History of federal government in Greece and Italy

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HISTORY

OF

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

IN GREECE AND ITALY -

\

BY

EDWARD A. FREEMAN

. EDITED BY

J. B. BURY, M.A.

FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN

SECON! EDITION

London
MACMILLAN AND CO.

AND NEW YORK
1893

All rights reserved

‘‘Could the interior structure and regular operation of the Achaian
League be ascertained, it is probable that more light might be thrown
by it on the science of Federal Government,‘ than by any of the like
experiments with which we are acquainted.”

THE FEDERALIST, No. xviii.

First Edition, published 1863, entitled “‘ History of Federal Government,
Srom the foundation of the Achaian League to the disruption of the United
States. Vol. I. General Introduction—History of the Greek Federations.”

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PREFACE BY THE EDITOR

THE first and only volume of Mr. Freeman’s History of Federal
Government appeared in 1863. Soon after its appearance he
left the subject for that of the Norman Conquest, and never
resumed it. It is much to be regretted that he did not carry
out his design, at least so far as to tell the story of the Con-
federation of the Swiss Cantons, and fully discuss Swiss Federal
institutions, even if he had stopped short of the United States.
The most recent Swiss historian of Switzerland, Dierauer, in
his Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (i. p. 265), has
expressed this regret. ‘Man kann es nur lebhaft bedauern dass
der englische Historiker nicht dazu gekommen ist in einer
Fortsetzung seines Werkes die (reschichte der schweizerischen
Eidgenossenschaft, den ‘angesehensten oder lehrreichsten’ Teil
seiner Aufgabe, zu bearbeiten.”

But while the History of Federal Government as a whole
was never completed, the first volume has all the value of a
complete work. In a letter written in 1861, in connexion with
arrangements for the publication of his book, Mr. Freeman
observed that even if the work were never finished “this one
volume—an essay on Federalism and a history of its Greek
form—would be a substantial work in itself.” It was therefore
after his death decided to reprint it as a History of Federal
Government in Greece. The manuscript of an additional chapter,
which was to have been the first in Volume II, and was written
before the author deserted his subject, was discovered among
his papers. It contains a full account of the defective forms of

292406

vi PREFACE BY THE EDITOR

Federalism which have appeared in Italy, comprising the Leagues
of early Italian history, and the Lombard Confederation of a
later age. This discovery has enabled us to adopt the more com-
prehensive title, 4 History of Federal Government in Greece and
Italy. A fragment on the German Confederacy (which was to
have been the beginning of Chapter XI) has been added.

The present work, then, is merely a reprint of the older
volume, with the addition of a new chapter on Italy, and a new
fragment on Germany. The original text has not been altered,
except in a few cases where positive mistakes—afterwards
recognized as such by the author—had crept in. The references
to authorities have been revised. No additions have been made
to the footnotes by the editor, except such as were indicated
by Mr. Freeman himself in an interleaved copy of his work.
The editor has reserved for an Appendix all observations and
corrections which seemed required to bring the history of
Greek Federalism up to date. Inscriptions have been published
since the appearance of Mr. Freeman’s work, which throw
considerable light on some points in the Achaian and /Xtolian
Constitutions. A work of much value, though hardly marked
by the lucidity of exposition which we are accustomed to
expect in French writers, has been devoted to these Leagues by
M. Marcel Dubois, and has been found very useful. It may be
observed that M. Dubois, while his views differ in many respects
from those of Mr. Freeman, fully recognizes his “ érudition
irréprochable.”

The only matter of importance in which Mr. Freeman’s
account of the Achaian and Aétolian Federal systems needs
modification is the Constitution of the Senates. We have now
direct evidence that the Attolian Senate was a body of Repre-
sentatives chosen by the States... We have no such direct
evidence for the Achaian Senate, but we have some distinct
indications pointing in that direction, as M. Dubois has shown ;
and the analogy of the Attolian League confirms these indica-
tions. On the other hand, there is not an atom of evidence

' See Appendix II p. 651, note to p. 262.

PREFACE BY THE EDITOR vil

for Mr. Freeman’s guess that the Achaian Boulé was chosen by
the Federal Assembly.!

This being so, certainly for the Aétolian, and probably for
.the Achaian Senate, a parallel and contrast may be drawn
between the Federal Assemblies of these old Leagues and the
Federal Assembly of modern Switzerland. The object of both
the ancient and the modern Federations was to provide that
both each State as a whole, and each citizen individually,
should have a voice in the Federal Assembly. They necessarily
set about accomplishing this object in very different ways,
because Primary Assemblies were the rule in the age of the
Greek Leagues, and Representative Assemblies are the rule in
modern times. The Federal Assembly, which met at Thermon
or Aigion, consisted of two parts: the Bouleutai or Senators,
elected by the States, and all the Attolian or Achaian citizens
who chose to attend. So, too, the Federal Assembly which
meets at Bern consists of the “Council of States,” composed
of ‘Representatives elected by the States, and the “ National
Council,” composed of Representatives who are elected directly
by the people in the electoral districts, into which each Canton
is divided. Thus the Council of States, corresponding to the
Boulé, represents the States, while the National Council is the
element which in an age of Representative Assemblies responds
to the mass of citizens (πλῆθος) in an age of Primary Assemblies.
Of course, the differences between the two systems are endless.
The Greek system had, in particular, the advantage that un-
represented ‘tminorities—even minorities of one—could attend
the Federal Assembly and speak for themselves. And it is also
evident that, as the Greek Bouleutai were almost certainly
elected in the Assembly of each State, a Representative of
Patrai might be assumed to represent the majority of his fellow-
citizens in a measure in which the member of the Council of
States elected by the State Government of Bern could not be
assumed to represent the opinions of the majority of the Bernese.
Consequently, the citizens of the Greek Leagues often con-

1 See Appendix II p, 643, note to p. 239.

Vili PREFACE BY THE EDITOR

sidered it unnecessary to attend the Assemblies themselves,
knowing that their interests were represented by the Bouleutai ;
and hence the second part of the Assembly was of a very
fluctuating kind. Sometimes the Assembly seems to have con-
sisted altogether of the Boulé. Both the Greek method and
the Swiss method resulted in dividing the Assembly into two
constituent parts; but while the nature of Representative in-
stitutions secures that both parts of the Swiss Assembly are
permanent Chambers, under the Greek system, one part—the
Representative—was permanent, while the other part fluctuated
and sometimes vanished altogether.

No references to contemporary events have been altered,
and the reader must bear in mind that he is reading words
which referred to the situation of Europe and America in 1862
and 1863. He must remember that the war between the North
and the South had not yet been decided, and that two Federal
Governments then existed together in America, the Confederate
States and the United States. He must remember that France
was in the hands of the ‘ Emperor” Louis Napoleon Buonaparte,
and the absurd proposal of a Confederation of Italian princes
with the Pope at its head—put forth “only to become the
laughing-stock of Europe” (p. 75)—was then an event of a
couple of years ago, Elsass and Lothringen were then French
(p. 273); the Ionian islands were under English “ protection ”
(p. 270). If Mr. Freeman had himself issued a new edition of
his work, he would doubtless have brought the book up to date
in this respect, and substituted new comments on the historical
developements in Europe which have taken place since he wrote.
He ventured to foretell (p. 91) that “the United States and
the Confederate States will have exchanged ambassadors before
the year 1941, or even before the year 1869.” He would have
had something to say on the actual issue of the war which
falsified that prophecy. He speculated on the theoretical
possibility of a Federal State of monarchical constitution; he
would have had some observations to make on the great mon-

PREFACE BY THE EDITOR ix

archical Bundesstaat which was established in 1870, and which
seems likely to last “longer than through a single generation ἢ
(p. 75). He would have pointed out that, though Federal in
form, it is not “a real Federation.” The position of Elsass and
Lothringen, incorporated in the “Empire” as Prussian. depen-
dencies, but not members of the Federation, is another instance
of subject districts in a Federal State, and one wonders whether
they will be ultimately elevated, like Ticino, to the position of
equal states. Mr. Freeman did not refer, in his Federal analogies,
to the compulsory Referendum of the Swiss Constitution of 1848 ;
but he would now, doubtless, have had some remarks to make
on the optional Referendum introduced in 1874—that curious
and ingenious attempt to find a substitute for the advantages
of the Greek Ekklésia, in circumstances in which such an Ekklésia
is not possible. The Referendum may be said to constitute a
fourth exception (see p. 53) to the Representative system in
modern Europe and America.

Touching South-Eastern Europe, the remarks with which
Mr. Freeman closed his first volume are as applicable to-day
as they were in 1863. Bulgaria is now only nominally a vassal
state ; the Bulgarians have won their freedom, and have shown
that they are, perhaps, more worthy to possess it than any other
state in the Illyric peninsula. But the “tinkering” policy of
the Treaty of Berlin has not made it less true, and further
tinkering by any such treaties in the future will not make it
less true, that the only safeguard against Austrian and Russian
aggression is a South Slavonic Federation, just as the only safe-
guard of Greece against absorption in the Macedonian monarchy
was found in the Federal tie. In the present circumstances
of the European world, the Illyric peninsula seems naturally
marked out as a field for a most interesting experiment in
Federal politics. One may hope that the only question is
whether the Margos or Washington of the Southern Slaves
will delay his appearance until the peninsula has been entirely
delivered from Turkish bondage, or whether a Federation will
prove the instrument of that deliverance.

x PREFACE BY THE EDITOR

Another question of the day which Mr. Freeman would,
doubtless, have touched upon in a new edition of his work is
that of an ‘Imperial Federation,” as it is called, of the British
Empire. The self-contradictory character of this idea, which
he clearly showed, would have furnished him with a new
illustration, by contrast, of the true meaning of Federalism.
No one who masters his lucid exposition of the nature of
Federal Government in Chapter II is likely either to be misled
by such a phrase or to fall into the opposite error of the vulgar
politician, who never loses an opportunity of confounding a
bond of dependency with a tie of federation. To suppose that
this error is due to a reminiscence of the fact that the states
and kingdoms which the Romans termed “federate” were in
every sense dependencies on Rome and not her equal allies,
would be to credit those who commit it with more historical
knowledge than they are at all likely to possess.

The Index has been prepared by Mrs. A. J. Evans.

TO

SPYRIDON TRIKOUPES,

LATE GREEK MINISTER AT THE COURT OF LONDON

My pEAR Mr. TRIKOUPES,

There is no man to whom I can inscribe so fittingly
as to yourself a volume which deals mainly with the
restoration of Grecian freedom after a period of foreign
oppression. As the native historian of regenerate Greece,
you fill a position strikingly analogous to that of the
illustrious writer who forms my chief guide throughout
the present portion of my work. Like Polybios, your
youth was spent among men and exploits worthy of the
countrymen of Aratos and Philopoimén; like Polybios,
too, your later years have been spent in recording, in
the still living tongue in which he wrote, the great events
of which you were an eye-witness and a partaker. You
have helped to win for your own immediate country an
honourable name among the divisions of the Greek race;
you have helped to place Atolia on the same level as
Achaia, and to raise the name of Mesolongi to a reputation
no lesa glorious than that of Megalopolis. And in one

xii DEDICATION

respect you are more happy than your great predecessor.
Polybios lived to see a time when the freedom of his
country was wholly extinguished, and when all that he
could do for her was to procure for her some small allevia-
tion of her bondage. You have lived to see your country
answer the calumnies of her enemies by conduct which
they cannot gainsay; you have seen Greece once more
draw on her the eyes of admiring Europe by one of the
justest and purest Revolutions in all recorded history.
While all that he could do was to obtain some contemp-
tuous concessions from an overbearing conqueror, you are
called on to take your share in the deliberations of an
Assembly where every honest heart in Europe trusts that
twice-liberated Hellas will be at last allowed to fix her
own destinies. Whatever may be the result of those
deliberations, whether a King is again to sit on the throne
of Theseus or a [resident again to bear the seal of
Lydiadas, that they may lead to the full establishment
of law and freedom in the land where law and freedom
first arose is the earnest wish of

Your sincere and obliged friend,

EDWARD A. FREEMAN.

SOMERLEAZE, WELLS,
January 3rd, 1863.

PREFACE

I TRUST that no one will think that the present work owes its
origin to the excitement of the War of Secession in America.
It is the first instalment of a scheme formed long ago, and it
represents the thought and reading of more than ten years. All
that late events in America have done has been to increase
my interest in a subject which had already long occupied my
thoughts, and, in some degree, to determine me to write at once
what otherwise might have béen postponed for some time longer.

The present volume is mainly devoted to the working of the
Federal system in Ancient Greece. The Federal period of
Grecian history is one which has been generally neglected by
English scholars, and I trust that I may have done something to
bring into more notice a period than which none is richer in
political lessons. But it must be remembered that I am not
writing a history of Greece or a history of Achaia, but a history
of Grecian Federalism. From this difference of object it follows
that I have treated my subject in a somewhat different manner
from that which I should have thought appropriate to a regular
history of Greece or of any other country. First, As a historian
of Federalism, I look to everything mainly as illustrating, or not
illustrating, the progress of Federal ideas. I dwell upon events,
or I harry over them, not according to their intrinsic import-
ance, but according to their importance for my particular
purpose. I have disposed in a line or two of battles which were
of high moment in the history of the world, and I have dwelt
at length on obscure debates and embassies, when their details

xiv PREFACE

happened to throw light on the Achaian Constitution or on the
mode of proceeding in the Achaian Assembly. It so happens
that much of the information most valuable for my purpose
comes in the form of details of this kind, which a general historian
would, naturally and properly, cut very short. I mention this
merely that I may not be thought to have either depreciated
or overvalued subjects which, writing with a special object, I
have looked at mainly from the point of view dictated by that
object.

Secondly, In writing the history, not of a particular country,
but of a form of government which has existed in several coun-
tries, I have constantly endeavoured to illustrate the events and
institutions of which I write by parallel or contrasted events and
Institutions in other times and places. I have striven to make
the politics of Federal Greece more intelligible and more inter-
esting, by showing their points of likeness and unlikeness to the
politics of modern England and America. I should have done
this, in some degree, in a history of any sort, but I have done it
far more fully in a history of a form of Government than I
should have done in an ordinary history of Greece or of any
other country. And I trust that I have not compared ancient
and modern politics in the mere interest of any modern party.
I have certainly not written in the interest of either the North
or the South in the American quarrel. I see too much to be
said for and against both sides to be capable of any strong
partizanship for either. Possibly this may not be a bad frame
of mind in which to approach the history of the quarrel, when
the course of my subject brings me to it. At present, what I
have had to do has mainly been to argue against the false infer-
ences on the subject of Federalism in general which some have
drawn from recent American history. And, if I do not write in
the interest of either side in the American dispute, neither am I
conscious of writing in the interest of any English political party.
I am conscious of holding strong opinions on many points both
of home and foreign politics ; for historical study does more than

PREFACE xv

anything else to lead the mind to a definite political creed ; but,
at the same time, it does at least as much to hinder the growth
of any narrow political partizanship. A historical student soon
learns that a man is not morally the worse for being Whig or
Tory, Catholic or Protestant, Royalist or Republican, Aristo-
crat or Democrat, Unionist or Confederate. He soon learns to
sympathize with individuals among all parties, but to decline to
throw in his lot unreservedly with any party. But he will not
carry his political toleration so far as to confound political differ-
ences and moral crimes. Indignation at successful wickedness is
a feeling of which no honest man will ever wish to rid himself ;
no honest man, above all no honest student of history, will ever
bring himself to look on the Tyrant whose very being implies
the overthrow of right with the same eyes with which he looks
on the mere political adversary whose motives may be as honour-
able as his own.

In writing the present volume, I have endeavoured to com-
bine a text which may be instructive and interesting to any
thoughtful reader, whether specially learned or not, with notes
which may satisfy the requirements of the most exacting scholar.
In the text therefore I have, as far as possible, avoided techni-
calities, and I have thrown the discussion of many points of
detail into the notes. I have throughout been lavish in the
citation of authorities, as I hold that an author should not
require his readers to take anything on his bare word, but should
give them the means of refuting him out of his own pages, if
they think good. If I have overdone it in the matter of refer-
ences, I am sure that every real student will allow that it is a
fault on the right side. I have felt such deep gratitude to those
authors who really act as guides and not as rivals to the original
writers, and I have felt so aggrieved at those who follow another
course, that I was determined to do all I could to avoid blame on
this most important score.

The nature of the authorities for this period of Grecian

xvi PREFACE

history has been explained in several passages of the volume
itself, and the chief among them, Polybios and Plutarch, ought
to be familiar to every scholar. But besides the evidence of
historians, there are few parts of history on which more light is
thrown by the evidence of coins. In this branch of my subject,
I am bound, at every step, to acknowledge the benefits which 1
have derived from the numismatic knowledge of my friend the
Hon. John Leicester Warren. A careful comparison of his
numismatic and my historical evidence has enabled us together
to fix several points which probably neither of us could have
fixed separately. I should have drawn more largely on Mr.
Warren’s resources, which have been always open to me, were
scholars not likely to have the benefit of his researches into
Greek Federal Coinage in a separate form.

At the risk of offending some eyes by unaccustomed forms, I
have spelled Greek names, as closely as I could, according to the
Greek orthography. This practice is now very general in
Germany, and it is gradually making its way in England. Mr.
Grote first ventured to restore the Greek K; Professor Max
Miiller, in the Oxford Essays, went several degrees further. For
the Latin spelling, nothing can be pleaded but custom—a
custom, which is merely a part of that unhappy way of looking
at everything Greek through a Latin medium, which has so long
made havoc of our philology and mythology. In exactly the
same way, serious mischief—I believe I may say serious political
mischief—has been done by our habit of looking at nearly every-
thing in modern Europe through a French medium, and of
speaking of German, Italian, and Flemish places by French
corruptions of their names. Strange to say, while we clothe
Italian names in a French dress, we usually clothe Modern Greek
names in an Italian dress. Inexplicable confusion is the neces-
sary result; names which have not altered since the days of
Homer are written in endless ways to adapt them to a Western
pronunciation which is hardly ever that of Englishmen. The
island of Mélos has never changed its name, and its name is

PREFACE XVil

sounded in the same way by a Greek and by an Englishman. It
seems eminently absurd to talk about Mélos in the history of the
Peloponnésian War, but, if the island happens to be mentioned
in a modern book or newspaper, to change its name into that of
Milo the slayer of Clodius. The only way to preserve consist-
ency is to write every Greek name, old or new, according to the
native spelling, and to leave each reader to pronounce according
to accent or quantity as he pleases. This I have done through-
out, with two exceptions. When a name has a really English,
as distinguished from a Latin or French, form, such as Philip,
Ptolemy, Athens, Corinth, I should never think of making any
change ; indeed I rather regret that we have not more forms of
the kind. Again, a few very familiar names, like Thermopyle,
Beotia, etc., though the form is not thoroughly English, I have
left as they are usually spelled. The change which has the most
unusual look is the substitution of the Greek ai for @ in the
ending of plural feminine names. In many cases, however, there
is also a singular form in use, which I have preferred wherever

I could.

I trust that the second volume, containing the history of the
Swiss and other German Leagues, will follow the present with
all reasonable speed. But it involves a minute examination of
some very obscure portions of history, and I cannot fix any
certain time for its appearance.

SoMERLEAZE, WELLS,
January 2nd, 1863,

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
GENERAL INTRODUCTION \
PAGE.—..
Object of the work . . . .
Federalism a compromise ; therefore hard to ‘define . . . . 1
General definition for historical purposes. . . . . - 2.
Definition of a perfect Federal Government . . ‘2/7 |

Internal Sovereignty of the several members, combined with the |
Sovereignty of the Union in all external matters

Wider range of the history . .
Four great examples of Federal Government.

1, The Achaian League, B.c. 281—146

2. The Swiss Cantons, A.D. 1291—1862 .

3. The United Provinces, a.p. 1579—1795

4. The United States, a.p. 1778—1862
Characteristics of the Four Great Confederations .
The German Confederation . .
Other ancient examples ; in Greece ; in ‘Italy ; ; in ykia
Other German Leagues ; the Hanse Towns . . . .
Other American Confederations . . . . . . . . 6

᾿
i]

DAA μα S Pw wh HP wh OD

CHAPTER II

CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED WITH OTHER
POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Illustrations of the relations of the members in a perfect Federal
Commonwealth . . . . . . . . 7

Two conditions of a true Federal Government . 8

Two classes of Federal Commonwealths; First, the “ System of Con-
Jederated States,” where the Central Power deals with the State
Governments only . . . . . . 8

XX CONTENTS
PAGE
Second, the “ Composite State,” where the Central Power acts directly
on all citizens . . . 9
The distinction one rather of means than of ends, and not always to be
drawn in history . . . . 10—11
Different classifications of governments ; Ist, into Monarchy, Aristo-
cracy, and Democracy; 2nd, into Absolute and Constitutional
Governments 12
Need of acrossdivision . . 12
Federalism a compromise between Great and Small States 13
Division into Great and Small States irrespective of their several
form overnment . . . . . . 18
Definition ὃ ge and Small States . 14
Characteristics of the Independent City 15
Patriotism confined to the,City 15
— Full developement of city-independence in Greece 16
Early and comparatively unimportant approaches to Constitutional
Monarchy and to Federal Republicanism 16
— Municipal charadter of the Greek Commonwealths, ‘aristocratic and
democratic alike . . . . . . . . . 16—17
— Civic Tyrannies . 17
— Condition of Dependent Cities i in Greece . . 18
- Difference between a dependent City and a member of a a Federation 18
Comparison of dependent cities with English Colonies . . 20
No means of general tncorporation supplied by the eystem οἵ Inde.
pendent Cities 21
Incorporation carried as far as possible by Athens i in the case s of the old
Attic Cities . . . 22
Its impossibility in the case of the later Athenian Empiro . . . 22
Dependencies of medieval and modern Italian cities, and of Swiss
Cantons . . . . . . 5 28
— Effects of incorporation at Rome . . 23
Town-autonomy in medisval Europe ; the independence of the cities
modified by the claims of the Emperors . . . . . 24—25
— General view of the system of Independent Cities . 26
Varieties in internal Constitutions and in external relations . . 26—27
Different relations between the City and its Territory . 28
Comparative gain and loss of the system . 29
- Advantages of small Commonwealths 29
Political Education of the individual Citizen 29
~ Comparison with the English House of Commons 3]
— Contrast with the Florentine Parliament 31
~ Connexion of Athenian history with the subject of Federalism 32
Greater responsibility of the Athenian citizen than of the English
member . . . . . . . . 88
Position of the English Ministry . 33

CONTENTS χχὶ

PAGE
Received duties of the private member ; different duties of the Athenian
Citizen . . . . . . 84
—The Assembly a Government as well as a Parliament . . . . 85
— Functions of the Senate and of-the Generals . . . . . 85
- Nothing analogous to “Office” and “ Opposition ” . . . . 985
— Direct Diplomatic action of the Assembly . . . . . . 86
Effect of these powers on individual citizens . . . . . 86
" - Athens the highest type ofthe system. . . . . «. | 87
Opportunity for the developement of genius. . . . . . 38
Intensity of patriotism in small States . . . . . . . 88
Identification of all citizens with the City . . . . . . 89
~ Bad side of the system of city-commonwealths . . . . . 89
Their greatness less permanent than that of greater States . . . 40
Common fallacy as to the weakness of small States . . 40
~ Different positions of small States where they are merely exceptions, and
where they are the general rule. . . . . . 41—42
Position of Free Cities in the Middle Ages. . . . . . 42
Constant warfare among Free Cities. . . . 42
Force of antipathy between neighbouring towns ; 5 examples in Greece
and Italy . . . . 42—43
Comparison between citizen- soldiers and professional soldiers . . 44
Severity of the Laws of War . . . . © « 45
~ Increased bitterness of faction in small States . . . . . 46
Local disputes commonly more bitter than general oncs . . . 48
—~General balance of gain and loss in small States . . . . 48
-Definition of large States, irrespective of their forms of government - 60
-- Two immediate results; smaller importance of the Capital ; represen:
tative character of National Assemblics . 50
Position of the Capital in a large State; its influence either indirect or
violent... . . . . 60—51
~~ Necessity of representative institutions ὦ ina Free State of large size . 52
~ Representative Government not necessarily Cabinet Government . . δῶ
Exceptions to the representative system in modern Europe and America ὅϑ8
Election of Polish Kings . . . . . 54
Napoleonic Universal Suffrage ; its delusive natnre . . . » 65
English and American ways of attaining the same object. . . 656
Election of the American President practically another exception . δὲ «
Its difference from Napoleonic Universal Suffrage . . . . 587
—General view of the system of large States. . . . . . 87
— Extent of local diversity in large States . 58
—Opposite systems of Centralization and of Local ‘Freedom independent
of the form of the Central Government . . . . . 59
— Difference between Municipal and Federal rights . . . . 59
— General characteristics of large States ; balance of gain and loss - 60—61

Advantages of great States . . . . . . . . 61

ΧΧῚΪ CONTENTS

Peace secured to a large country .
Lessening of local prejudices
Lessening of the evils of War

~ Lessening of party strife. . . .
Disadvantages of large States .

Inferior political education .

Ignorance and corruption of many electors .

Different forms of bribery at Athens and in England

These vices inherent in the systein . .

Balance of advantage in favour of large States .

Federal Governmenta system intermediate between Greatand Small States

It combines, though in an inferior degree, the special advantages of both
systems .

Federalism ἃ compromise ; ; therefore suited only to certain positions 69—70

Popular prejudices on the subject . .
No general deductions to be made from recent American events
Instance of similar disruptions i in Monarchies .
No case against Federalism in general, nor against the original American
Union . .
Testimony of the Southern States to the Federal Principle
— A large State may be a Republic without being a Federation
No argumént to be drawn from failures in England and France
—~ A Federation may consist of Monarchies
Imperfect approaches to kingly Federalism in the Feudal system
— A strictly Federal Monarchy unlikely to last . .
Other approaches to Federal Monarchy
— Instance of two or more Kingdoms under one King
—— Members of a Federation may be either Cities or States of considerable
size
Difference of scale i in Europe and America to be considered
*“General view of Federalism as an intermediate system . .
Intermediate position as regards government of the whole territory
Intermediate position as regards Political Education
~ Comparison of a State with a Kingdom, and with a consolidated
Republic .
Circumstances under which a . Federal Union. is desirable
“~ General result of Modern Federalism
Results of the American Union .
Its comparative permanency as compared with Fre ance .
~ Evils which the Federal Union has hindered . .
‘ Alleged weakness of the Federal tie ; true in a sense, but not necessarily
injurious
Circumstances under which 8 , Federal Union may be lasting
Circumstances under which it may be useful as a transitional state
—Cases for consolidation, and for separation

CONTENTS XXill

PAGE

Easiness of separation when needed ; its good side . 89
Probability that a Federation will be less anxious than a kingdom ta to

recover revolted members... 91

Inconsistency of striving to retain unwilling ‘members . ~ » «6 « 9

Witness of Switzerland in favour of the Federal ayetem . . . 92

Recapitulation . . . . . . . - . 04

CHAPTER III

OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL

-»The Amphiktyonic Council not a true Federal Government . . . 95
Origin of the Error ; opinions of modern writers . . . . . 96
— The Council a Religious, not a Political, body _.. . . . . 97
The Delphic Amphiktyony only one of several. . . . . 98
~ Its incidental political action . . . . . . 98
Amphiktyonic Crusades . . . . * 99
— The Council becomes the tool of particular States . . . . 100
— No inherent force in its Decrees . . . 100
- Indirect importance of the Council in the History of Federalism » . 101
~Its close approach to a Federal system, without ever growing
into one . . . . 101
~ Its constitution unsuited to historical Greece . . . . . 108
—-The Amphiktyony an Union of Tribes, not of Cities . . 108
—Unfair distribution of the Votes; analogy of the unreformed
Parliament . . . . 103—104
These incongruities less palpable i in a religious body . . . . 104
Amphiktyonic championship of Philip . . . . . 105
Reforms under Augustus ; new arrangement of the votes . . 105—106
Approach to Representative forms in the Council . . . . 108
-The Amphiktyonic body Representative, because not really a
Government . . 109
Political nullity of the Council daring the grater part of Grecian
History . . . . 109

CHAPTER IV

OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE
81. Of the Northern Leagues

An approach to Federal Government not uncommon among the ruder

portions of the Greek nation . . . . . . 112
The Phékian League as described by Pausanias oe . . » 118
Probably a revival of an earlier Teague rr 118
The Akarnanian League. . . . . . . «. 114

XX1V CONTENTS

Various Notices, B.c. 481—167

Constitution of the League .

The Epcirot League. .
Early Republican developement i in 1 Chaonia and Thesprotis .
Constitutional Monarchy in Molossis .

Foundation of the Federal Republic of Epeiros, B.C. 239299
No real Federalism in Thessaly . . .
Position and Power of the Thessalian Tages

Monarchy of Jasén, B.c. 872

Undisguised Tyranny of his successors, B.C. 370— 359
Thessaly a dependency of Macedonia . .

Legislation οὗ T. Quinctius Flamiuinus, B.o. 197.

§ 2. Of the Beotian League

History of the Bocotian League; its warnings .
Dangers of an overwhelming Capital in a Federal State .
Legal and practical position of Thebes in the Beeotian League

PAGE
114—115
116
116
117
117
117
118
118
119
119
119
120

120
120
122

The circumstances of Beotia suited to a Synoikismos, not toa Federal

system .
Effects on general Grecian History
Three Periods of Boeotian History
First Period, n.c. 776—387 . . .
Beotia both an Amphiktyony and ἃ Political League .

Use of the words ‘‘Beotian” and ‘‘Theban” by Thucydides and

Xenophén . . .
Constitution of the League . .
Subject Districts or Subordinate Leagues .
Office of the Bocotarchs and of the Four Senates .
Federal and Local Archons .

123
128
124
124
124

125
125
. 126
126—127
128

Theban Archon a mere Pageant ; ; real power vested in “the Polemarchs 129

Power of Thebes shown in the History of Plataia .
Secession of Plataia from the League .
Ill-feeling between Thebes and other Towns

Theban claims at the Peace of Antalkidas

Dissolution of the Bccotian League, B.c. 387

Second Period, 8.0. 8387 —334

The Peace carried out in the interest of Sparta
Spartan garrisons in the Cities ; Restoration of Plataia
Oligarchic and Democratic Parties .
Weakness of the Democratic element in Beotia

Thebes, hitherto the centre of Oligarchy, becomes, oy her Revolution

[Β.0. 379], the centre of Democracy
Career of Pelopidas and Epameinéndas
Bad results of Theban supremacy
Nominal revival of the League

129
129
130
131
132
132
132
133
133
133

138—134
134
134
134

CONTENTS ΧΧΥ
PAGE
Real subjection of the Lesser Cities to Thebes. . . . . 135
Destruction of Beotian Towns . . . . . 136
General dislike towards Thebes throughout Greece - . . 187
Gradual growth of the Theban claims . . . . . 138
Parallel between Thebes in Βοωοίϊα and Sparta in Lakénia ss . 189
The claims of Thebes exclude all true Federalism in Beeotia . . . 140
Restoration of the destroyed Towns . . . . 140
Destruction of Thebes by Alexander ine. 386) ᾿ Zealous co-operation
of the Beotian Towns . . . . . . . 141
Third Period, s.c. 8338---172 . . . . . . 141
Restoration of Thebes by Kassander, B.c. $16 . . . 141
Restoration of the League with a modified Headship ' in “Thebes . . 142
Insignificance of Boeotia in later Greece . . . . 142
Constitution of the League . . . . . 148
Dissolution of the League by Quintus Marcius, Β.0. 17 1 . . . 144
8 3. Of Ῥαγίοιια Allempts at Federal Systems—Tonia, Olynthos,
Arkadia, ete.
Unsuccessful attempts at Federal Union . . . . . . 145
Advice of Thalés to the Ionians . . . . 145

Degree of connexion among the Ionian Cities ; no true Federal Union 145—146
Their relation essentially Amphiktyonic ; its differences from the elder

Amphiktyonies . . . . . 145—146
Thalés probably intended a true Federal Union . . . . 147
His advice not taken ; its rejection a striking illustration of Greck

political ideas . . . 147
Attempted League of Olynthos dissolved by Sparta, B.C, 882 . . 149
Fatal results to Greece from its dissolution . . . . 149
Views of Mr. Grote too favourable to the designs of Olynthos . . 150
Proceedings of Olynthos as described by Kleigenés . . . 150
The terms offered acceptable to the Macedonian Towns, but rejected by

the Greeks of Chalkidiké , . . . 161
Their real nature not Federal Union, but absorption into Olynthos . 162
Federal Union of Arkadia, B.c. 370. . . . . . . 164
Little previous importance οὗ Arkadia . . . . . 154
History of Mantineia ; her destruction and restoration . . . 154—155
Arkadian Union hitherto merely Amphiktyonic . . . . . 155
Lykomédés designs atrue Federal Union 6... . . . . 155
Temporary success of the Federal scheme . . . . . 156
Foundation of Megalopolis . . . . . . . . 156
General adhesion of Arkadia to the League . . . . 157
Constitution of the League; the Assembly ὁ of Ten Thousand . 157—158
Probable existence of a Senate. . . . 158
Institution of a sole General . . . . . 159

Foundation of Megalopolis ; its advantageous position . . . 159—160

ΧΧΥῚ CONTENTS

PAGE

Decline of the Arkadian League ; history of Megalopolis . . 160—161
Pretended scheme of Federal Union in Euboia, B.c. 351 . . . 162
Evidence of the growth of Federal ideas in Greece . . . . 162
8 4. Of the Lykian League
The Lykian League ; its excellent Constitution . . . . 162
Strabo's description and testimony to its practical working . . 163—164
Merits of the Lykian Constitution ; no Capital . . . . . 164
The Assembly Primary, not Representative . . . . . . 164
Apportionment of votes to numbers. . . . . . . 165
Approach to Representative Government. . . . 166
A Senate not mentioned, but to be inferred from analogy . . . 166
Federal Magistrates. . . . . 166
Date and Origin of Federal Government i in Lykia . . . . 167
Relation of the Lykians to the Grecks . . . . . . 167
Traces of Federalism before the subjection of Rhodes . . . . 167
Lykia subject to Rhodes, B.c. 188 . . . . . . . 167
Lykia independent, B.c. 168 . . . . . . 168
Origin of the Constitution described by Strabo . . . . . 168
Destruction of the League by Claudius, a.p. c. 50 . . . . 169
CHAPTER V
ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE ...
§ 1. General Character of the History of Federal Greece

Common neglect in England of the History of Federal Greece _.. 171
Earlier Grecian History mainly the History of Athens; nullity of

Athens in the Federal Period . . . . . 172
Comparison between the earlier and later History of Greece . . 174
Wide spread of Hellenic culture . . 174
Importance of this age in Universal History and ὦ in the History « of the

Greek race. . . . . 175
Effects of Alexander's Conquests . . . . . . . . 175
Character of the age of Polybios . . . . . . . 175
Comparison between Thucydidés and Polybios . . . . - 176
Beginnings of the Federal Revival, B.c, 281 . . . ; . 177
Gaulish Invasion . . . . . . 178
Reconstruction of Macedonia under the Antigonids . . . . 178
Revival of the Achaian League . 179

Opposite aims of Macedonia and Achaia; position of the ‘Antigonid Kings 179

Condition of Greece under Philip and Alexander, and under the
Successors. . . . . . 179—180

Position of revived Macedonia and Greece . . . . . . 180

= «'- -

te el

CONTENTS XXVii

PAGE
Comparison of Macedonia in Greece with Austria in Italy. . . 181
Generous aims of the Achaian League . . . 188
An earlier establishment of Federalism in Greece not desirable - « 183
Effects of the League . . . . . . . . . . 184

8 2. Origin and Early Growth of the League

Growth of Federal ideas in Greece in the Fourth Century B.c. . . 185
Further Federal reaction against Macedonian influences . . . 185
Early History of Achaia ; early Union of the Achaian Towns . . 186
Probable greater laxity of the bond during the Old League . . . 187
Achaia daring the Peloponnésian War. - . . . 187
History of Pelléné ; Tyranny of Chairén, B.c. 368—885 . . 187—188
Achaia under the Successors and under Antigonos Gonatas, B.c. 314—

288 . . . . . . . . . 189
Final dissolution of the Old League . . . . 190
The Twelve original Cities ; loss οὗ Heliké and of Olenos . . . 190
Traces of Federal action under the Old League. 191
Beginnings of the revived League; Union of Patrai and Dyn [Β. C. 280)

of Tritaia and Pharai . . 191
Union of Aigion, Boura, and Keryneia, B.C. 275 . . . . . 192
Extension of the League over all Achaia . . . . . 192
Loss sustained by Patrai in the Gaulish War . . . . . 192
Quiet and peaceful growth of the League. . . 198
Markos of Keryneia probably the true Founder of the League . . 193
Iseas of Keryneia abdicates the Tyranny . 194
Nature of the Greek Tyrannies ; difference between their earlier and

later forms . . . . . . . . . . . 194

§3. Of the Achaian Federal Constitution
Probable formal enactment of the Federal Constitution, B.c. c. 274 . 198

Sources of information. . . . . 198
The Constitution formed for the Achaian Towns only . . . . 198
Democratic Constitution of the League. . . . 198
Differences between Achaian and Athenian Democracy . . . . 199
Independence of the several Cities . . . . . . . 199
Subject Districts or Dependent Towns . . 200
Tendencies to assimilation among the members of the ‘League, both in
Achaia and in America . . . . . . . . 200
The League really a National Government . . . . 202
No independent Diplomatic Action in the several Cities . . 202
Comparison with America ; the restriction less strict in Achaia . 202—208
Particular Embassies by licence of the Federal body . . . . 204
Later exceptions under Roman influence. . . . . 204

The Federal Assembly ; its Democratic Constitution . . . . 205

XXViil CONTENTS
. PAGE
Aristocratic elements in Achaia . . 206
Contrast with Athens ; the Achaian Constitution a nearer approach to
modern systems . . 206
Causes of the difference, arising mainly from the greater extent of terri-
tory in Achaia. . . . . . . . 207
The Assembly practically Aristocratic . . . . . . 207
Its nature not understood by Continental scholars . . . . 208
Analogies in England . . . . . . . . . . 209
Practical Democratical elements . . . . . . . . 210
Votes taken by Cities, not by heads. . . . 211
Advantages and disadvantages of this system of voting . . 211-912
General merits of the Achaian Constitution . . . . 214
Short and unfrequent Meetings of the Assembly 5 consequent restric-
tions on its powers . . . 214—215
The Initiative practically in the Government . . . 215
Place of Mccting ; first Aigion, afterwards other Cities ; ; advantages of
Aigion . . . . 215—216
Greater power of Magistrates i in Achaia than at Athens . . . 216
The Achaian Magistrates form a ““ Government” . . . . 217
Comparison with America and England . . . . . . 217
Various Federal Offices . 219
The Ten Ministers; probably “chosen from all the Cities indis-
criminately . . . . . . . 220
Relations of the Ministers to the General . . . . . . 221
An Achaian ‘‘ Caucus” . . . . . . . . . 222
The President or General. . . . . . 228
Powers and number of the Generals in other Greek States . . . 223
Two Generals of the Achaian League reduced to One . . 223
Extensive powers of the Office; comparison with a modern First
Minister . . . . . . . . . 224
Comparison οὗ Aratos and Periklés . . . . 225
Greater importance of Office in Achaia than at Athens. . 226
Comparison of the Achaian General], the American President, and the
English First Minister . . 227
Closer approach to the English system. in Achaia, owing to the General
being himself a Member of the Assembly . . 227
Greater power in the General necessary in a Federal than in a a City
Democracy . . . 228
Chief Federal Offices unpaid, but without a property qualification 229—230
Power of summoning Assemblies vested in the General in Council . 231
The Ministers act as Speakers of the Assembly . . . ., 231
Joint action of the General and Ministers in diplomatic matters . , 282
Unrestrained power of the General in War . . . 233

Union of military and political powers contrary to modern usage . . 238
The General’s title military, but his badge of office civil ὁ. . . 284

_ ᾿

—_ a eee, ee es ee ee 2 ~

CONTENTS ΧΧΙΧ
PAGE

Athenian experience on the union of civil and military powers ; their
gradual separation . . . . 234—235
The Achaian system a reaction ; its disadvantages . . . 285

The Presidential interregnum aggravated by the union of powers. 235—236
Question of re-election of the President ; the Achaian General incapable

of immediate re-election . . . . . . . 286---287
The Senate . . . . . . 289
Financial and Military policy of the League . . . . . . 241
Military Contingents ordered by the Assembly . . . . . 242
Mercenaries ; Federal garrisons . 242
General comparison between the Achaian League and the United

States ; their close general resemblance . 243
Differences between a Confederation of Cities and a Confederation of

States . . . . 248--244
Analogies and diversities i in the position of the President . . . 244
No exact parallel in Achaia to the American Senate. . . . 246
Closer analogy of the Norwegian Lagthing . . . . . . 247
Higher position of the Achaian Ministers. . . . 248
Achaia the more democratic in theory, and América in practice . . 248
The American Constitution not a conscious imitation of the Achaian . 249

Remarkable treatment of the Achaian History in the ‘“‘ Federalist” 7 . 249

An unconscious likeness to the ancient parallel, more valuable than a
conscious one . . . . . . . . . . 251
CHAPTER VI ᾿

ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ATOLIAN LEAGUE

General resemblances and differences between the Leagues of Achaia

and Atolia; their practical teaching . . 252
Early History of Atolia ; probable early appr oach to Federal Union 254—255
Ztolian acquisition of N aupaktos. B.c. 3388; . . . . 255
The League in the reign of Alexander. B.c. 336—323. . . . 256
Share of the #tolians in the Lamian War. 3.c. 323—322 . . . 256
AXtolia during the Wars of the Successors. . . . . . 257
Glimpses of tolian Constitution δὲ thistime . . . . . 257
Share of the Atolians in the Gaulish War. 3.0. 280, . . . 267
Annexation of Hérakleia_ . . 258
Earlier developement of tolia in some points ; ; closer union of the

Cantons . . . . . 258
Etolia a League of Districts rather than of Cities . 259
Democratic character of the Teague tempered with Aristocratic !

elements. . . . . . . 260—261
Powers of the Assembly . . . . . . . . . 261

The Senate or Apoklétoi_ . . . . . . . . 262

xxx CONTENTS

PAGE

Federal Magistrates. . . . . . . . . . 268
Powers of the General . . . . . 263
Foreign Policy of the Leagne ; contrast with Achaia . . . . 265
Variety of relations in the Atolian League . . . . . 268
Differences of position among the conquered states . . 269
Comparisons with the different relations of British Dependencies . . 270
Comparison between Atolia and Switzerland . . . . . 271

CHAPTER VII

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE ACHAIAN
LEAGUE TO THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA.—B.C, 281—222

§ 1. From the Foundation of the Achaian League to the Deliverance of

Corinth
B.C. 281—243
B.C.

284—272 Revolutions of Greece and Macedonia during the first years of
the League .°. . 276

State of Poleponnésoe ; favourable position of the Achaian
League . . - . 276—277
261—251 Ten years blank in 1 Grecian history . . . . . 277
255 Institution of the sole Generalship . . . . 277
Biographical character of the Achaian history . . . 278
680—580 History of Sikyén ; ita early Tyrants . . . . . 279
365 Euphrén founds Democracy . . . . . . . 279
308—301 Sikyén under the Successors . . . . . . 279
301—251 Second period of Tyrants. . . . 280
Administration of Timokleidas and Kleinias . . . . 280
264 Tyranny of Abantidas ; escape of Aratos to Argos . . 280
252—251 Tyranny of Paseas and ‘of Nikoklés . 281
251 Deliverance and internal pacification of Sikyén by Aratos 982. 984
251 Annexation of Sikyén to the Achaian League . . . 285
Importance and novelty of the step. . . . . 285
Sikyén admitted on equal terms . . . . 286

251—245 Position of Aratos; his relations to Antigonos and
Ptolemy . . . . . 287—288
245 Aratos elected General of the League . . . . . 288
His permanent position and character . . . . 288—289
Effect of the union of civil and military powers. . . 292
245—244 First Generalship of Aratos . . . 292
War with ZXtolia; defeat of the Beotians at ‘Chairéneia 292—293
243—242 Second Generalship of Aratos . . . 293—294

Deliverance of Corinth, and its accession to the League . 204
Accession of Megara, Troizén, and Epidauros . . 294—295

me ee ee, eee, ee Fe ee “---

CONTENTS χχχὶ

B.C. PAGE

Position of Athens and Argos . . . . . . 295
Achaian invasion of Attica . . . . . 295
Vain attempt to attach Athens to the League . . 296
Condition of Argos: succession of the Argefsn Tyrants . 296
Tyranny of Aristomachos the First . . . 297
Aratos encourages conspiracies against him . . . . 297
Greek view of Tyrants and Tyrant-slayers. . 297

Death of Aristomachos the First: succession of -Asistippos
the Second . . . . 80Ὶ
243---242 Vain attempt of Aratos on Argos | : . . . 3801
Suit at Mantineia between Aristippos and the League . . 802
Ptolemy Philadelphos becomes the ally of the League . . 802
Aratos’ pension from Ptolemy . 308

Illustration of the Achaian Constitution supplied by the firet
two Generalships of Aratos . . . . 808-- 804

§ 2. From the Deliverance of Corinth to the Annexation of Argos

B.C, 243—228

241—240 Third Generalship of Aratos . . . . . . . 805
Relations of the League with Sparta. . . . . 805
Contrast between Agis and Aratos . . . 806
Difference in their plans for the campaign ; Agia retires 806---807
Capture and recovery of Pelléné . . . 807
Truce with Antigonos ; alliance with Etolia . . . 808
239 Death of Antigonos Gonatas . . . . . . 808
The Démétrian War. . . . 808
239 Unsuccessful attempt of Aratos on Peiraieus . . . 809
Illustrations of the position of Aratos . . 809

239—229 Various attempts on Athens; feeling towards Aratos
there. . . . . . . 810
243—229 Attempts of Aratos on Argos . . . . . . 811
Kleénai joins the League. . . . . . . 812

Death of Aristippos the Second: tyranny of Aristomachos
the Second . . . . . . 812
Rival celebrations of the Nemean Games . . . . 818
Extension of the two Leagues in Arkadia . . . . 814
Revolutions of Mantineia . - 815
Union of Megalopolis with the Achaian League ; its effects . 816
Character οὗ Lydiadas . . . 815
288 Lydiadas chosen General . . . . . . . 817
Rivalry of Aratos and Lydiadas_. . . . . . 818

231 Second Generalship οὗ Lydiadas_ . . . . . . 819

XXxii CONTENTS

B.C. PAGE
289—229 Affairs of Northern Greece ; Revolution in Epeiros . . 820
First political intercourse with Rome . . . . $821
Hostility of the Atolians towards Akarnania . . . 82]
239—229 Akarnanian Embassy to Rome 321
281 Siege and relief of Mededén ; Etolian Assembly in the
camp . . 922
230 Ravages of the Tyrians i in Peloponnésos and Epeiros . . 824
Alliance of Epeiros and Akarnania with the Illyrians . . $24
229 Joint expedition of the two Teagnes to relieve ὁ Korkyra « . 3825
Death of Markos . . . . . . 82ὅ
Démétrios of Pharos. . . . . . . . 826
Interference of Rome . . . 826
229 Korkyra, Apollénia, and Bpidamno become Roman allies . $26
Humiliation of Illyria . . 826
228 Roman Embassies to the two Leagues, and honorary
Embassies to Corinth and Athens . . 327
Eventual results of Roman interference . . . . . 828
229 Inaction of Macedonia ; death οἵ Démétrios . . . . 828
229—221 Protectorate and reign of Antigonos Désén . , . . 829
Advance of the League after the death οἵ Démétrios _.. . 829
229 Application of the Athenians to Aratos when out of office . 330
Aratos buys the Macedonians out of Attica . . . 880
Progress of the League ; union of Aigina and Hermioné . 881
Unauthorized negociations of Aratos with Aristomachos of
Argos. . . . . . . . 881
Lydiadas interferes as General . 332

229—228 His proposal for the union of Argos rejected at the instance
of Aratos, but carried on the motion of Aratos as

General . . . . . . . . . 832—333
Aristomachos General . . . . . . . 833
Union of Phlious with the League . . . . . 884
Estimate of the conduct of Aratos . . . . 884

228 Commanding position of the Achaian League . . . 834

§ 3. From the beginning of the war with Kleomenés to the opening of
negociations with Macedonia

B.C. 227—224
871—227 Internal condition of Sparta . . . . . . 88
241 Reform and fate of Agis . . . . . . 837
28θ--- 222 Reign of Kleomenés . . . . . . . 887
226—225 Revolution οὗ Kleomenés’. . . . . 887
Relations between Sparta and the League . 888

Different position of Sparta from the cities delivered by Aratos 339
War acceptable on both sides . . . . . . 840

- -

eee. ἦς μπθσαν.ὅ ‘

= =

4 en eR, «αὐτο, aa μεσ ανν....

CONTENTS XXXili

B.C. PAGE
Position of the Atolians; their inaction throughout the

Kleomenic War... . . . . . . 841

Their acquisitions in Thessaly . - . 841

228 Spartan acquisition of the tolian towns i in Arkadia . . 842

Achaian interests involved in this annexation . . . 842

Deliberations of the Achaian Government. . . . 848

Attempt of Aratos on Tegea and Orchomenos . . . 848

227 Kleomenés fortifies Athénaion . . 344
Achaian declaration of war; annexation of Kaphyai to the
League . . . 844
227—226 Generalship of Aristomachos ; battle hindered by the inter-
ference of Aratos . . . 844—346
226 Indignation against Aratos ; Uydindas ἃ stands " against him for
the Generalship . . . 846—847
226—225 Twelfth (ἢ) Generalship of Aratos . . . . 847
Aratos’ campaign in Elis ; his defeat at Mount Lykaion . 847
Mantineia prised by Aratos and re-admitted to the
347—848
Results of ‘the recovery of Mantineia ; temporary depression
at Sparta. . . 849
226 Battle of Ladokeia; death of Lydiades . . . . 350—851

Utter defeat of the Achaians ; indignation against Aratos . 351
Assembly at Aigion ; strange vote of censure on Aratos . 852
Aratos contemplates resignation, but recovers his influence . 353
225—224 Generalship of Hyperbatas . . . . . . . 888

Kleomenés’ Revolution at Sparta . ‘ . . . 353

His successes in Arkadia ; he recovers Mantineia . . . 854

224 Third victory of Kleomenés at Hekatombaion . . 354

Position of Aratos and of Kleomenés_ . . . . $55—356

Probable nature of the supremacy claimed Py Kleomenés . 857

Aratos begins to look to Macedonia _. . . 859.
Difference between his view and that of " Plutarch or of

modern writers. . . . . . . 8ὅ9---860

§ 4. From the Opening of Negociations with Macedonia to the
end of the War with Kleoments

B.C. 224—221

224 Twofold negociations with Sparta and Macedonia . . . 861
Beginning of negociations with Kleomenés_ . . . 861
224—228 Aratos declines the Generalship ; Timoxenos elected - « 862
Beginning of negociations with Antigonos . 362

Dealings of Aratos with Megalopolis ; commission from M eya-
lopolis to the Federal Assembly . . . 863
Megalopolitan envoys allowed to go to Macedonia . . 3864

iy

XXXIV CONTENTS

B.C. PAGE
Their favourable reception by Antigonos ; letter from Anti-
gonos read in the Federal Assembly ; speech of Aratos

thereon . . . . 3864—3866
Negociations with Kleomenés ; sttong feeling i in his favour . 3867
Negociations interrupted by Kleomenés "illness. . . 867
Mission of young Aratos to Antigonos Antigonos demands

Akrokorinthos . . . . 867—3868
Kleomenés breaks off the negociations . . - .« 869
Universal indignation at the ‘ought of surrendering

Corinth . . . 870
Appearance of extreme factions in the Achaian cities ; they

lean to Kleomenés . . . . 870—871
His schemes appeal to Town- Autonomy against the Federal

principle . . . . . 871

223 Kleomenés wins the Arkadian and Argolic Cities . . . 872
Violent proceedings of Aratos at Sikyén . . . 873
Corinth calls in Kleomenés; Megara Joins the Beotian

League . . - « « 878—874
No real argument against Federal Government to be drawn

from these events . . . . . . . 874

223 Effects of the loss of Corinth . 876
' Aratos invested with absolute power, and defended by a a
guard . 377
223 He refuses the offers of Kleomenés, ‘and asks for help of tolia
and Athens . . 878
228 Final vote of the League to invite Antigonos and ‘cede ‘Akro-

korinthos . . . . . 879
Estimate of the conduet of Aratos . . . . 879
Lowered position of the League from this time . . . 879
Comparison between Cavour and Aratos . 880

223—222 Change in the character of the War; Kleomenés now the

champion of Greece . 382
Degradation of the League ; monstrous fattery of “Anti-

gonos . . . . . 888

228---222 Recovery of the revolted cities . . 884
Argos returns to the League ; execution of Aristomachos . 884

223 Antigonos put in possession of Akrokorinthos . . . 885

222 Fate of Mantineia . . . . . . . . 3885
Tegea united to the League . . . . . . . 886
Antigonos keeps Orchomenos . 386

222 Kleomenés takes Megalopolis ; first mention of Philopoimén . 386

221 Battle of Sellasia ; defeat and exile of Kleomenés . . . 387
Antigonos’ treatment of Sparta . . . . . . 387

221 Death and character of Antigonos . . . . . . 887

New position of the League . . ἢ . . . . 888

CONTENTS ΧΧΧΥ͂

CHAPTER VIII

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA TO
THE PEACE OF EPEIRO3

B.C. 221—205
B.C. PAGE
State of Greece after the fall of Kleomenés . . . . 889
Grand alliance under Macedonian headship . . . . 889
Internal and external condition of the Achaian League . . 390
Undiminished influence of Aratos ; his relation to the Mace-
donian Kings . . . 391—392
Character of Philopoimén; " comparison between him and
Aratos . . . 892—393
Withdrawal of Philopoimén from Peloponntac; probable
explanation of his conduct. . . 893—394
221 Accession of Philip... . . . . . . . 394
Causes of the Social War... . . . . . . 894

81. The Social War

B.C. 221—217

221—220 Third Generalship of Timoxenos . . . . . . 895
Phigaleia held by the Ztolians . . . - 895

221 Dorimachos plunders Messéné ; extensive incursions of the
ZEtolians . . . . 895—896
220 Invasion during a Presidential Election . . 896—397
220—219 Aratos General ; he enters on office before the legal time 397—398
220 Military Assembly at Megalopolis . 398
Disgraceful campaign of Aratos ; his defeat at Kaphyai . 898
Accusation and defence of Aratos i in the Assembly . . 899
Votes of the Achaian and Atolian Assemblies. . . 890
Relations between Attolia and Messéné . . . . . 400
Achaian Embassies to Macedonia and Epeiros . . . 401
£tolian incursions in Peloponnésos . . . . . 402
Insincerity of the Ztolian Government . . . 402
Affairs of Kynaitha ; return of the exiles. . . 402408
Horrible sack of Kynaitha by the tolians . . . . 408
Unsuccessful attempt on Kleitér . . . . ον. 408
Philip at Corinth . . . . . . . - « 404
222—220 Affairs of Sparta ΝΕ . 404
Philip sits in judgement on the Spartan parties at Tegea . 405
Declaration of Philip i in favour of Sparta. . . 406
Aratos’ liberal views of International right . . . 406
220 Congress at Corinth ; war agreed upon. . . 406—407

Opening of the Social War ; decree of the Congress of Corinth 407

ΧΧΧΥῚ CONTENTS

B.C, PAGE
Philip’s Letter to the Atolians; shifts of the Attolian

Government . . . . . . . 407

220—219 Skopas Atolian General . . . . . 408

220 The Achaian Assembly ratifies the decree . . . 408

Behaviour of Akarnania, Epeiros, Messéné, and Sparta 408—409

Comparative strength of Coalitions and Single Powers . . 409
Warnings against general inferences as to forms of govern-

ment. 410

220—219 Aitolian Embassies i in Peloponnésos; M achatas wins over r Elis 411

State of Sparta ; parties of Old and Young . . . . 411

Intrigues of the Kleomenists with ΖΕ 101 164. . . . 412

First and unsuccessful mission of Machatas . 412

220—219 Revolution at Sparta; Agésipolis-and Lykourgos chosen Kings 413
Second mission of Machatas; Sparta joins the Aitolian

Alliance, and begins war with‘Achaia_ . . . . 414
219 Beginning of the Social War ; its character . . 414
Paramount importance of Philip; his virtues and military
skill . . . . . 414—415
219-—218 Generalship of the younger Aratos . . . . . 415
Successes of Philip . ‘ 416
ZEtolian ravages in the Cantons of Dymé, Phar, and
Tritaia . . . 416
“‘Sonderbund ” of the three Western Cities . . . . 417
Loss and recovery of Aigeira . 418
219—218 Dorimachos Atolian General : sacrilege of the Etolians at
Dion and Dédéna . . . . . . 419
Pséphis annexed to the Achaian League . . . . 419
Philip’s conquests of Phigaleia and Triphylia . . . 419
Relations between Philip and the League. . . . 420
Personal relations between Philip and Aratos . . . 420
Plots of Apellés against Aratos and the Achaians . . 421

218 Philip’s interferences with the Achaian election . . 425. 453
218---217 Generalship of Epératos ; connexion of this election with the

events of the preceding year. . . «. - 4238—424_
Philip recovers Teichos . . . 424
Further schemes οὗ Apellés ; Aratos restored to Philip’s

favour . . 424—426

218 Influence retained by Aratos i in the Achaian “Assembly. - 426
Treason of Apellés against Pallp 5 Philip crushes the

plot. . ~ «6 «6 «427
218—217 Weak administration of Epératos_ . . . 428
217—216 Aratos general ; decrees of the Achaian Assembly . 428—429

217 Aratos’ mediation at Megalopolis; combination of full
Federal sovereignty with strict regard to State
rights. 0. wee 4289

