deal to float $42 million in Bolshevik

The Shadows of Power

bonds — • until the U.S. government stepped in. 16 Years later, he
would become our ambassador to the Soviet Union and a confidante
of its rulers.

We should not overlook Archibald Gary Coolidge, editor of Foreign
Affairs. In the periodical's first issue, he wrote an article about Rus-
sia, under the simple pseudonym "K," which chided the United
States for being "coldly aloof, haughtily refusing to recognize the
Soviet government or to have any dealings with it except in dis-
pensing charity/ 1

Coolidge acknowledged the brutality of the Bolsheviks, but rea-
soned:

Shall we refuse to sell sorely needed farm instruments to the Rus-
sian peasants because we dislike the Moscow Soviet? To recognize the
government of a country does not imply that we admire it . . .

Despite claims to the contrary, it is evident that Wall Street and
the CFR enjoyed an early love affair with the Bolsheviks. Perhaps
the best testimony came from one of Moscow's own representatives
— Ludwig Martens of the Soviet Bureau in New York, In 1919, he
was brought before a Senate committee investigating Soviet influ-
ence in America. The New York Times reported:

According to Martens, instead of carrying on propaganda among
the radicals and the proletariat he has addressed most of his efforts
to winning to the side of Russia the big business and manufacturing
interests of this country . , . * Martens asserted that most of the big
business houses of the country were aiding him in his effort to get the
government to recognize the Soviet government. 17

The Strange Partnership

More than once, this book has noted the alignment of Wall Street's
highest circles with Communism. This, of course, is hardly the or-
thodox outlook. We have always been told that Marxists and capi-
talists are sworn enemies. But this is frequently contradicted by
their record,

The Council's Birth And Early Links To Totalitarianism

Probably no name symbolizes capitalism more than Rockefeller.
Yet that family has for decades supplied trade and credit to Com-
munist nations. After the Bolsheviks took power T the Rockefellers 1
Standard Oil of New Jersey bought up Russian oil fields, while Stan-
dard Oil of New York built the Soviets a refinery and made an
arrangement to market their oil in Europe. During the 1920's the
Rockefellers' Chase Bank helped found the American-Russian
Chamber of Commerce, and was involved in financing Soviet raw
material exports and selling Soviet bonds in the U.S. 18

The Rockefeller perspective in more recent years hasn't changed.
The New York Times of January 16, 1967 carried the headline "Eaton
Joins Rockefellers To Spur Trade With Reds." The ensuing story
noted that the Rockefellers were teaming up with tycoon Cyrus
Eaton, Jr., who was financing for the Soviet bloc the construction of
a $50 million aluminum plant and rubber plants valued at over $200
million. During the 1970's, American technology helped the Soviets
construct the $5 billion Kama River truck factory. It is the world's
largest producer of heavy trucks and has been successfully converted
by the Kremlin to military purposes, such as the manufacture of
vehicles for the war on Afghanistan. The Soviets built the factory
mostly on loans from the U.S.; the chief private source of this credit
was the Chase Manhattan Bank, chaired by David Rockefeller. The
Chase, which maintains a branch office at 1 Karl Marx Square in
Moscow, has gained notoriety for financing projects behind the Iron
Curtain.

We note parenthetically that while the J. P. Morgan interests
dominated the CFR in its early days, the center of influence grad-
ually shifted to the Rockefellers- Indeed, David Rockefeller was
chairman of the CFR from 1970 to 1985,

Now the question that must arise is why this unexpected - — and
unpublicized — harmony exists between the super-rich and the
Reds. If the Communists were obedient to their creed, they would
be spitting at the "capitalist bosses," not climbing in bed with them.

The explanation materializes when we define, or perhaps redefine,
certain concepts. Communism, in practice, is a system where gov-
ernment has total power — not only political power, but power over
the economy, education, communications, etc. Socialism is essen-

The Shadows of Power

tially a lesser form — a little brother — of Communism: the gov-
ernment controls the means of production and distribution, but is
not as pervasive in its authority.

The American free enterprise system, as originally set up, was
much the opposite of Communism. The Constitution forced the gov-
ernment to remain "laissez faire"; it could exert virtually no influ-
ence on business, education, religion, and most other features of
national life. These were left in the private hands of the people.

It is natural enough to suppose that rich capitalists, who made
their fortunes through the free market, would be proponents of that
system. This, however, has not been the case historically. Free en*
terprise means competition: it means, in its purest form, that ev-
eryone has an equal opportunity to make it in the marketplace. But
John D, Rockefeller, J. P. Morgan, and other kingpins of the Money
Trust were powerful monopolists. A monopolist seeks to eliminate
competition. In fact, Rockefeller once said: "Competition is a sin."
These men were not free enterprise advocates.

Their coziness with Marxism (it is well to remember that Marx's
coauthor, Friedrich Engels, was a wealthy businessman) becomes
more comprehensible when we realize that Communism and so-
cialism are themselves forms of monopoly. The only difference is
that in this case, the monopoly is operated by the government. But
what if an international banker, through loans to the state, manip-
ulation of a central bank, campaign contributions, or bribes, is able
to achieve dominion over a government? In that case, he would
find socialism welcome, for it would serve him as an instrument
to control society.

Frederick C. Howe laid out the strategy of utilizing government
in his book Confessions of a Monopolist (1906):

This is the story of something for nothing — of making the other
fellow pay. This making the other fellow pay, of getting something for
nothing, explains the lust for franchises, mining rights, tariff privi-
leges, railway control, tax evasions. All these things mean monopoly,
and all monopoly is bottomed on legislation. 19

Howe further explained:

The Council's Birth And Early Links To Totalitarianism

These are the rules of big business. They have superseded the teach-
ings of our parents and are reducible to a simple maxim: Get a mo-
nopoly; let society work for you; and remember that the best of all
business is politics, for a legislative grant, franchise, subsidy or tax
exemption is worth more than a EGmberly or Com stock lode, since it
does not require any labor, either mental or physical, for its exploi-
tation, 20

Robber barons of the nineteenth century , such as Jay Gould and
Cornelius Vanderbilt, grew rich partly by bribing government offi-
cials. "Regulation," traditional scourge of the businessman, has an-
other face: it can be used to acquire exclusive monopolies and feed
on tax revenues. The early railroad magnates were able to get public
funds to foot the bill for constructing their lines. The very first U,S,
regulatory agency — the Interstate Commerce Commission — was
created at the petition of railroad owners, not railroad users, When
the Federal Reserve was under consideration in 1912, J. P. Morgan
partner Henry Davison (later a CFR member) told Congress: "I
would rather have regulation and control than free competition/' 21
Antony Sutton, in Wall Street and FDR, reviews a succession of
corporate notables who have espoused socialism in speeches and
hooks.

A modern illustration of how big business uses government for its
own ends is the Export -Import Bank. This federal bank was estab-
lished to "promote trade/' Here is how it can work. An American
manufacturer wants to sell his products to, say, Poland — but the
Poles have no cash to put up. So the Export-Import Bank theoret-
ically loans Poland money to buy the goods. We say "theoretically"
because in practice this step is cut out as unnecessary — the money
goes straight to the manufacturer. The Poles then pay off the Export-
Import Bank in installments — but at a low rate subsidized by
American taxpayers. And what if the Poles default? We taxpayers
pick up the whole tab! The manufacturer makes the transaction at
no risk to himself, through the medium of a federal agency.

There is nothing on earth more powerful than government, a fact
long ago recognized by international bankers. Regulation, socialism,
and Communism are simply different gradations of monopoly. Who

The Shadows of Power

L G. Farben also supplied forty-five percent of the election funds
used to bring the Nazis to power in 1933. 27

What is particularly odious is that certain American companies
did robust business with L G« Farben, which hired Ivy Lee (CFR)
to handle its public relations in the U,S. In 1939, on the eve of
blitzkrieg, the Rockefellers* Standard Oil of New Jersey sold $20
million in aviation fuel to the firm. 28 I. G, Farben even had an
American subsidiary called American L G. Among the directors of
the latter were the ubiquitous Paul Warburg (CFR founder ), Herman
A, Metz (CFR founder), and Charles E, Mitchell, who joined the CFR
in 1923 and was a director of both the New York Federal Reserve
Bank and National City Bank, There were also several Germans on
the board of American I. G.; after the war T three of them were found
guilty of war crimes at the Nuremburg trials. But none of the Amer-
icans were ever prosecuted.

This story of American ties to German fascism has been avoided
like the plague by the major U.S, media. However, several books on
the subject have appeared in recent years. Of these, Sutton's Wall
Street and the Rise of Hitler probably remains the definitive study.

Founding GFR president John W. Davis (right) was J. P. Morgan's
personal attorney. Above, Morgan and Davis confer during Senate
inquiry into the banking practices of the Morgan corporation. Thomas
Lamont, Morgan partner and founding Council member, is at left.

Morgan partner Russell Leffingwell (at right, leaving Senate
hearing chamber with Morgan) was the CFR's first chairman.

Attorney Paul Cravath,
who also represented the
Morgan interests, was the
Council's first vice-president.

\ntony C. Sutton

documented Wall Street's early

ties to the Soviet Union.

Kuhn, Loeb's Jacob Schiff
helped bankroll the
Russian Revolution.

William Boyce Thompson, a
founding CFR member, was
leader of the odd Red Cross
mission to Petrograd. 1920
photo.

At ceremonies marking the opening of the Council's East 65th Street
headquarters in 1930, speakers included (left to right) secretary-
Ireasurer Edwin F. Gay, honorary president Elihu Root, and president
John W. Davis. Root stated in his address that, to attain its
objectives, the Council would have to emulate the brick-by-briek
construction of the building, engaging in ''steady, continuous, and
unspectacular labor/'

3T A

HIT N

The rise of Adolph Hitler and the Nazis depended
largely on I. G. Farben — and the Dawes plan,

Averell Harriman (above, between Churchill and Stalin),

one of many Council members who, although

wealthy capitalists, enjoyed high harmony with the Bolsheviks,

The platitude that capitalists and Communists are archenemies has
long been discredited, however quietly, by figures such as the
Rockefellers. Above, Nelson Rockefeller greets Soviet premier Nikita
Khrushchev in 1959.

Chapter 4

The CFR And FDR

The Council on Foreign Relations exerted only limited influence
on Washington during the 192Q T s. The American people had wearied
of Wilsonian policy, with its attendant war, debt, taxation, and in-
flation. In 1920, Republican Warren Harding was elected President
with over sixty percent of the popular vote. A resolute opponent of
both Bolshevism and the League of Nations, Harding was anathema
to the CFR and international bankers, a factor that should not be
overlooked when considering the evil reputation some historians
have assigned him.

Under Harding and his successor, Calvin Coolidge, the United
States enjoyed unprecedented prosperity in an atmosphere of world
peace. It was a happy era of spirited accomplishments, remembered
Ibr the introduction of radio and talkies, Lindbergh's transatlantic
(light, and Babe Ruth's home runs. Some eight billion dollars were
even sliced off the federal deficit accrued under Wilson. This at-
mosphere was apparently not to the liking of the Money Trust. They
BOUght to oust the new Republican dynasty from the White House
iind install someone more cooperative - — Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Ever since his first Presidential campaign, FDR has been touted
18 a "man of the little people,*' a knight on a white horse who stood
ui> to Wall Street. This image is just that — an image.

Roosevelt was himself a prototypic Wall Streeter. His family had
been involved in New York banking since the eighteenth century.
11 Ls uncle, Frederic Delano, was on the original Federal Reserve
Board, FDR had a customary Establishment education, attending
( Jroton and Harvard, During the 1920's he pursued a career on Wall
Street, working as a bond writer and corporate promoter, and or-

The Shadows of Power

ganizing speculation enterprises. He was on the board of directors
of eleven different corporations. 1

In 1928, millionaire John Raskob, vice president of both Du Pont
and General Motors, became chairman of the Democratic National
Committee. He approached Roosevelt, whose family name carried
distinction and political clout, about running for governor of New
York — a traditional stepping stone for Presidential candidates.
Roosevelt declined, explaining that he owed $250,000 in connec-
tion with his polio resort at Warm Springs, Georgia, However,
after Raskob and other men of wealth wrote out checks liquidating
the debt, he agreed to run, and was elected New York's governor
that year. 13

We mentioned earlier the maxim that what appears in Foreign
Affairs today becomes foreign policy tomorrow. It would be an ex-
aggeration to say that we can predict who the next President will
be by noting which politicians are writing in Foreign Affairs, but
history suggests that, at strategic times, the candidates favored by
the Establishment, or who at least seek its favor, contribute to the
journal.

In the July 1928 Foreign Affairs , some two months before Raskob
approached him, FDR had published a piece entitled "Our Foreign
Policy: A Democratic View," In it, he recalled how Woodrow Wilson
brought home to the hearts of mankind the great hope that through
an association of nations the world could in the days to come avoid
armed conflict and substitute reason and collective action for the age-
old appeal of the sword." He gave clear signals to the Establishment
that he was ready to play ball in the game of world government:

The United States has taken two negative steps. It has declined to
have anything to do with either the League of Nations or the World
Court ....

Even without full membership we Americans can be generous and
sporting enough to give the League a far greater share of sympathetic
approval and definite official help than we have hitherto accorded ....

The time has come when we must accept not only certain facts but
many new principles of a higher law, a newer and better standard in
international relations.

The CFR And FDR

FDR's bonds to the Council were affirmed by his son-in-law, Curtis
Dall. Dall, a regular visitor at the Roosevelt home, eventually wrote
a book entitled FDR: My Exploited Father-In-Law, He wrote therein:

For a long time I felt that FDR had developed many thoughts and
ideas that were his own to benefit this country, the U.S.A. But, he
didn't. Most of his thoughts, his political "ammunition," as it were,
were carefully manufactured for him in advance by the CFR- One
World Money group. Brilliant ly, with great gusto, like a fine piece of
artillery, he exploded that prepared "ammunition" in the middle of
an unsuspecting target, the American people — and thus paid off and
retained his internationalist political support, 3

In 1929 the Council on Foreign Relations purchased new quarters
for itself at 45 East 65th Street in New York City. By a remarkable
"coincidence t M this address was next door to the house of Franklin
D. Roosevelt, who had just become governor of the state. Thus,
throughout the years preparatory to his White House tenure, FDR
lived literally under the CFR's shadow.

The J 29 Bust: FDR's Boom

Tragedy is the mother of new directions. The Panic of 1907
npawned the Federal Reserve, the sinking of the Lusitania led us
toward World War I, and the war itself nearly brought us into the
League of Nations, What happened in late October of 1929 would
also rechart our destiny.

Establishment historians present the ? 29 stock market crash as
llujy do most events: an accident, evolved from erroneous policies,
not from deliberate planning, We have all heard how foolish spec-
ulation bid stock prices high, but that the bubble finally burst, plung-
ing brokers out of windows and America into the Depression.

That version is correct enough, but has several missing parts. The
free enterprise system has been the traditional scapegoat for the
i 'rash. In reality, however, the Federal Reserve prompted the spec-
ulation by expanding the money supply a whopping sixty-two per-
cent between 1923 and 1929. When the central bank became law in
1013, Congressman Charles Lindbergh had warned: "From now on,

The Shadows of Power

depressions will be scientifically created/* 4 Like two con men working
a mark, the Fed made credit easy while Establishment newspapers
hyped what riches could be made in the stock market.

Louis McFadden, chairman of the House Banking Committee, de-
clared of the Depression: "It was not accidental. It was a carefully
contrived occurrence. . . . The international bankers sought to bring
about a condition of despair here so that they might emerge as rulers
of us all." 5

Curtis Dall, himself a syndicate manager for Lehman Brothers,
was on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange on the day of the
Crash. He said of the calamity:

Actually, it was the calculated "shearing" of the public by the World*
Money powers triggered by the planned sudden shortage of call money
in the New York money market. 6

It must be understood that an expedient existed on the New York
exchange called a "24 hour broker call loan." In those days, one could
purchase stock on extensive credit. He could lay down, say, $100,
and borrow $900 from a bank through his broker, to purchase $1000
in securities. If the stock increased just ten percent in value, he
could sell it, repay the loan, and walk away with his original in-
vestment doubled.

The only problem was that such a loan could be called at any time
— and if it was s the investor had to pay it off within twenty-four
hours. For most, the only way to do so was to sell the stock. One
can imagine the impact on the market if a great multitude of these
loans were called simultaneously.

In The United States* Unresolved Monetary and Political Prob-
lems, William Bryan explains what occurred during the '29 Panic:

When everything was ready, the New York financiers started calling
24 hour broker call loans. This meant that the stock brokers and the
customers had to dump their stock on the market in order to pay the
loans. This naturally collapsed the stock market and brought a bank-
ing collapse all over the country because the banks not owned by the
oligarchy were heavily involved in broker call claims at this time, and

The CFR And FDR

bank runs soon exhausted their coin and currency and they had to
close. The Federal Reserve System would not come to their aid, al-
though they were instructed under the law to maintain an elastic
currency. 7

Plummeting stock prices ruined small investors, but not the top
"insiders" on Wall Street- Paul Warburg had issued a tip in March
pf 1929 that the Crash was coming. 8 Before it did, John D, Rocke-
feller, Bernard Baruch, Joseph P. Kennedy, and other money barons
got out of the market. According to John Kenneth Galbraith in The
(Ireat Crash, 1929, Winston Churchill appeared in the visitors' gal-
lery of the New York Stock Exchange during the frenzy of the panic. 9
It has been said that Bernard Baruch brought him there, perhaps
to show him the power of the international bankers.

Early withdrawal from the market not only preserved the fortunes
of these men: it also enabled them to return later and buy up whole
companies for a song. Shares that once sold for a dollar now cost a
nickel. Joseph P. Kennedy's worth reportedly grew from $4 million
in 1929 to $100 million in 1935. t0 Not everyone was selling apples
during the Depression!

FDR now rode an open highway to the Presidency, fueled by such
men as Bernard Baruch, The latter's assistant, Hugh Johnson, said
of the campaign: "Every time a crisis came, B. M. [Baruch J either
gave the necessary money, or went out and got it." 11 In the meantime,
the Republicans were issued a death sentence. Newspapers blamed
President Herbert Hoover for the Crash and Depression. The Federal
Reserve, instead of moving to stimulate growth and recovery, con-
tracted the money supply by more than one third between 1929 and
1.933, thus sustaining the Depression and giving no relief to the
thousands of hanks dying from runs.

President Hoover had a plan to bail out the banks, but he needed
backing from the Democratic Congress. After losing the 1932 elec-
tion, the lame duck President appealed to Roosevelt: Would he issue
a statement encouraging Congressional support, and thus help end
the crisis? FDR gave no reply, later claiming that he had written
one, but that due to an oversight it was not sent. 12 The banks were
allowed to go on collapsing right until his inauguration, thus at-

The Shadows of Power

taching maximum stigma to the Republican Party, Ironically, when
the new President announced emergency banking measures, he used
the very plan drawn up by Hoover's Treasury Secretary. 13

Roosevelt in the White House

FDR did much to indulge his mentors. In his first year in office,
he granted recognition to the Soviet Union, fulfilling an objective
long promulgated by Foreign Affairs.

In 1934, he took America off the gold standard, setting the stage
for unrestrained expansion of the money supply, leading to decades
of inflation — - and decades of credit revenues for his friends in fi-
nance. With his Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. (the son
of a founding CFR member), he arbitrarily jacked up the price of
gold from $20 per ounce to $35, yielding untold profits for the in-
ternational banking community-*

FDR is probably best remembered for the New Deal, with its vast
tangle of tri-lettered bureaus and agencies. Of course, since a large
portion of the work force was unemployed, there was not enough
tax revenue to pay for these programs. So the government turned
to its other source — borrowing. In effect, the international bankers,
having created the Depression, now loaned America the cash to
recover from it. Naturally, the interest on these loans would be borne
on the backs of taxpayers for years to come. But many impoverished
Americans were only too ready to accept the money dangled by FDR,
without any deep contemplation of its origins or consequences.

While thousands went hungry, the President's Agricultural Ad-
justment Administration (AAA) paid farmers to destroy their crops
and livestock to "raise prices." Even a child could see the madness
of these actions, which demonstrated the dangers inherent in grant-
ing excessive power to government. What the New Deal really gave
America was a thick dose of socialism, or government monopoly.
This, of course, was precisely what the international bankers sought.
To this day, many Americans do not perceive that when they accept
federal aid, they almost invariably surrender a degree of freedom

*For a detailed account of the results of this maneuver, ae* Martin A. Larson, The Federal Reserve
and our Manipulated DoUar {Old Greenwich, Conn.: Devin-Adair, 1975),

The CFR And FDR

or control. Sunsets may be an exception to the old saw, "You can't
get something for nothing," but government benefits are not.

Top Wall Streeters were pleased with the creation of the Export-
I in port Bank in 1934, but the New Deal agency they probably liked
most was the National Recovery Administration (NBA), which was
designed to regulate the country's businesses.

The essence of the plan for the NRA was laid out by Bernard
Ikiruch in a speech on May Day in 1930. As chairman of the War
Industries Board during World War I, Baruch had possessed gov-
ernment-granted autocratic power over America's businesses. He
now savored the idea of the same arrangement in peacetime. Roo-
tevelt appointed Baruch' s protege, Hugh Johnson, to run NRA. As-
Misting Johnson were Gerard Swope, president of General Electric
Hid a member of the CFR; Walter Teagle, chairman of the board of
Standard Oil of New Jersey and a director of I. G. Farben's American
mibsidiary; and Louis Kirstein, vice president of Filene's of Boston.
Tli us the bureau was administered by the captains of industry —
the very people who, myopic historians tell us, regarded the New
Deal as a dreaded scourge. It is notable that when FDR operated
mi Wall Street, his office had been at the same address as the offices
of Baruch and Swope — 120 Broadway. 14

The NRA collaborated with business to set prices, wages, and
working conditions. The trick was that the largest companies had
the most say. For example, in establishing NRA guidelines for the
Iron and steel industry, U.S. Steel was allotted 511 votes, while
Allegheny Steel* a small firm, had only seventeen; Continental Steel
bad but sixteen. This meant that giant corporations could dictate
the operating standards in their respective fields, strangling small
competitors out of existence. In the iron and steel industry alone*
l here were more than sixty complaints of such oppression in early
1834. l6

This book is not intended to vindicate Herbert Hoover, who some-
I linos compromised with the international bankers, and even joined
the CFR in 1937, But it should be observed that Wall Street had
1 1 u-mpted to force NBA on him while he was President. He refused,
and paid for it In his memoirs, Hoover wrote:

The Shadows of Power

Among the early Roosevelt fascist measures was the National In-
dustry Recovery Act (NRA) , , , The origins of this scheme are worth
repeating, These ideas were first suggested by Gerard Swope . . . Fol-
lowing this, they were adopted by the United States Chamber of Com-
merce. During the campaign of 1932, Henry L Harriman, president
of that body, urged that I agree to support these proposals, informing
me that Mr. Roosevelt had agreed to do so. I tried to show him that
this stuff was pure fascism; that it was merely a remaking of Mus-
solini's "corporate state" and refused to agree to any of it He informed
me that in view of my attitude, the business world would support
Roosevelt with money and influence. That for the most part, proved
true. 16

The police-state power of NRA was perhaps best illustrated by the
case of Jack Magid, a New Jersey tailor. Magid pressed a suit for
thirty-five cents, whereas the NRA code for tailors stipulated forty
cents. For this "crime," Magid was fined and thrown in jail.

Luckily for America, the Supreme Court ruled the NRA and AAA
unconstitutional. Roosevelt retaliated by sending a bill fco Congress
that would enable him to appoint as many as six additional Supreme
Court justices. This became known as the famous "court-packing"
scheme. But even the President's friends on Capitol Hill could not
stomach such an assault on the checks and balances of power, and
the measure failed.

The Council on Foreign Relations played a significant role in the
Roosevelt administration, although its influence did not peak until
World War II. Afler being nominated at the 1932 Democratic con-
vention, FDR traveled to Colonel House's home to pay his respects.
House had an article published in the January 1933 Foreign Affairs
laying out what some of the new Washington regime's aims should
be. Among the officials Roosevelt drew from the ranks of the CFR
were Secretary of State Edward Stettinus (former board chairman
of U.S. Steel and the son of a Morgan partner), Assistant Secretary
of State Sumner Welles, and War Secretary Henry Stimson. Wall
Street banker Norman H. Davis, who served as the Council's pres-
ident from 1936 to 1944 ? was FDR ? s close friend and went on missions
abroad for him. James P. Warburg (CFR), the son of Paul Warburg,

The CFR And FDR

became a member of the President's £i bram trust." It was James
Warburg who would later tell a Senate committee: "We shall have
world government whether or not you like it — by conquest or con-
sent," Other CFE men held various positions in the Roosevelt gov-
ernment.

The Establishment also sought control of the Republican Party,
which the Crash had broken. The Republican Presidential nominee
in 1940 was Wendell Willkie. Certainly no one could call Willkie a
party traditionalist. Until the year he ran, he had been a registered
Democrat. A rabid internationalist, he wrote a book entitled One
World and later became a CFR member. Seven weeks before the
nominating convention, a poll showed that only three percent of
Republicans favored Willkie. But thanks to some mass media magic,
he emerged as "the" candidate. Congressman Usher Burdick had
this to say about it before the House:

We Republicans in the West want to know if Wall Street, the util-
ities, and the international bankers control our party and can select
our candidate?

I believe I am serving the best interests of the Republican Party by
protesting in advance and exposing the machinations and attempts
of J. P, Morgan and the New York utility bankers in forcing Wendell
Willkie on the Republican Party ....

r rhere is nothing to the Willkie boom for President except the ar-
tificial public opinion being created by newspapers, magazines, and
the radio, The reason back of all this is money. Money is being spent
by someone, and tots of it. 17

Wendell Willkie lost the election, but that was of no concern to
the insiders of Wall Street; they were supporting both candidates.
Willkie soon became an international emissary for FDR.

Wall Street district during the Crash of '29.
Conventional accounts have some missing pieces.

Franklin D. Roosevelt publicly decried Wall Street, but turned to
banking insider Bernard Baruch for campaign financing. Above,
the President-elect poses with Baruch following their conference
in Warm Springs, Georgia in January 1933,

Baruch with his lieutenant, Hugh
Johnson, leaving the White
House in 1934, The President
made Johnson head of the NRA.

Roosevelt's relationship to the
Council was described by his
son-in-law, Curtis Dall. Above,
Dall leaves the White House
after a visit with FDR in 1 939.

Wendell Willkie (with arms outstretched),
the "instant" Republican.

Chapter 5

A Global War With Global Ends

In September 1939, Hitler's troops invaded Poland. Britain and
France declared war on Germany; World War II had begun.

Less than two weeks later, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of
Foreign Affairs, and Walter Mailory, the CFR's executive director,
met in Washington with Assistant Secretary of State George Mes-
sersmittL They proposed that the Council help the State Department
formulate its wartime policy and postwar planning. The CFR would
conduct study groups in coordination with State, making recom-
mendations to the Department and President, Messersmith (a Coun-
cil member himself) and his superiors agreed, 1 The CFR thus suc-
ceeded, temporarily at least, in making itself an adjunct of the
United States government, This undertaking became known as the
War and Peace Studies Project; it worked in secret and was under-
written by the Rockefeller Foundation, It held 362 meetings and
prepared 682 papers for FDR and the State Department. Consul-
tation, however, soon became encroachment, Harley Notter, assis-
tant chief of the division of special research in the State Department,
wrote a letter of resignation to his superior (a CFR member), ex-
plaining that his dissatisfaction stemmed from

relations with the Council on Foreign Relations. I have consistently
opposed every move tending to give it increasing control of the research
of this Division, and, though you have also consistently stated that
such a policy was far from your objectives, the actual facts already
visibly show that Departmental control is fast losing ground. 2

A Global War With Global Ends

While the Council was digging a niche in our government, FDR,
Iflce Woodrow Wilson, was basing his reelection campaign on pledges
In slay out of war. In a speech on October 30, 1940, he declared, "I
Imve said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again:
Ynur boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars,'* 3

But Roosevelt was planning just the opposite. It is noteworthy
that when the Lusitania went down, Winston Churchill was head
i »f the British admiralty, and FDR — his distant cousin — Assistant
Secretary of the U.S. Navy. This conjured up a haunting sense of
\it[fa vu twenty-five years later, as the two men, now heads of state,
v< inferred. In 1940, at the American embassy in London, a code clerk
Darned Tyler Kent discovered secret dispatches between Churchill
mikI FDR, revealing the letter's intention to bring the U.S. into the
war. Kent tried to smuggle some of the documents out of the em-
I Missy, hoping to alert the American people, but he was caught and
confined to a British prison for the duration of the war. 4

The President's closest advisor was Harry Hopkins, who lived in
the White House and enjoyed a relationship with him that some
1 1 live likened to the House- Wilson kinship, According to Winston
< 'hurchill in The Grand Alliance, Hopkins visited him m January
1941 and said, "The President is determined that we shall win the
war together. Make no mistake about it. He has sent me here to tell
fOu that at all costs and by all means he will carry you through, no
mutter what happens to him. . , ." 5 William Stevenson noted in A
Man Called Intrepid that American-British military staff talks be-
Kiin that same month under "utmost secrecy/' which, he clarified,
"meant preventing disclosure to the American public." 6 Even Robert
Bherwood, the President's friendly biographer, once said: "If the
mnlutionists had known the full extent of the secret alliance between
tho United States and Britain, their demands for the President's
impeachment would have rumbled like thunder through the land." 7

CPR members were interested in exploiting the Second World War
as they had the first — as a justification for world government.
This, of course, later became reality in the crude form of the United
Nations, which was predominantly their creation. However, to in-
volvt' America in such a body would first require involving it in the
war itself. Foreign Affairs preached rearmament; in 1940, a group

The Shadows of Power

of Council members wrote an appeal that ran in newspapers across
the nation asserting that "the United States should immediately
declare that a state of war exists between this country and Ger-
many." 8 The globalists hoped to use the Axis threat to force the U.S.
and England into a permanent Atlantic alliance — an intermediate
step toward world government. Ads in Foreign Affairs pushed Clar-
ence Streit J s book Union Now, while the journal's contributors hailed
the same objective. In the last issue before Pearl Harbor, the lead
article typically maintained:

[HI ope for the world's future — the only hope — ties in the continued
collaboration of the oceanic Commonwealth of Free Nations.

To the overwhelming majority of Englishmen, and to very many
thousands of Americans, this recognition by both nations of their com-
mon needs and common responsibilities is the great good that is com-
ing out of the war, just as for their fathers (and the thought is a
warning) the League of Nations was the offset that could be made
against the misery of the last war. y

However, a 1940 Gallup poll found eighty-three percent of Amer-
icans against participation in the European conflict. The U.S. wasn't
about to go to war — unless there was an incident even more in-
sufferable than the Lusitania affair.

While there is no denying the belligerence and atrocities of the
Axis powers, it is certainly true that FDR dealt them incitements
to attack. Despite our neutrality, and without Congressional ap-
proval, he shipped fifty destroyers to Great Britain. This idea orig-
inated with the Century Group, an ad hoc organization formed by
CFR members. 10 Roosevelt also sent hundreds of millions of am-
munition rounds to Britain; ordered our ships to sail directly into
the war zone; and closed all German consulates. The U.S. occupied
Iceland and depth-charged U-boats. But the Germans avoided re-
taliation, knowing that America's entry into the war would turn the
tide against them, as it had in 1917.

Provocation was also given Japan. Henry Stimson, War Secretary
and a patriarch of the CFR, wrote in his diary after meeting with
the President: "We face the delicate question of the diplomatic fenc-

A Gjjobal War With Global Ends

ing to be done so as to be sure Japan is put into the wrong and
makes the first bad move — overt move." 11 After a subsequent meet-
ing, he recorded: 'The question was how we should maneuver them
(the Japanese! into the position of firing the first shot . . /' hZ The
Council's War and Peace Studies Project sent a memorandum to
Roosevelt recommending a trade embargo against Japan, which he
eventually enacted l3 In addition, Japan's assets in America were
frozen, and the Panama Canal closed to its shipping, On November
2ti, 1941 — just eleven days before Pearl Harbor — the U.S. govern-
ment sent an ultimatum to the Japanese demanding, as prerequisites
to resumed trade, that they withdraw all their troops from China and
Indochina, and in effect abrogate their treaty with Germany and Italy.
For Tokyo, that proved to be the final slap in the face.

Double Infamy at Pearl Harbor

Over the years, a number of books have documented that Franklin
I). Roosevelt had foreknowledge of the surprise attack on Pearl Har-
bor. Of these, the most recent and authoritative is Infamy: Pearl
Harbor audits Aftermath (1982) by Pulitzer-Prize winner John To-
land.

The author of The Shadows of Power summarized at length the
details of this matter in the December 8, 1986 issue of The New
American, We review them here briefly,

American military intelligence had cracked the radio code Tokyo
used to communicate with its embassies. As a result, Japanese dip-
lomatic messages in 1941 were known to Washington, often on a
same-day basis. The decoded intercepts revealed that spies in Ha-
waii were informing Tokyo of the precise locations of the U.S. war-
ships docked in Pearl Harbor; collectively, the messages suggested
an assault would come on or about December 7. These intercepts were
routinely sent to the President and to Army Chief of Staff General
George Marshall, In addition, separate warnings about the attack —
with varying specificity as to its time — were transmitted to these two
men by or through various officials, including Joseph Grew, our am-
bassador to Japan; FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover; Senator Guy Gillette,
who was acting on a tip from the Korean underground; Congressman
Martin Dies; Brigadier General Elliot Thorpe, the U.S, military ob-

The Shadows of Power

server in Java; Colonel F, G. L, Weijerman, the Dutch military attache
in Washington; and other sources. Captain Johan Ranneft, the Dutch
naval attache in Washington, recorded that U.S, naval intelligence
officers told him on December 6 that Japanese carriers were only
400 miles northwest of Honolulu. 14

Despite all of this, no alert was passed on to our commanders in
Hawaii, Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter C. Short.
Kimmers predecessor, Admiral Richardson, had been removed by
FDR after protesting the President's order to base the Pacific Fleet
in Pearl Harbor, where it was quite vulnerable to attack. Roosevelt
and Marshall stripped the island of most of its air defenses shortly
before the raid, and allotted it only one third of the surveillance
planes needed to reliably detect approaching forces. Perhaps to pre-
serve his station in history, Marshall sent a warning to Hawaii that
arrived a few hours after the attack, which left over two thousand
Americans dead, and eighteen naval vessels sunk or heavily damaged-

FDR appointed a commission to investigate what had happened.
Heading it was Supreme Court justice Owen Roberts, an interna-
tionalist friendly with Roosevelt. Two of the other four members
were in the CFR. The Roberts Commission absolved Washington of
blame, declaring that Pearl Harbor had been caught off guard due
to "dereliction of duty" by commanders Kimmel and Short, The two
officers long sought court-martials so they might have a fair hearing.
This was finally mandated by Congress in 1944. At the court-mar-
tials, attorneys for the defendants dug up some of Washington's
secrets. The Roberts verdict was overturned: Kimmel was exoner-
ated; Short received a small reprimand; and the onus of blame was
fixed squarely on Washington. But the Roosevelt administration
suppressed these results, saying public revelation would endanger
national security in wartime- It then conducted "new" inquiries in
which several witnesses were persuaded to change their testimony.
Incriminating memoranda in the files of the Navy and War depart-
ments were destroyed. The court-martial findings were buried in a
forty-volume government report on Pearl Harbor, and few Ameri-
cans ever learned the truth.

We noted introductively that the CFR has been accused of fond-
ness for Communism and globalism. In light of this, it may be in-

A Global War With Global Ends

structive to observe that these two systems were the prime benefi-
ciaries of World War II.

Gains for Communism

When World War I ended, millions of French, German, British,
and American soldiers lay dead. What was it all for? What was truly
won for their great sacrifice? Although the war had supposedly been
fought "to make the world safe for democracy/' it did not achieve
that. But one group did profit significantly — the Communists. They
used the chaos of the war to enflame Russia with revolution, and
captured the largest country on earth.

World War II had a similar denouement. Millions of French, Ger-
man, British, and American soldiers again lay dead. And for what?
Yes, the threat of fascism had been valorousiy eliminated, bul this
was gain in the negative sense. Only the Communists acquired some-
thing from World War II: Eastern Europe, and a foothold in Asia,
The war had a commonly overlooked irony, It was begun to save
Poland from conquest by Germany, Yet when it was over, Poland
had been conquered anyway — by the Soviets, This brought no tears
from CFR men like John Scott, who wrote in 1945: "When Russia
disappoints us, as in Poland, we must not indulge our tendency to
moralize and say that we cannot deal with the Bolsheviks. " JG

During World War II, the United States and USSR were allies.
Ostensibly this was an expedient forced by the threat of Hitler. But,
as we have already seen, the growth of German fascism and armed
might were made possible by the Dawes plan, a brainchild of the
international bankers that had the CFR's blessing.

Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin was a strange choice for an ally. Like
Hitler, he had slaughtered millions of his own people, including some
six million during the Ukrainian genocide (1932-33 ) alone. And like
Hitler, Stalin was an international aggressor. Few recall that the
1939 invasion of Poland was a joint venture by the Germans and
Soviets, who had signed a pact that year. In 1939-40, Stalin also
invaded Finland, occupied the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia, and annexed part of Romania. Nevertheless, FDR
called him "Uncle Joe," and the American press built him up as an
anti-fascist hero after Germany attacked Russia in 1941. And more

The Shadows of Power

than adulation was offered in support. During the war, America

bestowed over $11 billion in lend-lease aid on the USSR.

Overseeing these shipments was FDR's top advisor, Harry Hop-
kins, a zealous admirer of the Bolsheviks. Not everything Hopkins
sent was for the record. After the war, two Congressional hearings
examined evidence that he had also given Moscow nuclear materials
and purloined blueprints for the atomic bomb. Hopkins didn't face
charges — he was dead. But the facts of the case were chronicled
and preserved by George Racey Jordan, a lend-lease expediter, in
his book From Major Jordan's Diaries,

Under lend-lease, the Soviets received, among other things, 14,000
aircraft; almost half a million tanks, trucks, and other vehicles; and
over 400 combat ships. 16 Without this massive infusion of materiel,
it is doubtful that they could have turned back the German military.
America thus saved from extinction what is today regarded as its
greatest threat — Soviet Communism,

The U.S. government also cooperated in Stalin's territorial ag-
grandizement. At the "Big Three" conferences attended by Stalin,
Churchill, and Roosevelt, FDR made concession after concession to
the Red ruler. At Teheran, it was agreed that armies of the Western
allies would strike at Germany through France — not the Balkans
— which preserved Eastern Europe for Soviet engulfment. It was
agreed that Stalin would control eastern Poland, liberate Prague,
and maintain possession of the Baltic states. And it was agreed that
all would support Tito in Yugoslavia, rather than the anti-Com-
munist Draja Mihailovich,

At the Yalta Conference, an ailing President Roosevelt brought
along as advisor Alger Hiss, the Soviet spy who was later discovered
and convicted. Hiss, a member of the CFR, claimed that "it is an
accurate and not immodest statement to say that 1 helped formulate
the Yalta agreement to some extent." 17 At Yalta, it was conceded
that the Soviets would have three votes in the General Assembly of
the United Nations (which has been the official reality since the UN
started operating — all other countries have only one vote). In the
Pacific theater, the Soviets were given control of the Kurile Islands,
the southern half of Sakhalin Island, and the Manchurian ports of
Dairen and Port Arthur, And it was agreed that all Russians "dis-

A Global War With Global Ends

placed" by the war — that is, who had fled from Stalin's tyranny
westward into Europe — would be repatriated by the Allies. This
plan was in fact carried out: after the war, at least two million
Russian nationals were rounded up by reluctant American and Brit-
ish army units and forced into boxcars that returned them to the
Soviet Union, where they faced brutal reprisals. Many committed
suicide rather than go. This outrage was suppressed from the Amer-
ican public's knowledge and has become better known only recently,
thanks to such books as Julius Epstein's Operation Keelhaul. It is
little wonder that William C. Bullitt, former U.S. ambassador to the
Soviet Union, said of the Yalta agreement: '*No more unnecessary,
disgraceful and potentially disgraceful document has ever been
signed by a President of the United States." 1 B

Gains for Globalism

Most Americans believe the UN was formed after World War II
as a result of international revulsion at the horrors of the war.
Actually, it originated in CFR intellects, and the term "United Na-
tions" was in use as early as 1942.

In January 1943 7 Secretary of State Cordell Hull formed a steering
committee composed of himself, Leo Pasvolsky, Isaiah Bowman,
Sumner Welles, Norman Davis, and Myron Taylor. All of these men
— with the exception of Hull — were in the CFR. Later known as
the Informal Agenda Group, they drafted the original proposal for
the United Nations, It was Bowman — a founder of the CFR and
member of Colonel House's old "Inquiry" — who first put forward
the concept, They called in three attorneys, all CFR men, who ruled
that it was constitutional. They then discussed it with FDR on June
15, 1944. The President approved the plan, and announced it to the
public that same day. ly

The UN founding conference took place in San Francisco in 1945.
More than forty of the American delegates attending were CFR
members. Preeminent among them was Soviet agent Alger Hiss,
who was Secretary-General of the conference and helped draft the
UN Charter.

The Senate had rejected the League of Nations largely because
the legislators had been able to study the issue before it came to a

The Shadows of Power

vote. This time, however, no chances were taken, Alger Hiss flew
directly from San Francisco to Washington with the Charter locked
in a small safe. After glib assurances from delegates to the confer-
ence, the Senate ratified the document without significant pause for
debate. Senator Pat McCarran later said: *TJntil my dying day, I
will regret voting for the UN Charter."

But the United Nations was now law, and America, for the first
time, part of a world government. Using an $8.5 million gift from
John D. Rockefeller, Jr., the UN purchased land on New York's East
River for its headquarters.

In the meantime, the CFR found a new home of its own, moving
into the Harold Pratt House on East 68th Street, where it remains
to this day. Curiously, the Soviets established their United Nations
mission in a building across the street.

Since the United Nations' founding, the CFR and its mouthpiece
Foreign Affairs have consistently lobbied to grant that world body
more power and authority. That this has not been meaningfully
achieved is not from lack of effort on their part; it is thanks to
counter-efforts by distrustful Americans who have valued national
self-determination.

Toward More Centralized Banking

If the key to controlling a nation is to run its central bank, one
can imagine the potential of a global central bank, able to dictate
the world's credit and money supply. The roots for such a system
were planted when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank were formed at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944.
These UN agencies were both CFR creations. The idea for them
hatched with the Economic and Finance Group, one of the units of
the Council's War and Peace Studies Project. This group proposed
the IMF and World Bank in a series of increasingly sophisticated
memos to the President and State Department during 1941-42. After
Bretton Woods, the two institutions were touted in Foreign Affairs,

A. K, Chesterton, the distinguished British author, declared: 4 The
final act of Bretton Woods, which gave birth to the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund . . . and many similar assemblies of
hand-picked functionaries were not incubated by hard-pressed Gov-

A Global War With Global Eisrns

ernments engaged in waging war, but by a Supra-national Money
Power which could afford to look ahead to the shaping of a post-war
world that would serve its interest." 20

The IMF was ostensibly set up to control international exchange
rates and "stabilize currencies," but is the framework for a central
bank of issue. It is noteworthy that at Bretton Woods, Federal Re-
serve Board governor Mariner Eccles observed: "An international
currency is synonymous with international government/* 21 John
Maynard Keynes, the leading British figure at the Conference, pro-
posed a world currency which he called bancor r but this plan was
rejected as too radical to gain international acceptance. However,
this goal has not been abandoned. Dr. Johannes Witteveen, former
head of the IMF, said in 1975 that the agency should become 'the
exclusive issuer of official international reserve assets." 22 In the Fall
1984 Foreign Affairs, Richard N. Cooper laid out a modern plan for
international currency. He wrote:

A new Bretton Woods conference is wholly premature. But it is not
premature to begin thinking about how we would like international
monetary arrangements to evolve in the remainder of this century.
With this in mind, I suggest a radical alternative scheme for the next
century: the creation of a common currency for all the industrial de-
mocracies, with a common monetary policy and a joint Bank of Issue
to determine that monetary policy. (Emphasis in the original.)

Given the prophetic tendency of Foreign Affairs, and the increas-
ing uniformity of Europe's currencies, we must regard Cooper's pro-
posal as having more than trivial significance.

The IMF's sister, the World Bank, was supposedly established to
help postwar reconstruction and development. It is an international
lending agency, but what it lends more than anything else is dollars
from the U.S. taxpayer,

Who is the ultimate beneficiary? The World Bank hierarchy has
traditionally been closely linked to the Rockefellers' Chase Man-
hattan Bank. As Congressman John Rarick once explained: "[A]id
to the poor countries usually ends up as seed money or loans to the
wealthy industrialists from the developed countries to further their

The Shadows of Power

overseas operations in competition with the people whose country
they claim to represent," 23 The Los Angeles Times elaborated in 1978:
"Ostensibly to encourage agriculture and rural development, World
Bank loans go overwhelmingly to build an infrastructure — from
roads to dams — that enriches local and foreign contractors and
consultants." 34 Barron's put it succinctly that same year: "There's a
saying that the Bank takes tax money from poor people in rich
nations to give to rich people in poor nations." And, Barron's noted:
"To make matters worse, many of the social reforms that the Bank
is funding involve fostering the spread of socialism and Commu-
nism/* 25

Perhaps no one has summarized the strategy of the international
bankers better than Senator Jesse Helms, who stated in 1987:

!i]t is no secret that the international bankers profiteer from sov-
ereign state debt. The New York hanks have found important profit
centers in the lending to countries plunged into debt by Socialist re-
gimes. Under Socialist regimes, countries go deeper and deeper into
debt because socialism as an economic system does not work. Inter-
national bankers are sophisticated enough to understand this phe-
nomenon and they are sophisticated enough to profit from it.

Because the public debt is sovereign debt, the bankers have cal-
culated that they wiH always be able to collect. If there is too much
risk in the private debt side, it is a simple matter to get Socialist
governments to nationalize banks, industrial enterprises, and agri-
cultural holdings. In this way, private debt is converted to sovereign
state debt which the bankers have believed will always be collectable.