- ...- a eee ee eee ὦ

CONTENTS XXXVil

BG PAGE
Philip’s success in Northern Greece. . . 480
218—217 Mediation of Chios and Rhodes ; failure of the proposed Con-
ference . . . . 480—431
Second mission from Chios, Rhodes, Byzantion, and Egypt. 431
Philip turns his mind towards Italy . 432
Opening of a new period ; close connexion of the history of
Eastern and Western Europe from thisdate . - . 482
Influence of Démétrios of Pharos; he counsels interference
in Italy . . . . . . 483
217 Opening of the Congress of Naupaktos . . 484
Speech of Agelaos ; his ὁ poliey compared with that of Is0-
kratés . . . 435—487
Peace of Naupaktos . . . . . . . . 438
217—216 Agelaos δ οϊ δὴ General . . . . . . . 488

§2. From the End of the Social War to the End of the First War
with Rome
B.O, 217—205
Analogy between the Peace of Agelaos and the Peace of

Nikias . . . . 439
Connexion of the Macedonian and Punic Wars . . 489
Beginning of Roman influence in Greece . . . 439
Impolitic conduct of Philip . . 440

216 Philip’s treaty with Hannibal; its various forms and Prob

able explanation . . 441
Hellenic position assumed by Philip i in the Treaty . . 442
Philip's relations with Peloponnésos . . 444

215 Affairs of Messéné ; interference of Philip and Aratos . 444445
Last influence of Aratos over Philip. . . . . 445

214 Philip’s second attempt on Μεβδθῃδ. . 445
218 Death of Aratos; comparison between him and Philo-
poimén . . . 446—447

214 Beginning of the Roman War; Roman policy ofalliances . 447
211 Position of Rome ; her alliance with Atolia . . . 448—449

Plots for the ‘‘ reunion ” of Akarnania . . . . . 449
Roman conquests . . . . . 449

Invasion of Akarnania; heroic defence of the Akarnanians
and retreat of the Ztolians . . . . 449—450
218 Condition of Sparta ; sedition of Cheilén . . . . 450
218—217 Banishment and return of Lykourgos . . . «. -. 48
Reign of Machanidas . 451

210 Xtolian and Akarnanian embassies at t Sparta; ; _ speech of
Lykiskos . . . 451

Sparta in alliance with ‘Etolia . . . . . . 453

XXXVili CONTENTS

PAGE

Cc.
210 Naval warfare of Sulpicius ; desolation of Aigina . . . 458

209 The League asks help of Philip. . . 458
Philopoimén General of Cavalry ; he reforms abuses . 453—454
209 King Attalos chosen General of Ztolia . . . 455
Attempts at mediation on the part of Rhodes, ete. . . 455
Philip at Argos. . . . 456
209 Conference δὲ Aigion ; demands of the Etolians . . 456—457
Negociations broken off by Philip . . . - . 457
Philip repulses the Romans . . . . . . 458
His alternate debauchery and activity . ἘΣ . . 458
Exploits of Philip and Philopoimén . . . . . 458
208—205 Character of the last years of the War . . . . . 459
207 Philip’s attempt on Hérakleia . . . . . 459
208 Philip’s cessions to the Achaian League . . . 460
208—207 Philopoimén General of the League; his reforms . . 461—462
The Three Battles of Mantineia . . . 464

207 Third Battle of Mantineia ; complete victory of the
Achaians. . 464—465
Philopoimén ravages Lakénia . . . . . . 465
Nabis Tyrant of Sparta . . . . . . 465
Peace between AXtolia and Macedonia . . . . . 466
205 Conference at Phoiniké ; general peace. . . . 466
Note on the Generalships of Aratos - . . . . 468

( _.-
CHAPTER IX

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE FROM THE PEACE OF EPEIROS TO THE
DISSOLUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE

Character of the Period . . . . . . . 471

81. From the Peace of Epeiros to the Settlement of Greece under Flamininus

B.C, 205—194

202—200 Aggressive proceedings of PRInP 5 ; his “dealings with the
Achaian League . . 472
200 His devastation of Attica. . . . . . . 473
Justice of the war on the Roman side . . . . . 473
200—197 Second Macedonian War . , . . 478
Real good-will of Flamininus towards Greece . . . 474
‘Union of Greek States under Rome . . . . . 475
Relation of the Federal States to Rome . . . . 4765
Condition of Atolia ; Generalship of Damokritos . . 476

200 Indecisive Meeting at Naupektos 5 ; #tolians jon the
Romans . . . . 476

. a ..»--..--..5ῸῈΞξ..Ψ a. NA my, mt
- -

CONTENTS ΧΧΧῚΧ

B.C. PAGE
Position of Achaia ; influence of Philopoimén . . . 477
205—204 Reunion of Megara ‘with the League. . . . . 477
202—201 War with Nabis; deliverance of Messéné . . . 477
201—200 Generalship of Kykliadas . . . . . . 477
Philopoimén goes again to Crete . . - « 477
Philip at Argos ; his vain attempt to gain the League . . 478
199 His pretended cession of Triphylia and Orchomenos_ 478

198 The League joins the Roman Alliance; terms of the
treaty . 479

Constitutional details supplied ΕΣ the account of the
debate . . . . . . . 479
Share of the League in the war, . . . 480
Unsuccessful siege of Corinth by Lucius Quinctius . . 480
198---197 Argos betrayed to Philip and ceded by him to Nabis_ . . 481
197 Exploits of the Achaian troops at Klednai and in Asia . . 482

198 State of Epeiros ; attempts at peace ; Charops acts for
Rome . . 482
197 Beotia constrained to ζοίπ the Romans . . . . 483
Firm adherence of the Akarnanians to Pip . . . 483
197 Submission of Akarnania_ . . . . . . 484
196 Proclamation of Grecian Freedom . . . . . . 484
New Federations in Thessaly and Euboia_ . . . . 484
195 Recovery of Argos. . . . 485
Relations of the Eleutherolak@nic towns to Achaia . 485
Nabis retains Sparta ; discontent of the AXtolians . 486. 488
194 Withdrawal of the Roman garrisons. . . . . 486

8 2. From the Settlement of Greece under Flamininus to the death of
Philopotmén
B.c. 194—183

Affairs of the Achaian League . . . . 486
Eminence of Megalopolis ; paraliel of Virginia . . . 486
Megalopolitan Presidents. . . . 486
Absence of Geographical Parties . . 487

Influence of Philopoimén ; his internal and external policy . 487
Other Federal statesmen : Lykortas, Diophanés, Aristainos . 488

The Macedonian party extinct . 488

194 Discontent against Philopoimén at Megalopolis ; he raises the
smaller towns into independent States . . . 488—489
198—192 Philopoimén’s fourth Generalship . . . . 490
War with Nabis ; independent action of the League . . 490
192 Antiochos invited by the ΖΕ 1ο] 818 . . . . 490
Treacherous resolution of the Atolian Senate . . . 491

Murder of Nabis by the Atolians . . . . . . 491

xl CONTENTS

B.C.
192 Philopoimén unites Sparta to the Achaian League. . . 492
The union not forcible, yet contrary to Spartan feeling. . 492
192 Antiochos elected Ztolian General ; his relations with Achaia,

Bosotia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Elis . . , 498-- 494

191 Defeat of Antiochos at Thermopyle . 494

191—189 tolian War ; submission of Xtolia to the Roman “ Fait "494

Working of the AXtolian Constitution . . . . . 495

189 tolia becomes the Dependent Ally of Rome . . . 495

191 Union of Elis and Messéné with the Achaian League . . 496

Dealings of Flamininus with Messéné . . - «. 497

Annexation of Zakynthos prevented by Flamininus . . 497

The League extended over all Peloponnésos . . - . 498

Relations between Achaiaand Rome . . . . . 498

Roman intrigues with the newly-annexed cities. . 499

191 First disturbances of Sparta composed Philopoimen - §00

189 Spartan attack on Las . . . . 600

Secession of Sparta. . . . . . . . 501

189—188 Embassy to Rome . . . . . 501

190—188 Philopoimén’s two successive ’ Generalships . 501

188 Execution of Spartansat Kompasion; changesin the Spartan laws 502

Impolicy of Philopoimén’s treatment of Sparta. . 502
Continued disputes at Sparta; policy of the moderate party

there... . . 508—504

Roman intrigues for the dissolution of the League . . 604

182 Formal reunion of Sparta Ὁ. . . . . . . 504

Quiet incorporation of Elis . . . 605

183 State of parties in Messéné ; revolt under Deinokratés . . 505

Capture and execution of Philopoimén at Messéné . - 505

182 Re-admission of Messéné to the League . . 506

Three Messénian towns admitted as independent States . 507

180?Schemes of Chairdn at Sparta . . - oe . 507

191—183 Constitutional notices . . . . . . - 507

189 Yearly meetings removed from Aigion . . . . . 508

Constitution of the Senate . . . . 508

185 Rejection of Eumenés’ offer to nay its members . . . 508

Legal resistance to Roman encroachments. . 509

185—183 Assemblies refused to Q. Cacilius and to Flamininus . 510—511

8 3. From the Death of Philopoimén to the Battle of Pydna

B.C. 1883—168
Condition of the League at the death of Philopoimén . . 612
Parties in the League ; the elder Roman party not wilfully
unpatriotic . . . 512

Growth of the extreme Roman party under Kallikratés . . 512

eee

ec .,... --ὀ “---“ἀὐπαααα. Ce

CONTENTS xlif

B.C, PAGE
180—179 Presidency of Hyperbatos . . 513
Slavish doctrines of Hyperbatos and Kallikratés ; " opposition
of Lykortas . . 518
180 Embassy of Kallikratés to Rome ; revert of the Roman
Senate . . . . . . 513—514
179—178 Kallikratés elected General . . . . 514

172—168 Effects of the war with Persens on the Federal states . . δ14
Greek patriotic feeling now on the Macedonian side _.. - 515

Character of Perseus. . . . . . . 515
Character of L. milius Paulus . . . . 516
173 Dependent condition of Atolia ; civil dissensions . . . $§16
171 Roman and Macedonian parties ; Lykiskos General 517
169 Perseus in A&Stolia; part of the county joins him . . 517—b18
167 Massacre by A. Bebius . . . . 518
Dissolution of the Mtolian League . . . . . δ18
157 Death of Lykiskos . . . 518
171 Affairs of Akarnania ; debate i in the Akarnanian Assembly 518—519
167 Leukas separated from Akarnania . . - « 519
State of Epeiros ; parties of Kephalos and Charops . . 519
169 Geographical parties in Epeiros . . 520
167—157 Conquest and desolation of Epeiros ; tyranny of Charops . 520
173 Condition of Beeotia ; alliance with Perseus . . 521
171 Intrigues of Q. Marcius ; dissolution of the Beotian League 521 —522
Achaia during the war with Perseus. 522
Decree of non-intercourse between Achaia and Macedonia . 622
174 Debate on its proposed repeal , . . . . 522
1783—171 Missions of Marcellus and the Lentuli . . . . . . δ28
Roman dealings with individual cities . . . . . 523
171 Demands of Atilius and Marcius . . . . . . 524
170 Mission of Popillius and Octavius. . . . . . 524
Further inroads on Federal rights. . . . . . 525
170 Convention of the Moderate Party . . . . . δ2ὅ
170—169 Archén General . . 526
Embassy from Attalos ; debate on the restoration of
Eumenés’ honours . . . . . . 526
169 Negociations with Quintus Mareius . . . . . 526
Polybios opposes Appius Claudius. . 528
169—168 Embassy from the Ptolemies ; debate at Sikydn on the
Egyptian question . . . . . . 628—529

§ 4. From the Battle of Pydna to the Dissolution of the Achaian League
B.C. 167—146

Effects of the Conquest of Macedonia on the relations
between Rome and Achaia. . . . . . 580

xlii CONTENTS

B.C. PAGE

167 Embassy of Domitius and Claudius; demands of the
Romans . . . . . . . . . 531

Challenge of Xendn ; deportation of the Thousand
Achaians . . §81—5382

164—-151 Embassies on behalf of the exiles ; ; insidious rely « of the
Senate . . 582
Position of Polybios at Rome . . . . . . 683
151 Release of the Exiles . . . . 583
Character of Roman dealings with foreign nations. . . δ84
Dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis_ 534

166—159 Mission of C. Sulpicius Gallus ; separation of Pleurén from
the League. . . . . . . 5685
152 Debate on the Cretan Alliance . . . . . . δϑ8ὅ
151 Return of Stratios and Polybios . . . . . . 536
Causes of the final war with Rome . . . . . 536
156—150 Disputes between Athens and Orépos . . . . . 536
Menalkidas of Sparta General of the League . . . . 687
150 Achaian interference at Orépos_. . . . . . 537
150—149 Generalship of Diaios . . . . 538
149 Disputes with Sparta ; Diaios before Sparta . . 588539
Death of Kallikratés . . . . oo . 589
Damokritos elected General . . . . . . . 589

149—148 Fourth Macedonian War; mediation of Q. Cecilius
Metellus . . . . 5389—540
148 Victory and banishment of Damokritos . . - 640

148—147 Second Generalship of Diaios ; suicide of Menalkidas . 540—541
147 Embassy of L. Aurelius Orestes ; tumult at Corinth . 541—542

Embassy of Sextus Julius Cesar . . . . . δ48
Kritolaos elected General ; sham Conference at Tegea . . 648
147—146 Unconstitutional proceedings of Kritolaos. . . . 644
Efforts of Metellus to preserve peace. . . . . 645

146 Tumultuous meeting at Corinth ; violence of Kritolaos. 544—545
Beginning of war with Rome ; further efforts of Metellus . 546

Secession and siege of Hiérakleia . . . 547

Battle of Skarpheia ; defeat and death of Kritolaos . . 547

Diaios succeeds to the Generalship . . . . . 547

Negociations between Sésikratés and Metellus . . . 548

Cruelty and corruption of Diaios ; death of Sésikratés . . 549
Mummius at the Isthmus; battle of Leukopetra and sack

of Corinth . . . . 549

Achaia not yet formally reduced to 8 Provinee . 550
146—145 Dissolution of the League, and abolition of Democracy in

the cities . . . . . 651

145 Polybios legislates for the Achaian cities . . . . 651

Nominal revival of the League. . . . . . 652

CONTENTS

Devotion of the Peloponnésian people ; later parallels .
Errors of the League, mainly the result of Roman intrigne . 558

General results of the Achaian League .
Roman opposition a witness to its value

The Achaian League a natural model for liberated Greece
Future of South-Eastern Europe; Monarchic Federalism

probably the true solvent

CHAPTER X

OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY

Recapitulation .
Indirect influence of Greece ; ; direct influence of Rome .
Connexion of Italian history with the subject of Federalism

557
557
558

Italian history a transition between the Greek and the medieval

Federalism .

81, Of the Federations of Ancient Italy

Prevalence of Federalism in Ancient aly .

Its causes

These causes of general application -

Instances of Confederations beyond Greece and Italy
Greater importance of the Italian Leagues .
Uncertainty of the ethnology of Ancient Italy

Early existence of Federations in Italy—Nature of the evidence .

Late preservation of old Italian Constitutions
League of Erruria . . .

The Twelve Cities .

Constitution of the States

Amphiktyonic origin of the League .

Constitution of the Federal Assembly .

Traces of Federal Kingship .

Laxity of the Federal tie

Power of war and peace in the League, ‘and also i in 2 the States
The accounts of our authorities how far trustworthy
Probable scheme of the League

League of SAMNIUM

Absence of details

The Samnite Cantons . .

Effect of the separation of Capua . .

Analogy with AXtolia and Switzerland .

558

559
559
559
559
560
560
561
561
562
562
563
563
563
564
. 564
564—565
565
565
566
566
566
567
567

xliv CONTENTS

Samnite struggle against Rome
Lessons of Samnite history .

eague of LATIUM .
Abundance of untrustworthy details .
Treaty between Rome and Carthage, B.0. 508
Nature of the League . . .
The Thirty Cities . .
Relations of Rome to the League .
Probable origin of Rome
Latin proposals of union with Rome, B.C. 337

Close union of the Latin towns illustrated Py the Proposal .

Dissolution of the League, B.c. 334

§ 2. The Roman Commonwealth and the Italian Allies

Rome not a Federal State; but containing quasi-Federal elements
Gradual incorporation of other States with Rome . . .
Three great classes in Italy: Romans, Latins, and Italians .
The nature of the struggle between Patrician and Plebeian .

Quasi-Federal nature of the Roman Tribes

Near approach of the Roman system to Federalism and to Representa

tion

The greatness of Rome mainly due to her quasi- Federal elements

The SocraL WAR, B.c. 90—89

Its historical importance.

Probable results on the Italian side
Nature of the Authorities for the period
Character of the Roman dominion
Condition of the Italian Allies

Llaim of Roman citizenship for the Allies

Advantages and disadvantages of such admission .
Difference of feeling among the Italians ; among the States 1 near Rome ;
among the Samnites and Lucanians ; ; among the Etruscans and

Umbrians

Federal or Representative institutions the true remedy.
The claim of the Allies opposed by the worst, and smpported by the best
. 581—582

men of both parties at Rome
Tribuneship of Marcus Livius Drusus, B.c. 91
Beginning of the SocrAL War B.c. 90.

Analogy between the Italian Allies and the American Colonies

Federal Constitution of the seceding States .
Italicum the capital of the League

Constitution of the Federal Government borrowed from that of Rome .
Rome the great obstacle to a permanent Italian Federation .

The Social War, B.c. 90—89 . . .
\

PAGE
567
568
568
568
569
569
570
570
571
571
571
572

572
572
573
574
575

575
576
576
576
577
577
578
578
579
579

580
581

582
583
584
585
585
585
586
586

,

CONTENTS xlv
τὰ PAGE
Successes of the Allies . . 2 . . . . . 587
Movements in Etruria and Umbria . . . . . . 587
The Senate yields the demands of the Allies . δ87
The other States accept citizenship, but Samnium and Lucania still

hold out . . . . . . . . 588
Legislation of P. Sulpicius, B.C. 88 . ᾿ς. . . 589
Illusory nature of the franchise granted to the Allies . . . . 589
Their discontent . . . . . . . 589
Their cause embraced by Marius and Sulpicius . . . . . 590
The Civil War, Β.0. 88—82 . . . . . . . . . ὅ90
The Samnite War still continues . . . . . 690
Last stage of the war; the Samnites before Rome, B.C. 82 . . . 591
Battle at the Colline Gate . . . . . . . - 691
Permanent devastation of Samnium by Sulla . . . . . 592

8 8, Of the Lombard League ᾿ ,
Gradual incorporation of the Provinces with Rome . . . . 692
Rome forsaken by the Emperors . . . . . . . . 598
The Imperial succession always maintained. . . . . «. 598
The Kingdom of Italy, A.p. 568—1250. . — 6 6 « 598
Union of the Crown of Italy and Germany, A.D. 961 . . . . 594
Weakness of the royal authority, 1039—1056 . . 594

The Normans in Apulia and Sicily, 1021—1194 ; condition of Rome ; ;
Northern Italy in the twelfth century ; predominance of the Cities ; |

their practical independence . . . . . . 594
Reigns of Lothar II. and Conrad III. (11251152) . . . . 595
Imperialist reaction ; election of Frederick (1152) . . . . 595
Character of Frederick . . . 597
His position not to be confounded with that of modern Austria . 597
The War not strictly a national steele, but ὁ a struggie between royalty

and municipal freedom . . 598
Frederick enters Italy, A.D. 1154 . . . . . 599
Collision of claims between the Emperor and the Cities . . . 599
Early successes of Frederick . . . . . . . . . 599
Destruction of Milan, a.p. 1162 . . . . . . . . 600
Oppression of Frederick’s agents . . 600

Four opportunities for the Union of Italy: (1) i in . the ‘Social War; (2)
under the Lombard League ; (3) under Manfred ; a under Victor

Emmanuel . 600
Distinction of northern and southern Italy . . . . . . 601
The Campanian Republics, a.p. 839—1138 . . 601
The Cities supported by the Pope, Eastern Emperor, and a Ring of Sicily,

A.D. 1166. . . 601

Parallel with the revolt of the Netherlands . . . . . 602

\
\
xlvi CONTENTS

\—
PAGE
First movements in the Veronese March, a.p. 1155 . . . 602
Beginning of the LomparpD LkacurE . .. o 8 . 602
Relations of Venice and the Lombard Cities . . . . - . 602
Action of the Emperor Manuel . . . . . . . . 602
Condition of the Eastern Empire . . . . . . . . 608
Manuel aspires to reunite the Empires. . . . . . . 608
Growth of the League, A.p. 1164—1168 . . . εν» . 604
Accession of Lodi . . . . . . . . . 604
Foundation of Alexandria. 604

Indirect importance of the Lombard League in Federal a History ; ana-
logy with America and the Netherlands . . 605
Congress of the League . . 606
The League not a true Federation ; and why it did not become such . 606
Personal character of Frederick ; he yields in time . . . . 607
Second Lombard League. . . . . . . 607
No definite moment of separation | in Italy . 607

No such tendency to union in Italy as in the Netherlands and America 607
The Lombard cities really sovereign ; the Dutch and American pro-

vinces not so. . . . 607—608
Vigour and constancy of the ‘Confederates . . . . . 608
Peculiar policy of Venice ; siege of Ancona, A.D. 1174 . . . 609
Course of the war ; siege of Alexandria, a.p.1174—1175 . 609
Negociations between the Emperor and the cities broken off ἡ the Papal

Legates. . . . . . . . . 609
Battle of LEGNANO, A.D. ). 1176 . . . . . . 610
Change in Frederick's policy ; negociations for peace . . . . 610
Frederick reconciled with Venice and the Church. . . . . 610
Rights of the Empire as understood by the Lombards .__. . 610

Truce for six years between the Emperor and the League, A.D. 1177 . 611
Various cities join Frederick : Cremona, Tortona, and Alexandria . 611
Peace of Constanz, A.D. 1183; the treaty is in form a pardon, but

amounts to surrender of direct sovereignty . . . . 612—613
The Second Lombard League . . 614
The First League primarily polite ἢ the Second League primarily

ecclesiastical . . 614—615
Union of Italy under “Frederick or Manfred hindered by the Pope ;

good and evil which it would have prevented . 615
Italian nationality a purely modern idea. . . . . . 615
Question of Italian Confederation or Consolidation . . . 616
Italian Federation discredited by Louis Napoleon Buonaparte . . 616
Arguments on behalf of, and against, Federalism in Italy . . . 616
The question decided by the Italians . . 617
Federalism no longer appropriate in Italy ; local independence the

true policy . . . . . . . . . 617

Future restoration of the Empire . . . . . . . . 617

CONTENTS | xl vii

FRAGMENT
OF THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY PAGE
Influence of the Empire on Germany . . . 618
The three Imperial Kingdoms: Germany, Italy, and Burgundy . 618—619
Closest connexion between Germany and Burgundy . . 619

Connexion between Germany and the Empire growing into identity . 620
The German Confederation, a lax Staatenbund ; its theory and practice 621
Its peculiarities : (1) Most of its members principalities ; (2) it arose

from the splitting up of a more united State . . . . . 621
Process of disunion in Germany . 622
Germany really a Federation since Peace of Westphalia A.D. . 1648- 1806 622
The Kingdom of Germany . . . . . . . . 623
Comparison with England and France . . . . . . . 628
Origin of the German Kingdom . . . 628
Different history of England, 800— 1087 ; " France, 888 — 1202. ; and

Germany, 986—973, 1039—1056 . . . 624

Circumstances which strengthened the Royal authority i in Germany . 624
Retention of National Assemblies in Germany and England, but not in

France . . . 625
The Royal Domain ; the Free Cities ; the Ecclesiastical Princes . . 625
Contrast between German and F rench Kings . . . . . 625
Contrast between the later history of the Kingdoms . . . . 626

Causes of disunion in Germany :
(1) The Crown elective ; chiefly owing to its connexion with the

Empire. . . . . . . 627
The Empire essentially elective . 628
Ways in which the Imperial and elective character of the

German Crown diminished the royal authority . . . 628

(2) The German Confederation mainly composed of Principalities . 629
Connexion between this cause and the weakening of the

monarchy . . 629
Origin of the German Principalities ; royal. officers become

sovereigns . . . 629
The Diet a Federal Congress rather than 8 National Parliament . . 629
Governments, not peoples, represented in the Diet _.. . . . 6380
The Diet sinks into a diplomatic Congress . . . . . . 630
Other peculiarities of the German Confederation . . . . . 630
Loss of the ancient divisions . . - . 630
Comparison with England and France | . . . . . . 680—631
Splitting up of the ancient Duchies . . . . . . 631
Constant partitions and annexations . . . 631

Different position of the arriére vassals in France and i in Germany . 632
Vast number, and singular disproportion in size of the German States . 633
Position of Austria and Prussia. Parallel with Beotia . . . 638

xlvili CONTENTS

APPENDIX I.
1. Note on the Cities of the Achaian League.
2. Note on the Cities of the Lykian League .
3. The Federal Coinage of Akarnania
4. The Federal Coinage of Atolia .

APrrEeNnpix II.
Additional Notes by the Editor

INDEX . . . . . . .

CUTE |

AALS

-.“

φ ᾷ 4
ties $$ {0}
᾿ ere tee ει"
ΝΩ͂Ν rte
: h {ater we
7 %, & \ ᾿ Φ ! , « ss gets va
a Ἷ n! “t tl, tet tr ‘ ¢ 4: '
τ δ er we “4, tr eo pes
ae . 4 ἐν yt t
2 " me Μ᾿ ont # tA fyit ‘
a : we , , ,
3G ᾿᾽ ,’ « Aer ͵ 4 | |
co νὰ .»Ρ͵. * a ΝῊ ἮΝ» wo
4 ¢ gta ty
, 7 a” - - {sa , ᾿
΄ ats,” » εν,» ΄ , att
: τ ΄ . ὁ 4 ΄ ,. oe
“ afiaes ν | ᾿ ΄ "
- soe 75 . ΡΣ SJ ae “4
.. ““ : - re” ~ oe af κ | ᾿ ;
- OO 4 eC εἰ ἢ i ᾿ " ᾿
— “a * “2 » ΄ omg? ΄ 2 ae ,» 4a t ,7
“΄ > ~ * % ἦς, 45" 7 " oe
—_ .» - - ᾿ ; Ν "
- ῥ - © 4" ab “ο΄ Ὁ» δ᾽» . ᾿ , "
--- ss - “- . " . ey «"" “΄΄} “ ;
. et 7, - = εν γ΄: ; ; ”
“, oe +, “.“ -. & @ 44 ae ΄ . ΜΝ “ “7 ,. "
΄ 2a ; .
- oo oe , o o oa” comes > “ g . ,
” of a
“ - @ ΄
" » » oo a“ ae e »ν . , ; ;
-” aw > ᾿
"“" - , Ὁ . , , ,
an “ - oe "
“ ΄“-. ” 3.»
- wee Cad - 5
we” ." ᾳ
aa ΄ »“»
ΝΡ -..“ ;
rd - Ψ . “΄ | |
“ ΄ -" a” -
- ΄ 7° ° σ΄ .
~ .” ~”“ of ΄
a" a - ;
- = .
~ - ᾿ -ς * - a -
- “- “. 7 ; ᾿
- - " - -
- "
- ΄ rd .
- _ - - . of . ,
΄ s a
. @ σ΄
“" "oe
7 ae a os? ; ᾿
ΓΖ af ,
Ὁ, --- “ :
“ a
“ - ms ΄

widely distant ages and countries ; they are found among na
widely differing from one another in the amount of their poli
advancement and general civilization. But all of them agre
some points which history easily recognizes, though it may be
hard to bring them within the grasp of legal definition. There
is what may be called a certain Federal ideal, which has some-
times been realized in its full, or nearly its full, perfection, while
other cases have shown only a more or less remote approximation
to it. To establish a definition and a nomenclature for all these
several classes of governments, is the business of the political
philosopher. The historian, in recognizing the unlikeness, will
also recognize the likeness, and will acknowledge them all, perfect
and imperfect alike, as forming natural portions of his subject.
The first rude approach to any particular form of government is
as much a part of the history of that form of government as the
most fully developed shape which it can afterwards assume. I
shall therefore not scruple to apply the name of Federal Govern-
«4 ment to many states to which philosophical and legal inquirers
teneral Would probably refuse it. The name of Federal Government
efinition may, in this wider sense, be applied to any union of component
“ἢ ἀνα members, where the degree of union between the‘members sur-
poses. passes that of mere alliance, however intimate, and where the
degree of independence possessed by each member surpasses
Ἂν anything which can fairly come under the head of merely
municipal freedom. Such unions have been common in many
ages and countries, and many of them have been far from

realizing the full ideal of a Federal Government. That ideal, in
its highést and most ot deve opener the most finished
and the most aLfificial production itical ingenuity. It is
hardly possible that Federal Government can attain its perfect

form except in a highly refined age, and among a people whose

political education has already stretched over many generations.
Definition “Two requisites seem necessary to constitute a Federal Govern-
of a perfect ment in this its most perfect form. On the one hand, each of
Nederal the members of the Union must be wholly independent in those
ment, ° matters which concern each member only. On the other

hand, all must be subject to a common power in those
Internal matters which concern the whole body of members collectively.
indepen- Thus each member will fix for itself the laws of its criminal
dence of jurisprudence, and even the details of its political constitution.

the several . : . ὍΝ .
members, And it will do this, not as a matter of privilege or concession

I DEFINITION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 3

cr ce ee

from any higher power, but as a matter of absolute right, by

virtue of its inherent powers as an independent commonwealth.

But in all matters which concern the general body, the sove-
reignty of the several members will cease. Each member is

| perfectly independent within its own sphere ; but there is another

sphere in which its independence, or rather its separate existence,
vanishes. It is invested with every right of sovereignty on one Sove-
class of subjects, but there is another class of subjects on which riety οὗ
it is as incapable of separate political action as any province or jy all
city of a monarchy or of an indivisible republic. The making external
of peace and war, the sending and receiving of ambassadors, ™#tters.
generally all that comes within the department of International

Law, will be reserved wholly to the central power. Indeed, the

very existence of the several members of the Union will be
diplomatically unknown to foreign nations, which will never be

called upon to deal with any power except the Central Govern-

ment. A Federal Union, in short, will form one State in relation Χο
to other powers, but many States as regards its internal adminis

tration. This complete division of sovereignty we may look

upon as essential to the absolute perfection of the Federal ideal.

But that ideal is one so very refined and artificial, that it seems

not to have been attained more than four or five times in the
history of the world. But a History of Federal Government

must embrace a much wider range of subjects than merely the
history of those states which have actually realized the Federal

idea. We must look at the idea in its germ as well as in its Wider
perfection. We shall learn better to understand what perfect range of
Federalism is by comparing it with Federalism in a less fully- torical
developed shape. In order thus to trace the Federal principle view.
from its birth, we shall have to go back to very early times, and,

in some cases, to very rude states of society. But of course it

will not be needful to dwell at much length on those common-
wealths of whose constitution and history it would be impossible

to give any detailed account. For some commonwealths, which

may fairly claim the name of Federal Governments in the wider

sense, a mere glance will beenough. Our more detailed examina-

tion must be reserved for a few more illustrious examples of
Federal Union. There are a few famous commonwealths which, Choice of
either from having perfectly, or nearly perfectly, realized the examples
Federal idea, or else from their importance and celebrity in the illustra.
general history of the world, stand out conspicuously at the very tion.

4 GENERAL INTRODUCTION CHAP.

first glimpse of the subject, and whose constitution and history
will deserve and repay our most attentive study.
Four great § Four Federal Commonwealths, then, stand out, in four differ-
ores ent ages of the world, as commanding, above all others, the
Govern. attention of students of political history. Of these four, one
ment. belongs to what is usually known as “ancient,” another, to what
is commonly called ‘ medizval” history ; a third arose in the
period of transition between medieval and modern history ; the
creation of the fourth may have been witnessed by some few of
those who are still counted among living men. Of these four,
again,.one has been a thing of the past for many centuries ;
another has so changed its form that it can no longer claim a
place among Federal Governments; but the other two, one of
them among the least, the other among the greatest, of inde-
pendent powers, still remain, exhibiting Federalism in a perfect,
or nearly perfect, form, standing, in the Old World and in the
New, as living examples of the strength and the weakness of the
most elaborate of political combinations.

These four famous Commonwealths are,

The First, the ACHAIAN LEAGUE in the later days of Ancient
ACHAIAN (Greece, whose most flourishing period comes within the third

LEAGUR,
B.c, 28]. century before our own era.

The Swiss Second, the Confederation of the Swiss CANTONS, which, with
CANTONS, many changes in its extent and constitution, has lasted from the

1862, thirteenth century to our own day.
The Third, the SEVEN UnrTED PROVINCES of the NETHERLANDS,

whose Union arose in the War of Independence against Spain,
vinces, , 2nd lasted, in a republican form, till the War of the French

A.D. 1579- Revolution.
1795.

The Fourth, the UNITED STATES of NORTH AMERICA, which formed

States 8 Federal Union after their revolt from the British Crown under

a.p. 1778- George the Third, and whose destiny forms one of the most im-

1862. portant, and certainly the most interesting, of the political
problems of our own time.

Character. Of these Four, three come sufficiently near to the full realiza-
istics of ~~ tion of the Federal idea to be entitled to rank among perfect

eh

I FOUR GREAT FEDERAL COMMONWEALTHS 5

Federal Governments. The Achaian League-and tho tnited the Four

States since the adoption of the present Constitution, are indeed τοδὶ Con-
the most perfect developments of the Federal principle which tions
the world has ever seen. The Swiss Confederation, in its origin
a Union of the loosest kind, has gradually drawn the Federal ae
bond tighter and tighter, till, within our own times, it has
assumed a form which fairly entitles it to rank beside Achaia
and America. The claim of the United Provinces is more doubt-
ful ;1 their union was at no period of their republican being so
close as that of Achaia, America, and modern Switzerland. But
the important place which the United Provinces once filled in
European history, and the curious and instructive nature of their
political institutions, fully entitle them to a place in the first
rank for the purposes of the present History. All these four
then I purpose to treat of at some considerable length. Over
less perfect or less illustrious examples of the Federal system I
shall glance more lightly, or use them chiefly by way of contrast
to point out more clearly the distinguishing characteristics of
these four great examples. Thus, for instance, the modern The Ger-
German Confederation is, in point of territorial extent and of fede: son
the power of many of the states which compose it, of far greater “ve
importance than any of the European instances among the Four.
But its constitution is so widely removed from the perfection of
the Federal idea that, for our present purpose, this Union, which
includes two of the Great Powers of Europe, is chiefly valuable
as illustrating by contrast the more perfect constitutions of
Achaia and Switzerland. On the other hand there can be little other
doubt that there were in the ancient world several other Con- ucieut
federations, whose comstitutions must have realized the Federal °**™?!**:
idea almost as perfectly as the more famous League of Achaia.
But some of these possessed so little influence in the world, that
they can hardly be said to havea history. In the case of others
we know absolutely nothing of the details of their constitutions.
Northern Greece, especially, in the later days of Grecian freedom, in Greece ;
abounded in small Federal States, but we have no such minute
knowledge of their history and constitution as we have of those
of Achaia. Even the great and important League of AXtolia, so
long the rival of Achaia, is far better known to us in its external
history than in its internal constitution. Again it is clear that in Italy ;
the Thirty Cities of Latium, and probably some other similar

1 See Motley’s Rise of the Dutch Republic, iii. 514.

in Lykia.

Other
German
leagues ;

the Hanse
Towns.

Other
American
Confede-
rations.

6 4 | GENERAL INTRODUCTION CHAP. I

1

Leagues among the old Italian commonwealths, must have been
united by a Federal bond of a very close kind. But we know
hardly anything about them except what may be picked up from
the half-mythical narratives of their wars and alliances with
Rome. Lykia too, beyond all doubt, had a Federal constitution
which was in some respects more perfect than that of Achaia
itself. But then Lykia has nothing which can be called a
history, and its Federal constitution arose at so late a period
that its independence was provincial rather than strictly national.
So, in later times, the Swiss Confederation was really only one
of several unions of German cities, which happened to obtain
greater importance and permanence than the rest. One of these
unions, the famous League of the Hanse Towns, still exists,
though with diminished splendour, in our own day. So, in days
later still, the precedent of Federal union given by the English
settlements in North America, has been followed, though as yet
with but little success or credit, by several of the Republics
which have arisen among the ruins of Spanish dominion in the
same continent. All these instances, Greek, Italian, German,
and American, will demand some notice in the course of our
present inquiry. But they will not need that full and minute
attention which must be reserved for Achaia, Switzerland, the
United Provinces, and the United States.

Before, however, we go on to describe in detail the constitu-
tion and history of any particular Federal state, it will be
desirable to make some further remarks on Federal Government
in general, and to draw out at some length the points of contrast
between that and other political systems.

aS

CHAPTER II

CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED
WITH OTHER POLITICAL SYSTEMS

I HAVE already given something like a definition of Federal
Government in its perfect form, premising that that perfect
form is not to be looked for in all the examples which will come
under our present survey. We have seen that it is not to be
found in all even of the four illustrious Confederations which I
have selected for special examination. Compared with the con-
stitutions of Achaia and America, the Federal compact of the
Swiss Cantons before the French Revolution, and even the Union of
the Seven Provinces, will appear to be only remote approaches to
the Federal idea. But in the present Chapter, where I propose
to contrast Federalism with other political systems, I shall take
my picture of a Federal Government wholly from the most
perfect examples. Much, therefore, that 1 shall say, will be
quite inapplicable to the United Provinces or to the old Swiss
League, much more so to the so-called German Confederation of
our own day. .

A Federal Commonwealth, then, in its perfect form, is one
which forms a single state in its relations to other nations, but wW
which consists of many states with regard to its internal govern-
ment. Thus the City of Megalopolis in old times, the State of
New York or the Canton of Ziirich now, has absolutely no sepa-
rate existence in the face of other powers: it cannot make war
or peace, or maintain ambassadors or consuls. The common Ilustra-
Federal Government of Achaia, America, or Switzerland, is the thong of the
only body with which foreign nations can have any intercourse. of om
But the internal laws, the law of real property, the criminal law, members
even the electoral law, may be utterly different αὖ Megalopolis i Perfect
and at Sikyén, at New York and in Illinois, at Ziirich and at Gommon-
Geneva. Nor is there any power in the Assembly at Aigion, wealth.

ΝΗ

Two con-
ditions of
a true
Federal
Govern-
ment.

Two
classes of
Federal
Common-
wealths.
First, The
“* System
of Con-
Jederated
States,’
where the
Central
Power
deals only
with the
State
Govern-
ments.

8 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ~ cHap

the Congress at Washington, or the Federal Council at Bern,
to bring their diversities into harmony. In one point of view
there is only a single commonwealth, as truly a national whole
as France or Spain; in another point of view, there is a col-
lection of sovereign commonwealths as independent of one
another as France and Spain can be. We may then recognize
as a true and perfect Federal Commonwealth any collection of
states in which it is equally unlawful for the Central Power to
interfere with the purely internal legislation of the several
members, and for the several members to enter into any diplo-
matic relations! with other powers. Where the first condition
is not obtained, the several members are not sovereign ; their
independence, however extensive in practice, is a merely muni-
cipal independence. Where the second condition is not obtained,
the union, however ancient and intimate, is that of a mere
Confederacy rather than that of a real Confederation. But another
distinction will here arise. Even among those commonwealths
which at once secure to every member full internal independence,
and refuse to every member any separate external action, there
may be wide diversities as to the way in which the Central
Power exercises its peculiar functions. It is here that we reach
that division of Federal Governments into two classes which has
been laid down by most of the writers on the subject.2_ In the
one class the Federal Power represents only the Governments
of the several members of the Union; its immediate action is
confined to those Governments; its powers consist simply in issuing
requisitions to the State Governments, which, when within the
proper limits of the Federal authority, it is the duty of those

1 I reserve the exceptional case, to be discussed in the course of the history,
of a particular State holding diplomatic intercouse with foreign powers by expres«
licence of the Federal power. See an instance in Polybios, ii. 48. This is most
conspicuously a case in which the exception proves the rule.

3 (Cf. Bluntschli, Geschichte des schweizerischen Bundesrechtes, i. 554.
‘‘Der wahre Unterschied zwischen Staatenbund und Bundesstaat ist in dem
verschiedenen Organismus beider zu erkennen. Auch in dem Staatenbunde
sind die Einzelstaaten zu einem Staatsganzen verbunden, aber dieses' ist
nicht in sich selber wieder als ein besenderer, von den Einzelstaaten ver-
schiedener Zentralstaat organisirt, sondern die Bundesgewalt ist entweder
einem LEinzelstaate tibertragen oder aus den staatlichen Spitzen der Einzel-
staaten zusammengesetzt. In dem Bundesstaate dagegen gibt es nicht bloss
organisirte Einzelstaaten, sondern auch einen vollstaindig organisirten Zentral-
staat. So war der achiische Bund zur Zeit von Philopoemen nicht mehr ein
Staatenbund sondern ein Bundesstaat; so sind die nord-americanischen Frei-
staaten und ist ebenso die Schweiz seit 1848 als Bundesstaat organisirt.”]

iI TWO CLASSES OF FEDERATIONS 9

Governments to carry out. If men or money be needed for
Federal purposes, the Federal Power will demand them of the
several State Governments, which will raise them in such ways

as each may think best. In the other class, the Federal Power Second,
will be, in the strictest sense, a Government, which, in the other tom
class, it can hardly be called. It will act not only on the posite
Governments of the several States, but directly on every citizen State,” A
of those States. It will be, in short, a Government co-ordinate Grere the
with the State Governments, sovereign in its own sphere, as they power acta
are sovereign in their sphere. It will be a Government with directly on
the usual branches, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial ; with 31] citizens.
the direct’ power of taxation, and the other usual powers of a
Government ; with its army, its navy, its civil service, and all

the usual apparatus of a Government, all bearing directly upon

every citizen of the Union without any reference to the Govern-

ments of the several States. The State administration, within

its own range, will be carried on as freely as if there were no

such thing as an Union; the Federal administration, within its

own range, will be carried on as freely as if there were no such

thing as a separate State. This last class is what writers on
International Law call a Composite State, or Supreme Federal
Government.| The former class they commonly remand to the

head of mere Confederacies, or, at most, Systems of Confederate

States. Yet it is quite possible to conceive the existence of a

Federal Commonwealth, in which the Federal Power shall act

solely upon the several State Governments, which yet shall fully

answer the two conditions of external unity and internal plur-

ality. The American Union under the Confederation forbade

diplomatic action to the several States ;* it therefore formed a

single commonwealth in the eyes of other nations. Yet the

‘Wederal Power acted only on the several State Governments, and

1 This is what, in the Federalist, No. 9 (p. 47, ed. 1818) is called a Con-
solidation of the States. But Hamilton is here only using the language of
objectors, and the name consolidated would seem better to apply to non-Federal
commonwealths, as distinguished from Federal. It is so used by M. de Tocque-
ville, Démocratie en Amérique, i. 271.

2 See Wheaton’s International Law, i. 68 ; Austin’s Province of Jurisprudence,
p. 217; Calhoun’s Works, i. 163; Federalist, Nos. 9, 21, 39 et passim. The
distinction between the two classes is most fully and clearly drawn by Mr. J. 85.
Mill (Representative Government, p. 301), by Professor Bernard (Lectures on
American War, Oxford, 1861, pp. 68-72), and by Tocqueville (Démocratie en
Amérique, i. 250, 265 et seqq.).

3 Articles of Confederation, Art. vi. § 1.

The dis-
tinction
one rather
of means
than of
ends.

Inade-
quacy of
the system
of requi-
sitions.

10 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ~~ cuHap

not at all directly on individual citizens. The Swiss Confedera-
tion of 1815 even allowed diplomatic action to the several
Cantons within certain prescribed limits! Yet, on the whole,
even the Swiss Confederation, and much more the American
Confederation of 1778, had far more in common with perfect
Federal, or ‘“‘ Composite” States, than with lax Confederacies
like the German Bund. The real difference between the two
classes seems to be that the one is a good, the other a bad, way
of compassing the same objects.» Both America and Switzerland
found by experience that, without the direct action of the
Federal Power upon individuals, the objects of the Federal
Union could not be carried out. The several State Governments
are indeed, under the other system, constitutionally bound to
carry out all requisitions which do not transcend the limits of
the Federal authority. But we may be sure that the State
Governments will always lie under a strong temptation to dis-
obey such requisitions, not only when they really transcend the
limits of the Federal authority, but also when they are simply
displeasing to local interests or wishes.? Such a compact, in
short, may constitutionally be a Federal Union, but practically
it will amount to little more than a precarious alliance.* Still a
Confederation of this sort aims, however ineffectually, at being
a true Federal Union. The American Confederation of 1778
professed, while the German Confederation does not profess,® to
form one power, one nation,® or whatever may be the proper
word, in the face of other powers and nations. The articles of
Confederation wholly failed to carry out their own purpose ; and

1 See Wheaton, i. 90.

3 “The attributes of Congress under the Confederation and under the Con-
stitution were (with some not very important exceptions) the same. What was
done was to make them real and effective in the only possible way, by making
them operate directly on the people of the States, instead of on the States them-
selves."’"—Bernard, p. 69.

3 See Mill, p. 301.

4 Mill; Cf. Bernard, p. 68. See also Marshall’s Life of Washington, iv. 256-62.

5 On the German Confederation, see Mill, p. 300.

§ I do not feel called upon, at all events at this stage of my work, to enter
into the great American dispute between ational and Federal (see Federalist,
Nos. 39, 40 ; Tocqueville, i. 268 ; Calhoun, i. 112-161 ; Bernard, p. 72). I con-
fess that it seems to me to be rather a question of words. A power which acts in
all its relations with other powers, as a single indivisible unity, is surely a nation,
whether its internal constitution be Federal or otherwise. So to call it in no
way takes away from the independent rights of the several members. In the

language of Polybios, the word ἔθνος is constantly applied to the Achaian and
other Federal commonwealths ; indeed he seems to use it as the special formal

“io

II SYSTEM OF REQUISITIONS 11

the closer union of 1787, under the existing constitution, was
the result. Still, for my immediate purpose, it does not seem
needful to attend very closely to the distinction between these
two classes of Federations. In many of the ancient Leagues
with which we shall have to deal, it is evident that, on the one
hand, the League formed a single state in the face of all other
states, and that, on the other hand, the independence of the

several members was strictly preserved. But it is not always The dis-
easy to say how far the Federal Assembly and the Federal

not always
to be made

Magistrates exercised a direct power over the individual citizens

of each city, and how far it was exercised through the Assemblies in history.

and Magistrates of the several cities. We know, for instance,
that in the Achaian League there were Federal taxes ;! we do
not know whether they were directly gathered by Federal
collectors, or whether they were merely requisitions to the
several cities, which their Assemblies and Magistrates apportioned
by their own authority. The latter arrangement is just as likely
as the former ; but, if it could be shown to be the plan actually
in use, it would hardly have the effect of degrading the Achaian
League from the rank of a Composite State to that of a mere
Confederacy.? It is enough to enable a commonwealth to rank,
for our present purpose, as a true Federation, that the Union is
one which preserves to the several members their full internal
independence, while it denies to them all separate action in
relation to foreign powers. The sovereignty is, in fact, divided ;

title of such bodies. See, for instance, xx. 3, where ἔθνος, the Federal State, is
opposed to πόλις, the single city-commonwealth.

According to Tocqueville (i. 268) the American constitution is neither National
nor Federal, but some third thing, for which no name exists. He calls it “un
gouvernement national incomplet.”

The truest difference between a Federation aud a perfectly consolidated
Government is that already given. In a Federal state the several members
retain their sovereignty within their own range ; that is, the Federal power can-
not alter their internal institutions. In an ordinary monarchy or republic, the
supreme central power, in whomever it is vested, can alter the institutions of
any province or city. See Bernard, p. 71.

1 Pol. iv. 60 al κοιναὶ elo popal.

3 The system of requisitions is indeed in no way confined to Federal common-
tvealths ; it is quite compatible with monarchy, and indeed it has always been
exceedingly common under barbaric despotisms. The Sultan requires a certain
contribution from a district, which the authorities of the district levy as best
suits them. The royal administration is thus eased of a certain amount of trouble,
and the district at once acquires a certain amount of municipal freedom.. But
that freedom, great or small, exists merely by concession or sufferance, not of
right, as in a Federal State.

Classifica-
tion of
govern-
ment ;

Monarchy,
Aristo-
cracy, and
Demo-
cracy.

Absolute
and Con-
stitutional
Govern-
ments.

A cross
division
needed.

12 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cuap.

the Government of the Federation and the Government of the
State have a co-ordinate authority, each equally claiming
allegiance within its own range. It is this system of divided
sovereignty which I propose to contrast at some length with
the other principal forms of government which have prevailed
at different times among the most civilized nations of the world.

Forms of government may be classified according to so many
principles that it is needful to state at the onset what principle
of division seems most suited for the comparison which I have
taken in hand. The old stereotyped division into monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy, is sufficient for many purposes. A
more philosophical division perhaps is that which does not look
so much to the nature of the hands in which supreme power is
vested, as to the question whether there is any one body or
individual which can fairly be called supreme. This is the
division of monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, respectively,
into absolute and constitutional examples of their several classes.}
Thus the old Athenian commonwealth, where all power was
directly exercised by the People, was an Absolute Democracy.
An American State, on the other hand, where the People is
recognized as the ultimate sovereign, where all power is held to
flow from the people, but where a delegated authority is divided
in different proportions between a Governor, a Senate, and a
House of Representatives, is said to be an example of Constitu-
tional Democracy. In this way of looking at them, an Absolute
Government of any of the three kinds has quite as many points
in common with an Absolute Government of one of the other
kinds, as it has in common with a Constitutional Government of
its own class. But neither of these divisions seems suited to our
present purpose.” A Federal commonwealth may be either
aristocratic or democratic; or some of its members may be
aristocratic and others democratic; those Aristocracies and
Democracies again may exhibit either the Absolute or the Con-

1 See Calhoun’s Works, i. 28, 34 et seqq.

3 (Cf., on the classification of constitutions, Piitter, Historische Entwickelung
der heutigen Staatsverfassung des teutschen Reichs (3rd ed.) ii. 159. He observes
that, in discussing the constitution of the ‘‘German Empire,’’ ‘‘man dachte
nicht daran, dass zum Massstabe der verschiedenen Regierungsformen sich noch
eine hohere Abtheilung einfacher und zusammengesetzter Staaten denken liess,
und nur auf erstere jene dreyfache Eintheilung (namely, monarchic, aristocratic,
democratic) passte.”” He failed to recognize the theoretic possibility of a Federal
Monarchy. }

I CLASSIFICATION OF GOVERNMENTS 13

—_—~ ee eee

stitutional type of their own classes; indeed, though Federal

States have commonly been republican, there is nothing theoreti-

cally absurd in the idea of a Federal Monarchy. The classifica

tion of governments, which we must make in order to work out

the required contrast between Federalism and other forms, will

be in fact a cross division to the common classification into
Monarchies, Aristocracies, and Democracies. Federalism, as I

have already said, is essentially a compromise ; it is something
intermediate between two extremes. A Federal Government

is most likely to be formed when the question arises whether

several small states shall remain perfectly independent, or shall

be consolidated into a single great state. A Federal tie harmonizes ¥
the two contending principles by reconciling a certain amount

of union with a certain amount of independence. A Federal Federalism
Government then is a mean between the system of large states ἃ OE
and the system of small states. But both the large states, the tween
small states, and the intermediate Federal system, may assume a Great and
democratic, an aristocratic, or even a monarchic form of govern- ae
ment, just as may happen.

The two extremes then, with which the Federal system has
to be compared, are the system of small states and the system of
large states. Speaking roughly, the one is the ordinary political
system of what is called classical antiquity, the other is the or-
dinary political system of modern Europe. The system of small
states finds its most perfect developement in the independent
city-commonwealths of Old Greece; the system of large states
finds its most perfect developement in the large monarchies of
Europe in our own day. It is not too much to say that the
large and the small state alike may be either monarchic, aristo-
cratic, or democratic. As a general rule, small states have
flourished most as republics, and large states have flourished
most as monarchies, and the natural tendency of the two classes
of states seems to lie in those two directions respectively. But The
there is no sort of contradiction in the idea of a small state being Division
monarchic or of a large state being republican. Many small i, br
principalities have enjoyed a fair amount of prosperity and good their
government, and the experiment of governing a large country as several '
a single republic has been so seldom tried that we are hardly in govern.
position to decide whether it is necessarily a failure or not.! ment.

1 See Tocqueville, i. 270, 271; ii. 250.

Definition
of Large
and Small
States.

14 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT οσβάαρ.

But, this question apart, it is clear that a small republic may be
either aristocratic or democratic, that a large kingdom may be
either despotic or constitutional. And it is also clear that, while
free states, great and small, have certain points of resemblance,
large states and small states respectively have also some points
of resemblance, irrespective of their several forms of government.
It is in these points, where large states, whatever their constitu-
tion, form one class, and small states, whatever their constitution,
form another, that Federalism takes its position, as ‘a mean
between the two, sharing some of the characteristics of both. I
may add, that while Federalism, as a compromise, is liable to
some of the inherent disadvantages of a compromise, it mani-
festly, in those positions for which it is suited at all, goes a.
good way to unite the opposite advantages of the two opposite
systems between which it stands as a mean term.

I shall therefore now proceed, first to contrast at.some length
the two great systems of large and of small states, and then to
show the way in which a Federal Government occupies a position
intermediate between the two.!

Speaking roughly, I understand by a small state one in which
it is possible that all the citizens may, if their constitution allows
or requires it, habitually assemble for political purposes in one
place. ΒΥ ἃ large state I understand one in which such personal
assemblage is impossible; one, therefore, where, if the state be
constitutional, the constitution must be of the representative
kind. The large state, however, to have all the characteristics
and advantages of a large state, must commonly be much larger
than is absolutely necessary to answer the terms of this definition.
But I by no means intend to confine the name to what are
commonly understood by the name of Great Powers. All the
Kingdoms of Europe, and even some principalities which are not
Kingdoms, will count as large states for the purposes of this
inquiry. All alike share the characteristics which distinguish
them from the system of small states. The most perfect form
of this last is found when every City, with its immediately sur-
rounding territory, forms a commonwealth absolutely independent
and enjoying all the rights of a sovereign power.

1 It may be objected that a Federation may consist either of small or of large
states as they are here defined. I shall recur to this point presently.

It CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDEPENDENT CITY 15

This was the political system usual in the commonwealths of
ancient Greece and Italy, and it has been fully elucidated by the
various great modern writers on Greek and Roman history, but
most fully and elaborately by Mr. Grote. The ruling idea of the
politicians of those ages was what Mr. Grote calls the “autono-
mous city-community.” A man’s “country,”! in those days,
was not a region, but a city; his patriotism did not extend
over a wide surface of territory, but was shut up within the
walls of a single town. His countrymen were not a whole nation
of the same blood and language as himself, but merely those who
shared with him in the local burghership of his native place. A
man, in short, was not a Greek or an Italian, but an Athenian
or a Roman. Undoubtedly he had a feeling, which may, ina
certain sense, be called a patriotic feeling, for Greece or Italy as
wholes, as opposed to Persia or Carthage. But this feeling was
rather analogous to that which modern Europeans entertain for
the great brotherhood of European and Christian nations, than
to the national patriotism which an Englishman or a Frenchman
entertains for England or France. The tie between Greek and
Greek was indeed closer than the tie between European and
European, but it was essentially a tie of the same kind. Real
patriotism, the feeling which we extend to regions far larger
than the whole of Greece, did not reach beyond the limits of a
single Grecian city. This state of things is by no means peculiar
to ancient Greece and Italy ; traces of it are still to be seen in
modern Europe ; and it existed in its full force in some European
states down to very recent times. But it was in the brilliant
times of ancient Greece and Italy that this system found its
fullest developement, and that it made its nearest approach to
being universal over the civilized world. In modern Europe
independent cities have existed and flourished; a few indeed
even now retain a nominal existence. But such independent
cities have been, for the most part, merely exceptional cases,
surrounded by larger states whose form of government was
monarchical. In ancient Greece and Italy the independent city
was the ruling political conception, and in ancient Greece, in the
days of her greatest glory, it was the form of political life almost
universally received.

1 Πατρίς. The same use of the word is common in modern Greek.

2 Aristotle excludes from his definition of πόλις anything at all approaching
to the size of a nation. Babylon is hardly a city—tyea περιγραφὴν ἔθνους μᾶλλον
4 wodews. —Polit. iii. 3, 5. Cf. Polyb. ii. 37.

an

Character-
istics of the
Indepen-
dent City.

Patriotism
confined to
the City.

Full de-
velope-
ment of
city-inde-
pendence
in Greece,

Early ap-
proaches
to Consti-
tutional
Monarchy,

Their com-
parative
unimport-
ance before
the Mace-
donian
period.

Municipal
character
of the
Greek
Common-
wealths,

16 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — cHap.

Indeed the greater and more civilized the state, the more
completely do we find the idea of municipal republicanism
carried out. Neither of the other alternative forms of freedom,
the constitutional monarchy and the Federal republic, was at
any time absolutely unknown in the Grecian world. The polity
of the Homeric age, the King or chief of each town, with a King
of Kings at Mykéné as suzerain over at least all Peloponnésos,
might conceivably have grown into a monarchy, first of the
feudal, and then of the modern constitutional type. And, in the
half-Greek states of Epeiros and Macedonia, we actually find that
the heroic royalty did develope into something which may be
fairly called a rude and early form of constitutional monarchy.

‘. The Epeirot Kings swore obedience to the laws; the Mace-

donian, though a subject of a king, looked on himself as a
freeman, and there were Macedonian assemblies which, however
great may have been the royal influence, did impose at least
some formal restraint upon the royal will! On the other hand,
the robbers of AXtolia, the respectable but obscure townships of
the Achaian shore, and some other of the less advanced and
less important members of the Hellenic body, possessed, as far
back as we can trace their history, some germs of a polity which
may fairly entitle them to rank among Federal commonwealths.
But both the monarchic and the Federal states lagged for a long
tifle far behind the purely municipal ones. In the Greece of
Herodotos and Thucydidés, they play no distinguished part.
In the Greece of Xenophén and Isokratés, they still remain far
from prominent ; for the greatness of Thebes is really a muni-
cipal and not a Federal greatness. In short, constitutional
monarchy never attained any full developement in the ancient
world, and Federalism became important only when the most
brilliant days of Greece were past. Both in Greece and Italy,
the most important states so early threw aside regal government
altogethtr that the idea of the King ruling according to Law,
though certainly not unknown to Greek political thinkers, had
no opportunity to assume any fully-developed form. And though
a day came when nearly all Greece was mapped out into Federal
Republics, that day did not come till the system of perfectly

1 On the Macedonians and their Kings, see Edinburgh Review, vol. cv.
(April, 1857), 317-20, and the note and references in p. 327. See also Polybios,
v. 27, 29; cf. Drumann, Geschichte des Verfalls, p. 238. Of the Molossian
kingdom I shall have occasion to speak in my fourth Chapter.

II THE GREEK CITY-COMMONWEALTHS 17

independent separate cities had run its short and glorious caree.
Throughout the most brilliant days of Greece, all the greatest
Greek states were strictly sovereign municipalities. The
political franchise of the state was co-extensive with the
municipal franchise of the city. And this was equally true
whether the form of government of that city was aristocratic or
democratic. The difference between a Greek aristocracy and a aristo-
Greek democracy was simply whether legislative power and cratic ane
eligibility to high office were extended to the whole, or confined to alixe,
a part, of the class of hereditary burghers. In no case did they
extend beyond that class; in no case could the freedman, the
foreigner, or even the dependent ally, obtain citizenship by
residence or even by birth in the land. He who was not the
descendant of citizen ancestors could be enfranchised only by
special decree of the sovereign Assembly. In the democracy and Υ -
the oligarchy alike the City was the only political existence, the
one centre of patriotism. To live at a distance so great that it
was impossible to appear habitually at Assemblies held within
its walls was felt to be equivalent to sentence of exile! The
essentially civic character of a Greek state was not even affected
by the occurrence of that irregular form of Monarchy to which ~~?
the Greeks gave the name of 7'yranny.2 (Even the Tyrant is still Civic
the. Tyrant of the City; however oppréssive his internal ryle Tyrannied
may ise, he identifies himself with the military glory and ott- .
ward’ prosperity of that particular city, and does not think of
merging its separate being in any larger kingdom. He may.
conquer other cities by force of arms, but those cities are not
incorporated like the annexations of modern potentates. Their
inhabitants do not become the fellow-subjects of the inhabitants
of the Tyrant’s own city; the conquered city remains a dependency
of the conquering capital. It was not till Greece had, in the

1 “Tho natural limit of a democracy, is that distance from the central point,
which will but just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their
public functions demand."’—Federalist, No. xiv. p. 71. This is equally true of
all Greek commonwealths, aristocratic and democratic alike.

2 I shall, in my fifth Chapter, have occasion to speak more at length of the
Greek Tyrannies. I will here only remark that I use the word throughout in
its Greek sense. The Greek τύραννος is one who holds kingly power in a state
whose laws do not recognize a King. He differs from the King (βασιλεύς) in the
origin of his power, rather than in the mode of its exercise. The King may rule
ill ; the Tyrant may (though he seldom does) rule well; still the authority of the
King is lawful, that of the Tyrant is unlawful. In short, the word Emperor, in
its modern sense, exactly translates τύραννος ; but one cannot talk of an Emperor
of Megalopolis. .

σ

/

᾿
!

18 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cuap.

days of Macedonian influence, become familiarized with ex-
tensive monarchies, that the old Tyranny of Dionysios gradually
grew up, in the hands of Agathoklés and Hierdn, into something
like a Kingdom of Sicily. Bverywhere, whatever might be

e interna of government in the particular city, the
autonomous town-community, owning no sovereign, no feudal or
Federal superior, beyond its own walls, was the ruling political
idea of Greece in her best days, and the more advanced and
civilized was the state, the more closely did it cling to that one

\ favourite ideal of a commonwealth.

Condition

of Depend-

ent Cities
in Greece.

Difference
between a
dependent
City and a
member of
a Federa-
tion,

As in many other cases, we shall be better able to take in the
force and prevalence of the rule by looking at cases which
formed exceptions to 10.1 The sovereign and “independent city
was indeed the political ideal of Greece, but there were many
Grecian cities which were far from being sovereign and inde-
pendent. But this was simply because the force of some stronger
city stood in the way of their sovereignty and independence.
There were many towns which were not independent ; but every
town looked on independence as its right; every town which
was not independent deemed its loss of independence to be an
injury, and was constantly looking out for opportunities to
recover the right of which it felt itself deprived. The call to
make all Greeks autonomous was the popular cry set up ky
Sparta against imperial Athens.” But the condition of a city
thus shorn of its sovereignty sets more clearly before us what
the nature of the city-sovereignty was. Such a dependent city,
as Mr. Grote has shown in the case of the allies of Athens, was
by no means necessarily subjected to anything which we should
call foreign oppression. It might, and in many cases did, retain
its own laws, its own local administration, its own political
constitution, oligarchic or democratic according to the strength
of parties within its own walls. It might, or it might not, be
subject to a tribute to the superior State; it might even, in
some favoured cases, retain fleets and armies of its own, raised
by its own government and commanded by its own officers. It
is clear that a city in such a condition retains a degree of local
independence far greater than is allowed to any merely
municipal body in the least centralized of European kingdoms.
Its condition at first sight seems rather to approach to the

1 On the relation of Dependent Almance, see Arnold, Later Roman Common-
wealth, i. 165. 3 Thucydidés, i i. 139 et al.

ταν i, Uy eS ee ee eee

II DEPENDENT CITIES IN GREECE 19

purely internal sovereignty of a Swiss Canton or an American
State. What it lacks of full sovereignty is exactly what they
lack ; it lacks a separate being among the nations of the earth ;
it cannot make war or conclude foreign alliances; its public
quarrels are decided for it by a tribunal external to itself.
Where then lies the difference? It is this. The municipality in
a Constitutional Monarchy, the State in a Federal Republic, has
indeed no direct corporate voice in the general administration,
but that general administration is carried on by persons or
bodies in whose appointment the citizens of the municipality or
of the State have a direct or indirect voice. But a dependen
city in Greece had its foreign relations marked out for it b

power over which it had no control whatever. An English
town, as such, has nothing to do with peace or war, or with
general taxation and legislation. But then laws are made and
taxes are imposed by an Assembly to which that town sends
representatives ; peace and war are virtually made by Ministers
who are virtually appointed by that Assembly. An American
State, sovereign as it is within its own sphere, has no more
corporate voice than a mere municipality in those high national
concerns which are entrusted to the Federal Government.'! But
then the Government to which those concerns are entrusted
consists of a President and Congress in the choice of whom the
citizens of that State have a voice no less than in the choice of
their own local Governor and Legislature. Thus, in both cases,
if national questions are not submitted to the smaller body
in its corporate capacity, it is simply because, in relation to
such questions, the citizens of the smaller body act directly
as citizens of the larger. But in relation to this same class
of questions, the citizens of a dependent Greek city had no means
of acting at all. The most favoured ally of Athens, Chios, for
instance, or Mityléné, quite as independent internally as an
American State, had absolutely no voice, in any shape, in the
general concerns of the Confederacy. So far were Chios and
Mityléné from themselves declaring war and peace that they
had no sort of control over those who did declare war and peace.
Their fleets and armies were at the absolute bidding, not of a

2 The Federal Senators in the United States are indeed elected by the State
Legislatures, and are held specially to represent the State Sovereignties. But
the State Legislatures themselves are not consulted, and the Senators, when elected,
vote as individuals, just like the Representatives.

Compari-
son with
English

Colonies.

20 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cap.

President in whose election their citizens had a voice, not
of a King governed by Ministers whom their citizens indirectly
chose, but at the bidding of the Assembly of the City of
Athens, an Assembly in which no Chian or Mitylenean had
a seat. A public dispute between Methymna and Mityléné
was not judged, like a dispute between New York and Ohio,}
by a Supreme Court nominated by a President of their own
choice, but by the local tribunals of a distant city, over whose
nomination they had not the slightest influence of any kind.
In many respects the condition of a dependent Greek city
resembled that of an English Colony. The two agree in most
of those points which effectually distinguish both from the
member of a Federation. Both, unlike the Confederate City or
Canton, are strictly dependencies of a greater power. The
Colony, like the Athenian ally, is independent internally, but its
relations towards other nations are determined for it by a
power over which neither the Colony nor its citizens have
any sort of control? But there is one all-important difference
between the British Colony and the Athenian Ally. The dis-
qualifications of the colonist are purely local; he is a British
subject equally with the inhabitants of Britain; he can come
and live in England, and may become, no less than the native
Englishman, elector, representative, or even Minister. The
disqualifications of the Athenian ally were personal; the Chian
or Mitylenzan was not an Athenian, but a foreigner; if he
transferred his residence to Athens, he lost his influence in his
own city, while he acquired none in the city in which he dwelled.
Partly because he personally remains an Englishman, partly
because the instinct of perfect independence is not now so
keenly felt as it was in old Greece, the colonist commonly
acquiesces in the dependent position of his Colony. It is felt
that dependence is more than counterbalanced by perfect internal
freedom combined with the gratuitous protection of the mother-
country. As long as the mother-country abstains from practical
oppression, as long as the Colony does not become so strong as to
make dependence palpably incongruous, an English Colony has
really no temptation to separate. But, in a dependent Greek
city, the citizens were personally in an inferior position to the
citizens of the ruling state, while the city itself was deprived of a

1 See Tocqueville, Démocratie en Amérique, i, 254.
2 See Lewis, Government of Dependencies, p. 155 et seqq.

ev '

11 DEPENDENCIES COMPARED WITH ENGLISH COLONIES 21

power to which the political instinct of the Greek mind held
that it had an inherent right. The sway of Athens did not
necessarily involve either actual oppression! or any loss of
purely local freedom ; it was the loss of all share in Sovereignty
in the highest sense which the Greek city deplored when it was
reduced to a condition of dependent alliance.

It follows therefore that a system like the Athenian Alliance »
or Empire always remained a system of detached units A
Greek city either remained independent, retaining its full
sovereign rights, or else it became more or less dependent upon
some stronger city. There was no means by which it was No means
possible to fuse any large number of cities, like the members οὗ Tncor-
of the Athenian Alliance, into a single body with equal rights "04...
common to all. A Federal Union easily effects this end, but it the system
effects it only by depriving each city of the most precious attri- of Inde
butes of separate sovereignty. A Constitutional Monarchy, by Fitics,.
means of the representative system, also easily effects it, though
of course at a still greater sacrifice of local independence. Even
under a despotism, there is not the slightest need for placing the
inhabitants of a conquered, ceded, or inherited province in any
worse position than the inhabitants of the original kingdom.
But a Greek city had no choice but either absolute independence
oF a position of decided inferiority to some other city. It is
clear that a city-commonwealth can incorporate only within very
narrow limits. In such a commonwealth the city itself is every-
thing in a way into which the inhabitants of large kingdoms can
hardly enter. And the representative system, by which all the
inhabitants of a large country are enabled to have a share in the
government, is not likely to occur to men’s minds in such a state
of things. Every citizen in 4 Democracy, every citizen of the
ruling order in an Aristocracy, deems it his inalienable right to
discharge his political functions in his own person. Conse-
quently incorporation cannot be carried out over an extent of

1 That there were isolated cases of oppression on the part of individual
Athenian commanders, like Pachés, there is no doubt. But there was certainly
no habitual oppression on the part of the Athenian government. This has
been forcibly brought out by Mr. Grote (vi. 47, and elsewhere). See also North
British Review, May 1856, p. 169. Cf. Lewis, Government of Dependencies,
p. 102.

I have drawn my picture of a Greek dependent city from the most favoured of
the Athenian allies. But the condition of different allies of Athens differed much ;
and the position of a dependency of Sparta or Thebes in the next generation was
far inferior to that of the least favoured subject of Athens.

Incorpo-
ration
carried as
far as pos-
sible by
Athens,

in the case
of the old
Attic
Cities.

Impossible
in the case

of the later

22 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT omar.

territory so large as to prevent the whole ruling body from
habitually assembling in the city. Athens indeed, in a remote
and unchronicled age, actually carried incorporation as far as a
city-commonwealth could carry it. There is no record of the
causes and circumstances of the change, but there is no reason-
able doubt that the smaller towns of Attica, Eleusis, Marath6n,
and the rest, were once independent states,’ which were after-
wards incorporated with Athens, not as subjects of the ruling
commonwealth, but as municipal towns whose inhabitants
possessed the common Athenian franchise equally with the
inhabitants of the capital. But then Attica was not so large a
territory as to hinder all its free inhabitants from frequently
meeting together in a capital whose position was admirably
central. All Attica therefore was really incorporated with
Athens. Athens became the only City, in the highest sense, in
all Attica, and all the free inhabitants of Attica became her
citizens. But this incorporation, which geographical position
rendered possible in the case of old Attic towns, could never
have been extended to all the members of the later Athenian
Empire. If the jealousy of the Sovereign People could have
stooped to communicate its franchise to subjects, or even to

Athenian ilies, it was utterly impossible that the rights of Athenian

Empire.

citizens could have been exercised by the inhabitants of Rhodes
or of Byzantium. Even a Federal Union, except one which
admitted the representative principle, could hardly have bound
together such distant members; to unite them into a single
commonwealth of the ancient type was physically impossible.

1 See North British Review, May 1856, p. 150.

2 There can be no doubt that this incorporation was the main canse of the
great power and importance of Athens. As such, it is one of the great events in
the history of the world. No other Greek city possessed so large an immediate
territory, or so great a number of free and equal citizens. The territory of Sparta
was much larger; but then Sparta held the Lakonian towns as subjects ; their
inhabitants had no voice in general politics ; whatever freedom they had was
merely that of municipalities under a despotism. Thebes called herself the head
of a Beotian League, but the smaller Beeotian towns, as we shall see when we
reach that part of her history, looked on her as a Tyrant rather than a President.
A Bootian town was practically a subject dependency of Thebes, but throughout
Attica, a territory hardly smaller than Beotia, the smaller towns were free muni-
cipalities, and their inhabitants were citizens of Athens. This was a wonderful
advantage, precluding all fear of internal treason or discontent. ~

There is a dialogue in Xenophén, comparing Beotia and Athens at length, in
which the Athenians are always set against the Boeotians as a whole, not against
the Thebans only. οὐκοῦν οἷσθα, ἔφη, ὅτι πλήθει μὲν οὐδὲν μείους εἰσὶν ᾿Αθηναῖοι
Βοιωτῶν ; οἷδα yap, ἔφη. ---Χου, Mem. iii. 5, 2.

II INCORPORATION OF DEPENDENCIES 28

So in later times, wherever the system of city-commonwealths
existed, we find subject cities and districts following naturally

in the wake of other cities, which bear rule over them. We find Depen-
the system of the Athenian Empire followed, even in cases medi οἵ
where no geographical obstacle prevented the imitation of the aq.
earlier Athenian system of incorporation. Venice, Genoa, modern
Florence, held sway over other cities and districts, sometimes !talian
near neighbours, sometimes dependencies beyond the sea. In “i
both cases the subject countries often retained large municipal
privileges, but in neither case did the Sovereign City ever dream

of conferring on their inhabitants any share in its own more

exalted rights. So in the old state of things in Switzerland, and of
both the League as a whole and many of the several Cantons, Swiss
democratic Uri no less than oligarchic ‘Bern, assumed the
character of despotic sovereigns over subject districts, which
they too often governed yet more purely in the interest of the
sovereign state than had been done by Athens or Venice. In
short among city-commonwealths, where the Federal principle is
not admitted, absolute political independence or absolute political
subjection are the only alternatives. Once only in the history
of the world has incorporation on a large scale been tried in the
case of a city-commonwealth. And in that one case the experi-
ment undoubtedly failed. The geographical position of Rome
allowed an extension of the Roman franchise far wider than was
possible with the franchise of Athens or of any other Greek Effects of
city. From the narrow limits of the old Ager Romanus the corpora:
freedom of the Roman city was gradually spread over the whole Rone

of Italy, and, when it had long ceased to confer any real political

rights, its name was further extended to the inhabitants of the

whole civilized world. Within certain bounds, this liberal
extension of the franchise made Rome the greatest and mightiest

of all cities. But the same system, carried beyond those bounds,

led directly to the destruction of Roman freedom. Federation

was not tried ; it would have been inconsistent with the dignity

of the Sovereign City. Representation was unheard of ; so the
hundreds and thousands of citizens of the allied states were
gradually admi‘ted to a personal vote in the Roman Assembly.

The result natu ally was that the Assembly became at last a

frantic and ungo ornable mob, utterly incapable of peaceful
deliberation. When called on to discharge any political func-

tions, to pass a law or to elect ἃ magistrate, it commonly

Cantons,

Town-
autonomy
in mediz-
val Europe.

24 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT onap.

appealed at once to violence, murder, perhaps to open civil war.
From such a state of things even the despotism of the Ceesars
was felt to be a relief. The Athenian, Venetian, or Bernese
system was much as if the local Livery of London were invested
with the supreme power over the whole United Kingdom, leav-
ing to the other towns and counties ful! municipal, but only
municipal, independence. The Roman system was as if the
Livery of London were invested with the supreme power, every
elector in the United Kingdom being at the same time invested
with the freedom of the City.}

Greece then was the true home of the system of independent
city-commonwealths, the land where the system reached its
fullest and its most brilliant developement, the land where its
good and its evil results may be most fairly balanced against
each other. In ancient Italy the system hardly attained to full
perfection ; it was modified by a far stronger tendency than in
Greece to unite many cities by a Federal tie, and also by the
steady and increasing power of the one City of Rome. In
modern, and even in medieval, Europe Town-autonomy has
always had but a comparatively feeble life. Many common-
wealths of Italy, Germany, and the old Burgundian Kingdom,’
have attained to fame, wealth, and power; but, even in the
most brilliant days of mediswval Italy, town-autonomy was the
exception and not the rule. Most European states, great and
small, have always been monarchies. Such city-commonwealths
as have existed have always had a far greater tendency than in
Greece, sometimes to join themselves into Confederacies, some-
times to degenerate from great Cities into petty Principalities.®
And, in truth, the perfect city-autonomy of old Greece could not
exist in mediswval Europe. The still abiding life of the Roman

1 See National Review, April 1859, p. 337.

37 I must remark, once for all, that medieval history cannot be properly
understood unless it be fully understood that the Kingdom of Burgundy, the
region between the Saone, the Alps, and the Mediterranean, is historically no
part of France. It has been gradually acquired by the Kings and “ Emperors”
of Paris, by a series of stealthy robberies (reunions), reaching from the thirteenth
century to the nineteenth. Part of the country still retains its freedom as the
Western Cantons of Switzerland. Lyons, Besancon, Marseilles, were anciently
Free Cities of the Empire; they have been swallowed up, while Geneva and
Bern have as yet escaped ; that is the only difference.

3 Most of the points touched on in this paragraph I have worked out more at
large in the Oxford Essays for 1857, Ancient Greece and Medieval Italy, p. 156

et seqq.

’
@

Il TOWN-AUTONOMY IN MEDIZVAL EUROPE 25

Empire forbade it. ,The parts of Europe where the cities Indepen-

attained to the greatest splendour lay within the bounds of one cence of

or other of the monarchies which retained the style and imperial οἷ

pretensions of old Rome. Cherson! and the Campanian Re- by tt the

publics were dependencies of the Byzantine Emperor ; so was Claims of

Venice, in name at least, long after she had attained to practical
independence. The other cities which possessed republican
constitutions, in Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Provence, and
the Netherlands,? all lay within the limits of the Empire of the
West. However carefully the Imperial power might be limited
in practice, no commonwealth absolutely denied its existence in
theory. The city then was not absolutely independent ; it had
an earthly superior, entitled always to honorary respect, often to

some measure of practical obedience. A Greek city owned πο.

king but Zeus ; a German or Italian city had at least a nominal
king in Cesar.3 The title of “Free Imperial City,” borne as a
badge of honour by many a proud medixval commonwealth,
would have sounded like a contradiction in terms in the ears of
an Athenian. Venice alone, through her peculiar position and
her peculiar policy, obtained complete independence in name as
well as fact. The island city retained her nominal allegiance to
the Emperor of the East till she became strong enough to
dispense with all recognition of the successor either of Con-
stantine or of Charles. But even Florence and Genoa in the
days of their might would hardly have denied that some vague
and shadowy superiority over them belonged of right to the
chosen King of Germany and Italy, the crowned and anointed

Emperor of the Romans. From all these causes, the independ- .

ence of city-commonwealths, even in medisval, and still more in
modern, Europe, must be looked on as merely a secondary
element, existing only in an imperfect shape. It is to old
Greece that we must ever look for its one great and splendid
manifestation.

1 For the deeply-interesting history of Cherson, literally the Last of the Greek
Republics, see Finlay, Byzantine Empire, i. 415 [History of Greece, ii. 350] et 6644.

2 Strictly speaking, the cities in the County of Flanders should be excepted,
as Flanders, or its greatest portion, was a fief of the Crown of France. But the
history of Flanders can hardly be separated from that of the neighbouring and
kindred provinces which were all fiefs of the Empire. Provence, of course, was
not French till late in the fifteenth century.

8 The Emperor of course was supreme, in theory at least, everywhere. But
the independence of a town was often much more practically modified by the
neighbourhood of some local Duke, Count, or Bishop.

General
view of
the system
of Inde-
pendent
Cities.

Varieties
in internal
Constitu-
tions.

26 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT _ cuap.

Let us now strive to picture to ourselves the condition of a
country whose great political doctrine is that of the perfect
independence of each separate city. Such a land is crowded
with towns, each of them acknowledging no superior upon earth
and exercising all the rights of sovereignty as fully as the
mightiest empires. Within limits, it may be, less than those of
an English county, among a people one in blood, language,
manners, and religion, you may pass, in a short day’s journey,
through several independent states, each of which makes war
and peace at its pleasure, and whose relations to its neighbours
are regulated only by the public Law of Nations. From any
lofty peak you may look down on several capitals ata glance,
and see the territory of several sovereign commonwealths lying
before you asin a map. Within this narrow compass there may
be: perfect examples of every varying shade of political constitu-
tion! In one city pure Democracy may reign; magistrates
may be chosen, laws may be enacted, treaties may be ratified,
by an Assembly in which every free citizen has an equal voice.
In another, an hour or two from its gates, all power may be in
the hands of a narrow Oligarchy, who bind themselves by oath
to be evil-minded to the People? In a third, at no greater
distance, we may even find that name of fear, the Tyrant—the
ruler whose power rests on no hereditary right, on no popular
choice, but who dwells entrenched in his citadel, lording it over
unwilling subjects by the spears of foreign mercenaries. Thus,
within this narrow compass, we may see every form of govern-
ment in its extremest shape, and we may see them too in all

_ those intermediate forms by which each shades off imperceptibly

into the others. We may see Democracies in which an acknow-
ledged sovereignty of the People is found not to be inconsistent

1 [This is well brought out by Piitter in regard to the Germany of his day,
Hist. Entw. der heutigen Staatsverf. des teutschen Reichs, ii. 162. ‘‘ Kurz was
irgend einem, der mehrere unabhiingige Staaten in Europa bereiset, deren
Verschiedenheit in Verfassung, Gesetzen und anderen Einrichtungen begreiflich
machen kann, das wird einen Reisenden in Teutschland bald eben so deutlich, und
oft noch viel auffallender belehren, dass es ganz verschiedene Staaten sind, wo er
oft nicht halbe Tagereisen braucht, um bald republicanische, bald monarchische,
bald eingeschrinkte, bald beynahe despotische, bald erbliche, bald auf
Wahlfreyheit beruhende Regierungsformen wahrzunehmen, um mit jedem neuen
Gebiete wieder ganz andere Gesetze, ganz andere Miinzen, andere Posten, andere
Soldaten zu finden.’’}

? Arist. Pol. v. [viii] 9, 11. Nov μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐνίαις [ὀλιγαρχίαις] ὀμνύουσι

“ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι, καὶ βουλεύσω ὅ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν."

II GENERAL ASPECT OF CITY-COMMONWEALTHS 27

with the practical ascendancy of a high-born and wealthy class,
the leaders of the People but not their masters. We may see
Aristocracies, where the ruling order is not a band of sworn
oppressors, but a race of hereditary chiefs, submitted to, if not
with cordial love, at least with traditional respect. We may
even see Tyrannies, where the Tyrant would scarcely, in modern
language, deserve the name, where he is sometimes hardly to be
distinguished from a popular chief, sometimes hardly to be
distinguished from a hereditary King.1 And besides every
variety of internal government, we may also see, within this
same narrow compass, every possible variety of political relation
between city and city. For, though every city claims inde-
pendent sovereignty as its right, it may well be that every city
is not strong enough practically to maintain that right. One
city may stand absolutely alone, neither ruling over others, nor
ruled by others, nor yet entering into habitual alliance with any
other power.” Others, though not connected by anything which
can be called a Federal tie, may yet be attached to each other
by ancient affection ; they may be accustomed to have friends
and enemies in common, and they may, without resigning any
portion of their independent sovereignty, habitually follow the
political lead of some mightier and more venerable city.2 Others
may have sunk from independent into dependent alliance ; their
internal laws and government may be their own, but their fleets
and armies may be at the absolute control of another state.‘

1 In the Islands and in the colonies Tyranny seems to have been less carefully
distinguished from lawful Kingship than in continental Greece. Pindar freely
applies the name βασιλεύς to the Sicilian Tyrants, but it may be doubted whether
Herodotos, when speaking in his own person, ever distinctly applies the name to
any Tyrant. This has been pointed ont by a writer in the National Review
1862, p. 300.

The Tyrannies, both in continental Greece and in the colonies, must be care-
fally distinguished from the few cases of lawful Kingship which lingered on in a few
outlying places, Salamis in Cyprus for instance, long after its general abolition.
_—2-See the olicy of Korkyra as set forth in Thucydidés, i. 32, 37.

3 This was thé condition of the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta during the
great Peloponnesian War. Lacedemén took the habitual lead, but matters of
common interest were debated by the voices of the whole Confederacy, and each
city was free to act, or not to act, as it thought good. See Thuc. i. 125; v. 30;
Grote, vi. 105. It is instructive to see how, after the temporary conclusions
following the Peace of Nikias (B.c. 421), the different states gradually fell back
into their old places and relations. Cf. Xen. Hell. vii. 4, 8.

4 This was the condition of Chios, Mityléné, and the other allies of Athens
which never exchanged contributions of men for contributions of money. See
Grote, vi. 2.

Varieties
in external
Relations.

Different
relation
between
the City
and its
Territory.

28 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cHaApP.

Or they may even be without any fleet or army of their own;
they may pay tribute to some imperial city, which engages in
return to defend them against all aggressors.'_ Or some unhappy
cities may have fallen lower still ; dependent alliance may have
sunk into absolute subjection. Law and life and property may
all be at the absolute command of a foreign governor, for whom
even the domestic Tyrant would be a good exchange. And his
yoke may be embittered rather than alleviated, when his power
is supported by the intrigues of degenerate citizens who find
their private advantage in the degradation of their native city.”
Again, as there may be every conceivable variety of relation
between city and city, so we may also find, within the same
harrow compass, every conceivable variety of relation between
the city itself and its surrounding territory. In one district, as
we have seen in the case of Attica, every free inhabitant, that is
every man who is neither a slave nor a foreigner,® enjoys the full
franchise of the City, votes in its Assemblies, and is eligible to
its honours. In another, the rural inhabitants may be per-
sonally free, protected by the laws in all their private rights, but
shut out from the political franchise, subjects in short, rather
than citizens, of the sovereign commonwealth.‘ In the third,
the City, the abode of free warrior-nobles, may be surrounded
by lands tilled for them by serfs, Lakonian Helots or Thessalian
Penests, whose highest privilege is to be the slaves of the
Commonwealth, and not the slaves of any individual master.
But, in all these cases alike, the City is the only recognized
political existence. Each city is either sovereign or deems itself
wronged by being shorn of sovereignty. At a few miles from
the gates of one independent city we may find another, speaking
the same tongue, worshipping the same gods, sharing in the
same national festivals, but living under different municipal laws,
different political constitutions, with a different coinage, different

1 This was the condition of the great mass of the Athenian allies.

3 This was the condition of the extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta after the
great victory of Aigospotamos (B.c. 405). On the harmosts and dekarchies, see
Grote, ix. 271 et seqq.; Isok. Panath. 58.

3 It must be of course borne in mind that the children of a foreigner, though
born in the land, still remained foreigners, This seems strange to us as applied
to the question of nationality, but it is simply the rule of burghership as it was
carried out in many an old English borough.

4 This is essentially the condition of the Lakonian mweploixoc. They had
towns, but all notion of their separate political being was so utterly lost, that
their inhabitants had more in common with a rural population.

I ADVANTAGES OF SMALL COMMONWEALTHS 29

weights and measures, different names, it may be, for the very
months of the year, levying duties at its frontiers, making war,
making peace, sending forth its Ambassadors under the /pro-
tection of the Law of Nations, and investing the bands which
wage its border warfare with all the rights of the armies and the
commanders of belligerent empires.

Now what is the comparative gain and loss of such a political
system as this? There are great and obvious advantages,
balanced by great and obvious drawbacks. Let us first look Compara-
at the bright side of a-system to which the nation on which tive gain
the world must ever look as its first teacher owed the most the aystom.
brilliant pages of that history which still remains the text-book

of all political knowledge.

First of all, it is clear that, in a system of city-commonwealths, Advan-
the individual citizen is educated, worked up, improved, to the tages of
highest possible pitch. Every citizen in the Democracy, every common-
citizen of the ruling order in the Aristocracy, is himself states- wealths.
man, judge, and warrior. English readers are apt to blame
such a government as the Athenian Democracy for placing power
in hands unfit to use it. The truer way of putting the case
would be to say that the Athenian Democracy made a greater
number of citizens fit to use power than could be made fit by
any other system. No mistake can be greater than to suppose Political
that the popular Assembly at Athens was a mob such as gathers yeas
at some English elections, or such as the Assembly of the Roman individual
Tribes undoubtedly became in its later days. It was not an Citizen.
indiscriminate gathering together of every male human being
to be found in the streets of Athens. Citizenship was some-
thing definite ; if it was a right, it was also a privilege. The
citizen of Athens was in truth placed in something of an
aristocratic position; he looked down upon the vulgar herd
of slaves, freedmen, and unqualified residents, much as his own
plebeian fathers had been looked down upon by the old Eupatrids
in the days before Kleisthenés and Solén.1 The Athenian
Assembly was an assembly of citizens, of ordinary citizens

1 This quasi-aristocratic position of the citizen necessarily follows from the
nature of a civic franchise. The freedom of the city could be acquired only by
inheritance or by special grant. But in a great commercial and imperial eity
like Athens a large unqualified population naturally arose, among whom the

citizens held a sort of aristocratic rank. Such an unqualified population may
exist either in an Oligarchy or in a Democracy, and their position is legally the

30 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT onap.

without sifting or selection ; but it was an assembly of citizens
among whom the political average stood higher than it ever
did in any other state. Our own House of Commons, though

same in either case, The difference between Oligarchy and Democracy is a
difference within the citizen class. In a Democracy civil and political rights are
coextensive ; in an Oligarchy political rights are confined to a portion only of
those who enjoy civil rights.

The really weak point of Greek Democracy is one which I have not mentioned
in the text, because I wish to make my remarks as far as possible applicable to
city-commonwealths in general, whether aristocratic or democratic. Each gives
the same political education to those who exercise political rights ; the difference
is that in the Democracy this education is extended to all the citizens, in the
Aristocracy it is confined to a part of them. The real special weakness of pure
Democracy is that it almost seems to require slavery as a necessary condition of
its existence. It is hard to conceive that a large body of men, like the qualified
citizens of Athens, can ever give so large a portion of their time as the Athenians
did to the business of ruling and judging (ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν), without the
existence of an inferior class to relieve them froin at least the lowest and most
menial duties of their several callings. Slavery therefore is commonly taken for
granted by Greek political thinkers. In Aristotle’s ideal city (Pol. vii. 10, 13)
the earth is to be tilled either by slaves or by barbarian περίοικοι. In an
Aristocracy no such constant demands are made on the time of the great mass
of the citizens ; in an Aristocracy therefore slavery is not theoretically necessary.
It might therefore be argued that Democracy, as requiring part of the population
to be in absolute bondage, was really less favourable to freedom than to Aristocracy.
In the Aristocracy, it might be said, though the political rights of the ordinary
citizen were narrower, it was still possible that every human being might be
personally free. ‘But the experience of Grecian history does not bear out such
an inference. Slavery was no special sin of Democracy ; it was an institution
common to the whole ancient world, quite irrespective of particular forms of
government. And in fact, the tone of feeling, the general sentiment of freedom
and equality, engendered by a democratic constitution, actually benefited those
who were without the pale of citizenship or even of personal freedom. It must
doubtless have been deeply galling to a wealthy μέτοικος, whose ancestors had per-
haps lived at Athens for several generations, to see the meanest hereditary burgher
preferred to him on all occasions, It must have been more galling than it was in
a city like Corinth, where strangers and citizens were alike subject to the ruling
order. But Democracy really benetited both the slave and the stranger. The
slave was far better off in democratic Athens than in aristocratic Sparta or Chios.
(On the Chian slaves, see Thuc. viii. 40.) The author of the strange libel on
the Athenian Commonwealth attributed to Xenophén makes it a sign of the bad
government of Athens that an Athenian could not venture to beat a stranger
(μέτοικος) or another man’s slave! (Xen. de Rep. Ath. i. 10.) This accusation
speaks volumes as to the condition of slaves and strangers in aristocratic cities.
[With the μέτοικοι at Athens, cf. the Natifs at Geneva; Miiller, Hist. de la
Conféderation Suisse (Continuation), xv. 275 sqq.]

In modern times the experiment of a perfectly pure Democracy, one, that is,
in which every citizen has a direct vote on all questions, has been confined to a
few rural Cantons, where the demands on the citizen's time are immeasurably
smaller than they must be in a great city. The question of slavery therefore
has not arisen. American slavery is, of course, a wholly ditferent matter.

On the general subject of ancient citizenship, see Arnold, Thuc, vol. iii. p. xv.
(Preface. )

It POLITICAL EDUCATION OF THE CITIZENS 81

a select body, does not necessarily consist of the 658 wisest

men among the British people. Many of its members will Compari-
always be mere average citizens, neither better nor worse £ with
than many among their constituents. A town sends a wealthy jin Hose
and popular trader, an average specimen of his class. A county of Com-
sends a wealthy and popular country gentleman, an average ™™é
specimen of his class. Very likely several of those who vote

for them are much deeper political thinkers than themselves.

But the average member so elected, if he really be up to the
average and not below it, will derive unspeakable benefit from

his political education in the .House itself. He cannot fail to

learn much from the mere habit of exercising power in an
assembly at once free and orderly, and from the opportunity

of hearing the speeches and following the guidance of those

who are really fitted to be the leaders of men. This sort of
advantage, this good political education, which the English
constitution gives to some hundreds of average Englishmen,

the Athenian constitution gave to some thousands of average
Athenians. Doubtless an assembly of thousands was less
orderly than an assembly of hundreds ; but it must never be
thought that the Athenian Ekklésia was a mere unruly crowd,
ignorant of all order and impatient of all restraint. The mode

of proceeding was regulated by fixed rules just as much as the
proceedings of our Parliaments. As far as we know the history

of Athenian debates, breaches of order were rare, and scenes of

actual violence—common enough in the Roman Forum—were
absolutely unknown. It was surely no slight gain to bring so

many human beings into a position habitually to hear—and

that not as mere spectators, but as men with an interest and

ἃ voice in the matter—the arguments for and against a proposal
brought forward by Themistoklés and Aristeidés, by Periklés

and Thucydidés, by Kleédn and Nikias, by Démosthenés and
Phékién.! It is the habitual practice of so doing which is the

true gain. Popular assemblies which are brought together

only at rare intervals are incapable of wise political action,
almost incapable of free and regular debate. The Parliament Contrast

of Florence, for instance, was a mere tumultuous mob, which μπῶ the
orentine
Parlia-
1 Tocqueville, Dém. en Am. ii. 241. ‘‘C’est en participant ἃ la législation ment.
que l’Américain apprend ἃ connaitre les lois ; c’est en gouvernant qu'il s’instruit
des formes du gouvernement.” How much more truly could this be said of the
Athenian.

Compari-
son of the
Athenian
citizen
and the
English
mem ber,

Connexion
of Athe-
nian his-
tory with

32 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cnar?.

seldom did anything except vote away its own liberties. Such
a political franchise could give no political education whatever.
But the Athenian citizen, by constantly hearing questions of
foreign policy and domestic administration freely argued by
the greatest orators that the world ever saw, received a political
education which nothing else in the history of mankind has
ever been found to equal.}

The ordinary Athenian citizen then must really be compared,
not with the English ten-pound householder, but with the English
Member of Parliament in the rank-and-file of his party. In
some respects indeed the political education of the Athenian was
higher than any which a private member in our Parliament can
derive from his parliamentary position. The comparison is
instructive in itself, and it is more closely connected with my
immediate subject than might at first sight appear. When I
come to the political history of the Achaian League, I shall have
to compare the working of popular government, as applied to a
large Confederation of cities, with its working as applied, on the
one hand, to a single city like Athens, and, on the other, toa
large country, whether a republic or a constitutional monarchy.
I shall then show how the principles of the Achaian constitution,
no less democratic in theory than the Athenian constitution, were
modified in practice by the requirements of the wholly different

the subject state of things to which they were applied. Athens, in short, is

of Fede-
ralism.

the typical City and the typical Democracy. A clear view of
the Athenian constitution is absolutely necessary in order to
understand, as we go on, the modifications which later Greek
Federalism introduced into the old ideal of the democratic city.
I therefore do not scruple, with this ulterior purpose, to enlarge
somewhat more fully on Athenian political life than would be of

1 One of the few faults in M. de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America is his
failure to appreciate the Greek republics. Such words as the following sound
strange indeed to one who knows what Athens really was. ‘Quand je compare
Jes republiques grecque et romaine ἃ ces républiques d’Amérique; les
biblioth¢ques manuscrites des premiéres et leur populace grossi¢re aux mille
journaux qui sillonnent les secondes et au peuple éclairé qui les habite,’’ etc.
(ii. 237). Fancy the people who heard and appreciated Aischylus, Periklés, aud
Aristophanés, called a “populace grossi¢re,” because they had no newspapers to
enlighten them! And this by ἃ writer who, in his own walk, ranks deservedly
among the profoundest of political philosophers.

It is some comfort that Lord Macaulay, at all events, could have set him right.
See the well-known and most brilliant passage on the working of the Athenian
System in his Essay on Boswell’s Life of Johus»n,

Hi ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 33

itself necessary in ἃ comparison between the system of separate
city-commonwealths and the system of larger states. The
Athenian citizen, the Achaian citizen, the English Member of
Parliament, resemble each other in being members of popular
bodies each invested with the most important powers in their
respective countries. But the functions of the three are not
exactly the same, nor is the political education received by the
three exactly of the same kind. The Athenian had the highest
political education of all, because he had the highest responsibility
of all. The comparison between Athens and Achaia I will put
off to another Chapter; I will now rather try to show what the
Athenian political education really was by comparing the powers
and responsibilities of the ordinary Athenian citizen with those of
an ordinary Member of our own House of Commons.

There can be no doubt that an Athenian citizen who habitu-
ally and conscientiously discharged his political duties was called
on for a more independent exercise of judgement, for a more
careful weighing of opposing arguments, than is practically
required of the English private member. The functions of the Greater
Athenian Assembly were in a few respects more limited,! but, * esponsi-
on the whole, they were much more extensive than those of the or ty,
English House of Commons. The Assembly was more directly Athenian
a governing body. Démos was, in truth, King, Minister, and ‘itizen
Parliament, all in one. In our own system the written Law Buatet the
entrusts the choice of Ministers, the declaration of war, the Member.
negociation of peace, in general the government of the country
as distinguished from its legislation, to the hereditary Sovereign.
But the conventional Constitution adds that all these powers Position
shall be exercised by the advice of Ministers who, as chosen by of the |
the Sovereign out of the party which has the majority in the winistry.
House, may be said to be indirectly chosen by the House itself.
These Ministers, a body unknown to the written Law, but the
most important element in the unwritten Constitution, exercise
royal power during the pleasure of the House.* As long as they

1 Matters of Legislation, which we think so pre-eminently the business of a
popular Assembly, were at Athens by no means wholly in the hands of the
Ekklésia. Its powers were a good deal narrowed by the institution of the Nomo-
thetes (see Grote, v. 500). On the other hand, the Assembly exercised exactly
those functions of electing to offices, and declaring war and peace, any direct
share in which we carefully refuse to the House of Commons.

2 With uaa body which has no existence in the eye of the Law exercises the
chief power in the name of the Sovereign and during the pleasure of the House

D

Received
duties of
the private
Member.

Different
duties

of the
Athenian
Citizen.

34 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL<GOVERNMENT — onap.

retain the confidence of the House, they take the management of
things into their own hands.1 The House asks questions; it
calls for papers; it approves or censures after the fact ; but its
vote is not directly taken beforehand on questions of peace, war,
alliance, or other matters of administration. It leaves such matters
to the Ministers as long as it trusts them; if it ceases to trust
them, it takes measures which practically amount to their deposi-
tion. No Minister remains in office after a direct vote of censure,
or even after the rejection of a Government motion which he
deems of any importance. He may indeed dissolve Parliament ;
that is, he appeals to the country. But if the new Parliament
confirm the hostile vote of the old one, he has then no escape ;
he is hopelessly driven to resignation. No Minister receives
instructions from the House as to the policy which he is to carry
out ; least of all, when he rises in his place in Parliament to advo-
cate one policy, is he bidden by the House to go to his office and
take the requisite administrative steps for carrying out another
policy. Hence, under our present parliamentary system, the
average member is in truth seldom called on to exercise a per-
fectly independent judgement on particular questions of import-
ance. He exercises his judgement once for all, when he decides
whether he will support or oppose the Ministry ; by that decision
his subsequent votes are for the most part determined. Whether
this is a high state of political morality may well be doubted ;
it is enough for our present purpose that it is the political
morality commonly received. Matters were widely different in
the Athenian Assembly. Every citizen who sat there exercised
much higher functions than those of an English private member.
He sat there as a member of a body which was directly, and not
indirectly, sovereign. His own share of that corporate sover-
eignty it was his duty to discharge according to his own personal

of Commons. We shall presently have to contrast this with the Achaian and
American system by which a magistrate, chosen for a fixed time, exercises nearly
the same powers in his own person. Athens differs from all these by what may
be called vesting the royal authority in the House of Commons itself.

1 The gradual change of political language and political habits is curious.
The Sovereign no longer presides at a Cabinet Council, because the practical
function of the Ministers is no longer to advise the Sovereign, but to act for
themselves, subject to responsibility to Parliament. Therefore it has of late
become usual to apply the name of ‘‘Government” to the body which used to
be content with the humbler title of “ Ministry” or ‘‘ Administration.” Its
mem bers are felt, subject to their parliamentary responsibility, to be the real
rulers,

II COMPARISON BETWEEN ATHENS AND ENGLAND 36

convictions, Athens had no King, no President, no Premier ; The As-
she had curtailed the once kingly powers of her Archons til] sembly ἃ
they were of no more political importance than Aldermen or pont as
Police Magistrates. She had no Cabinet, no Council of Ministers, well as a
no Council of State.1_ The Assembly was, in modern political Fani*
language, not only a Parliament but a Government. There was’
indeed a Senate, but that Senate was not a distinct or external Functions
body: it was a Committee of the Assembly, appointed to put ofthe |
matters in regular order for the Assembly to discuss. There
were Magistrates, high in dignity and authority —the ten
Generals, on whom, far more than on the pageant Archons,

rested the real honours and burthens of office. But those of the
Magistrates were chosen by the Assembly itself for a definite Generals.
time ; it was from the Assembly itself that they received those
instructions which, in all modern states, whether despotic, con-
stitutional, or republican, would issue from the “Government.”

There was nothing at Athens at all analogous to what we call Nothing
“ Office ” and “Opposition.” Periklés, Nikias, Phékién, appeared analogous ᾿
in the Assembly, as Generals of the Republic, to propose what ,.4 « Op.
measures they thought fit for the good of the state. Their pro- position.”
posals, as coming at once from official men and from eloquent

and honourable citizens, were doubtless always listened to with
respect. But the acceptance of these proposals was by no means

a matter of course; their rejection did not involve immediate
resignation, nor did it even imply the rejection of their proposers

at the next yearly choice of Magistrates. The Assembled People

was sovereign ; as sovereign, it listened to its various counsellors

and reserved the decision to itself. . Periklés, Nikias, and Phékién,

were listened to; but Thucydidés,? Kleén, and Démosthenés were

listened to also, and their amendments, or their substantive pro-

posals, had as fair a chance of being carried as those of the
Generals of the commonwealth. A preference given to the pro-

posal of another citizen involved no sort of censure on the official

1 T cannot but think that Mr. Grote, to whom, more than to any other man,
we are indebted for true views of the Athenian Democracy, has heen sometimes
led astray by his own English parliamentary experience. He clearly looks on
Nikias and other official men as coming nearer to the English idea of a “ Govern-
ment,” and Kledn and other demagogues as coming nearer to the English idea of
a “Leader of Opposition,’ than the forms of the Athenian commonwealth
allowed. I have tried to set this forth at some length in an article in the North
British Review, May, 1856, p. 157.

2 I mean of course Thucydidés son of Melésias, the rival of Periklés ; quite a
different person from Thucydidés the historian.

B.c. 415.

Direct Di-
plomatic
action of
the As-
sembly,

B.c. 343.

Effect

of these
powers on
individual
citizens.

36 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — cmap.

man who was thus placed in a minority; it in no way affected
his political position, or implied any diminished confidence on
the part of the People. The Sovereign Assembly listened
patiently to the arguments of Nikias against the Sicilian expe-
dition, and then sent him, with unusual marks of confidence, to
command the expedition against which he had argued. It was
the Assembly which, by its direct vote, decided questions of
peace and war; it was the Assembly which gave its instructions
to the Ambassadors of Athens; and it was the Assembly which
listened, in broad daylight and under the canopy of heaven, to
the proposals which were made by the Ambassadors of other
powers. In modern times, even a republican state has some
President, Secretary, or other official person, to whom diplomatic
communications are immediately addressed. The consent of a
Senate may be needed for every important act, but there is some
officer or other who is the immediate and responsible actor.}
We shall see a very close approach to this system when we
come to look at Greek Democracy as modified in the Federal
constitution of Achaia. But in the pure Democracy of Athens
there is no approach to anything of the kind. When King
Philip has to communicate with the hostile republic, he does not
commission a Minister to address a Minister; he writes in his
own name to the Senate and People of Athens.2 The royal
letter is read, first in the Senate before hundreds, and then in
the Assembly before thousands, of hearers, each of whom may,
if he can gain the ear of the House, take a part in the debate on
its contents. So, when the reading and the debate are over, it
is by the sovereign vote of those thousands of hearers that the
policy of the commonwealth is finally and directly decided. It
is evident that the member of an Assembly invested with such
powers as these had the very highest form of political education
opened to him. If he did his daily duty, he formed an opinion

1 By the American Constitution the assent of the Senate is needed for the
treaties entered into by the President, and the power of declaring war is vested
in Congress. But all diplomatic business up to these points is carried on after
the forms usual with the Governments of other states. Despatches are not
addressed to Congress, nor even to the President, but to a Secretary of Stato,
whose office is not mentioned in the Constitution. According to Athenian prac-
tice, the letters of Earl Russell on the affair of the Trent would have been
«midressed, not to Mr. Seward, but to the House of Congress, and the liberation
of the Southern Commissioners would have needed a vote of those bodies.

2 See the Speech of Démosthenés (or rather of Hégésippos) about Halonnésos
(Oratores Attici, vol. iv. p. 82).

11 ATHENS THE HIGHEST TYPE OF CITY-COMMONWEALTH 57

of his own upon every question of the day, and that not blindly
or rashly, but after hearing all that could be said on either side
by the greatest of orators and statesmen. Of course he might
blindly follow in the wake of some favourite leader—so might a
Venetian Senator, so might an English Peer—but so to do was
a clear forsaking of duty. The average Athenian citizen could
not shelter himself under those constitutional theories by which,
in the case of the average English member, blind party voting is
looked upon as a piece of political duty, and an independent
judgement is almost considered as a crime.

The great advantage then of the system of small city-
commonwealths, the system of which the Athenian Demo-
cracy was the greatest and most illustrious example, was that
it. gave the members of the ruling body (whether the whole
people or only a part of the people) such a political education |
as no other political system can give. Nowhere will the
average of political knowledge, and indeed of general intelli-
gence! of every kind, be so high as in a commonwealth of this
sort. Doubtless to take Athens as the type is to look at the
system in its most favoirable aspect. The Athenian people Athens the
seem to have had natural gifts beyond all other people, and the bishest
circumstances of their republic brought each citizen into daily (fine
contact with greater political affairs than could have been the system.
case with the citizens of an average Greek commonwealth. At
Rome, again, the vast numbers of the Assembly and the com-
paratively narrow range of its functions must have effectually
hindered the Comitia from ever becoming such a school of politics
as the Athenian Pnyx. The Roman Tribes elected Magistrates,
passed Laws, and declared war ; but they did not exercise that
constant supervision over affairs which belonged to the Athenian
Démos. The ordinary powers, in short, of a Government, as
distinguished from a Parliament, were exercised by the Senate
and not by the Tribes. It was not every city-commonwealth
which could give its citizens such opportunities of improvement

1 General intelligence, not of course general knowledge, which must always
depend upon the particular age and country in which the commonwealth is
placed. The average Englishman knows far more than the average Athenian
knew, because the aggregate of knowledge in the world is incomparably greater
than what it was then. But the average Athenian probably knew far more
in proportion to the aggregate of knowledge in his own day ; most certainly he
had a general quickness, a power of appreciation and judgement, for which we
should look in vain in the average Englishman.

Oppor-

tunity for
the deve-
lopement
of genius.

a

38 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — cnap.

ma ee

as were enjoyed by the citizens of Athens. But, in estimating
the tendencies of any political system, they must be estimated
by their most perfect manifestations both for good and for evil.
And undoubtedly even commonwealths which gave their citizens
far less political education than was to be had at Athens must
have given them far more than is to be had in any modern
kingdom or republic. We idolize what is called the press,! as
the great organ of modern cultivation ; but, after all, for a man
to read his newspaper is by no means so elevating a process as
it is to listen with his own ears to a great statesman and to give
his independent vote for or against his motion. And great
statesmen moreover grow far thicker on the ground in common-
wealths of this kind than they do in great kingdoms. Many a
man who has a high natural capacity for statesmanship is, in.a
large state, necessarily confined to the narrow range of private
or local affairs. Such a man may, under a system of small
commonwealths, take his place in the Sovereign Assembly of
his own city and at once stand forth among the leaders of men.
In a word, it can. hardly be doubted that the system of small
commonwealths raises the individual citizen to a pitch utterly
unknown elsewhere. The average citizen is placed on a far

. higher level, and the citizen who is above the average has far

’ more favourable opportunities for the display of his special

Intensity
of patriot-
ism in
Small
States.

powers.
This elevation of the character of the individual citizen is the
main advantage of the system of small states. It is their one
great gain, and it is an unmixed gain. It does not indeed decide
the question in favour of small Commonwealths as against
Federations or great Monarchies. These last have their advan-
tages which may well be held to outweigh even this advantage ;
but it clearly is unmixed gain as far as it goes. Less absolutely
unmixed is another result of the system, which is closely connected
with both its good and its bad features. A system of small
commonwealths raises in each citizen a fervour and intensity of
patriotism to which the natives of larger states are quite
unaccustomed.” It is impossible, even in a fairly homogencous
country, to feel the same warmth of affection for a large region

1 It is worth notice that the “press” in comimon language always means
newspapers and not books.

3 On the intensity of patriotism in small commonwealths, see Macaulay, Hist.
Eng. i. 350 et seqq.

1I INTENSE PATRIOTISM IN SMALL STATES 39

as for a single city or for a small district. An Englishman is
patriotic ; a Dane, as a countryman of a smaller state, is more
patriotic still; but neither England nor Denmark can awaken

the same glow of patriotic zeal as the great name of Athens.' A
man loves his birthplace, he loves his dwelling-place, he has a
loyal respect for the seat of his country’s government. But with

the great mass of the subjects of a large kingdom these three
feelings will severally attach to three different places. With an
Athenian or a Florentine they all attached to the city of Athens

or of Florence. In a smaller state, like Megara or Imola, the
local patriotism might be yet more intense still, for the Athenian
citizen might really be a native and resident, not of Athens, but

of Marathén or Eleusis. But the inhabitant of the rustic Démos

was still an Athenian ; if his birthplace and dwelling-place were

not within the city walls, they could hardly be far out of sight

of the spear-head of Athéné on the Akropolis. In any case the Identifica
City was far more to him than the capital of a modern state can en of all
ever be to the great bulk of its inhabitants. To adorn a capital Vith the
at the expense of a large kingdom is one of the most unjust City.
freaks of modern centralization; but in adorning the city of
Athens every Athenian was simply adorning his own hearth and
home. Walls, temples, theatres, all were his own; there was

no spot where he was a stranger, none which he viewed or trod.
by the sufferance of another. The single city will ever kindle a

far more fervid feeling of patriotism than can be felt towards a
vast region, large parts of which must always be practically
strange. And this intensity of local patriotism is closely connected
with all that is noblest and all that is basest in the history of
city-commonwealths. Where the single city is all in all, no
self-devotion is too great which her welfare demands, no deed of
wrong is too black which is likely to promote her interests. The
unselfish heroism of Leénidas and Decius sprang from the very
same source as the massacre of Mélos and the destruction of
Carthage.

For that there is a weak and a bad side to this system of Bad side
separate city-commonwealths is as obvious as that there is a great of the ,
and noble one. First of all, the greatness of such commonwealths ¢),, rem 0
is seldom so enduring as that of larger states. A democratic city, common-
above all, if it would preserve at once freedom at home and a Wealths.
high position abroad, has need of a certain high-strung fervour

1 Thuc. vii. 64 τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν ᾿Αθηνῶν.

Greatness
of small
states less
permanent
than that
of greater
ones,

B.C. 508—
405.

Common
fallacy as
to the
weakness
of small
states,

40 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT _ cuar.

of .patriotism which is not likely to endure through many genera-
tions. This Mr. Grote has remarked in the case of Athens,
when he compares the feeble resistance offered by the contempor-
aries of Démosthenés to the growing power of Macedonia with
the vigour displayed by their fathers in the Persian and Pelopon-
nesian wars. A state again whose political franchise depends
wholly on the hereditary burghership of a single city cannot so
easily strengthen itself by fresh blood from other quarters, as
can be done by a great nation. A conquest destroys a city ; it
not uncommonly regenerates a nation. Of all city-commonwealths
none ever had so long a day of greatness as Rome. One main
cause doubtless was because the Roman People was less of a
purely civic body than any other city-commonwealth, and because
no other city-commonwealth was ever so liberal of its franchise.
Rome thus grew from a city into an empire; other cities, aristo-
cratic and democratic alike, have often seen their day of greatness
succeeded by a long and dishonoured old age. Nothing could
well be more miserable than the latter days of democratic Athens
and of oligarchic Venice. During the period-of Grecian history
with which we shall chiefly have to deal, the once proud
Democracy of Athens sinks into the most contemptible state in
Greece. And surely the dregs of a close body like the Venetian
patriciate afford the very lowest spectacle which political history
can produce.

Here then lies the real cause of the inherent weakness of
these small commonwealths. Nothing can be so glorious as the
life of one of them while it does live. The one century of
Athenian greatness, from the expulsion of the Tyrants to the
defeat of Aigospotamos, is worth millenniums of the life of Egypt
or Assyria. But it is a greatness almost too glorious to last ; it
carries with it the seeds of its own destruction. This kind of
weakness, at all events this want of permanency, is inherent in
the system itself. But another kind of weakness, with which
the ancient commonwealths are often reproached by superficial
observers, is not inherent, or rather it has no existence at all.
Men who look only at the surface are tempted to despise Athens
and Achaia, because of the supposed insignificance of what are
called “petty states” in modern Europe. There are men who,
when they look at the colossal size of despotic France or Russia,
are led to despise the free Confederation of Switzerland and the

1 Grote, iv. 240.

I SUPPOSED WEAKNESS OF SMALL STATES 41

free Monarchy of Norway. How utterly contemptible then must
commonwealths have been, beside which even Switzerland and
Norway would seem empires of vast extent. Such a view as
this involves the fallacy of being wholly physical and forgetting
all the higher parts of man’s nature. France and Muscovy have
indeed incomparably greater physical strength than Switzerland
or Norway, but the Swiss or the Norwegian isa being of a
higher political order than the Frenchman or the Muscovite. And
this view also involves another fallacy. It goes on a mistaken
analogy between small states, when they are surrounded by
greater ones of equal material civilization, and small states, when
small states constituted the whole of the civilized world. There
is a certain sense in which the interests of Switzerland are smaller
- than the interests of France, but there was no possible sense in
which the interests of Athens were smaller than the interests of
Persia. The small states of modern Europe exist by the suffer- Different
ance, by the mutual jealousy, possibly to some extent by the Position of
right feeling, of their greater neighbours! But the small itates
commonwealths of old Greece were actually stronger than the
contemporary empires; they were less than those empires only
in the sense in which Great Britain is less than China. The few where they
free cities now left in Europe are mere exceptions and anomalies ; 7 merely
they could not resist a determined attack on the part of one even °°?"
of the smaller monarchies. Cracow could have been wiped out a.p. 1846,
of the map of Europe at a less expenditure of force than the
combined energies of three of the Great Powers. If Germany
and Europe chose to look on, Denmark could doubtless annex -
Hamburg, and Bavaria annex Frankfort. So it must ever be
when Free Cities are merely exceptions among surrounding
Kingdoms, when every Kingdom maintains a standing army,
when a city can be laid in ashes in a day, and when the reduc-
tion of the strongest fortress has become simply a question of
time. But when we discuss the merits of a system of Free Cities,
we do not suppose those Free Cities to be mere exceptions to a

1 Just at this moment Federal Government in general has acquired a certain
amount of popular discredit from some of the acts of the power to which a
momentary caprice has specially attached the name. It therefore cannot be out
of place to point out the admirable union of dignity and modesty, the unswerving
assertion of right combined with the absence of all unseemly bravado, which has
distinguished all the acts of the Swiss Federal Government during the recent
aggressions of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, both in the annexation of Savoy and

in the more recent violation of Swiss territory in the Dappenthal. (February,
1862.) .

and where
they are
the general
rule,

Free cities
in the
Middle
Ages,

Constant
warfare
among
Free
Cities.