The New York banks find the profit from the interest on this sov-
ereign debt to be critical to their balance sheets- Up until very recently,
this has been an essentially riskless game for the banks because the
IMF and World Bank have stood ready to bail the banks out with our
taxpayer's money. ^

Bretton Woods marked neither the first nor last time that the
international bankers would devise a means of using other people's
money to obtain profits — both monetary and political — in the
name of humanitarianism.

Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton
Fish Armstrong helped build
bridges between the Council and
Washington.

Henry Stimson: "The question
was how we shouid maneuver
them into the position of firing
the first shot . . ."

In his 1982 best seller Infamy, historian John Toland (left)
enumerated the numerous warnings Washington received about
Pearl Harbor through such individuals as Senator Guy Gillette (right).
Earlier books that dealt with the controversy included: Pearl Harbor
by George Morgenstern; Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, edited
by Harry Elmer Barnes; The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor by Admiral
Robert Theobald; and Admiral Kimmel's Story by Husband Kimmel,

Admiral Kimmel (left) and General Short (right) were made
scapegoats after the attack, which sank or heavily damaged eighteen
naval vessels, destroyed 188 planes, and left over two thousand
dead.

The Roberts Commission, Its verdict pleased Washington.

At the "Big Three" ' conferences, Stalin won
a steady stream of concessions.

1943: Major George Racey Jordan {right) is decorated by Colonel A.
N. Kotikov, head o( USSR lend-lease mission. Jordan and other
witnesses later testified that Presidential advisor Harry Hopkins had
shipped the Soviets uranium as well as the secret plans for the
atomic bomb,

Harry Hopkins

isaiah Bowman

Of the American delegates at the founding UN conference in

San Francisco, more than forty belonged to the CFR Above,

Hamilton Fish Armstrong proposes an amendment, June 15, 1945.

Alger Hiss shakes hands with Harry Truman at UN founding

conference. Hiss, a Council member later exposed as a

Soviet spy, was Secretary-General of the conference.

March 1947: John D. Rockefeller III, on behalf of his father, presents

UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie with an $8.5 million

check to purchase land for the UN's headquarters.

Chapter 6

The Truman Era

Franklin D. Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, and was succeeded
by Vice President Hairy Truman. Truman, a former senator from
Missouri, had risen in politics through the backing of the notorious
Pendergast machine, which was later extensively prosecuted for vote
fraud.

The acclaimed new book The Wine Men, by Walter Isaacson and
Evan Thomas, centers on six statesmen whose careers peaked during
the Truman era. They were: Dean Acheson (a Truman Secretary of
State), Robert Lovett (Under Secretary of State and later Secretary
of Defense), Averell Harriman (various positions), John McCloy
(High Commissioner to Germany), George Kennan (State Depart-
ment advisor and Ambassador to the Soviet Union) and Charles
Bohlen (State Department advisor). The book calls these men "ar-
chitects of the American century" who 'left a legacy that dominates
American policy to this day." As chance would have it, all sis were
members of the CFR, and their backgrounds, for the most part, were
typically Establishment.

Harry Truman did not fit their mold by breeding; he did not hail
from Harvard, Wall Street, or the CFR. After Roosevelt's death, some
of the "wise men" descended on the White House and began what
Isaacson and Thomas call "the education of Harry Truman." 1

The Marshall Scam

Certainly one of the foremost highlights of the eventful Truman
years was the Marshall Plan, a massive package of economic aid the
U.S. bestowed on Western Europe, General George Marshall, who
was now Secretary of State, proposed it in a Harvard commencement

The Shadows of Power

speech in 1947. Conventional history presumes Marshall initiated
the concept, which, not surprisingly, had its actual birth at the
Council on Foreign Relations.

In their study of the CFR, Imperial Brain Trust, Laurence Shoup
and William Minter reported:

In 1946-1947 lawyer Charles M Spofford headed a [CFR study]
group, with banker David Rockefeller as secretary, on Reconstruction
in Western Europe; in 1947-1948 that body was ret i tied the Marshall
Plan, The Council's annual report for 1948 explained that even before
Secretary of State George C, Marshall had made his aid to Europe
proposal in June 1947, the Spofford group had " uncovered" the ne-
cessity for aid to Europe and "helped explain the needs for the Mar-
shall Plan and indicated some of the problems it would present for
American foreign policy. Moreover, a number of members of the 1947-
1948 group, through their connections with . , , governmental bodies
were in constant touch with the course of events." 5 *

Originally, it was to be called the Truman Plan, but this was
scrapped because it was felt that the name of Marshall — who was
Chief of Staff during the war — could elicit more bipartisan Congres-
sional support^ Thus was Marshall selected to introduce the pro-
posal publicly.

The Marshall Plan, overseen by the Economic Cooperation Admin-
istration (ECA), transferred $13 billion from the U.S. taxpayers to
Western Europe, But where did the dollars end up? Ln 1986, Tyler
Cowen observed in Reason magazine: "[A]ll of the aid channeled
through the EGA was linked to purchases of particular US goods
and services. In this regard, the Marshall Plan subsidized some US
businesses at the expense of the American taxpayer." 4 Cowen en*
titled his article 41 The Great Twentieth-Century Foreign- Aid Hoax."
Firms that could not get Americans to buy their products now forced
them to pay through surrogate European consumers. Some of the
goods sent were overstocked, overpriced, or inferior in quality — but
the Europeans took what the EGA stipulated. And why not? For
them, it was free,

T™ TtiuMAN Era

Mtti thull Plan was originally presented as a humanitarian
1 1 1 1 if; Ilut many U.S. congressmen, whose Bp|} rova ] was

* 1 1 to) nocxire the appropriations j were turning thumbs down,
'ii' 'I 1 1 m "New Deal for Europe." So a different marketing

il ovnii lined: the aidj it was said, would prevent Soviet aggres-

■

and Thomas quote John McCloy:

l • 1 1 • l • mil up and listened when the Soviet threat was m^ ioned rt
i id II. taught him a valuable lesson: One way to assure that
i nil flats noticed is to cast it in terms of resisting t^ e spread
t'oMiMninmm."

w\\ " they relate, "concluded that the anti-Comrti lin i s ^ r het-

r unary to win support for the British packag e »r,
i i iiinan had set the pace in March 1947, wh*n. he enun-
ailed Truman Doctrine: that America womj support
■• around the world against aggression.
Mm claims, however, that "Truman did not Really mean

) I Mo General Marshall and me that there was n \mi e too

i hoy tint anti-Communism in that speech/' Bohle^ \o£ eT re _
MiM'tihull and Bohlen sent a cable back to Washington asking

I) I Mi-d down. The reply came back from Truman without

• > l«- tnt ii , Congress would not approve the money.*

i*» I. nil I n< nix CFR "wise men" played unique roles in instituting
ili ill 1 1:»n: Harriman became the program's ad^njgtrator
Hdhlen was PR man; Lovett testified daily to Congress
" ">< '<»v irt menace; Acheson, on temporary leavef tom p UD ii c

<•■ i ed the Citizens' Committee for the Mar SQa n p] a n;

luy became president of the World* Bank, floating loans
i |, ,,,

Km nan — wittingly or not — supplied thBi tt t e ii ec tual

l< "ivlicn he authored the most famous article ev& r ^ appear

\f fairs. Called "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" and anon*

The Truman Era

The Marshall Plan was originally presented as a humanitarian
undertaking. But many U.S. congressmen, whose approval was
needed to secure the appropriations, were turning thumbs down.
Some called it a "New Deal for Europe." So a different marketing
appeal was used: the aid, it was said, would prevent Soviet aggres-
sion.

Isaacson and Thomas quote John McCloy:

"People sat up and listened when the Soviet threat was mention ed,"
he later said. It taught him a valuable lesson: One way to assure that
a viewpoint gets noticed is to cast it m terms of resisting the spread
of Communism. 5

"Acheson," they relate, "concluded that the anti-Communist rhet-
oric was necessary to win support for the British package." 6

Harry Truman had set the pace in March 1947 T when he enun-
ciated the so-called Truman Doctrine: that America would support
democracies around the world against aggression.

The Wise Men claims, however, that "Truman did not really mean
what he said": 7

"It seemed to General Marshall and me that there was a little too
much flamboyant anti-Communism in that speech," Bohlen later re-
called. Marshall and Bohlen sent a cable back to Washington asking
that it be toned down. The reply came back from Truman: without
the rhetoric, Congress would not approve the money.*

Each of the six CFR "wise men 13 played unique roles in instituting
the Marshall Plan: Harriman became the program's administrator
in Europe; Bohlen was PR man; Lovett testified daily to Congress
about the Soviet menace; Acheson, on temporary leave from public
service, formed the Citizens' Committee for the Marshall Plan;
John McCloy became president of the World Bank, floating loans
to Europe,

George Kennan — wittingly or not — supplied the intellectual
rationale when he authored the most famous article ever to appear
in Foreign Affairs. Called "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" and anon-

The Shadows op Power

ymously bylined *%" it was partially reprinted in Life and Reader's
Digest. In it, Kennan submitted that the U.S. should "contain" Com-
munism, an idea which became the keystone of American Cold War
strategy. Foreign Affairs ran the piece in July 1947, the month fol-
lowing Marshall's address. Kennan had summarized his thoughts
in a speech at Pratt House, after which editor Hamilton Fish Arm-
strong asked him for a written essay. Not insignificantly, the same
issue carried a lead article by Armstrong suggesting aid to Europe.
Given a hard sell in terms of prohibiting Soviet expansionism,
Congress now approved the plan — even Joe McCarthy voted for it.
But insiders knew the score. Charles L, Mee, in his book The Mar-
shall Plan, quoted Pierre Mendes-France, French executive director
of the World Bank:

The Communists are rendering a great service. Because we have
a 'Communist danger/ the Americans are making a tremendous effort
to help us. We must keep up this indispensable Communist scare."*

None of this means there was no Soviet threat — Stalin had
subjugated half of Europe, What it does help confirm, however, is
that when CFR members have professed anti-Communism, they
have often done so for ulterior motives.

NATO and Other Alliances

It was Winston Churchill who first warned of the "iron curtain"
in a speech at Fulton, Missouri in 1946. What is not well remem-
bered, however, is the solution he advocated: a "fraternal association
of the English-speaking peoples."

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formally estab-
lished in 1949, has always been explained to Americans as an anti-
Communist alliance, But the CFE's definition is far less narrow. It
regards all regional organizations as building blocks of world gov-
ernment, This frame of reference was expressed in Foreign Affairs
as early as 1926, when Eduard Benes wrote:

Locarno La European collective security agreement] represents an
attempt to arrive at the same end by stages, — by treaties and local

The Truman Era

regional pacts which are permeated with the spirit of the Geneva
Protocol, — these to be constantly supplemented, until at last, within
the framework of the League of Nations, they are absorbed by one
great world convention guaranteeing world security and peace by the
enforcing of the rule of law in inter-state life." 1

In April 1948, when Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett was
secretly arranging the NATO alliance, Foreign Affairs noted:

[A] regional organization of nations, formed to operate within the
framework of the United Nations, can only strengthen that organi-
zation. 1 '

Shortly after American entry into NATO was ratified by the U.S.
Senate, hi a pamphlet called "The Goal is Government of All the
World," Elmo Roper of the CFR mused:

But the Atlantic Pact (NATO) need not be our last effort toward
greater unity. It can be converted into one more sound and important
step working toward world peace. It can be one of the most positive
moves in the direction of One World. 1 -*

For NATO, then, as for the Marshall Plan, anti-Communism was

apparently just a selling point. The original plan called for Western
Europe to consolidate her forces into one army, but this was rejected
by the nations themselves — an alliance such as NATO was as far
as they would go. The pressure for European unity, however, has
never ceased. Through such associations as the Common Market
(established in 1957) and the European Parliament (which held its
first popular elections in 1979), Europe has become an increasingly
collective global unit.

NATO, of course, is not unique. In 1964, in his Foreign Affairs
article 'The World Order in the Sixties," Roberto Ducci explained:

Pending the formation of such wider and more responsible political
units, encouragement should be given to regional organizations, of
the type recognized fay the U.N- Charter. They should be strengthened

The Shadows of Power

so as to make them able to keep the peace in their respective areas:
NATO in the North Atlantic and the Council of Europe in the Euro-
pean regions, O.A.S. in the Americas, O.A.U. in Africa, SEATO in
Southeast Asia. 13

For decades, the CFR pushed this ascending approach to world
government, with Foreign Affairs carrying such titles as 'Toward
European Integration: Beginnings in Agriculture," "Toward Unity
in Africa ," 'Toward a Caribbean Federation," and so on.

Within the North Atlantic context, both the Marshall Plan and
NATO may be understood as facets of the attempt to use the threat
of Soviet Communism to push America and Europe into a binding
alliance, as a halfway house on the road to world order. The Marshall
Plan created the economic footing for this alliance* while NATO
represented the military component. The political bond — the final
and most crucial stage — was supposed to come to life in an Atlantic
commonwealth the globalists whimsically dubbed "Atlantica." An
organization called the Atlantic Union Committee, dominated by
CFR members, was formed to promote this concept. It did so dili-
gently during the 1950's and 60*s f and through the lobbying efforts
of it and its successor, the Atlantic Council, several resolutions were
actually brought before Congress that would have authorized a con-
vention to lay the foundations of an Atlantic union. These, however,
were consistently rejected by the elected representatives of the
American people.

The Fall of China

In 1949, the Communists took over the most populous nation on
earth. An intense controversy erupted over this in the United States.
Substantial evidence* now all but forgotten, implicated American
diplomacy in the debacle.

The story began with the Yalta Conference, when it was arranged
that the Russians would march into China, presumably to battle the
Japanese forces there. Stalin had maintained a nonaggression treaty
with Tokyo during the war, but said he would break it — provided
that we equip his army for the job, Roosevelt consented. Without
consulting the Chinese, it was also promised that the Soviets would

TheThumanEra

receive control of the Manchurian ports of Dairen and Port Arthur,
as well as joint operation of Manchuria's railways with the Chinese.

This agreement was disgraceful for at least two reasons: first,
Japan's defeat was already imminent, nullifying any need to invite
Stalin — a known aggressor — into the Pacific theater; second,
Roosevelt had no right to cede the territory of a sovereign nation to
a third country.

The Russians entered the Pacific war, all right — - just days before
it ended. The atomic bomb had already pounded Hiroshima. The
Soviets confiscated Japan's surrendered munitions in Manchuria,
collecting the spoils without expending the effort. They then turned
these, as well as American lend-lease supplies, over to China's Com-
munist rebels, led by Mao Tse-tung.

For the next four years, the land was ablaze as Mao fought to
overthrow the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang, a
faithful ally of the United States, was trying to establish a consti-
tutional republic. He had been criticized in Foreign Affairs as far
back as 1928, shortly after his struggle with the Communists had
begun.

In late 1945, President Truman dispatched General Marshall to
China as a special ambassador to mediate the conflict. Marshall had
been an obscure colonel until the reign of FDR, who boosted him
past dozens of senior officers to Chief of Staff Marshall was never
Listed on the CFR's roster, but he was chronically in the company
of its members, and once wrote the introduction to the Councirs
annual volume, The United States in World Affairs.

In China, Marshall demanded that Chiang accept the Communists
into his government or forfeit U.S. support. He also negotiated truces
that saved the Reds from imminent defeat, and which they exploited
to regroup and seize more territory. Finally, Marshall slammed a
weapons embargo on the Nationalist government, as the Commu-
nists had been urging him to do.

He returned home and was appointed Secretary of State, It became
the official line of the CFR-dominated State Department that Chiang
Kai-shek was a corrupt reactionary and that Mao Tse-tung was not
a Communist but an "agrarian reformer/ 1 This propaganda was ex-
tensively disseminated to the public by the now-defunct Institute of

The Shadows of Power

Pacific Relations (IPR). The CFR was the parent organization of the
IPR, which had no less than forty Council members in its ranks.
The Institute, like the Council, was heavily funded by Establishment
foundations.

An FBI raid on the offices of Amerasia, a magazine produced by
IPR's leaders, uncovered 1800 stolen government documents. Later,
the Institute was investigated by the Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary, which declared in 1952:

The Institute of Pacific Relations was a vehicle used by the Com-
munists to orient American Far Eastern policies toward Communist
objectives. Members of the small core of officials and staff members
who controlled IPR were either Communist or pro-Communist . . J 4

The situation in China became desperate. Thanks to the U.S.
embargo, the Nationalists were running out of ammunition, while
the Communists remained Soviet-supplied. In 1948, Congress voted
$125 million in military aid to Chiang, But the Truman adminis-
tration held up implementation for nine months with red tape, while
China collapsed. 15 In contrast, after the Marshall Plan had passed,
the first ships set sail for Europe within days.

Chiang and the Nationalists fled to Taiwan, The IPR myth that
he was the heavy and Mao the hero fell apart: Taiwan emerged as
a bastion of freedom, and out-produced the world trade of the entire
mainland; Mao, on the other hand, instituted totalitarian Commu-
nism, and slaughtered tens of millions of Chinese in purges lasting
over two decades.

On January 25, 1949, a young congressman declared before the
House of Representatives: "Mr, Speaker, over this weekend we have
learned the extent of the disaster that has befallen China and the
United States. The responsibility for the failure of our foreign policy
in the Far East rests squarely with the White House and the De-
partment of State. The continued insistence that aid would not be
forthcoming, unless a coalition government with the Communists
were formed, was a crippling blow to the National Government." He
reaffirmed this in a speech five days later, concluding: "This is the
tragic story of China, whose freedom we once fought to preserve.

The Truman Era

What our young men had saved, our diplomats and our President
have frittered away." 16 The young congressman was John F, Ken-
nedy.

The Strange War in Korea

The Second World War and Vietnam have overshadowed the war
sandwiched between them. The Korean conflict, like the loss of
China, had roots in World War II diplomacy. When Harry Hopkins
visited Stalin in May 1945, they agreed that Korea, a protectorate
of Japan, should be ruled by a postwar international trusteeship. A
Foreign Affairs article had proposed this in April 1944, recom-
mending that

a trusteeship for Korea will be assumed not by a particular country,
but by a group of Powers, say, the United States, Great Britain, China
and Russia, 17

In fact, Korea was divided in half, its disposition similar to Ger-
many's. The U,3, occupied the South below the 38th parallel, and
the Soviets the North, which they converted into a Marxist satrapy
under Kim II Sung. It is not unreasonable to say that there never
would have been a Communist regime in North Korea, nor would
there ever have been a Korean War, had American negotiations and
lend-lease shipments not brought the USSR into the Pacific theater.

The Soviets trained a 150,000-man North Korean army, supplying
it with tanks and fighter planes. But when the U.S. evacuated the
South, we left only a constabulary force of 16,000 Koreans equipped
with small arms. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, sent by Truman to
evaluate the military situation in the Far East, reported that North
Korea represented a distinct military threat to the South, which he
recommended arming; but his warning was ignored, and his report
suppressed from public knowledge. (Dismayed by the negligence that
led to the war, Wedemeyer became an outspoken critic of American
foreign policy after retiring from active service in 1951; his revealing
book, Wedemeyer Reports!, was widely read.)

In January 1950, Kim II Sung proclaimed in a New Year's Day
statement that this would be Korea's "year of unification," and called

The Shadows of Power

for "complete preparedness for war." What was the U,S. reponse to
this saber-rattling? Two weeks later, Dean Acheson, now Truman's
Secretary of State, declared that South Korea lay outside the "de-
fensive perimeter" of the United States. This gave a clear signal to
Kim, who invaded the South that June under Soviet auspices,

Like Pearl Harbor, the invasion shocked the average American;
but it is hard to believe that it shocked Truman, Acheson, or other
high foreign policy officials who had watched these events unfolding.

To review the war's course very concisely, the North Koreans had
initial success. But General Douglas MacArthur's troops, after a
brilliant landing at Inchon, drove them back across the 38th parallel,
liberating nearly all of Korea up to the Yalu River, which marks the
border of China. At this point, Communist Chinese armies entered
the fray, pushing MacArthur's forces back. The war finally ended in
stalemate, with the North-South frontier remaining close to what it
had been.

The war, like its prelude, had a number of anomalies. First, Amer-
ican soldiers were fighting as part of a UN police force (even though
they made up ninety percent of it).

Constitutionally, only the U.S. Congress is authorized to declare
war. But in the case of Korea, the President by-passed declaration
of war. We had ratified the UN Charter and were subject to its
statutes.

In 1944, the CFR had prepared a confidential memorandum for
the State Department that prophetically anticipated this circum-
stance. It noted:

[A] possible further difficulty was cited, namely, that arising from
the Constitutional provision that only Congress may declare war, This
argument was countered with the contention that a treaty would over-
ride this barrier, let alone the fact that our participation in such police
action as might be recommended by the international security orga-
nization need not necessarily be construed as war. ls

One of the remarkable ironies of the Korean episode was that the
Soviets, by simple exercise of their veto in the Security Council,
could have easily prevented the UN's intervention on behalf of South

The Truman Era

Korea. But they staged a walkout, allegedly over the failure of the
UN to seat Red China. They did not return until after the Korea
vote, even though UN Secretary General Trygve Lie expressly in-
vited them to attend. Why would the Soviets pass up a conspicuous
opportunity to protect their surrogate operation in Korea? This
raises the possibility that their "blunder" was intentional.

No less strange than the Soviets' conduct was Washington's pros-
ecution of the war. American armed forces were required to fight
under restrictions never before known in military annals.

Establishment historians have always faulted General MacArthur
for China's entry into the war, saying that the field commander's
cockiness caused him to underestimate the risks of pushing to the
Yalu. They ignore the consequences of the declaration issued by
Harry Truman, two days after the North Koreans' invasion:

. . . I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on For-
mosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese
Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against
the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this ia done. lu

During the war, under the pretext of not inciting Peking, the U.S.
Navy was ordered to protect the mainland from Chiang Kai-shek's
troops on Taiwan (Formosa). This freed up the Communist Chinese
armies for their strike across the Yalu, Chiang also offered us his
men for direct use on the Korean front. As a member of the UN,
Taiwan presumably had a perfect right to partake in this UN action.
But the proposition was rejected by General Marshall (whom Tru-
man had now appointed Secretary of Defense).

To halt the Chinese Communists' advance across the Yalu,
MacArthur ordered the river's bridges bombed. Within hours, his
order was countermanded by General Marshall. MacArthur said of
this:

I realized for the first time that I had actually been denied the use
of my full military power to safeguard the lives of my soldiers and the
safety of my army. To me, it clearly foreshadowed a future tragic
situation in Korea, and left me with a sense of inexpressible shocks

The Truman Era

was to validate NATO."* 3 Validating the UN was probably more to
the point. In 1952 7 Foreign Affairs ran a lead article entitled "Korea
in Perspective," in which the author summed up thus:

The burden of my argument, then, based on the meaning of our
experience in Korea as 1 see it, is that we have made historic progress
toward the establishment of a viable system of collective security. 5 *

CFR members had already used anti-Communist pretenses to ma-
nipulate the United States into the Marshall Plan and NATO, A fair
question then arises — in light of all the strange policies that induced
the Korean conflict and governed its progress — if the war was a
sick-minded contrivance to "prove" that the UN (world government)
could effectively prevent aggression and should thus be granted more
power. If so, it was a sorry joke on the American and Korean people.

Men may be willing to die for their country, they may be willing
to die for freedom, but who — as author James Burnham asked —
wants to die for "containment"? One man who comprehended this
was Douglas MacArthur. In April 1951, Truman fired him without
a hearing, supposedly because his dissent with Washington had been
made public, but more probably because he was determined to win
rather than settle for stalemate. Replacing MacArthur in Korea was
General Matthew Ridgway, whom David Halberstam called "a mil-
itary extension of Kennan," and who later joined the CFR.

The dismissal outraged Americans. Within forty-eight hours,
125,000 telegrams were sent to the White House. MacArthur re-
turned home to the largest ticker tape parades in U.S. history. Before
Congress he declared that there is "no substitute for victory."

The Truman administration was finished.

Hk ' W ! Ml- J

1 # r ^BB

. Im % $: JP Hk JB

"mtm

**j»- -—=^1 " r*^"^" *"^.: . ^ Ml\ ^1 ^f '

«B

Harry Truman with two of his "wise men/'
John McCloy (center) and Dean Acheson (right)

More than twenty years later, Acheson and McCloy would still

be advising the White House, Above, they flank President

Richard Nixon. Figure closest to camera is Henry Kissinger

George Marshall and Robert Lovett testify before Congress about the
need for the Marshall Plan. Only by addressing the Soviet threat —
arousing the anti-Communist instincts of a Christian America —
could the billions sought be obtained. This posturing helped give the
Establishment its illusive veneer of conservatism.

H. J. RES. 606

! ; i:i -I * I

George Kennan in June 1947

JOINT RESOLUTION

One of the many Atlantic

Union resolutions brought before

Congress. All were rejected.

Literature promoting the Atlantic Union

The Marshal! Mission aided the Communist victory in China. Left to
right: Chou En-lai, Marshall, Chu Teh, Cheng Kai-min, Mao Tse-tung.

As Marshall looks on, Chou En-lai signs the cease-fire
agreement he does not intend to honor,

The Chinese Communists executed millions.

The Forrestal Case

Truman tapped former CFR member James Forrestal to be Defense
Secretary. Forrestal stunned the Establishment, however, with overtly
anti-Communist activities. His initiative was largely responsible for
preventing a Communist takeover in Italy in 1948. Discerning the true
intent of Establishment foreign policy, he stated with revulsion:
"Consistency has never been a mark of stupidity. If the diplomats
who have mishandled our relations with Russia were merely stupid,
they would occasionally make a mistake in our favor. 11 He resolved to
counteract treason within the government. Truman fired him in March
1949. Forrestal then planned to buy the New York Sun and convert it
into an anti-Communist citadel — an undertaking sure to mean
steamy revelations about Washington. He never had the chance.
Five days after his dismissal, he was taken to Bethesda Naval
Hospital (for "fatigue' h ), where he was heavily drugged and held
incommunicado for seven weeks. All visitors except immediate family
were denied. Forrestal's diaries — undoubtedly explosive — were
meanwhile confiscated by the White House. His priest, Monsignor
Maurice Sheehy, finally prevailed upon Navy Secretary John Sullivan
to authorize his release. On May 22, 1 949, Forrestal was scheduled
for discharge. But at 2 AM that morning, he fell from a window near
his sixteenth-floor room. His bathrobe cord was found knotted around
his neck, The death was declared suicide, Forrestal T s brother Henry
called if murder. The tragedy, subsequent cover-up, and
contradictions in the "suicide" verdict were canvassed by Cornell
Simpson in his 1966 book The Death of James Forrestal

Chinese soldiers crossed the
Yalu under Washington's aegis,
without which Chinese general
Lin Piao (above) acknowledged
he would not have attacked.

U.S. fighters hunt for MIGs over
North Korea, American pilots in
Korea operated under restraints
unheard of in war.

>>■

The determined anti-Communism of Douglas MacArthur and Chiang
Kai-shek brought the wrath of the American Establishment on both.

Chapter 7

Between Limited Wars

Eisenhower and the CFR

It was clear in 1952 that the Republicans would return to the
White House. Harry Truman had more problems than the Alger
Hiss scandal. "Containment" was simply not working. Since the
concepts origination, hundreds of millions of people had fallen under
Communist domination. Americans sensed the need for a strong new
leader who could stand up to the Soviets. The favorite of the OOP's
rank and file was Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, the son of the former
President, and an outspoken foe of Communism. Douglas MacArthur
openly supported Taft, who entertained plans to make the general
his running mate. It was the Establishment's aversion to this can-
didacy that brought Dwight D, Eisenhower forward.

In 1941, the year we went to war, Eisenhower, or "Ike," was a
lieutenant colonel who had never seen a battle in his life. Yet by
late 1943 he had become a four-star general and supreme com-
mander of Allied forces in Western Europe. Eisenhower's meteoric
rise has been popularly ascribed to his performance in Louisiana
war maneuvers, and his efficiency as General Marshall's chief of
operations in Washington. But Robert Welch, in his critical biog-
raphy The Politician, noted that the extraordinary rash of promo-
tions was preceded by a dinner in Seattle where Ike met FDR's
daughter Anna, leading to a White House interview, 1

After the war, Eisenhower commanded U.S, occupation forces in
Germany. He returned home to become U.S. Chief of Staff. According
to Ike's adulatory biographer, Stephen Ambrose, "The elite of the
Eastern Establishment moved in on him almost before he occupied
his new office/' 2 The general and his wife, says Ambrose,

101

The dismissal of MacArthur proved not his undoing, but Truman's.

Congressman Joseph Martin surveys some of the public response.
100

Chapter 7

Between Limited Wars

Eisenhower and the CFR

It was clear in 1952 that the Republicans would return to the
White House. Harry Truman had more problems than the Alger
Hiss scandal. "Containment" was simply not working. Since the
concept's origination, hundreds of millions of people had fallen under
Communist domination. Americans sensed the need for a strong new
leader who could stand up to the Soviets. The favorite of the GQFs
rank and file was Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, the son of the former
President, and an outspoken foe of Communism. Douglas MacArthur
openly supported Taft, who entertained plans to make the general
his running mate. It. was the Establishment's aversion to this can-
didacy that brought Dwight D. Eisenhower forward.

After the war, Eisenhower commanded ILS, occupation forces in
Germany. He returned home to become U.S. Chief of Staff. According
to Ike's adulatory biographer, Stephen Ambrose, "The elite of the
Eastern Establishment moved in on him almost before he occupied
his new office, 1 ' 2 The general and his wife, says Ambrose,

101

The dismissal of MacArthur proved not his undoing, but Truman's,

Congressman Joseph Martin surveys some of the public response.

100

Chapter 7

Between Limited Wars

Eisenhower and the CFR

It was clear in 1952 that the Republicans would return to the
White House. Harry Truman had more problems than the Alger
Hiss scandal. "Containment" was simply not working. Since the
concept's origination, hundreds of millions of people had fallen under
Communist domination, Americans sensed the need for a strong new
leader who could stand up to the Soviets. The favorite of the GOFs
rank and file was Senator Robert Tail of Ohio, the son of the former
President j and an outspoken foe of Communism. Douglas MacArthur
openly supported Taft, who entertained plans to make the general
his running mate. It was the Establishment's aversion to this can-
didacy that brought Dwight D, Eisenhower forward.

In 1941, the year we went to war, Eisenhower, or "Ike/ 7 was a
lieutenant colonel who had never seen a battle in his life. Yet by
late 1943 he had become a four-star general and supreme com-
mander of Allied forces in Western Europe. Eisenhower's meteoric
rise has been popularly ascribed to his performance in Louisiana
war maneuvers, and his efficiency as General Marshall's chief of
operations in Washington. But Robert Welch, in his critical biog-
raphy Tite Politician, noted that the extraordinary rash of promo-
tions was preceded by a dinner in Seattle where Ike met FDR's
daughter Anna, leading to a White House interview. 1

After the war, Eisenhower commanded U.S. occupation forces in
Germany. He returned home to become U.S. Chief of Staff, According
to Ike's adulatory biographer, Stephen Ambrose, "The elite of the
Eastern Establishment moved in on him almost before he occupied
his new office." 2 The general and his wife, says Ambrose,

101

The Shadows of Power

spent their evenings and vacation time with Eisenhower's new,
wealthy friends. When they played bridge in the thirties, it was with
other majors and their wives; in the forties, it was with the president
of CBS, or the chairman of the board of U.S. Steel, or the president
of Standard Oil, 3

Bernard Baruch became a close acquaintance. Although he had
no academic background, Eisenhower was made president of Co-
lumbia University in 1948, He joined the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, was on the editorial advisory board of Foreign Affairs, and
chaired a Council study group on aid to Europe, Joseph Kraft, in
Harpers, quoted one CFR member as saying: 'Whatever General
Eisenhower knows about economics, he learned at the study group
meetings. 7 ' 4 In 1950 he was appointed supreme commander of the
globalists' baby, NATO.

The Establishment knew that to divest Taft and MacArthur of the
Republican nomination, they would have to present a candidate who
looked credibly tough and anti-Communist. General Eisenhower,
who was still wearing an aura of World War II glory , became their
choice.

By no stretch of the imagination was Ike a Republican tradition-
alist. In fact, until he ran, he had no party affiliation. The Democrats
tried to draft him in 1948, and Harry Truman had even approached
him about running on the same ticket. 5 Nonetheless, when Eisen-
hower beckoned to GOP ears during the 1952 campaign, he began
mouthing the same things Taft and MacArthur were saying. He
condemned the Yalta agreement, even though it was Ike himself
who had executed a number of its provisions; during the war, he
held his troops back, allowing the Soviets to conquer Prague and
Berlin; and as commander of postwar occupation forces, he autho-
rized Operation Keelhaul, repatriating at least two million Soviet
nationals to the USSR against their will. 6

The Establishment machine worked at full throttle for Eisen-
hower. Even the New York Times modestly noted:

There is some degree of similarity between the Willkie drive and
the movement to nominate General of the Army D wight D. Eisen-

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Between Limited Wars

hower. The same financial and publishing interests or their counter-
parts are behind the Eisenhower movement. 7

Human Events (January 23, 1952) told how certain bankers ap-
plied pressure

on businessmen who favor Tan: but have the misfortune to owe money
to these Eastern bankers. We have, on investigation, spotted several
cases in which businessmen . . . have received communications from
their New York creditors, urging them to join pro-Eisenhower com-
mittees and to raise or contribute funds thereto.* 1

At the Republican nominating convention, "dirty tricks"
abounded. The rules for selecting delegates were changed; Taft del*
egations from Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas were thrown out and
replaced by Eisenhower supporters.

Here is how Taft himself explained the lost nomination:

First, it was the power of the New York financial interests and a
large number of businessmen subject to New York influence, who
selected General Eisenhower as their candidate at least a year ago, , . .
Second, four-fifths of the influential newspapers in the country were
opposed to me continuously and vociferously and many turned them-
selves into propaganda sheets for my opponent. 9

In the lead article of the October 1952 Foreign Affairs, McGeorge
Bundy exulted over the nominations of Ike and his Democratic op-
ponent, Adlai Stevenson (also a member of the CFR). Once again,
the Establishment had succeeded in controlling both parties. Bundy
candidly acknowledged:

Contemplating this remarkable result, many were tempted simply
to thank their lucky stars; but it was not all luck. These two nomi-
nations were not accidental . . .

The fundamental meaning of the Eisenhower candidacy can best be
understood by considering the nature of the forces he was drafted to
stop — for fundamentally he was the stop-Tail candidate . i .

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The Shadows of Power

As President, Eisenhower drew his staff from the Establishment's
club. His first choice for Secretary of State was John McCloy, who
had served in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. McCloy,
however, declined — he was busy in 1953, becoming chairman of
both the Council on Foreign Relations and Chase Manhattan
Bank.

Winding up as Secretary of State was John Foster Dulles. Dulles
had been one of Woodrow Wilson's young proteges at the Paris Peace
Conference, A founding member of the CFR, he had contributed
articles to Foreign Affairs since its first issue. He was an in-law of
the Rockefellers, and chairman of the board of the Rockefeller Foun-
dation. He was also board chairman of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, where his choice for president of that body had
been Alger Hiss, m An inveterate internationalist, he had been a
delegate to the founding UN conference. Also a member of Truman's
State Department, he had none of the earmarks one would expect
of a Republican. Nevertheless, before the election, he began to parrot
conservative slogans, just as Eisenhower did. So great was the dis-
parity between Dulles* words and his personal reality that one of
his biographies was entitled The Actor.

Dulles died in 1959. Eisenhower replaced him with Christian
Herter, who had also been with Wilson at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence. Herter married into the Standard Oil fortune, and joined the
CFR in 1929. A rabid proponent of the Atlantic Union, he wrote a
book entitled Toward an Atlantic Community , and elaborated his
views in a Foreign Affairs article called "Atlantica," 11

For CIA director, Ike selected Allen Dulles, John Foster's brother.
He, too, had been at the Paris Peace Conference. He joined the CFR
in 1926 and later became its president.

Among the other administrators that Eisenhower drew from the
Council were: Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson; Commerce Sec-
retary Lewis Strauss; National Security Adviser Gordon Gray; HEW
Under Secretary Nelson Rockefeller; Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, Douglas Dillon; and many others who held lesser
positions.

Of course, Ike's choice for Vice President was Richard Nixon, about
whom we will say more later.

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Between Limited Wars

The Eisenhower Years

The Eisenhower Presidency was what one would expect from a
CFR administration.

• Ike did not reverse the Democratic trend of big spending and big
government. His cumulative deficits were nearly five times greater
than Harry Truman's, and the giant Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare was added to the federal bureaucracy.

• In 1953, a measure known as the Bricker Amendment was intro-
duced in Congress. It stipulated that no treaty signed by the U + 8,
could override the Constitution or infringe on the rights guaranteed
Americans. It was born out of the painful retrospect of Yalta and
the UN Charter. Foreign Affairs, that great paragon of "hospitality
to divergent views," ran a 19-page denunciation of the Bricker
Amendment as its lead article for October 1953. President Eisen-
hower toed the CFR line, calling the amendment's backers 4I nuts
and crackpots." 1 * Biographer Ambrose writes: "Eisenhower used all
his persuasive powers — in stag dinners, at meetings, in private, in
correspondence, even on the golf course — to kill the amendment." 13
And killed it was,

• Also in 1953, Congress established the Reece Committee to in-
vestigate tax-free foundations. For what was probably the first and
last time, the CFR came under official scrutiny.

The Committee's findings stated:

in the international field, foundations, and an interlock among some
of them and certain intermediary organizations, have exercised a
strong effect upon our foreign policy and upon public education in
things international. This has been accomplished by vast propaganda,
by supplying executives and advisers to government and by controlling
much research in this area through the power of the purse, The net
result of these combined efforts has been to promote "international-
ism" in a particular sense — a form directed toward "world govern-
ment" and a derogation of American "nationalism." 14

The report also observed that major foundations "have actively
supported attacks upon our social and government system and fi-
nanced the promotion of socialism and collectivist ideas." The Com-

105

Between Limited Wars

confidante Paul Hoffman (CFR) and White House Chief of Staff
Sherman Adams, to pressure Congress to censure the senator. Any-
one who really believes McCarthy made wild accusations should read
his expose of George Marshall, America's Retreat From Victory 9 in
which he scrupulously documented every charge, or read James J.
Drummey's informative catechism about McCarthy in the May 13 ,
1987 issue of The New American*

• In 1955, Eisenhower became the first President to attend a peace-
time summit with the Soviets. While the meeting accomplished noth-
ing for the West, it was a propaganda coup for the USSR. Photos of
Eisenhower clinking cocktail glasses with Soviet leaders would be
useful to demoralize the captive citizens of Eastern Europe, who
looked to the U.S. as their hope for liberation.

These people, however, trusted in Eisenhower's anti-Communist
rhetoric, which was occasionally broadcast over Radio Free Europe
and expressed support for their cause.

The Poles revolted in June 1956, but were subdued by tanks. In
late October of that year, the Hungarians succeeded in driving out
the Soviets, and rejoiced in freedom for five days. Then the Soviets
returned to the Hungarian border with 2,000 tanks, and the world
looked to see if Eisenhower would act.

Ohio Congressman Michael Feighan later explained what hap-
pened next:

Then the State Department, allegedly concerned about the delicate
feelings of the Communist dictator Tito, sent him the following cabled
assurances of our national intentions in the late afternoon of Friday,
November 2, 1956: 'The Government of the United States does not
look with favor upon governments unfriendly to the Soviet Union on
the borders of the Soviet Union."

It was no accident or misjudgment of consequences which led the
imperial Russian Army to reinvade Hungary at 4 a.m. on the morning
of November 4 T 1956, The cabled message to Tito was the go ahead

*The Drummey article factually comets numerous distortions and falsehoods about Senator
McCarthy that were spread to discourage further inquiry into the true n a Lure of the Establish-
ment, The article is highly commended and is available in reprint form Tor $2.00 from: Reprints,
The New American, Post Office Box 8040, Appleton, Wisconsin 54913*

107

The Shadows of Power

signal to the Russians because any American school boy knows that
Tito is Moscow's Trojan Horse. It took less than 48 hours for him to
relay this message of treason to his superiors in the Kremlin. All the
world knows the terrible consequences of that go ahead signal/

The Hungarians radioed: "Help us, not with advice, not with
words, but with action! With soldiers and arms! Our ship is sinking,
the light vanishes, the shades grow darker," Eisenhower, however,
only gave them words.

A group of heroic Spanish pilots wanted to fly supplies to the
freedom fighters. This plan required refueling in West Germany.
Prince Michel SturdEa, former foreign minister of Romania, wrote
in his book Betrayal by Rulers: "The Eisenhower government inter-
vened immediately in Madrid and Bonn, with all the means of pres-
sure at its command, demanding that the German government can-
cel the authorization already granted . . "™ The planes did not get
through.

Soviet rule was bloodily restored to Hungary. Rebellion then died
out in Eastern Europe for many years. Some commentators said it
was because the USSR had liberalized its grip, and the people were
now happy. Quite to the contrary, their spirit of rebellion was broken
because they now knew that the West would never help them.
• Perhaps the greatest shame of the Eisenhower administration
was allowing Fidel Castro to transform Cuba into the Soviets' first
outpost in the Western Hemisphere. Despite reasonable evidence,
some of the President's apologists long contended that Castro had
not been a Communist when he originally took power. The contro-
versy was ultimately dispelled by the dictator himself in his 1977
interview with Barbara Walters, when he said that he had been a
Communist since his university days.

Of course, no hint of this was communicated to the American
people. In 1957, Herbert L, Matthews (CFR) made the rebel Castro
out to be the George Washington of Cuba in a series of New York
Times articles that began with the front page of a Sunday edition.
Castro also received plenty of favorable coverage and interviews on
prime time TV. The public was given the "Chiang and Mao" treat-
ment all over again. Cuban President Fulgencio Batista was sud-

108

Between Limited Wars

denly depicted as a corrupt tyrant, while Castro was — in Matthews'
words — "a man of ideals" with "strong ideas of liberty, democracy,
social justice . . ." 2]

Former U.S. Ambassador to Cuba Earl E. T> Smith stated in a
letter published in the New York Times in 1979:

To the contrary, Castro could not have seized power in Cuba without
the aid of the United States, American Government agencies and the
United States press played a major role in bringing Castro to
power. , . , As the U.S. Ambassador to Cuba during the Castro-Com-
munist revolution of 1957-59, 1 had first-hand knowledge of the facts
which brought about the rise of Fidel Castro, , . . The State Depart-
ment consistently intervened — positively, negatively; and by innu-
endo — to bring about the downfall of President Fulgencio Batista,
thereby making it possible for Fidel Castro to take over the Govern-
ment of Cuba. 22

While Castro's supporters overseas sent him modern military sup-
plies, the ILS, government embargoed arms to Batista, whose troops
fought with obsolescent weapons — many of them dating to World
War I. On December 17, 1958, Ambassador Smith, acting on in-
structions from the Eisenhower State Department^ asked Batista to
step down. 23 He abdicated two weeks later.

In 1959, Castro, the new ruler of Cuba, was a guest speaker at
Pratt House. Those who warned that he was a Communist were
scoffed at. But three years later, he had Soviet missiles pointing at
the USA.

JFK and the CFR

In I960, John F. Kennedy was elected President. His family had
long flirted at the outskirts of the Establishment. Arthur Schles-
inger, Jr. noted in A Thousand Days:

The New York Establishment had looked on Kennedy with some
suspicion. This was mostly because of his father, whom it had long
since blackballed as a maverick in finance and an isolationist in foreign

109

The Shadows of Power

policy . . . . Now that he was President, however, they were prepared
to rally round . , . 2 *

The Kennedys' relationship with the Establishment was loosely
fictionalized in Captains and the Kings, Taylor Caldwell's novel
about an Irish immigrant who seeks to make his son the first Cath-
olic President. The book, which was dramatized as a TV miniseries,
depicted a secret, conspiratorial power clique it called the "Com-
mittee for Foreign Studies." It is worth reading the book's somber
foreword, in which Caldwell warned that the Committee really ex-
ists, under another name.

Whether or not Kennedy belonged to the CFR has been disputed.
As a senator, he stated that he was a member — yet, strangely, his
name never appeared on the Council's official roster.

Like Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy was given an Es-
tablishment education, attending prep school and then Harvard.
And, like Roosevelt, he made an apparent play for Establishment favor
by writing an article for Foreign Affairs (October 1957) with a similar
title to FDR's: "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy.* In it, Kennedy
referred to "distinguished individuals" who had served under Harry
Truman. Among those he named were John McCloy and Robert Lovett.
These were the two men whom Schlesinger, in A Thousand Days,
specified as the "present leaders" of "the American Establishments

As David Halberstam relates in the opening pages of The Best
and the Brightest, it was Lovett that President-elect Kennedy turned
to for counsel on his cabinet selection. In fact, JFK wanted Lovett
himself, offering him his choice of Secretary of State, Treasury, or
Defense. The aging "wise man" declined, but advised Kennedy on
who should fill the three positions. Without exception, Lovett's rec-
ommendations materialized in Kennedy's actual cabinet.

JFK spoke of a "New Frontier," but that term did not apply to his
administration. Some of the faces were new to Washington, but they
were dredged up from the same old breeding place — the Council
on Foreign Relations.

Like Eisenhower, Kennedy chose for Secretary of State the chair-
man of the Rockefeller Foundation — now Dean Rusk. Rusk had
not only been suggested by Lovett and Dean Acheson, but he had

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Between Limited Wars

written an article for the April 1960 Foreign Affairs on how a Pres-
ident should conduct foreign policy. That, presumably, just about
cinched it. An old protege of George Marshall in the Truman State
Department, Rusk had been in the CFR since 1952.

The Council would dominate Rusk's staff, Anthony Lukas reported
in the New York Times:

Of the first 82 names on a list prepared to help President Kennedy
staff his State Department, 63 were Council members. Kennedy once
complained, *Td like to have some new faces here, but all I get is the
same old names. "^

Some of the other CFR members Kennedy appointed to high sta-
tions were:

Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury

McGeorge Bundy, National Security Adviser

Walt Rostow, Deputy National Security Adviser

John McCone, CIA Director

Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense

Henry Fowler, Under Secretary of the Treasury

George Ball, Under Secretary of State

Averell Harrirnan, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to the President

Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President

Angier Duke, Chief of Protocol

John McCloy, Chief of U.S. Disarmament Administration

John Kenneth Galbraith said: "Those of us who had worked for
the Kennedy election were tolerated in the government for that
reason and had a say, but foreign policy was still with the Council
on Foreign Relations people." 27

The Kennedy Years

Cuba was almost thematic to Kennedy's Presidency; it even
seemed to haunt him at death, as investigators of his assassination

111

The Shadows of Power

have periodically stumbled across links to Cuba, consequential or
not. The Caribbean island marked what is usually regarded as Ken-
nedy's greatest failure (the Bay of Pigs) and his greatest triumph
(the Missile Crisis). But a degree of mythology has gathered around
both of these events. The first was characterized by '"blunder" and
the second by "coincidence," the two favorite words of Establishment
historiography.

The Bay of Pigs invasion (April 1961) was an attempt by a group
of expatriate Cubans to return to their homeland and liberate it.
They had been trained into an efficient brigade by the U.S. military.
The mission ended in grievous defeat — owing to eleventh-hour
decisions in Washington.

The operation had two parts. First, there were to be three prelim-
inary air strikes by Cuban pilots, based in Nicaragua, flying old B-
26 bombers. The air raids were designed to destroy the Communists'
small air force. Thanks to superb U.S. reconnaissance photos, the
location of every Castro plane was known, There were to be three
raids, and a total of forty-eight sorties. 518

However, orders from the White House eventually reduced this
to one raid with eight sorties. This inflicted some damage, but still
left Castro with a viable air force.

Kennedy did not cancel the last of the air strikes until the brigade
had already set sail, accompanied by the U.S. Navy. He made the
decision at the urging of his CFR advisors (Rusk, Bundy, Adlai
Stevenson) 29 and over the objections of his military consultants, who
warned it would doom the mission. The official reason later given
for the cancellations was that the bombings demonstrated too much
U.S. "involvement" and might adversely affect "world opinion."

The invaders landed before dawn, and announced to rejoicing in-
habitants that they had come to free Cuba, They penetrated far
inland. The better part of a Communist militia regiment defected
to their side. Then, to their shock and dismay, Castro's jets appeared
in the sky, blasting away with guns and rockets, Two of the brigade's
offshore supply vessels were sunk, and the others were forced to
withdraw.

Kennedy could still have salvaged the mission by ordering nearby
aircraft carriers to intervene. Richard Bissell (CIA) and Admiral

112

Between Limited Wars

Arleigh Burke urged him to do so, but the Rusk group again pre-
vailed, 30 The President did nothing.

After the Kennedy era, two books emerged as the authorities on
that period: Ted Sorenson's Kennedy and Schlesinger's A Thousand
Days. Both authors had been Kennedy advisors, both joined the CFR.
And their books both downplayed the significance of the aborted
bombing strikes, which in fact had been the crux of the invasion
plan's success.

As in Hungary, anti-Communist freedom fighters were aban-
doned. And as in Korea, civilian advisors overruled the military in
the conduct of warfare — with catastrophic results.

The Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962) has been called JFK's
"finest hour." We are told of how, after U.S. reconnaissance planes
spotted Soviet missiles in Cuba, Kennedy blockaded the island, stood
up to the Russians and made them back down.

Of course, there never would have been a missile crisis if the Bay
of Pigs invasion had gone off unhindered. This and a few other points
have been commonly overlooked.

Nineteen Soviet ships passed the vaunted blockade unimpeded. 31
Only one vessel was ever halted and inspected — the Marcula, an
American-built ship of Lebanese registry, sailing under Soviet
charter.

Little attention has been given to the concessions Kennedy made
to get the nuclear weapons out of Cuba. Columnist Walter Lippmann
— a founding member of the CFR who had been in Colonel House's
old "Inquiry" — suggested that the United States dismantle its mis-
sile bases in Turkey as an exchange. Two days later, Soviet dictator
Nikita Khrushchev made the same proposal. In the end, the United
States removed all of its intermediate-range missiles, not only from
Turkey, but from England and Italy as well. The public was told
that this was a coincidence, that the weapons were obsolete and due
for withdrawal anyway. General Curtis LeMay, former head of the
Strategic Air Command, sharply contradicted this in his book Amer-
ica Is in Danger, pointing out that the missiles had just become
operational!

A further concession made by Kennedy was a pledge of no more
invasion attempts against Cuba. The White House ordered that anti-

113

The Shadows of Power

Caatro militants in the U.S. be rounded up, and their guns and boats
confiscated.

The President originally demanded on-site UN inspection of the
Soviet missile withdrawal, but later backed down, settling for Mos-
cow's promise. To this day, no one knows with certainty if the mis-
siles were really evacuated or simply shifted into caves and under-
ground facilities.

Kennedy's "finest hour" was, on balance, a greater triumph for
the Soviets: it set the stage for the strategic nuclear superiority they
would later enjoy in Europe, and it guaranteed the preservation of
their Cuban colony.

In handling the crisis, Kennedy relied not only on his usual staff,
but called upon the services of Lovett, McCloy, and Acheson. The
final agreement was worked out by McCloy at his home in Stamford,
Connecticut, where he hosted the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister,
Vasily Kuznetsov* 32

Whatever we may say about John F. Kennedy, he remains one of
the most esteemed U.S. Presidents. A man with an independent
streak, he was apparently never a true "insider." Some have even
speculated that his assassination, still clothed in mystery, may have
resulted from an attempt to break with the Establishment, Though
it may have no significance, both McCloy and Allen Dulles — the
chairman and former president of the CFR — served on the Warren
Commission investigating the President's death.

114

The Establishment's fear of Robert Taft

(at right, with Representative Fred Hartley)

generated the candidacy of Dwtght Eisenhower.

Nixon and Eisenhower exult at
the 1952 Republican National Convention.

115

Ike with Bernard Baruch

The President with a few of the many CFR men in his administration.
Left to right, Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,
Security Adviser Dillon Anderson (joined the Council subsequent to
appointment), and Commerce Secretary Lewis Strauss.

116

October 31, 1956: Hungarian freedom fighters
take aim at Communist secret police.

117

Former Ambassador to Cuba Earf E. T. Smith (left) recounted
the US, help given Castro (right) during his climb to power.

Lovett and President-elect Kennedy after their meeting

118

Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara (left),

and Secretary of State, Dean Rusk (center),

were both chosen on Lovetts recommendation.

Bay of Pigs invaders were denied

the critical air support they had been promised.

Above, captured invaders are marched off to prison in Havana.

119

Chapter 8

The Establishment's
War In Vietnam

The Vietnam War is a dismal remembrance to its veterans, many

of whom still ask why we went and why we lost. No single event
has brought America more social transformation. We are prone to
accept that transformation as the unintended by-product of a war
that was a blunder. But as we have seen, historical "blunders/ 5 from
the Great Crash to Pearl Harbor to Cuba, have a convenient way of
serving the interests of the backstage globalists who run our country.

French control of Indochina ended in 1954, CFR chronicler Robert
Shulzinger notes that the CounciTs "study groups on Southeast Asia,
meeting in 1953-54, prepared the ground for the United States to
take over France's role as the outside power waging war against
local leftist insurrection," 1 The groups stressed the importance of
Southeast Asia to American interests.

After the Geneva Conference artificially divided Vietnam into
North and South, the U.S. government helped depose Emperor Rao
Dai — symbol of Vietnamese unity — and backed Ngo Dinh Diem
as the South's prime minister. Eventually Washington turned on
Diem as well; the Kennedy administration's collusion in the coup
that overthrew him (and ultimately resulted in his brutal murder)
is now widely documented.

In Vietnam, as in Korea, we engaged in war without declaring it.
C. L. Sulzberger stated in the New York Times in 1966:

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The Establishments War In Vietnam

Dulles fathered SEATO with the deliberate purpose, as he explained
to me, of providing the U.S. President with legal authority to intervene
in Indochina. When Congress approved SEATO it signed the first of
a series of blank checks yielding authority over Vietnam policy.*

Later, President Lyndon Baines Johnson obtained the power to
escalate the war from Congress through the Tonkin Gulf Resolution,
This transpired after an alleged assault on U.S. destroyers by North
Vietnamese torpedo boats — an incident whose authenticity many
later questioned. Doubts intensified after it was revealed that the
Johnson administration had drafted the resolution before the skir-
mish took place.

The matter has since been settled rather decisively by Admiral
James Stockdale, a former navy fighter pilot, in his 1984 book In
Love & War. Stockdale, a Congressional Medal of Honor winner who
spent more than seven years as a POW in North Vietnam, had been
on the scene during the supposed Tonkin Gulf attack. Although both
destroyers were firing rounds, Stockdale did not detect any Viet-
namese boats in the vicinity during an hour and a half of overflight.

It was now the nuclear age. At a televised dinner of the Council
on Foreign Relations (January 12 T 1954), John Foster Dulles had
declared that, thanks to our nuclear arsenal, we could deter Soviet
aggression with the threat of "massive retaliation." But this new
trend in U.S. policy had a corollary: if we exasperated the Soviets,
it was claimed, they too might push the button. Wars against Com-
munism would therefore have to be limited and not aimed at win-
ning. Thus, in Establishment dogma, the idea of victory in war was
now not only an anachronism: it was a liability.

As James E. King, Jr. wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1957:

Moreover, we must be prepared to fight limited actions ourselves.
Otherwise we shall have made no advance beyond "massive retalia-
tion ," which tied our hands in conflicts involving less than our survival.
And we must be prepared to lose limited actions. No limitation could
survive our disposition to elevate every conflict in which our interests
are affected to the level of total conflict with survival at stake. Armed
conflict can be limited only if aimed at limited objectives and fought

121

The Shadows of Power

with limited means. If we or our enemy relax the limits on either
objectives or means, survival will be at stake, whether the issue is
worth it or not.* (Fir at emphasis added.)

In Korea, where the Establishment's interest was in accrediting
the UN's police powers, stalemate had been considered an acceptable
substitute for victory; now that we were outside of a UN context,
however, defeat itself was acceptable. This was not explained to the
brave Americans who fought and bled in Vietnam, They found out
the hard way.

Mismanaging the War

In Vietnam, as in Korea, extraordinary restrictions were placed
on the U.S. military. These, known as the "rules of engagement/'
were not declassified until 1985, when twenty-six pages in the
Congressional Record were required to summarize them,

• The Air Force was repeatedly refused permission to bomb those
targets that the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed most strategic,

• U.S. troops were given a general order not to fire at the Vietcong
until fired upon.

• Vehicles more than two hundred yards off the Ho Chi Minn Trail
could not be bombed. (Enemy supply trucks, forewarned of ap-
proaching U.S. planes, had only to temporarily divert off the trail
to escape destruction.)

• A North Vietnamese MIG could not be struck if spotted on a
runway; only if airborne and showing hostile intent.

• Surface-to-air missile sites could not be bombed while under con-
struction; only after they became operational.

• Enemy forces could not be pursued if they crossed into Laos or
Cambodia. This gave the Communists a safe sanctuary just fifty
miles from Saigon. Even the brief incursion into Cambodia that
Richard Nixon authorized in 1970 was hamstrung by a variety of
rules and regulations authored in Washington,

Lieutenant General Ira C, Eaker observed:

Our political leaders elected to fight a land war, where every ad*
vantage lay with the enemy, and to employ our vast sea and air
superiority in very limited supporting roles only.

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The Establishments War In Vietnam

Surprise, perhaps the greatest of the principles of war . , . was de-
liberately sacrificed when our leaders revealed our strategy and tactics
to the enemy, , , ,

The enemy was told . . , that we would not bomb populated areas,
heavy industry, canals, dams, and other critical targets — and thus
sanctuaries were established by us along the Chinese border and
around Haiphong and Hanoi, This permitted the enemy to concentrate
antiaircraft defenses around the North Vietnamese targets that our
Air Force was permitted to attack — greatly increasing our casual! ties.
Missiles, oil and ammunition were permitted to enter Haiphong har-
bor unmolested and without protest.*

Such restrictions were equaled in perfidy by the indirect support
the United States provided North Vietnam by boosting trade with
the Soviet Bloc (which furnished some eighty percent of Hanoi's war
supplies).

This commerce was one of the Establishment's pet projects. Zbig*
niew Brzezinski, writing in Foreign Affairs, had called for economic
aid to Eastern Europe as early as 1961. 5 The journal even featured
an article by Ted Sorenson bluntly titled <£ Why We Should Trade
with the Soviets/ 76

The actualization of such trade seems to have begun with David
Rockefeller's trip to Moscow in 1964. The Chicago Tribune reported
on September 12 of that year:

David Rockefeller, president of Chase Manhattan bank, briefed
President Johnson today on his recent meeting with Premier Nikita
S. Khrushchev of Russia,

Rockefeller told Johnson that during the two-hour talk, the Red
leader said the United States and the Soviet Union "should do more
trade." Khrushchev, according to Rockefeller, said he would like to
see the United States extend long-term credits to the Russians.

On October 7, 1966 — with the war now at full tilt — Johnson

stated:

123

The Shadows of Power

We intend to press for legislative authority to negotiate trade agree-
ments which could extend most-favored-nation tariff treatment to Eu-
ropean Communist states . . ,

We will reduce export controls on East- West trade with respect to
hundreds of non-strategic items J

Six days later the New York Times told its readers:

The United States put into effect today one of President Johnson's
proposals for stimulating East- West trade by removing restrictions
on the export of more than four hundred commodities to the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe.

Among the "non-strategic items 1 ' cleared for export were: petro-
leum, aluminum, scrap metal, synthetic rubber, tires, air navigation
equipment, ground and marine radar, rifle cleaning compounds, di-
ethylene glycol (used in the manufacture of explosives), computers,
electric motors, rocket engines, diesel engines, diesel ftiel t and var-
ious truck and automobile parts. 8 Almost anything short of a weapon
itself was classified "non-strategic." In times of war, however, few
commodities are truly not strategic — even food, seemingly innoc-
uous, is vital for an army to prosecute war,

Did the Johnson administration's easing of restrictions influence
the flow of goods from Warsaw Pact nations to Hanoi? Two weeks
after the announcement, the New York Times reported (October 27,
1966);

The Soviet Union and its allies agreed at the conference of their
leaders in Moscow last week to grant North Vietnam assistance in
material and money amounting to about one billion dollars.

Bombing the Ho Chi Minn Trail to interdict the enemy's supplies
made no sense when we were enriching the source of those supplies.
Trade that would have been labeled "treason" in World War II was
called "building bridges" during the Vietnam War. This, along with
the self-destructive restrictions on the military , were two of the
reasons why we could not defeat tiny North Vietnam, whereas it

124

The Establishments War In Vietnam

had taken us less than four years to overcome the combined might
of the German and Japanese empires.

Why Did We Go to Vietnam?

Analysts such as David Halberstam believe John F. Kennedy in-
creased our commitment in Vietnam as an antidote to humiliation:
that after the Bay of Pigs and a bullying Khrushchev gave JFK in
Vienna, the President wanted to show the Russians — if not his
right-wing critics — that he had backbone.

But if Kennedy really wanted to atone for the Bay of Pigs, he
didn't have to go to Vietnam — all he had to do was send our armed
forces against Fidel Castro, and it is doubtful that the tin-pot dic-
tators fledgling regime would have lasted another day.

If you wanted to fight Communism, Vietnam was a terrible place
to pick, Our supply lines had to stretch halfway around the world.
There were no fronts; the enemy was nearly invisible, not only due
to the jungle terrain, but because the Vietcong, who wore no uni-
forms, looked like ordinary villagers. A glance at the map shows
Vietnam is a narrow country whose extensive border with Laos and
Cambodia always ensured the Communists of nearby refuge. The
French had not been able to hold out there with 300,000 troops,
which hardly imbued the enterprise with optimism, And the gov-
ernment of South Vietnam, thanks in part to U.S. meddling, was
un stable y fraught with coups and corruption. No, Vietnam was not
a Utopian battlefield on which to confront Communism.

In dissecting the Establishment psyche that produced our Viet-
nam entanglement, it should first be noted that the Establishment
was, in the early 1960's, under heavy fire. Traditionally, the Amer-
ican people seem to be more wary of the loyalty of our public servants
during Democratic administrations. Under Truman, there was an
uproar concerning the State Department. Not long after Alger Hiss's
conviction, Joe McCarthy made his famous Wheeling, West Virginia
speech. Four months later, however, Truman sent U.S. soldiers to
battle the North Koreans. This tended to deflect, temporarily at
least, criticism that his administration was soft on Communism.

From 1953 to 1961, the Oval Office housed a Republican — albeit
a nominal one — and conservatives' scrutiny of Washington became

125

The Shadows of Power

largely inert, But, after the reinstatement of the Democrats under
Kennedy, the American right experienced a renaissance,

• In 1961 , the largest anti-Communist rally in American history
was held at the Hollywood Bowl, and J. Edgar Hoover's Masters of
Deceit hit the best-seller list.

• In 1962, three exposes of the Council on Foreign Relations were
published: The Invisible Government, by former FBI man Dan
Smoot; The Welfare Staters, by Colonel Victor J, Fox; and America's
Unelected Rulers: The Council on Foreign Relations, by Kent and
Phoebe Courtney.

• Also in 1962, the American Legion passed a resolution condemn-
ing the CFR "as being actively engaged in destroying the Consti-
tution and sovereignty of the United States of America," and the
Daughters of the American Revolution adopted a resolution peti-
tioning Congress to investigate the Council.

• American Mercury magazine was regularly blasting both the CFR
and the international bankers linked to it.

• The recently formed John Birch Society was using its educational
program to counteract Communism and its Establishment sympa-
thizers.

• And the Goldwater movement was picking up, striving to restore
the GOP to its tradition.

Newsweek and the New York Times may have ignored it, but Amer-
icans were at war with the Establishment, especially those figures
in the Kennedy administration. The decision to go to Vietnam took
much of the steam out of these movements. Those who hated Com-
munism were now given a war against it — but it was an endless,
no-win war, one that would be dragged out until the nation at large
renounced ever fighting Communism again.

The Manipulators

We have noted a number of times in this book that the Estab-
lishment is not "conservative," despite PR to the contrary. In The
Strawberry Statement: Notes of A College Revolutionary, James Ku-
nen quoted a fellow student radical's report about a 1968 SDS con-
vention:

126

The Establishments War In Vietnam

Also at the Convention, men from Business International Round-
tables — the meetings sponsored by Business International — tried
to buy up a few radicals. These men are the world's leading indus-
trialists and they convene to decide how our lives are going to go. . . .

They offered to finance our demonstrations in Chicago.

We were also offered Esso (Rockefeller) money. They want us to
make a lot of radical commotion so they can look more in the center
as they move to the left, 9

Yet it was members of this same Establishment who were at the
helm during the Vietnam War. All of our ambassadors to Saigon
from 1963 to 1973 — Henry Cabot Lodge, Maxwell Taylor, and Ells-
worth Bunker — were members of the Council, LB J sought John
McCloy for that particular job, but he turned it down.

One of the chief engineers of the Vietnam fiasco was Walt Rostow,
chairman of the State Department's policy planning council from
1961 until 1966, when he became National Security Adviser. The
Washington Post of August 10, 1966, called him "the Rock of John-
son's Viet Policy," But was Rostow a hawk? A conservative right-
winger? Like his equally prominent brother, Eugene Victor Debs
Rostow (named for the Socialist Party leader Eugene Debs), Walt
Rostow had been a member of the CFR since 1955. He was rejected
for employment in the Eisenhower administration three times be-
cause he could not pass security checks. In I960, in his book The
United States in the World Arena, Rostow declared that:

it is a legitimate American national objective to see removed from all
nations — including the United States — the right to use substantial
military force to pursue their own interests. Since this residual right
is the root of national sovereignty and the basis for the existence of
an international arena of power, it is, therefore, an American interest
to see an end to nationhood as it has been historically defined. 10

Not exactly the words of a die-hard patriot. Rostow called for
unilateral disarmament and an international police force. In 1962,
there was a stir in Washington when Congress learned of a secret
State Department report Rostow had produced entitled "Basic Na-

127

The Shadows of Power

tional Security Policy/ 1 It discussed our "overlapping interests" with
Communist nations, called for recognition of Red China and East
Germany, and said we should bar assistance to freedom fighters
behind the Iron Curtain.

Robert Strange McNamara, who was Secretary of Defense during
the first half of the war, was hardly a militarist, Schlafly and Ward,
in their book The Betrayers, summarized McNamara's impact on
U.S. defense capabilities. By the time he left office in 1968 he had:

, . , reduced our nuclear striking force by 50% while the Soviets had

increased theirs by 300%,

. . . caused the U.S. to lose its lead in nuclear delivery vehicles.

. . . scrapped *U of our multimegaton missiles,

. . . cut back the originally planned 2,000 Minutemen to 1,000.

. . . destroyed all our intermediate and medium-range missiles.

, . . cancelled our 24*megaton bomb.

. . . scrapped 1,455 of 2,710 bombers left over from the Eisenhower

Administration.

. . . disarmed 600 of the remaining bombers of their strategic nuclear

weapons.

. , , frozen the number of Polaris subs at 41, refusing to build any more

missile-firing submarines.

. . . refused to allow development of any new weapons systems except

theTFX(F-lll).

. i . cancelled Skyboit, Pluto, Bynasoar and Orion [missile systemsl.

It was aptly noted that McNamara, who even called for the abo-
lition of our armed forces reserves, had inflicted more damage on
America's defenses than the Soviets could have achieved in a nuclear
first strike! He continually exasperated the Joint Chiefs on Vietnam
policy, forbidding sorties against strategic targets and keeping our
troops in short supply. After resigning, he stated, "I am a world
citizen now," and was appointed president of the World Bank. During
his tenure there, the Bank's annual lending grew from $1 billion to
$11.5 billion; in 1978 he oversaw a $60 million loan to Communist
Vietnam. More recently, CFR member McNamara has been ap-
pearing on television as a peacenik, and has coauthored articles for

128

The Establishments Wae In Vietnam

Foreign Affairs opposing the construction of SDI (the Strategic De-
fense Initiative).

Averell Harrimaii served as Kennedy's Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs, and was later chief negotiator at the
Paris peace talks. Harriman, as we have noted, was a fcrailblazer of
trade with the Bolsheviks. He was instrumental in bringing the
Communists to power in Romania. 11 Soviet Ambassador Anatoly
Dobrynin customarily attended Harriman's birthday parties, and
even vacationed with him in Florida. i2

Another critical Establishment figure was William Bundy, ap-
pointed Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in 1964,
the same year he became a director of the CFR The Pentagon Papers
later exposed him as a major architect of our Vietnam policy, It was
he who ''prematurely" drafted the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. And it was
his brother, McGeorge Bundy (CFR) who, as National Security Adviser,
oversaw the mission that resulted in the Tonkin incident. McGeorge
went on to become president of the Ford Foundation.

William Bundy was certainly no flag-waving anti-Communist, He
had once donated $400 to the Alger Hiss defense fund. J3 In 1972,
David Rockefeller chose him as the new editor of Foreign Affairs,
replacing Hamilton Fish Armstrong, who was retiring after fifty
years of service. Under Bund/s guidance, Foreign Affairs began to
repudiate Cold War attitudes. J. Robert Moskin, writing in Town &
Country, notes that "Bundy surprised his critics by publishing ar-
ticles in Foreign Affairs that questioned the wisdom of American
intervention in Southeast Asia/* 14

Thus a grand paradox crystallized. Bundy had helped get us into
the no-win war; now he edited a journal suggesting that Vietnam
proved the futility of challenging Communism. His apologists believe
that he was being penitent after realizing his errors in Vietnam.
But there remains another possibility; that it was planned this way.

Further insight can be derived by tracing the career of Bundy's
father-in-law — Dean Acheson.

Acheson and the "Wise Men"

Acheson, like Bundy, attended Groton, Yale, and Harvard Law
School, At the latter he became a protege of the leftist professor

129

The Shadows of Power

Felix Frankfurter, who got him a job in Washington. Even before
the Soviet Union was recognized by the U.S., Joseph Stalin hired
Acheson to represent Bolshevik interests in America. During the
Roosevelt and Truman administrations, he alternated between pri-
vate law practice and public service. In 1945, he told a Madison
Square Garden rally of the Soviet-American Friendship Society: "We
understand and agree with the Soviet leaders that to have friendly
governments along her borders is essential both for the security of
the Soviet Union and for the peace of the world." 1 s This attitude was
reflected in Acheson*s diplomacy. While Under Secretary of State,
he approved a $90 million loan for Poland, even though our ambas-
sador to that country, Arthur Bliss Lane, protested because of the
Communist government's severe human rights abuses. To secure
the loan, the Poles had retained Acheson's law firm, which made
over $50,000 on the deal, 16

Donald Hiss, brother of Soviet spy Alger Hiss, was Acheson's law
partner, In the State Department, Acheson helped Alger himself, as
well as several other men later identified as spies or security risks
(John Stewart Service, John Carter Vincent, Lauchlin Currie) to
high positions. He promoted Service even after the FBI had caught
him passing secrets to Communist agents. It was this Acheson clique
that helped push China into Mao Tse-tung's hands, causing a furor
in the U.S. When Ambassador Lane heard that Acheson had been
appointed Secretary of State, he said: "God help the United States!" 17
Acheson became a byword to many Americans. On December 15,
1950, the Republicans in the House of Representatives resolved
unanimously that he be removed from office.

He was — by the voters' repudiation of the Truman administration
in 1952. And many breathed a sigh of relief. But although his public
career was over, his influence was not. Acheson's law offices were
strategically located across Lafayette Park from the White House.
He became an unofficial advisor to the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon
administrations. Nixon even had a phone installed in Acheson's win-
ter home in Antigua. 18

Acheson had a crucial role in bringing about the Vietnam esca-
lation. The meaning of this must be weighed in light of his past,

130

The Establishments War In Vietnam

even though some claimed his views on Communism hardened in
old age.

Lyndon Eaines Johnson, it should be noted, had inherited the
Presidency after John F. Kennedy's death in 1963. He also inherited
Kennedy's Establishment advisors, with whom he did not harmonize
well. Unlike JFK, he had little in common with these men. He was
not a Harvard-CFR intellectual. A graduate of Southwest Texas
State Teacher's College, he had risen to prominence in Congress.
Kennedy chose him as his running mate in 1960 for his capacity to
win Southern votes and his influence within the Senate. When John-
son sought to retain the Presidency in the 1964 election, the Estab-
lishment backed him to the hilt: Barry Goidwater was the Repub-
lican nominee and, as such, was the first GOP Presidential candidate
in decades it had not controlled. Indeed, Goidwater represented
nearly everything the Establishment was against. For that reason,
the mass media was arrayed against him, and he was falsely char-
acterized as a fanatic who would start a nuclear war and snatch
social security checks from the elderly. These scare tactics sufficed
to give Johnson a landslide victory. Nevertheless, relations remained
shaky between LBJ and the Establishment administrators sur-
rounding him. He resented their arrogance, but also admired their
intellects. In any case, he probably trusted that they would not do
anything deliberately contrary to America's interests.

During the Vietnam War, Johnson met periodically with an ad-
visory group he himself called "the Wise Men" — fourteen VIP's,
twelve of whom were CFR members. Acheson was chief among these.
McCloy, Lovett, and Harriman were included in the gatherings.

In 1965 t Johnson was reluctant to heighten our role in Vietnam
any further, and explained his reasons before the assembled patri-
archs. The Isaacson and Thomas book, The Wise Men, which is in-
tended as a tribute to some of these men, relates:

Acheson fidgeted impatiently as he listened to Johnson wallow in
self-pity. Finally, he could stand it no longer. "I blew my top and told
him he was wholly right on Vietnam," Acheson wrote [to Truman],
'that he had no choice except to press on, that explanations were not
as important as successful action/'

131

The Shadows of Power

Ache son's scolding emboldened the others. iC With this lead my col-
leagues came thundering in like the charge of the Scots Greys at
Waterloo," Acheson exulted to the former President. 'They were fine;
old Bob Lovett usually cautious, was all out." 19

In effect, the Wise Men seized Johnson by the collar, kicked his
butt, and told him to escalate. They were almost unanimous in this
exhortation. William Bundy said that this was the occasion when
"America committed to land war on the mainland of Asia. No more
critical decision was made." 20

Each year, as the war intensified, Johnson consulted the Wise
Men, who told him to push on.

But in private they felt differently. Halberstam notes: "As early as
May 1964 Dean Acheson stopped a White House friend at a cocktail
party and said he thought Vietnam was going to turn out much
worse than they expected, that it was all much weaker than the
reports coming in . , " u And Acheson's correspondence from that
period demonstrates pessimism about the war he did not share with
the President,

Averell Harriman played the hawk for Johnson, so much that he
received a scolding from former Kennedy aide Arthur Schle singer.
Harriman brought Schlesinger to his hotel room, took a stiff drink,
and told him confidentially that he was against the war. 22

William Bundy wrote in a memoir that he had misgivings about
the pro-escalation advice the elder statesmen had given the Presi-
dent, but he did not so advise Johnson.

Referring to Acheson, Lovett, and McCloy, The Wise Men asks:

Even in 1965. they harbored serious doubts about committing U.S.
troops to the defense of the government of South Vietnam. Why did
they fail to convey those doubts to the President? 23

That, of course, is the $64,000 question! But Isaacson and Thomas
supply no satisfying answer.

In March 1968, in Science & Mechanics, a dozen top U.S. military
officers made individual statements concerning Vietnam, They sum-
marized how the restrictions on the armed forces had prolonged the

132

The Establishments War In Vietnam

war, and asserted that the U.S. could win in a few months if only
it would adopt realistic strategy ? which they outlined- Such views
were considered extremely dangerous in Establishment circles.

That same month, Johnson was scheduled to see the Wise Men
again, He expected that, as usual, he would be patted on the back
and told to continue the war. But before the conference, the Wise
Men received negative briefings about the war from three individuals
whom the wily Acheson had been consulting over the previous
month.

The next morning, Johnson sat down with the Wise Men> and
received the shock of his life. Based on that single set of briefings,
they had been wondrously transformed from hawks to doves: the
war, they said, was a rotten idea after all. Acheson, seated next to
the President, bluntJy informed him that thoughts of victory were
illusory, and that the time had come for the disengagement process. 24
The Wise Men tells us:

General Maxwell Taylor was appalled and "amazed" at the defec-
tion. "The same mouths that said a few months before to the President,
■You're on the right course, but do more/ were now saying that the
policy was a failure/' recalled Taylor. He could think of no explanation,
except that "my Council on Foreign Relations friends were living in
the cloud of The New York Times." 25

Johnson hit the roof.

When the meeting broke up, he grabbed a few of the stragglers and
began to rant. **Who the hell brainwashed those friends of yours?" he
demanded of George Ball. He stopped General Taylor. "What did those
damn briefers say to you?"

This, then, is the picture that now appears to be emerging. For
years, the Wise Men had prodded LB J deeper into Vietnam, until
he had committed over a half million combat troops. Now, in effect,
they said; "It's all a mistake — sorry about that," and left him holding
the bag. It was he, not they, who bore the fury of a rebelling America.

133

The Shadows of Power

Johnson briefly entertained thoughts of defiantly pushing for vic-
tory, but realized he would receive no support from the political
infrastructure surrounding him, LBJ's March 1968 meeting with
the Wise Men was his last. According to Townsend Hoopes, then
Under Secretary of the Air Force, "The President was visibly shocked
by the magnitude of the defection," 26 One aide reported that it left
him "deeply shaken/ 727 Five days later, a broken man, he announced
on television: "... I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nom-
ination of my party for another term as your President." A surprised
nation was left to conclude that this had been prompted by the good
showing Bobby Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy were making in the
Democratic primaries.

Ultimately, culpability for the war would be focused on the mili-
tary. In 1971, Louisiana Congressman John Rarick declared:

The My Lai massacre, the sentencing of Lt. C alley to life impris-
onment, "The Selling of the Pentagon," and the so-called Pentagon
papers are leading examples of attempts to shift all the blame to the
military in the eyes of the people.

But no one identifies the Council on Foreign Relations — the CFR

— a group of some 1400 Americans which includes as members almost
every top level decision and policy maker in the Vietnam War.

CBS tells the people it wants them to know what is going on and
who is to blame. Why doesn't CBS tell the American people about the
CFR and let the people decide whom to blame for the Vietnam fiasco

— the planners and top decision makers of a closely knit financial-
industrial-intellectual aristocracy or military leaders under civilian
control who have had little or no voice in the overall policies and
operations and who are forbidden by law to tell the American people
their side,

The My Lai incident, "The Selling of the Pentagon," and the Pen-
tagon papers have not scratched the surface in identifying the re-
sponsible kingmakers of the new ruling royalty, let alone in exposing
the CFR role in Vietnam. Who will tell the people the truth if those
who control "the right to know machinery*' also control the govern-
ment?**

134

The Establishments War In Vietnam

The war in Vietnam was not created by conservative "hawks." It
was created by luminaries of the CFR — whose globalism and tol-
erance of Communism is a matter of record. As in the world wars,
it was these two systems that emerged as the victors. At home,
nationalism — the anathema of the CFR — hit an all-time low, as
embittered young Americans lost faith in their country. And on the
other side of the world, little North Vietnam, like North Korea and
Cuba before it, was allowed prestigious triumph against the mighty
USA. Furthermore, thanks in part to the war's sapping of the De-
fense budget, the Soviets, militarily inferior at the war's outset, had
reached parity with us by its end.

The Vietnam War is a mystery only if seen through the accu-
mulated myths surrounding it — such as that it resulted from blun-
der, or from overconfident jingoism, Viewed, however, as an exercise
in deliberate mismanagement, it ceases to mystify, for its outcome
fulfilled precisely the goals traditional to the CFR.

135

1968; President Johnson consults with advisors on forthcoming Vietnam peace talks. What's wrong with the picture?
Everyone in it, except Johnson, was a member of the CFR. Left to right: Andrew Goodpaster, Averell Harriman,
Cyrus Vance, Maxwell Taylor, Walt Rostow, Richard Helms, William Bundy, Nicholas Katzenbach, Dean Rusk,
Johnson. (Helms was not a Council member at the time, but later joined,)

The Establishment has frequently exploited the native anti-
Communism of the American people to inveigle them into destructive
circumstances. In Vietnam, the "rules of engagement/' not
declassified until 1985, precluded a U.S. victory,

David Rockefeller's 1964 trip to Moscow helped
pave the way for wartime trade with the Soviet bloc.

137

Barry Goldwater's Presidential
run worried the Establishment.

Admiral James Stockdale

made a shocking revelation

about Tonkin Gulf.

Dan Smoot (left), former assistant to J. Edgar Hoover,

and Congressman John Rarick (right) were

among those who sought to expose the CFR

138

Robert Strange McNamara

Walt Rostow

The Bundy brothers — McGeorge (left), William (right)

139

Johnson, stunned by the about-face of M the Wise Men/'
prepares speech announcing he will not seek reelection.

Were they meant to lose?

140

Chapter 9

The Unknown Nixon

In 1968, the American voters were looking for an escape hatch
from Vietnam, Richard Nixon won the Presidential election, partly
because his Democratic opponent, Hubert Humphrey (CFR), had
been Johnson's Vice President, and already bore the war's stigma
by association. Liberals wanted an immediate pullout from Vietnam;
conservatives wanted a swift, decisive victory. Nixon gave them nei-
ther. Instead, four more years of protracted warfare widened Amer-
ica's divisiveness.

Richard Nixon, like Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson, was not
a member of the Establishment by birth and breeding, but his po-
litical career became inextricably linked to it. In 1946, Nixon was a
small-town lawyer who had never held any elected office, not even
town dogcatcher, Yet six years later he was Vice President-elect of
the United States, His supersonic success compared to that of his
running mate, Dwight Eisenhower,

Nixon's political odyssey began with a race for the House seat of
California's 12th District, In the election, he faced Democrat Jerry
Voorhis, a ten-year veteran of Congress. Voorhis was an enemy of
the banking establishment; he had introduced a bill calling for the
dissolution of the Federal Reserve System, and had denounced def-
icit spending and the international bankers who profit from it in his
book Out of Debt, Out of Danger.

It was reported that New York financing began to support the
Nixon campaign. William Costello, in The Facts About Nixon (I960),
noted:

141

The Shadows of Power

The congressman [Voorhis] said the representative of a large New
York financial house made a trip to California in October 1945, about
the time the Committee of One Hundred was picking Nixon, and called
on a number of influential people in Southern California. The emissary
"nawled them out* for permitting Voorhis, whom he described as "one
of the most dangerous men in Washington , w to continue to represent
a part of California in the House- As a consequence, Voorhis said,
"many of the advertisements which ran in the district newspapers
advocating my defeat came to the papers from a large advertising
agency in Los Angeles, rather than from any source within the Twelfth
District." 1

Nixon won the Congressional seat. Then in 1950 he was elected
to the Senate after a dirty campaign that earned him the nickname
"Tricky Dick." Nixon had a hand in exposing Alger Hiss, and al-
though his contribution has been somewhat exaggerated, 2 it gave
him an impressive anti-Communist credential that helped the Ei-
senhower ticket supplant Taft and MacArthur in 1952.

Certainly Nixon was not an "Old Guard" Republican. He was an
internationalist with a yen for foreign aid. Congressman Nixon trav-
eled with Christian Herter to Europe as part of the committee that
laid the groundwork for the Marshall Plan. In 1947, he brought
forward a resolution in the House calling for "a General Conference
of the United Nations pursuant to Article 109 for the purpose of
making the United Nations capable of enacting, interpreting, and
enforcing world law to prevent war." 3 He introduced a similar res-
olution in 1948.

Nixon served two full terms as Eisenhower's Vice President, rub-
bing shoulders with CFR members and getting to know the Estab-
lishment. In I960, he was the GOFs candidate for the Presidency,
opposing John F. Kennedy.

New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller had also sought the Re-
publican nomination in 1960; he even observed ritual by having an
article entitled "Purpose and Policy" published in Foreign Affairs
that April, Rockefeller was an archetypal Establishment globalist.
Speaking at Harvard, he declared that "the nation-state, standing

142

The Unknown Nixon

alone, threatens in many ways to seem as anachronistic as the Greek
city-state eventually became in ancient times." 4

Rockefeller could not win the support of enough grass roots party
members to secure the nomination. But he did have the power to
influence Nixon. Before the Republican National Convention took
place in Chicago, the GOP platform committee was working out a
conservative program. But as Theodore White said in The Making
of the President, 1960: "Whatever honor they might have been able
to carry from their services on the platform committee had been
wiped out. A single night's meeting of the two men in a millionaire's
triplex apartment in Babylon-by-the-Hudson, eight hundred and
thirty miles away, was about to overrule them . . ." 5 Nixon flew to
New York to see Rockefeller at his Fifth Avenue apartment. The
result was a new platform to Rockefeller's liking.

Barry Goldwater called this tryst "the Munich of the Republican
Party/' Edith Kermit Roosevelt commented:

It was not as a Standard Oil heir, but as an Establishment heir, a
man of "world good will," tbat Nelson Rockefeller forced the Republicans
to rewrite their platform. Thus the Republican platform was in effect a
carbon copy of the Democratic platform drawn up by Chester Bowles,
CFR member and former trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation. 6

Since the Establishment again had de facto control of both parties'
candidates, Nixon's defeat that November did not worry them. Ul-
timately, it didn't bother Nixon either, since he had only to wait for
his ship to come in.

In 1961, Nixon joined the Council on Foreign Relations .* In 1962,
a conservative, Joe Shell, was bidding to become the Republican
nominee for California's governorship. One week after Shell told Nel-
son Rockefeller he would not support him for President in 1964, he
learned that Nixon had entered the gubernatorial race. 7 The former
VP defeated Shell in the primary, but lost the election. It was then
conventionally regarded that Nixon was washed up in politics.

* In 1965 he dropped his CFR membership, which had become an issue in the 1962 gubernatorial
race.

143

The Shadows of Power

But auspiciously, he went to New York and joined the firm of
Nelson Rockefeller's personal attorney, John Mitchell (whom Nixon
later appointed Attorney General of the U.S J. In New York, he lived
in the very apartment at 810 Fifth Avenue where he and Rockefeller
had revamped the 1960 platform, 6 The building was owned by Rocke-
feller, who still lived there, but in a different unit. It would not be
going overboard to say that during the years before his *68 Presi-
dential run, Nixon was Rockefeller's neighbor, tenant, and employee.
His net worth increased substantially over this period.

In 1968, Nelson Rockefeller made his third consecutive bid for the
GOP nomination, logging another article in Foreign Affairs ("Policy
and the People"). The press characterized him as Nixon's liberal
"rival," but they were patently allies. If you can't be President, the
next best thing is to have influence over the man who is.

Nixon gave the Establishment his own signals by writing an article
for the October 1967 Foreign Affairs. Called "Asia After Vietnam,"
it hinted that the door could be opened to Communist China — a
long-time CFR goal that became reality during Ms Presidency. The
article also showed that Nixon was wise to globalist strategy, He
wrote of the Asian disposition "to evolve regional approaches to
development needs and to the evolution of a new world order. "* A
"new world order" was precisely what Nelson Rockefeller was calling
for in his 1968 campaign.

Nixon's CFR Administration

Between 1970 and 1972, the Establishment was rocked by the
release of new exposes. These included The Naked Capitalist by
former FBI official W. Cleon Skousen, and None Dare Call It Con-
spiracy by Gary Allen, The latter, even though it sold over five million
copies, was ignored by the mass media. However, some defense of
the Council on Foreign Relations began appearing in the press. An-
thony Lukas in the New York Times and John Franklin Campbell
in New York magazine wrote feature articles suggesting that the
CFR was a has-been collection of foreign-policy fossils, no longer
welcome in Washington with the "right-wing" Nixon in office. Camp-
bell even titled his article 'The Death Rattle of the American Es-
tablishment."

144

The Unknown Nixon

This was far from the truth, Richard Nixon broke all records by
giving more than 110 CFR members government appointments. As
under Eisenhower, GOP regulars were by and large excluded from
the search for administration personnel. Once again, the faces were
mostly new, but the ideology was not,

John F. Kennedy's choice for National Security Adviser was
McGeorge Bundy, who had been teaching a course at Harvard called
"The United States in World Affairs." Nixon's choice for National
Security Adviser was the professor who succeeded Bundy in teaching
that course: Henry Kissinger.

Kissinger, who advised Bundy during the Kennedy years, was
undoubtedly the most powerful figure in the Nixon administration.
As Shoup and Minter point out in Imperial Brain Trust;

Diplomatic superstar Henry A. Kissinger was a Council protege who
began his career in foreign affairs as a rapporteur for a Council study
group. Kissinger later told Council leader Hamilton Ftsh Armstrong,
who had played a key role in Kissinger's rise to power, "You invented

me."'"

The professor authored many articles for Foreign Affairs^ includ-
ing one in January 1969 on how the Vietnam peace talks should be
conducted. Not surprisingly, he later became our chief negotiator in
Paris.

The Rockefellers' intimacy with Kissinger equaled that of the
Council's. J, Robert Moskin notes:

It was principally because of his long association with the Rocke-
fellers that Henry Kissinger became a force in the Council. The New
York Times called him "the Council's most influential member/' and
a Council insider says that "his influence is indirect and enormous —
much of it through his Rockefeller connection," 11

Before joining Nixon's staff, Kissinger had been Nelson Rockefel-
ler's chief advisor on foreign affairs, He dedicated his memoir White
House Years to Rockefeller, and in the book called him "the single
most influential person in my life," 12 How did Nixon happen to select

145

The Shadows of Power

Kissinger? U.S. News & World Report commented in 1971: "Tt was
on the advice of Governor Rockefeller, who described Mr. Kissinger
as 'the smartest guy available/ that Mr. Nixon chose him for his top
adviser on foreign policy," 13

Nixon twice offered David Rockefeller the Treasury Secretary
post. 14 He rejected it. This is not surprising, since it has been said
that, for him, even the Presidency would be a demotion,

Nixon named as Commerce Secretary Peter G. Peterson (CFR),
who went on to replace David as the Council's chairman in 1985.

Among Nixon's other CFR recruitments: Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Arthur Burns; HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson; Hous-
ing Secretary James Lynn; foreign policy consultant George Ball;
chief economic aide Dr, Paul McCracken; UN Ambassador Charles
Yost; NATO Ambassador Harlan Cleveland; Ambassador to the So-
viet Union Jacob Beam; and the director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Gerard Smith. Other Nixon appointees, such
as Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, and Treasury secretaries David
Kennedy and George Shultz, joined the Council in later years. Nix-
on's pick for the highly visible Vice Presidency was Spiro Agnew,
who, although not a member of the CFR, had been national chairman
of the Rockefeller for President Committee in 1968.

Was Nixon a Conservative?

Although liberals detested Richard Nixon, whose rhetoric was of-
ten conservative, the record demonstrates that his policies were
constructed on the design of the Establishment, not the traditional
right.

Nationally syndicated columnist Roscoe Drummond observed in
1969:

The most significant political fact of the hour is now so evident it
can't be seriously disputed:

President Richard M> Nixon is a "secret liberal", , . .

Lyndon Johnson initiated and Congress approved the largest vol-
ume of social legislation of any president in history. And Nixon pre-
pares to carry forward every major Johnson measure.

146

The Unknown Nixon

During the eight Eisenhower years 45 new welfare programs were
passed. During the five Johnson years some 435 welfare programs
were passed and Nixon is not proposing to dismantle them. He is
proposing to build on them and his goal is to make sure they achieve
their purposes more effectively. 16

By 1970, syndicated columnist James Reston (CFR) agreed. He
wrote:

It is true that Nixon rose to power as an an ta -Communist, a hawk
on Vietnam, and an opponent of the New Deal, but once he assumed
the responsibilities of the presidency, he began moving toward peace
in Vietnam, coexistence with the Communist world of Moscow and
Peking, and despite all his political reservations, even toward advo-
cacy of the welfare state at home/ fl

By 1971, Reston exclaimed:

The Nixon budget is so complex, so unlike the Nixon of the past, so
un-Republican that it defies rational analysis, ■ . . The Nixon budget
is more planned, has more welfare in it, and has a bigger predicted
deficit than any other budget in this century, 17

President Nixon shocked newscaster Howard K. Smith by telling
him "I am now a Keynesian in economics/* Keynes, of course, was
the master advocate of government intervention in the marketplace,

Nixon, it is to be recalled, instituted wage and price controls when
inflation was a mere four percent. Such measures are pure socialism:
a conservative ideologist would not even consider them. Nixon jacked
federal spending to unprecedented levels, upped foreign aid, and
proposed the Family Assistance Plan (FAP), which would have guar-
anteed a minimum annual income to every family in America.