Force of
antipathy
between
neighbour-
ing towns.

42 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ~ cHAp.

general state of things, mere relics of a political system which
has passed away ; we suppose a state of things like that of old
Greece, in which the independence of every city is the universal,
or at least the predominant, rule of the civilized world. And
even in much later times, in those centuries of the middle ages
when Free Cities, though not predominant, were still numerous,
a city surrounded by strong walls and defended by valiant citizens
might successfully resist the resources of a great empire. Feudal
levies could not be kept to constant service, and, before the
invention of gunpowder, the art of attacking fortified places
lagged far behind the art of defending them. A single city
nowadays is weak as compared with a small kingdom, just as a
small kingdom is weak as compared with a great kingdom. The
fact that no state can resist a power which is physically stronger
than itself proves nothing as to the merits of particular forms of
government. Aristocratic Rhodes, democratic Athens, federal
Achaia, and kingly Macedonia were all alike, as their several
turns came round, swallowed up by the universal power of Rome.

But there is a far greater evil inherent in a system of
separate Free Cities, an evil which becomes only more intense
as they attain a higher degree of greatness and glory. This
is the constant state of war which is almost sure to be the
result. When each town is perfectly independent and sovereign,
acknowledging no superior upon earth, multitudes of disputes
which, in a great monarchy or a Federal republic, may be decided
by peaceful tribunals, can be settled by nothing but an appeal
to the sword. The thousand causes which involve large neigh-
bouring states in warfare all exist, and all are endowed with
tenfold force, in the case of independent city-commonwealths.
Border disputes, commercial jealousies, wrongs done to indi-
vidual citizens, the mere vague dislike which turns a neighbour
into a natural enemy, all exist, and that in a form condensed
and intensified by the very minuteness of the scene on which
they have to act. A rival nation is, to all but the inhabitants
of a narrow strip of frontier, a mere matter of hearsay; but
a rival whose dwelling-place is within sight of the city gates
quickly grows into an enemy who can be seen and felt. The
highest point which human hatred can reach has commonly
been found in the local antipathies between neighbouring cities.
The German historian of Frederick Barbarossa speaks with
horror of the hate which raged between the several Italian

IT CONSTANT WARFARE AMONG SMALL STATES 43

towns, far surpassing any feeling of national dislike between
Italians and Germans.! In old Greece the amount of hatred
between city and city seems to depend almost mathematically
upon their distance from one another. Athens and Sparta are
commonly rivals, often enemies. But their enmity is not in-
consistent with something of international respect and courtesy.
When Athens was at last overcome, Sparta at once rejected the 5.0. 404.
proposal to raze to the earth a city which, even when con-
quered, she still acknowledged as her yoke-fellow.?. That pro-
posal came from Thebes, between whom and Athens there
reigned an enmity which took the form of settled deadly
hostility.2 The greatest work that orator or diplomatist ever
achieved * was when Démosthenés induced the two cities to Bc. 339.
lay aside their differences, and to join in one common struggle
for the defence of Greece against the Macedonian invader. But Examples
even Athenian hatred towards Thebes was gentle compared with ™ Preece
the torrents of wrath which were poured forth upon unhappy”
Megara.® So too in Bosotia itself; just as Frederick entrusted
the destruction of Milan, not to his own Germans, but to Milan’s a.p. 1162.
enemies of Lodi and Cremona,® so Alexander left the fate of
Thebes to the decision of his own Greek allies, and the ven- 8.0. 335.
geance, not of Macedonia, but of Plataia and Orchomenos, soon
swept away the tyrant city from the earth.’ A system of Free
Cities therefore involves a state of warfare, and that of warfare
carried on with all the bitterness of almost personal hostility.
The more fervid the patriotism, the more intense the national
life and vigour, the more constant and the more unrelenting will
be the conflicts in which a city-commonwealth is sure to find
itself engaged with its neighbours.

The same causes tend also to produce a greater degree of
cruelty in warfare, and a greater severity in the recognized
law of war, than is found in struggles between great nations

1 See Radevic of Freising, iii. 39. Cf. National Review, No. XXIII.
(January, 1861, p. 52.) 2 Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 19, 20.

3 Circumstances led Athens and Thebes to receive help from one another in
the very crisis of their several revolutions (B.c. 403 and 382) ; but when these
exceptional causes had passed by, the old enmity returned. It never was
stronger than during the later campaigns of Epameinéndas and during the
Sacred War. 4 See Arnold's Rome, vol. ii. p. 331.

5 This comes out strongly in those scenes in the Acharnians of Aristophanés,
in which the Beotian and the Megarian are severally introduced.

5 Otto Morena, ap. Muratori, vi. 1103. Sire Raul, ib. 1187.

7 Arrian, i. 8. 8; 9. 9.

Compari-
son be-
tween
citizen
soldiers —
and pro-
fessional
soldiers.

A.D. 1631.
A.D. 1578.

B.C. 424,
A.D. 1176.

44 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — cmap.

in civilized ages. An army of citizen soldiers is a very different
thing from an army of professional soldiers. Undoubtedly the
citizen soldier never sinks to the lowest level of the professional
soldier. He never attains that pitch of fiendishness which is reached
when the professional soldier degenerates into the mercenary, and
when the mercenary degenerates into the brigand. Old Greece
was full of wars, of cruel and bloody wars, but she never knew
the horrors with which France, Germany, and Belgium were
familiar from the wars of Charles of Burgundy to those of
Wallenstein and Tilly. Such scenes as the sack of Magdeburg
and the Spanish Fury at Antwerp are all but without parallel
in Grecian history, they are altogether without a parallel among
the deeds of Athenian or Lacedemonian citizens.' But if the
citizen soldier does not degenerate into the wanton brutality
of the mere mercenary, yet the very feelings which elevate the
spirit of his warfare serve, on the other hand, to render it
far more cruel than warfare waged by a civilized army in
modern times. The modern professional soldier does as he
is bid; he does what is required by professional honour and
professional duty ; he is patriotic, no doubt, but his patriotism
would seem vague and cold to an Athenian marching to Délion,
or to a Milanese going forth to Legnano. In any case the war
is none of his own making; he is probably utterly indifferent
to its abstract justice, and utterly ignorant of its actual origin.
The enemy are nothing to him but something which professional
duty requires him to overcome ; they never did him any personal
wrong; they never drove away his oxen,” or carried off his wife.

1 Two events alone in Grecian history at all approach what was almost the
normal condition of European warfare in the sixteenth century. One occurs in
the Greece of Thucydidés, the other in the Greece of Polybios. But in the
earlier instance the guilty parties were not Greeks at all, in the later they were
the lowest of Greeks, the professional robbers of Atolia. In 3.c. 413 the little
Beeotian town of Mykaléssos was fallen upon, and the inhabitants massacred, by
Thracian mercenaries in the service of Athens (Thuc. vii. 29, 30). Even in the
midst of the terrible Peloponnesian war, this deed of blood raised a cry of horror
throughout all Greece. The other case is the seizure of Kynaitha by the
4Etolians in B.c. 220 (Pol. iv. 18). They were admitted by treachery ; once
admitted, they massacred friend and foe alike, and even put men to the torture
to discover their hidden treasures. This last extremity of cruelty is unparalleled
in Grecian warfare, and any Greek but an Attolian would have shrunk from it,
but it was a matter of every-day business with the Spanish soldiers of the
sixteenth century.

3.1). A. 154. οὐ γὰρ πώποτ᾽ ἐμὰς βοῦς ἤλασαν, οὐδὲ μὲν ἵππους,

οὐδέ ποτ᾽ ἐν Φθίῃ ἐριβώλακι, Bwrlavelpy,
καρπὸν ἐδηλήσαντ᾽.

Il CRUELTY OF THE WAR-LAW AMONG SMALL STATES 45

It is another matter when two armies of citizens meet together.
The war is their own war ; the general is probably the statesman
who proposed the expedition; his army is composed of the
citizens who gave their votes in favour of his proposal. The
hostile general and the hostile army are not mere machines
in the hands of some unseen and distant potentate; they are
the very men who have done the wrong, and on whom the
wrong has to be avenged. Defeat will at once involve the
bitterest of evils, ravaged lands, plundered houses, friends and
kinsfolk led away into hopeless slavery. Men in such a case
fight for their own hands; they fight, in very truth and not by
a metaphor, for all that is dear to their hearts,

παῖδας, γυναῖκας, θεῶν Te πατρῴων Edn,

θήκας τε προγόνων.
War of this sort is habitually carried on with much cruelty.
A modern kingdom seeks in its warfare the mere humiliation, or
at most the political-subjugation, of the enemy. The Greek or
Italian warrior, as we have’ seen, not uncommonly sought his
destruction. A nation may be subdued, but it cannot well be
utterly wiped out; a single city, Milan or Thebes, can be swept
away from the face of the earth. The laws of war, under these
circumstances, are cruel beyond modern imagination. The life Severity of
of the prisoner is not sacred unless the conqueror binds himself nee
by special capitulation to preserve it.2 To kill the men and sell
the women and children of a conquered—at all events of a
revolted—town was a strong, perhaps unusual, act of severity,
but it was a severity which did not sin against the letter of the
Greek Law of Nations, and which it was held that particular
circumstances might justify. Even when the supposed rights of
war were not pushed to such fearful extremes, the selling of
prisoners as slaves was a matter of daily occurrence. In such

1 Xsch. Pers. 396. 3 See Thue. i. 30 et passim.

3 The familiarity of this practice comes out strongly in an incidental notice
in Polybios (v. 95). Certain .Ztolians were taken prisoners by the Achaians ;
among them was one Kleonikos who had formerly been the πρόξενος or public
friend of the Achaian State. On account of this personal claim on the regard of
hia captors he was not sold (διὰ τὸ πρόξενος ὑπάρχειν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν παραυτὰ μὲν
οὐκ ἐπράθη), but after a while released without ransom. The sale of the prisoners
who had no such claims is assumed as a matter of course. The same author
elsewhere (ii. 58) distinctly asserts that the sale of the inhabitants of a conquered
city, even when no special provocation had been given, was acconling to the laws
of war, ἀλλὰ τοῦτέ γε [μετὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν πραθῆναι] καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν ἀσεβὲς
ἐπιτελεσαμένοις κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου ὑπόκειται παθεῖν.

B.C. 291.

Increased
bitterness
of faction
in small
states.

46 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cunap.

a state of things we can even understand the most fearful
spectacle of all, the cold-blooded slaughter of the captive leaders
at a Roman triumph. One shudders at the thought that Caius
Pontius was }—that Hannibal might have been—led in chains,
scourged, and beheaded in a Roman prison. But we should
remember that Hannibal had been to every Roman a deadly
personal foe such as no hostile general has ever been to us. In
our wars, the hostile sovereign, Philip or Lewis or Napoleon, has
at most threatened at a distance what Hannibal had himeelf
inflicted on the Roman at his own hearth and home. The
received war-law then was one of terrible cruelty; but the soldier
was still a citizen soldier; arms were only occasionally in his
hands; warfare was not his trade; his heart was not hardened
nor his conscience seared by a constant life of butchery and
plunder. Hence, if one sort of cruelty was more rife, we find
much less of another and a viler kind. We may believe that
Charles the Fifth, or even his son, would have shrunk from pro-
nouncing in cold blood such a judicjal sentence as the Athenian
Démos pronounced upon the people of Mityléné, Mélos, and
Skiéné.2 But then no Athenian army would ever have been
guilty of the long horrors of plunder, outrage, torture, and
wanton mockery which were the daily occupation of the soldiers
of Bourbon and of Alva. The citizen soldier is a man, stern,
revengeful, it may be even needlessly cruel, but he never utterly
casts off humanity, like the mercenary soldier in his worst
form.

Again, as the system of small commonwealths tends at once
to make wars more frequent and to aggravate the severity of the
laws of war, so it has a similar result in aggravating the bitter-
ness of internal faction. In saying this, I do not refer to any
extreme or monstrous cases. The bloody seditions of Korkyra *

1 See Arnold’s Rome, ii. 365.

- I know of no modern parallel to these judicial massacres of a whole people.
The massacre at Limoges by the Black Prince in 1371 (see Froissart, i. cap. 289,
vol. i. p. 401, ed. Lyons, 1559) was the result of a vow, and was carried out by
the Prince personally ; still, as being done in a stormed town, the case is not
exactly the same. In much earlier times a nearer parallel is found in the
execution of 4000 Saxon prisoners or rebels by Charles the Great in 782. Egin-
hard, who does not scruple to blame his hero on occasion (Vit. c. 20; cf. Ann.
792), records it without remark (Ann. 782) just as Thucydidés.(v. 116) does the
massacre of Mélos.,

8 Képxvpa and not Κέρκυρα is the correct local form used on the coins of the
island. It is always so written in Latin, as well as by Pausanias and Strabo.

HW BITTERNESS OF INTERNAL FACTION 47

no more represent the normal state of things in a Greek republic

than the horrors of the great French Revolution represent the

normal state of things in an European monarchy. Such scenes

of blood as either point to some circumstances of position or

national character, independent of particular forms of govern-

ment. Civil conflicts have been, in all ages, far more bloody in

France than in England.! So all Greek democracies were not

like the democracy of Korkyra; all Greek aristocracies were not

like those selfish oligarchs who took the fearful oath to be evil-

minded to the people. But on the other hand all Greek demo- Athens

cracies were not like the democracy of Athens; all Greek aristo- ane Kor-

cracies were not like the wise senates which bore rule at Rhodes me

and Chios. Athens, in its general obedience to law, in its strict cases for

observance of public faith®, in its civil contests carried on, with good and

sharpness and bitterness indeed, but still within the known limits “

of a defined parliamentary law, stands doubtless at the very head

of all Greek commonwealths. The brutal mob of Korkyra

doubtless stands no less pre-eminently at the bottom of the scale.

Some unusually bad elements in the national character, some

monstrous provocation on the part of their former rulers, can

alone account for the equally monstrous excesses of the reaction.

The normal state of an independent city-commonwealth doubt- Normal

less lies somewhere between the peaceful debates of Athens and state οὗ ἃ

the bloody warfare of Korkyra. It is a state of things in which ΤΟ ΑΝ
something

1 The French Revolution at the close of the last century, as being the most inter-
recent and the most permanent in its results, is naturally the best known event mediate.
of the kind; but it is only one among several similar events in the history of
France. The civil broils of France in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries read
exactly like similar scenes in the eighteenth. In all cases we have refined and
elaborate conatitutional theories which in practice take the form of indiscriminate
massacre. Our civil wars, again, in the seventeenth, the fifteenth, or even the
thirteenth century, seem child’s play beside the brutal strife of Burgundians and
Armagnacs, and the long catalogue of internal warfare which may be almost said
to form the civil history of France from Lewis the Eleventh to Lewis the Four-
teenth. Philip of Comines, who had seen both lands with his own eyes, bears
witness (Mémoires, liv. iii. c. 5) to the comparative mildness of English civil
warfare, Englishmen killed nobody except in fair fighting; even in battle, as
far as might be, they smote the leaders and spared the Commons, So the deeds
of 1572, of 1792, of 1851, have no parallel in the worst times of English history ;
Strafford and Cromwell alike, one might rather say any Englishman of any sort
since the days of Stephen, would have shrunk from the critnes of Guise, or
Robespierre, or Louis Napoleon Buonaparte.

3 Tots ὅρκοις ἐμμένει ὁ δῆμος (Xen. Hell. ii. 4, 43) is the witness of an enemy
to the good faith of the Athenian Democracy under the most trying circum-
stances, Thuc. viii. 97 ; Grote, viii. 122.

48 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cHap.

political enmity, though not reaching the fearful extremes of
Korkyraian atrocity, will yet be far bitterer than it is in any
modern constitutional kingdom. It will perhaps occasionally
break out into deeds of open violence ; it will still more frequently
lead to unjust judicial sentences, and to no less unjust legisla-
tive enactments. Actual massacres will perhaps be unknown,
and single judicial murders will not be very common; but the
general expulsion of the leaders of a defeated faction will be, if
not so common as the resignation of a defeated ministry is with
us, yet certainly more common than the extremer measure of
impeachment has become in modern times. Doubtless the com-
parison is hard to make, because we have to compare city-common-
wealths of one age with kingdoms and federations of another,
the Athens and Florence of a past time with the England and
America of our own day. But, on the whole, the experience of
ancient Greece, of medizval Italy, of states like Geneva down to
our own time, certainly seems to show that the bitterness of
political enmity is greatly heightened in these small common-
wealths. In such a commonwealth men of all sorts, men of
whom but few are kept in restraint by the checks of personal
character and position, are brought together face to face, with
the most precious interests of both sides directly depending on
the result. A great addition to the fierceness of the civil struggle
Local dis- can hardly fail to follow. We see that it is so among ourselves.
putes more Far greater bitterness, at any rate far greater outward expres-
bitter than sion of bitterness, accompanies an election or a local controversy
ones, of any kind than is ever to be seen among political leaders within
the walls of Parliament. For the same reasons which make
Enmities political differences in city-commonwealths more bitter, they are
more per- also more apt to become hereditary, to be made a point of family
ae "honour, at last to sink into mere watchwords of dislike without
common- any rational political meaning. Even among ourselves it is not
wealths. always easy to distinguish the Conservative from the Liberal or
the Liberal from the Conservative ; but who can point out the
real political difference between a Guelf and a Ghibelin at the
nd of the fifteenth century ?
General κ΄. We may then thus sum up the balance of gain and loss in a
balance 6f~" small city-commonwealth, as compared with a greater state. A
ee and small republic developes all the faculties of individual citizens to
small the highest pitch; the average citizen of such a state is a superior
states. = being to the average subject of a large kingdom; he ranks, not

II BALANCE OF GAIN AND LOSS IN SMALL STATES 49

with its average subjects, but, at the very least, with its average
legislators. It kindles the highest and most ennobling feelings
of patriotism ; it calls forth every power and every emotion of
man’s nature ; it gives the fullest scope to human genius of every
kind ; it produces an Atschylus and a Démosthenés, a Dante
and a Macchiavelli. But, on the other hand, the glory of such
a state is seldom lasting ; it is tempted to constant warfare, and
to warfare in some respects of a cruel kind; it is tempted to
ambitioh and acquisition of territory at least as constantly as
a larger state; and annexation by a city-commonwealth com-
monly brings with it more evils than annexation by a kingdom.
Again, civil strife is intensified, and party hatred becomes at
once more bitter and more enduring. And we may add that
city-commonwealths cannot really flourish save when they either
have the whole field to themselves or else have a marked ad-
vantage in civilization over the surrounding monarchies. The
former was the case in old Greece, the latter in medisval Italy.
In medieval Germany and Flanders the superiority of the cities
was less marked ; their freedom therefore was less complete, and
their career was less glorious. As the surrounding monarchies
advance in power, as they become more settled and civilized—
above all, when they take to the employment of standing armies
—the city-commonwealths gradually vanish, or exist only by the
contemptuous toleration of the neighbouring potentates. Be the
powers which surround them despotisms, constitutional kingdoms,
or even consolidated republics, the tendencies of an age of large
states are equally opposed to the retention of any practical
\ \independence by single unconfederated cities.

I have dwelt the longer on the nature of these independent
city-commonwealths, because the subject, as one remote from our
own political experience, is especially liable to be misunderstood,
and because a clear and full grasp of it is absolutely necessary
to understand the characteristics of that old Greek Federalism
which was a modification of the system of independent cities.
On the system of large states with which we are all familiar I System of
need not dwell at the same length. I will only point out one or urge
two of its direct political consequences, and then compare this states.
system with that of independent cities and balance their com-
parative loss and gain. And I would again remark that among
large states I reckon not only great kingdoms, but all states

E

50 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT Οοβαρ.:

which are too large to allow all their citizens habitually to meet
Definition in one place. And I include alike republics, constitutional
re? = monarchies, and despotisms of the modern European kind. In
irrespec- 8. modern European despotism, though the sovereign may be the

tiveof sole legislator, yet there is such a thing as Law, and, in matters

mer, Which do not touch the sovercign’s interest, the administration

govern. may be as good as in a free state. But I exclude mere Kastern

ment. despotisms, in which Law and Government, in the true sense of
those words, can hardly be said to exist at all

tro im- Two consequences immediately follow from the difference

meala

between a city-commonwealth and a large state as above defined.
smaller irst, whatever be the form of government of a large state, there
import- | Will be no such preponderating influence in any single city as
ance of the exists under the other system. Secondly, if the state be free,
Capital; whether as a republic or as a constitutional monarchy, its
repre’ _ national assembly must assume the representative form. These
sentative , . . .

character two differences are direct, one might say physical, results from
of National the increased size of the state.

Assem- First then, as to the position of the capital. I assume that
; in the large state there will be an equal freedom or an equal
of the bondage spread over the whole land. States like Rome,
Capital in Carthage, Venice, or Bern, where a single city bears rule over a
alarge large territory, do not come within our present consideration.
They are not legitimate large states, but a corrupted form of the
city-commonwealth. In the large modern state there is no such
overwhelming preponderance in the Capital. Indeed, the very
use of the word Capital shows it. The Capital—the Hauptstadt
—implies the existence of other cities, with which it may be
compared, and among which it has the pre-eminence. In a pure
city-government there is strictly no Capital, because there is but
one City, and that City is co-extensive with the State. In a
state like Carthage or Venice, the ruling City is something more
than a mere Capital; it is absolute mistress over other cities.
But the smallest European monarchy contains several cities, none
of which is subject to any other, but of which one will be the
Capital, the seat of Government, the official dwelling-place of
the Sovereign. Still, that Capital is only the first among many
equal cities ; the national life is not inseparably bound up with
it; it is the seat of government, simply because the seat of
government must be somewhere, because the requirements of
modern politics do not allow the Sovereign and his Councillors

results ;

HI POSITION OF THE CAPITAL IN LARGE STATES 51

to wander at large over the whole realm, like an old Teutonic
King. The Capital will be the centre of politics, society, and
literature ; its inhabitants will perhaps affect to look down upon

the rest of their fellow-countrymen ; they may, especially when

the Government is of a centralized kind, obtain an undue and
dangerous political weight, but they will have no direct legal
privileges above the rest of their fellow-subjects. The influence Indirect
of a Capital in a large state is almost sure to be for evil, because 224 violent
it must be either indirect or violent. Even in the best regulated Ot Capitals
states, an undue attention will often be given to the local in large
interests of the Capital, and advances from the national treasury *ttes.
will be more freely made in its behalf, than in behalf of other
parts of the kingdom. But this is simply because they are more
prominent and better understood, because they force themselves
upon the notice of the Sovereign and the Legislature in a way

in which the interests of other towns and districts cannot do.

In a despotic state, where the Sovereign does what he pleases,
where he is in no way controlled by the representatives of other
parts of the country, money will be still more recklessly and un-
justly squandered in adorning one town at the expense of a
whole kingdom. The other form of the influence of a Capital is

that by which we have so often seen a Parisian riot accepted

as a French Revolution. A government is violently upset and
another installed—it. may be by the mere mob of the town, it

may be by a perfidious magistrate who has a military force at

his command ; in either case the people of the whole land, who
have never been consulted about the matter, submit without
resistance to the King, Republic, or ten-years’ President thus
provided for them. In the one case the influence of the Capital

is indirect, in the other it is violent; in either case it is illegiti-
mate. The only legal weight of London or Paris consists in the
representatives which those towns, in common with other towns,

send to the common Legislature of the whole country. In a
modern European kingdom, the Capital and the rest of the
country are legally placed on perfectly equal terms. In a free
state they are equally free; in a despotism the yoke will not,
avowedly at least, press more heavily upon one town or district
than upon another. This state of things, where political rights

and political wrongs are evenly spread over the whole extent of

a large country, differs equally from the state of things in which

the Capital bears rule over the whole land, and from that in

Necessity
of repre-
sentative
institution
in a free
state of
large size.

Represen-
tative
Govern-
ment not
necessarily
Cabinet
Govern-
ment.

52 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cHaApP,

which the franchise of the Capital is extended over the whole
land. An inhabitant of Eleusis was a citizen of Athens; an in-
habitant of Lausanne was a subject of Bern; but an inhabitant
of any English town or county is neither a citizen of London nor
a subject of London; he is a member of a great commonwealth
of which the capital and his own dwelling-place are alike integral
and equal portions.

The second direct result from the increased largeness of
territory is that, if the state be constitutional, its constitution
must necessarily take the representative form. The people, or
that portion of the people which is invested with political rights,
will not exercise those rights in their own persons, but through
chosen persons commissioned to act in their behalf. The private
citizen will have no direct voice in government or legislation ;
his functions will be confined to giving his vote in the election of
those who have. This is the great distinction between free states
of the modern type, whether kingly or republican, and the city-
commonwealths of old Greece. It is the great political invention
of Teutonic Europe, the one form of political life to which neither
Thucydidés, Aristotle, nor Polybios ever saw more than the
faintest approach. In Greece it was hardly needed, but in Italy
a representative system would have delivered Rome from the
fearful choice which she had to make between anarchy and
despotism. By Representative or Parliamentary Government I
would not be understood as speaking only of that peculiar form
of it which has grown up by the force of circumstances in our
own country. A Cabinet Government, where the real power is
vested in Ministers indirectly chosen by the House of Commons
—that is, chosen by the King out of the party which has the
majority in the House of Commons—is only one out of many
forms of Representative Government. It suits us, because it is,
like our other institutions, the growth of our own soil; it by no
means follows that it can be successfully transplanted whole into
other countries, or even into our own colonies.! By a Repre-
sentative constitution I mean any constitution in which the
people, or the enfranchised portion of them, exercise their
political rights, whatever be the extent of those rights, not
directly, but through chosen deputies. Such a Representative

1 On this subject the eighth chapter of Earl Grey’s Essay on Parliamentary
Government (London, 1858) is well worth reading ; but of course there is another
side, or rather several other sides, to the question.

Π NECESSITY OF REPRESENTATION IN LARGE STATES 58

constitution is consistent with the full personal action of the
Sovereign within the legal limits of his powers; it is consistent
with any extent, or any limitation, of the elective franchise. 1
include the constitutions of medisval England and Spain, of
modern Sweden and Norway, the constitutions of the United
States and of the several States, even the old theoretical con-
stitution of France in the days of the States-General. All these
are strictly representative constitutions, though some of them
differ widely enough from what a modern Englishman generally
understands by the words Constitutional Government. A Repre-
sentative constitution may be monarchic or republican, it may be
aristocratic or democratic. The Representative system would be
as needful in the case of a franchise vested in a large noble class
scattered over the whole country, as it is in the case of a
franchise vested in every adult male. But if political rights
were confined to a hereditary body so small that its members
could. habitually meet together, say if our House of Lords
possessed the whole powers of the state, the government would
probably assume another form. The ruling aristocracy would
almost unavoidably be led to take up their chief residence in the
capital. The constitution would, in fact, become a city-aris-
tocracy, like that of Bern or Venice, bearing rule over a subject
district.

The necessity of the Representative system in a large state is
so universally accepted as the result of all European and American
experience, that I need not stop to argue the point at any length.
But it may be necessary to speak a few words on two or three Excep-
real or apparent exceptions, in which political power is, or has been, fons,t0 κ
directly exercised by the people, or the qualified part of them, sentative
in large modern states. The exceptions which occur to me are: system in
First, the way of electing the Kings of Poland under the old Modem
monarchy ; Secondly, the new-fangled Napoleonic fashion of sna
electing “Emperors,” approving constitutions, annexing provinces, America.
by what is called “‘ Universal Suffrage ;”! Thirdly, the practical

1 The Florentine Parliaments and the Venetian Great Council are not real
exceptions, as being found in the constitutions of single cities. The latter was a
part of the ordinary system of government in an aristocratic state. But the
Florentine Parliament, which I have already once mentioned (p. 31), may be well
referred to again, as it is so strikingly analogous to the Napoleonic Universal
Suffrage. The whole Florentine people, perhaps once in a generation, met together

in the square and presently entrusted absolute power to some Commission, some-
times to some Tyrant.

Election
of the
Polish
Kings.

Nature of
the Polish
Nobility.

54 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ~ cnHap,

(not the constitutional) aspect of the election of the President of
the United States. In all these cases the people, or the qualified
portion of them, takes a more direct share than usual in political
action. But even in these cases the representative system, as
the means of ordinary legislation and government, is not disturbed.

The old Kingdom of Poland called itself at once a Kingdom
and a Republic. In fact its constitution ingeniously united the
evils of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, without the
redeeming features of any of the three. The political franchise
was vested in a nobility so numerous, and many so poor, that,
while they formed a close aristocracy as regarded the rest of the
people, they formed a wild democracy among themselves. Such
a nobility, it need not be said, has absolutely nothing in common
with the British Peerage. The Polish nobles were not so much
a nobility in any common sense of the word, as a people, like
the Spartans or the Ottomans, bearing rule over a subject race.!
Such a very numerous nobility differs from the electoral body of
a constitutional state as a Greek aristocracy differed from a Greek
timocracy. In the one case the political franchise can be obtained
only by hereditary succession, and, when once obtained, it cannot
be lost. In the other case, it is attached to the possession of a
certain amount of property, and may be gained and lost many
times by the same person, if his property, at different times of
his life, rises above, or sinks below, the necessary qualification.
The difference is analogous to that between the hereditary
burghership of a town and a municipal franchise attached to
ownership or occupation. According to all ordinary political
notions, the Polish nobility was a body which could not possibly
meet together ; it was as much under the necessity of delegating
its powers to representatives as the electoral bodies of England
or America. And for most purposes it did so delegate them.
The common functions of a legislature were entrusted to an
elective Diet, a body which had some strange peculiarities of its
own,” which do not bear on our present subject. But, once
in each reign, the whole body met to elect a King; they met

1 IT do not mean to imply that the Polish nobility was historically an aristo-
cracy of conquest. Aristocracies which have grown up gradually, like that of
Venice, often become narrower than those which really owe their origin to
conquest,

4 The best known is the requirement of unanimity, which gave every member
of the Diet a veto upon all its acts. See Calhoun,i.71. He really does not seem
wholly to disapprove of the practice.

Ir NAPOLEONIC UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE 55

armed ; and, in theory at least, the assent of every elector present
was required to make a valid election. It is not wonderful if
election by such a body, like election by the Roman People in
their worst days, often took the form of a pitched battle. That °
this mode of electing a King, or of discharging national business
of any kind, was an absurd and mischievous anomaly few probably
will dispute. It was in fact merely an innovation of the latest
and worst days of the Polish Republic.’ And it was felt to be
an evil by all wise and patriotic Poles. The constitution of
1791, by which Poland, in her last moments, tried to assimilate
herself to other European nations, abolished election altogether,
and instituted a hereditary monarchy.

The Napoleonic Universal Suffrage, which has destroyed Napo-
freedom in France and has reduced Savoy and Nizza to the same Borne eal
level of bondage, is simply a palpable cheat, which, had its results Suffrage
been less grave, would have been the mere laughing-stock of its delu-
Europe. It is a mere device to entrapa whole people into giving ®ve
an assent to proposals which would not be assented to by their nature.
lawful representatives. Hitherto it has been in every case a
mere sham. There has been no free choice, no fair alternative
between two or more proposals or between two or more candi-
dates. The people have only been asked to say Yea or Nay to
something which has been already established by military force.

The election of a Polish King was a real election, a real choice
between candidates; the pretended election of Louis Napoleon
Buonaparte to the pseudo-Imperial Crown of France was no elec-
tion at all. But supposing a vote of this kind ever offered a fair
alternative, the system would be no less pernicious. A people
cannot be fit to exercise direct political power, unless they are
habitually trained to exercise it. Ina great kingdom they cannot
be so habitually trained. They may be perfectly fit to choose
legislators ;* they cannot be fit to legislate themselves. Least

1 Till the extinction of the House of Jagello in 1572, Poland followed the
common law of early European Kingdoms. There was a royal family, out of
which alone Kings were chosen, but the Crown did not necessarily pass to the
next in succession, The peculiarity of Polish history is that, in an age when
other kingdoms had become purely hereditary, the Poles made their Crown purely
elective. The practice of choosing Kings without regard to descent and by the
ee of the whole nobility dates only from the election of Henry of Anjou in
1573.

2 It must be remembered that the Napoleonic “ Universal Suffrage ” has nothing
in common with the use of the words ‘‘ Universal Suffrage’ in English political
controversy. Nobody has ever proposed that every adult male should vote in the

English
and Ame-
rican ways
of attain-
ing the
same ob-
ject.

Election
of the
American
President
practically
another
exception.

56 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT onap.

of all can they be fit to legislate now and then on the most im-
portant of all questions, the choice of a dynasty or a constitution.
Such an occasional and, so to speak, spasmodic exercise of power
must be utterly worthless. Undoubtedly a great exceptional
power of this kind may well be entrusted, not to the ordinary
Legislature, but to a body specially chosen for the purpose. In
the United States the meeting of such extraordinary Conventions
under certain circumstances is specially provided for both in the
Federal Constitution and in the Constitutions of the several
States. In our own country it would doubtless be thought right
by all parties that the introduction of any great constitutional
change should be preceded by a Dissolution of Parliament. The
election of the new Parliament in such a case would practically
come to the same thing as the choice of a Convention in America.
The whole body of electors would have, rightly and fairly, a
special opportunity given them for considering the subject ; but
the final voice of the nation would speak through its lawful
representatives, and not through the mockery of “ Universal
Suffrage.” The English and the American practice both give
full scope to the popular will in a way consonant with the received
principles of all modern constitutional states. The Imperial
invention is simply a blind ; it is the device of a despot to deceive
people by promising them something freer than freedom.

The election of the American President is, not indeed formally,
but practically, another exception to the rule by which, in all
modern free states, the political powers of the people are exer-
cised solely by their representatives. Formally, it is not such an
exception. The President is not chosen by the people at large,
but by special electors chosen for the purpose.! But as those
electors exercise no real choice, as it 15 known before the election

making of laws, but only in the choosing of lawgivers. Whether this is desirable
is a separate question, quite unaffected by the results of the Napoleonic device,
An impartial thinker will probably say that those, whether many or few, who are
fit to use votes, ought to have votes; that it is desirable that the whole people
should be fit to use them ; but that, except possibly in the New England States,
it would be hard to find a country where the whole people are fit to use them.
See Tocqueville, Dem. en Am. ii. 120.

1 How those electors shall be chosen is left by the Federal Constitution (Art.
ii. § 1, 2) to be settled by the Legislature of each State. Originally, in most of
the States, the Legislature itself chose the electors ; but, in all the States, except
South Carolina, this power has been gradually transferred to the people at large.
There are some good remarks on this subject in Shaffner’s War in America, p.
187 et seqq.

The Confederate Constitution (Art. ii. § 1, 2) copies the old provisions.

HI ELECTION OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT 57

how every candidate will vote if elected, this election of electors
practically comes to much the same as a direct popular election

of the President. There can be no doubt that this is one of the

weak points in the American system; it is the point in which

the calculations of the illustrious men who framed the American
Constitution have most signally failed. Still, the popular elec-

tion of the President has several points of advantage over the
Napoleonic Universal Suffrage. First, the mere form of electing Its dif-
electors pays a certain outward homage to the representative ference ;
system, while it is openly trampled under foot by the Napoleonic poleonic
device. Secondly, the indirect mode of election, even as it 18, Universal
has at least this result, that the President who is elected need Sufrage.
not have a numerical majority of the people in his favour. This

alone is no inconsiderable check on the tyranny of mere numbers.
Thirdly, regarding the election of the President as really placed

in the hands of the people, still it is a very different matter from
electing “Emperors” and voting the annexation of provinces.

The election of a President is not an irregular, occasional business

like saying “Oui” or “Non” to the perpetrator of a successful
conspiracy ; it comes regularly at stated intervals, about as often

as our Parliamentary elections. There is therefore no reason

why the American people may not be as well trained to elect
Presidents as the English people are trained to elect Members of
Parliament. Still, the election of the President, as it is now
practically conducted, though by no means such an evil as the
Napoleonic Universal Suffrage or the election of the Polish Kings

by the whole body of the nobles, is certainly a deviation from

the representative principle, and is so far an anomaly in the
practice of modern free states.

We will then assume these two immediate results of the
increased size of territory, the legal equality of all parts of the General

country, and the necessity for representative institutions, if the view of tne
state be constitutional. Let us then pass, in imagination or inj),

reality, through such a large state, through any kingdom, in States
short, of modern Europe. Its mere divisions, its Counties or

1 See Hamilton in the Federalist, No. 68. He remarks that ‘‘the mode of
appointment of the chief magistrate of the United States, is almost the only part
of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or
which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents.”

Even when Tocqueville wrote, this particular evil had hardly manifested itself.
Cf. Calhoun, i. 869, 385.

One such
State
answers
to many
City-
Common-
wealths.

A.D. 1859.

Extent of
local di-
versity in
large
States,

58 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cwap.

Departments, may well be equal in size to the territories of
several independent cities of old Greece or of medieval Italy.
A glance at the map of modern Italy or modern Greece at once
sets forth this difference. We look on the Kingdom of Greece
as one of the pettiest states in Europe; its weight in European
politics is hardly so great as that of one of its smallest cities
might have been in the days of Athens and Sparta. But a
province of the Greek Kingdom is made up of what was once
the domain of several Greek commonwealths. Corinth, Sikyén,
Pelléné, Phlious, are all found in a single department; Orcho-
menos, Mantineia, Tegea, and Megalopolis are all subordinate to
the modern local capital of Tripolitza. So too the portion of
Lombardy which free Italy has lately wrung from the Austrian
Tyrant contains some ten or twelve cities, which once appeared
as free republics, fighting for or against the Swabian Emperor.
So again not a few cities, which once were free commonwealths
under the suzerainty of the Empire, have been swallowed up
during the six hundred years’ aggression of the Kings and
Tyrants of Paris against the old realms of Germany and Bur-
gundy. We find then, in traversing a modern kingdom, that an
extent of territory which, on the other system, would be cut up
into countless ‘independent commonwealths, is governed by a
single Sovereign and is, in most cases, administered according to
a single code of laws. If the state be despotic, the despot is
equally master of the whole kingdom ; if the state be constitu-
tional, the highest power in the land will be an assembly in
which the whole kingdom is represented.!_ But within these limits
the amount of local freedom and of local diversity may vary
infinitely. In one kingdom everything may be squared out accord-
ing to the most approved modern cut-and-dried system. Noman
may be allowed to move hand or foot without licence from some
officer of the Crown ; local liberties, local bye-laws, magistrates
or public officers of any sort locally elected, may be something
unknown and proscribed. In another kingdom all this may be
reversed ; local and historical rights may be carefully respected ;
the assemblies of towns and districts may retain extensive powers

1 The whole kingdom, not necessarily all the dominions of the sovereign.
Every integral part of the United Kingdom is represented in the British Parlia-
ment—the disfranchisement of a County would not be thought of for a moment—
but the Colonies and dependencies are not represented, not being parts of the
kingdom.

11 DIFFERENCE EETWEEN MUNICIPALITY AND FEDERALISM 59

of local legislation ; magistrates and public officers may be elected
by the districts which they are to govern, or, if they are ap-
pointed by the Crown, they may be appointed according to a
principle which gives them nothing of the character of Govern-
ment functionaries.1_ These two opposing systems, of Centraliza- Opposite

. : Systems of
tion and of Local Freedom, do not at all necessarily depend upon δὰ τ οἱ

the constitution of the central Government. Local freedom is ion and
quite possible under an absolute monarchy ; local bondage is of Local

quite possible under a representative Democracy. A wise despot Freedom

will humour his people by allowing them local liberties which pendent of
will not affect his real power, and which, by acting as a safety- the form

valve, may really stave off revolution for many years. On the of the

other hand many states nominally free have had no idea of free- Govern
dom beyond giving each citizen that degree of influence in the ment.
general Government which is implied in the possession of an
electoral vote. That general Government may be one which he

helps to choose, and yet he may be left, in regard to all those

things which most directly concern him, as helpless a machine in

the hands of an official hierarchy as if that hierarchy derived its
commission from a despot. But, in any case, whether the local Difference

Government be centralized or municipal, its character is wholly de- ween
unicipal

pendent on the general Law of the Land. Wherever there are anq Fede-
rights which are beyond the powers of King and Parliament, we ral rights ;
have passed the bounds of strict municipality and are approaching

the borderland of Federalism.2 We might easily conceive the Municipal

municipal principle carried much farther than it is in England ; aedent”

1 An English County is an aristocratic republic; the magistrates, though ne

formally appointed by Royal Commission, are practically co-extensive with the Lepisla-
local aristocracy. An English borough, as regards its administration, is a repre- latore .
sentative democracy, tempered in some degree by the indirect election of the ,
Mayor and Aldermen. The borough magistrates, appointed by the Crown from
among the chief inhabitants, introduce a slight aristocratic element into the
judicial department. Rut neither Town-Councillors, nor Aldermen, nor County
and Borough Magistrates, have the least analogy with the administrative
hierarchies of foreign states.

2 England and Wales, though local bodies retain much local freedom, form a
perfectly consolidated Kingdom. But the relations between England and Scot-
land, where certain points are reserved under the terms of a Treaty between two
independent kingdoms, make a slight approach to the Federal idea. The rela-
tions between the United Kingdom and the Colonies approach more closely to a
Federal connexion, but they differ essentially from it. The Colony, as we have
seen above (see p. 20), may have the same internal independence as the Canton,
but it differs in having no voice in the general concerns of the Empire. The
relation therefore of the Colony to the mother-country is not a Federal but a
dependent relation. See Lewis, Government of Dependencies, caps. ii. iv.

Federal
rights in-
dependent
of it.

General
character-
istic of
large
States.

60 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cnap.

one might conceive towns and counties at home, no less than
Colonies abroad, possessing nearly the same invernal powers as a
Swiss Canton or an American State. But such towns and counties
would still possess their powers, not of inherent right, but merely
by positive law. Their rights, however extensive, would be
delegated and not independent ; they would still remain mere
municipalities, and would not become Sovereign States. That
portion of sovereignty which is vested in the State or the Canton
cannot, without an unconstitutional usurpation, be in any way
touched by the Federal power. But the most extensive rights
of a mere municipality are the mere creation of Common or
Statute Law ; they may be legally altered or abolished without
the consent of the municipality itself being asked. A vote of
the national Legislature in a free country, a Royal Decree in a
despotic country, can legally found, modify, or destroy all merely
municipal institutions, just as it seems best to the sovereign
power. A single Act of Parliament might at once cut down all
English local rights to the level of French or Russian centraliza-
tion. An Imperial Ukase might at once invest Russian towns
and counties with all the rights enjoyed by those of England, or
with rights more extensive still. The one measure would in no
way deprive the English elector of that portion of influence over
public affairs which he at present enjoys. The other measure
would in no way infringe upon the sole legislative authority of
the Autocrat. In any consolidated kingdom or republic, what-
ever be the extent of local freedom, the variety of local law and
custom, it exists purely on sufferance; it emanates from, and
may be altered by, a central power external to itself. The local
body is, in most cases, strictly confined to local affairs ; it has no
voice, even by representation,! in the general legislation of the
kingdom ; if a local body takes any part in national affairs, its
voice is purely consultative ; in most countries indeed it has not
even a consultative voice, it can make its wants known to the
Sovereign or the Legislature only in the form of a Humble Petition,
8 process equally open to every human being in the nation.

The great state then, whether it be a despotism, a constitu-
tional kingdom, or a consolidated republic, confines local action

1 The body holding local authority, the Town Council or the Quarter Sessions,
is not represented, as such, in Parliament. The county or borough members
represent the inhabitants of the county or borough, not the municipal govern-
ment.

ΤΙ ADVANTAGES OF GREAT STATES 61

to purely local matters, and vests all general power in the

national sovereign or the national legislature. That sovereign

and that legislature may indeed derive their powers from the

popular will, but in the exercise of those powers neither indi-

viduals nor local bodies can have more than an indirect influence.

Rights are equal throughout the whole land; the capital has no

legal privilege beyond any other city ; the constitution, where

there is a constitution, is of the representative kind. From these

characteristics of large states at once follows a chain of gains

and losses which are the exact opposites of the gains and losses Balance of

which attend on the system of city-commonwealths. pain and
First and foremost, the blessing of internal peace is at once Advan-

secured to a large country. This alone is an advantage so great tages of

that it must be a very bad central government indeed, under grt

which this one gain does not outweigh every loss. A large

modern kingdom will contain perhaps hundreds of cities, whose Peace

districts, under the old Greek system, might continually be the secured to

scene of a desolating border-warfare. All of these will, under country.

the modern European system, repose safely under the protection

of one common authority, which has power peaceably to decide

any differences which may arise among them. And the same

cause which hinders local quarrels, when they do arise, from

growing into local wars, will also go very far to prevent local Lessening

quarrels from arising at all. Towns and districts may indeed °f local

often retain irrational local prejudices, and the clashing of com-P™°"°*

mercial interests may often arouse local jealousies which are not

irrational. But when, as in the best regulated modern king-

doms, the inhabitants of every town and county are all citizens

of a common country, when the inhabitants of one district may,

without losing any civil or political rights, transfer their abode

to any other, there can never be any very serious local differences

between fellow-subjects of the same race and language. Even

when such differences of race and language exist as may be found

within the limits of France or of Great Britain, provincial diver-

sities may now and then afford a subject for pseudo-patriotic talk,

but it is in talk that they are sure to evaporate! Indeed, it

1 Τὸ has been gravely declared at a Welsh Eisteddfod that Her Majesty is
properly Queen of Wales with the province of England annexed. However this
be, the province and the kingdom have shown no tendencies towards separation
for several centuries.

62 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ~ cnHap.

often happens that the country which fancies itself to be subject
and degraded is, in very truth, a favoured district. Such a
country often has its full share of the advantages of the common
government, while it keeps its own local advantages to itself.
When differences of race and speech assume a really serious
character, it shows that they are real national diversities, and
that the two countries ought to be under separate govern-
ments. But mere local jealousies between town and town,
between county and county, become of no political importance
whatever. Towns which, in old Greece or in medieval Italy,
would have sent armies against one another, towns which would
either have lived in constant warfare, or the stronger of which
would have reduced the weaker to dependence, have, in a large
modern kingdom, hardly any disputes which require the inter-
ference of the Legislature or the Law Courts. Under a good
central government, which gives perfectly equal rights to all its
subjects, peace and good brotherhood will reign throughout the
whole realm. And a really good central government will not
attempt to push union too far. It will not seek to extinguish
that moderate amount of local distinction, loca] feeling, and
local independence, which is both a moral and a political gain.

. The utter wiping out of local distinctions goes far to reduce the

Lessening
of the evils
of War.

whole realm to that state of subjection to a single dominant city
which, whether under a monarchy or a republic, is the worst
political condition of all.

The same system, again, which tends to take away all causes
of dispute between different portions of the same nation, tends
equally to diminish the horrors of external war between different
nations. We have already seen that the recognized war-law
between contending kingdoms is much less severe than it is
between contending cities. The severity of its actual exercise
between the disciplined armies of two civilized states is lessened
in an almost greater proportion. But take war between preat
states in its worst form, take such a war as might be waged
between Alva on one side, and Suwarrow on the other. Even
such a war as this will inflict, in proportion to its scale, a far

In Gaul matters seem to be different; the existence of the Breton Archseo-
logical Society, which one would have thought was a harmless body enough, has
been found inconsistent with the safety of the “Imperial” throne of Paris.

1 Scotchmen are eligible to the highest offices in England, and they constantly

fill them without any Englishman feeling the least jealousy. Englishmen are, I
suppose, equally eligible to offices in Scotland, but they hardly ever fill them.

1 LESSENING OF THE EVILS OF WAR 63

less amount of human misery than a really milder conflict
between two rival cities. It will not recur so often; wars
indeed, when begun, may last longer, but the intervals of peace
will be proportionally longer still. And when war does come, it
will be, so to speak, localized. A happily situated, especially an
insular, nation may wage war after war, and spend nothing
except its treasures and the blood of the soldiers actually
engaged. To an Englishman war has long meant only in-
creased taxation and the occasional death, what he deems the
happy and glorious death, of some friend or kinsman. It is
quite another sort of thing to endure all this, and at the same
time to have your lands ravaged by Archidamos or your city
sacked by Charles the Bold. But there is one very important
difference between the warfare of Archidamos and the warfare
even of Charles the Bold. Archidamos could ravage every
corner of Attica, Charles the Bold could ravage only a very
small part of France. While Charles lay before Beauvais, the 1472.
inhabitants of Bourdeaux might sleep, as far as Charles was con-
cerned, in perfect safety and tranquillity. Even of an invaded
territory it is only a very small portion which directly feels the
horrors of invasion. Besides, the Great Powers have not un-
commonly agreed upon the ingenious plan of sparing each other’s
territories altogether, and fighting out their quarrels on neutral
ground. Thus, for a century or two, whenever there was a war
between France and Austria, it was generally carried on by
common consent on the convenient battle-ground of Flanders or
Lombardy. The worst war of modern Europe, the War of the The Thirty
Thirty Years, derives its peculiar horror from its having less i
than usual the character of a war between two great nations. 1618-48.
France, Sweden, and other powers, took a share in it, but it was
primarily a civil war of religion. As such, it combined, in a
great degree, the horrors of a war waged between small states
with the scale of a war waged between great ones. The wars
which we can ourselves remember, the Russian War of 1854-6
and the Lombard campaign of 1859, have been mere child’s
play compared with the great internal wars either of Greece or
of Germany. The scale of the powers engaged of course caused
a tremendous loss of life among actual combatants, but the
general amount of misery inflicted on the world was trifling
in proportion to what was caused either by the Peloponnesian
War or by the War of Thirty Years. Cases of special cruelty

Lessening
of party
strife.

Disadvan-
tage of
large
states.
Inferior
political
education.

Ignorance
and cor-
ruption of
many
electors.

64 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cuap.

or perfidy in modern warfare have been almost wholly confined
to local and civil conflicts, and those most commonly among the
less civilized nations of Europe. On the whole, the substitution
of large kingdoms for city-commonwealths has immeasurably
softened the horrors of war.}

And as the system of large states abolishes local warfare and
diminishes the severity of national warfare, so we have seen by
implication that it very seriously diminishes the bitterness of
political strife. These advantages form a great, indeed an over-
whelming, balance of gain on the side of the large state. But it
must not be forgotten that there is a reverse to this picture also.

We have seen that the great advantage of the city-common-
wealth is the political education which it gives, the high standard
which it tends to keep up among individual citizens. This is
the natural result of a franchise, like that of the city-common-
wealth, which makes it at once the right and the duty of every
man to exercise direct deliberation and judgement on public
affairs. This education a city-democracy gives to all the citi-
zens; even an aristocracy or timocracy? at all liberally consti-
tuted gives it to a large portion of them. But in a large state
the only way in which the mass of the citizens can have any
share in the government is by choosing their representatives in
the Parliament or other National Assembly. It is plain that
such a franchise as this, indirect in itself and rarely exercised,
cannot supply the same sort of political teaching as a seat in the
Athenian Assembly. A large number of the electors will always
remain ignorant and careless of public affairs to a degree that we
cannot believe that any citizen of Athens ever was. Under any
conceivable electoral system, many votes will be given blindly,
recklessly, and corruptly. Men who are careless about political
differences, if well to do in the world and not devoid of a con-
science, will not vote at all; if they are at once poor and
unprincipled, they will sell their votes. Many again who are
not corrupted will be deceived ; a hustings speech has become
almost a proverb for insincerity. This ignorance, carelessness,

1 See however, on the other side, an eloquent description in Sismondi, Répub.
Ital. ii. 448. .

3 In Greek political language a Timocracy (τιμοκρατία) is a government where
the franchise depends on a property qualification, distinguished from the Demo-
cracy, Which is common to all citizens, and from the Aristocracy, which is in the
hands of a hereditary class.

" DISADVANTAGES OF GREAT STATES 65

and corruption among the electors appears to be the inherent

vice of representative government on a large scale. There is
probably no form of government under which bribery can be
wholly prevented. It is a vice which occurs everywhere in
some shape or other, but which varies its shapes infinitely. If
bribery appears in a despotism or in a city-commonwealth, it
commonly takes the form of bribery of the rulers; in a repre-
sentative government, it takes the form, the really worse form,

of bribery of the electors. The ministers of despotic Kings, the

chief citizens of aristocratic republics, have been open to bribes

in all ages. The chief citizens of democracies lie equally under

the same slur. At Athens we hear constant complaints of
bribery ; but it is always bribery of that particular kind which

is unknown among ourselves. We hear of demagogues and
generals being bribed to follow this or that line of policy. The Different
charge was probably in many cases unfounded, for charges of ene of ᾿
corruption are easy to bring and hard to disprove. But the ginen,
fact that it was so often brought and so readily believed shows and in
at least that it was felt not to be improbable. It is certain that England.
any citizen who was known to be above corruption obtained, on

that account, a degree of public confidence which sometimes, as

in the cases of Nikias and Phékidn, was above his general desert.

But of bribery in the popular courts of justice we hear very
little, and of bribery in the Assembly itself we hear absolutely
nothing. That Assembly doubtless passed many foolish, hasty,

and passionate votes, but we may be quite sure that it never
passed a corrupt vote. But we may believe that Kleén or
Hyperbolos often had his reward for the motion which he made

to the People, and to which the People assented in good faith.
Among ourselves the vice manifests itself in an exactly opposite
shape. Kledén was accused of receiving bribes himself, but never

of bribing others. No recent English statesman has ever been
suspected of receiving bribes, but few perhaps are altogether
innocent of giving them. It is long indeed since any great
English Minister has made a fortune by corruption of any kind.

But in the last century Members of Parliament were bought
with hard cash ; in the present century the representatives are

no longer bribed themselves, but they do not scruple to bribe

the electors. The example of Rome might possibly be quoted

on the other side. Rome was a city-commonwealth, and yet, in

the later and corrupt days of the republic, bribery at elections

Ε

These
vices in-
herent in
the sys-
tem.

66 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cuHap.

was as common at Rome as it is among ourselves. But this was
evidently for the same reason which makes it common among
ourselves. The Tribes were open to bribery, because they had,
in those days, become little more than an electoral body ; their
legislative power had long been hardly more than a shadow.
There are then two forms of corruption, each the natural growth
of a particular state of things, and each of which has its peculiar
evils. The corruption of a single great Minister may do greater
immediate harm to the state than the wholesale corruption of
half the boroughs in England. But when electors generally
come to look on a vote as a commodity to be sold instead of a
duty to be discharged, when they look on a seat in Parliament
as a favour to be paid for instead of a trust to be conferred,
more damage is done to the political and moral instincts of the
people than if a corrupt Minister took hostile gold to betray an
army to defeat or to conduct a negociation to dishonour.

These vices of ignorance and corruption in the electoral body
seem to be the inherent evil of modern representative govern-
ment. There is no panacea, whether of conservative or of
democratic reform, which:can wholly remove them. Vote by
Ballot would probably do'a good deal to lessen intimidation and
something to lessen corruption ; but there is no reason to think
that it would entirely wipe out the stain. Nor can corruption
be got rid of by limiting the franchise to some considerable
property-qualification. Actual bribery may be got rid of, but
not corruption in all its forms. Those whose social position sets
them above being bribed with hard cash will easily find out ways
of repaying themselves for their votes by appointments in the
public service or by jobs at the public expense. And the vices
of ignorance and prejudice are beyond the reach of Reform Bills.
Ignorance and prejudice are the monopoly of no particular social
class and of no particular political party. Really wise men and
good citizens are to be found scattered up and down among all
classes and all parties. No system has yet been found which
will make them, and none but them, the sole possessors of
political power. No class has any real right to despise any
other class, whether above or below it in the social scale. In

1 Tocqueville (Dém, en Am. ii. 88) says that in the reign or Louis Philip the
bribery of an elector was almost unknown in France. This was doubtless
because the high qualification at which the franchise was fixed engendered forms
of corruption different from those which are rife in our own boroughs.

1 GENERAL BALANCE IN FAVOUR OF LARGE STATES 67

times of any widespread political delusion, a Papal Aggression,
for instance, or a Russian War, the madness seizes upon all ranks
and all parties indiscriminately. The few who still hearken to
the voice of reason are a small minority made up out of all
classes and all parties. Very little then is gained by mere
legislative restrictions of the franchise. The vices of electoral
ignorance and corruption are inherent in the system. They are
the weak side of European Parliamentary Government, just as
Athenian Democracy and American Federalism have also their
weak sides of other kinds. But though the evil can never be
overcome, much may be done to alleviate it. If well informed
men will make it their business to diffuse sound political know-
ledge among the people; if they will deal with the people as
men to be reasoned with, not as brutes to be chained or as fools
to be cajoled ; if as large a portion of the people as possible
has some direct share in local matters however trifling; much
may be done to raise the character of the electoral body. But
it is in vain to hope that the average standard of the electoral
body of a large state will ever stand so high as the average
standard of the popular Assembly of a small one. We must not
dream of ever seeing the every-day Englishman attain the same
political and intellectual position as was held by the every-day
Athenian.

On the whole comparison, there can be little doubt that the
balance of advantage lies in favour, of the modern system of
large states. The small republic indeed developes its individual
citizens to a pitch which in the large kingdom is utterly im-
possible. But it so developes them at the cost of bitter political
strife within, and almost constant warfare without. It may
even be doubted. whether the highest form of the city-common-
wealth does not require slavery as the condition of its most
perfect. developement. The days of glory of such a common-

They may
be allevi-
ated but
not wholly
removed.