Even the very liberal John Kenneth Galbraith was impressed. He
wrote in New York magazine in 1970:

Certainly the least predicted development under the Nixon admin-
istration was this great new thrust to socialism. One encounters people

147

The Shadows of Power

who still aren't aware of it. Others must be rubbing their eyes, for
certainly the portents seemed all to the contrary, As an opponent of
socialism, Mr. Nixon seemed steadfast . . ™

Nixon was no more conservative on foreign policy than domestic.
It was his administration that permitted the Soviets to discharge
their $11 billion World War II debt at less than ten cents on the
dollar, and then receive millions of tons of our grain at subsidized
rates. It also opened up forty U.S. ports to their ships, and pushed
Congress to grant the USSR most-favored-nation trade status.

Even though the Chinese Communists had been killing literally
millions in the Cultural Revolution, Richard Nixon began a new era
of friendly relations with them, fulfilling a step long called for by
CFR study groups and publications.

The Nixon administration was somewhat less restrictive than its
predecessor with the use of force against North Vietnam, but it also
concluded an undependable peace settlement. This bizarre agree-
ment allowed Hanoi to keep all of its troops in place in South Viet-
nam (estimated at 150,000 by Washington, 300,000 by Saigon) while
requiring the U,S. to remove all armed forces. President Thieu of
South Vietnam refused to sign, calling it a "surrender document," 19
but acquiesced when the Nixon administration told him it would
sign with or without him. The presence of North Vietnam's armies,
coupled later with the cutting of supplies to Saigon by Congress,
sealed the doom of South Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia fell with it.
The promise of peace had helped Nixon get reelected, and the agree-
ment won Kissinger the Nobel Peace Prize. But Southeast Asia's
allotment, in the end, was Communism and genocide.

As an epilogue to the Nixon era, it should be noted that Gary
Allen, one of the keenest observers of the Establishment, believed
that Watergate may have been the final act in Nelson Rockefeller's
long quest for the White House, Spiro Agnew, one recalls, was
bumped from the Vice Presidency after an old scandal cropped up,
Allen suspected that Nixon was told to appoint Rockefeller VP, but
that Nixon, perhaps emboldened by his reelection, refused to do so;
and that Watergate itself may have been a contrivance to expel the
President and his "palace guard" (men like Ehrlichman and Halde-

148

The Unknown Nixon

man, who were loyal to Nixon, not Rockefeller). Allen made an im-
pressive case for this in his book The Rockefeller File. Say what we
will, the scandal left Kissinger and the CFR clique unscathed, and
Gerald Ford's choice for Vice President was none other than Nelson
Rockefeller.

149

Nixon chose CFR heavyweight Henry Kissinger (right)

on the advice of Nelson Rockefeller (left), whom Kissinger

called "the single most influential person in my life/ 1

The Rockefeller-Nixon rivalry was largely histrionic.

150

II.

Gary AlJen, author of None Dare
Call It Conspiracy, may have
pinpointed the real explanation
for the Watergate scandal.

California Congressman
Jerry Voorhis

John Mitchell

Spiro Agnew

151

Nixon's actions frequently contradicted his conservative rhetoric and
media image. Above, he cavorts with Leonid Brezhnev in 1973.

Meeting Mao in 1972

152

The peace agreement negotiated by Henry Kissinger
allowed North Vietnam's troops to remain in the South —
virtually guaranteeing its collapse-

Vietnamese refugees flee from advancing
Communist forces, March, 1975,

153

Chapter 10

Carter And Trilateralism

The CFR's Little Brother is Born

With None Dare Call It Conspiracy putting the heat on the CFR,
David Rockefeller moved to form a new internationalist organization

— the Trilateral Commission. For some three decades, CFR mem-
bers had pushed for "Atlantic Union," a bilateral federation of Amer-
ica and Europe. The Trilateral Commission (TC) broadened this
objective to include an Asiatic leg.

How did the TC begin? "The Trilateral Commission," wrote Chris-
topher Lydon in the July 1977 Atlantic, "was David Rockefeller's
brainchild." 1 George Franklin, North American secretary of the Tri-
lateral Commission, stated that it "was entirely David Rockefeller's
idea originally," 3 Helping the CFR chairman develop the concept
was Zbigniew Brzezinski, who laid the first stone in Foreign Affairs
in 1970:

A new and broader approach is needed — creation of a community
of the developed nations which can effectively address itself to the
larger concerns confronting mankind, In addition to the United States
and Western Europe, Japan ought to be included, . . , A council rep-
resenting the United States, Western Europe and Japan, with regular
meetings of the heads of governments as well as some small standing
machinery, would be a good starts

That same year, Brzezinski elaborated these thoughts in his book
Between Two Ages. It showed Brzezinski to be a classic CFR man

— a globalist more than lenient toward Communism. He declared
that "National sovereignty is no longer a viable concept," and that

154

Carter And Trilateralism

"Marxism represents a further vital and creative stage in the ma-
turing of man's universal vision. Marxism is simultaneously a vic-
tory of the external, active man over the inner, passive man and a
victory of reason over belief . . ." 4

The Trilateral Commission was formally established in 1973 and
consisted of leaders in business, banking, government, and mass
media from North America, Western Europe, and Japan, David
Rockefeller was founding chairman and Brzezinski founding director
of the North American branch, most of whose members were also
in the CFR,

In the Wall Street Journal, David Rockefeller explained that "the
Trilateral Commission is, in reality, a group of concerned citizens
interested in fostering greater understanding and cooperation
among international allies," 5

But it was not all so innocent according to Jeremiah Novak, who
wrote in the Atlantic (July 1977):

The Trilateralists 1 emphasis on international economics is not en-
tirely disinterested, for the oil crisis forced many developing nations,
with doubtful repayment abilities, to borrow excessively. All told, pri-
vate multinational banks, particularly Rockefeller's Chase Manhat-
tan, have loaned nearly $52 billion to developing countries, An over-
hauled IMF would provide another source of credit for these nations,
and would take the big private banks off the hook. This proposal is
the cornerstone of the Trilateral pian. fi

Senator Barry Goldwater put it less mercifully. In his book With
No Apologies, he termed the Commission "David Rockefeller's new-
est international cabal," and said, "It is intended to be the vehicle
for multinational consolidation of the commercial and banking in-
terests by seizing control of the political government of the United
States. 7 ' 7

Zbigniew Brzezinski showed how serious TC ambitions were in
the July 1973 Foreign Affairs, stating that "without closer American-
European- Japanese cooperation the major problems of today cannot
be effectively tackled, and . . , the active promotion of such trilateral

155

The Shadows of Power

cooperation must now become the central priority of U.S. policy"*
(Emphasis in the original.)

The best way to effect this would be for a Trilateralist to soon
become President. One did.

Jimmy Carter Goes to Washington

After Watergate tainted the Republican Party's image, it became
probable that a Democrat would win the 1976 Presidential election.
Candidate James Earl Carter was depicted by the press — and
himself — as the consummate outsider to the Washington Estab-
lishment. He was, the story went, a good ol* boy from Georgia, naive
to the ways of the cigar-puffing, city- slicker politicians. People mag-
azine even showed him shoveling peanuts in denims.

Typical of press comment at that time were the words of columnist
Joseph C. Harsch of the Christian Science Monitor, who asserted
that Carter

has that nomination without benefit of any single kingmaker, or of
any power group or power lobby, or of any single segment of the
American people. He truly is indebted to no one man and no group
interest. 3

But Harsch belonged to the CFR, whose members are loath to
disclose the power of the group, or of its kingmaker, David Rocke-
feller.

In 1973, Carter dined with the CFR chairman at the latter's Tar-
rytown, New York estate. Present was Zbigniew Brzezinski, who
was helping Rockefeller screen prospects for the Trilateral Com-
mission. Brzezinski later told Peter Pringle of the London Sunday
Times that "we were impressed that Carter had opened up trade
offices for the state of Georgia in Brussels and Tokyo. That seemed
to fit perfectly into the concept of the Trilateral." 10 Carter became a
founding member of the Commission — and his destiny became
calculable.

Senator Goldwater wrote:

David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski found Jimmy Carter to
be their ideal candidate. They helped him win the nomination and

156

Carter And Trilateealism

the presidency. To accomplish this purpose, they mobilized the money
power of the Wall Street bankers* the intellectual influence of the
academic community — which is subservient to the wealth of the great
tax-free foundations — and the media controllers represented in the
membership of the CFR and the Trilateral. 11

Seven months before the Democratic nominating convention, the
Gallup Poll found less than four percent of Democrats favoring
Jimmy Carter for President. But almost overnight — like Willkie
and Eisenhower before him — he became the candidate. By the
convention, his picture had appeared on Time's cover three times,
and Newsweek's twice. Time's cover artists were even instructed to
make Carter resemble John F. Kennedy as much as possible. 12

Carter's Elitist Regime

The Trilateral Commission's predominance in the Carter admin-
istration has been pointed out by critics as disparate as Ronald
Reagan and Penthouse magazine, (The latter ran an article entitled
"The Making of a President: How David Rockefeller Created Jimmy
Carter,") During the campaign, however, only a few conservative
sources seemed to spot the connection.

One hint that Carter was more than a peanut-chomping hayseed
came in June of 1976, when the Los Angeles Times described a "task
force" that had helped the candidate prepare his first major foreign
policy speech (which began; "The time has come for us to seek a
partnership between North America, Western Europe, and Japan"),
The Carter advisors enumerated by the Times were: Brzezinski,
Richard Cooper, Richard Gardner, Henry Owen, Edwin O. Reis-
chauer, Averell Harriman, Anthony Lake, Robert Bowie, Milton
Katz, Abram Chayes, George Ball, and Cyrus Vance. 11 There was
one problem with the above list. Every man on it was a member of
the CFK We alluded earlier to Cooper's Foreign Affairs article pro-
posing an international currency, and Gardner's piece calling for "an
end run around national sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece."

In a speech in Boston, candidate Carter said: "The people of this
country know from bitter experience that we are not going to get
. . . changes merely by shifting around the same group of insid-

157

The Shadows of Power

era . ■ .The insiders have had their chance and they have not deliv-
ered." 14 After the election, top Carter aide Hamilton Jordan re-
marked: "If s after the inauguration, you find a Cy Vance as Secretary
of State and Zbigniew Brzezinski as head of National Security, then
I would say we failed. And I'd quit. But that's not going to happen. >ns
But it did happen, and Jordan did not quit. Carter simply shifted
around "the same group of insiders/' turning, like his predecessors,
to the institutions built by Wall Street and the international banking
establishment.

The new President appointed more than seventy men from the
CFR, and over twenty members of the much smaller Trilateral Com-
mission. Zbigniew Brzezinski acknowledges in his White House
memoirs: '"Moreover, all the key foreign policy decision makers of
the Carter Administration had previously served in the Trilateral
Commission . . ." ie (Carter is considerably less candid in his own
memoirs: he does not even mention the Commission,}

Brzezinski, of course, became National Security Adviser, the same
position Kissinger had held. Victor Lasky observed in Jimmy Carter:
The Man and the Myth: "The Polish-born Brzezinski was to David
Rockefeller what the German-born Kissinger was to Nelson Rocke-
feller." 17

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (CFR-Trilateral Commission) was
a nephew of John W. Davis (founding president of the Council on
Foreign Relations). Vance, who had served in the Kennedy and John-
son administrations, has been called "a product of the inner sanc-
tums of Yale and Wall Street." 18 Robert Moskirt commented on the
CFR makeup of his departmental staff:

When Cyrus Vance was called to Washington to be secretary of state
in 1977, he took along members of the Council's staff as well as of a
study group on nuclear weapons, He explains: "We work with people
at the Council, and know they are good*" 18

Vice President Walter Mondale (CFR-TC) had flown his colors in
the October 1974 Foreign Affairs, where he encapsulated much of
the Establishment line in a single sentence: "The economic coop-
eration that is required will involve us most deeply with our tra-

158

Cakter And Trilateralism

ditional postwar allies, Western Europe and Japan, but it must also
embrace a new measure of comity with the developing countries,
and include the Soviet Union and other Communist nations in sig-
nificant areas of international economic life." 20

Other Carter appointees who were in both the CFR and Trilateral
Commission: Defense Secretary Harold Brown; Federal Reserve
Chairman Paxil Volcker; Deputy Secretary of State Warren Chris-
topher; Under Secretary of State Richard Cooper; Assistant Secre-
tary of State Richard Holbrooke; Under Secretary of the Treasury
Anthony M. Solomon; Deputy Secretary of Energy John Sawhill;
Special Assistant to the President Hedley Donovan; Ambassador at
Large Henry Owen; and several others. And of course there were
"plain" CFR members like Treasury Secretary W, Michael Blumen-
thai, HEW Secretary Joseph Califano, SALT negotiator Paul
Warnke, and dozens of others, To paraphrase one commentator, by
the time Carter got to the White House, virtually the only thing
Georgian about him was his accent.

Carter Foreign Policy

Domestically, Jimmy Carter wrought record deficits and double-
digit inflation. But it was probably his foreign policy that most singed
the nerves of America,

In the July 1980 issue of Commentary magazine, Carl Gershman
reviewed a number of articles that appeared in Foreign Affairs and
Foreign Policy during the early-to-middle 1970's, (Foreign Policy,
published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was
founded by Council members as a congenial rival to Foreign Affairs.)
Gershman saw that these articles proposed a new foreign policy for
the United States — one that disdained the "cold war mentality,"
renounced the use of force against Communism (based on the Viet-
nam experience), and advocated assisting the type of movements we
had previously opposed (i.e., national liberation movements on the
left half of the political spectrum), Gershman then disclosed that
many of these essays* authors were tapped by the Carter adminis-
tration for top foreign-policy jobs. 21 This "new foreign-policy estab-
lishment," as Gershman called it (really just the same old CFR

159

The Shadows of Power

without the anti -Communist pretense), helped Carter translate its
ideas into reality — and a nightmare for the Free World.

Latin America. When the Sandinistas moved to seize power in
Nicaragua, Carter took measures that hastened the downfall of Pres-
ident Anastasio Somoza, a West Point graduate and devoted friend
of the USA. Somoza, it should be noted, was the duly elected leader
of his people. Nicaragua had an election system modeled on that of
the United States. There were two major parties, and additional
parties could qualify to run their candidates simply by securing
enough petitions. The 1974 election that brought Somoza to the
presidency was overseen by the OAS, which found no irregularities.
Nicaraguans enjoyed full civil liberties, including freedom of the
press. American journalists there were permitted to roam at will;
nevertheless, most of them portrayed Somoza as a man of consum-
mate evil. This enabled Jimmy Carter to undermine him without
significant protest within the United States.

On January 23, 1979, Valeurs Aetueltes, the French political and
economic weekly, reported the following comments by Mexico's Pres-
ident Lopez Portillo:

When President Carter visited me I told him: "I do not particularly
like Somoza or his regime, as you know. But if the Sandinistas unseat
him and replace him with a Castro- picked Government it will have a
profound effect on Nicaragua's neighbors and certainly touch off a
slide to the left in my country," It was as though he did not hear a
word of what I had said. He told me: u Oh, Mr. President, you must
do something to help me get rid of this Somoza."

Carter forced the IMF and World Bank to halt credit to Nicaragua;
embargoed its beef and coffee; and most importantly, prohibited
weapons sales to its military ^ and pressured our allies to do the same
(even compelling Israel to recall a ship bound for Nicaragua with
munitions). Unknown to most Americans, President Somoza, before
his brutal assassination, exposed the Carter conspiracy to depose
him in his book Nicaragua Betrayed. It contains the transcripts of
tape recordings Somoza made of visits to his office by U.S. officials.
After the Marxists took power in Managua, the Carter administra-

160

Carter And Trilaterausm

tion pushed through Congress $75 million in aid for them. The new
Nicaraguan rulers met the approval of one William M LeoGrande,
who wrote in the Autumn 1979 Foreign Affairs that their "program
guarantees freedom of the press, speech and association, including
the right to organize political parties irrespective of ideology/" 22
which at least proves the magazine is not always prophetic. Incre-
dibly, in his Presidential memoirs, Keeping Faith, Jimmy Carter
avoids any discussion of the Sandinista overthrow of Somoza, even
though it could pass as the most significant foreign policy event of
his White House career.

When campaigning in 1976, candidate Carter said in one of his
televised debates with Gerald Ford: "I would never give up complete
or practical control of the Panama Canal Zone."^ But that is just
what he did, as had been favored in Foreign Affairs,' 24 even though
the Canal Zone is strategically vital, and was no less U.S. territory
than Alaska or Hawaii. Americans were goaded into consenting
through exploitation of the legacy of no-win warfare: we were told
that, unless we surrendered the canal, we would face "another Viet-
nam."

The Middle East. Iran was an important U.S. ally, not only as an
oil source, but as the leading obstacle to Soviet ambitions in the
Middle East. The Shah of Iran, who had governed his country since
1941, suddenly, like Somoza, became a mass media arch villain, even
though he was probably the most progressive leader in his nation's
history. He was attempting to quell uprisings by Islamic funda-
mentalists and Marxists, but was forced to ease up and make conces-
sions to them when Carter threatened to withhold U.S. support.
General Robert Huyser, a Carter emissary, persuaded the Iranian
generals not to intervene to save the Shah's government. Khomeini
later slaughtered many of those generals. In 1979, Iran collapsed;
today it is a world center of terrorism.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan later that year, Carter's
response was essentially passive; this was not surprising since he
had been unwilling to use forceful measures even to release our
citizens held hostage by Teheran.

The Far East As we have noted, the CFR had for many years
appealed for U.S. recognition of the Chinese Communists. In the

161

The Shadows of Power

October 1971 Foreign Affairs, Jerome Alan Cohen wrote that "the
question is no longer whether to establish diplomatic relations with
China, but how to do so. Heaven may be wonderful — the problem
is to get there." 25 Jimmy Carter found a way.

The Red Chinese were eager for U.8, credit and technology } but
how sincere was their friendship? In 1977, Keng Piao, the Party's
Director of the Department for Foreign Liaison, stated in a Peking
speech:

We should carry on indispensable struggle against, as well as mak-
ing use of, the soft and weak side of the United States Just wait

for the day when the opportune moment comes, we will then openly
tell Uncle Sam to pack up and leave. 26

That same year, Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping explained before
the Party's Central Committee:

In the international united front struggle, the most important strat-
egy is unification as well as struggle. . . . This is Mao Tse-tung's great
discovery which has unlimited power. Even though the American im-
perialists can be said to be the number one nation in scientific and
technical matters, she knows absolutely nothing in this area, In the
future she will have no way of avoiding defeat by our hands, , . . We
belong to the Marxist Camp and can never be so thoughtless that we
cannot distinguish friends from enemies. Nixon, Ford, Carter and
future "American imperialist leaders" all fall into this category (ene-
mies). , , . What we need mainly is scientific and technical knowledge
and equipment, 27

Carter's right to break our long-standing defense treaty with Tai-
wan was questionable- Constitutionally, any treaty must be ratified
by the Senate. Whether or not Congress must also approve the ab-
rogation of a treaty was never specified in the Constitution. In 1978,
however, the Senate voted ninety-four to zero that the President
should consult that body before trying to change our agreement with
Free China, Carter ducked this by waiting for Congress to adjourn
for Christmas, On December 15, 1978, his announcement came. He

162

Cakter And Trilateralism

unilaterally terminated the treaty, broke relations with Taiwan, and
recognized the Chinese Communists, even though they had killed
more people than any other government in history. This challenged
the credibility of Carter's stand on "human rights," which he had
said was the cornerstone of his foreign policy.

Carter was silent about the Cambodian genocide, which does not
rate a single mention in his memoirs,* And he sought to remove our
troops from South Korea, which could have brought renewed Com-
munist invasion.

Africa, Carter maintained a trade embargo against Rhodesia, and
refused even to meet with Prime Minister Ian Smith when he came
to America to plead for his eountry. Rhodesia became Zimbabwe,
the dominion of Marxist Robert Mugabe. And in other African re-
gions, the Soviets and Cubans stepped in with little if any U.S.
opposition.

To his many injuries to freedom-loving peoples, Carter added a
slap in the face: he handed over the Crown of St- Stephen (Hungary's
symbol of national independence and faith, which had been smug-
gled out of that country before the Communists took over) to the
Red regime in Budapest.

Like the Grim Reaper wielding a scythe, Jimmy Carter left behind
a bloody trail of betrayed allies. Communism had been strengthened
in every corner of the globe. One is hard pressed to find major Carter
foreign policy decisions that served the interests of the American
people or the Free World. It would appear, however, that he very
satisfactorily executed the Trilateral- CFR game plan.

* The closest he comes is to note that Leonid Brezhnev said the Cambodians wore grateful to
the Vietnamese for ousting "the abhorrent regime of Pol Pot," 3 *

163

1977 meeting of the Trilateral Commission. Barry Goldwater called
the organization a "vehicle for multinational consolidation of the
commercial and banking interests by seizing control of the political
government of the United States."

Jimmy Carter tapped fellow Trilateralists Zbigniew Brzezinski (center)
and Cyrus Vance (right) for National Security Adviser and Secretary
ol State, despite assurances from Hamilton Jordan that it would
never happen.

164

The Shah of Iran

In his book Nicaragua Betrayed,
Anastasro Somoza revealed the
part Carter played in bringing the
Sandinistas to power.

The President welcomes Ortega at the White House.

165

Carter was selective in the application of his human rights policy.

With Teng Hsiao-ping

166

Chapter 11

A Second Look At Ronald Reagan

Reagan and the Establishment

After Mao Tse-tung took power in 1949 with help from the State
Department, the cry in America was "Who lost China?" In the Au-
tumn 1979 Foreign Affairs, editor William P, Bundy wrote a piece
called "Who Lost Patagonia? Foreign Policy in the 1980 Campaign "
Bundy patently feared that Jimmy Carter's foreign intrigues would
revive deep scrutiny of the U.S, government and its Establishment
connection. His article contended that our allies were falling apart
on their own; that it was happenstance that this occured "on Jimmy
Carter's watch"; and that there should be no "reckless charges," like
those raised about postwar China.

Many Americans, however, had different ideas. Even those un-
familiar with the Establishment and its modus operandi sensed
something very wrong with Jimmy Carter's foreign policy. Though
the major media kept mum, smaller publications joined with con-
servatives in stripping the Trilateralist of his farmboy mask.

Even campaigner Ronald Reagan hopped on the bandwagon, ad-
dressing Trilateral monopolization of the Carter regime- (See, for
example, the February 8, 1980 New York Times, ) This helped Reagan
win the backing of Main Street conservatives and primary victories
over George Bush, who was known as the Establishment's Repub-
lican in 1980. David Rockefeller, Edwin Rockefeller, Helen Rocke-
feller, Laurence Rockefeller, Mary Rockefeller, and Godfrey Rocke-
feller all gave the maximum contribution allowable under law to
Bush, a true Establishment scion. His father, along with Robert
Lovett, had been a partner in Brown Brothers, Harriman — Averell
Harriman's international banking firm. George Bush was a Skull

167

The Shadows of Power

and Bonesman, a director of the Council on Foreign Relations, and

a member of the Trilateral Commission. He shrewdly resigned from
the latter two as he initiated his campaign.

Ronald Reagan thus began by playing the Goldwater of 1980. But
soon he proved that his Hollywood training was not for naught.
Carey McWilliams noted in the Los Angeles Times in July of that
year:

It is ray belief that the Establishment — that elusive but very real
force in American life — has of recent weeks opted decisively for
Ronald Reagan. 1

In the August 1980 Playboy, Robert Scheer reported:

Prior to the New Hampshire primary, David Rockefeller convened
a secret meeting of like-minded Republicans aimed at developing a
strategy for stopping Reagan by supporting Bush and, failing that,
getting Gerald Ford into the race. Reagan heard about the meeting
and was, according to one aide, "really hurt." This aide reports that
Reagan turned to him and demanded, "What have they got against
me? 1 support big oil, 1 support big business, why don't they trust
me?" . . .

In any event, when Reagan scored his resounding triumph in New
Hampshire tn February, the overtures to the East began to work. New
York establishment lawyer Bill Casey fCFRI, who became campaign
director the day of the New Hampshire victory, began building bridges
and promising that a more moderate Reagan would emerge after the
Republican Convention, 2

Indeed, one did- Reagan picked Bush for his running mate, and,
after the election, put together a transition team that included
twenty-eight CFR men, among them the eternal John J. McCloy. As
President, he appointed more than eighty individuals to his admin-
istration who were members of the Council, the Trilateral Commis-
sion, or both.

For his Chief of Staff (later Treasury Secretary), Reagan desig-
nated James Baker, who had been Bush's campaign manager,

168

A Second Look At Ronald Reagan

For Treasury Secretary (later chief of staff) he chose Donald Re-
gan, a Harvard- Wall Street-CFR man.

His original Secretary of State was Alexander Haig> a former as-
sistant to Cyrus Vance and Henry Kissinger. When Haig joined
Kissinger's staff in 1969; he was a colonel; by 1972 he had become
a four-star general, in a leapfrogging career reminiscent of Marshall
and Eisenhower. Later he became supreme commander of NATO
and was, of course, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations,

Succeeding Haig at State in 1982 was George Pratt Sfaultz, a
director of the CFR and a member of the Pratt family of the Standard
Oil fortune (it was Mrs, Harold Pratt who donated Pratt House to
the Council). His appointment seemed pleasing to back-to-back au-
thors in Foreign Affairs* to which the Secretary contributed the lead
article for the spring 1985 issue. Known as an advocate of accom-
modation with the USSR, it was he who, years earlier, had signed
the accords resulting in the Kama River truck factory being built
for the Soviets by the West,

When Shultz picked retired banker John C. Whitehead for Deputy
Secretary of State, the New York Times commented: "Mr. Whitehead
brings to the job no apparent expertise in international diplomacy
.... In describing his attributes for the job, Mr. Shultz said that
Mr. Whitehead was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations
and was regularly invited to dinners given by Henry A. Kissinger,
the former secretary of state." 4

As Secretary of Defense, the President named Caspar Weinberger,
who had been a Nixon administrator and belonged to the Trilateral
Commission. He was replaced in 1987 by Frank Carlucci of the CFR.

In 1985, Winston Lord, president of the Council on Foreign Re-
lations and a former Kissinger aide, became Reagan's ambassador
to the People's Republic of China.

When Lord left Pratt House to assume his new responsibilities,
the Council needed a new president. One of the three final candidates
under consideration was Robert McFarlane, who had been Ronald
Reagan's National Security Adviser.

Reagan chose Malcolm Baldrige (CFR) as Commerce Secretary,
William Brock (CFR) as Labor Secretary, Alan Greenspan (CFR-
TC) as Federal Reserve Board Chairman, and on the list goes.

169

The Shadows of Power

Reagan Policy

Ronald Reagan has been billed as a thoroughgoing conservative.
But history bears witness that, like Eisenhower's and Nixon's, his
conservatism rarely goes beyond his speeches.

Campaigning in 1980, Reagan said he intended to balance the
budget by 1983, Jimmy Carter's annual federal deficits ranged from
$40.2 billion to $78.9 billion. Under Mr. Reagan, the red ink came
to a record $127,9 billion in fiscal 1982, then skyrocketed to $208.9
billion in 1983. The subsequent deficits, in billions of dollars, were
as follows:

1984 — 185,3

1985 — 212,3

1986 — 220,7

1987 — 173.2 (estimated)

Reagan's annual deficits have actually exceeded the annual bud-
gets of Lyndon B, Johnson, who had a Vietnam War to pay for as
well as the Great Society. He has chalked up more government debt
than all the Presidents before him combined. It is true that Congress
shares in the responsibility for this, but the blame cannot simply be
offloaded on them; the President's own budget proposals have con-
tained estimated deficits in the $100-200 billion range since fiscal
1983.

Reagan is touted as an enemy of taxation and big government.
Yet during his first term, although he did cut tax rates, he also
pushed through the largest single tax increase in our nation's his-
tory, as well as boosts in the gasoline and Social Security taxes. And
big government got bigger: the civilian work force in the executive
branch grew by nearly 100,000 between 1981 and 1986,

In 1983, Walter Heller, former economic advisor to Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson, was prompted to write a column in the Wall
Street Journal entitled if Mr. Reagan Is a Keynesian Now," In 1984,
economist Richard Parker echoed this conclusion in the Los Angeles
Times, noting; "While he proclaims Reaganomics' success, Reagan
also owes Americans a shocking confession: He's become a born-
again Keynesian." That same year, economist Lester Thurow ob-

170

A Second Look At Ronald Reagan

served in Newsweek that "President Reagan has become the ultimate

Keynesian." He continued:

Not only is the Reagan Administration rehabilitating exactly the
economic policies it pledged to bury when entering office, it is applying
them more vigorously than any Keynesian would have dared. Imagine
what conservatives would be saying if a liberal Keynesian Democratic
president had dared to run a $200 billion deficit. 5

Supposedly a proponent of military strength, candidate Reagan
criticized Jimmy Carter for abiding by the Salt II Treaty, which the
Senate had refused to ratify. He called it "fatally flawed" and said
he would spurn it, Yet as President he complied with Salt II until
late 1986, even after the treaty would have expired had it ever been
ratified, and despite numerous Soviet violations. In 1986, he ordered
two Poseidon ballistic missile submarines dismantled to ensure we
would stay within Salt II limits.

The President agreed to no increase in defense spending for 1986,
whereas White House hopeful Walter Mondale had advocated in-
creases of at least three percent annually. Thus Reagan's defense
budget that year was actually smaller than the one proposed by his
liberal Democratic rival. In The New American in 1986, William F,
Jasper summed other holes in the President's warrior reputation:

The Reagan administration has also cut back construction of new
Trident submarines; refused deployment of Minuteman III missiles
despite its authorization by Congress; reduced MX missile planned
deployment; continued deactivation of B-52 strategic bombers; can-
celled production of air-launched cruise missile B and Trident I sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles; cut back production of the B-l
bomber; and failed to reconstruct our dismantled anti -ballistic missile
(ABM) system. In short, Mr. Reagan's policies have been disastrous
for America's defense capabilities.*

Today, while the prospect of SDI is becoming increasingly remote,
few Americans seem to realize that the nuclear deterrent of the
United States still consists principally of: antiquated B-52 bombers,

171

The Shadows of Power

designed under Truman and constructed under Eisenhower and
Kennedy; ICBATs from the Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon years (after sit-
ting in their silos for two decades, no one really knows how well they
would work); and Poseidon submarines built before 1967. Ronald
Reagan has reinforced these with some new B-l bombers, MX mis-
siles, and Trident submarines, but in very limited quantities —
considerably less than the rates of attrition would call for. In con-
trast, the Soviets have never stopped expanding and modernizing
all segments of their nuclear forces. Reagan's most significant stra-
tegic advance was probably the placement of medium-range missiles
in Europe — and these he agreed to withdraw completely when he
signed the INF treaty in late 1987! Contrary to the popular impres-
sion, the Reagan administration has left America on the brink of
decisive nuclear inferiority.

Most people consider the President a determined anti-Communist;
this was an image he established early on with his well-publicized
description of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire." But here again,
his actions have fallen short of his words.

• When Communist Poland defaulted on its interest payments to
American banks in 1982, Ronald Reagan didn't pressure Warsaw
— instead, he bailed out the banks by having the U.S. taxpayers
pick up the tab.

• The Reagan administration channeled money into El Salvador to
help Jose Napoleon Duarte win his 1984 election over the anti-
Communist Roberto d'Aubuisson. 7 Duarte is a socialist; he has
seized the nation's banks and large farms; in fact, when he previ-
ously ran for president in 1972, his running mate was Guillermo
Ungo — current leader of El Salvador's Marxist guerrillas.

• When Jimmy Carter broke relations with Taiwan, Ronald Reagan
called it an "outright betrayal of a close friend and ally."* As Pres-
ident, however, he did not attempt to restore relations with Free
China. Furthermore, in August 1982 he issued a joint communique
with Peking stating that the U.S. "does not seek to carry out a long-
term policy of arms sales to Taiwan." Under Reagan, trade with Red
China has greatly multiplied; in 1986, the administration pressed
through Congress the sale of $550 million in advanced avionics

172

A Second Look At Ronald Reagan

equipment, giving some of the mainland's fighters an all-weather
capacity Taiwan's air force lacks.

• In Angola, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA freedom fighters are trying to
unseat the pro-Soviet ruling regime, which is kept in power by nearly
40,000 Cuban troops. Much publicity has been accorded the $15
million in military assistance given Savimbi by Reagan — but over-
looked is the more than $200 million in credits granted Angola's
Marxist government by the Export-Import Bank. Tens of millions
in aid have also been sent to Communist Mozambique, even though
it is using Soviet weapons to suppress a liberation movement by the
pro- Western RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance).

• When the Philippine crisis reached its climax in 1986, Ronald
Reagan joined hands with the international left, withdrawing sup-
port from President Marcos. Foreign Affairs, which had previously
served as a forum for Benigno Aquino, anticipated the situation in
its winter 1984/85 issue:

If Marcos cannot or will not accept the reforms necessary to ensure
stability, then we must be willing to call his bluff, and look even further
down the line, toward the inevitable emergence of a new Philippine
leaderships

The article stated that the fate of the Philippines must remain an
internal affair, but added: '"U.S. leverage should not be underesti-
mated; U.S. efforts to shape the setting for the inevitable Philippine
transition can almost certainly have some benefit."

Ferdinand Marcos was no saint, but he may look like one compared
to the Communists, if and when they wrest the islands from Corazon
Aquino.

• In response to the Afghanistan invasion, Jimmy Carter embar-
goed grain to the Soviet Union. But Mr. Reagan approved sale of
our wheat to Moscow again — at heavily subsidized rates. On De-
cember 27, 1986, the President warned that Soviet leaders "must
be made to understand that they will continue to pay a higher and
higher price until they accept the necessity for a political solution
involving the prompt withdrawal of their forces from Afghanistan
and self-determination for the Afghan people/" 10 The very next day,

173

The Shadows of Power

however, administration officials said they were ending most con-
trols on the export of oil and gas equipment and technology to the
USSR, Reagan did allow Afghanistan's brave freedom fighters,
the Mujahideen, some weapons, but he pledged to cut these off
during his negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev in December
1987! The curtailment had in fact been brewing as much as two
years earlier. At that time, according to William Safire in the New
York Times:

[T]hree State Department functionaries cooked up a plan to accom-
modate Soviet demands about withdrawal from Afghanistan. The key
concession: permit the Russians to continue arms shipments to its
puppet Government while the US cut off aid to the Mujahedeen . , .

The secret letter assured Moscow that upon the day its troop with-
drawal began, "foreign interference" would stop — meaning that the
C. LA -channeled aid to the 1 Afghan rebels] would be terminated

It is known to insiders as "the Day One deal": American aid to the
Afghan resistance, but not Soviet aid to the puppet Kabul regime,
would stop on Day One of the yearlong Soviet troop pullout."

After exposure led to public protest, the President began to disa-
vow the policy. But a UPI story dated March 21, 1988 carried this
incredible report:

The United States and Soviet Union, seeking to ensure an orderly
Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, are sharing data on radical
Islamic guerrilla factions viewed as a threat to a settlement, according
to administration officials, . , .

Such maneuvering may mean curbing U.S, support for the Islamic
rebel factions the administration has so relied on during the 8V 2 -year-
old guerrilla war against Soviet occupation forces, they said. . . ,

A CIA source, speaking of the rebels, confirmed a shift in the US
position, [and] said, "We want to see some groups fed to other groups"
— intelligence terminology for neutralizing undesirable elements. , . .

Asked about US-Soviet discussions about the mujahideen, a State
Department spokesman declined comment on grounds it is an intel-
ligence matter,"

174

A Second Look At Ronald Reagan

Conservatives have been pleased with some facets of Ronald Rea-
gan's performance, such as his judicial appointments and the Gre-
nada rescue mission. There is, of course, the controversial "Contra
aid" he has sought. But this, despite energetic Congressional op-
position, is far less than the Nicaraguan freedom fighters would need
to defeat the Sandinistas, whose army takes to the field with heavy
tanks and helicopter gunships from the Soviet Union. At best, they
are being allowed to fight a "no-win" war of containment. Further-
more, the administration has backed ex-Sandinistas and other for-
mer opponents of Somoza (such as Eden Pastora and Adolfo Calero)
as heads of the Contras, giving the whole operation the smell of a
sellout. Even Pastora, known as "Commander Zero," has been a
guest at Pratt House. (As this book went to press, the Contras had
been forced into a cease-fire on Sandmista terms, with a de facto
surrender in the works,)

The Reagan record shows that, all things considered, his policies
are the same ones that have steered our nation for over fifty years.
That the Establishment has tolerated him for two terms tends to
suggest that it may be more comfortable with a conservative-image
Republican as President. This allows its program to advance rela-
tively unhindered, and puts Washington watchdogs to sleep.

In 1971, Lyndon Baines Johnson said of President Nixon: "Can't
you see the uproar if I had been responsible for Taiwan getting
kicked out of the United Nations? Or if I had imposed sweeping
national controls on prices and wages? Nixon has gotten by with it.
tf I had tried to do it, or Truman, or Humphrey, or any Democrat,
we would have been clobbered." 1 - 1 Walter Mondale must have similar
thoughts about Ronald Reagan.

In an article in Foreign Affairs in 1981, former Kissinger aide
William G. Hyland wrote foreseeingly: "Just as Nixon had the anti-
Communist credentials to develop an opening to Peking, so Reagan
has the credentials to initiate a new relationship with the ILS.Sil." 14
That, presumably, applied to the rest of the Establishment agenda
as welL We presume Mr. Hyland is familiar with the Establishment
agenda. In 1984, he replaced William Bundy as editor of Foreign
Affairs.

175

George Bush and George Shultz headed a long list of personnel
that President Reagan drew from the Eastern Establishment.

^^Si^

* X

1 1

Donald Regan

Alexander Haig

176

The President's performance in office
did not match his conservative rhetoric.

With Red China's Zhao Ziyang

177

Chapter 12

The Media Blackout

Establishment Control of the Media

All of the American history we have just finished reviewing is
factual. Yet it is far from the traditional version. So the question
naturally arises: Why do the media avoid the various circumstances
shown in this account, or at best downplay them? Why don't inves-
tigative news shows like Sixty Minutes, perceived as gutsy and no-
holds-barred, tackle the Pearl Harbor cover-up, American financing
of questionable projects behind the Iron Curtain, or the Trilaterahst-
CFR hold on our government? Surely such material would have
sufficient audience appeal.

The answer is almost self-evident. The mass media are subject to
the same "power behind the throne" as Washington. For the Estab-
lishment to induce public cooperation with its program, it has always
been expedient to manipulate the information industry that is so
responsible for what people think about current events. A prime
mover in this process was J. R Morgan — the original force behind
the CFR.

In 1917, Congressman Oscar Callaway inserted the following
statement in the Congressional Record:

In March, 1915, the J. R Morgan interests, the steel, shipbuilding,
and powder interests, and their subsidiary organizations, got together
12 men high up in the newspaper world and employed them to select
the most influential newspapers in the United States and sufficient
number of them to control generally the policy of the daily press of
the United States.

These 12 men worked the problem out by selecting 179 newspapers,
and then began, by an elimination process, to retain only those nec-

178

The Media Blackout

essary for the purpose of controlling the general policy of the daily
press throughout the country- They found tt was only necessary to
purchase the control of 25 of the greatest papers. The 25 papers were
agreed upon; emissaries were sent to purchase the policy, national
and international, of these papers; an agreement was reached; the
policy of the papers was bought, to be paid for by the month; an editor
was furnished for each paper to properly supervise and edit infor-
mation regarding the questions of preparedness, militarism, financial
policies and other things of national and international nature con-
sidered vital to the interests of the purchasers, , . .

This policy also included the suppression of everything in opposition
to the wishes of the interests served. 1

The press, thus controlled, was very successful in persuading
Americans to support our entry into World War I. However, in sub-
sequent years, a number of books appeared that challenged the
justification of our involvement, the merits of the Allied cause, and
the wisdom of Colonel House and his colleagues in devising the
Versailles Treaty, These books included Harry Elmer Barnes' Gen-
esis of the World War (1926), Sidney Fay's Origins of the World War
(1928), and many others.

After World War II, however, the Establishment moved to pre-
elude such investigation. The eminent historian Charles Beard, for-
mer president of the American Historical Association, stated in a
Saturday Evening Post editorial in 1947:

The Rockefeller Foundation and Council on Foreign Relations . . ,
intend to prevent, if they can, a repetition of what they call in the
vernacular "the debunking journalistic campaign following World War
L" Translated into precise English, this means that the foundation
and the council do not. want journalists or any other persons to ex-
amine too closely and criticize too freely the official propaganda and
official statements relative to "our basic aims and activities" during
World War IL In short, they hope that, among other things, the policies
and measures of Franklin D. Roosevelt will escape in coming years
the critical analysis, evaluation and exposition that befell the policies

179

The Shadows of Power

and measures of President Woodrow Wilson and the Entente Allies
after World War I.*

Dr. Beard noted that the Rockefeller Foundation had granted
$139,000 to the CFR S which in turn hired Harvard professor William
Langer to author a three-volume chronicle of the war.

Historians whose writings concurred with the "authorized" ver-
sions of events, such as Langer, Samuel Morison, Herbert Feis,
Henry Steele Commager, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr,, were gener-
ally guaranteed exclusive interviews, access to government docu-
ments and statesmen's diaries, sure publication, and glowing ap-
praisals in the front of the New York Times Book Review. Most of
these men had served in the administrations they wrote about,

On the other hand, historians who dared question foreign policy
under Roosevelt and Truman, such as Beard, Harry Elmer Barnes,
Charles Tansill, John T. Flynn, and William Henry Chamberlin,
suddenly found themselves blacklisted by the publishing world that
had previously welcomed their works. Beard succeeded in issuing
two volumes critical of the Roosevelt administration only because
he had a devoted friend at Yale University Press. Before his death
in 1948, he was smeared in the media as senile.

In 1953, Barnes described how the censorship process worked:

The methods followed by the various groups interested in blacking
out the truth about world affairs since 1932 are numerous and in-
genious, but, aside from subterranean persecution of individuals, they
fall mainly into the following patterns or categories: (1) excluding
scholars suspected of revisionist views from access to public documents
which are freely opened to "court historians" and other apologists for
the foreign policy of President Roosevelt; (2) intimidating publishers
of books and periodicals, so that even those who might wish to publish
books and articles setting forth the revisionist point of view do not
dare to do so; (3) ignoring or obscuring published material which
embodies revisionist facts and arguments; and (4) smearing revisionist
authors and their books. . . .

As a matter of fact, only two small publishing houses in the United
States — the Henry Regnery Company and the Devin- Adair Company

180

The Media Blackout

— have shown any consistent willingness to publish books which
frankly aim to tell the truth with respect to the causes and issues of
the second World War. Leading members of two of the largest pub-
lishing houses in the country have told me that, whatever their per-
sonal wishes in the circumstances, they would not feel it ethical to
endanger their business and the property rights of their stockholders
by publishing critical books relative to American foreign policy since
1933. And there is good reason for this hesitancy. The book clubs and
the main sales outlets for books are controlled by powerful pressure
groups which are opposed to truth on such matters. These outlets not
only refuse to market critical books in this field but also threaten to
boycott other books by those publishers who defy their blackout ul-
timatum/*

The historical suppression described by Dr. Barnes thirty-five
years ago still operates today. It could be pointed out — quite right-
fully, of course — that in more recent years American policy and
policy makers have occasionally been savaged (as with Vietnam,
Watergate, and the Iran-Contra affair). However, such episodes did
not bruise the Council on Foreign Relations or its allies; instead they
stigmatized those people whom the Establishment disliked, and
those very policies it had always opposed (nationalism and anti-
Communism).

What we have operating in America is an Establishment media.
As erstwhile New York Times editor John Swinton once said; "There
is no such thing as an independent press in America, if we except
that of little country towns."

The Times itself was bought in 1896 by Alfred Ochs, with backing
from J. R Morgan, Rothschild agent August Belmont, and Jacob
Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb, It was subsequently passed on to Ochs' son-
in-law Arthur Hays Sulzberger (CFR), then to Orville E. Dryfoos
{CFR), and finally to the present publisher, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger
(CFR). The Times has had a number of CFR members in its stable
of reporters, including Herbert L. Matthews, Harrison Salisbury,
and Lester Markel. Currently, executive editor Max Frankel, edi-
torial page editor Jack Rosenthal, deputy editorial page editor Leslie

181

The Shadows of Power

Gelb, and assistant managing editors James L. Greenfield, Warren
Hoge, and John M, Lee are all in the Council-

The Times' friendly rival, the Washington Post, was bought by
Eugene Meyer in 1933. Meyer ? a partner of Bernard Baruch and
Federal Reserve Board governor, had joined the CFR in 1929. Meyer
began his reign at the Post by firing its editor for refusing to support
U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union. 4

Today the Post is run by Meyer's daughter, Katharine Graham
(CFR). Managing editor Leonard Downie, Jr., editorial page editor
Meg Greenfield, and deputy editorial page editor Stephen S. Rosen-
feid are all Council members.

The Washington Post Company owns Newsweek, which is a de-
scendant of the weekly magazine Today, founded by Averell Har-
riman, among others, to support the New Deal and business inter-
ests. Newsweek's editor-in-chief Richard M. Smith and editor
Maynard Parker both belong to the CFR, as have a number of its
contributors. Both Newsweek and the Post have donated money to
the Council.

Time magazine maintains the same kind of rivalry with Newsweek
as the New York Times does with the Post: they compete for readers,
not in viewpoint. Time was founded by Henry Luce (CFR-IPR-At-
lantic Union), who rose as a publisher with loans from such indi-
viduals as Dwight Morrow and Thomas Lamont (both Morgan part-
ners and CFR members), Harvey Firestone (CFR), and E. Roland
Harriman (CFR).

Time's longtime editor-in-chief was Hedley Donovan (Trilateral
Commission member, CFR Director, trustee of the Ford Foundation
and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and eventually
Special Assistant to President Jimmy Carter). The current editor-
in-chief, Henry Grunwald, is in the CFR, along with managing editor
Henry Muller. Time, Inc., which also publishes People, Life, Fortune,
Money, and Sports Illustrated, has several Council members on its
board of directors.

The CFR also has interlocks with the major TV networks. William
S. Paley, chairman of the board at CBS for many years, belonged to
the Council on Foreign Relations, as does the chairman today,
Thomas H. Wyman, and eleven of the fourteen board members listed

182

The Media Blackout

for 1987. CBS news anchor Dan Rather is in the CFR. CBS helped
finance the Trilateral Commission, and the CBS Foundation has
contributed funds to the Council.

NBC is a subsidiary of RCA, which was formerly headed by David
SarnofT(CFR). SarnofThad financial backing from Kuhn, Loeb and
other Rothschild-linked banking firms. He was succeeded by his son
Robert, who married Felicia Schiff Warburg, daughter of Paul War-
burg and great granddaughter of Jacob Schiff, RCA's chairman of
the board now, Thornton Bradshaw, is a CFR man, as are several
other board members. The Council has had a number of NBC news-
men on its roster over the years, including Marvin Kalb, John Chan-
cellor, Garick Utley, and Irving R. Levine.

There are CFR figures on ABC's board, and in its news depart-
ment, including Ted Koppel and David Brinkley.

The Council on Foreign Relations also has links to the Wall Street
Journal, the Los Angeles Times, the Associated Press wire service,
PBS, and other major news sources. The Council's annual report for
1987 notes that 262 of its members are "journalists, correspondents,
and communications executives,"

What does this mean? Membership in the CFR is not by itself an
indictment. However, when large numbers of Council men are clus-
tered at the helm of a media outlet, then its editorial policy, news
slant, and personnel selection are almost guaranteed to reflect the
globalise pro-socialist thinking that typifies the Council.

Media Bias

Recently, a number of studies have revealed strong prejudice in
the mass media. Beyond doubt, the leader in the movement to expose
and combat this bias has been Reed Irvine's Washington-based or-
ganization, Accuracy in Media (AIM).

In 1981, professors Robert Lichter (George Washington Univer-
sity) and Stanley Rothman (Smith College) published tabulated re-
sults of interviews they had conducted with the media elite: jour-
nalists from the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street
Journal, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report, ABC, CBS,
NBC, and PBS. The survey showed the media far to the left of the
public at large. Of those casting ballots for major party candidates

183

The Shadows of Power

in the 1964 election, ninety-four percent had voted for Lyndon John-
son, and only six percent for Barry Goldwater, Even in Richard
Nixon's 1972 landslide, eighty-one percent voted for George Mc-
Govern. The leftward stance of the media was also shown by their
answers to questions on social and political issues. For example,
ninety percent took the pro-choice position on abortion, and fifty-
seven percent agreed with the Marxist thesis that the U.S, causes
poverty in the Third World by exploiting it. 5

The Lichter-Rothman survey was corroborated in 1985 by a Los
Angeles Times poll of 3000 editors and reporters from over 600 news-
papers. After comparing the results to those of readers, the Times
was forced to conclude that "members of the press are predominantly
liberal, considerably more liberal than the general public " G

But do journalists allow their attitudes to influence their report-
ing? Research shows that they do.

One area where this shows up is national defense. News com-
mentators are fond of reciting how many warheads the U.S. has,
but they almost never mention that most of our ICBM's, ballistic
missile submarines, and strategic bombers are some twenty years
old and nearing obsolescence. A study by the Institute of American
Strategy determined that, on the subject of national defense, CBS
News gave over sixty percent of its coverage to proponents of re-
ducing our defenses, and only 3,5 percent to advocates of greater
strength — a ratio higher than 17-1. 7 One can imagine the impact
of such imbalance on public opinion.

Equally pronounced is the media's selectivity in covering foreign
affairs. Although we often hear about human rights abuses by anti-
Communist governments, Marxist violations are commonly ignored.

An illustration is the genocide in Cambodia, where at least a third
of the population died under the Khmer Rouge. First, the American
press contributed to the holocaust by demanding withdrawal of U.S.
support from the government of the Republic of Cambodia. Norodom
Sihanouk helped set the pace in the October 1970 Foreign Affairs,
writing that "I can only hope for the total victory of the revolution,**
which, he said, "cannot but save my homeland and serve the deepest
interests of the mass of the little* Khmer people." 8 Sihanouk also
made the bizarre prediction that U.S.-Cambodian relations would

184

The Media Blackout

"once again become good" as soon as Washington stopped helping
the government combat the Communists.

The U.S. media echoed Sihanouk's viewpoint, On April 13, 1975
— just four days before the fall of Phnom Penh — the New York
Times ran this headline: "Indochina Without Americans: For Most
a Better Life/'

By the end of 1976, more than a million Cambodians had died
under the Communists 1 reign of terror. Yet during that year, the
New York Times carried only four stories on human rights problems
m Cambodia; by contrast, it published sixty-six on abuses in Chile.
The Washington Post had just nine human rights stories on Cam-
bodia; fifty-eight about Chile. And on the network evening news in
1976, NBC never referred to the problem in Cambodia; ABC men-
tioned it once, and CBS twice. s

A similar blackout has occurred more recently with Afghanistan,
where the Soviets have slaughtered more than one million people
and turned millions more into refugees. Reed Irvine notes that, on
a single evening in December 1986, network news devoted more
time to the "Irangate" controversy (fifty-seven minutes) than it had
to the war in Afghanistan during all of 1985 (fifty-two minutes). 10
Human rights stories still get attention — but only if in selected
countries, AIM surveyed the New York Times and Washington Post
from May to July, 1986, and found that the two papers ran a total
of 415 stories on South Africa during that stretch, 11

Abdul Shams, former economic advisor to Afghanistan's late Pres-
ident Hafizullah Amin 7 had this to say about U.S. media coverage
of his homeland, in a 1985 interview with The Review of the News:

The major American news media have ignored what is happening
in Afghanistan and they have also ignored Afghans like me who try
to tell what is happening. But the smaller newspapers and radio and
TV stations have been very cooperative. . . ,

Every day, hundreds or thousands of my people are killed and the
networks and major news media say nothing. But if one person is
killed in South Africa, immediately the media start screaming

I have talked to many, many people here in the United States, many
of them refugees from Communist countries themselves and they can-

185

The Shadows of Power

not believe the things they see in the major news media. They say
that the American news media are on the other side. Much of the time
I am forced to believe that they are correct. 12

Disproportionate news reporting gives Americans a distorted
world view — and because it may affect what they tell their rep-
resentatives in Congress, it also affects world events.

President Anastasio Somoza made revelations about our medians
methods and impact in his book Nicaragua Betrayed:

On Sunday afternoon, Sixty Minutes is the most watched network
show in the United States .... I have watched the show and I am
familiar with the format. Generally speaking, the show is not complete
unless someone is nailed to the cross. Also, the program will invariably
sneak in a touch of propaganda. You can be sure this propaganda is
slanted to the Left.

When I was advised that Sixty Minutes wanted to interview me, 1
certainly had misgivings ....

However, I wanted so much for the American people to understand
the realities of our situation in Nicaragua and to know what the
administration m Washington was doing to us, that I agreed to do
the program. All arrangements were made and Dan Rather was sent
down to do the program. That interview I shall always remember-
Rather tried every conceivable journalistic trick to trip me up on
questions. He knew in advance the answers he wanted and come "hell
or high water" he was going to find the question to fit his preconceived
answer. Well, he never succeeded. From watching the show, one would
never know that Dan Rather spent two and one-half hours grilling
me. It's difficult to believe, but Rather condensed that entire time to
seven minutes. . . .

1 didn't realize what the power of film editing really meant. With
that power, Rather cast me in any role he chose. Everything good I
said about Nicaragua was deleted. Any reference to Carter's effort to
destroy the government of Nicaragua was deleted. Every reference to
the Communist activity and Cuba's participation was deleted.

His insistence that there was torture in my government probably
disturbed me the most. We would go over the subject and then we

186

The Media Blackout

would come back to it again. He just wasn't getting the answers he
wanted. Finally he said; "May we visit the security offices of the Nica-
raguan government?" He had heard that this was a torture chamber
and he believed it. I replied: "Yes, Mr. Rather, you may visit those
offices and you may take your camera/ Then 1 added: "You go right
now. Take that car and go immediately so that you can't say I rigged
it." Well, he did go, and he saw where the people worked and talked
to many of them. When the show came on the air, he made no mention
of the fact that he had personally visited our security offices and was
free to film, talk to people, or do anything he wanted to do. He knew
in advance how he wanted to portray me and his predetermined plan
was followed.

When Rather left my office, I was convinced he would take me apart.
I was right. The show was a disaster. Rather depicted a situation that
didn't exist in Nicaragua. That show did irreparable harm to the
government of Nicaragua and to me. Such massive disinformation
also does harm to the American people. J:j

President Somoza's comments are a good example of "the other
side of the story" that the American viewer is not allowed to see.
Doubtless other recipients of Sixty Minutes interviews could give
similar accounts.

Media personnel with sound ethics will report news factually and
reserve their opinions for editorials. In reality, however, opinion
usually mingles with the news. It is ironic that many journalists,
while insisting there be no press censorship, themselves censor sto-
ries. They demand, as during the Iran-Centra hearings, that "all the
facts" be told, yet do not themselves tell all the facts.

The leftist bias of the media strongly confirms that the Establish-
ment is not conservative. If the Establishment, with its colossal
wealth and links to press management, wanted news reporting with
a conservative orientation, or simply with balance, we would get it.

We do not.

187

Historian Charles Beard, appearing with his wife
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1 941

Historian Harry Elmer Barnes
188

Reed Irvine of Accuracy in Media

TEMI 1

MAN |

NlfwSlirllllllC

The
Death
Squads*^

CuTktf

M:*piv:j Vw h hs.iri(0'ftl

The major mass media can be counted on
to sell the Establishment line.

Hedley Donovan of Time and Dan Rather of CBS —

two of many media giants who have belonged to the Council

189

Bones of victims of the Communist genocide in Cambodia, unearthed
from a mass grave near Phnom Penh. During 1976, the New York
Times ran sixty-six human rights stories about Chile, but only (our
about Cambodia.

Coverage of Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan
was also avoided by most of the media.

190

Chapter 13

The CFR Today

This book's detractors will say it has exaggerated the power and
influence of the CFR. Admiral Chester Ward, a former Council mem-
ber whom we referred to in chapter one, made a point of clarification
germane to this:

CFR, as suchy does not write the platforms of both political parties
or select their respective presidential candidate^ or control U.S. de-
fense and foreign policies. But CFR members, as individuals, acting
in concert with other individual CFR members, do, 1

It is true, of course, that the Council is not an oath-bound broth-
erhood that dictates its members' words and deeds. A number of
individuals are apparently invited into the CFR simply because they
have a distinguished name or other enhancing qualities, and they
may join without endorsing or even knowing the Council's habitual
viewpoint. For this reason, no one should be censured merely for
belonging to the CFR. However , the membership's great majority,
and by all means its core of leaders, have been chronically pro-
socialist and pro-globalist.

It is also true that, while the Council maintains an extraordinarily
low profile, it is not a secret society. Dr, Carroll Quigley called it "a
front group," Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, a "front organization," and it
is helpful to understand it in these terms. It is not the Establishment,
but a surface component of it. Nor is it a theater of illegitimate
activities; it publishes an annual report in which it makes a good
account of its finances, and generally it maintains the trappings of
a public-spirited institution. Behind all of this, however, is a move-

191

The Shadows of Power

ment to effect a new world order. Because this movement has per-
sisted for seven unrelenting decades, has been lavishly funded, and
has been forwarded by the conscious, deliberate actions of CFR mem-
bers in government, many have called it a conspiracy. History speaks
loudly enough to vindicate the use of this term. Some speculate that
there is, within the Council, a cadre which is the heartbeat of its
globalism.

So if indeed we have committed the sin of overestimating the role
of the Council on Foreign Relations, let us then certainly acknowl-
edge that other sources have grossly underestimated it.

What about the Council today? What does the future hold for it
— and vice versa? A number of changes are in evidence.

We noted earlier the Council's eventual switch from a bilateral
objective (Atlantic Union) to a trilateral one. Another path to world
government that more or less fell into disuse was direct widening
of UN authority. Richard Gardner's April 1974 Foreign Affairs ar-
ticle, "The Hard Road to World Order/' charted a new course. Gard-
ner explained that *'the 'house of world order' will have to be built
from the bottom up rather than the top down." In other words, since
greater UN power had been successfully resisted by the public, an-
other approach was needed: strengthening the various ingredients
of world government, bit and piece. Gardner laid out ten command*
ments as a guide to action. And in succeeding years, the phrase "new
world order" and its variations — which had long been inscribed on
the pages of Foreign Affairs — began to dwindle in appearance.
There was an emphasis shift toward Gardner's plan: articles com-
mending the Law of the Sea Treaty, international currency reform,
international trade measures, and so forth.

Recently, however, even this trend has faded. Today, Foreign Af-
fairs shows few traces of globalism, and for the first time has begun
looking like its professed identity: a more or less balanced journal
of world affairs, rather than a handmaiden for the international
bankers.

It would be tempting to ascribe this transition to the arrival of
new editor William G. Hyland in 1984. However, Foreign Affairs'
improved look appears to be part of an overall process of image
reconstruction by the CFR.

192

The CFR Today

The Council has long been accused of being elitist. In 1961, Edith
Kermit Roosevelt remarked that it had "a membership of at least
ninety percent Establishment figures." 2 This is no longer the case.
The CFR has been making an overt drive to recruit members from
outside the banking/law stereotype and from beyond the North-
eastern seaboard fits membership's natural habitat). In keeping
with this, the leadership has passed from old-line Establishment
figures to men with unfamiliar, plebeian-sounding names. When
David Rockefeller retired as chairman in 1985, he was succeeded by
Peter Peterson, the son of Greek immigrants. Winston Lord > who
vacated the presidency that same year, was a Pillsbury heir whose
forebears had been regularly inducted into Skull and Bones since
the mid-nineteenth century. Lord's replacement was Peter Tarnoff,
grandson of Russian immigrants. Despite the cosmetology, Moskin's
1987 Town & Country article quotes one CFR officer as saying: "We
are still an elitist organization," and a Council "veteran" who admits:
"The great irony is that it is now operating more as a club than
years ago. It is the biggest exclusive club in America. It is an almost
Jamesian form of corruption. People of culture get to meet people
from Wall Street and become consultants." 3

Additionally, John Rees, publisher of Information Digest, noted in
1984 that "the American Right has been so successful at exposing
the power and Leftward bias of the C.F.R k that a conscious effort
has been made to add token Conservatives and moderates to the
membership list for protective coloring . , ." 4 A few individuals
broadly recognized as anti-Communists, such as Arnaud de Borch-
grave and Norman Podhoretz, are now on the Council's roster.

While these various modifications could be regarded as genuine
reforms, they may constitute an effort to "refute," retroactively, the
blistering charges traditionally made against the Council — that it
is an elitist front for the international banking community, globalist
and pro-Communist in outlook.

Even the Council's annual report has been spruced up. Once a
dry recitation of names, by-laws, and activities, it now appears in a
handsome, enlarged edition, filled with photos of Council members
chatting with world dignitaries over cocktails,

193

The Shadows of Power

More image renovation has taken place at the bookstore. The

trend-setter here may have been David Halberstam's The Best and
the Brightest which, while giving only passing attention to the CFR
as an organization, was an episodic profile of Establishment notables
during the Kennedy-Johnson era, Halberstam scratched out the re-
quired minimum of criticisms of these men (that McGeorge Bundy
was arrogant, that Robert McNamara was too statistics-minded,
etc J, but this was overshadowed by his reverence for their intellects,
as his title suggests. For example, he referred to Bundy as "the
brightest light in that glittering constellation around the President,"
with a "cool, lucid mind, the honed-down intelligence of the math-
ematician, the insight of the political-science scholar at Harvard." 5
Halberstam told us, or quoted others who told us, that with Mc-
Namara "the mind was first-rate, the intellectual discipline awe-
some,* that for William Bundy "brains were not his problem," that
Kennedy was "exceptionally cerebral," and so forth, which is not to
deny their intelligence, but only to note the book's preoccupation
with it. Halberstam did make some uncompromising denunciations,
but only of those people associated with anti-Communism or the
conservative tradition. He called Vietnam commander General Paul
Harkins "a man of compelling mediocrity" who "was ignorant of the
past, and ignorant of the special kind of war he was fighting," 6
referred to "the wild irrationality, the deviousness, the malicious-
ness and venality of the South Vietnamese," 7 and revealed his dis-
dain for what he called "God-fearing, Russian-fearing citizens," and
Christian missionaries who went to China because "it was, by and
large, more exciting than Peoria/' Halberstam, it is duly observed,
is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

The year 1984 saw publication of Robert Shulzinger's The Wise
Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Re-
lations, Here again, the title exalts the professed intellectual powers
of the Establishment, although the text grants that this has been
overrated. Shulzinger's preface carefully points out that his book is
a balanced account, neither tribute nor diatribe. Like Halberstam,
however, he rarely faults Council members for anything more sub-
stantive than pomposity. One of his biggest criticisms is that "Coun-
cil officials and friends have often exaggerated the body's impor-

194

The CFR Today

tance." s This is just the sort of "criticism* Council members must
savor! For in the interest of minimizing public scrutiny, they have
always downplayed their importance, which is the net effect of Shul-
zinger's book. Again like Halberstam, he shoots more than blanks,
but his real bullets are reserved for the Establishment's enemies.
He can wait only until the second sentence of his book to bring up
The John Birch Society, the CFR's most persistent and erudite critic.
The first sentence quotes a condemnation of the CFR Shulzinger
says he saw "scrawled on a bathroom wall," and he apparently hopes
readers will then associate such tactics with The John Birch Society.
Perhaps, instead, they find it a comment on where he does his re-
search, Shulzinger was an International Affairs Fellow under the
Council's sponsorship in 1982.

Then there is Isaacson and Thomas's monumental The Wise Men
(1986), where again the title congratulates intellect. As we have
noted, all six of the "wise men" were in the CFR — as are the authors
themselves. Of the five endorsements on the book's jacket, four were
written by Council members, The book is a prime example of the
Establishment scratching the Establishment's back, Although bio-
graphical in focus, it intermittently mentions the CFR, And while
it does yield significant revelations about American policy making,
it is manifestly written as a glorification of its six subjects. It tells
us of John McCloy's "discreet counsel, his rocklike wisdom, his re-
assuring steadiness";'* and of how Robert Lovett "seemed devoid of
personal ambition or ulterior motives. His discreet and selfless style
of operating came to be idealized by others as the benchmark for a
certain breed of public servant"* The Wise Men portrays its bio-
graphees as a rather conservative lot who, after World War II,
aroused Americans from Coke-guzzling complacency to the dangers
of the Soviet Union. But in reality, as we have seen, CFR conser-
vatism is usually quite selective, turning on only when it serves the
interests of Wall Street or globalism. As with Halberstam and Shul-
zinger, the book betrays an unmistakable antipathy toward the Es-
tablishment's main enemy: those people identified as devoutly anti-
Communist — a word Isaacson and Thomas seem to think comes
with the suffix "hysteria." McCloy, Acheson, Lovett, and the rest are
portrayed as demigods, steering America through the treacherous

195

The Shadows of Power

rapids of foreign policy as they deftly humor egocentric generals and
backwoods congressmen whose folly would land us on the shoals.

Why all this GFR-Establishment image-building? If we follow a
human analogy, people give the most attention to their looks right
before a date, a job interview, a speech, or a photograph session —
that is, right before undergoing scrutiny.

Some answers may he in the CFR's 1986 annual report. Chairman
Peter G, Peterson noted that an endowment drive called "the Cam-
paign for the Council" had raised over fifteen million dollars, which
he said "greatly strengthens the base from which we may contem-
plate future steps," Peterson continued:

To prepare the way for the possibility of such steps, David Rocke-
feller, with the approval of the Board of Directors, last spring estab-
lished a special Committee on the Council's National Hole ♦ . > . it
seemed an opportune time to reassess how, if at all, our functions,
programs, and policies might be altered to reflect the possibility of a
new national role. L1

What this new role might be the report didn't specify, but it did
note:

A major goal has been the development of a Washington program
of activities similar to those that take place at the Harold Pratt
House, 12

In 1987 , Council president Peter Tarnoff stated:

Because of the importance of Washington as the center of American
foreign policy making and the presence there of 27 percent of our
stated membership, we have decided to increase the size of our op-
erations in the nation's capital. . . . Over the next three years, we also
intend to allow the stated membership in Washington to rise from the
present level of 464 to 600 13

Will a switch of focus from New York to Washington be part of
the Council's "new national role?" And if so, why?

196

The CFR Today

Aging CFR member George Kennan, the originator of "contain-
ment," may have supplied a clue in an interview with Walter Cronk-
ite televised by CBS on March 31, 1987, Cronkite introduced Kennan
as "one of our genuine wise men." These were their filial remarks,
perhaps intended to stick the most in viewer consciousness.

Cronkite (narrating): To help the United States establish a sound
foreign policy, and stay within its principles, Kennan believes we
should have a council of wise men drawn from all areas of national
life.

Kennan: I think it ought to be a permanent body; it ougbt to be
advisory both to the President and to the Congress ... and they should
have, for the government, for the executive branch, and for the leg-
islative branch, some of the prestige and authority of opinions of the
Supreme Court . . ♦ In our legal system, we deal on the basis of prec-
edent. If a court has said something, we take it into account. I would
like to see that prestige given to such a body.

Such ambitions are nothing new to the Council. Back in 1924,
Count Hugo Lerchenfeld wrote in Foreign Affairs:

Could not a body of highly deserving and competent men, such as
are found in every nation as representatives of its highest moral forces
— a kind of Areopagus — meet to give decisions on highly important
contested matters? Could not a council be formed whose high judge-
ment and impartiality would be taken for granted, and which would
guide public opinion all over the world? M

What Kennan is suggesting today ts that foreign policy, like ju-
dicial matters, be settled by an unelected elite. But to found such a
body would require a restructuring of our government so radical
that it could probably not be achieved except by a constitutional
convention. Lo and behold, a convention is now being called for.

197

Peter G, Peterson

Kennan now suggests a foreign

policy "council of wise men"

akin to the Supreme Court.

198

Chapter 14

On The Threshold Of
A New World Order?

The Threat to the Constitution

During the constitutional bi centennial > some have celebrated the
Constitution; others have urged a new one. As the Christian Science
Monitor noted in 1984:

Amid the planning for festivals and finery, pomp and ceremony,
there's a deeper meaning we must be careful not to miss. The bicen-
tennial gives an opportunity for a rededication to the principles of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and for some careful thought about
the wisdom of constitutional revision. 1 (Emphasis added J

Warren Burger resigned as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
to work on the official Commission on the Bicentennial of the United
States Constitution. This implies the project has more than trifling
significance. The Burger Court was long accused of misconstruing
the Constitution to advance a political agenda. But what better way
to accomplish this than to change the Constitution itself? Justice
Burger has insisted that the Commission's meetings be held in secret
— an odd stipulation if its only purpose is celebration.

Burger is also Honorary Chairman of Project '87, a bicentennial
organization that, according to its literature, "is dedicated to com-
memorating the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution by
promoting public understanding and appraisal of this unique doc-
ument 1 * 2 (Emphasis added J Co-chairman of Project '87 is James

199

The Shadows of Power

MacGregor Burns, an advocate of constitutional revision. Bums
wrote in his 1984 book The Power To Lead:

Let us face reality. The framers [of the Constitution] have simply
been too shrewd for us, They have outwitted us. They designed sep-
arated institutions that cannot be unified by mechanical linkages, frail
bridges, tinkering. If we are to "turn the founders upside down" — to
put together what they put asunder — we must directly confront the
constitutional structure they erected, 3

Burns serves on the board of yet another bicentennial group —
the Committee on the Constitutional System (CCS). As of January
1987, the CCS had forty-eight board directors, more than a third of
them members of the Council on Foreign Relations. Co -chairing the
CCS is Douglas Dillon who, with David Rockefeller, also co -chaired
the aforementioned Campaign for the Council that raised fifteen
million dollars so that the CFR could contemplate "a new national
role."

The CCS is proposing drastic changes in the Constitution, These
were outlined in the 1985 book Reforming American Government;
The Bicentennial Papers of the Committee on the Constitutional Sys-
tem. Ensuing are some of them.

• One proposal would have us emulate the European parliamentary
system; American voters would be unable to cast ballots for indi-
vidual candidates, restricted instead to choosing a party slate across
the board. This would eliminate independent candidates (which
would suit the Establishment very well).

• The Congress would be expanded. The party whose nominee be-
came President would designate one-sixth of all representatives in
the House and one-third of all senators. This would dimmish the
elective power of the voters and the balance between the executive
and legislative spheres,

• The requirement for Senate ratification of treaties would be low-
ered.

• The CCS has also advocated extending representatives' terms
from two to four years and senators' from six to eight, and allowing

200

On The Threshold Of A New World Order?

congressmen to serve in the executive branch while still holding
their seats in Congress.

Not surprisingly, these proposals have perceptible ancestry in a
Foreign Affairs article. It was written in 1980 by Lloyd N. Cutler
(CFR), Counsel to President Carter, after the Senate refused to ratify
the dubious Salt II Treaty. He finished his article by noting that,
while a constitutional convention could achieve the changes he con-
templated, a "more practicable first step would be the appointment
of a bipartisan presidential commission . . , n Cutler went on to be-
come co-chairman of the CCS,

The aggregate measures sought by the group are ostensibly de-
signed to facilitate the policy-making process. But they reduce the
say of the American voters and play havoc with our system of checks
and balances, thus increasing the potential for an eventual dicta-
torship,

CCS members are not just mulling over modifications, but the
possibility of a whole new Constitution. In Reforming American Gov-
ernment we read:

The change will require major surgery. One cannot stop short of
bold and decisive departures- And yet a guiding principle should be
to write the new Constitution in a way that permits considerable lee-
way." (Emphasis added.)

The idea of a "modem" Constitution is not itself new — in fact,
one has already been written! It was published in 1970 by the Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions, which was established by
Ford Foundation financing. This constitution was primarily drafted
by Rexford Guy Tugwell, an old member of FDR's "brain trust."
Among the extreme changes its articles called for were the conver-
sion of the Senate from an elected body to one entirely appointed
by the President, its members (some of whom would come from
private groups) to serve for a lifetime; transfer of states' powers to
the federal government; nationalization of the communications in-
dustry; and conditional removal of the right to trial by jury.*

There hasn't been a constitutional convention since the original
one in 1787, But if you think we are far from having another, think

201

The Shadows of Power

again. Such a proceeding transpires if two-thirds of the state leg-
islatures call for it. As of early 1988, thirty-two of the required thirty-
four states had done so. They gave their approval because a consti-
tutional convention has been publicized as the means to require a
balanced federal budget — a context conveniently created by wild
deficit spending under Ronald Reagan. Few of the state legislators
were aware of the radical agenda for constitutional change that has
been formulated. Once such a convention begins, there is no telling
where it might go. Whether or not it could be limited to balancing
the budget is considered debatable, since there is little precedent to
go on.

Of course, the only way to justify the severe constitutional mu-
tations intended by groups like the CCS would be the existence of
a national crisis. This has not been overlooked. The report of the
first New England Regional Meeting of the CCS said that co-chair-
man Douglas Dillon "thinks needed changes can be made only after
a period of great crisis. 1 ' Project '87 co-chairman James MacGregor
Burns stated in Reforming American Government:

1 doubt that Americans under normal conditions could agree on the
package of radical and "alien" constitutional changes that would be
required. They would do so, I think, only during and following a stu-
pendous national crisis and political failure.

In a lengthy cover article in the October 1987 Atlantic, CFR chair-
man Peter G. Peterson forecast an economic crunch — if not crash

— for the near future.

We have seen that the international bankers have historically
been quite adept at instigating disasters in order to compel redi-
rection of American policy. As is rather well known, western banks
in recent years have loaned out hundreds of billions of dollars to
Third World and Communist nations. For many of these countries,
repayment appears impossible, The banks keep rescheduling in-
stallments, but some analysts anticipate that eventually the debtors
will simply renege, officially and permanently, in a united front.
This would probably collapse the U.S. banking system and economy

— unless extreme measures were introduced.

202

On The Threshold Of A New World Order?

Should this crisis, by some coincidence, erupt in the midst of a
constitutional convention to balance the budget, then our entire way
of life might be altered. Richard Cooper's dream of an international
currency, along with dozens of other Orweilian changes propounded
by Foreign Affairs and the bicentennial groups, might then appear.
And perhaps George Kennan's "council of wise men" (i.e M members
of the CFR) would be instituted as a Supreme Court of foreign policy
on the pretext that it offers the best brains available. Could this be
the ultimate meaning behind the CFhVs "new national role" and its
plans for a quasi-Pratt House in Washington? It may also explain
why the Council is giving itself an extensive face lift. For if it is to
become a division of our government (as it succeeded in doing on a
small scale during World War II), it would probably first be subject
to investigative hearings and screenings — thus the necessity to
erase all outward appearances that might tend to corroborate the
elitism, globalism, and pro-Communism long imputed to it.

Admittedly, this is speculation. But history is not speculation, and
history contains enough specimens of Establishment scheming to
warrant our vigilance, This is especially true in light of the very real
constitutional reform movement.

The Constitution guarantees our liberties — our freedom of
speech, press, assembly, and religion; our right to choose our leaders
and our right to fair trials. Half of mankind lacks these liberties;
our desire to keep them also justifies our vigilance.

If the Establishment has its way, when will the constitutional con-
vention take place? In Between Two Ages — published the same year
as TugwelPs "new constitution" - — Zbigniew Brzezinski forecast:

The approaching two-hundredth anniversary of the Declaration of
Independence could justify the call for a national constitutional con-
vention to re-examine the nation's formal institutional framework. Ei-
ther 1976 or 1989 — the two-hundredth anniversary of the Constitution
— could serve as a suitable target date for culrninatmg a national dia-
logue on the relevance of existing arrangements, the workings of the
representative process, and the desirability of imitating the various Eu-
ropean regionalization reforms and of streamlining the administrative

The Shadows of Power

structure. Mare important still, either date would provide a suitable
occasion for redefining the meaning of modern democracy . , , 7

The year 1976 has come and gone, but was not neglected by the
globalists. To mark the occasion, the World Affairs Council of Phil-
adelphia issued a "Declaration of INTERdependence." It proclaimed:
"Two centuries ago our forefathers brought forth a new nation; now
we must join with others to bring forth a new world order.**

Nineteen seventy-six witnessed no constitutional convention, but
proponents still hope that Brzezinski's other year, 1989, will. It is
somewhat curious that he labeled this the 200th anniversary of the
Constitution, since — although it became effective in 1789 — it was
written and signed in 1787, and ratified by the required number of
states in 1788. Perhaps it is more to the point that 1989 is the 200th
anniversary of the French Revolution, which many theorists see as
the historical genesis of the collectivist movement. It is also the
100th anniversary of the Socialist International.

Years ending in "nine" have been good ones for globalists and
Communists — bad ones for the rest of us. Marked by 1989 will be
the seventieth anniversary of the League of Nations (and the Paris
meetings at which the CFR and RIIA were founded); the sixtieth of
the stock market crash; the fiftieth of World War II; the fortieth of
the fall of China; the thirtieth of Castro's assumption of power in
Cuba, giving the Soviets their first base in the Western Hemisphere;
the twentieth of the beginning of our pullout from Vietnam; and the
tenth of Jinuny Carter's banner year, 1979 — when Iran and Nic-
aragua fell, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Salt II was signed,
and we formally commenced relations with Red China,

Aside, then, from other portents now in place, it may not be en-
tirely facetious to say that sentiment alone could prompt a major
Establishment move in 1989.

Wall Street's Biggest Merger

If the changes envisioned by constitutional reformers come to pass,
what will be our nation's destiny? A U.S. financial cave-in would
probably draw the whole planet into its vortex, as did the Great
Depression. In the long run, a new world order under one govern-

204

On The Threshold Of A New World Order?

ment would be offered as a global panacea. This would incorporate
Free World countries with Communist states.

From Romania to Vietnam, CFR men acting as U.S. diplomats
have tried to force coalition governments on nations struggling
against Communism. Such coalitions have inevitably resulted in
Communism, because the Communists have always violated and
exploited the agreements made, and usurped all power. Indeed, as
Louis Budenz, a high-ranking American Communist and editor of
the Daily Worker, was to acknowledge after renouncing the Party:
"The coalition government was a device used by the Communists
always to slaughter those whom they brought into the coalition/' 9
What the globalists are ultimately seeking is a macrocosmic coalition
government.

For decades, the Council on Foreign Relations has advocated re-
gional alliances against the Soviet Union, but with the footnote that,
in the end, the USSR should be brought into "the community of
nations." This would be preceded by a fusion of Eastern and Western
Europe, a favorite Foreign Affairs theme.

We alluded earlier to the abortive Reece Committee, whose in-
vestigations discovered that the Establishment foundations were
funding the promotion of world government and socialism. In the
fall of 1953, Norman Dodd, Director of Research for the Reece Com-
mittee, was invited to the headquarters of the Ford Foundation by
its president, H. Rowan Gaither (CFR). According to Dodd, Gaither
Lold him: "Mr. Dodd, all of us here at the policy-making level have
had experience, either in O.S.S. or the European Economic Admin-
istration, with directives from the White House. We operate under
those directives here. Would you like to know what those directives
are?" Dodd replied that he would. Gaither said: "The substance of
Ihem is that we shall use our grant-making power so to alter our
life in the United States that we can be comfortably merged with
the Soviet Union."*

Dodd, stunned, asked if he would repeat that before the House
committee for the enlightenment of the American people.

Gaither answered: **This we would not think of doing."

205

The Shadows of Power

This helps account for the compatibility of the CFKs globaiism
with its pro- Communism, There can be no one- world government
without a "IX S, -USSR merger.

Recent events foretoken such a merger, As we observed near the
outset of this book, a Council delegation visited with Gorbachev and
other Russian leaders in February 1987. This was at the Soviets*
invitation t which is a gauge of the respect Pratt House commands
at the Kremlin. Facts on File reports that the CFR contingent "de-
clined to openly talk about the details of the discussion." 1 "

Gorbachev in the meantime has staged a campaign of paltry re-
forms known as glasnost. Millions today languish in Soviet gulags 7
but when Gorbachev releases one or two prominent dissidents, the
U.S. press receives it like the Emancipation Proclamation, while
continuing to disregard the dictator's butchering of Afghanistan. The
American people are being deluged with media hype which proclaims
the supposed new openness of the USSR. Paid propagandists of the
Soviet government, such as Vladimir Posner, are presented to TV
viewers as "journalists," as if, like U.S. correspondents, they had
the freedom to criticize their country's rulers.

Today we are told that anyone against accommodation with the
Soviet Union is a warmonger, and that striking the right bargain
with Moscow will lead to a new age of world peace, We have been
reminded repeatedly that "After all, the Russians are people just
like us" — which is assuredly true. But the Soviet lifestyle is glar-
ingly unlike ours. Economic hardships in the USSR — where one
must stand in line all night to buy a container of milk — are but
the least of the system's demerits. It is a totalitarian state, void of
civil liberties, So great is the prohibition against freedom of speech
and press that it is against the law even to own a mimeograph
machine. Barbed wire and machine guns guard against would-be
emigrants. According to Solzhenitsyn, more than sixty million hu-
man beings have perished in Soviet slave labor camps. Is this the
kind of society Americans want to be coupled with? Unequivocally,
it is not. We prefer to keep sleeping without wondering if a knock
on the door will mean the secret police have come to abduct us into
a nightmare from which there will be no awakening- Yet the glob-
alists long for a Soviet merger.

206

On The Threshold Of A New World Order?

History Has a Pattern

According to some, history is basically a jumble of events: blun-
ders, coincidences, and happenstances that have brought us to where
we are today, This outlook does nothing to elucidate our past- How-
ever, seen in the context of globalist influence and maneuvering,
history — especially twentieth century American history — begins
to make sense, as if snapping into place upon a calculated blueprint.

With little exception, American policy has conformed to this blue-
print ever since the New Deal A good illustration is our China policy,
which has brought us toward rapprochement with the Chinese Com-
munists as swiftly as the American people could be persuaded to
allow it. Every President since FDR has had a part in this contin-
uum,

• Roosevelt: ceded Manchurian ports to Stalin during World War
II, and agreed to equip the Soviets' expedition into China, where
they armed Mao Tse-tung's revolutionaries.

• Truman: through his proxy, George Marshall, permitted the fall
of China by truce negotiations, a weapons embargo against the Na-
tionalists, and the obstruction of CongressionaOy mandated military
aid.

• Eisenhower: forced Taiwan to relinquish the Tachen Islands to
Peking, and interceded to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from invading
the mainland in 1955.

» Kennedy: also prevented Chiang from invading the mainland, in
1962 — when it was in turmoil and ripe for overthrow,

• Johnson: terminated economic aid to Taiwan.

• Nixon: visited China, breaking the ice with the Communists.

• Ford: presided over the withdrawal of most of the U.S. troops from
Taiwan* and visited the mainland.

• Carter: broke relations with Taiwan; recognized Peking,

• Reagan: proliferated trade with Red China, and promised reduced
arms sales to Taiwan.

Step by step, our China policy, like our broad foreign policy, has
followed an essentially unwavering course. It matters little which
party occupies the White House. Anyone can see that when the
"conservative" Richard Nixon went to Peking, he was paving the
way for the "liberal" Jimmy Carter to recognize it.

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The Shadows of Power

Our history has a pattern. Thomas Jefferson once said: "Single
acts of tyranny may be ascribed to the accidental opinion of a day;
but a series of oppressions, begun at a distinguished period, and
pursued unalterably through every change of ministers, too plainly
prove a deliberate systematical plan of reducing us to slavery/ 7

Jefferson's words could well be applied to the American historical
process in this century. If that process continues unimpeded, we can
anticipate a national crisis, a constitutional convention, and a new
world order binding the Free World to the countries of the Iron and
Bamboo Curtains.

2QH

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Uoyd Cutler

Warren Burger

H. Rowan Gaither:

* , , that we can be comfortably

merged with the Soviet Union. 1 '

209

Chapter 15

Solutions And Hope

How can we prevent materialization of the developments projected
in the last chapter? First, we still dwell in a free country, with free
speech and the power to vote. And we can exercise these rights to
demand and enforce change.

For more than fifty years, American policy has been formulated
mostly by one group. As the titles of the recent books we cited in
Chapter Thirteen hint, the main qualification claimed for these peo-
ple is intelligence. FDR had a "brain trust/' In a memorandum,
Assistant Secretary of State George Messersrnith said the use of the
CFR ? s War and Peace Studies Project during World War II was
justified because the Council could "call upon the best brains in
international relations/' 1 In his prospectus for the Trilateral Com-
mission, David Rockefeller stated it was his intention to bring the
"best brains in the world" together. George Bush and other Estab-
lishment candidates for President have pleaded their fitness for of-
fice by saying that, if elected, they would call the nation's top minds
to Washington.

But there is a problem in this. The word "genius/ 5 it is to be
remembered, is often paired with the word "evil." Intellect alone
does not make a statesman. There is another requisite ingredient:
character. What good are brains in public officials if they aren't used
to serve the interests of the electorate? So far, the "best brains" have
brought us staggering debt and taxation, the Vietnam War, the
collapse of allies around the world, and much other detriment. It
would take a crackerjack of a resume writer to launder their record.

Only one American in 100,000 belongs to the Council on Foreign
Relations. Why should this clique continue to set policy? Why should

210

Solutions And Hope

others be denied an opportunity? This is our nation. And we have
a right to leaders who represent us, not international banking or
world government

We Americans can make a difference. We can speak out, alerting
our friends and neighbors to the danger facing our republic. And we
can elect congressmen who will fight the Establishment — this
means congressmen who will:

• Support the Constitution and oppose a constitutional convention.

• Support a strong U.S. defense and oppose any treaty that moves
us toward alignment with the Soviet Union.

• Support effectual aid to foreign peoples battling Communist
aggression, and oppose trade and credits for Marxist regimes.

• Oppose the strengthening of the UN and other international agen-
cies of dubious merit.

• Support reductions in federal spending, taxation, and bureau-
cracy.

Where we cannot elect representatives devoted to such a platform,
we can still urge them to vote this way on individual legislative
issues.

And we can seek a President who wiU jettison the CFR.* Of course,
all White House candidates claim to have no strings attached. Wood-
row Wilson ran as the anti-Money Trust candidate, FDR as the anti-
Wall Street candidate, Jimmy Carter as the anti-"insider" candidate,
and Ronald Reagan as the anti-Trilateral Commission candidate.
As Chief Executives, however, all of these men were guided by the
very forces they allegedly opposed. So the voters have to choose with
exquisite wisdom,

It is also time to call for a Congressional investigation of both the
Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission, as the
American Legion did in 1980.

* One candidate in the 1988 campaign explicitly pledged to do so if elected. Pat Robertson stated
on November 16, 1U87: "I intend to eliminate the influence of the Council on Foreign Relations
and the Trilateral Commission from the State Department and the Treasury Department. I intend
to appoint as Secretary of State someone who puts the long range interests of the United States
first, rather than trying to sacrifice our interests in order to achieve global accommodation with
the Soviet Union." On the other hand, of eight foreign policy advisors listed for Michael Dukakis
in Time magazine for May 2, 1988, seven were members of the CFR.

211

The Shadows of Power

Furthermore, Americans must be vigilant toward events overseas.
In instance after instance where the Establishment has joined farces
with the international left to destabilize a country, a certain pattern
has emerged that it behooves us to be aware of.

(1) Insurgent Communists, equipped by the Soviet Union or one
of its surrogates, begin a campaign of terror in the nation.

(2) To protect the population, the government cracks down on the
revolutionary terrorists. Some are killed, others imprisoned,

(3) The American press now begins to denounce the government
for "oppressing dissenters," "violating human rights," and "jailing
political prisoners." The country's leader is targeted as a "tyrant"
and "neo-Nazi." There are rumors of torture by his security forces.
In the meantime, the Communists are described not as Communists,
but as "democratic reformers/'

(4) The United States — via CFR diplomats — intervenes. It de-
mands that the government make concessions to the rebels, includ-
ing the release of those captured, and form a coalition government
with them. If the government refuses, the U.S. embargoes trade and
weapons. If it gives in, the terrorists carry on with impunity. Either
way, the nation is doomed.

(5) Under the irresistible pressure of both the USSR and the U.S.,
the government now collapses, and the Marxists assume power.
There is no longer any pretense about whether or not they are Com-
munists. They convert the country into a police state, executing
opponents, seizing the press, suppressing religion, and prohibiting
free speech as "counter-revolutionary." But the American mass me-
dia are no longer concerned about human rights there — they are
too busy taking aim at someone new.

The above scenario, with minor variations, has been used suc-
cessfully to topple China, Cuba, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran,
Nicaragua, and Rhodesia. It is in the late stages in the Philippines,
only with Corazon Aquino serving as an unwitting Kerensky inter-
mediate to Communist takeover. It is currently being applied to
Chile, South Africa, and South Korea. It will not stop with them —
later it will be Honduras, Guatemala, Taiwan, Singapore, and as-
sorted other lands. The scenario has been rerun more times than
an old Star Trek episode, and one asks when the American people

212

Solutions And Hope

will finally realize that what they are witnessing is not a unique
situation but part of a continuum.

We must learn to recognize the pattern. It does not matter whether
the nation at risk is being accused of "tyranny** as in Nicaragua,
"racism" as in Rhodesia, or "corruption" as in the Philippines, The
specific charge s whether true or not, matters little to men of the
Establishment; their object is to destabilize the country — and, for
the American people to accept that, a suitable excuse has to be
furnished. We must instruct our congressmen to oppose further sub-
version of our allies. And the next time a journalist complains that,
in South Korea, freedom of the press has been restricted, ask him
to explain why he doesn't mention that, in North Korea, it has been
annihilated.

The task of stopping the rush toward a Communist-style "new
world order'* seems formidable, It would be easier, of course, if there
was an organization designed to stop it. There is. Perhaps the best
way to introduce this group is to examine one of the most recent
entries in the Establishment's anthology of "coincidences."

The Ultimate Coincidence

On September 1, 1983, the Korean Air Lines Flight 007, en route
from Alaska to Seoul, was obliterated by air-to-air missiles from a
Soviet interceptor. All 269 passengers and crew, including 61 Amer-
icans, were lost, Soviet fighters had trailed the plane for over two
hours. Nearly all observers agreed that it could not have been shot
down without top clearance from Moscow. The question was: Why
did the Soviets do it? Why did they risk the inevitable backlash of
world opinion to eliminate a harmless civilian airliner? There had
to be something or someone on board important enough to make the
consequences worth it. There was — someone all but ignored by the
mass media: Dr. Lawrence Patton McDonald, member of Congress.

McDonald was the most dedicated anti-Communist on Capitol
Hill. The Review Of The News noted: "From the time he took his
oath of office in 1975 until the moment of his death, Congressman
McDonald had systematically carried out a campaign against the
Soviet Communists of a sort which no other U.S. elected official had
ever done on his own," 2 Author Jeffrey St. John, in his book about

213

The Shadows of Power

the KAL 007 tragedy, Day of the Cobra, observed: "Congressman
Lawrence McDonald had spent his entire career warning against
the use of terrorism as an instrument of Soviet policy* particularly
the use of the threat of nuclear war by the Kremlin as a weapon to
paralyze the United States and its Western allies' will to resist." 3
McDonald was Washington's most outspoken critic of trade and tech-
nology transfer to the USSR, He was the president and founder of
the Western Goals Foundation, which produced books and video-
tapes on Soviet-generated terror and espionage. He had recently
written a series of articles about Yuri Andropov and the KGB, Voting
appraisals gave him the most conservative rating in Congress during
his five terms in office. And most significantly, Lawrence McDonald
was chairman of The John Birch Society — the world's largest and
most sophisticated anti-Communist organization. He was con-
demned in Pravda, Izuestia, and on Radio Moscow. Dr. Lawrence
McDonald was, arguably, the Kremlin's number one enemy.