Balance of
advantage
favour

f large
ates.

wealth are indeed glorious beyond comparison; but it is ἃ -

glory which is too brilliant to last, and in proportion to the
short splendour of its prime is too often: the unutterable
wretchedness of its long old age. The republics of Greece
seem to have been shown to the world for a moment, like
some model of glorified humanity, from which all may draw
the highest of lessons, but which none can hope to reproduce
in its perfection. As the literature of Greece is the ground-

68 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT onap.

work of all later literature, as the art of Greece is the ground-
work of all later art, so in the great Democracy of Athens we
recognize the parent state of law and justice and freedom, the
wonder and the example of every later age. But it is an
example which we can no more reproduce than we can call
back again the inspiration of the Homeric singer, the more
than human skill of Pheidias, or the untaught and inborn
wisdom of Thucydidés. We can never be like them, if only
because they have gone before. They all belong to that
glorious vision of the world’s youth which has passed away
for ever. The subject of a great modern. state leads a life
less exciting and less brilliant, but a life no less useful, and
more orderly and peaceful, than the citizen of an ancient
commonwealth. But never could we have been as we are,
if those ancient commonwealths had not gone before us. While
human nature remains what it has been for two thousand years,
so long will the eternal lessons of the great Possession for all
Time,! the lessons which Periklés has written with his life and
Thucydidés with his pen, the lessons expanded by the more
enlarged experience of Aristotle and Polybios, the lessons which
breathe a higher note of warning still as Démosthenés lives the
champion of freedom and dies its martyr—so long will lessons
such as these never cease to speak with the same truth and the
same freshness even to countless generations. The continent
which gave birth to Kleisthenés and Caius Licinius and Simon
of Montfort may indeed be doomed to be trampled under foot
by an Empire based on Universal Suffrage; but no pseudo-
democratic despot, no Cesar or Dionysios ruling by the national
will of half-a-million of bayonets, will ever quite bring back
Europe to the state of a land of Pharaohs and Nabuchodonosors,
until the History of Thucydidés, the Politics of Aristotle, and
the Orations of Démosthenés, are wholly forgotten among men.

—

We have thus compared together the two systems of 'govern-
ment which form, as it were, the poles of our inquiry. We
have contrasted the city-commonwealth, which sacrifices every-
thing else to the full developement of the individual citizen,
and the great modern kingdom, which sacrifices everything
else to the peace, order, and general well-being of an extensive
territory. Each, if it be a really good example of its own class,

1 Kriya és del. Thuc,. i, 22.

II FEDERALISM AN INTERMEDIATE FORM 69

attains its own object perfectly ; but each leaves much that is

highly desirable unattained. May there not be a third system,
intermediate between the two, borrowing something from each

of them, and possessing many both of the merits and of the

faults inherent in a compromise? May there not be a system ΕΈΡΕΒΛΙ,
which aims at both the objects which are aimed at singly by JOvERN-
the other two systems, a system which will probably attain system in-
neither object in the perfection in which it is attained by the termediate
system which aims at it singly, but which may at least claim ortween
the merit of uniting the two in a very considerable degree? gan
Such a third system, such a compromise, is to be found in that States.
form of government which is the special object of our present

inquiry, that namely of the Federal Republic... A Federal It com-
Government does not secure peace and equal rights to its whole nen
territory so perfectly as a modern Constitutional Kingdom. It jn interior
does not develope the political life of every single citizen 80 «degree, the
perfectly as an ancient city-commonwealth. But it secures a special ad-
far higher amount of general peace than the system of in- reef
dependent cities; it gives its average citizens a higher political sygtems.
education than is within the reach of the average subjects of hs
extensive monarchies. This form of government is a more

delicate and artificial structure than either of the others; its .
perfect form is a late growth of a very high state of political |
culture; it is, even more than other forms of government,
essentially the creation of circumstances, and it will even less

than other forms bear thoughtlessly transplanting to soils

where circumstances have not prepared the ground for it. For

all these reasons:there is no political system which affords a

more curious political study at any time. And, at this present

moment, the strength and the weakness which it is displaying

before our eyes make its origin and its probable destiny the

most interesting of all political problems.

I have said that Federalism is essentially a compromise,’ an Federal
artificial product of an advanced state of political culture. Near “re
approaches to it may be found in very early stages of society, Compro-
and yet it is clearly not a system which would present itself mise,
at the very beginnings of political life. It is probable that
both the great kingdom and the independent city existed
before the system of Federations was thought of. It is quite
certain that both great kingdoms and independent cities had

1 See Bernard’s Lectures, p. 73.

70 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ~~ cHap.

reached a high degree of splendour and of political importance
before Federal Governments played any remarkable part in the

only suited history of the world. Federalism is a form of government which

to certain

positions.

Popular
prejudice
on the
subject.

is likely to arise only under certain peculiar circumstances,’ and
its warmest admirers could hardly wish to propagate it, irrespec-
tive of circumstances, throughout the world in general. No one
could wish that Athens, in the days of her glory, should have
stooped to a Federal union with other Grecian cities. No one
could wish to cut up our United Kingdom into a Federation,
to invest English Counties with the rights of American States,
or even to restore Scotland and Ireland to .the quasi-Federal
position which they held before their respective Unions. A
Federal Union, to be of any value, must arise by the establish-
ment of a closer tie between elements which were before distinct,
not by the division of members which have been hitherto more
closely united. All that I here claim for Federal Government
—though, to be sure, no more can be claimed for any other
sort of government—is that it may be looked upon as one
possible form of government among others, having its own
advantages and its own disadvantages, suited for some times
and places and not suited for others, and which, like all other
forms of government, may be good or bad, strong or weak, wise
or foolish, just as may happen. At this moment there is un-
reasonable prejudice abroad against Federal Government in
general. This is partly because we hold ourselves, and that
quite justly, to have lately suffered a wrong at the hands of
one particular Federal Government,” partly because it.is thought
by many that the disruption of the greatest Federal Government
that the world ever saw proves that no Federal Government can
possibly hold together. A moment’s thought will show the
fallacy of any such inferences. They are exactly the sort of
hasty conclusions which a knowledge of: general history dispels.

1 The circumstances under which a Federation is possible and desirable are
discussed by M. de Tocqueville (Dém. en Am. i. 269 et seqq) and by Mr. Mill
(Rep. Gov. p. 298). It is curious to see the different aspects in which the
matter is looked at by two such able writers. There is no contradiction
between them, but each supplies something which is wanting in the other.

3 January, 1862. These errors are fostered by the strange habit which the
newspapers have of calling the Government at Washington, ‘‘the Federal
Government,” as if it were the only one in the world, or as if the Government
of the Confederate States were not equally a Federal Government. It would be
about as reasonable to call any kingdom with which we had a dispute “ the
Royal Government,” and to make inferences unfavourable to monarchy.

I NO CASE AGAINST FEDERALISM IN GENERAL 71

All that these facts prove is the indisputable truth that a Federal
constitution is not necessarily a perfect constitution, that the

Federal form of Government enjoys no immunity from the

various weaknesses and dangers which beset all forms of
government. They undoubtedly prove the existence of mis-
management in the conduct of the American Republic; they
probably prove that circumstances have rendered it undesirable

that the whole Union should remain united by a single Federal

bond. But they prove no more against Federalism in the No general
abstract than the misgovernment of particular Kings and the deductions
occasional disruption of their kingdoms prove against Monarchy from
in the abstract. At this stage of my work I desire to keep recent
myself as clear as possible from the tangled maze of recent American
American politics. I postpone to a later stage any definite events
judgement on questions which have as yet hardly become matters

of history. I am not now concerned to judge between North

and South, to act as the accuser or the champion either of
President Lincoln or of President Davis. I have to deal only

with such mistaken inferences from recent events as affect the
general question of Federal Government. I am not concerned

to defend either Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Davis; but I am concerned

to answer any inferences which reflect on the wisdom either of
Markos and Aratos or of Washington and Hamilton. The South

has seceded from the North, whether rightly or wrongly I do

not here pronounce. There can be no doubt that, to say the

least, a plausible case can be made out on behalf of Secession

on the ground of expediency. It is quite possible that there

may not have been that degree of mutual sympathy * between

the States without which a Federal Government cannot be
successfully carried on. It is quite possible that the Union,

as it stood, was too large to be properly governed as one
Federal commonwealth, perhaps as one commonwealth of any

kind. All these admissions would prove nothing, either against
Federal Government in the abstract, or against the wisdom of

1 Mr. Spence’s arguments (American Union, p. 198) to show the constitutional
right of Secession carry no conviction to my mind, but his arguments on the
ground of expediency deserve, to say the least, the most careful answer that the
North can give them.

Professor Bernard’s Lectures on the constitutional question seem to me to
maintain a very just mean between the extreme views of Mr. Spence on the one
side and Mr. Motley on the other.

2 See Mill, Representative Government, p. 298.

72 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ~ cnHap.

“the founders of the particular Federal Government of the

Similar
disrup-

tions in
the case
of Mon-
archies.

No case
against
Federalism
in general,

United States. Let it be granted that the continuance of the
American Union was undesirable, that it was expedient and
just for the Southern States to separate. This proves no more
than is proved by similar disruptions in the case of monarchies.
In different ages of European history, Sicily has seceded from
Naples, Portugal has seceded from Spain, Greece has seceded
from Turkey, Belgium has seceded from Holland, Hungary, we
all trust, is about to secede from Austria. These examples are
not generally looked upon as proving the inherent weakness and
absurdity of Monarchy. The secession of South Carolina and
her sisters goes exactly as far and no further to prove the
inherent weakness and absurdity of Federalism. What all these
instances prove is merely this, that, both under Monarchies and
under Federations, States are sometimes joined together which
had better be separated. So far from the disruption proving
anything against Federalism in the abstract, it does not even prove
anything against the American Union as it came forth from

nor against the hands of its founders. Those founders, when they legislated

the ori-
ginal
American
Union.

Testimony
of the

Belgium
and Hol-
land.

for thirteen States on the Atlantic border, could not foresee the
enormous extension of the Republic from Ocean to Ocean. Nor
could they foresee those vast diversities of interest and feeling
which have, since their time, arisen between the different sections
of the original Union. The opposition between slaveholding
and non-slaveholding States, between agricultural and manu-
facturing States, is an opposition which has arisen since the
establishment of the Federal Constitution. Could they have
foreseen all that has happened since their day, Washington
and his colleagues would have been, not merely the wise but
fallible men which they undoubtedly were, but unerring prophets,
a character to which they laid no claim. And, after all, the
Southern States have, in their very secession, paid the highest
tribute that could be paid to the general principle of Federalism.
They have seceded from one Federal Government only to set
up another. Their first act has been to re-enact the old Federal

" Constitution, with only such changes in detail as the experience

of seventy years had shown to be needful. That Belgium, in
separating from the Dutch Monarchy, still remained a kingdom,
proves far more in favour of Monarchy than its separation proves

1 See the Confederate Constitution in Ellison’s Slavery and Secession (London,
1861), p. 312.

1 QUESTION OF A LARGE NON-FEDERAL REPUBLIC 73

tt SS

against it. So the fact that the Southern States, in separating
from the old Federal Union, forthwith set up a new Federal
Union of their own, proves far more in favour of Federalism in
the abstract than their separation proves against it. I abstain
at present not only from entering on the details of the recent
Secession, but even from entering on the details of the Federal
Constitution itself. I refer to them here only to answer popular
objections, to show that recent events in America prove absolutely
nothing against Federalism in the abstract, and that we ought
to be able to discuss the comparative merits and defects of
Federalism and other forms of government as _dispassionately
in 1862 as we could have done in 1860.

I have several times, when speaking of Federal Governments,
assumed incidentally that their constitution will be republican, just
as I have also sometimes assumed incidentally that the constitu-
tion of a large consolidated state will be monarchical. I have
done so simply because, up to this.time, experience has shown
that they commonly are so. There is indeed no absurdity in
supposing that the government of a large country. might per-
manently assume the form of an Indivisible or Consolidated
Republic. There is no reason in the nature of things why a A large
large state, with an Assembly representing the whole nation, state te mey
might not intrust executive functions, not to a hereditary King ὃὸ public ;
directed by Ministers approved by the Assembly, but to an without
avowedly elective Council of State or to a President chosen for being ἃ
a term of years. The attempts hitherto made to establish such 50,
a government have been so few that their failure by no means
proves that some future attempt may not be successful. They
have commonly been made under much less favourable circum-
stances, and under much less worthy leaders, than the Federal
Constitution of the United States. Some Cromwell or Buonaparte
has commonly soon appeared to convert the Republic into a
Tyranny. No one can mourn over the extinction of the Rump No argu-
in England. The republican constitution was in no sense the ment to be
work of the nation ; the mockery of a representative body which on
ordained it was in truth an oligarchy in no whit better than the failures in
royal despotism which it succeeded or the Tyranny by which it England
was followed. The last French Republic fell because of the France.
twofold madness of placing a born conspirator at the head of
a free state and of entrusting a republican President with the

A Federa-
tion may
consist

of mon-
archies.

Approach
to kingly
Federalism
in the
Feudal
system.

74 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cmap.

command of an enormous army. Instances like these certainly
do not show that the Consolidated Republic is at all an impossible
form of government for a large country. But since, as a matter
of fact, all the greatest states of the world are, and commonly
have been, monarchically governed, I have, for convenience, in
my comparison of the great state with the small commonwealth,
assumed that the great state would be a monarchy. So, on the
other hand, there is no abstract absurdity in supposing that a
league of monarchies, especially constitutional monarchies, might
assume the true Federal form. But, as a matter of fact, all the
greatest and most perfect Federations, past and present, have
always been Republics. I have therefore, in like manner often
assumed, in contrasting Federal states with others, that the
Federal state would be a Republic.!

The question of the possibility of a Federal Monarchy is one
which it may be worth while to follow out a little further. The
relation of lord and vassal between sovereign princes, if strictly
carried out, would produce something very like a kingly Federa-
tion.? The vassal prince is sovereign in his internal administra-
tion, but his foreign policy must be directed by that of his
suzerain. He must never wage war against him, and he must
follow his standard against other enemies. But in truth this is
an ideal which has never been fully carried out, and, if it were
carried out, it would not produce a perfect Federal Government.
It has never been carried out, because the harmonious relation
of lord and vassal which it supposes has never permanently
existed. Sometimes a too powerful suzerain has reduced his
vassals from the estate of vassals to that of subjects. Sometimes
too powerful vassals have thrown off vassalage altogether, and

The theory have grown into independent sovereigns. The one process took

never fully
carried
out,

place in France and the other in Germany. By annexing the
dominions of their vassal princes, the Kings of Paris extended
their territories to the sea, the Rhone, and the Pyrenees.? In
Germany the vassal princes and commonwealths gradually grew
into practical independence of their nominal King the Emperor.
The very name of the German Kingdom died out in popular

1 See Archdeacon Denison’s Prize Essay on Federal Government (Oxford,
1829), p. 33.

2 See the Federalist, No. 17, p. 90.

3 The Rhone and the Pyrenees, not the Rhine and the Alps, which have been
reached by another process. See above, p. 24, note 2,

II QUESTION OF FEDERAL MONARCHIES 78

thought and popular language.! The old Germanic body is often

spoken of as a Confederation, and it may fairly claim to rank

among Confederations of the looser kind. But it was a Con-
federation only so far as it had ceased to be a monarchy. Its

modern successor, the so-called German Confederation, has but

little of the true Federal character about it, and, so far as it is

Federal, it is not monarchic. Some of its members are even now
Republics, and it has not, like the old Empire, any acknowledged
monarchic head. And, even if the feudal theory had ever been and, if
harmoniously carried out, the relation of vassal principalities to “Tied ia
an Imperial head would not of itself amount to the true Federal ou pro-
relation. It would rather resemble the relation of dependent duce a true
alliance in which Chios and Mityléné stood to Athens. To Federa-
produce anything like true Federalism, all national affairs should ton.

be ordered in a National Assembly, an Institution which in feudal

France was never attempted, and to which the Imperial Diet of
Germany presented only a very feeble approach. It is indeed Scheme
possible in theory that the powers of the American President, as Oded
they stand, might be vested in a hereditary or elective King, and yonarchy ;
that the functions of the Governors of the States, as they stand,

might be vested in hereditary or elective Dukes. Such an Union

would be a true Monarchic Federation. The connexion would

be strictly Federal, and Kings and Dukes would be invested with

really higher powers than were held by a King of Poland or a

Duke of Venice. But such a constitution has never existed ; it unlikely
would be a political machine even more delicate and hard to * last.
work than a Federation of Republics. We may safely say that

it could not last through a single generation.

But kingly states have sometimes made a nearer approach to Other ap-
true Federalism than anything that could practically grow out Proacnes ;
of the relation of lord and vassal. We may pass by instances in Monarchy.
remote ages and barbarous countries, of whose details we have
no record. Such may, or may not, have been the Twelve Kings
of Egypt? and the Five Lords of the Philistines.» We may pass
by the abortive scheme of a Confederation of Italian Princes with a.p. 1859.
the Pope at their head, which was put forth by Louis Napoleon
Buonaparte only to become the laughing-stock of Europe. A far

1 The name however remained down to the last. The formal titles, even of
Francis the Second, were “ Erwihlter Rimischer Kaiser, Kénig in Germanien und
Jerusalem.” These he laid aside, and, dissatisfied with his hereditary rank of

Archduke, assumed the portentous title of ‘‘ Emperor of Austria.”
* Herod. ii. c. 147. 5. 1 Sam. vi. 4.

wn

5
. Ὁ “.
Π

5:

ai

Two or
more
Kingdoms
under one
King.

Spain ;

The
** Austrian
Empire ;”

Great Bri-
tain and
Ireland ;

Sweden
and
Norway.

76 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cnap.

nearer approach may be found in the case of the union of two or
more kingdoms under one King.!_ The kingdoms so joined may
form one state in all their relations with other powers, while
they may retain the most perfect independence in all internal
matters; they may keep their own laws, their own constitu-
tions, and a distinct administration of the ordinary government.
Such were England and Scotland during the century between the
Union of the Crowns and the Union of the Kingdoms ; such were
Great Britain and Ireland during the last eighteen years of the
last century ; such have been Sweden and Norway for nearly
fifty years past. But such unions have been few in number, and
they have commonly been the result of accident. A Kingdom
has been conquered or inherited by the King of another Kingdom ;
it has received the stranger as its sovereign, but it has retained
its own constitution and laws. When many states have been so
united, as by the Dukes of Burgundy, the Kings of Castile, and
the so-called “Emperors” of Austria, had they been governed
with any regard to right and justice, something like a Federal
Monarchy might have been the result. But in Spain, the rights
of independent kingdoms first sank into mere provincial liberties,
and then were absorbed by the general despotism of the common
Sovereign. Spain has risen again, not indeed as a Confederation,
but as a constitutional kingdom, which lacks nothing except
rulers worthy of the nation. In the case of the “ Austrian
Empire,” long years of tyranny and faithlessness have produced
a hatred of the central power which separation alone can satisfy.
But, were this otherwise, it may be doubted whether a union of
such utterly incongruous nations, even on the mildest and justest
terms, could ever satisfy the conditions necessary for a Federa-
tion of any kind. Where only two crowns have been thus
united, a tendency to more perfect union has commonly arisen.
This, in its best form, has taken the form of an equal fusion of
the two kingdoms ; in its worst form it has degenerated into an
absorption of the weaker kingdom by the stronger. In our own
country, Scotland has first been united with England, and then
Ireland has been united with Great Britain. Of cases where such
more perfect union has not followed, the most permanent and
beneficial has been the union of Sweden and Norway. That is
to say, the terms of union preserved to Norway liberties which
otherwise she might have lost. The union was a desirable mean

1 Mill, Representative Government, p. 303.

I] ACTUAL APPROACHES TO FEDERAL MONARCHY 7

between mere absorption by Sweden, and an attempt at perfect
independence which would probably have been fruitless. . The
union has worked well, through the indomitable love of freedom
which reigns in the noble Norwegian nation. But it is hardly
a system which a patriotic Norwegian would have hit upon as
desirable for its own sake. On the whole the general tendency
of history is to show that, though a Monarchic Federation is by
no means theoretically impossible, yet a Republican Federation
is far more likely to exist as a permanent and flourishing system.
We may therefore, in the general course of our comparison,
practically assume that a Federal state will be also a Republican
state.

When I speak of the Federal system as one intermediate
between the systems of large and of small states, it may be ob-
jected that the states which compose a Federation’ may be either
large or small states, according to the definitions of large and small ὁ
states which I have already given. It is undoubtedly true that Members
the members of a Confederation may be either single cities or oF α Fede-
states of a considerable size. The Achaian League was a League te either
of Cities, the United States are a League of countries, many of Cities or
which exceed in size the smaller kingdoms of Europe. It there- States of
fore naturally follows, that in Achaia the internal governments ayjo size.
of the several cities resembled those of any other Greek democracy,
while the internal governments of the several American States
follow the common type of modern European constitutions.
That is to say, the Achaian cities had primary, the American
States have representative Assemblies. It is clear that a great
commonwealth, like the State of New York, is as much obliged
to adopt representative institutions as England or Italy.! But
though the component parts of a Federation may be as large on
the map as some European kingdoms, they are not likely to be
states which really occupy the same position. This great size of

1 Switzerland exhibits an intermediate state of things. Some Cantons have
primary, others have representative Assemblies. It is only in one or two of the
largest Cantons that representation can have been absolutely necessary on
geographical grounds. It must have been introduced elsewhere by the influence
of the common type of European freedom. A Canton like Geneva, consisting of
a large town with a very small surrounding territory, would have seemed the
place of all others to revive a Democracy of the Athenian kind. But the constitu-
tion of Geneva, though democratic, is representative ; Démos, in his purity, is to
be found only in some of the small rural Cantons which contain no important
town. .

Difference
of scale in
Europe
and Ame-
rica to

be con-
sidered.

78 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ~— cBApP.

the States is peculiar to the American Union, and we must take
into account the difference of scale between America and Europe.
In a newly-settled continent, a country which covers as much
ground as France or Spain may, in population, in everything in
short except mere extent, be only on a level with a small Swiss
Canton or German Duchy. The difference may be seen not only
between Europe and America, but between the older and newer
parts of the American Union itself. The area of Texas is between
three and four times as great as the area of all the New England
States ; the population of Texas, bond and free, is less than half
the population of the one State of Massachusettes! Though
several of the States are of the size of kingdoms, it is only one
or two in which it would not be perfect madness to set up as
wholly independent powers. A Federal connexion with other
states is just as necessary to most of them as it was to the
Achaian cities, or as it now is to the Swiss Cantons. Still it
undoubtedly makes a great difference in the character of a
Federation, whether its members are single cities or states of
such a size as to require Representative Assemblies. That is to
say, while Federations, as a class, occupy a position intermediate
between the two other systems, some particular Federations will
approach nearer to one extreme, and others to the other. A
League of the Achaian sort will share many of the merits and
the defects of a system of independent city-commonwealths. <A
League of the American sort will share many of the merits and
the defects of a system of large monarchies or republics. And
yet the position of Federations as a class still remains distinct
and intermediate. The position of Megalopolis and that of New
York, both being sovereign in their internal affairs, and mere
municipalities as regards foreign powers, have really more of
resemblance to one another, notwithstanding the difference of
scale, than the position of Megalopolis has to the position of
Athens and the position of New York to that of England.
Though one Federation will incline more to one extreme and one
to the other, it is still true that Federal Governments, as a class,
occupy a middle position between the two extremes. Along with
some of the defects inherent in a compromise, they have the

1 Area of Texas, 237,504 square miles, of all New England, 65,038, of Massa-
chusetts, 7800. Population of Texas, 601,039, of all New England, 3,318,681,
of Massachusetts, 1,231,065. I take my figures from Ellison’s Slavery and
Secession, p. 362.

IY FEDERALISM AS AN INTERMEDIATE SYSTEM 79

a

advantage of a middle position in uniting, to a considerable
extent, the merits of both the opposite systems.!

A Federal Government then secures peace, order, and unity General
to a large territory, not so perfectly as a large kingdom does, τον οἵ
but far more perfectly than can be done by a system of small ἐς δὴ in.
independent states. -It affords to its citizens a political education termediate
less perfect than is afforded to the citizens of a city-common- *ystem.
wealth, but far more perfect than is afforded to the subjects of a
large kingdom. In theory indeed the Federal Government
secures peace, order, and national unity just as well as the A
kingdom does. The Federal power supplies legal means for
settling disputes between State and State, just as readily avail-
able as those which a large kingdom supplies for settling disputes
between district and district. The Federation is as truly
sovereign in its own department as the State is in its own
department. Resistance to the lawful commands of its Govern-
ment is as much rebellion as resistance to the lawful commands
of a monarch. An injury done by one State to another State or Inter-
to a citizen of another State is not a matter of international mediate
wrong ; it is a mere breach of the peace, to be rectified by the Pe ropards
Federal Courts or, if need be, to be chastised by the Federal govern-
army. The theory is exactly the same; but the Government ment of
of a Federation will have more difficulty in carrying the theory te tor
into practice than the Government of a consolidated state. For
Federal purposes the several States are merely municipalities or
individuals, but they possess infinitely greater powers than can
ever belong to municipalities or to individuals.? If they wish to
resist, the means of resistance are far easier. In the looser kind
of Federation, that which works only by requisitions, disobedience
to an unpleasant requisition will be a matter of course. Even
where the Union is closest, the coercion, however just, of a
recalcitrant State is sure to be a difficult and invidious business.

The mere threat of nullification or secession by several States
may weaken the action of the Federal power in a way which
their constitutional opposition in the Federal Assembly could not

1 See Tocqueville, i. 278. L’Union est libre et heureuse comme une petite
nation, glorieuse et forte comme une grande, Again, ii. 208. La forme fédérale
que les Americains ont adoptée, et qui permet ἃ l'Union de jouir de la puissance
d'une grande république et de la sécurité d'une petite.

2 On these subjects there are many striking passages in Tocqueville. See
especially, i. 241, 251, 252, 254, 256. Some of these passages have been strangely
misunderstood by his English translator

Inter-
mediate
position

as regards
Political
Education.

80 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cuHap.

do. There is therefore no doubt that a Federal Government is
practically less efficient to maintain peace, order, and national
unity than a consolidated Government. That it is more efficient
to maintain them than a system of small independent states,
which in truth does not seek to maintain them at all, needs no
demonstration.

In like manner it is easy to show that a Federal State will
afford its average citizens a degree of political education, greater
than they can obtain in a large kingdom, less than they can
obtain in a city-commonwealth. Doubtless the amount of
developement and education which a Federal State gives to the
individual citizen will mainly depend upon the size and the
internal constitution of its several members. Ina Confederation
of Cities the several cities will approach to the character of
independent city-commonwealths ; in a Confederation of large
States the several States will approach to the character of large
kingdoms or republics. Yet certain general tendencies will run
through both classes. It is impossible that any member of a
Federation of either kind can give to the mass of its citizens
such a degree of political education as may be given by a per-
fectly independent democratic city. The Achaian Cities pos-
sessed, some of the Swiss Cantons still possess, Democracy in its
purest form, where every adult male citizen has a direct voice
in the popular Assembly. But no such City or Canton can
possibly give its citizens the same political education as was
given to the citizens of democratic Athens.1 The very condition
of the case forbids it. The mere existence of the Federal tie at
once prevents the citizen of Pelléné or of Schwytz from being
called on to deliberate and decide on such important and in-
structive questions as were laid before the citizen of Athens.
It was the discussion of those high questions of imperial policy ©
on which Periklés and Démosthenés harangued, which gave their
hearers the very highest of all political teaching. But these
questions, so far as any parallel to them can exist at all, are, by
the Achaian and Swiss system, transferred from the Assemblies
of each particular City or Canton to the Federal Assembly at
Aigion or at Bern. The chief means of improvement is therefore
at once placed out of the reach of the ordinary citizen of the

1 That pure Democracy is now confined to some of the most backward among
the Cantons is purely accidental. The argument would apply equally if it existed
at Geneva or Basel.

13 POLITICAL EDUCATION IN FEDERATIONS 81

Federation. Still, the powers of the City or Canton are far

more than municipal ; it is really sovereign in all purely internal
matters. A share therefore in its government must afford a
political education, if inferior to that of the Athenian, yet at

least superior to any that can be obtained in the purely muni-

cipal Assemblies of an extensive kingdom. Again, in a city or

smal] district, the constitution may legally be representative ;

the legal function of the private citizen may be, not to make

laws, but only to choose law-makers. Still, in such a common-

wealth, the people at large will always have a far greater insight

into public affairs, and will always exercise a far greater influence

over their course, than can possibly happen in a large kingdom.

In a Confederation of larger States, where some members may Compari-
be as large in geographical extent as some European kingdoms, 39} of ἃ
the direct share of the people in the government cannot well be Kingdom, ἡ
greater in kind than it is in a constitutional monarchy. It may

be greater in amount, because more offices may depend upon
popular election ; but in the State of New York, no less than in

the Kingdom of Britain or of Italy, the direct influence of the

people cannot go beyond the election of legislators and magis-

trates. But their indirect influence will be far greater in the

State than it can be in the Kingdom. Republican habits and
feelings will cause appeals to the people to be far more common

and far more direct than is usual in a monarchic state. Political
meetings and regularly organized Conventions will be far more
common and far more influential. There will not be the same

wide difference as to regularity of proceeding and as to moral
weight between such self-appointed bodies and the constitutional
Assemblies of the country. And this indirect influence of the Compari-
people will not only be greater than it can be in the constitu- 20 of 8
tional Kingdom ; it will be greater than it can be in the consoli- State with
dated Republic. It will doubtless be.greater in the consolidated dated Re-
Republic than it can be in the Kingdom ; but it may be doubted public.
whether in a consolidated Republic it will be at all more en-
lightened or useful than it can be ina Kingdom. Ina large
Republic, say France in its short republican day, the danger is

that the people will gain increased influence without increased

means of improvement. The institutions of a smaller common

1 The Achaian Assembly was in theory a Primary Assembly, but it had practi-

cally much more of the character of a Representative one. This will be discussed
at length in Chapter V.

G

Self- 4

Govern-
ment in
Federal
States.

82 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — cuap.

ee a ee ee

wealth, while they give the people the increased influence, give
them the increased means of improvement along with it. No
means of improvement, save the unattainable standard of the
Athenian Assembly, is equal to that afforded by a good system
of local Self-Government.1_ Now of all systems the Federal
Republic is the most favourable to local Self-Government; the
Consolidated Republic would seem to be less favourable to it
than the Constitutional Monarchy. In such a Republic, the one
Sovereign Assembly, the true and sole representative of the
nation, will, in its natural love of power, be far from favourably
inclined towards any authority which does not directly proceed
from itself, towards assemblies or magistrates over which it has
only an indirect control. The Parliament of a Monarchy, whose
sphere is limited by its very nature, is not likely to have the
same jealousy of local rights ag the omnipotent National
Assembly of a Republic. And both a Federal Congress and a
State Legislature may be expected to have less jealousy still.
Both Assemblies are accustomed to limitations of various kinds ;
the Federal Congress indeed is limited in a way which prevents
it from touching local rights at all. And the State Legislature,
which might touch them, is itself accustomed to limitations of
one kind at the hands of the Federal body, and will therefore
be more inclined to tolerate limitations of another kind at the
hands of local bodies. The very model of the Federal Govern-
ment, the perfect liberty retained by each State within its own
walk, will naturally suggest the retention of a large amount of
municipal liberty by the smaller divisions of which the State
itself is composed. In the New England States, where the true
Federal model is best carried out, local Self-Government seems
to have reached its fullest developement.2 The Township, the
County, the State, the Union, are wheels within wheels, govern-
ments within governments, each lower office preparing and edu-
cating for the office above it, from the Select-Man of the Township
to the President of the United States. It is clear that no system,
short of the Athenian Democracy, can give the mass of the people
a political education at all comparable to this. It may indeed
be that even the general diffusion of political intelligence is not

1 Tocqueville, ii. 208. Les institutions communales qui, modérant le despo-
tisme de la majorit¢é, donnent en méme temps au peuple le χοῦϊ de la liberté et
Vart d’étre libre.

4 See Tocqueville, i. p. 108 et seqq.

iT SELF-GOVERNMENT IN FEDERATIONS 83

a ο .ρ.ϑ. “ κ“““ρ“ρ΄ρΦ..«Φρ“φΦΦ.ΦΦρΠὖρς-“΄ΠΦΠὖΡ0΄ὖ΄Π ͵΄΄.--Ἐ.«ςὕὄ..... ἷ.-.

an unmixed good; it is possible that where everybody is a
statesman, nobody will be a great statesman ; it is possible that
the constant occupation of the mind on political subjects may
tend to diminish some qualities, even some political qualities,
which may be no less practically useful than political intelligence
itself. The English people are certainly not remarkable for a
high average of political intelligence ; but they often display an
amount of political good sense, of rational confidence in well-
chosen leaders, which we might look for in vain among the
busier spirits of America. But I believe that the faults, which,
among many virtues, have disfigured the political working of the
United States are owing to the peculiar circumstances of that
Itepublic, and are not inherent results either of Democratic
Government or of Federal Government. For the discussion of
these points I trust to find a more fitting place in a later stage
of my history. It is enough now to refer to the counter-
examples of Athens, Achaia, Holland, and Switzerland. My
present position simply is that, as the tendency of a Federal
State is to give each individual citizen! greater political powers
and greater political responsibility, so it also gives him the
opportunity of submitting himself to a more thoroughly edu-
cating and improving process than lies within the reach of the
ordinary subject of a great monarchy. But all that Achaia or
Switzerland or America can give is utterly inferior to that politi-
cal training, which the constant habit of ruling and judging, of
hearing the greatest affairs discussed by the greatest men, offered
to one and all of the twenty thousand citizens of Athens.

Such then are the advantages and disadvantages which seem
naturally to belong to Federal Governments as such. But it
must be remembered that, of all political systems in the world,
the Federal Republic is the last which it would be prudent in its
admirers to preach up as the one political system to be adopted
in all times and places. It isa system eminently suited for some
circumstances, eminently unsuited for others. Federalism is
in its place whenever it appears in the form of closer Union.
Europeans, accustomed to a system of large consolidated states,
are apt to look upon a Federal system as a system of disunion,
and therefore a system of weakness. Toa Greek of the third
century B.c., to an American in 1787, it presented itself as a

1 In an aristocratic Federation this must of course be understood of those
citizens only who are invested with the highest franchise.

Circum-
stances
under
which a
Federa!
Union is
desirable.

84 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cuHap.

system of union and therefore of strength. The alternative was
not closer union, but wider separation. A Kingdom of Pelo-
ponnésos or of America was an absurdity too great to be thought
of. A single Consolidated Republic was almost equally out of
the question. The real question was, Shall these Cities, these
States, remain utterly isolated, perhaps hostile to one another,
δῦ most* united by an inefficient and precarious alliance /—or
shall they, while retaining full internal independence, be fused
into one nation as regards all] dealings with other powers?
Looked at in this light, the Federal system is emphatically a
system of union, and of that strength which follows upon union.
The Federal connexion is in its place wherever the several
members to be united are fitted for that species of union and for
no other. It requires a sufficient degree of community in origin
or feeling or interest to allow the several members to work
together up toa certain point. It requires that there should not
be that perfect degree of community, or rather identity, which
allows the several members to be fused together for all purposes.
Where there is no community at all, Federalism is inappropriate ;
the Cities or States had better remain wholly independent, and
take their chance of the advantages and disadvantages of the -
system of-small commonwealths. Where community rises into
identity, Federalism is equally inappropriate ; the Cities or States
had better sink into mere Counties of a Kingdom or Consolidated
Republic, and take their chance of the advantages and disad-
vantages of the system of large states. But in the intermediate set
of circumstances, the circumstances of Peloponnésos struggling
against Macedonia, of Switzerland struggling against Austria, of
the Netherlands struggling against Spain, of the American colonies
struggling against England, Federalism is the true solvent. It
gives as much of union as the members need and not more than
they need. At the present moment, by the confession of both
sides, the Federal tie is the appropriate one to bind together New
York and Massachusetts, South Carolina and Georgia. The only
question is whether the requisite degree of community of
interests, feelings, and habits exists between New York and
Massachusetts on the one hand and South Carolina and Georgia
on the other. If it does not, the interests of the world will be
better promoted by the existence of two Federations instead of
one. Even should a third Federation arise in the remoter West,
the principle of Federalism will remain untouched, as long as the

I GENERAL RESULTS OF MODERN FEDERALISM 85

Federal tie, and nothing tighter or looser, is applied to those
States whose degree of fraternity with one another makes the
Federal relation the appropriate degree of connexion. Wherever
either closer union or more entire separation is desirable, Feder-
alism is out of place. It is out of place if it attempts either to
break asunder what is already more closely united,' or to unite
what is wholly incapable of union. Its missién is to unite toa
certain extent what is capable of a certain amount of union and
no more. It is an intermediate point between two extremes,

capable either of being despised as a compromise or of being
extolled as the golden mean.

My object, at this particular stage of my argument, is, more General
than anything else, to answer certain popular fallacies with resuits of
regard to my subject. I will therefore slightly forestall some Fede.
things which are more appropriate to a later stage, and will ask ralism.
what Federalism, applied in its proper place, has really done,
and is still doing, before our eyes. What have been its real
results in America? I do not ask what have been the results of
American institutions generally ; that is an inquiry which I post-
pone altogether. I do not ask what has been the result either
of a democratic state of society or of a democratic form of
government. I ask, What has been the result of the Federal
system, as such, in the United States? J ask again, What has
been its result in a land nearer to us though less closely con-
nected ? What has a Federal Union done, or failed to do, for
Switzerland, and, through Switzerland, for Europe ?

No one who really understands the position of the United
States at the time when their Federal Constitution was formed Results
will doubt that the establishment of a Federal system was of the can
absolutely the only course open to the founders of the Republic. Ynion.
Thirteen independent, and possibly hostile, commonwealths hardly
formed a desirable alternative. A consolidated State of thirteen
counties was a notion utterly chimerical. The reasons which
may now make two or three Confederations more desirable
than one had not then shown themselves. Washington and his

1 I mean of course countries really united like England and France. Where
the tie is merely artificial or violent, as in the lands unequally yoked together
under Austrian or Turkish tyranny, Federalism may (or may not) be the proper

relation for the different states on acquiring freedom. The decaying Ottoman

Empire certainly affords a most tempting field for the experiment of some form
or other of monarchic Federation.

Its com-
parative
perma-
nency as
compared
with
France.

Evils
which the
Federal
Union has
hindered.

86 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — cHap.

coadjutors did what wise men would do in the circumstances in
which they found themselves. Like Solén, they established,
not the best of all possible constitutions, but the constitution
which was the best possible in that particular time and place.
And what has been the result of their work? Their constitution
has at least outlived’ countless constitutions both in Europe and
in America. When the American constitution was drawn up,
France was still under the absolute and undisputed sway of a
Most Christian King. The American Union has been contem-
porary with a Constitutional King of the French, a Convention,
a Directory, a Consulate for a term, a Consulate for life, an
Emperor of a Republic, an Emperor of an Empire,' a Constitu-
tional King of France, an Emperor again, a Constitutional King
of France again, a King of the French, a Provisional Government,
a Dictator, a President for four years, a despotic President for
ten years,an Emperor for what period no one can foretell. The
constitution-making of Philadelphia has been at least more per-
manent than the constitution-making of Paris. At all events,
the American Union has actually secured, for what is really a
long period of time, a greater amount of combined peace and
freedom than was ever before enjoyed by so large a portion of
the earth’s surface. There have been, and still are, vaster
despotic Empires, but never before has so large an inhabited
territory remained for more than seventy years in the enjoyment
at once of internal freedom and of exemption from the scourge
of internal war. Now this is the direct result of the Federal
System. Either entire independence or closer union would have
brought with it evils which the Federal relation has prevented.
Had the thirteen States remained wholly independent common-
wealths, had new States, equally independent, grown up to the
West of them, we cannot doubt that the American continent
would, before this time, have become the theatre of constant
wars between so many independent and rival powers. Had the
States formed a single Monarchy or Consolidated Republic, some
attempt would long ago have been made to force upon the whole
country one uniform law, either allowing or forbidding Slavery.
Who can doubt that a Civil War, even more fearful than the
present one, would have been the immediate consequence? The

1 The early Imperial coins of the first Buonaparte bear on the reverse the
legend “ République Frangaise,” which in the later ones is exchanged for ‘‘ Empire

Francais.’ ,

II ALLEGED WEAKNESS OF THE FEDERAL TIE 87

Federal Union has at least staved off either evil for no incon-
siderable term of years. It has staved it off for a period as long
as the greatest glory of Athens, for a period not far short of half {
the duration of the truest glory of Rome.! There have been
bitter dissensions and bitter hatreds, violent words and violent
actions, there have been nullifications and threats of secession
and attempts at local insurrection, but, till this present outbreak,
there has been nothing really deserving the name of Civil War.
The Federal system has at least saved that vast continent for
nearly three generations from the mutual slaughter of men of
the same race and speech, from the sight of ravaged provinces
and of cities taken by storm. During all these years, the amount
of union between the several States, the amount of independence
retained by each State, has been found to be exactly that amount
which answered the required purpose. Ifthe system has broken
down at last, we may be sure that any other system would have
broken down much sooner. And, after all, it has only broken
down very partially. One Federation has been divided into
two, just as one Kingdom has often been divided into two; but
neither of the powers thus formed has thought of setting up
anything but a Federal system as the form of its own internal
constitution.

It is often said that the Disruption of the United States at Alleged
once puts Federalism out of court by proving the inherent weak- weakness
ness of the Federal tie. To make a general political inference pogeral
from a single example in history is not a very philosophical way Tie.
of reasoning. The alleged weakness of the Federal tie is more-
over, in a certain sense, a truism. The Federal tie is in its own
nature weaker than the tie which unites the geographical divisions
of a perfectly consolidated state. But what Federalism ought
really to be compared with is not perfect union, but the com-
plete separation which has commonly been its only alternative.

I freely admit, in a certain sense, the weakness of the Federal tie. True in a
But the real question is not whether the tie is weak or strong, sense, but
but whether there are not certain circumstances in which a weak arily inje.
tie is better either than a strong tie or than no tie at all. The rious.
Federal tie is weak because it is artificial. It is hardly possible

1 From the Declaration of Independence in 1776 to the Secession of 1861 is
85 years. From the battle of Marathén (B.c. 490) to the conquest of Athens by
Lysander (B.c. 404) is 86. The period of Roman History between the settlement
of the quarrels of the Orders (B.c. c. 337) and the beginning of the later struggles
under the Gracchi (B.c. 133) is about 200 years.

Circum-
stances
under
which a’
Federal
Union

88 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cuap.

that a man can feel the same love for an ingenious political
creation as he may feel either for a single great nation or for a
single city-commonwealth. The Achaian League or the American
Union can hardly call forth either that feeling of hereditary
loyalty which attaches to Kings descended from Alfred or Saint
Lewis, or that burning patriotism which the Athenian or the
Florentine felt for the City in which his whole political and
personal being found its home. A Federal Union, in short, must
depend for its permanence, not on the sentiment but on the
reason of its citizens. If circumstances remain as they were at
the time of its formation, if the particular degree of union which
it secures is found to be practically better than either closer

Inet \ union or more complete independence, a Federal Government

Circum-
stances
under
which it
may be
useful as
a Transi-
tional
state.

Cases for
Consolida-
tion.

Cases for

Separa-
tion, A

may well be as permanent as any other. If circumstances
change, if it be found that either consolidation or separation is
desirable, then the Federal Union, essentially a compromise, may
be found to have worked well as a system of transition. Let us
suppose that the members of a Federal Union, by long connexion
and familiarity, by the habit of united action for many import-
ant purposes, have at last formed the desire for a still more
complete union. To turn a Federation into a Consolidated state
will be found at least as easy as to unite a group of isolated
atoms into a Federation. The several States have already dele-
gated a large portion of their rights to a common Government of
their own choosing; all that is needed is to go a step further,
and to .invest that common Government with rights more ex-
tensive still, Let us take the other alternative. Let us suppose
that the union of a number of weak states has given to each a
power and prosperity which it never could have obtained alone ;
that, under the wing of the central power, its childhood has
grown up into maturity, and its weakness has developed into
strength. The several States may feel that they are able to go
alone, that the Union, which once strengthened, now only restrains
them. In such a case the impulse towards complete indepen-
dence would probably be irresistible. Such a separation would
in a certain sense prove the weakness of the Federal tie; in
another sense it would prove that there was strength in its very
weakness. Or let us take the case which has actually happened.
Let us not suppose a general disruption, a dissolution of the
whole Union into independent atoms; let us suppose that,
through circumstances unforeseen when the League was founded,

1 RIGHT AND WRONG OF SECESSION 89

certain parts of the Union have ceased to have that community

of feeling and interest with certain other parts which it is essen-

tial that the members of a Federal body should have with each
other. Here too the weakness of the Federal tie may be said to

come in. In either of these cases, the idea of secession will pre-

sent itself more readily, and the idea can be more easily carried

out, than can happen when one portion of a consolidated

state feels itself aggrieved by the common Government. When-

ever the tendency in a Federation runs towards separation, the Easiness ot
tendency will be almost irresistible. The amount of political inde- separation
pendence retained by the several States is so great that it may both ἡ eoded.
lead them to aspire to, and actually make them capable of, an
independence still more complete. Each citizen will always enter-

tain a warmer and more immediate patriotic feeling for his own

State than he entertains for the Whole Union. If he think that his

own State is wronged by the Union, the idea of its perfect inde-
pendence is one which may easily occur. And if the idea does
occur, it will be found far more easy to carry out into practice

than similar schemes of secession could be under any other form

of Government. The secession of an English county or of a
French department is something too ludicrous to think of. To

say nothing of the inherent absurdity of the wish, to say nothing

of the certainty of the rebellion being at once crushed, the new
commonwealth would be utterly helpless. It has no political
traditions apart from the whole country, it has no form of local ,
government which it can at once convert into a sovereign power.

But the American State has already a Governor and a Legis-
lature on exactly the same model as the President and Congress

of the whole Union. The Governor and Legislature already
possess very large political powers; in the older States they

are actually institutions of more ancient date than the Federal
Government itself. It needs no great stretch of imagination to
invest with greater powers a Government which possesses such

large powers already, and for the State to enter alone upon the
general stage of the world, to commission Ambassadors and to

levy armies on its own account. So to do is, always in legal
theory, sometimes in sober historic truth, only to fall back on

the state of things when as yet the Sovereign State had ceded

no portion of its powers to the Federal Union. This facility of Easiness of
Secession is what is meant when the weakness of the Federal tie Separation.
is spoken of. But in truth it may be doubted whether this very side.

Why it is
easier to
secede from
a Federa-
tion than
from a
Consoli-
dated
State.

90 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — cuap.

weakness may not bring with it some incidental advantages. At
any rate a plausible case may be made out in favour of this
facility of Secession. Rebellion is sometimes necessary, and
Secession is certainly the mildest form that Rebellion can take.
For, beyond all doubt, Secession is, legally and formally, Re-
bellion. The Federal Union is essentially a perpetual union; a
Federal Constitution cannot, any more than any other constitu-
tion, contain provisions for its own dissolution. The Federal
power is entitled to full obedience within its own sphere, and
the refusal of that obedience, whether by States or by indi-
viduals, is essentially an act of Rebellion. It does not at all
follow that such rebellion is necessarily either wrong or inex-
pedient ; but it does follow that Secession is not an every-day
right to be exercised at pleasure. A seceding State may be fully
justified in seceding ; but to justify its secession it ought to be
provided with at least as good a case as the original States had
for their secession from the Crown of Great Britain. Granting
therefore that separation between members of a Federation will
be sometimes expedient, surely a system which supplies the
means of a peaceable divorce is not without its good side. It is,
on every ground, far easier to secede from a Federation than
from a Consolidated State. Some reasons I have already given.
In the case of a Kingdom, a feeling will often come in which,
unreasonable as it is, is none the less powerful for being un-
reasonable. In many men’s minds loyalty is simply a blind
attachment to a person or to a family, not a rational conviction
of the duty of obedience to all lawful authority. To such minds
the most reasonable rebellion against a King will seem a far more
heinous crime than the most unreasonable rebellion against a Re-
public. Again, Kings, whether despotic or constitutional, and
Consolidated Republics too, can seldom indeed be got to give upa
single inch of their territories, except by force. The supposed
honour and the supposed interest of the Monarch require that, if
he does not extend, he at least should not diminish, the boundaries
of the realm which he has inherited. And nations have such a
way of identifying themselves with their Kings that popular
feeling will, in such cases, run for a long time in the same
current with royal feeling. Every wise English statesman dis-
liked the American War; but to George the Third on the one
hand, and to the mass of Englishmen on the other, the honour
of England seemed to require the recovery of the revolted

iW EXAMPLE OF AMERICA 91

colonies. The experience of Federal States on this point is not

very extensive. But the reason of the case would lead us to

expect that the members of a League from which one or more
members have seceded would be less anxious to retain them, at

all events less ready to make great sacrifices to retain them by

force, than either a monarch or his subjécts will be to recover

a revolted province. Every Englishman thought his personal Proba-
honour involved in the reconquest of Delhi; it does not seem so ee fhat
directly to concern a citizen of New York whether South Carolina tion will
is, or is not, a member of the same Federal body as his own be less
State! The War in the United States has not yet lasted a year j
and a half?; it has hitherto been chequered by victories and kingdom
defeats on both sides, and, after all, the real difficulty on the to recover
part of the North is not to win battles or to capture towns, but revolted
to occupy, that is, to conquer in any practical sense, the whole
of so vast a territory.? It still remains to be seen whether the

people of the Northern States will be ready to endure so pro-

longed a struggle for the forcible reduction of their revolted
brethren, as Spain or even as England endured for the forcible
reduction of their revolted dependencies. It is dangerous to

try to prophesy, but one cannot help thinking that the United

States and the Confederate States will have exchanged Ambas-

sadors before the year 1941 or even before the year 1869.‘
Besides the physical difficulties of conquering a large country,

besides the difficulty of seeing what interest the conquerors have

in the conquest, there is the absurdity of the process of conquest

itself. A Federation, though legally perpetual, is something

which is in its own nature essentially voluntary : there is a sort

of inconsistency in retaining members against their will. What Incon-

is to be done with them when they are conquered? They can Sitency of

: striving to
hardly be made subjects of the other States; are they then to retain”
unwilling
1 Of course the question of geographical possibility is here of great importance, Members.
If Kentucky or Tennessee had seceded all by itself, without the support of any
other State, the thing would have been as ridiculous as a secession of North-
amptonshire, and the nuisance would have been abated by the combined forces
of the whole Union. But the secession of Maine or of Florida would not have so
clearly touched the interests of other parts of the Federation.
2 July, 1862.
3 This is forcibly put in Mr. Spence’s Seventh Chapter.
* The Dutch War of Independence began in 1568 ; the Thirteen Years’ Truce
was concluded in 1609, but the independence of the United Provinces was not
formally recognized by Spain till 1648. Our own American War lasted eight
years, 1775-88.

Example
of Switzer-
land.

92 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cHap.

---...-.-- --.- --. -------ο-. --...-. -..

be compelled at the point of the bayonet to recognize their
conquerors as brethren, and to send, under the penalties of
treason, unwilling Senators and Representatives to Washing-
ton? Kither alternative is utterly repugnant to the first
principles of a Federal Union. Surely the remedy is worse
than the disease. The revolted State, as a foreign power,
may become a friendly neighbour; as an unwilling Con-
federate, it will simply be a source of internal dissension
and confusion. A State will hardly think of Secession as
long as it is its manifest interest to remain in the Union.
When it ceases to be its manifest interest to remain, there
may at least be grave doubts as to either the justice or
the expediency of retaining it by force. The Achaian League
was weakened, indeed we may say that it finally perished,
by nothing so much as by the attempt to retain members in the
Confederation against their will.

The truth is that the disruption of the United States has
been mainly owing to their unparalleled prosperity. In that
boundless continent, with no neighbour at once able and willing
to contend with them on equal terms, Secession has been pos-
sible. No despot stands at either end of the Union ready to
swallow up each seceding State as soon as it loses the protection
of its neighbours. Federalism cannot be said to have been found
wanting, where it has not been really tried. What a Federal
union really can do when it is tried is best seen by another
example. From America let us turn our eyes to Switzerland.
The territory of the Swiss Confederation is, both in a military
and a political point of view, one of the most important in
Europe. Lying between the two great despotisms of France
and Austria, it is above all things needful that it should be held
by a free and an united people. But disunion seems stamped
upon the soil by the very hand of nature, no less than on the
soil of Hellas itself. Every valley seems to ask for its own
separate commonwealth. The land, small as it is, is inhabited
by men of different races, different languages, different religions,
different stages of society. Four languages are spoken within
the narrow compass of the League. Religious and political dis-
sensions have been so strong as more than once to have led to
civil war. How are such a people to be kept united among
themselves, so as to guard their mountains and valleys against
all invaders? I need hardly stop to show that the citadel of

ΤΙ EXAMPLE OF SWITZERLAND 93

Europe could not be safely entrusted to twenty-two wholly inde- Perfect
pendent Republics or to twenty-two wholly independent princes. *eParation
But would consolidation answer the purpose? Shall we give them fect bon-
the stereotyped blessing of a hereditary King, a responsible solidation
Ministry, an elected and a nominated House of Parliament 1 Slike im-
Or shall we, by way of variety, give them some neatly planned poseible.
scheme of a Republic one and indivisible? Such a Kingdom,

such a Republic, would but present, on a smaller scale, much

such a spectacle as the Empires of Austria and Turkey. The
Burgundian and the Italian provinces would rebel against a
dominant German government, and would fly for support to

their neighbours of kindred speech beyond the limits of the
Kingdom. France would soon become to Vaud what Piedmont

has been to the Italian provinces of Austria, what Russia has

been to the Slavonic provinces of Turkey. The Federal relation

has solved the problem. Under the Federal system, the Catholic The
and the Protestant, the aristocrat and the democrat, the citizen problem
of Bern and the mountaineer of Uri,—the Swabian of Ziirich, δ Federal
the Lombard of Ticino, the Burgundian of Geneva, the speakers Constita-
of the unknown tongues of the Rhextian valleys—all can meet #2.
side by side as free and equal Confederates. They can retain

their local independence, their local diversities, nay, if they will,

their local jealousies and hatreds, and yet they can stand forth,

in all external matters, as one united nation, all of whose mem-

bers are at once ready to man their mountain rampart the
moment that the slightest foreign aggression is committed on

any one of their brethren. The Federal system, in short, has

here, out of the most discordant ethnological, political, and re-

ligious elements, raised up an artificial nation, full of as true and

heroic national feeling as ever animated any people of the most
unmixed blood. An American State can secede, if it pleases:

no Swiss Canton will ever desert the protection of its brethren,
because it knows that Secession, instead of meaning increased
independence, would mean only immediate annexation by the
nearest despot. If any one is tempted to draw shallow infer-

ences against Federalism in general from mistaken views of one

single example, he may at once correct his error by looking at

that nearer Federation which has weathered so many internal

and external storms. No part of my task will be more
delightful or. more instructive than to trace the history

of that glorious League, from the day when the Austrian a.p. 1815.

A.D. 1860.

Recapitu-
lation.

94 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cuap. 11

invader first felt the might of freedom at Morgarten to the
day when a baser and more treacherous despotism still, in
defiance of plighted faith and of the public Law of Europe,
planted the vultures of Paris upon the neutral shores of the
Lake of Geneva.

I have thus gone through the comparison which I designed

_between the two opposite poles of political being, and that

ingenious and nicely-balanced system which is intermediate
between the two. I have compared the small City-Common-
wealth, the great Monarchy or Consolidated Republic, and the
Federal Union, whether of single Cities or of considerable States.
I have pointed out the inherent advantages and disadvantages
of the three systems, and the circumstances under which each
is preferable to the others. I now draw near to my main
subject, to show the practical working of the Federal principle
as it is exemplified in the history of the Federal Governments
of the Ancient, the Medizval, and the Modern world.

CHAPTER III
OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL

BEFORE entering on that great developement of the Federal
principle which marks the last age of independent Greece, it
will be well to speak somewhat more briefly of certain less
perfect approaches to a Federal system, which may be seen in
the earlier days of Grecian history, and of which the noble
work of Aratos was doubtless ina great measure a conscious
improvement. And, first of all, it will be needful to say a
few words as to an error which is now pretty well exploded,
but which was of early date and which once had a wide currency.
Many philosophical speculators on government have been led
into great mistakes by the idea that Greece itself, as a whole,
and not merely particular Grecian states, ought to be ranked
as an instance of Federal union.

The body which has been often mistaken for a Federal The Am-

Council of Greece is the famous Council of the Amphiktyons phiktyonte
Counci

at Delphi. Probably no one capable of writing upon the ots true
subject can have been so wholly ignorant of the whole bearing Federal
of Grecian history as to take the Amphiktyonic League for a Covern-
perfect Federal union after the Achaian or American pattern. τὸ
But it is easy to understand how such a body as the Amphiktyons
may have been mistaken for a Federal Diet of the looser kind.
It is certain that Dionysios,! pretty clear that Strabo,? not
unlikely that Cicero,®? supposed the Amphiktyonic Council to

1 iv. 25. He goes on, in his usual style, to say how Servius Tullius founded
the Latin League in imitation of the Amphiktyons. Now the Latin League,
though probably not a perfect Federal Government, has a fair right to be classed
among close approaches to the Federal idea.

* ix. 3,7. Strabo speaks of the League as consisting of πόλεις, Pausanias,
(x. 8. 2) more accurately of γένη Strabo’s expressions, περὶ τῶν κοινῶν
βονλευσόμενον and δίκας Scai πόλεσι πρὸς πόλεις εἰσί, go far beyond the facts of

the case.
2 The often quoted expression of Cicero, ‘‘ Amphictyones, id est, commune

Origin of
the Error.

Opinions
of Modern
Writers.

96 . OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL CHAP.

have been invested with far more extensive powers than it
ever possessed, at all events during the best days of Greece.
The error on their part was natural: the later history of in-
dependent Greece was conspicuously a history of Federalism ;
and it was easy to carry back the political ideas of the times
with which they were most familiar into days in which those
ideas were most certainly unknown. And indeed there seems
some reason to believe that the Amphiktyonic body had, in
the age of Strabo, really put on something more like the out-
ward shape of a true Federal body than it had ever worn in
the age of Démosthenés. From the later Greek and Latin
writers the error naturally spread to modern scholars. In days
when all “the classics” were held to be of equal value and
authority, and when it was hardly yet discerned that all “the
classics” were not contemporary with each other, men did not
see how little the descriptions of Strabo and Pausanias, even
though backed by an incidental allusion of Cicero, were really
worth, when weighed against the emphatic silence of Thucydidés,
Aristotle, and Polybios. And in truth modern scholars, writing
under the influence of political and historical theories, have

-often pressed the words of Strabo, Pausanias, and Cicero, far

beyond anything that Strabo, Pausanias, or Cicero ever meant.
The writers of the last century seem to have looked upon the
Amphiktyonic League as a real political union of the Greek
nation, and they sometimes highly extol the political wisdom
of the authors of so wise a system.! In a like spirit, the
accidental and fluctuating supremacy of a single Bretwalda over
the several Old-English kingdoms was, by writers of the same
age, often supposed to be the deliberate result of calculations
no less far-searching than those which are attributed to Amphi-
ktyén the son of Deukalién.* The true nature of the Amphi-
ktyonic League was, as far as I know, first clearly set forth by

Grecie Concilium’—an expression, by the way, which in a certain sense, is
quite defensible—is a mere obiter dictum (De Inv. Rhet. ii. 23), and may or may
not express Cicero’s deliberate judgement, From Cicero’s words, Raleigh doubtless
got his phrase, ‘‘the Council of the Amphyctiones, or the General Estates of
Greece.” Hist. of the World, Part I. Book 4, Cap. i. 8 4.

1 Compare the first two Chapters of Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, Book ix.
He mentions the Amphiktyons but once, but he clearly has them in his mind
throughout. On the other hand see the strictures on the supposed constitution
of the League in the ‘‘ Federalist,” No. xviii. p. 91.

2 Rapin (Hist. d’Ang. i. 189) gravely discusses the Bretwaldadom at some
length, and compares the Bretwalda to the Dutch Stadtholder.

mx THE AMPHIKTYONS NOT A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 97

Sainte Croix, in his, for the time, really valuable work on old
Greek Federalism.1_ The work of Tittmann on the Amphiktyonic
League” is somewhat retrograde after that of Sainte Croix. It
is needless to say that in the works of our own great country-
men, in the histories of Thirlwall and of Grote, no traces of the
error can be discerned. The old notions as to the nature of
the Amphiktyonic Council and the relations of the Greek states
to one another may now be set down as an exploded mistake,®
a mistake arising partly from ignorance of the true nature of
Federal Government, partly from inability to distinguish between
the different degrees of authority to be allowed to different Greek
and Latin writers.

The Amphiktyonic Council then, there can be no doubt, was The _
in no wise an instance of Federal Government, even in the very Council 8

laxest sense of the word. It was not a political, but a religious Relig οὐδ,

body. If it had any claim to the title of a General Council‘ of Political
Greece, it was wholly in the sense in which we speak of General Body.

1 Des Anciens Gouvernemens Fédératifs, Paris, an vii.

2 Ueber den Bund der Amphiktyonen. Berlin, 1812.

3 No scholar of {recent times has attempted to revive it, except Colonel Mure,
in a pamphlet (National Criticism in 1858, p. 22) which that distinguished
scholar probably regretted before he died. It is no disrespect to Colonel Mure,
whose studies, most valuable in their own line, did not lie in a strictly historical
direction, to say that he clearly had no idea what a Federal Government really
is. Some of the particular arguments are very weak, and the Colonel does not
seem to have seen how far the silence of Thucydidés outweighs the speech of a
thousand Plutarchs or Dionysii. He refers us to the description of the Amphi-
ktyons by Tacitus (Ann. iv. 14) as ‘‘ quis precipuum fuit rerum omnium judicium,
qua tempestate Greci, conditis per Asiam urbibus, ore maris potiebantur.”
Undoubtedly Tacitus, as Colonel Mure says, is ‘‘an author not accustomed to
speak at random,” but his obiter dictum is really not decisive as to the mythical
ages of Greece. Colonel Mure goes on to say that the Amphiktyons erased the
boastfal inscription of Pausanias. This is on the authority of an oration
attributed to Démosthenés, but generally looked on as spurious (c. Neer. § 128),
while Thucydidés (i. 182) makes the erasure the act of the Lacedemonians them-
selves. That Themistoklés (Plut. Them. 20) opposed the proposal to deprive the
medizing Greeks of their Amphiktyonic franchise, is very probable, but it does
not go the least way towards showing that the Amphiktyons were, in any sense,
a Federal Government.

4 Xschinés (Ktes. § 58) has the expressions κοινοῦ cuvedplov τῶν Ἑλλήνων
and afterwards Ἑλληνικοῦ συνεδρίου. The latter phrase, as it stands in the
context, referring to Philip’s admission to the Amphiktyonic body, certainly
proves nothing. Nor does the former, which is quoted by Tittmann (p. 62),
prove very much. Tittmann also quotes the Amphiktyonic decree in Démosthenés
(De Cor. § 198) where the Amphiktyons call themselves τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων
συνέδριον. Of these expressions one comes from Aéschinés, who is well disposed
to magnify Amphiktyonic rights, and whose language is never imitated by

H

The

Delphic
Amphi-
ktyony

98 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL CHAP.

Councils in Modern Europe. The Amphiktyonic Council re-
presented Greece as an Ecclesiastical Synod represented Western
Christendom, not as a Swiss Diet or an American Congress
represents the Federation of which it is the common legislature.
Its primary business was to regulate the concerns of the temple
of Apollo at Delphi. And the Amphiktyonic Council which
met at Delphi and at Thermopyle was in truth only the most

only one of famous of several bodies of the same kind. An Amphiktyonic,

several,

Incidental
Political
Functions
of the
Council.

or, more correctly, an Amphiktionic,! body was an Assembly of
the tribes who dwelt around any famous temple gathered together
to manage the affairs of that temple. There were other Amphi-
ktyonic Assemblies in Greece, amongst which that of the isle
of Kalaureia,? off the coast of Argolis, was a body of some
celebrity. The Amphiktyons of Delphi obtained greater im-
portance than any other Amphiktyons only because of the greater
importance of the Delphic sanctuary, and because it incidentally
happened that the greater part of the Greek nation had some
kind of representation among them. But that body could not
be looked upon as a perfect representation of the Greek nation
which, to postpone other objections to its constitution, found
no place for so large a fraction of the Hellenic body as the
Arkadians. Still the Amphiktyons of Delphi undoubtedly
came nearer than any other existing body to the character of
a general representation of all Greece. It is therefore easy to
understand how the religious functions of such a body might
incidentally assume a political character. Thus the old Amphi-
ktyonic oath® forbade certain extreme measures of hostility
against any city sharing in the common Amphiktyonic worship.
Here we get on that mixed ground between spiritual and

Démosthenés, who so profanely talks of ἡ ἐν Δελφοῖς σκιά. The other comes from
the Amphiktyons themselves, who certainly never had more occasion to magnify
their office, than in the decree by which they invited Philip into Greece. Yet
even they directly afterwards qualify the strong expression by the words ol
Έλληνες of μετέχοντες τοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν ᾿Αμφικτυόνων. All those expressions,
like those of Herodotos to be presently quoted, hardly amount to more than the
name Ἑλληνοτάμιαι, as applied to certain officers, not of a Hellenic Federation,
but of the Athenian Confederacy.

1 The derivation from ἀμφικτίονες, quoted by Pausanias (x. 8) from Androtién,
is now generally received. Indeed the spelling AMPIKTIONEZ occurs on the
Amphiktyonic coinage at Delphi.

2 Strabo, lib. viii. c. 6,14. Ἂν δὲ καὶ ᾿Αμφικτυονία ris περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦτο,
ἑπτὰ πόλεων, αἱ μετεῖχον τῆς θυσίας, κιτιλ, This gives the original idea of an
Amphiktyony.

3 Xsch. Fals, Leg. § 115.

αν. a “που συκδαὶ, κι...

ΠῚ πε INCIDENTAL POLITICAL ACTION 99

temporal things on which Ecclesiastical Councils have often
appeared with more honour to themselves than in matters more
strictly within their own competence. The Amphiktyonic
Council forbade any Amphiktyonic city to be razed or its
water to be cut off, with as good an intention, and with about
as much effect, as Christian Synods instituted the Truce of God,
and forbade tournaments! and the use of the cross-bow. But,
more than this, the Amphiktyonic Council was the only delibera-
tive body in which members from most parts of Greece habitually
met together. On the few occasions when it was needed that
Greece should speak with a common voice, the Amphiktyonic
Council was the natural, indeed the only possible, mouth-piece
of the nation. Once or twice then, in the course of Grecian
history, we do find the Amphiktyonic body acting with real
dignity in the name of United Greece. We naturally find this Instances
more distinctly the case immediately after the repulse of the οὕ ἀπ
. . ς . phiktyonic
Persians, when a common Greek national feeling existed for action,
the moment in greater strength than either before or afterwards.
Then it was that the Amphiktyonic Council, evidently acting
in the name of all Greece, set a price upon the head of the
Greek who had betrayed the defenders of Thermopyle to the sc. 479.
Barbarians.” But, in setting a price on the head of Ephialtés,
the Amphiktyonic Council, as head of Greece, hardly did more
than was done by the Athenian Assembly, if not as the head
of Greece, yet as its worthiest representative, when it proscribed
Arthmios of Zeleia for bringing barbaric bribes into Hellas.®
Sometimes again we find, naturally enough, this great religious Amphi-
Synod, like religious Synods in later times, preaching Crusades ktyonic
ς 1: ΜΝ . . Crusades.
against ungodly and sacrilegious cities, against violators of the
holy ground or of the peaceful worshippers of Apollo. And,
whatever we may think of the pious zeal of A‘schinés against 3.0. 340.
the Lokrians of Amphissa,4 we may at least fairly believe that
the first sacred war under Solén® was a real Crusade, carried 5.0. 595.
1 As at the Second Lateran Council. See Roger of Wendover, ii. 400, Eng.
Hist, Ed.
2 Herod. vii. 214 (so 218). Οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων Πυλαγόροι ἐπεκήρυξαν .. . ἀργύριον.
Professor Rawlinson, in his Translation of Herodotos, strangely strengthens the
words of the historian into the “ deputies of the Greeks, the Pylagore.”
3 Xsch. Ktes. § 258. It is a favourite common-place with the orators.
4 Asch. Ktes. § 118 et seqq. Thirlwall, vi. 80.
5 Plut. Sol. 11. Asch. Ktes. § 108. In later times (B.c. 281) we find a

Crusade against AStolia led by the Spartan King Areus (Justin, xxiv. 1) on the
same ground as this of Solén, namely the sacrilegious cultivation of the plain of

The
Council
becomes
the tool of
particular
States.

No inhe-
rent force
in its
Decrees.

B.c, 371.
B.c. $82,

100 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL CHAP.

on with as distinct a sense of religious duty as ever sent forth
Godfrey or Saint Lewis or our own glorious Edward. At other
times the Amphiktyonic Council, just like other religious Councils,
does not escape the danger of being perverted to purely temporal
purposes. Nothing is easier than to see that the Amphiktyonic
Council, in the days of Philip, had sunk into a mere political
tool in the hands first of Thebes, then of Macedonia.1 And in
all cases, whether the sentences of the Council were just or
unjust, whether they were dictated by religious faith or by
political subserviency, the Amphiktyonic body had no constitu-
tional means at its command for carrying them into execution.
The spiritual tribunal had no temporal power; culprits had to
be delivered to the secular arm, and the secular arm had to be
looked for wherever it might be found. If no pious city like
Thebes, no pious prince like Philip, undertook to act as the
minister and champion of the Council, an Amphiktyonic judge-
ment had no more inherent force than the judgement of a
modern Ecclesiastical Synod. Sparta, the most devout wor-
shipper of Apollo, took no heed to the Amphiktyonic fine which
Theban influence procured as the punishment of the treacherous
seizure of the Kadmeia by Phoibidas.2 So did Philomélos and
his successors in Phékis resist both anathemas and armies, till

Kirrha. But I do not see the evidence for asserting, as is done by Droysen
(Hellenismus, i. 645) and by Mr. P. Smith (Dict. Biog. art. Areus) that this was
in consequence of a formal Amphiktyonic decree. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 53. There
is an intermediate Sacred War (B.c. 449. See Thuc. i, 112) in which the
Amphiktyons are not spoken of at all.

1 There seems however no ground for believing that the Amphiktyons took
upon themselves to elect Alexander as chief of Greece against Persia. The
statement of Dioddros to that effect (xvii. 4) is, I suspect, a confusion, most
characteristic of Diodéros, with Philip's appointment as chief of the Amphiktyonic
Crusades. Both Philip and Alexander were chosen, so far as they were chosen
at all, by the Congress of the Confederate Greeks at Corinth (Arrian, i. 1. Diod.
u.s.). Diodéros is however followed by Mr. Whiston in the Dictionary of
Antiquities, p. 81, and even by Mr. Grote (xii. 15). But Droysen seems to me
to see the state of the case much more clearly. ‘Aber so diirftig war diess
einzige Analogon einer verfassungsmassigen Nationaleinigung [the Delphic
Amphiktyony] dass Philipp selbst die neue Form eines Bundes in Korinth
versucht hatte, die Nation oder die nachsten Kreise derselben zu einigen.”
Hellenismus, ii. 503. Droysen’s strong Macedonian bias must however be guarded
against, just like the strong anti- Macedonian bias of Mr. Grote.

2 On this see the remarks of Mr. Grote, x. 275 et seqq. It marks the progress
of vagueness and misconception that Diodéros, in recording the Theban accusa-
tion of Sparta (xvi. 28, 29), merely uses the words ἐς ᾿Αμφικτύονας ἐν ᾿Αμφικτυόσι,
which in Justin (viii. 1) have grown into “commune Grecie concilium ”’—the
phrase of Cicero without his explanation.

ee ee ae ὁ

ΠῚ ITS INDIRECT IMPORTANCE IN FEDERAL HISTCRY Ὧι

the clear eye and strong hand of Philip saw and grasped his
opportunity at once to avenge Apollo and to make his kingdom

Greek and himself the leader of Greece. Otherwise a bull from

Delphi or Thermopylae could have done as little to stay the 8.0. 357-
march of Onomarchos as bulls from the Vatican, unsupported 34°

by the arm of the French invader, could do in our own day to

stay the march of the first chosen King of Italy.

But though the Amphiktyonic Council was in no sense a
Federal Government, its importance in a History of Federal
Government is of a high order. The negative bearings of the Indirect
existence of such a body can hardly be overrated. Nothing 'mport
proves so completely how dear to the Greek mind was the Council
system of distinct and independent cities ; nothing shows more in the
clearly how little the. minds of early Greek statesmen turned History of
towards a Federal Union of the whole or of any large portion ;,,.
of Greece ; nothing therefore shows more clearly how great was
the work which was accomplished by the Greek statesmen of
a later age. If the thought of a Federal Union of Greece had
ever occurred, if the need of such an Union had ever been
felt, the Amphiktyonic Council afforded materials out of which
it might readily have been developed. As we find the ancient
commonwealths coming to the very edge of a representative
system, and yet never really establishing one, so we here Close
find Greece coming to the very edge of a Federal system, and approach
yet never crossing the limit. A body of Greeks, including council to
members from nearly all parts of Greece, habitually met to a Federal
debate on matters interesting to the whole Greek nation, and S7#e™-
to put forth decrees which, within their proper sphere, the
whole Greek nation respected. The wonder is that, with such
a body existing, the idea of a Federal Union never presented
itself ; that no one ever thought of investing the Amphiktyonic
body with much more extensive powers to be exercised for the
common good of Greece. _ No more speaking witness can be Why it
found to the love of town-autonomy inherent in the Greek inte neoad
mind than the fact that no such developement of the Amphikty- Federal
onic body was, as far as we know, ever thought of. Perhaps, Union.
besides the love of town-autonomy, the constitution of the
Council, so eminently unfair as a representation of historical
Greece, may have had something to do with the fact that its
proper functions were always kept within such narrow limits.

But one difficulty which modern parallels may perhaps suggest

The
Council
an Eccle-
siastical,
but not a
Clerical
body.

Special
Objections
to the
develope-
ment of a
Federal
System
out of the
Council.

ν

“Φ > os a "
.

Σν Ὁ φοδτ ὁ Δ τον: ὈΕ ΦΉΒ AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL 6. cap.

would not have occurred in this hypothetical transformation
of the Delphic Amphiktyony into a real Federal Diet of Greece.
The Amphiktyonic Council undoubtedly answers in its functions
to the Ecclesiastical Synods of modern times; but to have
made the Amphiktyonic Council the sovereign Assembly of
Greece would have been quite a different process from investing
the Convocation of Canterbury with the immediate sovereignty
of England or an Cicumenical Council of the Church with the
Federal sovereignty of Europe. We must always remember
that in the ancient world the distinction of Clergy and Laity
did not exist. There were spiritual offices and there were
temporal offices, but there was no distinct spiritual order of
men. The Amphiktyons were a religious body, but they were
not a clerical body. The Council, after the manner of Greek
Councils, had a larger Assembly attached to it, and this
Assembly was of the most popular, not to say the most
tumultuous, kind, consisting indiscriminately of all Greeks who
might happen to be at Delphi to sacrifice or to consult the
Oracle! But even the members of the Council itself, the
Hieromnémones and the Pylagoroi, possessed no permanent
spiritual character. They appeared at Delphi and at Pyle as
the servants of Apollo; elsewhere they appeared as statesmen,
soldiers, or private citizens. They were therefore just as
competent or incompetent as any other body of Greeks to
undertake the management of the general affairs of Greece.
Their immediate functions as Amphiktyons were not secular
but religious ; but those occasional functions in no way implied
that their holders were personally or permanently isolated from
common temporal affairs.

But besides the general indisposition of the Greek mind to
permanent union of any kind, there were some special causes
why the Amphiktyonic Council was never developed into a
Federal Union. It is true that deputies from most parts of
Greece were in the habit of meeting together and of discussing
questions, often perhaps trifling in themselves, but still questions
in which the whole of Greece was interested. Here was indeed
the raw material for constructing a Federal Union, had any
Greek felt the want of one. But the constitution of the Council
was such that, before it could have been safely invested with
the smallest political power, the most sweeping of Reform Bills

1 Xsch. Ktes. § 124.

ΠῚ CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNCIL 108

would have been needed for its reconstruction. Its composition

was of a kind which made it a most unfair representation of
historical Greece. Historical Greece was, above all things, «
system of Cities. The Amphiktyonic Union was an Union not Its con-
of Cities but of Tribes. This alone, as Mr. Grote remarks,} stim to
shows the immense antiquity of the institution. Any League historical
which had arisen, we might almost say from the time of Homer Greece.
onwards, could hardly fail to have been a League. of Cities.

Any institution which had arisen since the time of the Dorian
Migration could hardly fail in some way to represent the results

of that great event. But though the list of members of the
Council is given with some slight variations 3 by different authors,

all agree in making the constituent members of the Union Tribes

and not Cities. The representatives of the Ionic and Doric A Union
races sat and voted as single members, side by side with of Tres
the representatives of petty peoples like the Magnésians and Cities
Phthidtic Achaians. When the Council was first founded,
Dorians and Ionians were doubtless mere tribes of Northern
Greece, of no more account than their fellows, and the pro-
digious developement of the Doric and Ionic races in after times

made no difference in its constitution. How the vote of each

race was determined is an obscure point of Greek archeology ὃ

which hardly bears on our immediate subject. What is im-
portant for our present point of view is that Sparta and Athens,

as such, were not members of the Amphiktyonic body. They

were simply portions respectively of the Doric and Ionic aggre-

gates, and they had legally no more weight than the smallest

Doric or Ionic city. The wish of the whole Doric race, the

wish of the whole Ionic race, nay, the common wish, if we

can conceive such a thing, of Sparta and Athens and their
respective followings of Allies, might be at any moment set Unfair dis-
aside by the votes of three or four petty tribes, some of which tabation

1 Hist. of Greece, vol. ii. p. 325, 7. Votes.

2 The several lists are discussed at some length by Tittmann (p. 35), whose
conclusions are followed by Mr. Grote (ii. 825). They differ chiefly in the
enumeration of the insignificant tribes of Northern Greece. The omission by
Pausanias of the Beotians, a people so specially mentioned by Mschinés (Fals.
Leg. § 122), must be an error.

3 Cf. Grote, u.s. Strabo (ix. 3. 7) says that Akrisios settled the vote of
each city, ψῆφον ἑκάστῃ δοῦναι, τῇ μὲν καθ' αὑτὴν, τῇ δὲ ped’ ἑτέρας, ἣ μετὰ
πλειόνων. We shall presently come to reasons for thinking that this system of
Contributory Boroughs belonged only to the latest form of the institution.

4 Misch. Fals. Leg. § 122.

104 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL CHAP.

were not even independent political communities. Perrhaibians,
Magnésians, Phthiétic Achaians, had ceased to be independent
states before the beginning of the historical days of Greece.
They had sunk into mere subjects of the Thessalians, and their
deputies in the Council must have voted as their Thessalian
masters bade them. Viewed as a political representation of
historic Greece, the Amphiktyonic Council was something even
more anomalous than was the British Parliament in its un-
reformed state, when viewed as a representation of the British
Analogy people. The presence of Gatton and Old Sarum, the absence
ofthe of Manchester and Birmingham, the two votes of Liverpool
formed 2nd the four votes of East and West Looe, all had their perfect
Parlia- ὀ precedents in the constitution of the venerable body which met
ment. at Delphi and Thermopyle. Or rather the defects of the
Amphiktyonic system must have been practically by far the
greater of the two. English rotten boroughs have at least
often been the means of introducing into Parliament some of
its most distinguished members, but it could only have been
the deputies of these little insignificant tribes who gained for
the whole body the contemptuous description given of it by
Démosthenés.! But ina purely religious Assembly these in-
congruities were probably not found so intolerable as they
assuredly would have been found in an Assembly exercising
Incon- real political power. The very anomalies were consecrated by
gruities .the traditional reverence of centuries. The very points in the
Religious constitution of the Council which made it so unfit for political
body. action, made it only more venerable when looked at as a holy
representative of past ages. What if certain tribes had sank
from independence to bondage? Statesmen might indeed, in
their earthly policy, regard such merely political changes, but
misfortune, without guilt, could not degrade any faithful
worshipper of Apollo in the presence of his patron God. The
zeal and piety of Athens and Sparta were not more fervent,
doubtless they were far less fervent, than the zeal and piety
of the little communities around the Temple, whose whole

1 Dem. Cor. § 190. ᾿Ανθρώπους ἀπείρους λόγων καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ wpoopw-
μένους, τοὺς ἱερομνήμονας. Or are we to infer that the Hieromnémones were an
inferior body to the Pylagoroi? As Aischinés was one of the latter, we may
infer that the greater members of the Amphiktyony sent deputies, in that
capacity at least, who would not deserve the description. But in any case, the
majority of both orders would come from the petty tribes, and would doubtless
be what Démosthenés describes,

ΠῚ ITS UNFAIR DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES 105

importance was derived from their share in its management.

The God of Delphi was no respecter of persons; he looked

with equal favour on the devotion of the weakest and of the

most powerful worshipper. A change in the constitution of

the Council would probably have been looked upon by the

mass of Greeks as a heinous sacrilege. But, while such a
constitution existed, the Council was unfit for political power,

and, whenever it did meddle with political matters, its inter-
ference was invariably mischievous. Any power which could
command the votes of the little tribes about Mount Oita could
procure whatever decisions it chose in the Amphiktyonic body.

Philip, the common foe of Greece, was welcomed by the
Amphiktyons as a deliverer, a true servant of Apollo, a pious B.o. 352.
Crusader against the usurping and sacrilegious Phékian. It Amphi-
is not improbable that! many of the smaller Greek cities may Ktyouic _
really have shared, from shortsighted political motives, in this ship of
ill-timed goodwill to the Macedonian. But this only shows Philip.
the more clearly the utter unfitness of the Council to act ‘in

any way as a political mouth-piece of Greece. When Démos-

thenés had united Thebes and Athens in one common cause,

the union of those two great cities did not command a single
integral vote in the Amphiktyonic Council.

It is certainly very remarkable that, long after the Council
had ceased to be of any importance whatever, many of the
defects in its constitution should have been reformed. Pausanias ἢ
describes the Council as it stood in his time, when, under the
Roman dominion, the debates of the Amphiktyons must have
been of considerably less moment than the debates of an English
Convocation. Some at least of the changes which he mentions Reforms
he attributes to the legislative mind of Augustus Cesar. The under st
Council, in this its later form, became at last, in a great degree, 5 ¢° 3]_
a representation of Cities, when Greece had no more independent a.p. 14.
Cities to represent. An attempt too was made, after the happy
precedent set by the wise confederation of Lykia,® to do what in
modern political language is called apportioning members to
population. In the old state of things the Dolopians, Magnésians,
Ainians, ani Phthidtic Achaians had formed a large proportion

' FAtiaburgh Review, vol. cv. p. 319 (April, 1857).
7 4. 4, δ.
' The Lykian League will be described in the next chapter.

B.c. 346.

New ar-
rangement
of votes
in the
Council.

106 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL CHAP.

of the Council. Now they lost their separate Amphiktyonic
being ; the Dolopians indeed had ceased to exist altogether ;! the
other tribes were made what we may call Contributory Boroughs
to Thessaly. The votes thus saved were divided among several
new and several restored members. The Phékians had, at the
end of the Sacred War, lost their Amphiktyonic votes, which
were transferred to Macedonia, as the due reward of Philip’s
Crusade in the cause of Apollo. In the new constitution
Augustus found room both for Phékians and Macedonians, as
well as for the inhabitants of his own new city of Nikopolis.
Delphi, Athens, Euboia, now appear as substantive members.
The two Lokrian votes were divided between the two divisions
of the Lokrian nation. ‘The Dorian votes, in like sort, were
divided between the original Dorians of the North and the
Dorians of Peloponnésos, that is to say those of Corinth, Sikyé6n,
Argos, and Megara; for Sparta, which shared in the exclusion
of Phékis, does not seem to have shared in its restoration. The
whole number of votes was raised to thirty, and, instead of each
constituency, as before, possessing two votes, the votes were now
distributed among the members of the League in various pro-
portions ranging from one to six.? Three of the members,
Nikopolis, Athens, and Delphi, were single cities, and these, it is
expressly said,’ sent representatives to every meeting. The other
constituencies were still not cities but races ; their Amphiktyonic

1 Paus. u.s. Ov γὰρ ἔτι ἣν Δολόπων γένος.
2 The whole scheme is as follows :—
Nikopolis
Macedonia .
Thessaly (with Malians, Ainians, Mognésians, and
Phthidtic Achsians)
Beeotia
Phokis
Delphi
Northern Doris
Ozolian Lokrians
Epiknémidian Lokrians
Euboia. .
Argos, Sikyon, | Corinth, and ἃ Megara .
Athens .

3 Paus. u.s. Al μὲν δὴ πόλεις ᾿Αθῆναι καὶ Δελφοὶ καὶ ἡ Νικάπολις, αὗται μὲν
ἀποστέλλουσι συνεδρεύσοντας ἐς dudixruovlay πᾶσαν᾽ ἀπὸ δὲ ἔξ wy τῶν κατειλεγ-
μένων ἑκάστῃ πόλει ἀνὰ μέρος ἐς ᾿Αμφικτύονας καὶ ἐν χρόνον πειιῤὺ τ συντελεῖν ἔστιν.

ΣΙ REFORM UNDER AUGUSTUS 107

representatives were to be chosen by the several cities of the
race inturn. Thus the vote of the Peloponnesian Dorians would
be given in successive years by a Corinthian, a Sikyénian, a
Megarian, and an Argive,! while every meeting contained one
member for Athens, two for Delphi, and six for Nikopolis. Most
of the cities in short were in the same position as the counties
of Nairn and Cromarty 3 before the Reform Bill, when they sent
a member between them who was elected in alternate Parlia-
ments by Nairn and by Cromarty. This account of Pausanias
is well worth studying, as setting before us a very curious piece
of amateur constitution-making. Had the Amphiktyonic body
in the days of Augustus still retained any practical functions to
discharge, its constitution, as settled by the Imperial reformer,
would seem to be by no means unhappily put together. The
Council was not indeed a representation of the whole of Greece,
but neither had it ever been so in earlier times. It still gave
an undue advantage to the North over the South ; but something
might be said for this in the case of a confederacy founded to
manage the concerns of a Northern temple. We must also
remember how completely Athens and Sparta had fallen from
the position which they held in the days with which most of us
are almost exclusively familiar. The weakest points of the
Augustan charter are the enormous number of votes given to the
new city of Nikopolis and the very scanty amount of repre-
sentatives allowed to the Dorians of Peloponnésos. Still, after
all allowances, the new constitution of the Council was certainly
ἃ great improvement upon the old one. But possibly it was
only because of the utter nullity of the Amphiktyonic body that
any such constitution was bestowed upon it. The founder of the
Empire could well allow so harmless a safety-valve to carry off
the last feeble ebullitions of Hellenic freedom. While the firm

1 It would seem that disputes sometimes arose among the contributory cities
about their Amphiktyonic rights. At least in an inscription in Boeckh’s Collec-
tion, No. 1121 (vol. i. p. 578), a certain Archenoos of Argos is praised for having,
among his other good deeds, recovered the Amphiktyonic rights of his native
city —perd τὸ ἀνασῶσαι αὐτὸν τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ᾿Αμφικτνονείας τῇ πατρίδι. Another
inscription (1124) commemorates an Argeian Amphiktyon named Titus Statilius
Timokratés, the son of Lamprios—a curious illustration of ‘Greece under the
Romans ;"’ Titus being doubtless an Argeian who had obtained Roman citizenship.
Another hybrid of the same sort, Caius Curtius Proklos, is commemorated, in
another inscription (No. 1058, vol. i. p. 559) as a Megarian Amphiktyon.

? Besides these, the counties Bute and Caithness (a strangely chosen pair), and
Clackmannan and Kinross also elected alternately.

Approach
to Repre-
sentative
forms

in the
Council.

The
Council
not a
Govern-
ment, but
a mere
Union

for a
particular
purpose.

108 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL CHAP.

grasp of Roman Governors was pressed tight upon the provinces
of Macedonia and Achaia, their inhabitants might safely be per-
mitted to play either at Town-Autonomy or at Federal Govern-
ment beneath the sacred shadow of the Delphian Temple.

It can hardly fail to have been observed that the Amphi-
ktyonic Council, both in its earlier and its later forms, makes
a far nearer approach to the forms of Representative Govern-
ment than anything which we find elsewhere in ancient Greece,
whether in the constitutions of Federations or in those of single
cities. In every Greek Government, as we cannot too constantly
bear in mind, every qualified citizen was entitled to take his
personal share and did not delegate his mghts to another. No
Greek city, no Greek Federation, presents an example of a real
Representative Assembly. But the Amphiktyonic Council is
strictly a Representative body; in discussing its nature, it is
impossible to avoid introducing the language which we familiarly
employ in speaking of modern Representative bodies. It may
indeed be said that, after all, the Amphiktyonic Council was
merely a Senate, and that, in conformity with universal Greek
precedent, there was an Amphiktyonic Popular Assembly, in
which every worshipper of Apollo had a right to appear. But
it is clear that the Amphiktyonic Council filled a much more
exalted position in relation to the Amphiktyonic Assembly than
the Athenian Senate, for instance, did in relation to the Athenian
Assembly. In the Amphiktyonic Constitution it is the Council
which is really the important body, and the Council is certainly
representative. Buta really representative Senate would be just
as great an anomaly in an ordinary Greek constitution as a
representative Assembly. The real reason why we find repre-
sentative forms in the Amphiktyonic body, while we do not find
them in ordinary Greek Governments, is that the Amphiktyonic
body was in no sense a Government at all. The Amphiktyonic
Council was not exactly a Diplomatic Congress, but it was much
more like a Diplomatic Congress than it was like the governing
Assembly of any commonwealth, kingdom, or Federation. The
Pylagoroi and Hieromnémones were not exactly Ambassadors,
but they were much more like Ambassadors than they were like
Members of a British Parliament or even an American Congress.
The business of the Council was not to govern or to legislate,
either for a single state or for a League of states; its duty was

ΠῚ REPRESENTATIVE NATURE OF THE COUNCIL 109

simply to manage a single class of affairs, in which a number of
independent commonwealths were alike interested, but which

did not come within the individual competence of any one of

their number. It is manifest that this could only be done by
deputies from the several states interested, that is by repre-
sentatives. The nearest approach to the Amphiktyonic Council

in modern times would be if the College of Cardinals were to

consist of members chosen by the several Roman Catholic nations

of Europe and America. Such a body would be entrusted with
business in which every Roman Catholic country is interested,

but it would not form a Federal or even necessarily a local
Government. The Amphiktyons were the guardians of the
Delphic Temple, but they no more formed a local Government

for the city of Delphi than they formed a Federal Government

for the whole of Greece. The Council was representative, just The Am-
because it was not a Government, though again we may, if we phiktyonic
please, wonder that the employment of representative forms in representa -
the Council did not suggest the employment of representative tive, be-
forms in the Federal, if not in the City, Governments of Greece. 8088 “
In like manner it σε ἃ be a very interesting subject of inquiry Govern.
whether, from a similar set of causes, representative forms, or a ment.
close approach to them, did not exist in Ecclesiastical Synods

much earlier than they did in Secular Parliaments, and whether

the founders of the representative system in modern Europe may

not, consciously or unconsciously, have had ideas suggested to

them by the constitution of the Assemblies of the Church.

It belongs rather to a historian of Greece than to a historian
of Federal Government to run through the whole evidence which
80 conspicuously shows the political nullity of the Amphiktyonic
body during the best days of Greece. This has been amply
done, to say nothing of the earlier work of Sainte Croix, both
by Bishop Thirlwall and Mr. Grote. The Amphiktyonic Council Political
is of no moment in the world of Thucydidés, it is of no moment ne?
in the world of Xenophon, it is of no moment in the world of Connell
Polybios. Its short and mischievous importance belongs wholly during the
to the days of Démosthenés and Philip. Thucydidés never once grotter
mentions it, though he has often occasion to mention the Delphian Bian
Temple, to record stipulations for its management, and at least History.

one war for its possession.! It is clear that, in his time, the
1 The Sacred War in Bo. 449. Thuc. i. 112. See above, p. 99.

110 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL CHAP.

Council so far from holding any Federal] authority over the
general affairs of Greece, was not even independent in its own
proper sphere of religious duty. And if we find it playing an
important part in the days of Démosthenés and Philip, the
difference is simply because Sparta and Athens, in the previous
century, had not thought it worthy of any notice at all, while
now first Thebes and then Philip found that even the Shadow at
Delphi was capable of being made useful asa political tool. The
Politics of Aristotle contain no mention of it. Polybios speaks
of it twice,! neither time in a way implying any sort of Federal
power. The mistake of looking at the Amphiktyonic body as a
Federal union of Greece arose only in times when freedom in all
its forms, Federal or otherwise, had utterly passed away from
the soil of Greece. Yet the Amphiktyonic Council is an institu-
tion of no small importance in a general history of Federal
Government. What it was and what it was not, shows more
speakingly than anything else how utterly alien to the Greek
mind, in the days before Macedonian domination, was anything
like a Federal Union of the whole nation or even the most
remote approach to it.”

1 The first time (iv. 25) the Amphiktyons are simply mentioned in their proper
character as guardians of the Delphic Temple. In this duty they had been inter-
fered with by the Atolians, and Macedonia, Achaia, and the other allied powers,
agree to effect their restoration. The second passage (xl. 6) is very curious
indeed ; it seems to set the Amphiktyons before us, not as a political, but as a
literary body, a view which certainly did not occur to Démosthenés. Aulus
Postumius wrote a book in Greek, and asked to be excused if, being a foreigner,
he made mistakes in language. Cato tells him that if the Amphiktyonic Council
had set him to write in Greek (εἰ μὲν yap αὐτῷ τὸ τῶν ᾿Αμφικτυόνων συνέδριον
συνέταττε γράφειν ἱστορίαν), his excuse would have been a good one; but as
nobody obliged him to write in Greek or to write at all, he had no excuse if he
wrote badly. This story is also told by Plutarch, Cato Maj. 12. It reminds one
of Jeffrey’s criticism on Byron: ‘‘If any suit could be brought against Lord
Byron, for the purpose of compelling him to put into court a certain quantity of
poetry,” etc. Edin. Rev. Jan. 1808.

2 On this subject of the Amphiktyonic Council, the eighteenth number of the
‘* Federalist’ should by all means be read. It is clear that the authors, Madi-
son and Hamilton, had not the least notion of the true nature of the institution,
but it is most curious to see the strong political sagacity of the authors struggling
with their utter ignorance of facts. They were politicians enough to see the utter
political nullity of the Council in Grecian history ; they were not scholars enough
to see that it never really pretended to any character from which anything but
political nullity could be expected. Some of the particular comments and illus-
trations are most ingenious, I shall have again to refer to this curious paper
when I come to speak of the remarks of the same writers on the Federal consti-
tution of Achaia.

M. de Tocqueville also seems to have misunderstood the nature of the Am-

ΤΙΣ POLITICAL NULLITY OF THE COUNCIL 111

phiktyonic Council. He compares (i. 266) the position of Philip as executor
of the Amphiktyonic decrees with the preponderance of the Province of Holland
in the Dutch Confederation. Philip’s position was really a great deal more like
that of his French namesake when he undertook, by commission from Pope
Innocent, to wrest the Kingdom of England from the sacrilegious John. Tocque-|
ville’s English translator does not point out the error.

Still more recently an example of the same sort of union of political shrewd-
ness with utter lack of historical knowledge is to be found in Mr. Spence’s work
on the American Union, a book not indeed to be compared with the writings of
Hamilton or Tocqueville, but abounding in keen observation of facts and in sound
inferences from those facts. But Mr. Spence’s remarks on the Amphiktyonic
Council and the Achaian League (pp. 7, 8) are merely Hamilton served up again.
Of Aitolia, Lykia, and even Switzerland, he seems never to have heard. Mr.
Spence too is without Hamilton's excuse ; if he could not read Polybios, he might
at least have read Thirlwall.

An ap-
proach to
Federal
Govern-
ment not
uncommon
among the
ruder por-
tions of
the Greek
nation.

CHAPTER IV
OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE

§ 1. Of the Northern Leagues. Phékis, Akarnania, Epeiros,
Thessaly

I HAVE already remarked that the greatest and most civilized
states of Greece were precisely those which clave most strenu-
ously to the principle of distinct town-autonomy. The approaches
to Federal Government which we find in the earlier history of
Greece appear only among the more backward portions of the
nation ; and, as we know but little of the details of their several
constitutions, we can derive from them comparatively little
knowledge bearing on our general subject. In fact some sort of
approach to a Federal Union must have been rather common
than otherwise in those parts of Greece in which the city-system
was never fully developed.!_ In a considerable portion of Greece
the cities seem to have been of comparatively little consequence ;
particular cities and their citizens are seldom mentioned ; we far
more commonly hear of the district and its inhabitants as a collec-
tive whole. Such seems to have been the case with the Lokrians,
the Northern Dorians, and, so far as they can be said to have
had any political existence at all, with those other little tribes of
which we scarcely hear except as returning so disproportionate
a share of members to the Amphiktyonic Council. The whole
tribe is spoken of as if it had some sort of political unity; yet
they certainly were not monarchies, and we do not hear of the
domination of any single city. There must have been a common
power of some kind, and yet it would be hardest of all to believe
that whole tribes formed indivisible republics, and that the

1 “The system of federation existed everywhere in the early state of society,
and Achaia was ripe for its renewal at a later period, because no one town had
so outgrown the others as to aspire to become the capital of the whole country.”
Arnold’s Life, i, 273.

σι

ιν EARLY FEDERALISM IN NORTHERN GREECE 118

villages or small towns whose inhabitants made up the tribe had

no separate political existence at all. Some rude form of Feder-

alism can hardly fail to have existed among them. Among other -
tribes, as the Phékians and Akarnanians, we have distinct evi-

dence that some sort of Federal Union really did exist. But of

the details of their constitutions we know nothing; we have

at best only a few scraps belonging to later times, when the
examples of Achaia and Attolia had given such an impulse to

the Federal principle everywhere. Of the Phékian League The
nearly all our knowledge! comes from an incidental mention of ΤΒΟΕΙΑΝ
Pausanias, who describes the building, the Phékikon, where the
Federal body used to assemble. But the traveller is much

more anxious to describe the pillars and statues which adorned

the place of meeting than to give us any information as to the
constitution of the League itself. We gather however from his
account that the Phékikon did not stand in any town ; possibly the
Phékians may have taken warning by the example of their Beeotian
neighbours. We also gather that these meetings at the Phékikon,

like so many other old Greek institutions, preserved their nominal
existence down even to the days of Pausanias. As to the date

of the Phékian Union, when we remember the utter destruction 8.6. 846.
of the Phékian towns after the Sacred War, it is clear that the
League spoken of by Pausanias must have been an institution of

a later age than the time of Philip. _ Indeed as all Phékis was, 3.0. 196.
for a short time, incorporated with A®tolia, and as all Greek sic. 146.
Leagues were for a while dissolved by the Romans,’ the mimic
League of Pausanias’ times must have been actually established

since the days of Mummius. But it would probably reproduce

the forms of the constitution as they stood in the great Federal

period of Greece. And this League again, like the Achaian Probably
League itself, was probably ‘only a revival of an older union, *7evival
so that what Pausanias saw may well have been the shadow of earlier

League.
1 In this chapter I am chiefly concerned with the constitution and the earlier “en
history of the several Minor Leagues. Their history during the great Federal
period of Greece I reserve, like that of the Achaian League itself, for my more
strictly historical chapters.

3 Paus. x. 5,1. ‘Es δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ Δελφῶν εὐθεῖαν ἀναστρέψαντι ἐκ Δαυλέδος,
καὶ ἰόντι ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσω, ἔστιν οἰκοδόμημα ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τῆς ὁδοῦ καλούμενον Φωκικὸν,
ἐς ὃ ἀπὸ ἑκάστης πόλεως συνιᾶσιν οἱ Φωκεῖς. Cf. Drumann, Geschichte des Ver-
falls der griechischen Staaten, p. 436.

There is a pleasing simplicity in the notion of suddenly coming upon the seat
of a Federal Government by the roadside.

3 See below, at the end of the next section.

I

B.C. 859--
346,

The AKAR-
NANIAN
LEAGUE,

Earlier
Notices.

114 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cHap.

the state of things which existed before the ascendency of
Philomélos. The Phékians are always spoken of as a substan-
tive whole ;1 we hear of embassies? being sent, and business
in general being transacted, in the name of the whole Phokian
body. Philomélos and his successors were chiefs, tyrants, or
whatever we choose to call them, not of this or that city, but
of the whole Phékian people? Yet the Phékians had numer-
ous cities, as more than twenty were destroyed after the
Sacred War. It seems necessarily to follow that some sort
of Federal Union had always existed in Phékis, and, as we
hear of no dominant or presiding city, the Phékian League
was probably a better devised political machine than the far
more famous League of Bootia.

Of the Akarnanian League, formed by one of the least import-
ant, but at the same time one of the most estimable‘ peoples in
Greece, we know a little more than of that of Phdkis, but
still our knowledge is only fragmentary. The boundaries of
Akarnania fluctuated, but we always find the people spoken of
as a political whole. We pick upa few details from Thucydidés,
Xenophén, Polybios, and Livy, and we know that Aristotle
treated of the Akarnanian constitution in that great political
collection, the loss of which is one of the greatest of all the
losses which the historical student has to mourn. The single
fragment however which has been preserved ὃ unhappily contains
no political information. We gather from the incidental notices
in Thucydidés that, in his time, Akarnania, or at least the great
mass of the Akarnanian towns, already formed a Federal body of
some kind. The Akarnanians are constantly spoken of as acting
with one will, and forming one political whole. Yet their union,
just as we shall find in the earlier. days of the Achaian Union,

1 Dem. Fals. Leg. 92. Ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Φωκέων.

2 Xen. Hell. vi. 1,1. Ol Φωκεῖς ἐπρέσβευον els τὴν Λακεδαίμονα.

3 Diod. xvi. 23. Ὁ Φιλόμηλος, μέγιστον ἔχων ἐν τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν ἀξίωμα, διε-
λέχθη τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι. Ib. 24. τῶν δὲ Φωκέων ἑλομένων αὐτὸν [Φιλόμηλον] στρατ-
ηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα. Cf. Thirlwall, v. 333. Tittmann, Staateverfassungen, p. 709.

4 Pol. iv. 30. ᾿Αλλά μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ γνήσιοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ Kar’
ἰδίαν οὐδέποτε περὶ πλείονος οὐδὲν ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ καθήκοντος ὅπερ ᾿Ακαρνᾶνες ἐν
τοῖς πλείστοις καιροῖς οὐδενὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἧττον εὑρίσκονται διατετηρηκότες,
x.7.\. The Akarnanians must have improved since the days of Thucydides, who
describes the Akarnanians, along with the Atolians and Ozolian Lokrians, as
retaining the old barbarous habits of robbery and going always armed.

Thue, i. 5.
δ᾽ Arist. Pol. p. 297, ed. Oxon, 1887.

IV THE AKARNANIAN LEAGUE 115

did not always exclude revolutions and changes of policy in
particular towns. Thus, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian s.c. 481 -
War, the city of Astakos was governed by a Tyrant whom the 429.
Athenians expelled and the Corinthians restored ;1 and the city
of Oiniadai was hostile to Athens, while the rest of Akarnania
was firm in the Athenian alliance. But these instances were
clearly interruptions of an established Federal order of things.
Thucydidés speaks, by implication at least, of the Akarnanian
League as an institution of old standing in his time. The
Akarnanians had, in early times, occupied the hill of Olpai as
a place for judicial proceedings common to the whole nation.®
Thus the Supreme Court of the Akarnanian Union held its
sittings, not in a town, but in a mountain fortress. But in
Thucydidés’ own time Stratos had attained its position as the
greatest city of Akarnania,‘ and probably the Federal Assemblies
were already held there.© In the days of Agésilaos® we find 5.0, 391.
Stratos still more distinctly marked as the place of Federal
meeting. But in after times Akarnania was exposed to the
inroads of the aggressive Attolians, who so far betrayed the
cause of Greek freedom as to join with Alexander the son of
Pyrrhos in an attempt to dismember the Akarnanian Con- 5.0. 272-
federacy.’ Stratos at length became a permanent A‘tolian 289.
possession, and, in the later days of Akarnanian freedom, Leukas Later
appears to have taken its place as the ordinary seat of the Notices.
Federal Government,® till Leukas too was lost after the Third s.c. 197.
Macedonian War. At the same time, meetings were at least 5.0, 167.
occasionally held at other places, as Polybios® records one held
in the city of Thourion or Thyrion before the separation of go. 169.
Leukas from the League.

Of the constitution of the League we know but little.
Ambassadors were sent by the Federal body,’® and probably, just

1 Thue, ii. 30, 33. 3 Ib. 102.

8 Thue. iii. 105. Ὄλκας, τεῖχος ἐπὶ λόφον ἰσχυρὸν πρὸς τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὅ ποτε
᾿Ακαρνᾶνες τειχισάμενοι κοινῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἐχρῶντο. See Tittmann, p. 729.

4 Thue. ii. 80. ᾿Αφικνοῦνταί τε ἐπὶ Στρατὸν, πόλιν μεγίστην τῆς ᾿Ακαρνανίας,
νομίζοντες, εἰ ταύτην λάβοιεν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν σφίσι τὰ ἄλλα προσχωρήσειν.

5 See Dict. Anc. Geog. art. Acarnania.

’ Xen. Eel. iv. 6, 4. Πέμψας els Στρατὸν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ᾿Ακαρνάνων.

8 Liv. ‘uxxiil. 17. Leucade hac [sunt decreta. Id caput Acarnanim erat,
eoque in concilium omnes populi conveniebant. So xxxvi. 11.

® Pol. xxxviii. 5.
10 Pol, ix. 832. Παραγενόμεθα μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν ᾿Ακαρνάνων ἁπεστα = war

πρὸς buds.

im
=]

Constitu-
tion of the
League.

The
EPEIROT
LEAGUE.

B.C. 429.

116 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cmap.

as in the Achaian League, it would have been held to be a
breach of the Federal tie if any single city had entered on
diplomatic intercourse with other powers. As in Achaia too,
there stood at the head of the League a General with high
authority... We know not whether this was an ancient
Akarnanian institution, or whether it were introduced in later
times in imitation of the Achaian or A‘tolian system. What
little more we know of the constitution of the League is derived
from an inscription found at Aktion,? the subject of which is the
honours conferred by the Akarnanian body on two Romans
named Publius and Lucius Acilius. This inscription incidentally
tells us of the existence of a Senate and Assembly, according
to the common Greek model, of a Priest of the Aktian Apollo,
who seems to have been regarded as a Federal magistrate,
of a Secretary of State,‘ and of three other magistrates 5 whose
functions are not explained. “The General is not mentioned.
Possibly the office may have been abolished under the Roman
dominion, or it may have been usual to date the years, not by
the Generals, but by the Priests of Apollo. So, at Athens,
years were reckoned not by the effective magistracy of the Ten
Generals, but by the almost honorary magistracy of the Archon.
The existence of coins bearing the name of the whole Akarnanian
nation shows that there was unity enough to admit of a Federal
coinage, though coins of particular cities also occur.

There seems every reason to believe that these Phékian and
Akarnanian constitutions were fairly entitled to the name of
Federal Governments in the stricter sense. The difficulty is to
decide how far the strict Federal form really dated from an early
period, and how far it was introduced in after-times in imitation
of the great Achaian model. We may be also pretty certain that
something similar was the constitution of Epeiros in those later
times when the old half-barbarian Molossian Kingdom had taken
its place as a Greek Republic. As early as the Peloponnesian War
the Chaonians and Thesprétians had adopted republican forms.®

1 Pol. v. 6. Ἧκεν ἔχων ᾿Αριστόφαντος ὁ στρατηγὸς πανδημεὶ τοὺς ᾿Ακαρνᾶνας.

Liv. xxxvi. 11. Clytum pretorem, penes quem tum summa potestas erat.
2 Rose, Inscriptt. Greece. p. 282.

s ἔδοξε τᾷ βούλᾳ καὶ τῷ κοινῷ τῶν ᾿Ακαρνάνων.

4 ἐπὶ γραμμάτεος τᾷ βούλᾳ Προίτου. ὃ A προμνάμων and two συμπρομνάμονες.

6 Aristotle (Pol. 807) found the constitution of Epeiros, or at any rate of
Thesprétis, worthy of a place in his great collection, no small honour for a half
barbarian state. (Cf. Blakesley on Herodotos, v. 92, 7’.]

Iv THE EPEIROT LEAGUE 117

The Chaonians were in a state of political developement Early Re-
of which both Greece and Italy afford examples in the course pupcan
of the transition from monarchy to democracy. Two annual τορι a
magistrates, whose title is unknown, were chosen out of a single Chaonia
ruling family.1 So at Athens the Archons were for a long time and ahes-
chosen exclusively out of the old royal house. So, if we believe?”
the conjectures of Niebuhr, the Tarquinii? at one time and the
Fabii® at another had a right, legal or prescriptive, to have one
of the Roman Consuls chosen from among them. The Molossians, Constitu-
on the other hand, were governed by Kings, but they were Kings Monarchy
of heroic Greek blood, and constitutional monarchy must have jn Mo.
made some advances among them. The hereditary principle was lossis.
so firmly established that a Regent could be trusted to act for a 5.0. 429.
minor King.* On the other hand, the Molossian King met his
people in their National Assembly at Passarén, where the King
swore to govern according to the Law, and the People swore to
preserve his Kingdom to him according to the Law. The
temporary greatness of the Molossian Kingdom under Alexander 3.0. 350-
and Pyrrhos is matter of general history. Our immediate 2/2.
business is with the republican government which succeeded on
the bloody extinction of royalty and the royal line. Epeiros 8.0. 289-
now became a Republic ; of the details of its constitution we 229:
know nothing, but its form can hardly fail to have been Federal.®
The Epeirots formed one political body ; Polybios always speaks Federal
of them, like the Achaians and Akarnanians, as one people acting ΑΝ
with one Μ01}}.7 Decrees are passed, Ambassadors are sent and
received, in the name of the whole Epeirot people, and Epeiros
had, like Akarnania, a federal coinage bearing the common name
of the whole nation. Epeiros was, undoubtedly in all its dealings
with other nations, one Republic. But it is hard to see how a

1 Thue. ii. 80. Βάρβαροι δὲ Xdoves χίλιοι ἀβασίλευτοι, ὧν ἡγοῦντο ἐπ᾽ ἐτησίῳ
προστασίᾳ ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους Φώτυος καὶ Νικάνωρ᾽ ἐστρατεύοντο δὲ μετὰ Χαό-
νων καὶ Θεσπρωτοὶ ἀβασίλευτοι. The name Phiétyos in these regions reminds one
of the Souliot hero Phétos Tzabellas.

2 Niebuhr, Hist. Rom. i. 509, Eng. Tr. 3 Ib. ii. 179 et seqq.

* Thuc. ii. 80. Μολοσσοὺς δὲ ἦγε καὶ ᾿Ατιντᾶνας Σαβύλινθος ἐπίτροπος ὧν
Θαρύπου τοῦ βασιλέως ἔτι παιδὸς ὄντος.

δ Plut. Pyrrh. 5. Εἰώθεισαν οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐν Πασσαρῶνι, χωρίῳ τῆς Μολοττίδος, °
"Apel At θύσαντες ὁρκωμοτεῖν τοὺς ᾿Ηπειρώτας καὶ ὁρκίζειν, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄρξειν κατὰ
τοὺς νόμους, ἐκείνους δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν διαφυλάξειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους.

6 Colonel Leake (Northern Greece, iv. 181) calls it a‘‘loose federacy of
republics.” I see nothing to lead us to suppose that the Federal tie was looser

in Epeiros than in other contemporary Leagues.
7 (Cf. Pausanias, iv. 85, 3.)

B.C. 204.

Β.σ. 198.

No real
Federalism,
in THES-
SALY.

Position
and Power
of the
Thessalian
Tagos.

118 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE = cuHap.

Republic, unless it assumed the Federal form, could have
embraced so large a country, one which included many cities,!
and several tribes which in earlier days had been quite distinct.
The Federal form too was then in its full prevalence among the
Grecian states, and was that which a newly-founded Republic
would most naturally adopt.2, Of the Epeirot magistrates we
find no distinct mention in Polybios ; one passage in Livy ὃ im-
plies the existence of three Generals, and it has been ingeniously
suggested ‘ that they represented the three tribes of Molossians,
Chaonians, and Thesprétians. But another passage in the same
author® seems to imply a single General, and a subordinate
Commander of Cavalry. Possibly between the two transactions
referred to, a constitutional change may have taken place in
Epeiros, similar to one which we shall have hereafter to consider
in the Achaian League, and one chief magistrate may have been
substituted for three.

Phékis, Akarnania, and Epeiros may thus be set down as
having enjoyed real Federal Governments. Thessaly, on the
other hand, though a loose connexion sometimes existed among
its several cities, cannot be looked upon as having at any time
attained to the true Federal system. There may have been
some feeble approaches to it in earlier times,® and after the
battle of Kynoskephalai, an imitation of the Achaian constitu-
tion seems to have been set up under Roman auspices.’ But,
throughout the time of Greek independence, Thessaly was but
seldom united as one political whole, and whenever it was 80
united, it was always merely through common subjection to a
single man. The Tagos of Thessaly was not a King, because his
office was not hereditary or even permanent; neither was he
exactly a Tyrant, because his office had some sort of legal

1 Seventy were destroyed by L. Zmilius Paullus, p.c. 168. Liv. xlv. 34.

4 See Schorn, Geschichte Griechenlands, p. 87, and, more at large, Droys¢h’s
Hellenismus, ii. 432, 433. Cf. Tittmann, 730 et seqq.

3 Liv. xxix. 12. Phcenice urbs est Epiri ; ibi prius collocutus Rex [Philippus]
cum Aeropo et Darda et Philippo Epirotarum Pretoribus, postea cum P. Sein-
pronio congreditur. Affuit colloquio Amynander Athamanum Rex et Magistratus
alii Epirotarum et Acarnanum.

These magistrates conclude a peace, so they probably were Plenipotentiaries
from the Assembly.

4 See Droysen and Schorn, u.s.

δ Liv. xxxii. 10. Pausanias Pretor et Alexander Magister Equitum

® Niebuhr, Kleine Schriften, i. 248. Tittmann, 713 et seqq.
7 Ib. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 361.

Iv NO TRUE FEDERALISM IN THESSALY 119

sanction.! But it came much nearer to the character either of a

King or of a Tyrant than to that of a Federal President like the

General of the Achaians. The Tagos, a citizen of one, Thes-

salian city, exercised over all Thessaly a supremacy hardly to be
distinguished from kingship,* a supremacy to which other cities
submitted with reluctance,? and to which they were sometimes
constrained to yield by force of arms. Nor do we hear of any-

thing like a Federal Council or of any other check upon the

power of the Tagos, when he was once appointed. Jas6n of Monarchy
Pherai acts throughout like a King, and his will seems at least as °f Jas6n.
uncontrolled as that of his brother sovereign beyond the Kam-
bounian hills. Even Jasén seems to have been looked upon as z.o. 372-0.
a Tyrant ;° possibly, like the Athenian Démos, he himself did

not refuse the name.’ Certain it is that, after Jas6n’s death, Undis-

the office of Tagos became, under his successors Polyphrén and vised
yranny

Alexander, a Tyranny of the worst kind.? In the next century, of his Suc-
whatever may have been the nominal form of the constitution, cessors.
Thessaly was practically a dependency of Macedonia.® The 360 870-
country indeed retained nominal independence enough to enter —
into treaty-engagements, and to be enumerated in lists of allies
alongside of Achaia and of Macedonia itself.'° But it is clear Thessaly
that the will of the Macedonian Kings was practically undis- 8. depend-

ency of

1 Xen, Hell. vi 1. 18, Ταχὺ δὲ ὁ ᾿Ιάσων ὁμολογουμένως ταγὸς τῶν Θετταλῶν ne
καθειστήκει. Tb. vi. 4, 28. Μέγας μὲν ἣν καὶ διὰ τὸ τῷ νόμῳ Θετταλῶν ᾽ταγὸς αὶ ο, 346—
καθεστάναι. OR

4 Niebuhr, Kl. Sch. u.s. Die Wiirde des Tagus, welche Jason iibertragen 19°:
ward, war eine koénigliche. Cf. Herod. v. 68, where we find a βασιλεύς of
Thessaly, meaning doubtless the Tagos.