The odds against such a man 'lust happening" to be on the flight
the Soviets destroyed were astronomical. Yet the news media ne-
glected the obvious potential significance. After the incident, a host
of "experts" were called in who assured the public that there was
no specific reason for the attack — instead, they explained , it was
due to the generalized phenomenon of Soviet "paranoia concerning
their airspace." The following statement by Secretary of State
George Shultz was typical:

The answer to the broader question of motivation seems to lie in
the character of the Soviet Union. There is a massive concern for
security, a massive paranoia, and I think this act was an expression
of that excessive concern over security. 4

It should be noted that as chairman of The John Birch Society
( JBS), McDonald was not only an archenemy of the Soviet Union,
but of the American Establishment — of which the JBS is the most
vocal critic. For years, the Society has been intellectually at crossed
swords with the CFR. Congressman McDonald even wrote the fore-
word to Gary Attends The Rockefeller File, in which he spoke out
against "the drive of the Rockefellers and their allies to create a one-

214

Solutions And Hope

world government, combining super-capitalism and Communism
under the same tent . . ."

When Lawrence McDonald established the Western Goals Foun-
dation, its stated purpose was "to rebuild and strengthen the polit-
ical, economic, and social structure of the United States and Western
Civilization so as to make any merger with totalitarians impossible,"
Such a merger now looms closer than ever before. When the CFR
delegation paid a visit to Gorbachev and his minions in February
1987, one could only reflect on how timely McDonald's removal was
for the glohalist vision.

Lawrence McDonald is dead, but his cause survives — and so does
the organization he left behind.

The John Birch Society

Spokesmen for the Establishment are not only fond of lauding its
collective IQ, but of twitting its "right-wing" critics as ignorant riff-
raff. You could not prove this by Robert Welch (1899-1985), who
founded The John Birch Society in 1958, At age two, he learned to
read; at seven he read all nine volumes of Ridpath's Histoiy of the
World; at twelve he was a freshman at the University of North
Carolina, America entered World War I, and Welch, a college degree
already under his belt, enrolled at the U,S, Naval Academy at age
seventeen. After two years he ranked fourth in a class of nearly one
thousand, When the war ended, so did his motivation, and he re-
signed. He attended Harvard Law School from 1919 to 1921, but
withdrew to start what would be an extremely successful business
career. He was on the board of directors of the National Association
of Manufacturers for seven years, traveled extensively, authored
several books, and ran for lieutenant governor in Massachusetts. In
1958, aroused by the growth of Communism and the Eisenhower
administration's hollow conservatism, Welch brought together sev-
eral prominent Americans to found an anti-Communist society.

It was named after John Birch, a young Christian missionary
serving in China when World War II broke out. Birch came to the
assistance of General Claire Chennault's Flying Tigers, who were
helping the Chinese resist the Japanese invasion. He volunteered
for service in the U.S. Army, rose to the rank of captain, and was

215

The Shadows of Power

highly decorated by both the American and Chinese governments.
But, a few days after the war's end, the Chinese Communists mur-
dered him. His death was regarded as perhaps the first casualty in
the final postwar struggle between the Free World and Communism,

The John Birch Society soon had tens of thousands of enthusiastic
members, organized into individual chapters throughout the coun-
try. These chapters became the vanguard of the American movement
against Communism, big government, world government, and the
proverbial Establishment itself. "Education/' said Robert Welch, "is
our total strategy." That strategy came to life in scores of books —
both new ones and reprints of old classics; a monthly journal, Amer-
ican Opinion (whose modem successor is called The New American);
filmstrips; tabulations of Congressional voting records; a national
lecture circuit for distinguished speakers; and even summer camps
for youth. All these activities continue today.

The response from the Communists and the Establishment was
predictable The tactic used had a prototype in a directive issued by
the Communist Party to its U.S. members in 1943. It read:

When certain obstructionists become too irritating, label them, after
suitable build-ups, as Fascist or Nazi or anti-Semitic, and use the
prestige of anti -Fascist and tolerance organizations to discredit them.
In the public mind constantly associate those who oppose us with
those names which already have a bad smelL B

A certain element has always used Hitler's war against the Soviet
Union as proof that Communism is the natural antithesis of Nazi-
ism. In point of fact, the two systems are cousins — both are forms
of totalitarianism (total government). What The John Birch Society
and other ideologically conservative groups espouse is limited gov-
ernment, which fits on the opposite end of the spectrum from both
Communism and Naziism. Nevertheless, a rather successful mis-
representation has been carried out.

The Communist and Establishment press operated in sync. In
1961 ? People's World, the West Coast Communist newspaper, de-
scribed the Society as a secret fascist outfit. Pravda > which carried
as many as six attacks on the JBS in one issue, called Robert Welch

216

Solutions And Hope

an "American Fuhrer," "brandishing the bludgeon of the Hitlerite
storm trooper." Not to be outdone, Time magazine (March 10, 1961)
reported that many considered Birchers "barely a goosestep away
from the formation of goon squads/* Robert Welch had said that
"truth is our only weapon/* But CBS News claimed the Society was
purchasing guns — a story that turned out to be complete fabrica-
tion. JBS spokesman G. Edward Griffin notes that part of the cam-
paign against the Society included "dirty tricks" such as calling
people in the night and saying: "This is The John Birch Society, Get
out of town, ya dirty Commie!"

The stereotype assigned Birchers was that of people looking under
their beds for Communists- They were, it was reported, anti-Semitic
as well as paranoid about the Russians, The author of this book,
who is partly of Russian-Jewish lineage, finds these charges ridic-
ulous. To be sure, there is anti-Semitism in the world, but anyone
who tries to find one shred of it in any Birch Society publication will
come away empty-handed. As to paranoia about Soviet Communism,
one has only to think of the millions that system has made into
corpses and ask: What did these people die from — paranoia?

Although the stereotype was established with fair success, the
media assault, on the whole, backfired. All the publicity helped the
Society grow. The approach in more recent years has been to give
it "the silent treatment."

As Robert Welch reached the twilight of his life, he handed over
the reins of leadership to Lawrence McDonald. Dr. McDonald, a
surgeon as well as a Congressman, was young, handsome, articulate,
and a born activist. But he died at Soviet hands with 268 others on
September 1, 1983. In December of that year, Welch made his final
public appearance at ceremonies marking the Society's twenty-fifth
anniversary. He suffered a crippling stroke a few days later, and
died on January 6, 1985-

The John Birch Society continues to spearhead the fight against
world government. To be sure, it is the underdog in this conflict.
Unlike the Establishment, the JBS does not have billions in foun-
dation assets it can tap to make its case. But perhaps that's just
why it will win — its members are motivated by something greater
than money,

217

The Shadows of Power

If you think you would lite to learn more about The John Birch
Society, contact the organization at its headquarters (Post Office
Box 8040, Apple ton, Wisconsin 54913). Its staff would be delighted
to hear from you!

What Is It All About?

America now confronts a distinct choice. In a few short years, we
could be part of a totalitarian "new world order," or we could remain
a free and independent nation. Our forefathers fought and died so
that we might have that freedom and independence — something
to think about before giving them away. Patriotism was long re-
garded as virtue. But now it is often slighted. Patriotism, we are
told, is nationalism, and nationalism, we are told, is fascism, the
stuff of Adolph Hitler. (Oddly enough, the people who advance this
view frequently call Communist rebels in the Third World "nation-
alists" — in which case they consider the term unobjectionable. It
is a sin, apparently, only for the rest of us,)

But Hitler's nationalism was largely a fanatic devotion to race. In
America, we are a compound of ail races. For us, patriotism is not
just allegiance to a people, it is allegiance to the principles our
country was built on.

Of course, the idea of a new world order may sound inviting, and
it certainly will if the mass media promote it during an economic
crisis, a rash of terrorism, or the imminence of war. Even today,
globalists — whose numbers are by no means confined to the walls
of Pratt House — talk of a "New Age 11 in which all men will live in
peace and harmony. There is a serious flaw, however, in their thesis.

America's founders devised an arrangement of governmental
checks and balances. The executive, legislative, and judicial
branches all served to restrain each other's power. The House coun-
terbalanced the Senate, and the states counterbalanced Washington
itself j whose authority was further limited by the Bill of Rights. Why
was all this so? Because the founders knew that unrestricted power
leads to tyranny. "Government," declared George Washington, "is
not reason, it is not eloquence — it is force. Like fire, it is a dangerous
servant and a fearful master." James Madison said: "The accumu-
lation of all power — legislative, executive, and judiciary — in the

218

Solutions And Hope

same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyr-
anny."

There is a saying: "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power
corrupts absolutely." An everyday example would be an abusive boss.
Upon those beneath him, he inflicts wrath he would never dare show
his own superiors — because around his subordinates, he has power;
there is no risk to a bad temper, nothing to act as a restraint. In
other words, hi the absence of restraints, man's worst side tends to
come out. History has repeatedly illustrated this. In 1919, Boston's
police went on strike, and mob violence reigned in the city. Hundreds
of stores were looted, with many "ordinary citizens" partaking in
the crime. With the restraints gone, the worst in people emerged.

The authors of the Constitution understood this phenomenon, and
understood that political power, being the greatest power on earth,
is extremely dangerous unless confined. This is why the globalist
plan must be stopped. If all power is vested in a single international
authority, what force except God Himself could save us from the
abuses certain to follow?

Why is it that America has never experienced genocide or police-
state terror like other parts of the world? Because the decentrali-
zation of power decreed by the Constitution makes them impossible.
For two centuries, refugees have come to the United States to escape
oppression overseas. But what if America is absorbed by a world
government that turns despotic? There will be no new country for
anyone to flee to.

Actually, the nations of the world themselves act as a sort of check-
and-balance system against each other. If a dictator oppresses his
people too greatly, they may seek foreign assistance. Even the So-
viets are afraid to persecute too extensively lest they forfeit Western
trade and credits. If, however, our world pluralism is junked for a
world government, we are apt to see atrocities far worse than any
the world has known.

What could possess anyone to believe that erasing national bound-
aries will erase evil from mankind? Yet that, in effect, is what many
globalists proclaim.

Of course, some say there \b no such thing as evil — that it's all
relative, a matter of a man's opinion. But there is evil: the bones of

219

The Shadows of Power

Dachau and Cambodia cry it out. And this evil has been with man
for a long time.

There is, as anyone can see, a perennial conflict throughout the
world. It has been called the struggle between left and right, between
the Iron Curtain and the Free World, and between atheistic Com^
munism and Christianity, Actually, this clash of global forces is
simply a macrocosm of the battle going on inside every man. Here
it has been termed the conflict between material and spiritual val-
ues, between desire and conscience, and between Satan and God,
But whatever we call it, the conflict is there. This is why we have
the paradox of capitalists allied with Communists. Contrary to
Marxist doctrine, life is not a class struggle but a spiritual one.
People can choose one side or the other, whether they are rich or
poor, or their name is Carnegie or Castro.

In essence, history itself is the story of this conflict. Those who
view history as a series of accidents, it is interesting to note, also
usually believe that the universe itself began as an accident — a
"big bang" — and that man resulted from random molecular colli-
sions,

There are, however, those of us who accept the causality of God,
Many centuries ago, the Hebrew Old Testament (as in the book of
Daniel) and the Christian New Testament (as in the book of Reve-
lation) prophesied that ultimately a beautiful kingdom will prevail
over all creation under Messiah or Christ. But they also warned of
an evil, one-world government: the kingdom of the Antichrist, which
would signify terror and tribulation for the earth. We might do well
to ask if that kingdom is now taking shape, as nation after nation
falls to Communism, with its totalitarianism, genocide, and perse-
cution of Jews, Christians, and all other dissenters.

Many notables of the American Establishment have given them-
selves over to one side in this conflict, and it is not the side the
ancient scriptures recommend. Whether or not they are conspirators,
whether they are conscious or not of the ultimate consequences of
their actions, their powerful influence has helped move the world
toward apocalyptic events. This book has been written not as a
condemnation of them — for who among us is without culpability?
— but as a warning to avert catastrophe.

220

Solutions And Hope

Ancient Israel was founded as a land of God. It thrived and knew
great power. But eventually it became engrossed with its material
abundance, forgot the laws of God, grew weak, and was conquered,
its people scattered abroad. Similarly, America was founded as a
land of God, a Christian land. It became the freest and strongest
nation on earth. But, like Biblical Israel, it too is losing sight of its
religious roots, floundering in materialism. Will the United States
also be conquered?

We Americans must make a choice — liberty or new world order.
If we wait too long, a national crisis may sweep us into the wrong
decision irrevocably. Perhaps with the help of The John Birch So-
ciety, we can thwart the ends of globalism. One thing is for sure:
the job will be a lot easier if we turn our hearts toward God and ask
for his assistance. If not, all the signs say, night's curtain will surely
fall.

221

Robert Weich

Lawrence P. McDonald

Dr, McDonald's wife, Kathryn, and son t Trygwi, at
Washington memorial service for the slain congressman

Footnotes

Abbreviations: CFR — Council on Foreign Relations; FA — Foreign
Affairs.

Chapter One. A Primer on the CFR

L Curtis B. Dal], FDR: My Exploited Father-In-Law (Washington, DC.:

Action Associates, 1970), p. 67.

2. Don Bell, "Who Are Our Rulers?," American Mercury, September 1960,
p. 136.

3. F.DM.: His Personal Letters (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,
1950), p. 373,

4. Phoebe and Kent Courtney, America's Unelected Rulers: The Council
on Foreign Relations (New Orleans: Conservative Society of America,
1962), pp. 1-2,

5. Edith Kermit Roosevelt, "Elite Clique Holds Power in U.S.," Indianap-
olis News, December 23 T 1961, p, 6.

6. Arthur Scfalesinger, Jr TJ A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1965X p. 128.

7. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random
House, 1972), p. 6.

8. Newsweek, September 6, 1971, p. 74.

9. Richard Rovere, "The American Establishment, * Esquire, May 1962,
p. 107.

10. J. Anthony Lukas, 'The Council on Foreign Relations: Is It a Club?
Seminar? Presidium? Invisible Government?," New York Times Magazine,
November 21, 1971, p. 129.

11. Advertisement in Foreign Affairs, Summer 1986.

12. Theodore White, The Making of the President, 1964 (New York: Athe-
neum, 1965), p. 67.

13. Christian Science Monitor, September 1, 1961, p. 9.

14. Joseph Kraft, "School For Statesmen," Harper's, July 1958, p. 64.

223

The Shadows of Power

15. John Franklin Campbell, "The Death Rattle of the American Estab-
lishment," New York, September 20, 1971, p. 48.

16. Lukas, pp. 125-26.

17. CFR, Annual Report, 1985-86, p. 27.

18. CFR, Annual Report, 1986-87, p. 5.

19. J. Robert Moskin, "Advise and Dissent/' Town & Country* March
1987, p. 154.

20. Kraft, p. 64.

21. Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward, Kissinger on the Couch (New Ro-
chelle, New York: Arlington House, 1975), p. 151.

22. CFR, Annual Report, 1986-87, p. 5.

23. Moskin, p. 208.

24. Richard J, Bamet, Roots of War (New York: Atheneum, 1972), p. 49,

25. Kraft, p. 66.

26. Schlafly and Ward, pp, 144-50.

27. Charles W. Eliot, 'The Next American Contribution to Civilization,"
FA f September 15, 1922 s p. 59,

28. Philip Kerr, "From Empire to Commonwealth," FA, December 1922,
pp. 97-98.

29. American Public Opinion and Postwar Security Commitments (New
York: CFR, 1944), quoted in Alan Stang, The Actor (Belmont, Mass,:
Western Islands, 1968), p, 35.

30. Richard N. Gardner, "The Hard Road to World Order," FA, April
1974, p. 558.

31. Kurt Waldheim, "The United Nations: The Tarnished Image," FA,
Fall 1984, p. 93.

32. Max Eastman, The Character and Fate of Leon Trotsky," FA f
January 1941, p. 332,

33. Leonard Silk and Mark Silk, The American Establishment (New York:
Basic Books, 1980), pp, 192-93,

34. CFR, Annual Report, 1985-86, p. 17.

35. Roosevelt, p, 6,

36. Congressional Record, December 15, 1987, Vol, 133, p, S18146,

Chapter 2. Background to the Beginning

L Gary Allen, with Larry Abraham, None Dare Call It Conspiracy (Ross-
moor, Calif,: Concord Press, 1972), p. 41,

224

Footnotes

2. Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope (New York: Macmillan, 1966),
pp, 326-27,

3. Ibid., p. 324.

4. Gustavus Myers, History of the Great American Fortunes (New York:
The Modern Library, 1936), p. 556.

5. Bob Adelmann, "The Federal Reserve System," The New American,
October 27, 1986, p, 31,

6. Frederick Lewis Allen, "Morgan The Great," Life, April 25, 1949,
p. 126.

7. Congressional Record, December 22, 1913, Vol. 51, p. 1446,

8. Frank Vanderlip, "Farm Boy to Financier," Saturday Evening Post,
February 9, 1935, pp. 25, 70.

9. Congressional Record, December 22, 1913, Vol. 51, pp. 1446-47.

10. A. Ralph Epperson, The Unseen Hand (Tucson, Arizona: Publius
Press, 1985), p. 182.

11. Congressional Record, December 22, 1913, Vol. 51, p. 1446.

12. Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (New York; Doubleday, Page.
1914), pp. 13-14.

13. Ball, p. 137.

14. Ferdinand Lundberg, America's 60 Families (New York: Vanguard,
1938), pp. 110-11.

15. Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1926), Vol. 1, p. 114.

16. Arthur D. Howden Smith, Mr. House of Texas (New York: Funk &
Wagnalls, 1940), p. 70.

17. Ibid., p. 23.

18. George Sylvester Viereck, The Strangest Friendship in History (New
York: Liveright, 1932), p. 28.

19. Dall, p. 71. Concerning the Rockefellers, see William Hoffman, David:
Report on a Rockefeller (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1971), p. 51.

20. William P. Hoar, Architects of Conspiracy (Belmont, Mass.: Western
Islands, 1984) T p. 92.

21. Colin Simpson, The Lusitania (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p. 157.

22. Ibid, pp. 264-65.

23. Tbid., p. 13L

24. Ibid., p. 147.

25. Ibid., p. 131.

225

The Shadows of Power

26, Viereck, pp. 106*15,

27. Seymour, Vol, 4, p, 38.

Chapter 3. The Council's Birth and Early Links to Totalitarianism
I- Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The
Council on Foreign Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1977), p. 16.

2. Eliot, p. 65.

3. Robert D. Shulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs; The History of
the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press >
1984), p. 6.

4. Campbell, p. 47.

5. Quigley, p. 952.

6. Ibid.

7. Edward Mandell House, Philip Dru: Administrator (New York: B. W,
Huebsch, 1912), p. 276.

8. Antony C. Sutton, Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution (New Ro-
chelle, New York: Arlington House, 1974), p. 25.

9. Ibid., p. 46.

10. Ibid., pp. 71-81.

11. Ibid., p. 83.

12. Ibid., p. 156.

13. Ibid., p. 147.

14. Paul D. Cravath, 'The Pros and Cons of Soviet Recognition," FA,
January 1931, pp. 266-76.

15. Human Events , November 10, 1962, p. 853.

16. Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1986), pp. 100-101.

17. New York Times, November 17, 1919, p. 1.

18. Allen, None Dare, pp. 99-100.

19. Frederick C. Howe, Confessions of a Monopolist, (Chicago: Public Pub-
lishing Co., 1906), p. v.

20. Ibid., p. 157.

21. Hoar, p. 89.

22. Quigley, p. 308.

23. New York American, June 24 t 1924, quoted in Bell, p. 136.

226

Footnotes

24. Antony C. Sutton, Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler (Seal Beach,
Calif,; 76 Press, 1976), p. 35.

25. New York Times, October 21, 1945, Section 1, p. 12.

26. Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment ofL G. Farben (New
York: The Free Press, 1978), pp. 122-23.

27. Sutton, Wall Street and Hitler, p. 109.

28. Ibid., p. 35.

Chapter 4. The CFR and FDR

1. Antony C. Sutton, Wall Street and FDR (New Rochelle, New York:
Arlington House, 1975), p, 18-

2. John T. Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth (New York: Devin-Adair, 1948),
pp. 268-70,

3. Ball, p. 185.

4. Charles A. Lindbergh, Sr., The Economic Pinch (reprinted by Omni
Publications, Hawthorne, Calif., 1968), p. 95, quoted in Allen, None Dare,
p. 53.

5. Louis T. McFadden, On The Federal Reserve Corporation, remarks in
Congress, 1934 (Boston: Forum Publication Co.), p. 89, quoted in Allen,
None Dare, p. 55.

6. Dall, p. 49.

7. Quoted in Allen, None Dare, pp. 54-55.

8. Allen, None Dare, p. 63.

9. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash, 1929 (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1955), p. 105.

10. Hoar, p. 190.

11. Hugh S. Johnson, The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth (New York:
Doubteday, Doran, 1935), p. 141.

12. Flynn, p. 24.

13. Ibid., p. 27.

14. Sutton, Wall Street and FDR, p, 134.

15. Ibid., pp. 138, 141.

16. Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Great Depres-
sion 1929-1941 (New York: Macmillan, 1952), p, 420.

17. Congressional Record, June 19, 1940, Vol. 86, p. 8641.

227

The Shadows of Power

Chapter 5. A Global War with Global Ends

1. Shoup and Minter, p. 119,

2. Ibid,, p. 160.

3. Samuel 1. Rosenman, comp., The Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Macmillan, 1941), p. 517.

4. John Toland, Infamy: Peart Harbor and Its Aftermath (New York: Dou-
bleday, 1982), pp. 115-18.

5. Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1950), p. 23.

6. William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1976), p. 157.

7. Ibid.

8. Shulzinger, p. 271,

9. Geoffrey Crowther, "Anglo-American Pitfalls," FA t October 1941, p. 1,

10. Shoup and Minter, p. 123.

11. Toland, pp. 275-76.

12. Robert A. Theobald, The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor (Old Green-
wich, Conn,: Devin-Adair, 1954), p, 76,

13. Shoup and Minter, pp. 131-35,

14. Toiand, p. 316.

15. Shulzinger, pp, 116-17.

16. Antony C, Sutton, National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union
(New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1973), pp, 82-84.

17. Hoar, p. 303.

18. The Review Of The News, May 31, 1972, p 60.

19. Shoup and Minter, pp. 169-71,

20. A, K. Chesterton, The New Unhappy Lords (London: Candour, 1969),
p. 156.

21. Gary Allen, "Stop the Bank Gang," American Opinion, February
1979, p. 12.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 102,

24. Joseph Collins and Frances Moore Lappe, ic World Bank: Does It Bind
Poor to Poverty?," Los Angeles Times, September 24, 1978, Part IX, p. 3.

25. Shirley Hobbs Scheibla, "Down a Rathole?," Barron's, September 25,
1978, p. 9.

26. Congressional Record, December 15, 1987, Vol 133, p. S18148.

228

Footnotes

Chapter 6. The Truman Era

1. Isaacson and Thomas, p. 19.

2. Shoup and Minter, p. 35.

3. Isaacson and Thomas, p. 410.

4. Tyler Co wen, *The Great Twentieth- Century Foreign-Aid Hoax," Rea-
son, AprU 1986, p. 40.

5. Isaacson and Thomas, p. 289.

6. Ibid., p. 365,

7. Ibid., p. 398.

8. Ibid., p. 397.

9. Charles L, Mee, Jr., The Marshall Plan (New York: Simon and Schus-
ter, 1984), p, 234,

10. Eduard Benes, "After Locarno: The Problem of Security Today; 1 FA,
January 1926, p. 210,

11. Oswald o Aranha, "Regional Systems and the Future of ILN./' FA t
April 1948, p. 420.

12. Courtney and Courtney, p. 51.

13. Roberto Ducei t "The World Order in the Sixties," FA, April 1964,
pp. 389-90.

14. Courtney and Courtney, p, 23,

15. Freda Utley, The China Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1951),
pp. 44-45.

16. Jamea MacGregor Burns, John Kennedy: A Political Profile (New
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), p. 80,

17. A. J. Grajdanzev, "Korea in the Postwar World," FA, April 1944,
p. 482.

18- American Public Opinion and Postwar Security Commitments, p. 10,
quoted in Stang. pp. 35-36,

19. American Foreign Policy, 2950-55: Basic Documents (Washington,
B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), Vol. H, p. 2468.

20. Charles A, Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-1951
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), p. 402.

21. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964),
p. 375.

22. Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper &
Bros., 1954), p. 315.

229

The Shadows of Power

23, Isaacson and Thomas, p. 698,

24. Adlai Stevenson, "Korea in Perspective" FA, April 1952, p. 360.

Chapter 7. Between Limited Wars

1. Robert Welch, The Politician (Belmont, Mass.: Belmont Publishing,
1963), pp, 7-8.

2. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1983), Vol. l,p. 437.

3. Ibid,

4. Kraft, p. 66.

5. Ambrose, VoL 1, pp. 459-60.

6. See, for example, Julius Epstein, Operation Keelhaul (Old Greenwich,
Conn.: Devin-Adair, 1973), and Nicholas Bethell, The Last Secret {New
York: Basic Books, 1974).

7. Gary Allen, Richard Nixon: The Man Behind the Mask (Belmont,
Mass.: Western Islands, 1971), p. 115.

8. Ibid,, p. 116.

9. Human Events , December 2, 1959.

10. Stang, p. 164.

11. January 1963 issue.

12. Allen, Richard Nixon, p, 183.

13. Ambrose, Vol. 2 (1984), p. 155.

14. Rene A. Wormser, Foundations; Their Power and Influence (New
York: Devin-Adair, 1958), pp. 304-5.

15. Report, Special House Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Founda-
tions, 1954, pp. 176-77, quoted in John Stormer, None Dare Call It Trea-
son (Florissant, Missouri: Liberty Bell Press, 1964), p. 210,

16. Wormser, p. 349.

17. Lukas, p. 123.

18. Ambrose, Vol. 2, p. 57,

19. Congressional Record, August 31, 1960, Vol. 106, p. 18785.

20. Michel Sturdza, Betrayal by Rulers (Belmont, Mass.: Western Islands,
1976), pp. 218.

21. New York Times, February 24, 1957, p. 34,

22. New York Times, September 26, 1979, p. A24.

23. Earl E. T. Smith, The Fourth Floor (New York: Random House,
1962), pp. 169-74.

230

Footnotes

24. Schlesinger, p. 128.

25. Ibid.

26. Lukas, p. 126.

27. Halberstam, p. 60.

28. Mario Lazo, Dagger in the Heart: American Policy Failures in Cuba
(New York: Twin Circle, 1968), p. 271.

29. Ibid, p. 289.

30. Ibid., p. 298.

31. Ibid., p. 372.

32. Isaacson arid Thomas, p. 630.

Chapter 8- The Establishment's War in Vietnam

1. Shulzinger, p. 45.

2. New York Times, March 2, 1966, p, 40.

3. James E. King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War," FA y January
1957, p. 256.

4. Science & Mechanics, March 1968, pp. 90-91.

5. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe," FA t
July 1961, p. 645.

6. April 1968 issue.

7. Allen, None Dare, p. 102.

8. See articles by Wallis W. Wood, "Vietnam: While Brave Men Die,"
American Opinion, June 1967; "It's Treason!: Aid and Comfort to the
Vietcong," American Opinion, May 1968.

9. James Kunen, The Strawberry Statement; Notes of a College Revolu-
tionary (New York: Random House, 1969), p, 112.

10. Walt Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York:
Harper & Brothers, I960), p. 549.

11. M. Stanton Evans, The Politics of Surrender (New York: Devin-Adair,
1966), p. 340.

12. Isaacson and Thomas, p. 710,

13. Frank L. Kluckhohn, Lyndon's Legacy: A Candid Look at the Presi-
dent's Policymakers (New York: Devin-Adair, 1964), p. 112.

14. Moskin, p. 157.

15. Felix Wittmer, "Freedom's Case Against Dean Acheson," American
Mercury, April 1952, p. 11.

16. Ibid., p. 7.

231

The Shadows of Power

17. Ibid.

18. Isaacson and Thomas, p. 716.

19. Ibid., p. 652.

20. Ibid,, p, 653.

21. Halberstam, p. 403.

22. Isaacson and Thomas „ p. 660.

23. Ibid, p. 653,

24. Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York: David
McKay, 1969), p. 216.

25. Isaacson and Thomas, pp. 700-701,

26. Hoopes, p. 217.

27. Lloyd C. Gardner, ed., American Foreign Policy: Present to Past (New
York: The Free Press, 1974), p. 30.

28. "You've A Right To Know/* circular of Congressman John R. Rarick,
July 15, 1971.

Chapter 9* The Unknown Nixon

L William Costello, The Facts About Nixon (New York: Viking, 1960),
p. 51.

2. See Allen, Richard Nixon , pp. 140-42.

3. Newsletter of Congressman John G. Schmitz, October 18, 1972. See
also Congressional Record, July 9 T 1947, Vol. 93, p. 8567.

4. Barry Goldwater, With No Apologies (New York: William Morrow,
1979), p. 279.

5. Theodore White, The Making of the President, 1960 (New York: Athe-
neum, 1961), p. 199.

6. Roosevelt, p. 6.

7. Allen, Richard Nixon, p. 217.

8. Ibid., p. 223,

9. Richard Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," FA, October 1967, p. 113.

10. Shoup and Minter, p. 5.

11. Moskin, p. 156.

12. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979),
p. 4.

13. U.S. News & World Report, November 1, 1971, p. 26.

14. Silk and Silk, p. 207.

232

Footnotes

15. Roscoe and Geoffrey Drummond, "President Proves Himself To Be A
Liberal-Iii- Action/' Indianapolis News, January 22, 1969, p. 17,

16. Washington Star, January 21, 1970, quoted in Allen, Richard Nixon,
p. 14.

17. New York Times, January 31, 1971, p. E13.

18. John Kenneth Galhraith, "Richard Nixon and the Great Socialist Re-
vival/ 1 New York, September 21, 1970, p. 25.

19. Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams (New York: Arbor House, 1985),
p. 167.

Chapter 10. Carter and Trilateral ism

1. Christopher Lydon, "Jimmy Carter Revealed: He's a Rockefeller Re-
publican/' Atlantic Monthly, July 1977, p. 52.

2. Gary Allen, "They're Catching On/' American Opinion, November
1977, p. 4.

3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America and Europe/' FA, October 1970, p. 29.

4. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages (New York: Viking, 1970),
p. iz.

5. David Rockefeller, "Foolish Attacks on False Issues/' Wall Street Jour-
nal, April 30, 1980 t p. 26.

6 S Jeremiah Novak, "The Trilateral Connection: Meet the President's Tu-
tors in Foreign Policy," Atlantic Monthly f July 1977, p. 59.

7. Goldwater, p. 280.

8. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search For Focus," FA t
July 1973, p. 723.

9. Gary Allen, Jimmy Carter, Jimmy Carter (Seal Beach, Calif.: '76 Press,
1976), p, 69.

10. Victor Lasky, Jimmy Carter: The Man and the Myth, (New York:
Richard Marek, 1979), p. 160.

11. Goldwater, p. 286.

12. Allen, Jimmy Carter, p. 139.

13. Los Angeles Times, June 24, 1976, Part I, p. 12.

14. Robert C. Turner, I'll Never Lie to You: Jimmy Carter in his Own
Words (New York: Ballantine Books, 1976), p. 48.

15. Lasky, p. 161; Isaacson and Thomas, p. 726.

16. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National
Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983),
p. 289.

233

The Shadows of Power

17. Lasky, p, 160.

18. Isaacson and Thomas, p. 726.

19. Moskin, p. 210.

20. Walter Mood ale, "Beyond Detente: Toward International Economic
Security," FA t October 1974, p. 7.

21. Carl Gershman, 'The Rise & Fall of the New Foreign-Policy Estab-
lishment," Commentary, July 1980, p. 20,

22- William M, LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another
Cuba?," FA, Autumn 1979, p. 44.

23. The Review Of The News, December 28, 1977, p. 59.

24. See, for example, Martin B. Travis and James T. Watkins, "Control of
the Panama Canal: An Obsolete Shibboleth," FA, July 1959, or Stephen
& Rosenfeld, "The Panama Negotiations — A Close-Run Thing," FA,
October 1975.

25. Jerome Alan Cohen, "Recognizing China," FA, October 1971, p. 30.

26. David Nelson Rowe, U.S. China Policy Today (Washington, D.C: Uni-
versity Professors for Academic Order, 1979), pp. 27-28*

27. David Nelson Rowe, The Carter China Policy: Results and Prospects
(1980), p, 16.

28. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York:
Bantam, 1982), p, 256.

Chapter 11. A Second Look at Ronald Reagan

L Carey McWilliams,, "Establishment Picks Reagan to Run — and Rule,"
Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1980, Part II, p, 7.

2. Robert Scheer, 'The Reagan Question," Playboy, August 1980,
pp.240, 242.

3. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Testing the Hard Line," and Andrew Knight,
"Ronald Reagan's Watershed Year?," FA, America and the World 19S2.

4. New York Times, April 19, 1985, p. A6.

5. Newsweek, January 23, 1984, p. 49.

6. William F. Jasper, "Ronald Reagan," The New American, July 28,
1986, p. 32.

7; Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1984, p. 2.

8. Rowe, The Carter China Policy , p. 10.

9. Robert A, Manning, "The Philippines in Crisis," FA, Winter 1984/85,
p. 410.

234

Footnotes

10. The New American, January 19, 1987, p. 3.

11. William Safire, "Derailing Day One/" New York Times, March 24,
1988, p. A35.

12. Boston Globe, March 21, 1988, p. 9.

13. Washington Star, December 1, 1971, quoted in Allen, None Dare,
p. 125.

14. William G. Hytand, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Long Road Back," FA,
America and the World 1981, p. 548.

Chapter 12. The Media Blackout

1. Congressional Record, February 9, 1917, Volume 54, pp. 2947^48.

2. Charles Beard, "Who's to Write the History of the War?," Saturday
Evening Post, October 4 t 1947, p. 172.

3. Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell,
Idaho: Caxton, 1953), pp. 15-16, IS.

4. Gary Allen, "Control of the Media," American Opinion, May 1983,
p, 96.

5. S. Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda S. Lichter, The Media
Elite (Bethesda, Maryland: Adler & Adler, 1986), pp, 29-30.

6. Reed Irvine, "How the Media Cheat," Conservative Digest, September
1986, p. 66.

7. Ernest W. Lefever, TV and National Defense (Boston, Va.: Institute for
American Strategy Press, 1974), p. 193,

8. Norodom Sihanouk, 'The Future of Cambodia,' 1 FA, October 1970,
p, 10,

9- Interview with Reed Irvine, The Review Of The News, January 24,
1979, p. 35.

10. AIM Report, December-B, 1986.

11. AIM Report, October-A, 1986.

12. The Review Of The News, July 31, 1985, pp. 37, 39.

13. Anastasio Somoza, with Jack Cox, Nicaragua Betrayed (Belmont,
Mass.: Western Islands, 1980), pp. 205-7.

Chapter 13- The CFR Today

1. Schlafiy and Ward, p, 150,

2. Roosevelt, p. 6.

3. Moskin, p. 210.

235

The Shadows of Power

4. John Rees, "The Council is Watching," American Opinion, January
1984, p. 23.

5. Halberstam, p, 44.
ft Ibid., pp. 183, 185.

7. Ibid,, p. 482,

8. Shulzinger, p. xi.

9. Isaacson and Thomas, p. 336.

10. Ibid,, p. 337.

11. CFR, Annual Report* 1985-86, p. 10.

12. Ibid, p. 86.

13. CFR, Annual Report, 1986-87, p. 13.

14. Count Hugo Lerchenfeld, "Dawn* FA, September 1924, p. 122.

Chapter 14. On the Threshold of a New World Order?

1. Christian Science Monitor, April 26, 1984, p. 27.

2. This Constitution (a quarterly published by Project *87), Winter 1985,
rear cover.

3. James MacGregor Burns, The Power to Lead (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1984), p. 189.

4. Donald L. Robinson, ed,, Reforming American Government: The Bicen-
tennial Papers of the Committee on the Constitutional System (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), p. 149.

5. See Robert L. Preston, The Plot to Replace the Constitution (Salt Lake
City: Hawkes Publishing, 1972).

6. Robinson, p, 162.

7. Brzezinski, Between Two Ages, p. 258.

8. Utley, p. 213.

9. Alan Stang, "Foundations Pay the Way,* American Opinion, January
1977, p. 41.

10. Facts on File, 1987, p. 123.

Chapter 15, Solutions and Hope

1. Shulzinger, p. 61,

2. The Review Of The News, September 14, 1983, p. 31.

3. Jeffrey St. John, Day of the Cobra (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1984),
p. 73.

4. Ibid. T p. 208.

236

Footnotes

5, "Propaganda and the Alert Citizen," Soviet Total War; Historic Mission
of Violence and Deceit, Vol. 1, published by the House Committee on Un-
American Activities, September 23, 1956, p, 347, quoted in G. Edward
Griffin, This is the John Birch Society (Thousand Oaks, Calif,: American
Media, 1972), p. 51.

237

INDEX

ABC, 183, 185

Accuracy in Media (AIM), 183, 185

Acheson, Dean, 81, 83, 90, 93, 94,

106, 110, 114,129-33, 195
Actor, The, 104
Adams, Sherman, 107
Admiral KimmeVs Story, 75
Aeroflot, 13

Afghanistan, 173-74, 185-86, 190
Agnew, Spiro, 146, 148, 151
Agricultural Adjustment

Administration (AAA), 58,

60
Aldrich, Nelson, 22-23, 25, 33
Allen, Frederick Lewis, 21
Allen, Gary, 19, 144, 148-49, 151,

214
Ambrose, Stephen, 101, 105, 106
Amerasia, 88
America Is in Danger, 113
American I. G,, 48
American League to Aid and

Cooperate with Russia, 41
American Legion, 126, 211
American Mercury, 126
American Opinion, 216
American Public Opinion and

Postwar Security

Commitments, 11
American -Russian Chamber of

Commerce, 43
America's Retreat From Victory,

107
America's Unelected Rulers; The

Council on Foreign

Relations, 126
Amin, Haiizullah, 185
Anderson, Dillon, 116
Anderson, Robert, 104
Andropov, Yuri, 214
Angola, 173
Aquino, Benigno, 173
Aquino, Corazon, 173, 212
Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, 64, 75,

79, 84, 129, 145
Associated Press, 183
Atlantic, 154, 155, 202
Atlantic Council, 85
Atlantic Union, 85, 95-96, 104, 154

Baker, James, 168

Baker, Ray Stannard, 31

Baldrige, Malcolm, 169

Ball, George, 111, 133, 146, 157

Baltic States, 69, 70

Bank of the United States, 20^21

Bao Dai, 120

Barnes, Harry Elmer, 75, 179, 180-

81, 188
Bamet, Richard, 9
Barr, Robert, 41
Barron*s, 74
Baruch, Bernard, 21, 27, 29, 32,

57, 59, 62, 63, 102, 116, 182
Batista, Fulgencio t 108-109
Bay of Pigs invasion, 112-13, 119,

125
Beam, Jacob, 146
Beard, Charles, 170-80, 188
Belmont, August, 181
Benes, Eduard, 84
Best and the Brightest, The, 6, 110,

194
Betrayal by Rulers, 108
Betrayers, The, 128
Between Two Ages, 154, 203
Birch, John, 215-16
Bissell, Richard, 112
Blumenthal, W. Michael, 159
Bohlen, Charles, 81, 83, 106
Bowie, Robert, 157
Bowles, Chester, 143
Bowman, Isaiah, 71, 78
Bradshaw, Thornton, 183
Bretton Woods Conference, 72-74
Brezhnev, Leonid, 152, 163, 166
Bricker Amendment, 105
Brmkley, David, 183

239

Brock, William, 169

Brookings Institution* 5

Brown, Harold, 159

Brown Brothers, Harriman . 167

Bryan, William, 56

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 123, 1 54-58 ,

164,203,204,209
Budenz, Louis, 205
Bullitt, William ?i 71
Bundy, McGeorge, 103, 111, 112,

129, 139, 145, 194
Bundy, William, 129, 132, 136,

139, 167, 175, 194
Bunker, Ellsworth, 127
Burdick, Usher, 61
Burger, Warren, 199, 209
Burke, Arleigh, 113
Burnham, James, 93
Burns, Arthur, 146
Burns, James MacGregor, 199-200,

202
Bush, George, 167*68, 176, 187

Caldwell, Taylor, 110
Calero, Adolfo, 175
Calif ano, Joseph, 159
Callaway, Oscar, 178
Galley, William, 134
Camhodia, 163, 184-85, 190
Campbell, John Franklin, 37, 144
capitalism, alignment with

Communism of, 29, 42-46, 52
Captains and the Kings, 110
Carlucci, Frank, 169
Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 5, 25,

29-30, 104, 159
Carter, Jimmy, 154-67, 170, 171,

172, 173, 182, 187, 201, 204,

207, 211
and the CFR, 157-59
and the Trilateral Commission,
156-59
Casey, William J., 168

Castro, FideJ, 13, IS, 108-109, 112,

118, 125
CBS, 134, 182-83, 184, 185, 197,

217
CBS Foundation, 183
Center for the Study of Democratic

Institutions, 201
central hanks and central banking,

19-25, 29, 72-74
Century Group, 66
Chadbourne, Thomas, 41
Chamberlin, William Henry, 180
Chancellor, John, 183
Chase Bank, 43
Chase Manhattan Bank, 5, 43, 73,

104, 123, 155
Chayes, Ahram, 157
Cheng Kai-nun, 96
Chennault, Claire, 215
Chesterton, A. K, 72
Chiang Kai-shek, 87-88, 99, 207
Chicago Tribune, 123
China, fall to Communism of, 8fi-

89, 96-97, 207
China, People's Republic of, 88, 90,

91-92, 97, 144, 148, 161-63,

172-73, 207
China, Republic of (Taiwan), 88,

91, 162-63, 172-73, 207
Chou En-lai, 96, 97
Christian Science Monitor, 7, 156,

199
Christopher, Warren, 159
Chu Teh, 96
Churchill, Winston, 31, 52, 57, 65,

84
Citizens 1 Committee for the

Marshall Plan, 83
Clark, Mark, 92
Cleveland, Harlan, 146
coalition governments, 205
Coffin, Charles, 41
Cohen, Jerome Alan, 162
Commager, Henry Steele, 180

240

Commentary, 159

Commission on the Bicentennial of

the Constitution, 199
Committee on the Constitutional

System (CCS), 200-202
Committees on Foreign Relations,

7
Common Market, 85
Communism, 68-71, 83-84, 125-26,
212, 216, 220
alignment with capitalism of, 29,

42-46, 52
and the CFR, 12-15, 38-42, 84,

205-206
see also China, fall to

Communism of; Korean
War; Vietnam War;
specific Communist
countries
Communist Manifesto, 29
Confessions of a Monopolist, 44
Congressional Record, 122, 178
Coningsby, or the New Generation,

3
Constitution, U.S., 44, 218-219
endangered by reform

movement, 199-204
constitutional convention, 201-204
"containment," 84, 92-93, 101
Contras, 175

Coolidge, Archibald Cary, 42
Coolidge, Calvin, 53
Cooper, Richard R, 73, 157, 159,

203
Costello, William, 141
Council of Europe, 82
Council on Foreign Relations,
passim
and Bretton Woods Conference,

72-73
and Jimmy Carter, 157*59
and Communism, 12-15, 38-42,

84, 205-206
current trends of, 191-97

delegation's visit to USSR (1987),

13, 206
description in general, 6-7
and Eisenhower, 102-104
and German reparations, 46
globalism of, 10-12, 14-15, 37,
71-72 3 84-86, 106, 192,
205-206
influence on U,S. foreign policy,
7-10, 15, 191-92
see also specific foreign
policy topics
and John F. Kennedy, 109-11
and Korean War, 90, 92-93
and Marshall Plan, 82-84
and mass media, 181-83
mass media silence concerning,

15, 178
and J. P. Morgan, 38, 49, 50
and NATO, 84-86
and Richard Nixon, 143-46
origins, 36-38
partiality of, 9-10
and Ronald Reagan, 168-69
and Franklin D. Roosevelt, 54-

55, 60-61
as source of staffing for U.S.
government, 7-8, 60-61,
77, 104, 110-111, 145-46,
158-59, 168-69
and United Nations, 65, 71-72,

79-80
and Vietnam War, 120, 127, 129,

131, 133-35
and World War II, 63-75
Courtney, Kent, 126
Courtney, Phoebe, 126
Cowen, Tyler, 82
Crash of 1929, 55-58, 62
Cravath, Paul, 38, 41, 50
Cronkite, Walter, 197
Crown of St. Stephen, 163
Cuba, 108-109, 111-14
Cuban Missile Crisis, 113-14

241

Cultural Revolution, 148
Currie, Lauchlin, 106, 130
Cutler, Lloyd N., 201,209
Czarism and the Revolution, 39

Daily Worker, 205
Dall, Curtis, 55, 56, 63
Daniel, book of, 220
D'Aubuisson, Roberto, 172
Daughters of the American

Revolution, 126
Davis, John W., 38, 49, 51, 158
Davis, Norman PL, 60, 71
Davison, Henry, 41, 45
Dawes, Charles, 46
Dawes Plan, 46-47, 51, 69
Day of the Cobra, 214
de Borchgrave, Arnaud, 193
de Goulevitch, Arsene, 39
Death of James Forrestal, The, 98
Debs, Eugene, 127
Declaration of INTERdependence,

204
Delano, Frederic, 34, 53
Devin- Adair Company, 180
Diem, Ngo Dinh, 120
Dies, Martin, 67

DOlon, Douglas, 104, 111, 200, 202
Disraeli, Benjamin, 3
Dobrynin, Anatoly, 129
Dodd, Norman, 205
Dodge, Cleveland, 27, 29
Donovan, Hedley, 159, 182, 189
Downie, Leonard, Jr., 182
Drummey, James J., 107
Drummond, Roscoe* 146
Dryfoos, Orville E., 181
Duarte, Jose Napoleon, 172
Ducci, Roberto, 85
Dukakis, Michael, 211
Duke, Angier, 111
Dulles, Allen, 104, 114
Dulles, John Foster, 41, 104, 116,

121

Eaker, Ira C, 122

Eastern Europe, 70, 107-108, 205

Eaton, Cyrus, Jr., 43

Eccles, Mariner, 73

Economic Cooperation

Administration (EGA), 82

Ehrlichman, John, 148

Eisenhower, Dwight, 10MQ9, 115-
16,141, 142, 146,157, 170,
207, 215
and the CFR, 102-104