3 See the whole speech of Polydamas, Xen. Hell. vi. 1. 4 sqq.

4 Ib. vi. 1, 5. 5 Ib. vi. 1, 18; 4. 29, 80.

6 When Jasin was murdered, the assassins were received with honour in
various Greek cities, on which Xenophén (vi. 4, 32) adds @ καὶ δῆλον ἐγένετο ὅτι
ἰσχυρῶς ἔδεισαν ol Ἕλληνες αὐτὸν μὴ τύραννος γένοιτο.

7 Arist. Pol. iii. 4, ᾿Ιάσων ἔφη πεινῆν, ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὡς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος
ἰδιώτης εἶναι."

8 Xen. Hell. vi. 4, 84. Ὁ δ᾽ αὖ Πολύῴφρων . . . κατεσκευάσατο τὴν ταγείαν
τυραννίδι ὁμοίαν. Ib. 35. ᾿Επεὶ δ᾽ αὐτὸς [᾿Αλέξανδρος] παρέλαβε τὴν ἀρχὴν,
χαλεπὸς μὲν Θετταλοῖς ταγὸς ἐγένετο, κιτιλ. On the tyranny of Alexander, see
Plut. Pel. 26 et seqq.

9 Pol. ix. 28. Φίλιππος. . . οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης πόλεων ἐγένετο κύριος,
ἀλλὰ καὶ Θετταλοὺς ὑφ᾽ αὑτὸν ἐποιήσατο διὰ τὸν φόβον. This seems accurately
to distinguish between the cities of Chalkidiké, directly incorporated with
Macedonia, and those of Thessaly, merely brought under an overwhelming
Macedonian influence.

10 Pol. iv. 9. Ἡ γεγενημένη συμμαχία... ᾿Αχαιοῖς, ᾿Ηπειρώταις, Φωκεῦσι,
Μακεδόσι, Βοιωτοῖς, ᾿Ακαρνᾶσι, Θετταλοῖς.

Legisla-
tion of T,
Quinctius
Flani-
ninus,
B.0. 197.

History
of the
Baorian
LEAGUE ;

its Warn-
ings ;

120 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cHap.

puted, and also that in Thessaly, as elsewhere, their influence
was maintained by the worst of means, by fostering disunion
and disorder of every kind. We know that elsewhere an
efficient Federal system was the thing which they most sedu-
lously discouraged, and no system of the kind is likely to have
existed during the time of their supremacy. Flamininus was a
lawgiver of a better sort; he doubtless sincerely desired to give
both Thessaly and all parts of Greece as much liberty as was
consistent with the dominant interests of Rome. His constitu-
tion at least set free the smaller Thessalian towns from their
previous bondage to the great cities,* but the internal constitu-
tions of the towns were, with the natural instinct of a Roman,
fixed by him on an oligarchic basis. But even a freer and
better system, if dictated by a foreign deliverer, could be of little
value then and of little interest now. There is no sign of any-
thing like real native Federalism in Thessaly, and therefore any
minute examination of Thessalian political antiquities would be
alien to our subject.

§ 2. Of the Beotian League

The political history of Boeotia is of far more importance than
that of Thessaly ; it is, indeed, in an indirect way, one of the
most important portions of the political history of Greece. The
Bootian League was undoubtedly a very ill-arranged political
contrivance; but its history gives us, if only by way of warn-
ing, some of the lessons which are most needful in a general
survey of Federal Government. The fate of the Beotian Con-
federacy is a constant commentary on the dangers which may
arise to a Federal State from the influence of. an overwhelming

.capital. A great capital, even in a consolidated state, has a

Dangers

of an over-,
whelming
Capital in
a Federal
State.

strong tendency to be a great evil; but the existence of such a
capital among a League of republics is more perilous still. A
single great city, standing out prominently above all the others,
is always likely to destroy the true Federal equality, and, in-
stead of remaining a single equal member, to become first the
President, and then the Tyrant, of the League. Of course, a
Federation neither can nor ought, any more than other form of
government, to check the growth and prosperity of any of its

1 Liv. xxxiv. 51. 2 Niebuhr, Kl. Sch. i. 248, 9.
8. See Thirlwall, viii. 361.

Iv THE BQOTIAN LEAGUE 121

—_ - a ee —— —

cities; but it is highly desirable to take such measures as may
secure the League against a disproportionate influence on the
part of any single member. A Federal State will do well to fix

its Seat of Government anywhere rather than in its greatest city.

If a Federal State has a capital, the same dangers at once arise
which even in a consolidated state arise from the influence of
one preponderating city. But in a Federal State they are likely

to assume a yet worse form. In a monarchy the capital has,
after all, no different legal position from that of another town ;

it is invested with no portion of sovereignty, nor is it commonly

in the habit of legal political action. But in a Federal body,

the capital is already a sovereign commonwealth, capable of, and
accustomed to, distinct political action within its own sphere ; it

is therefore far more likely to encroach upon the rights of weaker
members than can be done in a monarchy or an indivisible
republic. Most of the wisest Confederations have avoided this
danger, by having no capital at all, none at least in the same
sense in which Paris or even London is a capital. We have Most Con-
seen Akarnanian Federal Meetings held on an entrenched hill- tedere
top, and Phékian Federal Meetings in a temple by the wayside. HOM δανθ
The Achaian Congress, in the best days of the League, met in a pre-
the insignificant town of Aigion, and afterwards in the several coment
cities in turn. In the Dutch Republic the enormous influence Capi
of Amsterdam was somewhat counterbalanced by the arrange-
ment by which both the Provincial States of Holland and the
States-General of the United Provinces were held, not at Amster-
dam, but at the Hague. So either a wise providence or a most
happy accident has fixed the Seat of Government of the American
Union in a city which is simply the Seat of Government, and
nothing else. One cannot avoid a vague feeling of possible
danger, if the gigantic city of New York were the permanent
dwelling-place of the Federal President and Congress. Happily
New York, like Amsterdam, is not only not the capital of the
United States, it is not even the capital of the State to which it
gives its name. So in Switzerland, the Federal Government till
lately held its sittings in three towns, Bern, Ziirich, and Luzern,

in turn. It is a grave question whether it was a wise arrange-
ment which has fixed the Seat of Government permanently at
Bern. Bern indeed is not the greatest city of Switzerland, but

it is the only one which combines an amount of population and

a geographical position which could allow it to aspire to the

Amphik-
tyony and
a Political
League.

B.c. 519
(Clinton),
ς. 5810
(Grote iv.
222).

124 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE = cHAp.

The history of the Boeotian League naturally falls into three
periods. The first extends from our earliest historical notices
of the country to the first dissolution of the League at the
peace of Antalkidas. The second includes the short but
brilliant period of Theban greatness, down to the conquest
of the city by Philip and its destruction by Alexander.
The third includes the history of Beotia from the destruction
of Thebes by Alexander and its restoration by Kassander down
to the final dissolution of the League ‘by Quintus Marcius
Philippus.

During the first period we find, as early as we can get at
any certain information, the Bootian cities united by both a
religious and a political bond. They formed an Amphiktyony,
and they also formed a Federal Government. Of these two,
one cannot doubt that the religious association existed before
the political League and served as its groundwork. The Beeotian
Amphiktyony held its solemn festival at the temple of the
Iténian Athéné near Koréneia ;! its title was the Pamboidtia,”
a name formed after the same analogy of so many other religious
gatherings of the same kind. How soon this Amphiktyonic
connexion grew into a political union it is hard to say, but
it is clear that the Bootian League was looked on as an
institution of old standing during the Peloponnesian War. It
must both have existed and have been perverted from its
original purpose, before the oppressed Plataians sought for
Athenian help. We may fairly believe that the Federal union
of Boeotia was as old as Federal institutions in any part of
Greece.

The old Boeotian League, as far as its outward forms went,
seems to have been fairly entitled to the name of a Federal
Government, but in its whole history we trace little more
than the gradual advance of Thebes to a practical supremacy
over the other cities. This difference between the theory and

have) has no internal enemies to keep down; Austria is, like Thebes, helpless
from internal dissensions.

1 Paus, ix. 34, 1. Tis ᾿Ιτωνίας ᾿Αθηνᾶς ἐστὶ τὸ ἱερόν" καλεῖται δὲ ἀπὸ
Ἰτώνου τοῦ ᾿Αμφικτύονος. This smaller Amphiktyony is ascribed to ἃ son
of Amphiktyén, as the great one at Delphi to Amphiktyén himself.

2 Strabo, ix. 2, 29. Cf. Pol. iv. 8; ix. 84, for the πανήγυρις of the
Pamboidtians. (The Boidtian Amphictyony used also to meet at Onchéstos.
Strabo, ix. 2,33. ᾿Ογχηστὸς. . .. ὅπου τὸ ᾿Αμφικτυονικὸν συνήγετο. }

IV EARLY SUPREMACY OF THEBES 125

the practice of the Boeotian constitution is curiously illustrated
by the ordinary language both of Thucydidés and of Xenophdn. Use of
Whenever there is anything like a formal mention of the whole the words |
people, in the description for instance of a battle or a negocia- °°"
tion, the word used is “ Bowotian ;” but when the historians “ Theban”
narrate or comment in their own persons on the policy of the by Thucy-
League, the word “Theban” is commonly used instead. Thus conephon.
the whole argument about the fate of Plataia is put by Thucy-
didés into the mouths of “Theban,” not of ‘ Boeotian,” orators,}
just as the first treacherous assault on the town is attributed
wholly to Theban heads and to Theban hands.? But when he
comes to describe the battle of Délion,® and the negociations
after the Peace of Nikias,* he gives to the armies, ambassadors,
and senators their formal title of “ Boeotians.” So Xenophén
attributes to “Theban” politicians the proposal® to destroy
Athens and the receipt of bribes from the Great King,® but
in describing the battles in the Corinthian war,’ he too falls
back upon the technical name “Beeotian.” This usage of
ordinary language exactly expresses the truth of the case.
The League was a Beeotian body animated by a Theban soul ;
the devices of Theban statesmen were habitually carried out by
the hands of Beotian soldiers.®

It is perfectly evident that the Boeotian League had the form
of a real Federal Government. It is equally evident that it .
altogether wanted the true Federal spirit. The common govern- Constitu-
ment was carried on in the name of the whole Bootian nation. tio of the
Its most important magistrates bore the title of Boeotarchs; their το
exact number, whether eleven or thirteen,® is a disputed point
of Greek archeology, or rather of Boeotian geography. For our

1 Thue. iii. 60. Οἱ Θηβαῖοι δείσαντες. . . . ἔλεγον.

2 Thue. ii. 2. Προϊδόντες γὰρ οἱ Θηβαῖοι, x.7.X.

3 Ib. iv. 91. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ. . . ξυνελέγοντο, κ.τ.λ.

* v. 86 οἱ seqq. throughout.

5 Xen. Hell. ii. 2.19. ᾿Αντέλεγον Κορίνθιοι μὲν καὶ Θηβαῖοι. . . . μὴ
σπένδεσθαι ᾿Αθηναίοις ἀλλ᾽ ἐξαιρεῖν.

6 ΤΡ, iii, ὅ, 8. Ol ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις προεστῶτες. . . . πείθουσι Λοκρούς.

7 Ib. iv. 2, 17 et seqq.

8 Tittmann (p. 696) seems to me to under-rate throughout the practical
supremacy of Thebes during our first period.

® Thue. iv. 91. Τῶν ἄλλων βοιωταρχῶν, of εἰσιν Evdexa, ob ξυνεπαινούντων
μάχεσθαι. . . . Παγώνδας ὁ Αἰολάδον, βοιωταρχῶν ἐκ Θηβῶν per’ 'AprarOldou
τοῦ Λυσιμαχίδον, καὶ ἡγεμονίας οὔσης αὐτοῦ, κιτιᾺ. where see Dr. Arnold’s note,
and compare Boeckh, vol. i. p. 727, and Mr. Whiston in Dict. of Antt. art.

SO

Subject
Districts
or Sub-
ordinate

Leagues,

Office of
the Beo-
tarchs.,

126 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cHap.

purpose the number is indifferent; the important point for us
is that Thebes chose two Beotarchs; and each of the other
cities one? The same narrative from which we learn this fact
shows also that, besides the cities which were, in name at least,
sovereign states, Boeotia, like Switzerland in the old time, con-
tained districts which did not enjoy direct Federal rights, but
which were connected, in some subordinate way, with some one
or other of the sovereign cities.2 It may however be doubted
whether these dependencies were, strictly speaking, subject
districts, like the Italian possessions of Uri, or whether Beotia
was not, like the Grisons, a League made up of smaller Leagues.
However this may be, the Boeotarchs, as representatives of the
several Boeotian cities, were the supreme military commanders
of the League,* and, as it would appear, the general adminis-

Beeotarches, [The Beeotarchs are mentioned in Herodotos ix. 15. Ol γὰρ
βοιωτάρχαι μετεπέμψαντο τοὺς προσχώρους τῶν ᾿Ασωπίων.

1 Boeckh (u.s.) explains the second Theban Beotarch to have been the
representative of some town formerly a member of the League, but after-
wards merged in Thebes. This is a highly probable explanation of the origin
of the custom; practically the double Theban Beeotarchy, like the four
members for the City of London, represented the superiority of Thebes to
the other cities.

* Mr. Grote (vi. 528) speaks of the Boeotarchs as consisting of ‘‘two chosen
from Thebes, the rest in unknown proportions by the other cities.” Certainly
Thucydidés does not directly say that there was one Beotarch from each
city, but almost every scholar seems to have taken it for granted (see Hermann,
Pol. Ant. § 179, Eng. Tr.), and it is hard to imagine any arrangement by
which any sovereign city would be left without its Boeotarch. This narrative
of Thucydidés, and another which will presently be referred to, are, as far
as I know, our only authorities for the number and power of the Bootarchs
during this first period of the League. With the Beotarchs of the days of
Epameinéindas we have as yet no concern. (With the position of Thebes
in the Bootian League, compare that of Davos in the Ten Jurisdictions. See
Histoire de la Confédération Suisse (translated from the History of J. von
Miiller and continued), vol. xii. p. 612. Cf. also the privileged position of
Chur in the Gotteshausbund, ib. xiii. 356 ; and the preponderance of the City
of Zug in the canton of Zug, ib. xiv. 226, and Bluntschli, Gesch. des schweiz.
Bundesrechtes, i. 422. ]

8 Thuc. iv. 76. Χαιρώνειαν δὲ, A ἐς ᾿᾽Ορχόμενον . . . . ξυντελεῖ, where see
Arnold’s note. I cannot help thinking that the word ξυντελεῖν implies a greater
degree of freedom in these dependent places than Dr. Arnold allows. See also
Boeckh, i. 728.

4 It may be doubted whether the words ἡγεμονίας οὔσης αὐτοῦ, in the
passage of Thucydidés (iv. 91) quoted above, imply that the supreme command
was always vested in a Theban Beotarch, or whether it was merely the turn
of Pagdndas to command that particular day. It is worth notice that the
Beotian army at that time was not drawn up in any uniform order, but the
troops of each city followed their own customs. The Thebans were twenty-five
deep, the others in different proportions. Thuc. iv. 93.

Iv CONSTITUTION OF THE BQOTIAN LEAGUE 127

trators of Federal affairs. This is the ordinary position of the
military commanders in a Greek state, as we see by the au-
thority possessed by the Ten Generals at Athens, and by the
Federal General of the Achaian League. The Beeotarchs of course Bc. 424.
command at Délion, but they also act as administrative magis- 8.0. 397.
trates of the League by hindering Agésilaos from sacrificing at
Aulis.1 We see something more of their functions in a narrative
of Thucydidés which gives us almost our only glimpse of the
internal working of the Bootian Federal constitution. During
nearly the whole of our first period, the Bootian government
was oligarchic. Just as in Achaia each city had its local
democratic Assembly and the League had its Federal democratic
Assembly, so in Bosotia the Federal Government was oligarchic,
and we cannot doubt that the government of each particular
city was oligarchic also? The supreme power of the League The Four
was vested in the Four Senates of the Bootians® Of the Senate.
constitution of these Senates we know absolutely nothing; but
it is most probable that the division was a local one, and that
the Four Senates represented four districts, If so, it shows
that the Federal bond in Bootia must have been much laxer
than it was in ‘Achaia, and the necessity of consulting several
- Assemblies suggests resemblances between the constitution of
Beeotia and the constitution of the United Provinces. Still
less do we know how four co-ordinate Senates were kept in 8.6. 421.
harmony together; but the only glimpse which we get of

1 Xen. Hell. tii. 4. 4. Ol βοιώταρχοι. . . . πέμψαντες ἱππέας, x.7.X.
This has a military sound, but it was doubtless in strictness a measure of
police.

2 Mr. Whiston (Dict. of Antt.) is doubtless justified by analogy in supposing
that each Beotian city had its own βουλή or Senate, and δῆμος or Popular
Assembly (see Boeckh, i. 729), but the passage which he quotes from Xenophén
hardly proves it (Hell. v. 2. 29). It merely speaks of a Theban βουλή and that
during the time (B.c. 382) when the Confederation was in abeyance. I am not
clear about the existence of Popular Assemblies in the Bootian cities during our
first period. There is, as might be expected, abundant evidence for their ex-
istence in later times, but I doubt whether any of the many inscriptions in
Boeckh, which mention a δῆμος, belong to the days of the old oligarchic

6.

5 Thue. v. 88, Ταῖς τέσσαρσι βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν. . . . αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ
κῦρος €xovow, Tittmann (p. 695) assumes their representative, and denies their
aristocratic, character. The latter at least is clear enough. A Federal δῆμος,
like that of the Achaians, is mentioned in later inscriptions (see Boeckh, i. 728);
but one can hardly fancy its having even a nominal existence earlier than the
revolution of Pelopidas.

Diplo-
matic
Action

of the
Senates
and the
Beotarchs,

Federal
and Local
Archons.

128 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cuap.

them sets them before us as submissive and tractable bodies,
which commonly did little more than register the edicts of the
Beotarchs.! Their constitutional powers seem to have been
something like those of the American Senate; the Bootarchs
propose to them a scheme of a treaty, which it rests with them
to accept or to reject. We may even believe that the Senates
were, on such matters at least, only authorized to consider
proposals made to them by the Bootarchs, and that they had
no initiative voice of their own.* It is clear that the actual
negociation was carried on wholly by the Boeotarchs, just as
it would be by an American President and his Ministry. In
this particular case the Bveotarchs fully expected that the
Senates would have ratified their proposals without examina-
tion or explanation, and they were much surprised at finding
the proposed treaty rejected.* The whole story gives us a
very poor impression of the management of the Beotian Foreign
Office.

Though the Bootarchs were, like the Athenian Generals,
practically the most important officers of the state, yet, like
the Athenian Generals, they did not stand formally at its
head. The nominal chief of the League was a magistrate
called the Archon of the Boeotians,* whose name seems to
have been used as a date even in purely local proceedings
in the several cities.© We also- find local Archons in the
several cities.6 Though many of the inscriptions which
record the names of these Archons are doubtless later than
the Peace of Antalkidas, or even than Kassander’s restoration
of Thebes, still the analogy of other states would lead us to
believe that the Archons, both of the League and of its several
cities, were magistrates of the highest antiquity. Probably

1 Cf. Grote, vii. 84: They must, as Boeckh (i. 728) remarks, have been
assembled in one place.

2 See Arnold’s note on Thue. v. 38,

8 Thuc. ib. Olduevor τὴν βουλὴν, κἂν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἣ
ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν.

4 See the inscription in Boeckh, No. 1594 (vol. i. p. 776). Mr. Whiston
infers from this inscription that the Federal Archon ‘‘ was probably always
a Theban.” As the inscription specially mentions that the particular Archon
commemorated was a Theban, I should have inferred the contrary. This
inscription is of a later date than the restoration by Kassander.

5 See the inscription in Leake’s Northern Greece, ii. 182. Χαροπίνω ἄρχοντος
Βοιωτοῖς, x.7.X.

® See Rose, Inscriptt. Greece. 264 et seqq.

Iv MAGISTRATES OF THE BQOTIAN LEAGUE 129

the Boeotian, like the Athenian, Archon had once been the

real ruler of the state, and had been gradually cut down to

a routine of small duties, sweetened by the honour of giving

his name to the year. Of the particular Archon of Thebes, Theban
Plutarch! records an usage, which, though his mention of it Archon
belongs to a time later than our present date, must surely have p.-cant,
been handed down from very early times. The Theban Archon,

at least in the interval between the occupation of the Kadmeia

by Phoibidas and the delivery of Thebes by Pelopidas, was 5.0. 382-
chosen by ἰοῦ," and kept a sacred spear of office always by 379.
him.* These customs are not likely to have been of recent
introduction ; they savour of high antiquity, and point to the

Archon as a venerable pageant rather than as a magistrate
possessing real authority. He is spoken of, not as a ruler Real power
but as a sacred person, and it is clear, from the whole narrative of the Po-
of Xenophén and Plutarch, that the main powers of the state lem
were then in the hands of Polemarcha.*

Yet, with all this show of good Federal Government, the true
Federal spirit could have had no place in a League where every- Power of
thing was carried on in the selfish interest of a single city. Thebes
What the position of Thebes in the Bootian League really was ates
is shown by the whole history of the brave and unfortunate city tory of
of Plataia. The Plataians set the first recorded example of Plataia.
Secession from a Federal Union. But it was most certainly not Eistaion
Secession without a cause. The Plataians broke through their from the

Federal obligations, they forsook the ancestral laws of all henge, ;

1 De Genio Socratis, 30.

2 10. ὁ κνάμιστος ἄρχων.

8 The sacred spear can hardly fail to have been an institution of the remotest
antiquity, and it points to a time when the Theban Archon, like the Athenian
Polemarch, had really been a military commander. But his appointment by lot
is not likely to have been introduced at Thebes, any more than at Athens, until
the office had become ἃ mere pageant. When an office is disposed of by lot, it is,
as Mr. Grote shows, a sign that the office is no longer thought to require special
qualifications, but is held to be within the compass of an average citizen. The
lot is not necessarily democratic ; as the great equalizer, it is just as likely to be
introduced into an oligarchic body where the feeling of equality among the
members of the ruling order is commonly very strong.

Rotation, as practically adopted in the appointment of the Lord Mayor of
London and of the Vice-Chancellors of the Universities, goes on the same principle
as the lot. It implies that the office requires no special qualifications, but that
one member of the class from whom its occupants are taken is as able to fill it
as another.

* See especially Xen. Hell. v. 2. 80. Τοῦ νόμου κελεύοντος ἐξεῖναι πολεμάρχῳ
λαβεῖν, εἴ τις δοκεῖ ἄξια θανάτου ποιεῖν.

K

{ll-feeling
between
Thebes
and other
Towns.

BAO. 407.
B.C. 423.

Thespia.

130 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE — cnHap.

Boeotia,! but it was because those obligations and those laws
had been perverted into mere instruments of Theban domination.
They found the Theban yoke too hard to bear, and they sought
for aid against the oppressor, first at Sparta and then at Athens.?
Even thus early, Secession from the Boeotian League was looked
on by impartial spectators as a right to be secured against the
overwhelming ascendency of Thebes. The Corinthians, when
called in as mediators, determine that Thebes has no right to
control any city which does not wish to belong to the Beotian
Confederation.® It is clear that language like this would never be
used of any really equal Confederation in any age. If a mediator
were to be called in to settle American differences, the form of
his decree would not be that New York should leave the Con-
federate States undisturbed. That the example of Plataian
secession was not followed by other cities may be partly owing
to geographical causes. No other Boeotian city, except Tanagra,
lay so temptingly near to a powerful protector. And the events
of the Peloponnesian War at once tended to beget a bitter
feeling between Athens and the Bootians generally and to show
how little real help Athens was able to give to a dependency
beyond Mount Kithairén.* But towards the end of the war, we
hear in general terms of strong disaffection towards Thebes on
the part of the smaller cities,° and in one case, even before the
Peace of Nikias, in the very year after the common Beotian
victory at Délion, the Thebans destroyed the walls of Thespia,
on the ground of the “ Atticism” of the inhabitants.® The
language of Thucydidés would almost imply that this was a mere
act of high-handed Theban violence, without even the form of

1 Thue, iii. 66 et al. Ta πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια. I cannot believe in any
rivalry between Thebes and Plataia, such as Drumann (437) seems to imply, as
if Plataia disputed the first place in‘ the League with Thebes, Drumann also
strangely omits all mention of the connexion between Plataia and Athens,

39 Herod. vi. 108. πιεζεύμενοι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων. Thue. iii. 55. ὅτε Θηβαῖοι
ἡμᾶς ἐβιάσαντο.

8 Herod. (u.s.) . Ἔδν Θηβαίους Βοιωτῶν τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐς Βοιωτοὺς
τελέειν.

4 See Grote, iv. 222.

5 Xen. Mem. iii. 5.2. Βοιωτῶν μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ, πλεονεκτούμενοι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων,
δυσμενῶς αὐτοῖς ἔχουσιν᾽ ᾿Αθήνησι δὲ οὐδὲν ὁρῶ τοιοῦτον. The date of this
dialogue, which I have already had occasion to quote (see above, p. 22), between
Sdkratés and the younger Periklés, is fixed to the year 407 by Periklés being
spoken of as a newly-elected General, He was one of the unfortunate com-
manders at Arginousai.

6 Thue, iv. 188. Θηβαῖοι Θεσπιέων τεῖχος περιεῖλον, x.7.X.

IV POSITION AND CLAIMS OF THEBES 131

legitimate Federal action. He adds that the Thebans had long
wished to destroy Thespia, and now found their opportunity.
The city could not resist, because the flower of its warriors had
fallen in the war with Athens. Such examples as this and that
of Plataia might well cause a sullen acquiescence in Theban
domination. Against Thebes backed by Sparta, resistance was
hopeless. It was not till long after, when Thebes and Sparta o,ho.
were enemies, that, at last, on a favourable opportunity during menos,
the Corinthian war, Orchomenos openly. seceded.!_ The event is 50. 395.
recorded by Xenophén in the form commonly used to express
the revolt of a subject or dependent state. But, long before
this, in the famous pleadings as to the fate of Plataia, though pistaia
the Thebans put prominently forward the general principles of 5.0. 427.
Boeeotian Federalism, still the whole is practically treated as a
dispute between Plataia and Thebes. The Plataians ask that
they may not be given up to the vengeance of the Thebans;
they pray that Plataia may not be destroyed, and its territory
not be annexed to that of Thebes.2 They prayed in vain; the
captives were massacred, their city was destroyed, and their
territory was confiscated, not to the profit of the Boeotian Union,
but to that of the Theban State.® .

Thus the power of Thebes went on increasing,* and no doubt
the discontent of the smaller cities went on increasing also, down
to the time of the Peace of Antalkidas. Then we first find the jeban
Theban claims formally put forth in all their fulness, but only, claims at
as it proved, to bring utter dissolution upon the whole Con- whe Peace
federacy. In the Plataian conference all that the Thebans had kidas,
ventured formally to claim was a primacy, expressed by a word ὅ 3.0. 387.
familiar to Greek diplomatic language, and not formally incon-
sistent with the independence of the smaller towns. Afterwards
we have seen the Boeotarchs, themselves Federal magistrates,
going through at least the form of consulting the Federal
Councils. But now the Thebans openly put themselves forward
as the representatives, or rather as the sovereigns, of all Boeotia.

1 Xen. Hell. iii. 5. 6. Ὀ μὲν Λύσανδρος... . Ὀρχομενίους ἀπέστησε Θηβαίων.

3 Thue. iii, δ8, Ὑμεῖς δὲ εἰ κτενεῖτε ἡμᾶς καὶ χώραν τὴν Πλαταιίδα Θηβαΐδα
ποιήσετε.

3 Ib. 68 (the whole chapter).

4 Manso, Sparta, iii. 150. Theben begniigte sich nicht die erste, es verlangte
die Hauptatadt im bdotischen Lande und es in der Art zu seyn, wie in Lakonien
Ms Thue. iii, 61. Οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι, ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον, ἡγεμογεύεσθαι
ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν.

182 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE — cnap.

Antalkidas comes down with his rescript from the Great King,

ordering that all Greek cities should be independent.! It suited

the policy of Sparta? to construe this independence in the

strictest sense everywhere except in Lakonia. When the Peace

was to be sworn to, according to the usual Greek custom, by the

representatives of every power concerned, Ambassadors from

Thebes, not Boeotarchs or Ambassadors from the Four Councils,

demanded to take the oaths on behalf of all Boeotia.2 The

Spartan King Agésilaos refused to receive their oaths, or to

admit them to the benefits of the Peace, unless they formally

recognized the independence of every Greek city, great and

small. The Ambassadors had no such instructions from their

Government,‘ and it required a Lacedzemonian declaration of

war to bring Thebes to consent to such terms. They were

evidently understood as a formal renunciation of all Theban

Dissolu- Superiority in Boeotia, and apparently as a formal dissolution of

tion of the the Boeotian League in any shape. As the Thebans consented

peotian to the required recognition of independence,5 we may conclude

on 387, that every Boeotian city entered into the terms of the treaty as

᾿ @ sovereign commonwealth, and we may thus look upon the old
Beeotian Federation as formally dissolved.

Second The second portion of Boeotian history includes the splendid
Period, ἃ day of Theban greatness under Pelopidas and Epameinéndas.
ae 387- I am not writing a History of Greece, but a History of

ederal Government, all that I have to do is to pick out from
the general narrative such points as bear directly upon the
Federal relations between Thebes and the other Boeotian towns.
By the Peace of Antalkidas all Greek cities, great and small,
became independent under the guaranty of Sparta. But Sparta
seems, throughout Greece, to have interpreted independence
The Peace after the same strange fashion as she had interpreted it after
carried out the end of the Peloponnesian War. Either at once or, as is

in the of more likely, gradually after some interval,® the several cities

Sparis 1 Xen, Hell. v. 1. 81. Tas δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας
.Ο, 887-2. _,
αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι.
2. ΤΌ. v. 2. 16. Εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς [Λακεδαιμονίους] τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι
ὅπως μὴ καθ᾽ ὃν εἴη.
8 ΤΌ, ν. 1. 82. Οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι ἠξίουν ὑπὲρ πάντων Βοιωτῶν ὀμνύναι.
4 ΤΌ. Οἱ δὲ τῶν Θηβαίων πρέσβεις ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ ἐπεσταλμένα σφίσι ταῦτ᾽
εἴη.
5 ΤΌ, v. 1. 88. Θηβαῖοι δ᾽ εἰς τὰς σπονδὰς εἰσελθεῖν ἠναγκάσθησαν, αὐτονόμους
ἀφέντες τὰς Βοιωτίας πόλεις. 6 On this point see Mr. Grote’s note, x. 46.

IV SECOND PERIOD OF BCGOTIAN HISTORY 138

were occupied, like Athens under the Thirty, by narrow local
oligarchies, supported by a Spartan harmost and garrison.! In Spartan
the case of Thebes we know how this state of things was athe
brought about, namely through the treacherous seizure of the cities,
Kadmeia by Phoibidas.? Plataia was restored,® restored as an 8.0. 382.
equal and independent city ; its restoration implied not only a Restors-
loss of Theban supremacy, but the actual loss of that portion of pistsia,
the existing Theban territory which had formerly formed the 8.0. c. 386.
Plataian district. But the independence of Plataia, like that of

the other towns, was not thought inconsistent with the presence

of a Lacedemonian harmost. Several entirely new elements

were thus introduced into the world of Bootian politics.
Hitherto Bootia had been less affected than most parts of Oligarchic
Greece by the struggles of oligarchic and democratic parties. *%4 Demo-
The Beeotian cities had been, from time immemorial, oligarchi- Patina,
cally governed. Oligarchic government was doubtless, in Theban Weakness
eyes, one of the ancestral principles of the Bosotian constitution,* οὗ the we
hardly less important than the other great principle of Theban giement
supremacy. Not that a democratic party was altogether wanting in Βαοίία.
in Bootia, but it was weak, and could do nothing without

foreign help. Democracy was introduced by the Athenian πο. 457.
victory at Oinophyta, but democracy did not flourish on the
uncongenial Beoeotian soil,° and oligarchy reappeared when 8.0. 449.
Boeotia was again detached from the Athenian alliance by the

first battle of Koréneia. The invasion which led to the battle

of Délion was planned by Athens in concert with a democratic sc. 424.
party in Beeotia,® but the utter failure of the scheme doubtless

gave a deep and lasting blow to the democratic interest. The
histories of Plataia and Thespia, as already recorded, leave Thebes,
hardly any doubt that this democratic or Athenian party was hitherto
the party of the independence of the smaller cities against the centre
Thebes. But the dissolution of the League, and the Spartan garchy,
occupation, for such it was, which followed, must have put
matters on quite another footing. Oligarchy no longer meant,

either in Thebes or elsewhere, the ascendency of the ancient

1 See Isok. Plat. 20, 21. Cf. Pol. iv. 27.

2 Xen. Hell. v. 2. 25 et seqq.

3 On this restoration see Grote, x. 43.

4 Ta πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια. See above, p. 180.

5 Arist. Pol. viii. 3. Ἔν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτ-
ενομένοις ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη.

δ Thuc. iv. 76.

becomes,
by her Re-
volution,
[s.o. 379,]
the centre
of Demo-
cracy.

Career of
Pelopidas
[Β.σ. 379-
364] and
Epamei-
néndas
[B.0. $79-
362].

Bad re-
sults of
Theban su-
premacy.

Nominal

tarchs.

134 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cuHap.

nobles of the land, whose rule, in a country where it had been
so little interrupted, may well have involved no practical
oppression.! Oligarchy now meant the domination? of a small
number of citizens, whose power rested entirely on the presence
of a foreign force. A powerful democratic spirit was naturally
called forth, and, above all, at Thebes, hitherto the centre of
oligarchy. A democratic revolution delivered Thebes at once
from her traitorous citizens and from her foreign garrison, and
the new Theban Democracy entered, under Pelopidas and
Epameinéndas, upon its short and glorious career. There is
no portion of Grecian history which more thoroughly awakens
our sympathies than all that personally concerns those two
most illustrious citizens. We hardly know which more to
admire, Pelopidas the slayer of the Tyrants, or Epameinéndas
who refuses to stain his hands even with Tyrants’ blood. The
fight of Leuktra, the invasion of Lakonia, the restoration of
Messéné, the foundation of Megalopolis, the deaths of Pelopidas
in Thessaly and of Epameinéndas at Mantineia, are all among
the most spirit-stirring scenes even in the eventful history of
Greece. But it is easy to see that Pelopidas and Epameinéndas
were the chiefs of a people utterly unworthy of them; that the
momentary greatness of Thebes did but leave Greece yet more
disunited,® more ready to become the prey of the Macedonian
aggressor ; and that, looking at the matter with the eyes of a
historian of Federalism, this second period of Boeotian history is
yet more disastrous than the first period before the Peace of
Antalkidas. The League was nominally revived ; constitutional
Federal language was employed in formal documents,‘ and

1 The Platonic Sékratés (Kriton, c. 15) calls (B.c. 899) Thebes and Megara
well governed cities—evvopoundvas πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτου:----
εὐνομοῦνται γάρ, κιτιλ. He does not call them εὐνομουμένας simply as being
oligarchic, as he goes on to blame the ill government of oligarchic Thessaly—éxet
γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία.

2 Xenophén himself uses the strong word δυναστεία, only less strong than
τυραννίς, meaning in fact a Tyranny in the hands of several persons instead of
one only. Ἔν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις.
Hell. ν. 4. 46.

3 Xen. Hell. vii. ὅ. 27. ᾿Ακρισία δὲ καὶ ταραχὴ ἔτι πλείων μετὰ τὴν [ἐν
Μαντινείᾳ] μάχην ἐγένετο ἢ πρόσθεν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. Four years afterwards
Philip took Amphipolis.

4 The κοινὴ σύνοδος τῶν Βοιωτῶν (Diod. xv. 80) received complaints from
Thessaly against Alexander of Pherai (B.c. 364); and, just before Chairdneia
(Β.ο. 338), Philip sent an embassy ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Βοιωτῶν (Diod. xvi. 85).
Cf. above, p. 126, note 4.

IV CAREER OF PELOPIDAS AND EPAMEINONDAS 185

Boeotarchs, and not mere local Polemarchs, again appear as the
commanders of the Bootian armies.! It is also clear that,
immediately after the Theban Revolution, the Theban cause 8.0. 378.
was popular in the Bootian cities? No doubt the Theban
Democracy, like the Athenian Democracy, put itself forward,

and that for a while sincerely, as the champion of independence

and democratic government everywhere, in opposition alike to Liberal

native oligarchies and to Lacedsmonian garrisons. But the profes-
sion of

result soon showed how impossible it was that an overweening Thebes,
city like Thebes should ever enter into the true Federal relation

with weaker states. Thebes showed more quickly than Athens,

or even than Sparta, how easily Presidency may be developed

into Empire. It does not indeed prove much that the recovery

of the Bosotian cities is spoken of by Xenophén in terms which

are applicable only to a reconquest by force of arms. To 8
Lakonian partisan like that renegade Athenian, the expulsion by
Theban hands of a Spartan harmost and the oligarchy which he
maintained, doubtless seemed to be the high-handed extinction

of a legal government by the hands of a foreign invader. But

though the Bootian cities willingly entered into a revived Real sub-
Baotian League, they soon found that a Beotian League was jection of

now only another name for bondage to Thebes. A nominally te sosser

democratic Boeotian Assembly, instead of four oligarchic Senates, Thebes,

1 The number now was seven (Paus. ix. 13.6, 7). I do not know of any dis-
tinct evidence whether any of these Bosotarchs were really chosen by the smaller
towns or not.

2 See Grote, x. 215, 268. Xenophén (Hell. v. 4. 46) seems to imply a sort of
secession of the Démos from the smaller cities, ὁ μέντοι δῆμος ἐξ αὐτῶν [τῶν
πολέω»] els τὰς Θήβας ἀπεχώρει.

3 Xen. Hell. v. 4. 63. Θράσεως δὴ ἐστρατεύοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἐπὶ τὰς περιοικίδας
πόλεις [mark the word περιοικίδα9] καὶ πάλιν αὐτὰς ἀνελάμβανον. νἱ. 1. 1, Ol
δὲ Θηβαῖοι, ἐπεὶ κατεστρέψαντο τὰς ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις, ἐστράτευον καὶ εἰς τὴν
Φωκίδα. This clearly implies actual warfare, but what follows the first of the
two passages as clearly implies that it was a warfare in which the Démos in the
cities attacked took the Theban side. Still I cannot understand Mr. Grote’s
meaning when he says (x. 183, 184) “that the Thebans. . . revived the Beotian
confederacy, is clearly stated by Xenophén’’—in the two passages just quoted.
It is clearly stated that “the Thebans again became presidents of all Beotia”
(p. 183), but surely not that they revived a confederacy. Xenoph6n speaks not
of reviving a confederacy, but of Thebes warring against and conquering certain
cities. Considering Xenophén’s prejudices, his language is in no way inconsistent
with the fact, otherwise sufficiently established, that the restoration of the
Federal system was at least professed. But surely his words do not clearly state
it. And considering what happened to Plataia and other cities so soon after, I
certainly think that the practical aspect of the case is better set forth in the

ords “subjugation ” and “submitted ” used by Bishop Thirlwall (v. 71).

136 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cuHap.

might now sit to register Theban edicts in the name of the
League, but the practical nature of the relation between Thebes
and the other cities admits of no doubt. It is enough that the
language of historians and orators always implies that Thebes
had become practically sovereign. The smaller cities are spoken
of in language which implies subjection ;! we hear now, not of
a Beoeotian Confederation, but of a Theban State, into which
other cities are compelled to merge themselves against their
Destruc- will? Finally we hear, during this period, of the utter
tion of —= destruction by Theban hands of no less than four Bosotian

Beootian towns. Plataia now paid for the crime of having so long been,

of Plataia, first an Athenian and then a Spartan outpost.? Orchomenos,
B.C. 873 once rescued by the personal interference of Epameinéndas,‘ at

or a2 3 of last, during that hero’s absence, became the victim ° alike of 108

menos, ancient mythical rivalry,® and of its more recent political opposi-
ΒΟ. 368 tion. Thespia, disaffected even before the fight of Leuktra,’

τους of was destroyed soon after, and Korénela shared the fate of

B.c. 373 or Orchomenos.2 These events, the destruction of so many
371; and of Hellenic cities, above all of the ancient and renowned Orcho-

7 or aea 7 menos, to which Thebes herself had once been tributary, raised

a feeling of profound indignation throughout Greece. When
the genius of Epameinéndas no longer guided her counsels, and

1 Περίοικοι, περιοικίδες πόλεις. I have already mentioned this use of the
word.

2 See the expressions used in the Plataic Oration of Isokratés 8-10, μὴ πεισθεῖσαν
τὴν IDaraéwy πόλιν ἀλλὰ βιασθεῖσαν Θηβαίοις [not Βοιωτοῖς] cuvredetv—rijs
σφετέρας αὐτῶν πολιτείας οὐδὲν δεομένους κοινωνεῖν ἀναγκάζουσι---συντελεῖν ἐς τὰς
Θήβα---- προστάττειν ἡμῖν---οὐ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῖς ἀρκτέον, κιτ.λ. Something is
doubtless to be allowed for angry Plataian (or Isokratic) oratory, something
doubtless to the old special hatred between Thebes and Plataia ; still the most
vehement orator in South Carolina would not use such language with regard to
any single Northern State, though he might apply it to the Northern Union in
general,

8 The details of the destruction of Plataia are given by Pausanias, ix. 1. 4
et seqq.

4 Diod. xv. 57. Paus. ix. 15. 8. Thirlwall, v. 158, 9. Grote, x. 264.

5 Diod. xv. 79. The Plataians were only expelled ; the men of Orchomenos
were killed and the women and children sold, like the Mélians and Skidnaians by
Athens. According to Pausanias (ix. 15, 14) the Thebans slew or branded such
Beeotian exiles as they met with in their Peloponnesian campaign.

6 Isok. Plat. 11. Ov τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῖς [Θηβαίοις] ἀρκτέον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον
Ὀρχομενίοις φόρον οἰστέον" οὕτω γὰρ εἶχε τὸ παλαιόν.

7 Paus. ix. 18, 8, 14. 1-4. The date of the destruction of Thespia is doubt-
ful, see Thirlwall, v. 85. Grote, x. 219.

8 On the date of the destruction of Koréneia, see Grote, x. 427.

9 See Grote, x. 427, xi. 285.

IV THEBAN TREATMENT OF THE SMALLER TOWNS 137

even during his lifetime whenever he was not at hand to restrain

her passions, Thebes stood forth as a city of coarse and brutal General

upstarts, who had suddenly risen to a place in the Hellenic distke of
world for which they were utterly unfit. No Grecian city through-
seems ever to have been more thoroughly hated than Thebes out

was between the battle of Mantineia and the battle of Chairéneia. Bree

Athens felt for her a repugnance which she never showed 339
towards either her Spartan rival or her Macedonian conqueror.
To overcome this loathing, and to range the warriors of Thebes
and Athens side by side against Philip, was the most glorious .
exploit of the glorious life of Démosthenés.”

The dates of these acts of Theban violence towards the smaller
Boeotian cities are in some cases matters of dispute. Most of
them occurred after the battle of Leuktra, but that of Plataia
took place before. Certain it is that, just before that battle, the Theban

Theban claims had risen to their full height. In the negociations aims the
which preceded it we seem to read over again the negociations pattie of

which preceded the Peace of Antalkidas.? The Thebans swore Leuktra,
to the Peace, or were willing to swear to it, in the name of all ®°- 871
Beeotia.* Agésilaos, as before, demands a recognition of the
independence of the other Boeotian cities, and the admission of

1 Ephoros, quoted by Strabo, ix. 2. 2. Τελευτήσαντος γὰρ ἐκείνου [᾿Ἑπαμει-
γώνδου] Thy ἡγεμονίαν ἀποβαλεῖν εὐθὺς rods Θηβαίους συνέβη, γευσαμένους αὐτῆς
μόνον" αἴτιον δὲ εἶναι, τὸ λόγων καὶ ὁμιλίας τῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὀλιγωρῆσαι, μόνης
δ᾽ ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῆς κατὰ πολεμὸν ἀρετῆς.

2 See a noble passage in Arnold’s Rome, ii. 331.

3 Pausanias (ix. 18. 2) evidently confounded the two occasions, as he intro-
duces Epameinéndas as the Theban orator before the Peace of Antalkidas.

4 It is certainly hard at first sight to reconcile the accounts of this event given
by Xenophén (Hell. vi. 3.19) and by Plutarch (Ages. 28) and Pausanias (see
last note). But they do not seem to me quite so contradictory as Mr. Grote
thinks them (x. 231, note). In Xenophén’s story, the Theban Ambassadors first
allow Thebes to be set down as having sworn, and on the next day demand
(ἐκέλευον) to have the name “ Thebans” struck out, and ‘‘ Beeotians ”’ substituted.
Mr. Grote asks “why should such a man as Epameinéndas (who doubtless was
the envoy), consent at first to waive the presidential claims of Thebes, and to
swear for her alone? If he did consent, why should he retract the next day?”
Now it strikes me that the proceeding is capable of another explanation, and that
there is no “ waiving of presidential claims,” and no “retracting the next day.”
It is evident from the language of all the historians and orators, that the supre-
macy of Thebes was now far more openly avowed than it had been under the old
League, and that the word “Theban ” was now constantly used where “ Boeotian ”
would have been used in the preceding century. The Thebans might well swear
as “Thebans,” meaning to carry with them the whole of their confederates ; to
say “Theban” rather than “ Beotian” might be meant not as any ‘‘ waiving of
presidential claims,”’ .but rather as the strongest way of asserting them. But
Agésilaos might very well choose to take it in a contrary sense ; he would call on

B.C. 371.

B.c. 369.

Gradual
growth
of the
Theban
claims.

138 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cnaap.

each to swear in its own name! as a sovereign commonwealth.
The Thebans again refuse; they are again excluded from the
treaty, but this time with very different results. Their former
refusal and exclusion had been followed by their submission, by
the dissolution of the Boeotian League, at last by the occupation
of the Theban Kadmeia by a Lacedemonian garrison. The
present refusal and exclusion was indeed followed by a Lacede-
monian invasion of Bosotia, but that invasion was crushed at the
fight of Leuktra, and soon after repaid by the presence of the
Theban invaders in Sparta itself.

In this negociation, as in the former one, Thebes formally
claims to be regarded as the head of Beeotia, the representative
of the whole Baotian body towards other powers. She demands
to be looked upon as capable of contracting, by her single act,
international obligations binding on all the Bootian cities. In
this negociation, as in the former one, the Spartan King refuses
to recognize Thebes in any such character. He knows Thebes,
only as he knows Orchomenos, as one Boeotian city out of several,
capable of contracting for herself alone, and whose obligations
are binding on no other Bootian commonwealth. Here is indeed
a change on both sides since the Lacedemonian judges sat to
decide between the conflicting arguments of Theban and Plataian
orators. Then all that Thebes formally claimed, whatever she
practically exercised, was a mere supremacy implying no absolute
subjection, and even that she grounded on old Beeotian custom,
and on her own rights as the supposed metropolis? of the other
Beotian towns. Then, whatever Thebes claimed, Sparta, as her
interest then dictated, was ready to allow. Now Thebes employs,
even in her formal claims, the language, no longer of a metro-
polis or of a Federal president, but of a sovereign, or rather of
a tyrant, city. Now Sparta, in pursuance of what has now
become her interest, denies not only the claims lately advanced
by Thebes, but the general principle of any kind of Boeotian

the other Beotian cities to swear separately ; the Thebans would then demand to
have the doubtful word ‘‘ Thebans’”’ changed into ‘‘ Beotiaris ;” that is, to have
their oath taken as the oath of all Boeotia. Then would follow the lively dialogue
between Epameinéndas and Agésilaos recorded by Plutarch and Pausanias, pre-
ceded probably by some such reasoning on the Theban side as Mr. Grote supposes.
(Cf. Vischer, Kleine Schriften, i. 559, and see Appendix iii. ]

1 This is more clearly brought out by Pausanias (ix. 13. 2) than by any
one else.

2 Thue. iii, 61. Ἡμῶν κτισάντων WAdrasay ὕστερον. τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας,
κιτ.λ.

IV COMPARISON OF THEBES AND SPARTA 189

unity, a principle certainly as old as any other immemorial fact
of Grecian politics. But if the claims of Thebes had grown
between the siege of Plataia and the Peace of Antalkidas, they
had again grown between the Peace of Antalkidas and the nego-
ciations at Sparta.’ Here, on her own ground, Spartan pride Parallel

received such a home-thrust from the audacious Theban as ewer

Spartan pride had never before dreamed of. Epameinéndas geotia
ventured on a parallel such as assuredly the most daring imagina- and Sparta
tion had never ventured on before. Thebes will recognize the Lekonis.
independence of the Bosotian towns when Sparta recognizes the
independence of the Lakonian towns. Thebes will allow Orcho-

menos to swear as a separate commonwealth, when Sparta allows

Amyklai to swear as a separate commonwealth. Here the claims

of Thebes stand plainly before us in the naked form of unalloyed

tyranny. We have already more than once seen the Boeotian

cities described, in relation to Thebes, by the same name of sub-

jection by which the Lakonian cities* are described in relation

to Sparta. We now see this parallel in all its fulness formally

avowed as a principle of Theban politics. The Bcotian towns

are to be mere Perioikoi of Thebes, no longer sovereign members

of a Bootian League, of which Thebes was at most a constitu-

tional President. The comparison was equally daring in the

claims which it made on behalf of Thebes and in the threat

which it implied against Sparta. No such revolutionary words

1 See Xen. Hell. vi. 3. 2.

2 Isok. Panath. 179. ᾿Ονόμασι μὲν προσαγορευομένους ws πόλεις οἰκοῦντας,
τὴν δὲ δύναμιν ἔχοντας ἐλάττω τῶν δήμων τῶν rap’ ἡμῖν. The whole passage is
a curious picture of the position of the περίοικοι. Of course an Attic δῆμος, as
such, was politically nothing, but its inhabitants severally were Athenian citizens ;
a Lakonian πόλις was also politically nothing, while its inhabitants severally were
mere helpless subjects of Sparta.

The Lakonian πόλεις are mentioned in rather a different way in a curious
passage of Herodotos (vii. 234) where Démaratos tells Xerxes of the many
Lacedsmonian cities, among which he merely speaks of Sparta as the greatest,
and inhabited by the bravest among the brave Lacedemonians. Herodotos was
not a politician like Thucydidés or Polybios, still less was he a pamphleteer like
Isokratés ; such a description was quite enough for his conception of a picturesque
dialogue between Xerxes and Démaratos, without bringing in political distinctions
which Xerxes would not have understood. But a mere “ English reader’ might
be led seriously astray as to the political condition of Lakonia by reading this
single passage of Herodotos by itself. Yet strange to sny, Professor Rawlinson,
who discusses at large the population of the city of Sparta, and who adds to the
Book a learned dissertation about Alarodians and Orthocorybantes, does not
vouchsafe the “English reader” the least information as to the real political
condition of Amyklai and Epidauros Liméra.

On these Perioikic πόλεις see Grote, ii. 484 et seqq.

B.c. 869.

The claims
of Thebes
exclude all
true Fede-
ralism in
Beotia.

B.c. 388.
Restora-
tion of the
destroyed
Towns.

140 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE — cnHar.

had ever before been heard in any Grecian congress. No Greek
had ever yet questioned the absolute rights of Sparta over the
Lakonian towns. No Spartan, probably no Greek, had ever
before imagined that treaties requiring that every Greek city
should be independent might be so construed as to make Amyklai
independent of Sparta as well as to make Orchomenos independent
of Thebes. Epameinéndas now put forth a principle which at
once loosened the very foundations of Spartan dominion, and he
lived to carry out his principle in the most practical shape.
Before his work was over, he had rent away from Sparta half
her territory, and had set up an independent Messéné in opposi-
tion to Sparta, as Sparta had set up an independent Plataia in
opposition to Thebes. It is impossible not to rejoice even at the
mere humiliation of Sparta, and still more so at the restoration
of the heroic commonwealth of Messéné.! But it is clear that
the words of Epameinéndas contained a sentence of death against
Beeotian Federalism or Beeotian freedom in any shape ;? it is
clear that, though he held back his unworthy countrymen from
the grosser acts of oppression, yet his life was devoted to the
mere aggrandizement of the one city of Thebes, and not to the
general good of Bootia or of Hellas.

Different as was the general character of our first and our
second period of Beotian history, the terminations of the two
were strikingly alike. After the defeat of Chairéneia, Thebes
had to receive a Macedonian garrison into the Kadmeia, as she
had before had to receive a Spartan garrison. Plataia, Thespia,
Orchomenos, and Koréneia now arose again,® surrounding Thebes

1 The restoration of Messéné however, except as a mere blow to Sparta, proved a
failure. The career of the restored Messénians is inglorious, quite unworthy of the
countrymen of the half-mythic Aristomenés, or of the gallant exiles of Naupaktos.
The glory of Epameinéndas as a founder is to have been the creator of Megalopolis.

2 Mr. Grote thinks that the words of Epameinéndas do not imply that he
claimed that ‘‘ Thebes was entitled to as much power in Bootia as Sparta in
Laconia” (x. 231, 234) but only that the Federal union of Bootia under the
presidency of Thebes should be looked on as being “an integral political aggre-
gate’ as much as Lakonia “under Sparta,” or as Attica—he does not venture to
say “under Athens.’ Surely there is no analogy between a Federal head of
several independent cities, a despot city ruling over several subject cities, and a
country where the whole, is so to speak, one city, while the smaller towns are
mere parishes. Unless Epameinéndas meant his parallel between Thebes in
Beeotia and Sparta in Lakonia to be exact in all points, it has no force at all,
and it is open to an obvious retort. And certainly the position of Sparta in
Lakonia was utterly inconsistent with Federalism or with freedom of any kind.

3 Paus. iv. 27. 10; ix. 37. 8. He assigns the restoration to Philip, Arrian
(i. 9. 10) to Alexander,

Iv THIRD PERIOD OF BQOTIAN HISTORY 141

---

with allies of Macedonia even more zealous and hostile than they

had been in their former character as allies of Sparta. The

troops of these cities served heartily with Alexander in his
campaign against Thebes,’ and it was by their voices? that the

tyrant city was devoted to the destruction which she had 80 Destruc-
often inflicted upon others. As Thebes had enriched herself tion of
with the territory of four of her Beotian sisters, so, now that Mevandes,
her own day was come, the Macedonian conqueror divided the s.c. 335.
whole Theban territory among his Beotian allies. Thebes now Zalous co-
vanishes for a while from among the cities of the earth. As one ὀρθγαίδοι
of the bulwarks of independent Greece against Macedonia we Beotian
may lament her fate; but the special historian of Boeotian Towns.
Federalism cannot weep for her.

The third period of Beotian history may be more briefly
gone through. The part played by Beotia in the later history Third
of Greece is almost always contemptible; and of the few im- Period, B.c.
portant events in which she was concerned I shall speak else- 335-172,
where. Thebes did not long remain a ruin or a sheep-walk, an
example of the fate to which she had herself once wished to
reduce Athens. As she had found a Macedonian destroyer, she 8.0. 405.
now found a Macedonian restorer. Thebes was restored by Restora-

Kassander ;* it would seem with some sort of formal consent 5 tion of
. Thebes by
on the part of the other Bootian towns. They of course were Kassander

deeply interested in a proceeding which might possibly threaten 8.6. 316.
them with a mistress, and which, in any case, involved an imme-
diate surrender of territory. On the other hand, to say nothing
of the power of Kassander and of the general feeling of Greece
in favour of Theban restoration, it is quite possible that the

1 Arrian, i. 8. 8. Diod. xvii. 13. Arrian mentions also the Phokians.

2 Arr. i. 9.9, Τοῖς δὲ μετασχοῦσι τοῦ ἔργου ξυμμάχοις (ols δὴ καὶ ἐπέστρεψεν
᾿Αλέξανδρος τὰ κατὰ τὰς Θήβας διαθεῖναι) τὴν μὲν Καδμείαν φρουρᾷ κατέχειν ἔδοξε,
τὴν πόλιν δὲ κατασκάψαι εἰς ἔδαφος, καὶ τὴν χώραν διανεῖμαι τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. ΟἹ.
Diod. xviii.11. Dioddros (xvii. 14), with much less probability, makes Alexander
assemble and consult τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν Ελλήνων, τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον ; that is,
probably, the Corinthian Synod, or possibly, in so blundering a writer, the
Delphic Amphiktyons. Compare p. 100, note 1 on the supposed agency of the
Corinthian Synod or of the Amphiktyons, and p. 43 on the hatred of the
Beeotian towns towards Thebes.

3 Isok. Plat. 31. "Ἔθεντο οἱ [Θηβαῖοι] τὴν ψῆφον ws χρὴ τήν re πόλιν ἐξαν-
δραποδίσασθαι καὶ τὴν χώραν ἀνεῖναι μηλόβοτον ὥσπερ τὸ Κρισαῖον πεδίον. Cf.
Suidas under μηλόβοτος. See above, p. 125.

4 Paus. iv, 27. 10; ix. 7. 1.

5 Diod. xix. 54. Κάσσανδρος. . . πείσας τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς, ἀνέστησε τὴν
πόλιν.

Restora-
tion of the

B.c. 245.

Insignifi-
cance of
Beotia in
later
Greece.

B.c. 201-

186 or
222-197,

142 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cuap.