El Salvador, 172

Engels, Friedrieh, 44

Epstein, Julius, 71

Esquire, 6, 15

Establishment, 4^6, 12, 14, 15, 26,
37, 95, 98, 101-104, 106,
109-10, 123, 125-27, 130,
141-44, 167-68, 175, 176,
178, 179, 181, 187 p 191, 193,
195, 214, 216

Estonia, 69

European Parliament, 85

Export-Import Bank, 45, 59, 173

Facts About Nixon, The, 141

Facts on File, 206

Fairlie, Henry, 4

Farben, LG., Co., 47-48, 51, 59

Fay, Sidney, 179

FDR: My Exploited Father-in-law,

55
Federal Reserve, 22-26, 28, 34, 55,

57
Feighan, Michael, 107
FeiB, Herbert, 180
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt, 106
Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, The,

75
Finland, 69
Firestone, Harvey, 182
Flying Tigers, 215
Flynn, John T>, 180
Ford, Gerald, 25, 149, 161, 168, 207

242

Ford Foundation, 5, 129, 201, 205

Foreign Affairs, 6, 8-14, 16, 17, 37,
41, 42, 46, 54, 58, 60, 64, 65,
66, 72, 73, 75, 83-86, 87, 92-
93, 102, 103-105, 110, 111,
121, 123, 129, 142, 144, 145,
154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 161,
167, 169, 173, 175, 184, 192,
197,201,203,205

Foreign Policy , 159

Formosa, see China, Republic of

Forrestal, Henry, 98

Forrestal, James, 98

Fortune, 182

foundations, 5, 26, 88, 105-106,
157, 205

Foundations: Their Power and
Influence, 106

Fowler, Henry, 111

Fox, Victor J,, 126

Frankel, Max, 181

Frankey, William, 17

Frankfurter, Felix, 3, 130

Franklin, George, 154

From Major Jordan's Diaries, 70

Gaither, ft Rowan, 205, 209
Galbraith, John Kenneth, 6, 57,

111, 147
Gardner, Richard R, 11, 17, 157,

192
Gay, Edwin F., 51
Gelb, Leslie, 181-82
Genesis of the World War, 179
Germany, reparations and rise of

Nazis in, 46-48
Gershman, Carl, 159
Gillette, Guy, 67, 75
Gilpatric, Roswell, 111
glasnost, 206
globalism, 218-221
of the CFR, 10-12, 14-15, 37, 71^
72, 84-86, 106, 192, 205^
206

see also world government
Goidwater, Barry, 126, 131, 138,

143, 155, 156, 164, 184
Goodnow, Frank, 41
Goodp aster, Andrew, 136
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 13, 174, 177,

206, 215
Gould, Jay, 45
Graham, Katharine, 182
Grand Alliance, The, 65
Gray, Gordon, 104
Great Crash, 1929, The, 57
Great Depression, 23, 57-58
Greenfield, James L., 182
Greenfield, Meg, 182
Greenspan, Alan, 169
Grew, Joseph, 67
Grey, Edward, 30
Griffin, G, Edward, 217
Groton School, 5, 53, 130
Grunwald, Henry, 182

Hagedorn, Hermann, 40
Haig, Alexander, 169, 176
Halberstam, David, 6, 7, 93, 110,

125, 132, 194, 195
Haldeman, Robert, 148
"Hard Road to World Order, The,"

11, 192
Harding, Warren, 53
Harkins, Paul, 194
Harper's, 7, 9, 102
Harper's Weekly, 27
Harriman, Averell, 41-42, 52, 81,

83, 111, 129, 131, 132, 136,

157, 167, 182
Harriman, E. Roland, 182
Harriman, Henry L, 60
Harsch, Joseph C,, 156
Hartley, Fred, 115
Hays, Wayne, 106
Heller, Walter, 170
Helms, Jesse, 14, 18, 74
Helms, Richard, 136

243

Henry Regnery Company, 180

Herter, Christian, 104, 142

Hiss, Alger, 70, 71-72, 80, 104, 106,

125, 129, 130, 142
Hiss, Donald, 130
historical blackout, 179-81
History of the Great American

Fortunes, 20
History of the World (Ridpath), 215
Hitler, Adolph, 31, 47, 51, 69, 218
Hoffinan, Paul, 107
Hoge, Warren, 182
Holbrooke, Richard, 159
Hoopes, Townsend, 134
Hoover, Herbert, 57-58, 59*60
Hoover, J. Edgar, 67, 126, 138
Hopkins, Harry, 65, 70, 78
House, Edward M, 27-32, 35, 36,

37, 39, 60 t 113 f 179
Howe, Frederick C, t 44-45
Hull, Cordell, 71
Human Events, 103
Humphrey, Hubert, 141
Hungary, 107-108, 117, 163
Huyser, Robert, 161
Hylan, John K, 3
Hyland, William G„ 175, 192

Imperial Brain Trust , 82, 145
In Love & War, 121
income tax, 25-26, 29
Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its

Aftermath, 67, 75
informal Agenda Group, 71
Information Digest, 193
Inquiry, the, 32, 38, 71, 113
Institute of American Strategy, 184
Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR),

87-88, 106
international bankers, 3, 19-25, 46-

47, 56-58, 61, 73-74, 141,

202
International Court of Justice, 11
International Monetary Fund

(IMF), 72-74, 155, 160
Interstate Commerce Commission,

45
Invisible Government, The, 126
Iran, 161

Irvine, Reed, 183, 185, 188
Isaacson, Walter, 81, 83, 131, 132,

195
Izvestia 7 214

Jackson, Andrew, 4, 20-21
Japan, and U.S. entry into World

War II, 66-68
Jasper, William R, 171
Jefferson, Thomas, 208
Jekyll Island meeting, 22-23, 24, 33
Jenner, William, 4
Jessup, Philip, 106
Jimmy Carter: The Man and the

Myth, 158
John Birch Society, The, 126, 195,

214-18
Johnson, Hugh, 57, 59, 63
Johnson, Lyndon B., 121, 123-24,

127, 131-34, 136, 140, 141,

146-47, 170, 175, 184, 207
Jordan, George Racey, 70, 78
Jordan, Hamilton, 158, 164

Kalb, Marvin, 183

Kama River truck factory, 43, 169

Kate, Milton, 157

Katzenbach, Nicholas, 136

Keeping Faith, 161

Kelly, Petra, 13

Keng Piao, 161

Kennan, George, 81, 83-84, 92, 93,

95, 197, 198, 202
Kennedy, David, 146
Kennedy, John F., 88-89, 109-14,

118, 119, 125, 126, 130, 142,

145, 194, 207
and the CFR, 109-11
Kennedy, Joseph P., 57, 109-10

244

Kennedy, Robert F., 134
Kennedy, 112
Kent, Tyler, 65
Kenworthy, Joseph, 31
Kerensky, ALeksandr, 40
Keynes, John Maynard, 73 t 147
Khmer Rouge, 184
Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 161
Khrushchev, Nikita, 12, 14, 52,

113, 123, 125, 137
Kim n Sung, 89-90
Kimmel, Husband, 68, 75, 76
King, James E-, Jr., 121
Kirstein, Louis, 59
Kissinger, Henry, 94, 145^46, 148,

149, 150, 153, 158, 169
Koppel, Ted, 183
Korea, 163, 213

see also Korean War
Korea: A Study of United States

Policy in the United Nations ,

92
Korean Airlines flight 007, 213-15
Korean War, 89-93, 99, 122
Kotikov, A. N,, 78
Kraft, Joseph, 7, 9, 102
Kuhn, Loeb and Company, 21, 27,

39, 50, 181, 183
Kunen, James, 126
Kurile Islands, 70
Kuznetsov, Vasily, 114

Laird, Melvin, 146
Lake, Anthony, 157
Lament, Thomas, 41, 49, 182
Lane, Arthur Bliss, 130
Lane, Franklin K,, 28
Lange, Oskar, 13
Langer, William, 180
Lasky, Victor, 158
Lattimore, Owen, 106
Latvia, 69

League of Nations, 29, 31-32, 36,
37,54,71,85

Lee, Ivy, 41, 48
Lee, John M., 182
Leffingwell, Russell, 38, 49
LeMay, Curtis, 113
lend-lease, 70
Lenin, V. L, 13, 38
LeoGrande, William M., 161
Lerchenfeld, Hugo, 197
Levine, Irving R., 183
Lichter, Robert, 183
Lie, Trygve, 80, 91
Life, 21,84, 182
"limited war," 91-92, 99, 121*23,

175
Lin Piao, 92, 99
Lindbergh, Charles A,, Sr, 22, 23,

24-25,33,55
Lippmann, Walter, 113
Lithuania, 69
Lloyd George, David, 47
Locarno, 84

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 127
Loeb, Solomon, 21
Lomonossoff, George, 41
London Sunday Times, 156
Lord, Winston, 169, 193, 198
Los Angeles Times, 74, 157, 168,

170, 183, 184
Lovett, Robert, 81, 83, 85, 95, 110,

114, 118, 119, 131, 132, 167,

195
Luce, Henry, 182
Lukas, Anthony, 8, 106, 111, 144
Lusitania, 30-31, 35, 64
Lusitania, The (book), 31
Lydon, Christopher, 154
Lynn, James, 146

MacArthur, Douglas, 90-93, 99,

100, 101, 102, 142
McCarran, Pat, 72
McCarthy, Eugene, 134
McCarthy, Joseph, 84, 106-107,

125

245

McCloy, John, 8, 14, 81, 83, 94,

104, 110, 111, 114, 127, 131,

132, 168, 195
McCone, John, 111
McCracken, Paul, 146
McDonald, Kathryn, 222
McDonald, Lawrence P., 213-15,

217, 222
McDonald, Tryggvi, 222
McFadden, Louis, 23, 56
McFarlane, Robert, 169
McGovern, George, 184
McNamara, Robert, 119, 128-29,

139, 194
McWilliams, Carey, 168
Madison, James, 218
Magid, Jack, 60
Making of the President, I960, The,

143
Mallory, Walter, 64
Man Called Intrepid* A, 65
Manchuria, 87
Mao Tse-tung, 87-88, 96, 130, 152,

162, 167, 207
Marcos, Ferdinand, 173
Markel, Lester, 181
Marshall, George C, 67-68, 81-83,

87, 91, 95-96, 97, 101, 107,

111, 207
Marshall Plan, 81-84, 85, 86, 88,

95, 142
Marshall Plan, The, 84
Martens, Ludwig, 42
Martin, Joseph, 100
Marx, Karl, 29, 44
mass media, 178-90
"massive retaliation, 1 ' 121
Masters of Deceit , 126
Matthews, Herbert L., 108-109,

181
Mee, Charles L., 84
Mend es- France, Pierre, 84
Messersmith, George, 64, 210
Mete, Herman A., 48

Meyer, Eugene, 182
Mezes, Sidney, 32
Mihailovich, Draja, 70
Mikoyan, Anastas L, 13
Minter, William, 82, 145
Mitchell, Charles E., 48
Mitchell, John, 144, 151
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlevi, see

Shah of Iran
Mondale, Walter, 158, 171, 175
Money, 182
Money Trust, 22, 34
monopolism, 44-46
Morgan, J. P. (elder), 21, 22, 27,

33, 44, 181
Morgan, J, P, (younger), 25, 29, 38,

40, 43, 46, 49, 50, 61, 178
Morgenstern, George, 75
Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., 58
Mo risen, Samuel, 180
Morrow, Dwight, 182
Moskin, J. Robert, 8, 9, 129, 145,

158, 193
Mozambique, 173
Mugabe, Robert, 13, 163
Mujahideen, 174
Muller, Henry, 182
Mussolini, Benito, 60
Myers, Gustavus, 20

Naked Capitalist, The, 144
National City Bank, 22, 27, 47, 48
National Recovery Administration

(NRA), 59-60, 63
NATO, 84-86, 93, 102, 169
Nazi Germany, assistance by U.S.

bankers to, 47-48
Nazis, labeling by Communists of

opponents as, 216
NBC, 183, 185
New American, The, 67, 107, 171,

216
New Deal, 58-60
New Freedom, The r 26

246

New York, 37, 144, 147

New York Journal-American, 39

New York Sun, 98

New York Times, 8, 9 t 13, 15, 42,

43, 102, 106, 108, 109, 111,

120, 124, 126, 133, 144, 145,

167, 169, 174, 181-82, 183,

185, 190
New York Times Book Review, 180
Newsweek, 6, 126, 157, 171, 182,

183
Nicaragua, 160-61, 175, 186^87
Nicaragua Betrayed, 160, 165, 186-

87
Nicholas O, Czar, 39
Nikezic, Marko, 13
Nitze, Paul, 111
Nixon, Richard M., 94, 104, 115,

122, 130, 141-50, 152 t 170,

175, 184 T 207
and the CFR, 143-46
None Dare Call It Conspiracy, 19,

144, 151, 154
Notter, Harley, 64
Novak, Jeremiah, 155
nuclear deterrent forces of the

United States (1988), 171-72
Nuremburg war crimes trials, 48

OAS, 85, 160
OAU, 85

Ochs, Alfred, 181

One World, 61

Operation Keelhaul, 102

Operation Keelhaul (book), 71

Origins of the World War, 179

Ortega, Daniel, 13, 18, 165

OSS, 183

Oudin, Maurice, 41

Out of Debt, Out of Danger, 141

Owen, Henry, 157, 159

Paley, William 8., 182
Panama Canal, 161

Panic of 1907, 21-22

Paris Peace Conference, 29, 31-32,

36, 46, 104
Parker, Maynard, 182
Parker, Richard, 170
Pastora, Eden, 175
Pasvolsky, Leo, 71
PBS, 183

Pearl Harbor, 67-68, 75-76
Pearl Harbor (book), 75
Pecora hearings, 25
Pendergast machine, 81
Pentagon Papers, 129, 134
Penthouse, 157
People, 156, 182
People's World, 216
Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace,

75
Peterson, Peter G., 146, 193, 196,

198, 202
Philip Dru: Administrator, 28-29, 39
Philippines, 173
Pitt, William, 3
Playboy, 168

Podhoretz, Norman, 193 /
Poi Pot, 163

Poland, 69, 70, 130, 172
Politician, The, 101
Portillo, Lopez, 160
Posner, Vladimir, 206
Power to Lead, The, 200
Pratt, Mrs. Harold, 169
Pratt House, 6, 13, 16, 72, 169, 196
Pravda, 214, 216
Pringle, Peter, 156
Project '87, 199

Quigley, Carroll, 20, 38, 46, 191

Rand Corporation, 5
Ranneft, Johan, 68
Rarick, John, 73, 134, 138
Raskob, John, 54
Rather, Dan, 183, 186-87, 189

247

RCA, 183

Reader's Digest, 84

Reagan, Ronald, 13, 157, 167-77,

202,207,211
and the CFR, 168-69
Reason, 82
Red Cross mission to Petrograd,

40-41, 50
Reece Committee, 105-106, 117,

205
Rees, John, 193
Reforming American Government:

The Bicentennial Papers of

the Committee on the

Constitutional System, 200,

201, 202
Regan, Donald, 169, 176
regional alliances, 84-86
Reischauer, Edwin Ov, 157
RENAMO, 173
repatriation of Soviet nationals

after World War % 71, 102
Republican Party, 53, 57-58, 61,

101-102, 143
Reston, James, 147
Revelation, book of, 201
Review Of The News, The, 185, 213
Rhodesia, 163
Richardson, Elliot, 146
Richardson, J. G., 68
Ridgway, Matthew, 93
Roberts, Owen, 68
Roberts Commission, G8> 77
Robertson, Pat, 211
Rockefeller, David, 43, 82, 123,

129, 137, 146, 154-58, 167,

168, 103, 196, 198, 200, 210
Rockefeller, Edwin, 167
Rockefeller, Godfrey, 167
Rockefeller, Helen, 167
Rockefeller, John D., Jr., 22, 72
Rockefeller, John D., Sr. T 21, 22,

33, 44, 57
Rockefeller, John D., Ill, 80

Rockefeller, Laurence, 167
Rockefeller, Mary, 167
Rockefeller, Nelson, 22, 25, 52,

104, 142-46, 148*50, 158
Rockefeller family, 29, 43, 48, 104,

145, 214
Rockefeller File, The, 148, 214
Rockefeller Foundation, 5, 25, 64,

104, 110, 143, 179-80
Rogers, William P., 8
Romania, 69, 129
Roosevelt, Anna, 101
Roosevelt, Edith Kermit, 5, 14, 18,

143, 193
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4, 39, 53-

72, 81, 86-87, 110, 179, 180,

207,211
and the CFR, 54-55, 60-61
Roosevelt, Theodore, 27
Root, Elihu, 51
Roper, Elmo, 85
Rosenfeld, Stephen S., 182
Rosenthal, Jack, 181
Rostow, Eugene, 127
Rostow, Walt, 111, 127-28, 136,

138
Rothman, Stanley, 183
Rothschild, Meyer Amachel, 19
Rothschild family, 19-21
Round Table, 36, 38
Rove re, Richard, 6
Royal Institute of International

Affairs, 36
"rules of engagement" in Vietnam,

122-23
Rusk, Dean, 110-111, 112, 113,

119, 136
Russian Revolution, 38*40

Safire, William, 174

St. John, Jeffrey, 213

St Stephen, Crown of, 163

Sakhalin Island, 70
Salisbury, Harrison, 181

248

Salt II Treaty, 171, 201

Sandinistas, 160-61, 175

Sarnofr, David, 183

SarnofF, Robert, 183

Saturday Evening Post, 22, 179

Savimbi, Jonas, 173

Sawhill, John, 159

Scheer, Robert, 168

Setoff, Jacob, 21, 22, 27, 34, 39-40,

50, 1 SI, 183
Scruff, John, 39
Setoff, Mortimer, 40
Schlafly, Phyllis, 9 S 128
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 6, 109-10,

111, 113,132, 180,191
Science <fe Mechanics, 132
Scott, John, 69
SDS, 117
SEATO, 8& t 121
Senate Committee on the

Judiciary, 88
Service, John Stewart, 130
Seymour, Charles, 28, 31
Shah of Iran, 161, 165
Shams, Abdul, 185-86
Sheehy, Maurice, 98
Shell, Joe, 143
Sherwood, Robert, 65
Short, Walter C, 68, 76
Shoup, Laurence, 82, 145
Shultz, George, 146, 169, 176, 214
Shulzinger, Robert D., 37, 120,

194-95
Sihanouk, Norodom, 184
Simpson, Colin, 31
Simpson, Cornell, 98
Sixty Minutes, 178, 186-87
Skousen, W. Cleon, 144
Skull and Bones, 5, 167-68, 193
Smith, Arthur D, Howden, 28
Smith, Earl E. T., 109, 118
Smith, Gerard, 146
Smith, Howard K, 147
Smith, Ian, 163

Smith, Richard M., 182
Smoot, Dan, 126, 138
socialism, 43-45, 74, 147-48
Solomon, Anthony M,, 159
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 14, 206
Somoza, Anastasio, 160-61, 165,

186-87
Sorenson, Ted, 112, 123
"Sources of Soviet Conduct, The,"

83-84
South Africa, 185
Soviet Union, 13-14, 38-43, 69-71,

84, 86-87, 89, 90-91, 108-

109, 113-14, 123-24, 130,

135, 147, 174, 175, 205-206,

212, 213-14
Soviet- American Friendship

Society, 130
Spofford, Charles M„ 82
Sports Illustrated, 182
Stalin, Joseph, 52, 69-71, 77, 84,

86, 87, 130, 207
Standard Oil of New Jersey, 43,

48, 59
Standard Oil of New York, 43
State Department, U.S., 5, 64, 88,

107, 109, 111, 130, 167, 174
Stettinus, Edward, 60
Stevenson, Adlai, 103, 112
Stevenson, William, 65
Stimson, Henry, 8, 60, 66-67, 75
stock market crash of 1929, 55-57
StockdaJe, James, 121, 138
Strangest Friendship in History,

The, 28
Straus, Oscar, 41
Strauss, Lewis, 104, 116
Strawberry Statement: Notes of a

College Revolutionary, The,

126
Streit, Clarence, 66
Strong, Benjamin, 24
Study No, 7, Basic Aims of U.S.

Foreign Policy, 11

249

Sturdza, Prince Michel, 108
Sullivan, John, 98
Sulzberger, Arthur Hays, 181
Sulzberger, Arthur Ocha, 181
Sulzberger, C. L., 120
Supreme Court, 25, 60, 199
Sutton, Antony, 39, 45, 48, 50
Swift, Harold, 41
Swinton, John, 181
Swope, Gerard, 59, 60

Tachen Islands, 207
Taft, Robert, 101-103, 115, 142
Taft, William Howard, 27
Taiwan, see China, Republic of
Tansill, Charles, 180
Tarnoff, Peter, 193, 196
Taylor, Maxwell, 127, 133, 136
Taylor, Myron, 71
Teagle, Walter, 59
Teheran Conference, 70
Teng Hsiao-ping s 162, 166
Thacher, Thomas, 41
Theobald, Robert, 75
Thieu, Nguyen Van, 148
Thomas, Evan, 81, 83, 131, 132,

195
Thompson, William Boyce, 40-41,

50
Thorpe, Elliot, 67
Thousand Days, A, 109, 110, 113
Thurow, Lester, 170-71
Time, 7, 157, 182, 183, 211, 217
Tito, Josip Broz, 13, 70, 107-108
Today, 182
Toland, John, 67, 75
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 121, 129
Toward an Atlantic Community,

104
Town <& Country, 8, 129, 193
Tragedy and Hope, 20
Trilateral Commission, 154-59,

164, 167-68, 183, 210, 211
Trotsky, Leon, 12, 13, 39

Truman, Harry, 80-83, 87-94, 98,
100, 101, 102, 105, 110, 125,
131, 141, 207

Truman Doctrine, 83

Trust Company of America, 21

Tugwell, Rexford Guy, 201, 203

Ukrainian genocide, 69

Ungo, Guillermo, 13, 172

Union Now, 66

UNITA, 173

United Nations, 11, 14, 85, 90-91,

93, 142, 192
CFR's involvement in founding,
71*72, 79-80
United States in the World Arena,

The, 127
United States in World Affairs,

The, 87
United States' Unresolved

Monetary and Political

Problems, The, 56
U.S. News & World Report, 146,

183
Utley, Gariek, 183

Valeurs Actuelles, 160

Vance, Cyrus, 136, 157, 158, 164,
169

Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 45

Vanderhp, Frank, 22-23

Versailles Treaty, 31, 32, 46, 179

Viereck, George, 28

Vietnam War, 120-41, 148, 153
restraints on military during,

122-23
role of "the Wise Men," 131-34
U.S. trade with Communist bloc
during, 123-24

Vincent, John Carter, 130

Volcker, Paul, 159

Voorhis, Jerry, 141-42, 151

Waldheim, Kurt, 12

250

Wall Street and FDR, 45
Wall Street and the Bolshevik

Revolution, 39
Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler,

48
Wall Street Journal, 155, 170, 183
Walters, Barbara, 108
War and Peace Studies Project, 64,

67, 72, 210
War Industries Board, 29, 59
Warburg, Felicia Schifif, 183
Warburg, James R, 60-61
Warburg, Paul, 21, 22, 24, 28, 32,

34, 40, 48, 57, 60, 183
Ward, Cheater, 9, 10, 17, 128, 191
Wardwell, Alan, 41
Warlike, Paul, 159
Warren Commission, 114
Washington, George, 30, 218
Washington Post, 40, 127, 182, 183,

185
Watergate, 148-49, 181
Wedemeyer, Albert C, 89
Wedemeyer Reports!, 89
Werjerman, R G. K, 68
Weinberger, Caspar, 169
Welch, Robert, 101, 215-17, 222
Welfare Staters, The, 126
Welles, Sumner, 60, 71
Western Goals Foundation, 214,

215
White, Theodore, 7, 143
White House Years, 145
Whitehead, John C, 169
Wiesner, Jerome, 111
Wiilkie, Wendell, 61, 63, 102, 157
Wilson, Woodrow, 26-32, 34, 35,

39,53,54,65,104,180,211
'"the Wise Men," (advisors to

President Johnson), 131-34
Wise Men, The, 14, 81, 83, 131,

132, 133, 195-96
Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The

History of the Council on

Foreign Relations, The, 37,

194-95
With No Apologies, 155
Witteveen, Johannes, 73
Wool ley, Clarence, 41
World Affairs Council of

Philadelphia, 204
World Bank, 72*74, 128, 160
world government, 10-12, 14-15,

31, 46, 65-66, 84-86, 93, 192,

204-206, 218-21
see also globalism; League of
Nations; United Nations
World War 1, 26, 29-32, 179
World War II, 63-78
Wormser, Rene, 106
Wyman, Thomas EL, 182

Yale University Press, ISO
Yalta Conference, 70-71, 86, 102
Yost, Charles, 146
Young, Owen, 46
Young Plan, 46
Yugoslavia, 70

Zhao Ziyang, 177
Zimbabwe, 163
Zyklon B gas, 47

251

Acknowledgements

I convey my gratitude to Charles Mann for undertaking the pub-
lication of this book, and for the energy he devoted to it; to John
McJVtanus and F. R Duplantier for their editorial advice; and to
Gerald Mazzarella for his encouragement and faith in my work, I
also thank Don Eckelkamp, Joan Manzi, Lance Wilder, Dorothy
Smith, and all others whose hard work and professionalism con-
tributed to the production of The Shadows of Power.

253

About The Author

As a student at Colby College and Boston University during the
latter years of the Vietnam War, James Perloff included himself in
the new generation that had gone radical left — an outlook he voiced
as a school columnist and cartoonist. However, when he probed
America's power structure deeply, he was shocked to learn that he
and his fellow students had moved in the precise direction intended
by the Establishment — that unofficial ruling entity they thought
they had been rebelling against. Several years of research persuaded
him that the American Establishment was a far more clever orga-
nism than anyone had ever dreamed, and culminated with his writ-
ing The Shadows of Power. Mr. Perloff is a contributing editor to
The New American, the biweekly journal of news and opinion,

254

Publisher's Appendix

Our listing of the names of those who hold membership in the Council
on Foreign Relations is not meant to imply that all members are fully
cognizant of the history of the organization or in agreement with its purposes
as described in this book.

— Editor, Western Islands

Officers and Directors, 1987-1988

OFFICERS

Pcltr Q Peterson
Chairman of (he Board

Peter TamafT

Prvsidcnl

Warren Christopher

Vicr Chairman

John Temple Swing
EXKUIHV Vita Pr-n.utfrtft

Lewis T Preston
Tftomrer

Alien Frye

We* htifdefjt. Washington

WHIinm H Gleysteen. Jr.
K[fr f'rvitdrnl. Sludiei
John A. MilJmgunn
Vice President, Pfanmnn
and Development
Margaret Ctancr-McQwidc
Vice President, Meelmei

DIRECTORS

Graham T All-in, Jr.
Harold Brown
James E Burke
Richard B Cheney
Warren ChristoplieT
Robert F Erburu
Richard L Grlb
Alan Greenspan

Karen Elliott House

Stanley Hoffmann

B R Innun

J cane J Kirkpalnck

Juamta Krep^

Charles McC Mathiai, Jr

Donald F Mc, Henry

Ruben F Met tier

Peter G. Peterson

Lewis T Preston

William D Roger*

Robert A. ScalipinO

Brent Scowcroft

Stephen Sunnas

Peter Tarooff, tx officio

Glenn E Watts

Clifton R. Wharton, Jr.

Membership Roster June 30, 1988

Aaron* David L
Abboud, A. Robert
Ahegglen, James C
Abel. Elie

Abety* Joseph F , Jr
Atozaid, John P.
Abram, Mom* B.
Ahtamowiu, Morton I.
Abrams. Elliott
Absnire, David M
A ImuEcnr. Qdefl
Ackcrman, Peter
Adam, Ray C
Adams, Robert McCormick
Adams. Ruth S&lxman
Adclman, Kenneth L
AgBarw8l h Vinod K
Agnew. Harold M
Agronsky, Martin
Aguirre, Horocio
A ho, C Michael
AitfinofL M. Bernard
Ajami, Fouad
Akers, John F.
A kins, James E
Albnahl, Archie E-
Albrighl, Madeleine
Alderman, Michael H,
Aklrich t Gcoige H.
AieinikotT, T. Alexander
Alexander, Robert J
Allan, F. Aley
AJlard, Nicholas W
Allbntron, Joe L
Allen. John R-

Allen. Lew. Jt.
Allison. Graham T . It
Allien. Richard C.
Alpern, Alan N,
A It mart, Emily
Allraan. Roger C
Altschut, Arthur G.
Andersen, Harold W.
Anderson. John B
Anderson, Lisa
Anderson, Marcus A.
Anderson, Paul F
Anderson. Robert
Anderson, Robert O.
Andreae, CharJes N, t III
Andreas. Dwayne O
Angermudlcr. Hans H
Angulo, Manuel R
Anwhuelz, Norbert L
Ansow. M. Michael
Anthoine, Robert
Anthony. John Duke
Aptcr, David E-
AraskoE. Rand V.
Arboleya. Carlos J.
A r ledge. Roone
Arm acoM. Michael H
Armstrong, Anne
Armstrong, C Michael
Armstrong, DeWitt C, lit
Armstrong, John A
Armstrong, Willis C.
\i:ihiih]. Henr) H

Arnold, Millard W.
Art. Robert X
Arthurs, Alberta

AriH, Edwin L
Ascncio, Diego C
Ashcf. Rnben E.
Aspin, I..--.
A-.s---.uva. George E.
Alberton, Alfred L., Jr.
Aft wood. William
Atwood, J Bnan
Auspitz, Jostah Lee
Avers, H, Brandt

Babbitt, Bruce
Bachman. David Mark
Bacot, J. Carter
Badrr, William B.
Bailey, Charles W
Baird, Charles F
Baker, Howard H . Jr.
Baker, James E.
Baker, Pauline H.
Balaran, Paul
Baldwin, David A
Baldwin, Robert E
Baldwin, Robert H B.
Bales, Carter F.
Ball, David George
Ball. George W
Etaiidow, Doug
Banta. Kenneth W.
Barber, Charles F.
Barber, James A., Jr.
Barber. Perry O-* Jr.
Barter. Teresa C
Barghoorm Frederick C
Barker, Robert R.

HONORARY OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS EMERITI

Arthur H- Dean*
H.mi^Ijs Dillon
George S Franklin
Caryl P Haskins
Joseph E Johnson
Grayson Kirk
John J. McQoy

Ifonruttty Chairman

James A. Perkins
Phihp D. Reed
Dimd Rockefeller

Hwiiirary Chairman
Char In M SpotTord
Cym* R. Vance

•Died November 19*7 *

Barlow. William E.
Bamalhan, Joyce
Barnds, William J.
Barnes, Harry G., Jr.
Barnes, Michael D.
Baroei* Richard J
Bamctl, A Daak
Barnetl, Frank K
BamcH, Marguerite R.
Bamett, Robert W.
Baroody, William J. Jr.
Barr, Thomas D.
Barron t Thomas A
Bartholomew, Reginald
Bart lei l. Joseph W.
Banlcit. Richard Allen
Bank! i, Thomas A
Bart Icy, Robcn L
Barrclay, Michael
Baskin, Bo
Bassow. Whitman
Batkin, Alan R.
Balor, Francis M
Battle, Lucius D.
Hiiuman. Robert P.
Baumann, Carol Edlcr
Beam. Jacob D
Bean, Atherton
Beaatey. William Howard, til
Beanie. Richard J.
Bccklcr, David Z.
Beecher, William
Beeman, Richard E
Beglev. Loiuis

Bchrman. Jai.k \

Beim. David O.

^Includes mdivijujik to whom jnvnauons w^tc citaided by the Board k lis June L9SB meeting and who had
arcqjitd by rhc time ihia Report went td press

255

Beinecke t William S.
fell. Daniel
Bell. David E.
Bell. Hoi ley Mack
Bell, J. Bowver
Bell, Peter D.
Belt. Sieve
Bellamy, Carol
Bcnbow. Terence H.
Bennet, Douglas J r , Jr.
Bennett, Donald V,
Bennett, J. F.
Bennett, W, Tapley, Jr.
Benson. Lucy Wilson
Beplat, Tristan E-
Berger. Marilyn
Berger, Samuel R
Berger, Suzanne
Bcrgold, Harry E. h Jr.
Bergstoi, C. Fred
Bernardin. Joseph Cardinal
Bern d L John E.
Bernslcm, Peter W.
Bernstein, Robert I„
Berry, Sidney B
Bessie, Simon Michael
Betts. Richard K.
Beyer, John C.
Blaler, Seweryn
Bialkin, Kenneth J.
Btalos, Jeffrey P.
Blenen, Henry S.
Biertey, John Charles
Bierwirth, John C

Ui llnr.L-ri.ii- . James H
Binger. James H.
Binnendijk, Hans
Birketund, John P.
Bsmbaum, Eugene A.
Bissell, Richard E,
Bissell, Richard M., Jr,
Black, Cyril E
Black. Joseph E
Black. Shirley Temple
Blacker, Coit D
Blackmcr. Donald L, M,
Black will, Robert D.
Blake, A. Wing Sommers
Blake. Robert D.
Blank, Stephen
BJechman, Barry M.
Blendon, Robert J.
Bliss, Richard M,
Blotunficld. Lincoln P.
Bloom field, Richard J
Blum, John A.
Blumenthal. W, Michael
Boardman, Harry
Bubbitt, Philip
Boccardi, Louis D.
Boeschenstein, William W,
Bogdan, Norbert A.
Boggs, Michael D.
Bohcn. Frederick M.
Boiling, Landruin R.
Bohen. Joshua B.
Bond. Robert D.
Bomme- Blanc. Andrea

Bonney, J. Dennis
Bonsai, Dudley B.
Bonsai. Philip W
Bookout, John F.
Bom, Gary B.
Boschwitz. Rudy
Boswcrth, Stephen W.
Boiifoll. Luis J.
Bouion, Marshall M.
Bowen, William G.
Bower, Joseph L.
Bowie. Robert R.
Bowman, Richard C,
Boyd, William M.. U
Boyer, Ernest L
Bracken, Paul
Braddock, Richard S,
Brademas, John
Bradford, Zeb
Bradley, Tom
Bradley, William L.
Bradshaw, Thornton F.
Brady, Nicholas F-
Brairtiird, Lawrence J.
Brandon, Carter J.
Branscomb, Lewis M,
Branson, William R
Bray, Charles W, Til
Brcck, Henry R.
Bresnan, John J.
Breyer, Stephen G-
Brimmer, Andrew F,
Brinklcy, David
Brinktcy, George A.
Brittain, Alfred, HI
Britten ham, Raymond L
Brock, Mitchell
Brock, William E., HI
Broda, Frederick C,
Brokaw, Tom

Bromery, Randolph Wilson
Bromley, D Allan
Bronfman, Edgar M,
Brooke, Edward W.
Brooke, lames B.
Brooks, Harvey
Brooks, Karen
Bross, John A,
Brower, Charles N
Brown, David D., [V
Brown, Frederic J.
Brown* Harold
Brown. Irving,
Brown, L. Carl
Brown, L. Dean
Brown, Lester R.
Brown. Richard P., Jr.
Brown, Seyom
Brown, Walter H.
Browne, Roben S.
Bruce Lawrence. Jr.
Bryant, Ralph C
Hryson, John E.
r -i zezu sski, Zbigniew
Buebheim. Robert W.
Bucbman, Mark E
Buckley, William F„ Jr,
Bucy, J. Fred, Jr.

Bugliareho, George
Bullock. Hugh
Bullock, Mary Brown
Bundy. McGeorge
Bundy, William P.
Burke, James F~
Burley, Anne- Mane
Bums, Patrick Owen
Bun. Richard R.
Bui-tom Daniel F. r Jr.
Bush -Brown. Albert
Bushier. Rolland
Bussey, Donald S
Butcher. Goler Teal
Butcher, Willard C-
Buder, George Lee
Butler, Samuel Ci
Butler, William J.
Butlenwieser, Benjamin J.
Byrnes, Robert F
Byrom. Fletcher

Cabot, Louis W.
Cabot, Thomas D.
Cabranes, Jose A-
Cahill, Kevin M.
Cahn, Anne H
Caldcr, Alexander, Jr
CaldweB, Philip
Calhoun, Michael J.
Califano, Joseph A. r Jr.
C'jiLiri.s, Hugh
Callander. Robert J
Calico, David P.
Campbell. John C.
Campbell, Glenn W.
Camp*, Miriam
Canal, Carlos M„ Jr.
Canfield. Franklin O.
Cannon, James M.
Carey, Hugh L,
Carey, John
Carey, William D.
Carlson, RobErt J
Carlson, Steven E.
Carlucci, Frank C.
CarmichaeL William D.
Catncsale, Albert
Capon, D&vid D.
Cnrrington, Walter C
Carroll, J, Speed
Carson. C. W, Jr.
Carswell, Robert
Carter. Ashton B.
Carter, Barry H.
Carter, Edward William
Carter. H adding. Ill
Carter. Jimmy
Carter, William D.
Casper, Gerhard
Castillo, Leonel J.
Cater. Douglass
Cates, John M. t Jr.
Catto. Henry E- Jr.
Cave, Ray
Chacc, James
Chafce, John H

Chaikin, Sol Chick
Chain, John T„ Jr.
Challenor, Her^chelte S.
Chambers, Anne Cox
Chancellor, John
Chao, Elaine
Chapman, John F.
Charles, Robert B.
Charpie, Robert A,
Chayes, Abrarn J.
Chayes, Antonia Handler
Cheever, Daniel S.
Chenery, Hollls fl.
Cheney, Richard B
Chcrnc, Leo

Chickering, A. Lawrence
Chi Ida, Marquis W
Choucri, Nazli
Christiansen, Gcryld B.
Christopher, Robert C.
Christopher. Warren M.
Chubb, Hcndon
Churchill. Buntzie Ellis
Cisler, Walker L
Cisneros, Henry G,
Clapp, Priscilla A,
Clarizio, Lynda M.
Clark, Dick
Clark, Howard L.
Clark, Kenneth B.
Clark, Ralph L.
Clark, Wesley K.
Clarke. J G
Clendenin, John L.
Cleveland, Harlan
Cleveland, Harold van B.
Clifford, Donald K-, Jr.
Cline, Ray S
aine, William R
Cloherty, Patricia M
Cturman, Richard M.
Coffey, Joseph I.
Cohen, Barbara
Cohen. Benjamin J.
Cohen, Eliot A.
Cohen, Jerome Alan
Cohen, Joel E.
Cohen. Roberta
Cohen. Stephen B.
Cohen, Stephen F
Cohen, William S.
Colby, William E
Coleman, William T., Jr.
Coles, James Stacy
Collado, Emilio G.
Collins, Wayne Dale
Combs, Richard E.. Jr.
Condon, Joseph F-
Cone, Sydney M. Ill
Connor, John T
Connor, John T., Jr.
Connor, Joseph E
Conway. Jill
Cook, Don
Cook, Frances D,
Cook, Gary M,
Cook, Howard A,
Cooke, Goodwin

256

Coolidgc, Nicholas J.
Coohdge, T. J. t Jr.
Coombs, Philip H.
Coon, Jane Abcll
Cooney, Joan Ganz
Cooper, Charles A,
Cooper, Chester L
Cooper, Richard N.
Corrigan. E Gerald
Corrigan. Kevin
Colt, Suzanne
Cotter, William
Cousins, Norman
Cowan. L. Gray
Cowles, John, Jr.
Co A, Pamela M, J,
Cox, Robert G,
Coyne, Thomas A.
Crane, Winthrop Murray
Crawford, Anne W
Crawford, John F
Creel, Dana S.
Cremin. Lawrence A,
Cmtendeu, Ann
Crocker, Chester A,
Crook, William H.
Cross, June V.
Cross. Sam Y.
Gravity Gordon
Crow T Trammell
Crowe. William J. p Jr
Crystal. Lester M.
Culver, John C
Cumming, Christine
Cummings, Robert L., Jr,
Cummiskey, Frank J.
Cuomo, Mario M.
Curran, Timothy J,
Curtis, Gcraid L,
Cutler, Lloyd K
Culler, Waiter L
Cutter, W. Hi>wm;in
Cyr, Arthur

Dale, William B.
Dalley, George A.
Dallin, Alexander
Dallmcyer. Dqrinda
Dalton, James E.
Dam, Kenneth W.
Dan forth, William H
Daniel. D. Ronald
Danncr, Mark
Darman, Richard G-
Davant. James W.
Davidson, Daniel I,
Davidson, Ralph K.
Davidson, Ralph P
Davis, Dorothy M,
Davis, Jacquclyn K.
Davis, Jerome
Davis, John A,
Davis, Kathryn W.
Davis, Lynn E,
Davis, Nathaniel
Davis, Shelby Culiom
Davis, Vincent

Davison, Daniel P.
Davison, W Phillip!;
Dawkins, Peter M.
Dawson, Horace G,, Jr.
Dawson, Horace G„, HI
Day, Arthur R.
Deaglc, Edwin A,, Jr
Dean, Jonathan
Dean, Robert W,
Dean, Thompson
Debevoise, Eli Whitney
Debevoise. Eh Whitney, [I
Dc Borchgrave, Arnaud
Debs, Barbara Knowles
Debs, Richard A
DeOane, Alfred C, Jr.
Defter, Midge
Dc Cubas, lose
Dees, Bowcn C,
De Habsburgo Dobkin,

lnmaculada
De Hoyos. Dcbora
De Janosi, Peter E.
Dc Mcnil, George
De Mcnil, Lojs Pattisnn
Deming, Frederick L.
Dentson, Robert J.
Dennard, Cleveland L.
Dennison, Charles, S,
Denny, Brewster C-
Denton, E- Hazel
DcFalma, Samuel
Dcrian, Patricia Murphy
De Rosw, Alphonse
Destler. l M.
Dcutch, John M,
Dcutch, Michael J
DeVecchi^ Robert P
£>evine, C Robert
Devine. Thomas J.
De Vries, Rimmer
DeWind, Adrian W.
De Young, Karen
Dickey, Christopher S.
Dickson, R Russell. Jr.
Dicbold, John
Diebold, William. Jr.
Dietel, William M
Dillon, Douglas
Dilwnrth, J Richardson
Dine, Thomas A.
Dobriansky, Paula
Dodd. Christopher J.
Doeisch, Douglas A.
Dohcrty. William C. Jr.
Domingucz, Jorge I
Donahue, Donald J.
Donahue, Thomas R.
Donaldson, William H.
Donnell, Ells won h
Donnelly, H. C
Donovan. Hedley
Doty, Paul M.
Douglas, Paul W.
Douglass, Robert R.
Downie, Leonan^ Jr
Draper, William H „ III
Drayton, Wiliiam, Jr.

Dreier, John C
Drell, Sidney D.
Drew, Elizabeth
Dreyfuss, Joel
Drumwright, 3. R.
Dubow. Arthur M.
DuBrul. Stephen M., Jr.
Duffcy, Joseph
Duffy, James H
Duke, Angier Biddk
Dulany, Peggy
Duncan, Charles W_, Jr.
Duncan, John C,
Duncan, Richard L.
Dunn, Kenipton
Durham, G. Robert
Dutton, Frederick G

Eagkburger, Lawrence S,
EatJc, Gordon
Earle, Ralph, H
Easum, Donald B.
Eaton, Leonard J.. Jr.
Eberle, William D.
Eberstadt, Nicholas N.
Ecton, Donna R.
Edehnan, Albert I.
Edehnan. Eric S.
Edehnan. Gerald M.
Edehnan, Marian Wright
Edelstein, Julius C. C.
Edson, Gary R.
Edwards, Howard L-
Ed wards, Roben H.
Ehrlich, Thomas
Eichenberg. Richard C
Eilts, Hermann Frederick
Emaudi, Luigi R.
[ jri;jiidi, Mario
Einhom. Jessica P.
Eiscndralh, Charles R
Eliot, Theodore L„ Jr.
El Koury, Jaime A.
Ethott, A, Randle
Elliott, Byron K.,
Elliott, Osbom
Ellis. James R.
Ellis. Patricia
Ellis, Richard H
Ellison, Keith P
Ellsberg, Daniel
Ellsworth, Robert F.
Embree. Ainslie "E
Emerson, Alice F-
Endcrs, Thomas Ostrom
English, Robert D.
Enthoven, AJain
Epstein, David B
Epslein, Jason
Erb, Guy F.
Erb, Richard D
Erhsen, Claude E
Erburu, Robert F.
Ercklentz, Alexander T-
Estabrook, Robert H.
Esty, Daniel C

Ht/ioiu. Amitai
Evans, John C.
Evans. John K,
Evans, R iwland, Jr.
Ewmg, Willmm. Jr,
Enter, John

Fabian, Larry L
Fairbanks, Douglas
Faloo. Mathea
Falk + Pamela S
Falk, Richard A
Fallows, James
Fanning, Kathennc W.
Farcr, Tom J,
Farmer, Thomas L.
Fasccll, Dante B,
Feiner, Ava S.
Feldmim, Mark B,
Feldstein. Martin S.
Fcnster, Steven R.
Ferguson. Glenn W.
Ferguson, James L.
Ferguson, Tim W.
Ferrari, Frank E
Ferraro, GeraJdine A
Ferre, Maurice A.
Fessenden, Han
Fierce. MiHred C,
Fifield, Russell K
Finberg, Barbara D.
Finger, Seymour Man
Finkelstcin, Lawrence S-
Finky, Murray H.
Finn, James
Finney, Paul B-
Fircstonc, James A.
Firmage, Edwin B.
Fisher, Picter A,
Fisher, Richard W
Fisher, Roger
Fishlww, Albert
Filz, Lauri J.
FilzGerald, Frances
Fitzgibbons, Harold E*
Flanagan, Stephan J.
Ran»g«Fi. Peter M.
Fogleman, Ranald R
Foley. S. R., Jr.
Foley, Thomas S-
Foote, Edward T, H
Ford, Gerald R.
Forrestal, Michael V
ForrestaJ, Robert P.
Forrester h Anne
Fowler, Henry H,
Fox, Donald T
Fox, John D.
Fox, Joseph C-
Fox, William T R
Franck, Thomas M.
Francke, Albert, HI
Frank, Charles R. Jr.
Frank, Isaiah
Frank, Richard A.
Frankel, Andrew V
Frankcl, Francinc R.

257

Frankel. Marvin E-
Franket, Max
Franklin, George 5,
Frederick, Pauline
Frederick, Robert it.
Fredericks, Wayne
Freeman, Harry L.
Freeman, Orville L.
Frclinghuysen, Peter H. B.
Fremont-Smith, Marion IL
Freund, Gerald
Frey, Donald N,
Freytag, Richard A,
Fribourg, Michel
Fribourg, Paul
Fried, Edward R.
Friedberg, Aaron L,
Fricden, Jeffrey A
Friedman. Benjamin M.
Friedman, Irving S.
Friedman, Stephen
Friedman T Stephen J,
Friedman, Thomas L.
Fromkin, David
Frcmm, Joseph
Fromulh, Peter
Frost, Ellen L.
Frosty F. Daniel
Frye, Alton
Frye, William R.
Fuerbringer, Otto
Funari, John
Funkhouser, E. N r , Jr,
FtirkiKi, Richard M.
putter* Elkn V.

GsbncL Charles A.
Gaddis, John Lewis
Gaffney, A r Devon
G&lhraith. Evan G,
Gallatin, James P.
Galvin. John R.
Gatvis, Carlos
Ganoe, Charles S,
Garber, Larry
Gard, Robert G, h Jr.
Gardner, James A-
Gardner, Richard N.
Garment, Leonard
Garment, Suzanne
Garrek, Anne
Garretson, Albert H-
Garrison* Lloyd K.
Garrison, Mark
Gart, Murray J.
Garten, Jeffrey E.
GarthofT, Raymond L-
GarviriH Clifton C, Jr.
Garvin, Richard L.
Gates, Phitomene A,.
Gatei, Robert M.
Oati T Charles
Gati, Toby Trtster
Geertz, Clifford
Gcigcr, Theodore
Gcjdenson. Sam
Gelb, Leslie H.

Gelb. Richard L.
Gel I- Mann. Murray
Geltman, Barton David
George, Alexander L
Georgeseu, Peter A
Gcfhet, Louis
Gefgen, David R.
Gerstner. Louis V. r Jr.
Getler, Michael
Geyelin, Henry R.
Geyelin. Philip L
Gibney, Frank ft
Giffen, James H
Gigot, Paul A.
Gil. Peter P,
Gilbert, H ft.
Gilbert, Jackson B-
Gilbert, Jarobm, Jr.
Gilbert, S Parker
Gilmore. Kenneth O.
Gilpatric. Roswcll L.
GiIjhii, Kenneth R. III
Gilpin, Robert R, Jr
Ginsburg, David
Ginsburg, Ruth Bader
Gin&burgh, Robert N
Glascr, Charles* L.
Glazer, Nathan
GEcystcen, William R, Jr.
Globennan, Norma
Godchauji. Frank A, h [II
Godwin, 1. Lamond
Gockjian. Samuel V.
Goheen, Robert F
Goizueta, Roberto C.
Goldberg, Arthur J.
Gotdberg, Samuel
Goldberger, Marvin L
Golden, James R.
Golden, William T.
Goldin, Harrison J.
Goldman, Charles N.
Goldman, Guido
Goldman, Marshall h
Goldman, Merle
Goldmark, Peter C„ Jr.
Goldschmidt, Neil
Goldstein, Elizabeth A
Goldstein. Jeffrey A.
Gomory, Ralph E.
Gompert, David C
Gong, Gerrit W.
Goodby, James E.
Goodman, George J. W,
Goodman, Herbert [.
Goodman, Roy M.
Goodman,

Sherri L- Washerman
Goodpastcr, Andrew J.
Goodscll, James Nelson
Gordon, Albert H.
Gordon* Lincoln
Gorman, Joseph T
Gorman, Paul F.
Gormck, Alan L.
Golbaum, Victor
Gottlieb, Gidon A. G,
Gottlieb, Thomas M.

Gotisegen, Peter M,
Gould, Peter G
Goussebnd, Pierre
Grace, J. Peter
Graff. Henry F
Graff. Robert D
Graham, Bob
Graham, Katharine
Graham, Thomas, Jr
Graham, Wilham R.
Grant, James P.
Grant, Stephen A.
Granville* Maurice F
Graubard, Stephen R.
Gray, Hanna Hnlborn
Green, Bill
Green, Carl J.
Greenberg, Maurice R
Greenhtrg, San ford D.
Greene, James C,
Greene, James R.
Greene, Joseph N. f Jr.
Greene, Mergaret L.
Greenfield, James L-
Greeufield + Meg
Greenough. William C.
Greenspan, Alan
Greenwald, Joseph A.
Greenway, H. D S.
Greenwood. Ted
Gregorian, Vartan
Grenier, Richard
Griffith, Thomas
Griffith. William E.
Grose, Peter
Gross, Ernest A
Gross, Patrick W-
Grossman, Gene M.
Grove, Brandon K, Jr.
Groves, Ray J.
Grune, George V.
Grunwald. Henry A
Gullion, Edmund A.
Gulliver, Adelaide Cromwell
Guti'rcund. John H,
Gurhman, Edwin O
Gwertzman, Bernard M.
Gwin, Catherine

Haas, Peter E
Haas, Robert D.
Habib, Philip C.
Haggard, Stephen
Haig, Alexander M-, Jr.
Halaby. Najeeb E
Haley, John C.
Hailingby, Paul, Jr.
Halperin, Morton H,
HaJpem. Sue M
Hslsted, Thomas A.
Hamburg, David A.
Hamburg. Margaret Ann
Hamilton, Ann Q-
Hamilton, Charles V.
H ami! tan, Edward K.
I lam ill cm. Michael P.
Hammer, Armand

Hancock, Judith L.
Hansen, Carol Rae
Hansen, Roger D.
Hanson, Robert A.
Hanson, Thor
Harari, Maurice
Harding, Harry
Hardt. John P.
Hargrove, John Lawrence
Harman, Sidney
Harpcl, James W.
Harper, Conrad K.
Harper, Paul C , Jr.
Harper, Zenola
Harriman, Pamela C.
Harris. Irving li
Harris, Joseph E-
Harris. Scott Blake
Harrison, Sehg S
Harscli, Joseph C
Hart, August in 5
Han, Douglas M
Hart, Parker T,
Hartley. Fred L
Hartman. Arthur A
Han man, J Liie
Harinack. Carl E.
Haikell. John H. F,, Jr.
Haskina, Caryl P
Hatfield, Robert S.
Hange. John R.
Haustr, Rita E
Hauser, William L
Hauspurg, Arthur A-
Haviland, H Field. Jr.
J l.m Liiiv. A - i n . ■ r .
Hayes. Margaret Daly
Hayes, Samitcl P.
Haynes, Fred
Haynes, Ulric, Jr,
Haywfird. Thomas B.
Hazard. John N.
HeaJy P Harold H., Jr
Heard. Alexander
Htck. Charles B.
Heektcher, August
Hedsirom. Mitchell W
Hcginbotham, Stanley J.
Hehir, J. Bryan
Heifen. Elaine F.
Hcimann, John G
Heintzen, Harry L
Helandcr, Robert C
Hetdring, Frederick
Hellman, F. Warren
Hellmann, Donald C
Hclmboldt, Miles E-
Helms, Richiird
Henderson v Lawrence J- t Jr.
Henkin, Alice H.
Henkin, Louis
Hennessy. John M r
Hcrhng, John
Hermann, Diaries F.
Herskovii*, Jean
Herter, Christian A„ Jr.
Herter, Frederick P
Herttberg, Arthur

258

Herzfeld, Charles M.
Hei zstein. Robert E-
Hesburgh. Theodore M,
Hess, John B
Hessler, Curl is A.
Hester. James M.
Hewitt, William A.
Hew leu. Sylvia Ann
Heyns, Roger W.
Higgins, Robert F
Higher Keith
Hight t B, Boyd
Hillenbrand, Martin J,
Hitsman. Roger
HincrfckJ, Ruth J
Hine&, Gerald D.
Hinshaw, Randall
Hnuon, Dcanc R.
Hirschman, Albert O.
Hoagland, Jim
Hoch, FTank W,
Hodgson, James D.
Hoeber, Amorctia M-
Hoehrt. William E,. Jr.
Hocnkin, Malcolm
Hocpli. Nancy L.
Hoffman, Michael L
Hoffmann, Stanley
Hoge> James
Hoge, Warren
Hogucl, George R,
Hoguet, Robert L
Hohenbcrg, John
Holbrooke, Richard C\
Holtomh. M. Staler
Holdemian, James B,
Holland, Robert C
Hollick, Ann L
Holmes. H. Allen
Hoist, Wilkm
Holt I 'at M.
Hooks, Benjamin L.
Hoopes, Townsend W.
HboytiT, Herbert W„ Jr.
Hordick, Arnold L.
JCoonats, Robert D.
Horn, Garfield H.
Horn, Karen H.
Horn, Sally K
Horner, Marina S.
Horowitz, Irving Louis
Horton, Alan W
Horfon. Elliott
Horton. Frank B., HI
Hosmer, Bradley C.
Hottelet, Richard C.
Houghton. Amory, Jr.
Houghton, Arthur A,, Jr,
Houghton, James R.
House, Karen Elliott
Hovey, Graham
Hovey, J, Allan, Jr.
Howard, John B.
Howard, John R,
Hoyt. Mont P.
Hubef, Richard L
Hudson, Man lex O-. Jr.
Huebner T Lee W

Hufbauer, Gary C.
Huffington, Roy M
Hulstedler. Shirley
Hugcl, Charles E.
Huggins, Nathan J.
Hughes, John
Hughes, Thomas L.
Hughr, Henry C.
Huizctiga, John W.
Hummel, Arthur W_, Jr.
Hun&berger, Warren S.
Hunter, Robert E
Hunter-Gaul L, Charlayne
FJuni iny.cn. Samuel P.
Hurewitz, J. C,
Huriock,, James B
Huyck, Philip M.
Hyde t Henry B.
Hylaud, William G

Ignatius, David
Jk!e, Fred C.
[Echman, Alice S.
rndcrfunh, Karl F
Ingersoll, Robert S
I ir;i.i:i. B. R.
[nlnhaatnr. Michael D.
Ireland, R. L, ffl
Irish, Leon E-
[rwin, John N., 11
Irwin, John N.. Ill
Isaacson, Walter
fseltn, John Jay
Isenbcrg, Sieves L-
lsham, Christopher
Issawi, Charles
tstel Yves* Andre
Izlar, William H., Jr,

Jabher. Paul
Jablonski, Wanda
Jackson, Elmore
Jackson, Eugene D.
Jackson, Henry F.
Jackson, John H.
Jackson. William E,
Jacob, John E.
Jacobs Eli S

JaCObS, V;-1u;il:

Jacobs, Nonrow
Jacobson, Harold K
Jacobson, Jerome
Jaeoby, Tam&r
Jahrling, Robert V W.
Jamieson, J, K.
Janklow, Morton L.
lanow, Merit E
Jansen, Mariui B
J:«.sir ,iv._ Robert
Jensen, John W,
Jervis, Robert L
Jessup, Alpheus W.
Jessup, Philip C. h
Johnson, Chalmers
Johnson, Howard W.

Johnson, Joseph E.
Johnson, Paul G.
Johnson. Richard A.
Johnson. Robbin 5-
Johnson, Robert H,
Johnson, Thomas S.
Johnson, W. Thomas
Johnson, WiHnd R.
Johnston. Philip
Jones, David C
Jones, Peter T~
Janes, Sidney R.
Jones, Thomas V.
Jordan. Amos A
Jordan, Vernon E,, Jr.
Jorden, William J.
Joseph, Gen M
Joseph, James A
Jsjftephson. Wihiiini
Joyce, John T
Junz, Helen B.
J Lister, Kenneth J.

Kagan, Robert W
Kahan, Jerome H
Katun, George McT.
Kahn, Harry
Kahn, Tom
Kaiser, Philip M
Kaiser, Robert G.
Kaib. Marvin
Kalicki, Jan
Kamarck. Andre*' M,
Kanuner, Peter H
Kampelrnan, Max M
Kamsky, Virginia A-
Kann, Peter R.
Kanter, Arnold
Kaplan, Gilbert E
Kaplan, Harold J.
Kaplan. Hclene I.
Kaplan. Mark N
KiiraJckas, Anne
Karis. Thomas O
Karnow, Stanley
Kams, Margaret P.
Kass. Stephen L.
Kissinger, Theodore W.
Kassof. Allen H
Kalz, Abraham
Kali. Milton
Katz. Ronald S.
Ka<j:enhacb, Nicholas deB.
Kalzeuslein, Peter J
Kaufman, Henry
Kaufmann. Wilham W,
Kaysen. Carl
Kcarns, David T-
Kcatley, Anne
Keene, Lonnie S,
Keeny, Spurgcon M,, Jr.
Kellehtr. Catherine M.
Kcllcn. SSepheti M.
Keller. George M.
Kefley, P. X.
Kelly, George Armsirong
Kelly, John H

Kehnan, Herbert C
Kemp, Geoffrey
Kempe. Frederick
Kempner, Maximilian W,
Kendal^ Donald M
Kenen, Peter B.
Keniston, Kenneth
Kennan, Christopher J
Kennan, Elizabeth T
Kennan i George F
Kennedy „ David M-
Kennedy, Donald
Kennedy, Randall L.
Kenney, F, Donald
Kcohane, Nannerl O
Keohane. Robert O.
Keppel, Francis
Kern H Harry F.
K ester. John G.
Ketelsen. James L
Keydel, John F.
KhiHUad, Zaltnay
Khuri, Nicola N.
Kiermaier, John
Kischmck, W. F
Kilson, Marfjn
KntiTuitt, Kobcn M.
King. Henry L.
King, John A., Jr
Kininer, William R.
Kipper. Judith
Kirhy, Michael A.
Kirk, Grayson L
Kirk land, Lane
Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.
Riser, Willmm S.
Kissinger, Henry A
Kitchen. Helen
Kiiclicn. lefTrey C.
Kleiman, Roben
Klein. David
Klein. Edward
Klurfcld, James
Kniijlil. Roberl lltintingtyn
Knoppers, Antonie T
Knowlion, William A,
Knowlton, Winthrop
Kohler, Foy D.
Kojm, Christopher A.
Kolodzicj, Edward A.
Koltai, Steven R-
Komer. Robert W.
Kondracke. Mor^m
Korb. Lawrence J
KorbonskL Andrzej
Korry, Edward M.
Kraar, Louis
Kraemer-, Ljlhan K.
Kramer. Helen M,
Kramer, Jane
Kramer, Michael
Kramet. Steven Philip
Kraslow, David
Krasner T Stephen D,
Krasno. Richard M.
Krause. Lawrence B.
Kreidler, Robert N.
Kreisrwrg, Paul H,

259

Krepon, Michael
Kreps, Juan its M.
Kmher, Bernard
Kristol, Irving
Krugman + PauJ R.
Kroidenier, David
Kruzci, Joseph
Kubarych, Roger M.
Kubwch, Jock B.
¥.v...r '*-,.. -j. William
Kutewicz, John J.
Kupchan, Charles A.
Kupperman, Robert H.
Kurth, James R.

L
Laber, Jcri

Labrecquc, Thomas G.
Lahoud, Nina J.
Laise, Caral C.
Lake, W. Anthony
Lake, William T
Lall, Betty Goctz
Lamm. Donald S.
Lamont, Edward
I iiir.Onr, J. :j rising
Lamontagne, Raymond A-
Lampton, David M.
Lancaster, Carol J.
Landau, George W.
Landry, Lionel
Lancy, James T\
Langer, Paul F.
Lansncr. Kermil
LaPalombara, Joseph
Lapham, Lewis H.
Lapidus, Gai] W,
Laqucur, Waller
Larrabee, F. Stephen
Lary. Hal B.
Lauder, Leonard A.
Laumger, Philip C r Jr.
Laukhuft", Perry
LavcnlhoL David A.
Lawrence, Richard
Lazarus, Sreven
Le Blond. Richard K., II
Lcddy, John M,
Ledcrberg, Joshua
Lederer, Ivo John
Lee, Ernest 5,
Lee, John M,
Ue, William L,
Lcfever,. Ernest W.
Leghorn, Richard S
Lcgvold, Robert H-
Lehman, John R
Lehman, Onn
Lehrer, Jim
Lchrman, Hal
Leich t John Foster
Leigh, Monroe
Leland. Marc E
Lelyvetd, Joseph
LcMelle, Titden J.
LeMellc, Wilbert J.
Leonard, H. Jeffrey
Leonard, James F

Leonard, James G.
Leonhard, William E.
Leslie, John E.
Levine, Irving R
Levine, Mel
Levine H Susan B.
Levinion, Marc
Uvitas, Mitchel
Levy, Marion J„ Jr.
Levy, Reynold
Levy, Walter J,
Lewis, Bernard
Lewis, Drew
Lewis,, Flora
Lewis, John F,
Lewis, John Wilson
Lewis, Samuel W.
Lewis, Stephen R.
Lewis, W Walker
LI. Victor H.
Libby, L Lewis
Liehtblau, John R
Lteber, Robert J,
liebernrian, Henry R.
Lieberthal, Kenneth
Lifters, William A.
Lincoln, Edward J.
Lindquist, Warren T,
Lindsay. Franklin A.
Lindsay, George N
Lindsay, John V.
Lindsay, Robert V.
Link, TfoJand S.
Linowefi. David F.
Linowitz, Sol M,
tipper, Kenneth
tjpscomb, Thomas H.
Lipsct, Seymour Martin
Lipsky, Seth
Lipson, Leon
Lissakcrs, Karin M.
Little. David
Lilwak, Robert £.
Livingston, Robert Gerald
Llewellyn, J. Bruce
Locke, Edwin A.. Jr.
Lock wood, John E.
Lodal, Jan M.
Lodge, George C
Loeb, Frances Lehman
Loch, John L.
Loeb, Marshall
Loft, George
Logan. Francis D.
Long. Franklin A-
Long, Jeffrey W r
Long, T. Dixon
LoomiSp Henry
Loos, A William
Lord, Bctte F5ao
Lord, Charles Edwin
Lord, Winston
Lovelace. Jon B.
Lovestone, Jay
Low, Stephen
Lowenfeld, Andreas F,
Lowenfeld, David
Lowenstein, James G.

Lowenthal, Abraham F.
Ley, Frank E,
Loiano, Ignacio E„ Jr.
Lubman, Stanley B.
Lucas, C Payne
Luce, Charles F.
Luck* Edward C
Lucrs, William R
Lustick, Ian S.
Luter, Yvonne
Luttwak, Edward R
Lyman, Richard W.
Lynch, Edward S.
Lynn, James T.
Lynn, Laurence E., Jr
Lynn, William J.
Lyon, E. Wilson
Lyons. Gene M
Lytbcott. George I.

M
McAdams, David
McAllister, Jef Olivarius
McAulifTe, Jennifer Toolin
McCnH, H, Carl
McCarthy, John G.
McCJoy, John J.
McCloy, John J, II
McColough, C Peter
McConnell, Michael W.
McCormack r Elizabeth J.
McCouch, Donald G.
MeCracken, Paul W.
McCurdy, Dave K
McDonald, Alonzo I..
McDonough. William J,
McDougat. Myres S.
McFarlane, Robert C
MeOee, Gale W
MeGhce, George C
McGiflert, David E.
McGillicuddy, John F
MeGovern. George $.
McHale. Thomas R.
McHenry, Donald F.
McKee, Katharine
McKeever, Porter
McKinley, John K.
McKinney, Robert
McLaughlin, David T.
McLean, Sheila Avrin
McLin, Jon B„
McManus, Jason
McNamara, Robert S.
McNeill, Robert L.
McPherson, Harry C, Jr.
McPherson, M. Peter
MeQuade, Lawrence C.
MacArthur, Douglas, II
MacCormack, Charles F.
Mac Donald, Gordon J.
MacEachron, David W.
MacFarquhar, Emity
MacGrego^ Douglas A.
MaeGregor, Ian K
MacLaury, Bruce K.
Macomber, John D.
Macombcr, WiUiam B.

Macy, Robert M. t Jr.
Maged, Mark J
Magowan, Peter A-
Maguire, John D.
Maboney, Margaret E
Maier, Charles S.
Main waring, ScOll
Malek, Frederic V
Malin, Clement B.
Mallery, Richard
Malmgren, Hsr^ld Q.
Malone, Peter
Manca, Mane Antoinette
Mande]baum r Michael E.
Mangels, John D-
Manilow, Lewi*
Mann, Michael D.
Manning, Bayless
Manning, Robert J.
Mansager. Felix N.
ManshcL Warren Demian
Marans, L Eugene
Marcom T John E., Jr.
Marcum, John Arthur
Marcy, Carl
Marder, Murrey
Margolis, David J.
Mark, David E.
Mark. Hann M.
MarkofF, Michelc G,
Marks. Leonard H.
Marks. Paul A
Marks, Russell E.. Jr.
Marmor, Theodore R.
Marous. John C.
Marroti, Donald B.
Marshak, Robert E.
Marshall, Andrew W,
Marshall. Anthony D.
Marshall. C. Burton
Martin. Edwin M.
Martin. Malcolm W P
Martin, William McC, Jr.
Martin, William F.
Martinez, Vilma S.
Marti nazal, Leo S-, Jr.
Mason, Elvia L r
Massie, Suzanne
Masten, John E.
Mathews, Jessica Tuchman
Mathews, Michael S.
Mathias, Charles McC, Jr.
Matlock, Jack F., Jr.
Matsui, Robert T
Matsuoka, Tama
Mattcwn, William B.
May, Ernest R.
Maver, Qhudettc M.
Mayer, Gerald M„ Jr.
Mayer, Lawrence A.
Mayuard. Robert C.
Maynes, Charles William
Maxur, Jay
Mead, Dana G.
Meagher, Robert F
Mehta, Ved
Mcissner, Charles F-
Mcister, Irene W.

260

Mclloan, George R,
Melville, Richard A.
Mendtovitz, Saul H
Menke, John R.
Mcron. Thcodor
Merow, John E-
Merrill, Philip
Merritt, Jack N
Mcrszci, Zotian
Mcselson, Matthew
Messucr, William Curtis,. Jr.
Metcalf, George R.
Mettler, Ruben F,
Meyer. Cord
Meyer, Edward C.
Meyer. John R
Meyer. Kari E.
Meycrson, MarTin
Mickctson, Sig
Middleton, Drew
Midgley, Elizabeth
Midglcy, John J,. Jr.
Miller, Charles D-
Miller, David Chartesy Jr
Milter, Franklin C
Miller, J, Trwin
Miller, Judith
Miller, Paul L.
Miller, William G.
Miller, William I
Milieu, Allan R
Milling! on- John A
Mills, Bradford
Mitner, Helen
Minow, Newton N.
Mladck. Jan V.
Mochizuki, Mike
Moc, Sherwood G,
MoEiduLe. Waller F
Montgomery, Porker G-
Montgomery, Philip O'B
Moody, Jim
Moody, William S.
Moore, John Norton
Moore, Jonathan
Moore, Paul, Jr.
Moose, Richard M
Moran, Theodore H.
Morgan, Cecil
Morgan, Thomas E.
Morgcnthsu,

Luc in d j L Franks
Morley. James William
Morrell, Gene P.
Morris, Grmnell
Morris, Max K.
Morriscll, Lloyd H,
Morse, David A.
Morue, Edward L.
Morse, F Bradford
Morse. Kenneth P.
Moses, Alfred H.
Moss, Ambler H., Jr,
M 01 ley. Joel
Moynihan, Daniel P.
Mraz, John Edwin
Mudd. Margaret F,
Mutferd, David C,

Mulholland. William D.

Muller, Henry
Muller. Steven
Mungcr, Edwin S-
Murjro. J. Richard
Munroe. George B.
Munroe, Vernon, Jr.
Munyan, Winthrop R.
Murphy, Joseph S,
Murray, Allen E.
Murray, Douglas P
Murray, Lori Esposito
Muse, Martha T.
Miiskic, Hdmiind S.

NachmanofT, Arnold
Nachi, Michael
Nadin, M lahaq
Nagorski, Zygmunt
Nathan. James A.
Nathan. Robert R
Nait, Ted M.
Nau, Henry R.
Neaf, Alfred C
Ncgruponte, John D.
Ncier, Arych
Nelson, ClilTord C-
Nclson, Jack
Nelson, Mark A
Nelson, Merlin E
NeuKtadi. Richard E
Newbcrg, Paula R
Newbnrg. Andre W- G.
Newell, Barbara W
Newhcusc, John
Newman, Pnscilla A.
Newman, Richard T.
Ncwsom, David D.
Newton, Quigg* Jr.
Newton. Russell B„ Jr.
Ney, Edward N
NichnH. Rodney W.
Niehoii*, John M,
Nichuss, Rosemary Neaher
Nielsen. Waldernar A.
Nimetz, Matthew
Nitae, Paul H.
Nolan, Janne E
Nolan. Kimberly
Nolte, Richard H
Nooter, Robert H.
Norman, William S,
Norstad, LaurU
Norton, Augustus R.
Norton, Eleanor Holmes
Nossiter, Bernard D.
Novak. Michael
Ncyes, Charles Phelps
Nugent, Wither
Nye, Joseph S., Jr.

Oakes, John B.
Obtrdorfer, Don
O'Clcireatain, Carol
O'Connor, Walter F
Odeen, Philip A,

Odom, William E.
OTJonnell, Kevin
OettULger. Anthony G.
Offit, Moms W,
CFIahcrty. J Daniel
Ogden, Alfred
Ogdcn, William 5
0"Hare, Joseph A,
Q'Kecfe, Bernard J
Okimoto. Daniel I
Oksenberg, Michel
OS- in; Herbert
Oliver, Covey T.
Olmslead. Cecil J.
Olsen 1 Leif H
Olson, William C
Olvey, Lee D
O'Malley, Cormac K H.
Omcstad, Thomas
O'Neill, Michael J.
Opel, John R
Qpp£nheime,v Kraiii M.

Omsteini Norman J.
Osborn, George K., Ill
Qsborue. Richard dc J
Osmer-McQuadc. Margaret
Osnos, Peter
Ostrander, F. Taylor
Overholser. Geneva
Owen, Henry
Owen, Roberts B,
Oktojui, Stephen A
0*nnm. Robert B
Oye, Kennel h A.

Packard. George R
Page, John H-
Pagels. Hciitt R
Paine, George C, 11
Pais, Abraham
Palenberg, John C.
Paky, William S.
Palmer, Mark
Palmer, Norman D.
Palmer, Ronald D-
Palmieri. Victor H.
Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H.
Parker. Daniel
Parker, Maynard
Parkinson, Roger
Parris, Mark Robert
Parsky, Gerald L
Pa&sm, Herbert
Patrick, Hugh T.
Patterson. Gardner
Patterson, Hugh B. f Jr.
Patterson. Robert P.. Jr.
Patterson, Torkcl L-
Pauker f Guy J
Paul. Roland A.
Payne, Samuel B
Peacock, P. Defter
Pearce, WillLim R.
Pearhtine, Normaji
Pearson, John E.
Peek. Michael A
Pederseo, Richard F.

Pdgrifl, Kathryn C.
Pell, Claibome
Penfield, James K.
Pennoyer, Robert M-
Pcretz, Don
Perkins. Edward J
Perkins, James A.
Perkins, Roswell B.
Perk, Richard N.
Perlmuttcr. Amos
Perry, Hart
Peters. Arthur King
Peters, Auiana L-
Petersen, Donald E,
Petersen, Gustav H,
Petersen, Howard C.
Peterson, Peter G.
Pelerson 1 Rudolph A.
Peciacus. David H.
Pelrec. Richard W
Pctschck, Stephen R,
Petty, John R
Peiiullo, Lawrence A.
Pfaltzgraff. Robert L
Pfeiffer, Jane CahlH
Pfciffer. Ralph A , Jr.
Pfelffcr, Steven B.
Phillips, Chnsiopher H.
Phillips, Russell A., Jr.
Picker, Harvey
Pinker, Jean
Pickering, Thomas R.
Pick Gerard
Pierce, William C,
Picrey, George T
Pierre, Andrew J
Pifer, Alan
Pigott, Charles M.
Pike, John E.
Pilliod, Charles J., Jr.
Pincus, Lionel I.
Pincus, Walter H.
Pmkerton, W. Stewart
Pino, John A.
Pinoia, J. J,
Pi|ws, Daniel
Pipes, Richard E
Pitts, Joe W„ HI
Plank. John N.
Platig, E Raymond
Piatt, Alan A,
Piatt, Alexander H,
Piatt. Nicholas
Flatten. Donald C.
Plimpton, Calvin K
Podhnretx, Norman
Polk, William R
Pollack. Gerald A.
Polsby. Nelson W.
Pnnd f Elizabeth
Poneman, Daniel B.
PiKH. J. Sheppard
Pones. Richard D.
Posen, Barry R
Posner, Michael H.
Posvar, Wesley W.
Poller. Robert S.
Potter, William C.

261

Powells Colin L.
Powell Robert
Power, Philip H
Power, Thomas R, Jr.
PowerS, Joshua 8-
PowerS, Thomas Moore
Powers, William F„ Jr,
Prangcr, Robert J.
Pratt, Edmund T.
Press, Frank
Fressler, Larry
Preston, Lewis T.
Prewiu, Kenneth
Price. John R„ Jr.
Price, Robert
Puchala, Donald J.
Fucketl, Allen E,
Pugh, Richard C.
Puree!!, Susan Kaufman
Purslcy, Robert E,
Pusey, Nathan M.
Pusiay, John S.
Putnam, George E., Jr.
Putnam, Robert D-
Pye, Lucian W.
Pyie, Cassandra A

Quandt, William B.
Quester, George H
Quigg, Philip W.
Quigley, Leonard V

Rabb. Maxwell M.
Rabinowitch. Victor
Radway, Laurence L
Ragonc. David V r
Ramo, Simon
Rams, Gustav
Rashish, Myer
Rather, Dan
Rathjens, George W
Raltncr, Steven L,
Rauch, Rudolph S.
Ra venal. Earl C
Rpvcnhott, Albert
Raviteh, Richard
Rawl H Lawrence G.
Raymond, Jack
Raymond, Lee R.
Read, Benjamin H.
Reed, Charles B.
Reed, John S.
Reed, Joseph Verner
Reed, Philip D
Reeves. Jay B- L-
Rcgam John M., Jr,
Reichert, William M,
Reid, Ogden
Reid, Whitelaw
Reinhardt, John E.
Reisman, W. M.
Renfrew, Charles B.
Resor. Stanley R,
Reston, James B,
Revdle, Roger
Rey, Nicholas A.

Reynolds, A. William
Rhinelander, John B.
Rhinesmith. Stephen H.
Rhodes, Frank H. T.
Rhodes. John B., Jr,
Rhodes, William R
Ribicoff, Abraham A-
Rice^ Condoleezza
Rice, Donald B
Rice, Joseph A.
Rich, Frederic C.
Rich, John H. Jr.
Rich^ Michael D.
Richardson. David B,
Richardson. Elliot L
Richardson, John
Richardson, Richard W.
Richardson, William B.
Richardson, William R.
Richman, Joan F.
Rickard, Stephen A.
Riddel]. Malcolm
Ridgcway. Rozanne L.
Riclly. John E.
Ries, Hans A,
Riesel, Victor
Ripley, S Dillon, II
Ritch, John B , 111
Rivard, Robert
Rivers h Richard R-
Rivkin, David B., Jr.
Rivltin. Donald H.
Rivlin, Alice M-
Robb. Charles S.
Roberts. Chalmers M-
Robem, Richard W
Roberts, Walter Orr
Roberts, Walter R.
Robinson. Charles W.
Robinson, James D„ [1 1
Robinson, Linda S.
Robinson, Marshal! A.
Robinson, Pearl T-
Robinson, Randall
Robison. Glin C.
Roche, John P.
Rockefeller. David
Rockefeller, David, Jr,
Rockefeller John D„ IV
Rockefeller Rudman C.
Rockwell. Kays H
Rodman, Peter W r
Rodriguez, Vincent A
Roelt, Riordan
RotT, J. Hugh, Jr,
Rogers, Bernard W.
Rogers. David E.
Rogers, William D,
Rogers, William P.
Rogovin, Mitchell
Rohaiyn, Felix G.
Rohlcn, Thomas P.
Rohier, William Lawrence
Rokke, Ervin J.
Romberg, Alan D.
Romero- Pared o, Carlos
Roncy, John H.
Roosa, Roben V.

Roosa, Ruth AmEnde
Rosberg, Carl G.
Rose, Daniel
Rose, Elihu
Rose, Frederick P.
Rosecrance, Richard
Rosen, Arthur II.
Rosen, Jane K.
Rosenblilh, Walter A.
Rosenblum. Mort
Rosenfcld, Robert A.
Rosenfeld, Stephen $
Rosenthal, A. M.
Rosenthal, Douglas E,
Rosenthal, Jack
Rosenzweig, Robert M-
Roiin, AJtel G.
Rosovsky, Henry
Rosa, Arthur
Ross. Dennis B,
Ross. Roger
Ross, Thomas B,
Rosso, David J.
Rostow. C, Nicholas
Rostow. Elspeth Da vies
Rosrow, Eugene V.
Rostow, Walt W,
Rolberg. Robert I
Roth, Stanley Owen
Roth, William M.
Roth, William V., Jr.
Rouse, James W.
Rovine, Arthur W.
Rowen, Henry S.
Rowny, Edward L.
Rubin, Seymour J.
Ruckcishaus, Wiliiam D.
Rudeostine, Neil L.
Rudman, Warren B.
Rudolph, Lloyd 1.
Rudolph, Susan ne Hoeher
Ruebhausen, Oscar M,
Rucnilz, Robert M.
Ruina, J P.
Rungc. Carlisle Ford
Rush, Kenneth
Rusk, Dean

Russell. Thomas W rI Jr-
Rustow, Dank wart A-
Ruih, David A.
Ruttan, Vernon W
Ryan, Hewson A.
Ryan, John T„ Jr.
Ryan. John T„ III

Sadowski, Yahya
Safran, Nadav
Sagan, Scott
Sage, Mildred D
Said, Edward
Saknian, Carol
Salcido. Pablo
Salisbury, Harrison E,
Salk, Jonas
Salomon, Richard E.
Salomon. William R,
Sahzman, Charles E.

Salzman, Herbert
Sample, Steven B.
Samuel, Howard D.
Samuels. Barbara CL, II
Samuels, Michael A.
Samuels, Nathaniel
Samuels, Richard J.
Sanchez, Nestor D.
Sanders, Edward G,
Sanfond, Charles S.. Jr,
Sanford, Terry
Sarro, Dale M.
Saul. Ralph ft
Saunders, Harold H.
Savage, Frank
SawhJU. John C
Sawyer, Diane
Sawyer, John E.
Say lor, Lynne S,
Scalapino, Robert A.
Scali, John A.
Schacht, Henry B.
Schachier, Oscar
Sehaetzel, J. Robert
Schafcr. John H-
Schaufelc, William E,, Jr.
Schecier, Jerrold
SehetTer, David J.
Scheinman, Lawrence
SchifT. Frank W.
Schilling, Warner R.
Sehlesinger, Arthur Jr.
Schlesinger, James R.
Schlosser, Herbert S.
Schmertz, Herbert
Schmidt. Benna, Jr.
Schmoker, John B.
Schmults, Edward C,
Schneider, Jan
Schneider, William
Schneicr, Arthur
Schocn, Douglas
Schoettle, Enid C B.
Schorr, Daniel L.
Schubert, Richard V.
Schuh, G. Edward
Schuyler, C V. R.
Schwab, William B.
Schwartz. David N.
Schwartz. Harry
Schwartz, Norton A
Schwarz, Frederick A. 0. r Jr
Schwebel, Stephen M,
Sciolino, Elaine F.
Scott, Stuart N
Seowcroft, Brent
Scranron, William W,
Scrnushaw, Nevin 5,
Seaborg, Gleim T-
Seabury, Paul
Seagrave, Norman P.
ScaniJins, Robert C. Jr.
Sebenias, James K.
Segal, Sheldon J.
Seibold, Frederick C, Jr
Seidman, Herta Lande
Seigenthaler, John L.
Seigle. John W,

262

Seigmous, George M.. 11 r
Scita, Frederick.
Selby, Norman C
Selin, Ivan

Setnple, Robert B., Jr.
Selear, John K..
Sc*e1l, John W.
Sexton, Wilham C
Shafer, Raymond Phiiip
Stately Datma E,
Shannon, James M,
Shapiro, Eli
Shapiro, George M
Shapiro. Isaac
Sharp, Daniel A.
Shayne. Herbert M.
Sheaier, Warren W
Sheehne, Paid C
Sheffield, James R.
Sheinkman. Jack
Sheldon, Eleanor Bcmert
Shelley, Sally Swing
Shdp, Ronald J£
Shelton-Colby, Sally A.
Shelton, Joanna Reed
Shenk, George H.
Sherry, George L
Sherwood, Elizabeth D
Sherwood, R k hard E,
Shinn, James J.
Shinn. Richard R
Shipley, Walter V.
Shirer, William L.
Shoemaker, Alvm V
Shoemaker. Don
Shriver, JJonald W, Jr.
Shrjver, Sargent, Jr.
Shubcrt, Gustave H
Shulman, Colette
Shulman, Marshall D.
Shulti. George P.
Sick, Gary G.
Siegman. HcnTy
Sifton, Elisabeth
Sigalj Leon V.
Sigmund, Paul E-
Sihler, William W.
Silas C J,

Silbcrman. Laurence H,
Silk, Leonard S
Silvery Robert B.
Simes, Dimitri K.
Simmons, Adele Smith
Simmons. Richard S.
Simon t William E.
Simons, Howard
Sim*, Albert G.
Sisco, Joseph J.
Sitrick, James B,
Skid more. Thomas E,
Ski I ting, Jeffrey K.
Skinner, Elliott P.
SkolnikofT. Eugene &
SJade, David R.
Slater^ Jacqueline R.
Staler, Joseph E.
Slawson, Paul S.
Sloan, David M.

Sloane, Ann Browncll
Slocombe, Walter B.
Slocum, John J.
Sloss, Leon
Small, Lawrence M.
Smart, S Bruce, Jr.
Smith, Carleton Spraguc
Smith. Datus C„ Jr.
Smith. David S.
Smith. DeWitt C. Jr.
Smith. Gaddis
Smith, Gerard C
Smith, Hedriek
Smith, John T. t II
Smith. Larry K
Smith. Malcolm B-
Smtth, Michael Joseph
Smith, Perry M.
Smith, Peter B.
Smith, R Jeffrey
Smith, Richard M
Smith, Robert F
Smj(h. Stephen G.
Smith. Theodore M-
Smith, Tony
Smith, W. Y.
Smythe, Mabel M.
Snipes, James C.
Snow, Robert Anthony
Snyder, Craig
Snyder. Jack L-
Snyde^ Jed C,
Sohol. Dorothy Meadow
Sodcrberg, Nancy E.
Sohn, Louis |a.
Solarz, Stephen J.
Solhert, Peter O. A.
Solomon. Anthony M.
Solomon, Peter J,
Solomon, Richard H.
Solomon, Robert
Sonne. Chris! ian K
Sonnenfeldt, Helmut
Sounenfeldt, Richard W
•Sqrensen, Gi3tuui Martin
Sorensen, Theodore C.
Soros. George
.Sovcrm, Michael I.
Spain. James W,
Spang, Kenneth M.
Spencer, Edson W.
Spencer, John H.
Spencer, William C.
Spencer, William I.
Spero, Joan E-
Spelh, James Gustave
Spier*. Ronald 1.
Spiro, Davjd K.
Spiro, Herbert J.
Spofford, Charles M.
Sprague, Robert C.
Squadron, Howard M.
Stackpole, Stephen H,
Staley, Eugene
Stalson, Helena
Stamas. Stephen
St&nkard, Francis X.
Stanley, Peter W.

Stanley. Timothy W.
Stanton, Frank
Stanton, R_ John. Jr-
Slaples, Eugene S.
Slarobin. Herman
Starr, Jeffrey M-
Starr, S. Frederick
Stassen. Harold E.
Stavridis, Jnm&
Stcadman, Richard C.
Stebbins. James H.
Steel, Ronald
Steiger. Paul E
Siein, Eric
Stein, Jonathan B
Steinberg, David J,
Steinberg, James B.
Stein bruner. John D.
Steiner, Daniel
Stepan, Alfred C
Stern, Ernest
Stem, Friti
Stem, H Peter
Stern, Paula
Stemer, Michael E.
Stcrnlight, David
Stevens, Charles R.
Stevens, James W.
Stevens, Norton
Stevenson. Adlai E . Ill
Stevenson, Charles A-
Stevenson, John R.
Stevenson, Kuih Carter
Sic wart, DorjftUt M-
Stcwart, Patricia Carry
Stewart, Ruth Ann
Sticht, L Paul
Stichm, Judnh Hicks
Stilel, Laurence D,
Stilwell, Richard G
Stohaugh, Roben B.
Stoessinger, John G-
Stoga, Alan
Stokes, Bruce
Stokes. Donald E
Stokes, Louis
Stone. Jeremy J.
Stone, Roger D.
Stone, Shepard
Stookey, John Hoyt
Stratton, Julius A.
Straus, Donald B.
Straus, Oscar S,
Straus, R- Peter
Straus, Ralph I-
Straus, Robert K
Strauss, Robert 5-
Sirauss, Simon D
Straus^-Hupe. Robert
Stremlau, John J.
Stroud, Joe H.
Styron, Rose
Sudarkasa, Niara
Suleiman, Ezra N.
Sullivan, Eugene J,
Sullivan, Leon H.
Sullivan, Roger W.
Sullivan, William H-

Summers, Harry G., Jr,
Sunderland, Jack B.
Surrey, Walter Sterling
Suslow, Leo A.
Sutterlin, James S.
Sutton, Francis X,
Sutton, Percy E,
Swank, Emory C.
Swanson, David H
Swearer, Howard R.
Sweitzer, Brandon W.
Swenson, Eric P,
Swigert, James W,
Swing. John Temple
Symington, W Stuart
Sxanion, Peter L.

Taber. George M
Taff William H., IV
Talbot, Phillips
Talbott, Strobe
J an ham, George K.
Tannenwald, Theodore. Jr-
Tanncr. Harold
Tanter, Raymond
Tarn off, Peter
Taubman, William
Taylor, Arthur R.
Taylor, George E-
Taylor, T James, Jr.
Taylor, William L. Jr
Teeters. Nancy H.
Teitelbaum T Michael S.
Tempclsman. Maurice
Tennyson, Leonard B.
Terracciano, Anthony P.
Terry* Sarah M,
Thayer r A. Branson
Theobald. Thomas C.
Thcry, Jane L- Barber
Thoman. G, Richard
Thomas. Barbara S.
Thomas, Brooks
Thomas. Evan W., 11
Thomas, Evan W., Ill
Thomas. Franklin A.
Thomas, Lee B M Jr.
Thomas, Lewis
Thompson, W. Scott
Thompson. William Pratt
Thomson. James A.
Thomson, James C, Jr.
Thornburgh, Dick
Thome! I, Richard P
Thornton* John L
Thomton, Thomas P.
Thorp. Willaid L.
Thomp, Cathryn L
Thurman. M. R
Tillinghast, David R
Tillman. Seth P.
Timothy, Kristen
Tisch, Laurence A.
Todaro, Michael P.
Todman, Ttnence A. ■
Tolbcrt, Kalhryn
ToU, Maynard J r , Jr.

263

Tomlinscm, Alexander C.

Tonclson, Alan

Topping* Seymour

Torn, Robert C.

Traii^ Harry D , 11

Trairi r Russell E.

Trahnor. Bernard E.

Trani, Eugene P.

Travcrs. Peter J,

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Yalman, Nut
Yang, Chen Ning
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Yarmolinsky, Adam
Yco, Edwin H.. Ill
Yergiii, Danid H-
Yoffie, David
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Young, Alice
Youngs Andrew
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Young, Lewis E
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Voung, Nancy
Young, Richard
Young, Stephen B.
Youngman, William S.
Yu, Frederick T. C.
Yudkiu. Richard A.

Zagoria, Donald S,
Zakheim. Dov S.
Zarb, Frank G.
Zartman, I. William
Zcidenstein^ George
Zelnick, C. Robert
Zilkha, Fira K
Zimmerman, Edwin M.
Zimmerman, Peter D,
Zimmerman William
Zimmermann d Warren
Zinberg, Dorothy S.
Zindcr, Norton D.
Zorthian, Barry
Zraket. Charles A.
Zucketman, Mortimer B-
Zumwall, Elmo R., Jr,
Zwick. Charles J.
Zysman, John

264

Does America have a hidden oligarchy?

is U.S. foreign policy run by a closed shop?

What is the Council on Foreign Relations?

It began in 1921 as a front organization for J. P. Morgan and Company. By
World War II it had acquired unrivaled influence on American foreign policy.
Hundreds of U.S. government administrators and diplomats have been drawn
from its ranks — regardless of which party has occupied the White House. But
what does the Council on Foreign Relations stand for? Why do the major media
avoid discussing it? What has been its impact on America's past — and what
is it planning for the future? These questions and more are answered by James
Perloff in The Shadows of Power.

An eye-opening account of a private group that has helped shift American
foreign policy away from America's best interests. Highly recommended.

David B. Funderburk

Former U.S. Ambassador to Romania

Policies linked to the organization described in this book have helped visit
a number of tragedies on the free world, There may be more forthcoming.
James Perloff has cut through a litany of myths to bring out the facts. To not
read this book is to live dangerously.

Philip Crane

United States Congressman

If we want to avoid the disaster of one-world government, if wQ'wish to
preserve our priceless national sovereignty and live through all t me as free
men, then it is imperative that the American people read The Shadows of
Power,

Meldrim Thomson, Jr. j ' »)

Governor of New Hampshire (1973-1979)

There have been many books purporting to explain the "real" reasons for
what happened to us in Vietnam. Unfortunately, most of these hav& been
part of the same old smokescreen from the actual architect of the war, the
American Establishment. Our veterans deserve more than memorials —
they deserve the truth. Here at last is a book where they can find it.

Andrew Gatsis
Brigadier General, US, Army (Ret J

ISBN: 0-88279-1 34-6 Cover design by Don Eckeikamp

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