Beotian cities found that they had really not gained by the
destruction of the greatest of their number. Elsewhere the step
was highly popular: Athens, the partaker in the later struggles
of Thebes, gave zealous help towards her restoration ; gratitude
towards the city of Epameinéndas prompted help no less zealous
on the part of Messéné and Megalopolis ; contributions came in
from various parts of Greece, and even from the Greek colonies
in Italy and Sicily.!. Thebes thus rose again, and before long
she again became the head of a Bootian League,? but with
powers very inferior to what she had possessed in the days of
her might. The date of the reconstitution of the League does
not seem certain, but, through the whole range of the history of
Polybios, Boeotia is always spoken of as a political whole, just

’ like Phékis or Akarnania. But the revived Bootian League

cuts a very poor figure beside the Achaia of Aratos or the Sparta
of Kleomenés. The Bootians once ventured to join with the
Achaians against the Atolian brigands, but after a single defeat
they gave up all share in general Grecian politics? They seem
even to have entered into some relation to the aggressors, in-
consistent with perfect independence,‘ a relation presently to be
exchanged for a yet more servile submission to Macedonia.®
Nor did they atone for external insignificance by a vigorous and
orderly government at home. The account of the internal state
of the country given by Polybios is ridiculous beyond concep-
tion. The Bcotians did nothing but eat and drink; they ate
more dinners in a month than there were days in it ;® they let
the administration of justice sleep throughout the land for
twenty-five years.’ Yet these Beotian swine® seem to have

1 Paus. ix. 7. 1. Diod. xix. 54. 2 Beeotie caput, Liv. xxxi. 1; xlii. 44.

8 Pol. xx. 4. Plut. Ar. 16.

4 Pol. xx. 5. ᾿Εγκαταλίποντες τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς προσένειμαν Αἰτωλοῖς τὸ ἔθνος.
Droysen (ii. 370) takes this to imply actual συμπολιτεία with the Atolians, and
undoubtedly the same word, in a slightly different construction, is used to express
the annexation of Sikyén to the Achaian League. ii. 43. "“Aparos... τὴν
πατρίδα. .. προσένειμε πρὸς Thy τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν πολιτείαν. But this would seem to
prove too much, and the words need not imply more than close alliance and
slavish subserviency to A¢tolia.

5 Pol. xx. 5. Ὑπέταξαν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁλοσχερῶς Μακεδόσι.

6 Ib. xx. 6. Ὥστε πολλοὺς εἶναι Βοιωτῶν οἷς ὑπῆρχε δεῖπνα τοῦ μηνὸς πλείω
τῶν εἰς τὸν μῆνα διατεταγμένων ἡμερῶν.

7 Thid. Also xxiii. 2. Drumann (439) seems rather to misconceive this
period. Surely Polybios describes a time of carelessness and corruption, rather
than one of violence (Faustrecht).

8 Pind. Ol. vi. 90. ᾿Αρχαῖον ὄνειδος. . . Βοιωτίαν ὗν.

IV CONSTITUTION OF THE REVIVED LEAGUE 148

possessed a Federal constitution to which the models afforded
by neighbouring states had given a better form than it had

possessed in the days of Isménias or of Epameinéndas. Thebes Constitu-
was the head of the League, the place of meeting for the Federal tion of the

Assembly,' but she no longer enjoyed the same tyrannical power
as of old. At the head of the League, as at the head of other
Leagues, there was a single General,” who probably stepped into
the position originally held by the ancient Federal Archon.
There were also Beoeotarchs,? whose office now would answer
pretty well to that of the Achaian Démiourgoi or Ministers ;
and, as in Achaia, there was a Commander of Cavalry. There
was a Federal Assembly in which we may gather from an ex-
pression of νυ," that each of the confederate cities had a dis-
tinct vote. We hear nothing of any oppression on the part of
Thebes,® nor very much of dissensions between the several cities.
Not that Boeotia, any more than other Greek states, was free
from party disputes, but they seem to have arisen almost wholly
from questions of foreign policy. There was, in the war of
Philip and Flamininus, a Roman and a Macedonian party, and
Thebes was the stronghold of the Macedonian interest.’ A strata-
gem of Flamininus® compelled the Bcoeotian League to embrace
the Roman side. The factions and crimes by which this change
of policy was followed are hardly worth recording. But at least
the dissolution of the League was not the work of internal dis-
sensions, but wholly of the insidious policy of Rome. To break
up Federations and alliances among Grecian cities was always
one of the main objects of any power, native or foreign, which

B.C. 198-7.

aspired to supremacy or illegitimate influence in Greece. Thebes —

indeed for a moment, while Epameinéndas directed her counsels,
pursued a nobler policy in Arkadia, but the isolation of the
separate cities was an end usually aimed at by all who sought
to bring Greece under the yoke. We have seen how success-
fully this policy was carried on by Sparta; it was continued by

1 Liv. xxxiii. 1.

2 Pol. xx. 6. ἔνιοι τῶν στρατηγῶν. xxiii. 2. στρατηγοῦντος Ἱππίου. So
Livy xlii. 43 talks of the Beotian “ Pretor,” his regular translation of στρατηγός.
3 Pol. xviii. 26. Liv. xxxiii, 22. Plut. Arat. 16. * Pol. xx. 5.

δ᾽ Liv. xxxiii. 2. Omnium Beotie civitatum suffragiis accipitar.

® The only expression which looks like it (Pol. xxvii. 5) Θηβαίους βαρεῖς
ὄντας ἐπικεῖσθαι, refers to the dissensions between the Roman and Macedonian
parties just before the dissolution of the League.

7 See Pol. xx. 5. Thirlwall, viii. 335 et seqq.

8 Liv, xxxiii. 1. Thirlwall, viii. 336.

144 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE onar.

— ee

Dissolu- the Macedonian Kings; it was finally carried out in its fullest

tion οὗ the extent by the subtle machinations of Roman diplomacy. The
Quintus Y course of the war with Perseus gave the Roman Ambassador

Marcius, Quintus Marcius an opportunity of bringing about the dissolu-

BC. 171. tion of the League of Bosotia, which I shall describe more at
large in a future chapter. His combined intrigues and violence
gradually induced the several cities to desert their Federal
Union, and to place themselves, one by one, under Roman
protection.!. Thus did the Boeotian League fall asunder,’ and 1
see no reason to infer from a casual expression of a single writer,
that the political union between the Boeotian towns was restored
at any later time.®

1 Pol. xxvii. 1. 2. Liv. xlii. 43. 44. Thirlwall, viii. 437.

3 Pol. xxvii. 2, Td δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἔθνος ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον συντετηρηκὸς Thy
κοινὴν συμπολιτείαν, καὶ πολλοὺς καὶ ποικίλους καιροὺς διαπεφευγὸς παραδόξως, τότε
προπετῶς καὶ ἀλογίστως ἑλόμενον τὰ παρὰ Περσέως, εἰκῇ καὶ παιδαριωδῶς πτοηθὲν
κατελύθη καὶ διεσκορπίσθη κατὰ πόλεις. The difference between ἔθνος and πόλις,
in the political language of Polybios, is that between a Federal State and a single
city. See xx. 3, and many other passages. Livy habitually represents the words
by “gens” and “civitas.” He also often uses “populus”’ in the sense of State
or Canton as a member of a League.

Mommsen (i. 582) holds that the formal dissolution of the League did not
take place till B.c. 146. Ido not see how this can be reconciled with the words
of Polybios and Livy. A Beotarch is spoken of in the interval, but he is
apparently a purely Theban magistrate — βοιωταρχῶν τηνικαῦτα ἐν Θήβαις.
Paus. vii. 14. 6.

3 Pausanias (vii. 16. 9—10), describing the results of the victory of Mummius
(B.c. 146) adds, συνέδριά τε κατὰ ἔθνος τὰ ἑκάστων, ᾿Αχαιῶν καὶ τὸ ἐν Φωκεῦσιν
ἢ Βοιωτοῖς ἣ ἑτέρωθί που τῆς Ἑλλάδος, κατελέλυτο ὁμοίως πάντα. ἔτεσι δὲ οὐ
πολλοῖς ὕστερον ἐτράποντο ἐς ἔλεον Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς Ελλάδος, καὶ συνέδριά τε κατὰ
ἔθνος ἀποδιδόασιν ἑκάστοις τὰ ἀρχαῖα, κ.τ.λ.

- From the former part of this passage Mr. Whiston (Dict. of Ant. art.
Beotarches), following Boeckh (i. 727), infers that Mummius found a Beeotian
League to dissolve in B.c. 146, and therefore that the League must have been
‘partially revived” after its dissolution by Marcius in 3B.c. 171. But surely
Pausanias, especially when using the pluperfect tense, may just as well refer to
the dissolution under Marcius, or, as the pious antiquary is not the most infallible
authority in strictly historical matters, Pausanias may even have forgotten that
the dissolution of the Bootian League was the work of Marcius and not of
Mummius. It seems hardly worth while to extemporize a revival and a second
dissolution without better authority. The latter portion of the passage, as
referring to a nominal restoration later than B.c. 146, does not bear on the point.
On the restoration there spoken of, see Thirlwall, viii. 502; Finlay, Greece
under the Romans, 25. All these imaginary Confederations continued to exist,
with their whole staff of Generals, Archons, Bootarchs, Senates, etc. down to a
surprisingly late period of the Roman Empire. This is abundantly shown by the
inscriptions in Boeckh. But it is hardly worth enlarging on such mock constitu-
tions in a History of Federalism, except when they either illustrate the institu-
tions of earlier times, or when one gets such curious details as Pausanias gives
(see above, p. 105) of the Amphiktyonic Council after the Augustan Reform Bill.

1V ATTEMPTS AT FEDERAL UNION 145

8 3. Of various attempts at Federal Systems—LTonia,
Olynthos, Arkadia, ete.

Besides these Federations of Phékis, Akarnania, Epeiros, and
Beeotia, all of which actually existed and flourished, we must not
pass by some less successful attempts at the establishment of Unsuccess-
Federal Governments in ancient Greece. Several such efforts ful at-
were made at various times, which bore no permanent fruit. Still ie dar
they are important facts in Grecian history, and, as they serve Govern-
to illustrate the history and the growth of the Federal idea, they ments.

form a natural portion of our subject.

It may be doubtful how far we are entitled to reckon among |
such attempts the advice which, according to Herodotos,! was Aldvice of
given to the Ionian Greeks by the philosopher Thalés when they alta to
were first. threatened with Persian invasion. Some degree of tp risns,
union had always existed among the Ionian colonies in Asia, but do. 545.
there is no ground for believing that their union was of a kind
which at all amounted to a real Federal Government.? They had
indeed general meetings at the Panionion,® but those meetings Former
were primarily of a religious kind, though undoubtedly they pannection
were often taken advantage of for political deliberations among ereen
the several cities. Their connexion in short seems to have been Ionian
rather closer than that of ἃ mere Amphiktyony, but it is clear Cities.
that it came nearer to an Amphiktyony than to a true Federal
union. It is a relation of a peculiar kind, a sort of developement
of the old Amphiktyonic relation, of which we find some other Their
Instances, especially among the Greeks of the Asiatic colonies. rerio
It is a species of union which might naturally arise among settlers peices
in a foreign land, mindful of their old home and of their common ktyonic.
origin, but still in no way disposed to sacrifice any portion of
their separate political being. Unions like those of the Asiatic
Ionians and Atolians * were in fact Amphiktyonies instituted for

1 Herod. i. 170. ᾿Εκέλευε ὃν βουλευτήριον Ἴωνας ἐκτῆσθαι, τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἐν Téw’

Ἰέων γὰρ μέσον εἷναι ᾿Ιωνίης᾽' τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πόλιας οἰκεομένας μηδὲν ἧσσον
νομίζεσθαι, κατάπερ εἰ δῆμοι εἶεν.

2. Mr. Blakesley, in his edition of Herodotos (vi. 7 et al.), seems to me greatly
to exaggerate the amount of true Federal ideas in Ionia. A much truer picture
is given by Bishop Thirlwall (ii. 115. 191), and ΩΝ more clearly by Mr. Grote
(iii, 345). 3 See Herod. i. 142. 148.

4 The Beotian Amphiktyony of Koréneia would be a union of very much the
same kind as these unions among the Asiatic Greeks, if we could conceive it exist-
ing independently of the political Bootian union which had its centre at Thebes.

L

146 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE ΟΒΑΡ.

a special, and that partly a political, end. They differed from

the Amphiktyonies of Old Greece in this. In an Amphiktyony

of the elder kind, the union between the members simply exists

for the sake of the temple. The common temple gives its name

to a body which, except in reference to that temple, has no

Its differ- common being at all. In these unions among the Asiatic Greeks,
ence trom this relation is reversed. The union is much more religious than
Amphi- Political, still it is something more than the mere spiritual
ktyonies. brotherhood of fellow-worshippers in a common temple. The
union does not exist merely to protect the temple, but the

temple, the Panionion, or the like, is itself built as the binding

and consecrating symbol of an union already recognized as exist-

ing. Greeks of the same tribe, settled among barbarian neigh-

bours or subjects, wished to recognize one another as kinsmen,

and often stood in need of one another's help as allies. They

founded a religious union as the badge of their mutual recogni-

tion, and as a means of promoting general harmony and good

Notrue feeling among them. But they had no idea of carrying either
acral national or religious brotherhood so far as to infringe on the
’ inherent separate sovereignty of every Hellenic city. Indeed,

the very isolation of the Ionian cities, and the greatness to which

they speedily rose, would tend to make the feeling of town-
autonomy, if possible, stronger than it was among the cities of

Old Greece. Certain it is, if only from this very advice of

Thalés, that the Ionian Greeks had no permanent union, cemented,

as in the real Leagues, by a common Senate and Assembly.

Thalés proposed to establish a closer union than already existed,

but it may be doubted exactly how close he meant that union to

be. The words of Herodotos may be construed in two ways,’

and in any case his political language is not to be so strictly

pressed as the political language of Thucydidés or Polybios. And

Advice of indeed one can hardly suppose that Thalés himself, notwith-
Thalés ; its standing the evident wisdom of his advice, had attained to the
means: clearness of political vision which distinguishes the two great
political historians of Greece. The language of Herodotos, taken

strictly, might imply that Thalés meant to recommend such an

1 See Blakesley, Herod. i. 170. Professor Rawlinson, in his notes, passes

by this most important passage without notice. In his translation he makes

Thalés say: “ Their other cities might still continue to enjoy their own laws,

just as if they were independent states (κατάπερ el δῆμοι εἶεν)" This is probably

historically true, but it is hard to see what process of construing can get it out of
the words of Herodotos.,

IV THE IONIC AMPHIKTYONY 147

union as that which had fused all the Attic towns into the one
commonwealth of Athens.! Yet when we think of the greatness of
some of the Ionian cities, and their distance from one another, it is
hardly possible to believe that Thalés wished to merge them so com-
pletely into one commonwealth as had been done with the old Attic
cities. No one could think of reducing Ephesos, Milétos, and
Kolophén to the level of Marathén and Eleusis. No one could
think of asking Ephesians, Milésians, and Kolophénians to cease to
be Ephesians, Milésians, and Kolophénians, and to become Teians
instead. It is far more probable that Thalés designed each city to He proba-
retain its separate being as an independent city, and only wished Diy intend-
to form a Federal Council for common consultation and defence Federal.
against the barbarians. If so, this advice of Thalés would be the Union.
earliest instance of a Federal Union being deliberately recom-
mended to a group of separate states by a single political thinker.
But it does not appear that the advice of Thalés produced the least
practical effect. The Ionian Federation remained the mere vision
of one philosophical Milésian; in the mind of every other Ionian the
Greek instinct of autonomous city-government was too strong for
any such scheme even to obtain a hearing. We have here in short
a striking comment on what has been already said as to the im-
portant bearing on our subject of the history of the Delphic
Amphiktyony. The Delphic Amphiktyony is important in a
history of Federal Government, just because it was not a Federal
Government. So the advice of Thalés is important in the same
history, just because it remained advice and was never carried
out into action. The Delphic Amphiktyony came near enough His advice
to a Federal Union of all Greece to have suggested such a not taken ;
Federal Union, had the Greek mind in general felt any need of tion Ν
any union of the kind. That no such Union ever arose out striking
of it is the surest proof how little such an Union was in harmony astra
with Greek political feeling. Still more easily might the Ionic Greek poli-
Amphiktyony have grown into an Ionic League, had the [onians tical ideas.
in general felt any need of an Ionic League. That they rejected
the scheme when it was proposed to them shows more clearly
than anything else how little progress true Federal ideas had
made among them. To the philosophic mind of Thalés the

1 But for the marvellous translation of Professor Rawlinson, one would hardly
have stopped to notice anything so obvious as that the word used by Herodotos
is δῆμοι, or that δῆμοι here means (not “independent states,” but) the local

divisions of Attica. Even the antiquated translation of Beloe shows that its
author understood at least thus much.

148 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cHap.

transition from an Ionic Amphiktyony to an Ionic League
doubtless seemed easy enough. His countrymen from the
various cities were in the habit of assembling for periodical
religious meetings, and even of using these religious meetings,
when occasion served, for real political conferences.1_ To improve
these irregular conferences into a permanent Congress, with
authority in all foreign affairs, would seem to him to be only
a natural developement of a state of things to which every Ionian
was already fully accustomed. But Thalés seems to have been
the only Ionian to whom any such idea occurred. When he
proposed to fix the seat of his Central Government at Teds, he
doubtless thought that he was providing for the liberties of his
proposed League, that he was guarding against the very evils
which had doubtless already begun to show themselves in
Boeeotia.? But Milésian and Ephesian pride would not consent
to surrender an atom of Milésian or Ephesian Sovereignty to a
Federal Council sitting at Teés. This advice of Thalés, and its
fate, also illustrates another remark which I have already made.
It was precisely the greatest and most illustrious cities of Greece
which clung the most pertinaciously to their separate town-
autonomy. Sparta, Athens, and we may fairly add Thebes, were
willing enough to bear rule over other cities ; they were willing
enough to be the chiefs of a body of allies more or less dependent
upon them ; Athens at least was once willing to incorporate other
cities as it were into her own person ; but neither Sparta, Athens,
nor Thebes ever consented to unite with other cities in a free
and equal Federal bond. It was only among the ruder and less
advanced tribes of Greece that the true Federal principle had,
in the days of Thalés, made any visible progress. We cannot
doubt that necessity had already drawn the towns of Phékis and
Akarnania into those Federal unions which we find existing
among them throughout the whole duration of Grecian history.
But the Ionic cities were, in the days of Thalés, among the
foremost cities of the Hellenic name. They were as little likely

1 As, for instance, when the common revolt against Persia obliged an unusual
amount of common action. Then we find (Herod. vi. 7) πρόβουλοι from the
different cities meeting at Teés, and we even find the words (ib. v. 109) τὸ κοινὸν
τῶν ᾿Ιώνων. We may well doubt whether such a formula was commonly used.

2 Blakesley on Herod. vi. 7. ‘‘He would have selected Teds somewhat on the
principle on which the site of Washington was selected for the capita] of the
United States of America. Teds could never become formidable to the inde-
pendence of the members of the Confederation.”

Iv PROJECTED LEAGUE OF OLYNTHOS 149

as Sparta or Athens to follow Phékian or Akarnanian precedents
of union ; they were rather as fully disposed as Sparta or Athens
could be to cleave to the full possession of all those sovereign
rights which the Hellenic mind held to be inherent in every
sovereign Hellenic commonwealth.

Far more important in Grecian history is the attempt made Projected
by Olynthos, shortly after the Peace of Antalkidas, to organize ἰϑαξὰο οὐ
a general confederacy of the Greek and Macedonian cities in (go, 889].
her own neighbourhood. Sparta, as the interpreter and executor
of the Peace, made it her business to hinder any union, whether
it took the form of Federation or of subjection, no less among
the Chalkidic, than among the Beeotian, towns. A Spartan dissolved
army was sent to Chalkidiké; Olynthos was besieged and by Sparta,
compelled to surrender, and the Olynthian union was dis- το 370.
solved. The last great English historian of Greece has given
to this Olynthian confederacy an interest which it certainly
never possessed before.1 There can be no doubt that, seen from Fatal
a general Hellenic point of view, the dissolution of the ois t
Olynthian confederacy was one of the most calamitous events rence OF
in Grecian history. An Olynthian League, or even an Olynthian lution.
Empire, would have given Greece a strong bulwark at the very
point where a bulwark was most needed. An Olynthian League,
or even a liberally administered Olynthian Empire, would have
united all the purely Greek cities of the Macedonian border,
together with the most civilized and most Hellenized portions
of Macedonia itself. Such an united body might well have
formed an effectual barrier against the advance even of Philip
and Alexander. Sparta in truth, by her conquest of Olynthos,
betrayed the Greeks of Thrace to the Macedonian King,? just
as she had already, by the Peace of Antalkidas, betrayed the
Greeks of Asia to the Persian King. It may indeed well be
doubted whether, in a general view of the world’s history, it
would have been a gain to mankind to have cut off the energies
of Alexander from any wider field than that of Illyrian and
Scythian warfare. But, from a purely Greek point of view,
there can be no doubt that the overthrow of the Olynthian
power was a most unfortunate event for the whole of Greece.

And there can be no more doubt as to the character of the
Spartan intervention in Chalkidiké than as to the character of the
1 Grote, x. 67 seqq. 2 ΤΌ, x. 94.

Views of
Mr. Grote,

too favour-.

able to the
designs of
Olynthos.

B.c. 382.

B.c. 874.

Proceed-
ings of
Olynthos
as de-

_ scribed by
Kleigenés.

150 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cnap.

Spartan intervention in Boeotia. All our sympathies lie with
Olynthos as against Sparta and as against Macedonia, just as
all our sympathies lie with the Sacred Band of Thebes alike
when it marched forth to victory at Leuktra and when it
marched forth to defeat at Chairéneia. But it is another
question whether we may not at the same time be called upon
to sympathize with Akanthos and Apollénia against Olynthos,
just as we sympathize with Plataia and Orchomenos even
against the Thebes of Pelopidas and Epameinondas.

It certainly strikes me that Mr. Grote has drawn far too
favourable a picture of the terms on which the Olynthian
League, if League we are to call it, was designed to be formed.
I cannot help suspecting that the great historian of Athenian
Democracy has been a little carried away by admiration for
a city which was at once a bulwark against Macedonia and a
victim of Sparta. The facts of the case, the nature of the union
which Olynthos sought to form, are known only from the speech
made by the Akanthian envoy Kleigenés, when asking for
Lacedzemonian help against Olynthos.! The whole circumstances
of the story cannot fail to remind us of the later story of Poly-
damas of Pharsalos coming to ask—this time to ask in vain—for
Lacedemonian help against Jasén of Pherai.? In the one case
indeed it is a threatening City and in the other it is a threaten-
ing Prince; but Akanthian patriotism seems at least as much
alarmed by the claims of Olynthos as Pharsalian patriotism was
alarmed by the claims of Jasén. Kleigenés, in the speech which
Xenophén puts into his mouth, describes the advances which
Olynthos was making among all the cities in her own neighbour-
hood, both Greek and Macedonian.® She was drawing them

1 Xen. Hell. ν. 2. 11—19.

2 ΤΌ, vi. 1.2. See above, p. 119.

3 The extension of the Olynthian Union to Macedonian cities, and even to
Pella, the greatest of Macedonian cities (Xen. Hell. v. 2. 13) must.show either,
Ist, That there was, as Mr. Grote (x. 70) suggests, a Greek population in these
cities ; or 2nd, That the Macedonian population of these cities, even of the inland
Pella, must already have been largely Hellenized ; or 3rd, That the Macedonians
in general must have been by no means so far removed from Hellenic nationality
as some writers think. The relation between Olynthos and her Macedonian
neighbours is expressed in quite different language from her relations towards her
Thracian neighbours, The Macedonian cities were to be set free from the
Macedonian King (ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ ras τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν ἀπὸ
᾿Αμύντου τοῦ Μακεδόνων βασιλέως. Xen. Hell. v. 2. 12), but the Thracians are
spoken of as the merest subjects or tools (ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ yelrovés εἰσιν αὐτοῖς
Θρᾷκες of ἀβασίλευτοι, ol θεραπεύουσι μὲν καὶ viv ἤδη τοὺς ᾿Ολυνθίους" εἰ δὲ bx

Iv PROPOSED TERMS OF UNION 151

all into close connexion with herself, some, it would seem, with

their own consent, but others without it.1 The nature of this
connexion is described by the Akanthian orator in terms nearly Terms of
the same as those in which the Plataian orator describes the onan b
connexion which Thebes attempted to force upon his own city.” Olynthos,
The inhabitants of the allied towns were to be admitted to some

kind of citizenship at Olynthos, they were to live according to

the Olynthian laws,® and they were to possess common rights of
intermarriage and of holding landed property in each other's
territories. Under many circumstances such terms as these

would have been, as Mr. Grote calls them, hjghly liberal and
generous. If they had been offered to conquered enemies,

they would have been a wonderful improvement upon the
Spartan, the Athenian, or the Theban way of dealing with
conquered enemies. To Greek subjects of the Macedonian King,

or to Macedonians striving after Hellenic civilization, it was

clear political promotion to obtain the franchise of any Greek Acceptable
city on any terms. We are therefore in no way surprised to ae to.
learn that the Macedonian towns thankfully accepted the offers εν

of Olynthos. We are just as little surprised to learn that towns,
Akanthos and Apollénia, and seemingly the Chalkidian cities
generally, altogether rejected them. Nor is it necessary to but reject-
suppose, with Mr. Grote, that their refusal arose from a mere θὰ by the
blind attachment to town-autonomy. It would be at worst acrenp”
pardonable blindness to cleave to that innate political instinct dike, Ὁ
of the Greek mind to which Greece in truth owed her whole
greatness and glory. To expect a Greek city willingly to
exchange its town-autonomy even for a free and equal Federal
relation with other cities, would have been to expect all its
citizens to be, like Thalés, wise beyond their age and country.

But it does not appear that any really free and equal Federal
relation with Olynthos was offered to Akanthos and Apollénia.
Undoubtedly we have before us only one side of the case, and

éxelvous ἔσονται, κιτλ. Ib. 17). That is to say, the Macedonian allies were

worthy of whatever measure of freedom Olynthos thought good to leave to her

Greek allies ; but Thracians, even though advanced enough to do without a King,

were fit only for that subjection which was the natural lot of the barbarian.

1 Xen. Hell. v. 2.18. Al γὰρ ἄκουσαι τῶν πόλεων τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνοῦσαι,
κιτ.λ.

2 See the Plataian Oration of Isokratés (8----11) quoted above, p. 186.

3 Xen. Hell. v. 2.12. Ἐφ᾽ ᾧτε χρῆσθαι νόμοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ συμπολιτεύειν.

4 ΤΌ. v. 2.19. El μέντοι σνγκλεισθήσονται ταῖς τε ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ἐγκτήσεσι
wap’ ἀλλήλοις, ἃς ἐψηφισμένοι εἰσί.

152 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE — cnap.

it would be well if we could compare the statements of the
Akanthian Kleigenés with those of an Olynthian orator in
reply. But one thing is plain; Olynthos offered her terms,
liberal or illiberal, at the point of the sword.’ If Akanthos
willingly consented, well; if not, Olynthos would make war
upon her. And what, after all, did Olynthos offer? Unless
the misrepresentations of the Akanthian orator are most
Real na- impudently flagrant, she offered, not equal union in a common
ture of te Chalkidian League, but mere absorption into the particular
fered, not Commonwealth of Olynthos. What form this absorption would
Feieral have taken may be doubted. A single expression of Démos-
Union, put thenés looks, so far as it is worth anything at all, as if Olynthos
into Olyn- was intended to be the only City strictly speaking. The word
thos. which he employs? is that which denotes, not a League like
Phékis or even like Beotia, but the union of the Attic cities
with Athens. But even if, as in the case of Attica, the full
Olynthian franchise was to be communicated to all the allied
cities, still such a franchise must have proved a mere delusion.
Mere distance, and the greatness of some of the cities concerned,
would have effectually hindered an union after the Attic pattern.
A Federal union was doubtless just what was wanted ; such an
union would have provided the needful bulwark against
Macedonia without violating the independence of any Grecian
city. But there is nothing that shows that any real Federal
Council or Assembly was proposed. Akanthos is required to
accept the laws and citizenship of Olynthos. The Akanthians
naturally answer that they wish to retain their own laws and

1 Xen. Hell. v. 2.13. Πέμψαντες δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ πρὸς ᾿Απολλωνιάτας
οἱ ᾽ολύνθιοι προεῖπον ἡμῖν ὅτι, εἰ μὴ παρεσόμεθα συστρατευσόμενοι, ἐκεῖνοι ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς
ἴοιεν.

2 Dem. Fals. Leg. 298. Οὔπω Χαλκιδέων πάντων εἰς dy συνῳκισμένων.
Pausanias indeed (viii. 27. 2) uses the same word, and its cognate συνοικισμός,
of the foundation of Megalopolis, which was designed to be the capital of a real
Federal State, and Polybios (iv. 33) uses it of the foundation alike of Megalopolis
and of Messéné. But, both at Megalopolis and at Messéné, there was a literal
and physical συνοικισμός, The inhabitants of several Arkadian towns migrated
to the newly-founded Great City ; and the scattered remnants of the Messénian
people were gathered together from various quarters to fill the new Messéné. So
Olynthos itself owed its first origin to another literal συνοικισμός (see Thuc. i. 58);
but it is hardly possible that anything of the sort could now be contemplated ;
Akanthos and Pella were uot to be destroyed, and their inhabitants transported
to Olynthos. But, if the literal sense is excluded, the συνοικισμός can hardly
mean anything except the merging of the political existence of all the other cities
in the one commonwealth of Olynthos.

IV REAL NATURE OF THE OLYNTHIAN SCHEME 153

their own citizenship.1 A Federal union would in no way
have implied the surrender of either. In truth, the aspect of
the whole case looks very much as if what Olynthos really
wished was to reduce the Chalkidian towns to the condition
familiar in Roman political language as the Civitas sine Suffragio.*
They were to cease to be independent commonwealths, which,
in a true Federal union, they would not cease to be; they were
to accept the laws of Olynthos, and to receive the private rights
of Olynthian citizens; but they were to have no _ political
franchise, or at most one which was sure to prove quite illusory.
It is hard to see anything in the whole scheme but a design to
promote Olynthian aggrandizement, by means, if need were, of
Olynthian conquest. The Olynthian mode of conquest was
certainly, as a mode of conquest, singularly mild and liberal ;
and all Greece, could it have seen the future, might well have
rejoiced to see a powerful Greek state, whether an Olynthian
Empire or a Chalkidian League, fixed as a boundary against

1 Xen. Hell. v. 2. 12—14. Ἐφ᾽ ᾧτε χρῆσθαι νόμοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ συμ-
πολιτεύεν . . . .. ἡμεῖς δὲ. .. βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι καὶ
αὐτοπολῖται εἶναι.

3 Thirlwall, ν. 12. ‘They were admitted to that kind of political connection
which the Greeks described by the word sympolity. Their citizens enjoyed all
the civil rights of citizens of the sovereign city. They were capable of acquiring
property in land in the Olynthian territory, and of allying themselves with
Olynthian families; but they were excluded from all the privileges which were
exercised in the Olynthian assembly, and were compelled to submit to the laws,
and, it seems also, to adopt the constitution of the ruling state.”

Without quite pledging myself to the words in Italics (for some illusory sort
of Olynthian franchise seems quite conceivable), I certainly think that Bishop
Thirlwall’s picture of the Olynthian design is, as a whole, far truer than Mr.
Grote’s. So Drumann, though his exact view is somewhat different ; “Wie die
Thebaner in Béotien, so suchten die Olynthier in Chalcidice gewaltsam einen
Stidteverein zu griinden . . . ganz Chalcidice zm einem Stidtevereine zu verbinden,
dessen Haupt es wurde.”—Verfall, 440. 1.

3 Mr. Grote relies much on the saying of Kleigenés that the cities were then
indeed unwilling to be incorporated with Olynthos, but that it would be difficult
to separate them from the Olynthian connexion when they had once tasted its
advantages, Very true, but what were the main advantages spoken of? Not
the private or public rights of Olynthian citizens, but unlimited plunder under
Olynthian banners. After mentioning the expected influence of the ἐπιγαμέαι
and ἐγκτήσεις, he continues (Xen. Hell. v. 2. 19), εἰ. . . γνώσονται ὅτι μετὰ
τῶν κρατούντων ἕπεσθαι κερδαλέον ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ ᾿Αρκάδες, ὅταν μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἴωσι,
τά τε αὑτῶν σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἁρπάζουσιν, ἴσως οὐκέθ᾽ ὁμοίως εὔλντα ἔσται,
Of course the ἐπιγαμίαι and ἐγκτήσεις, even without any political franchise,
would do something, but the main attraction is the prospect of gain through the
contemplated conquests of Olynthos, just as the Arkadian allies of Sparta gained
by service in the Spartan armies. This is hardly the notion of Federal union
entertained either by Aratos or by Washington.

154 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE o#ap.

Macedonian aggression. But certainly the Olynthian scheme,
as described in the only extant contemporary account of it,!
does not seem to answer the description of a true Federal
connexion nearly so closely as some much more obscure unions
of Grecian cities which already existed.

Shortly after this attempt at Federal union—if Federal union
we are to consider it—in Northern Greece—a far more promising
Federal attempt was made to establish a Federal state in Arkadia. The
Union of decline of the Lacedsmonian power after the battle of Leuktra
ARKADIA, eas . . .
5ο. 370. Opened the way for political changes and new combinations in
Little pre- all parts of Greece. The Arkadian race, though one of the most
Vion im ancient and most numerous divisions of the Grecian name, had
i ikadia. Bitherto been little heard of in Grecian history. Since the pre-
dominance of Sparta in Peloponnésos had been firmly established,
the Arkadians had chiefly appeared in the character in which
they are described in the speech of Kleigenés of Akanthos, that
namely of submissive allies of Sparta, following her banners for
the sake of the plunder to be derived from Spartan conquests.
History of The city of Mantineia alone had, on several occasions, taken a
Mantineia; more prominent and independent part in Grecian affairs. In
s.c. 420. the interval between the Peace of Nikias and the Sicilian Expe-
dition, Mantineia appears, together with Argos and Elis, as a
leader of anti-Spartan movements within Peloponnésos.? In the
herde- second period of Spartan supremacy, after the Peace of Antal-
struction kidas, Mantineia incurred the wrath of Sparta to that degree that
by Spart® she, a Hellenic ci lled in the Homeric catalogue,?
B.o. 386, 886, ἃ Hellenic city, enrolled in the Homeric catalogue,” was
degraded from the rank of a city, and her inhabitants were dis-
tributed among the four villages whose union, at some ante-
historic and even ante-mythic period, was said to have been the
first origin of the Mantineian state. It may be that, as the Lace-
1 We can hardly set against the contemporary description of Kleigenés such
vague expressions as we find in the speech of Chlaineas in Polybios (ix. 28), ἦν τι
σύστημα τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης Ἑλλήνων, obs ἀπῴκισαν ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς, ὧν
μέγιστον εἶχε πρόσχημα καὶ δύναμιν ἡ τῶν ᾿Ολυνθίων πόλις. Here, though the
pre-eminent position of Olynthos is clearly set forth, we do find the word σύστημα,
the technical name for true Federations like those of Achaia and Lykia, used to
denote the relation between the Chalkidian cities and Olynthos. But a casual
expression used so long after does not prove much, and moreover Chlaineas seems
to be speaking of the times immediately before Philip, to which his language
would be still less appropriate. 2 See Thuc. v. 45 et seqq.
3 ἢ, B. 607. Kal Τεγέην εἶχον καὶ Moyrwény ἐρατεινήν.
4 Xen. Hell. ν. 2. 1—7. Καθῃρέθη μὲν τὸ τεῖχος, διῳκίσθη δ᾽ ἡ Μαντίνεια
τετραχῇ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾧκουν. Cf. Pol. iv. 27.

Iv EARLY HISTORY OF ARKADIA 155

demonian partisan Xenophdn tells us, there were Mantineian
oligarchs base enough to find a selfish satisfaction in this degra-

dation of their native city.1_ It is more certain that, as soon as

the Spartan power was broken at Leuktra, the members thus
violently separated were again united. Mantineia appeared Its restora-
once more as a city, and again began to take an important part #02. Β.0.
in the affairs of Arkadia and of Hellas.2 Mantineian patriotism

now took a bolder flight than it had ever taken before. The
reunion of Mantineia was only to be the precursor of the union Plan of an
of all Arkadia. Up to this time there had been no real political oraacian
connexion between the different branches of the Arkadian name. 4.0,
The different cities and districts had retained some vague notions

of national kindred, and some degree of unity, as in Jonia and
elsewhere, had been kept up by common religious rites.> Arkadia,

in short, formed an Amphiktyony of its own, an institution per- Arkadian
haps the more needful for a people who had no share in the ΤΙ ‘to
general Delphic Amphiktyony. But hitherto the connexion perety
had been purely Amphiktyonic; we find no trace of any real Amphi-
political union between the several Arkadian towns. Mantineia Ktyonic.
and Tegea, the two chief among them, were frequently hostile to

one another. At this very time we find them in marked oppo-

sition; Tegea adhered to the interest of Sparta, while Man-

tineia naturally attached herself to the rising power of Thebes.

Under such circumstances, the formation of a general Arkadian
Federation was at once a noble conception and a most difficult
undertaking. Its author appears to have been Lykomédés of
Mantineia,‘ who certainly merits thereby a high place among the
statesmen of Greece. His design for an Arkadian union em- Plans of
braced a plan for a real Federal Government, and it gave the Lykomé-
Federal principle a much wider scope than had ever before been

opened to it in Grecian affairs. The scheme of Lykomédés was

a noble and generous one, and, though it bore but little imme-

1 Xen. Hell. v. 2. 7.

3 ΤΌ. vi. 5.3. ᾿Εξ ὧν δὴ καὶ of Μαντινεῖς, ws ἤδη αὐτόνομοι παντάπασιν ὄντες,
συνῆλθόν τε πάντες καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο μίαν πόλιν τὴν Μαντίνειαν ποιεῖν, καὶ
τειχίζειν τὴν πόλιν. This shows that Mantineian satisfaction at the διοικισμός
must have been confined to a few oligarchs.

8 See Grote, x. 284.

4 Diodéros (xv. 59) attributes the first idea of the Arkadian union to a Lyko-
médés of Tegea. This is probably merely one of his characteristic blunders,
though it is curious that a misconstruction of a passage of Pausanias (viii. 27. 2)
has led some scholars to a belief in a Lykomédés of Tegea on quite independent
grounds. See Thirlwall, v. 110.

Arkadian
union to be
strictly
Federal.

Temporary
success of
the Federal
scheme.

Founda-
tion of
Megalo-
polis, B.C.
370.

156 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE — cnar.

diate fruit, yet its memory, no doubt, contributed hints to the
great Federal statesmen of later Greece. It also served the
cause of Federalism in another way; its one great result, the
foundation of Megalopolis, gave Federal Greece some of the
noblest of her leaders. Lykomédés designed a Federal Govern-
ment in the strictest sense; he did not, like the politicians of
Thebes and Olynthos, seek for any invidious supremacy for his
own city ; his plans contemplated a free and equal union of the
whole Arkadian name. The union was to be strictly Federal ;
the several cities were not to lose their existence as free Hellenic
commonwealths, but Arkadia, as towards all other states, was to
be one;/ the united Arkadian body was to have a Federal As-
sembly, Federal magistrates, and a Federal army. To avoid all
jealousies between existing cities, to cut off all rivalry between
Tegea and Mantineia, all fear of the new constitution proving a
mere cloak for a supremacy on the part of either, a new Federal
Capital was to be founded as the seat of the Central Government
of the Arkadian people. And all this was no mere vision ; the
success of the scheme was indeed but temporary, but it did
succeed for a while, and it was no fault of Lykomédés if more
selfish politicians undid his noble work. For a few brilliant
years Arkadia was really one; Mantineia did not envy Tegea,
and Tegea did not vex Mantineia. Megalopolis, the Great City,
arose as the Washington of the new Federation, and there the
general Arkadian Assembly met to transact the general Federal
affairs of the Arkadian nation. And if this great and wholesome
change was not brought about absolutely without violence, it
certainly was brought about with much less violence than any
other change of equal moment in recorded Grecian history. <A
local revolution at the right moment? took away all danger
from the Lacedemonian tendencies of Tegea. Tegea joined the

1 Xen. Hell. vi. 5.6. ᾿Ενῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι re πᾶν τὸ ᾿Αρκαδικὸν, καὶ ὅ τι
νικῴη ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων. The Lacedemonian
partisan is of course disposed to exaggerate the degree in which the Federal
power trenched on the independence of the several cities. But in every
Federal Government worthy of the name the central power is κύριος καὶ τῶν
πόλεων in all matters coming within its own competence, and it is clear that the
Arkadian κοινόν did not destroy the separate existence of the Arkadian cities as
States or Cantons. It would have been well if Xenophén had told us how the
process of νικᾷν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ was effected, whether the majority of the Ten Thou-
sand was ascertained by counting heads, or whether each city had a distinct vote.
The latter is more consonant with Greek Federal practice.

2 See the account of the Tegean revolution in Xen. Hell. vi. 5. 7 et seqq.
Cf. Grote, x. 285.

Iv TEMPORARY FEDERAL UNION OF ARKADIA 157

League; nearly all Arkadia, and a few towns whose Arkadian
character was doubtful,! entered into it with delight. Orcho-
menos indeed, and a few other towns,’ still clave to their com-
plete separate autonomy. That they were compelled by force ®
to share the common destinies of the nation was doubtless not
abstractedly justifiable, but we could hardly expect it to be
otherwise. There are no signs of general compulsion on one
side and general unwillingness on the other, such as we have
seen in the cases of Thebes and Olynthos. With what zeal the
scheme was adopted in most parts of Arkadia, we learn from an
incidental notice in the hostile Xenophén.‘ Agésilaos reached
the Arkadian town of Eutaia, and found in it only old men,
women, and children. Every male of the military age had gone
to attend the Arkadian Constituent Assembly, and to take his
share in the formation of the Arkadian Federal Constitution.®

General
adhesion of
Arkadia to

the League.

For the details of the Arkadian constitution we are, as usual, Constitu-

left to incidental notices. Here we have again to deplore the
loss of the great political work of Aristotle. All that is pre-
served of his account of Arkadian matters amounts to the fact
that he mentioned the Assembly of the Ten Thousand ; not a
detail survives.© Xenophdén, the bitter Lacedemonian partisan,
could have told us everything if he had chosen, but he does not
even record the foundation of Megalopolis. The existence of
the Great City, like that of its sister Messéné, was so glorious
for Epameinéndas, so disgraceful and calamitous for Sparta, that
the renegade Athenian had not the heart to insert their names
in his history. Yet it is from Xenophén’s occasional notices
that we have to glean most of the little which we do know of
the details of the Arkadian Federal system. The League had a
Federal Assembly which met at Megalopolis, and was known as

1 Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 26. So vii. 4. 12 (Bo. 365). Καταλαμβάνουσιν ol
᾿Ηλεῖοι Λασίωνα, τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ἑαυτῶν ὄντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι συντελοῦντα els
τὸ ᾿Αρκαδικόν.

3 Xen. Hell. vi. δ. 10, 11. δ Ib, 18. 22. 4 Ib. 12.

δ Ib. Τοὺς ἐν τῇ στρατευσίμῳ ἡλικίᾳ olxopévous els τὸ ᾿Αρκαδικόν. See Grote,
x. 287. Bishop Thirlwall (v. 117, note) seems to take another view, but is not
this Assembly at Asea the same as the meeting which he himself describes in
p. 110% If we suppose this Assembly to have been armed like some instances
in Achaia and elsewhere (see p. 215), the Assembly and the army would in fact
be the same thing, and there would be hardly any perceptible difference between
the views of Bishop Thirlwall and Mr. Grote. It is not however likely (see
p. 158, note 2) that this military character of the Assembly would be retained as
a permanent institution. . The instances in Achaia are rare, and are accounted
for by special circumstances. 6 See Arist. Pol. (ed. Oxon. 1837), p. 800.

tion of the

League.

The
Assembly
of Ten
Thousand ;

its Consti-
tution.

Powers of
the Ten
Thousand.

Probable
existence
of a
Senate.

158 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cuap.

the Ten Thousand.! As to the constitution of this Assembly
there has been some doubt, but the most probable opinion is
that which represents it as being, like the Achaian Assembly of
later times, open to every citizen of every Arkadian city who
chose to attend.2 That it was a representative Assembly, in the
sense of being composed of chosen delegates, seems unlikely,
both from the greatness of the number, and because there is no
parallel for such an Assembly of Delegates in any known Grecian
commonwealth. The Assembly, especially during the enthusiasm
of the first days of the League, would doubtless be largely at-
tended, and ten thousand is a large attendance, when we re-
member that five thousand citizens was above the average
attendance in the Athenian Assembly. There is no need to
infer from the name Ten Thousand that there really was any
fixed number. The name was undoubtedly in familiar use, but
it need not have been a formal title ;* it is most likely only a
vague, and probably an exaggerated, way of expressing the vast
numbers of the Arkadian Assembly. The functions of the Ten
Thousand were those which were commonly vested in the
sovereign Assembly of a Grecian commonwealth. The Ten
Thousand made war and peace in the name of all Arkadia,5
they received and listened to the ambassadors of other Greek
states ;® they regulated and paid the standing army of the
Federation ; ἴ they sat in judgement on political offenders against
the collective majesty of the Arkadian League.® That they
were assisted in their deliberations by a smaller Senate is not
distinctly asserted ; but we might fairly infer it from the analogy
of other Greek states, and the results of antiquarian research
have made it almost certain that the Arkadian Assembly did

1 Ol μύριοι. Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 38 et pass. Dem. F. L. 220, etc. The name
constantly occurs.

2 This is the view of Mr. Grote (x. 317), and it seems more in accordance
with general Greek notions on such matters. Bishop Thirlwall (v. 117) discusses
several other views. I can hardly persuade myself either that the Assembly was
an army, or that it consisted wholly of Megalopolitans. This last notion seems
opposed to the whole nature of the League. 3 Thue. viii. 72.

4 The common formula for a Greek Confederation, τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ᾿Αρκάδων,
is used as equivalent to οἱ μύριοι. Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 35, 38.

5 Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 2. Λυκομήδης. . . πείθει τοὺς μυρίους πράττειν περὶ
συμμαχίας πρὸς αὐτούς. Cf. vii. 1. 38, and Diod. xv. 59.

6 Dem. F. L. 220.

7 The ἐπάριτοι or ἐπίλεκτοι. Diod. xv. 62. Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 22, 33.

8 See the trial of the Mantineian προστάται (were these Magistrates, or merely
popular leaders ?) in the passage of Xenophén last quoted.

Iv CONSTITUTION OF THE ARKADIAN LEAGUE 159

not depart from the usual pattern! There were Federal Magis-

trates, whose titles are not recorded ;? and at the head of the

whole League there seems to have been, as in so many other

cases, a single Federal General.’ These Federal officers, we cannot Federal

doubt, were elected by the Assembly of the Ten Thousand. piagis-
The Federal capital of Megalopolis- was formed by the union Founda-

gathered together as citizens of the Great City. In a few ne
instances we regret to hear that compulsion was employed,® but 970 '

in most cases the inhabitants of the small Arkadian townships
gladly accepted their offered promotion to the rank of citizens of

the national capital. It may perhaps be doubted whether the
choice of any city as the place of Federal meeting was perfectly

wise ; a better place might perhaps have been found, as in the

case of the Phékian League,’ under the shadow of some great

1 Pausanias (viii. 82. 1) speaks of the Θερσίλιον at Megalopolis, which he
defines as τὸ βουλευτήριον ὃ τοῖς μυρίοις ἐπεποίητο ᾿Αρκάδων. Colonel Leake
finds its ruins in the position, near the Theatre, pointed out by Pausanias, and
concludes that, ‘though it may have been subservient to the uses of the Council
of Ten Thousand, it could hardly have been employed for its actual assembly, as
such a multitude could only have been seated in a theatre-shaped edifice.”
(Morea, ii. 39.) Bishop Thirlwall (v. 116) infers from this, with great proba-
bility, that there was a Senate, and that this Θερσίλιον was its place of meeting.
This view is also confirmed by the use of the word βουλευτήριον by Pausanias.
The Ten Thousand were not a βουλή, nor would they meet in a βουλευτήριον.
The Ten Thousand themselves doubtless met, as Colonel] Leake suggests, in the
Theatre ; but hard by their own place of meeting was the smaller βουλευτήριον,
for the use of the βουλή, the Committee chosen, by lot or otherwise, from among
the Ten Thousand, to discharge the usual functions of a Greek Senate. The
word βουλευτήριον (see p. 239, note 2) does seem to be occasionally used for the
place of meeting of the Achaian Assembly, but we have seen (p. 240) that there
is reason to believe that the Achaian Assemblies were often much more thinly
attended than the Arkadian Ten Thousand. But the Achaian Assembly also
sometimes met in a theatre.

2"Apxoyres are mentioned, Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 24; 4. 83. Their formal title
may or may not have been Archon.

8 This seems implied in such expressions as (Xen. Hell. vii. 8, 1) Alvéas
Στυμφάλιος, στρατηγὸς τῶν ᾿Αρκάδων γεγενημένος ; (Diod. xv. 62) Λυκομήδης
ὁ Μαντινεὺς, στρατηγὸς ὧν τῶν ᾿Αρκάδων.

4 From the language of Pausanias (viii. 27. 7) and Strabo (viii. 8. 1) it seems
that some of the cities were actually deserted, while others were simply reduced
to the condition of dependent villages or perhaps of municipal towns. These last
were, at a late time (see p. 489), restored to an equality with the capital, as inde-
pendent cantons of the Achaian League.

δ Paus. viii. 27. 5,6. Οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν καὶ ἄκοντες ἀνάγκῃ κατήγοντο és τὴν
Μεγάλην πόλιν», κιτ.λ.

6 Ib. viii. 27. 3—5. Ὑπό τε προθυμίας καὶ διὰ τὸ ἔχθος τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων
πατρίδας σφίσιν οὔσας ἐκλιπεῖν ἐπείθοντο... ΠΕ συνελέγοντο és τὴν Μεγάλην
πόλιν σπουδῇ, K.7.r. 7 See above, p. 118.

Advanta-
geous posi-
tion of the
Federal
Capital.

Decline
of the
Arkadian
League.

160 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE — cuap.

national sanctuary, such as the great temple of the Arkadian
Zeus. But if Federal Arkadia was to have a capital at all, there
can be no doubt as to the wisdom of the choice actually made.
Here we may, with Pausanias,! discern the guiding genius of
Epameinéndas. To have chosen Mantineia, Tegea, or any othér
of the ancient cities, as the Federal capital, would have opened
the way to innumerable jealousies, and might even have led to
the same evils of which the Arkadians had such a living example
before their eyes among their own Beotian allies. And Epa-
meinéndas himself, when acting as the counsellor of the Arkadians,
would doubtless see the danger as clearly as any Arkadian ; in
Arkadia he would advise for the good of all Arkadia, and not be
warped by that narrow local patriotism which led even him to
sacrifice the general welfare of Boeotia to the selfish interests of
Thebes. Had the Ten Thousand met at Mantineia or Tegea,
the noble scheme of Lykomédés might only have led to the
destruction of that which he had most at heart; he might have
become the founder, not of a really equal Arkadian Confedera-
tion, but of a mere Mantineian or Tegean Empire over Arkadia.
Such a danger was much less to be dreaded from a new city
called into being at the will, and for the purposes, of the Con-
federation itself. And, besides this, the Great City, as its later
history shows, occupied a most important military position. It
commanded one of the main passes by which Sparta used to pour
her troops into Arkadia. Some such bulwark as was supplied
by Megalopolis was imperatively required for the safety of the
country. And it was the more needed, because the other chief
city of southern Arkadia, and that which commanded the other
approach, was Tegea, so lately gained over from subserviency to
Spartan interests, and still probably containing a party unfavour-
able to the national cause. These considerations might reconcile
even distant members to the position of the Federal capital, not
in the centre of the Confederation, but on its most exposed
border. With Epameinéndas no doubt the chief object was
effectually to shut Sparta in, Megalopolis keeping her in check
from the north, and the other new city of Messéné from the west.

The Arkadian League, as an important Greek power, did not

1 Pausanias distinctly recognizes Epameinéndas as the true founder of Mega-
lopolis. Paus. viii. 27. 2. γνώμῃ μὲν τοιαύτῃ συνῳκίζοντο ol ᾿Αρκάδες, τῆς
πόλεως δὲ οἰκιστὴς ᾿Επαμεινώνδας ὁ Θηβαῖος σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ καλοῖτο ἂν, τούς τε yap
᾿Αρκάδας οὗτος ἣν ὁ ἐπεγείρας ἐς τὸν συνοικισμὸν, K.T.X.

ι

Iv DECLINE OF THE ARKADIAN LEAGUE 161

last long. We are not well informed as to the steps of its
decline ; but, before the death of Epameinéndas, Mantineia and 8.6. 362.
Tegea were again hostile cities. Their positions, during the last

stage of his warfare, are singularly reversed from what they had

been eight years before. Mantineia is now the ally of Lace-
dzmén, and Tegea is the stronghold of the Theban interest in History of
Peloponnésos. Megalopolis always remained a considerable city, Mg ο-
though it did not wholly answer the intentions of its founders, ?° is]
either in its extent or in its political importance. At a later

period we find it a zealous ally of Macedonia; later still it
appears in the more honourable character of an important
member of the Achaian League, illustrious as the birthplace of
Lydiadas, Philopoimén, and Polybios. The Assembly of the

Ten Thousand survived the loss of Lykomédés and of Epamei- s.c. 347.
ndéndas ; - Aischinés and Démosthenés pleaded before it;! and
Démosthenés uses language which implies that it still at least
professed to act in the name of the whole Arkadian people.’
Démosthenés himself pleaded the cause of Megalopolitan inde- B.c. 353.
pendence before the Athenian Assembly,? when the Arkadian

city was again threatened by Sparta and defended by Thebes,‘

and when a faction in Megalopolis itself, as before in Mantineia, -
desired the dissolution of the Great City and the restoration

of their own influence over its former petty townships. Later

again, in the war between Agis and Antipater, all Arkadia 8.0. 380.
except Megalopolis took the patriotic side; Megalopolis stood a

siege in the interest of Macedonia,® and its losses were repaid

by a pecuniary compensation levied on the vanquished cities.’
Opposition to Sparta would naturally drive Megalopolis into
alliance with Macedonia, and it may well be believed that, in the

days of Macedonian domination, selfish interests may have made

the position of a powerful city in close alliance with Macedonia

appear preferable to that of a Federal capital of Arkadia.
Certain it is that, from this time forward, the Macedonian interest

was very strong in Megalopolis, and equally certain that no
general Arkadian League existed when the Achaian League

began to be organised. The great scheme of Lykomédés, the

most promising that any Grecian statesmen had yet designed,

had altogether fallen asunder. And yet his labours were far

1 Dem. F. L. 220. 2 See ib. 10, 11.
2 In the oration ὑπὲρ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν. * See Thirlwall, v. 8367—70.
® Thirlwall, v. 368. 6 Esch. Ktes. 165. 7Q. Curt, vi, 1. 21.

M

Pretended
scheme of
Federal
Union in
EUBOIA.
B.C. 351.

162 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cHAP.

from being wholly fruitless. He had given a model for the
statesmen of later generations to follow, and he had founded the
city which was to give birth to the most illustrious Greeks of
the last age of Grecian independence.

After this Arkadian Confederacy, which, if it had a poor
ending, at all events had a grand beginning, it may seem almost
ludicrous to quote a mere abortive scheme, or pretence at a
scheme, our whole knowledge of which is contained in a single
sentence of a hostile orator. Kallias, the Tyrant of Chalkis, he
who was defeated by Phékién at Tamynai, veiled, if we may

Schemes of believe Auschinés, his schemes of ambition under the pretext of

Kallias of
Chalkis.

A.D. 1859.

Evidence
of the
growth of
Federal
ideas in
Greece.

The
LYKIAN
6:
its excel-
lent Con-
stitution.

founding a general Euboian Council or Assembly in his own
city. Not a detail is given us, but the words employed seem
to show that a pretence at true Federalism was the -bait. A
Federal scheme proceeding from such a source would probably
have borne more likeness to the abortive scheme of an Italian
League put forth by Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, than to the
noble works of Aratos and Washington. But in either ‘case the
bait of a Federal Constitution was an instance of the homage
which vice pays to virtue. WhenaGreek Tyrant hit upon such
a device to cover his schemes of aggrandizement, it is clear that
the Federal principle was now gradually working its way to that
influence over the Greek mind which it certainly did not possess
in the preceding century, and which it emphatically did possess
in the century which followed.

§ 4. Of the Lykian League

I will end this chapter with a notice of one Federation more,
one not within the limits of Greece, and whose citizens were not
Greek by race, but which was so clearly formed after Greek
models that it may, in a political history, fairly claim a place in
the list of Greek Federal Governments. I mean the wise and
well-balanced Confederation of Lykia; whose constitution has
won the highest praise from Montesquieu ὅ in the last century,

1 Xisch. Ktes. 89. Καλλίας ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς, μικρὸν διαλιπὼν χρόνον, πάλιν ἧκε
φερόμενος εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, Εὐβοϊκὸν μὲν τῷ λόγῳ συνέδριον ἐς Χαλκίδα συνάγων,
ἰσχυρὰν δὲ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἔργῳ παρασκευάζων, ἐξαίρετον δ᾽ αὑτῷ τυραννίδα
“προσποιούμενος. Cf. Dict. Biog. art. Callias.

2 Esprit des Lois, ix.3. ‘‘S’il falloit donner un modéle d’une belle république
fédérative, je prendrois la république de J.ycie.’

Iv THE LYKIAN LEAGUE 163

and from Bishop Thirlwall! in the present. The antiquities
and the language of Lykia have lately attracted the atten-
tion of scholars in no small measure. To the political
inquirer the country is no less interesting, as possessing
what was probably the best constructed Federal Government
that the ancient world beheld. The account given by Strabo,
our sole authority, is so full, clear, and brief, that I cannot
do better than translate it. The “ancestral constitution of
the Lykian League,”? is described by the great geographer in
these words :—

“There are three and twenty cities which have a share in
the suffrage, and they come together from each city in the Strabo's
common Federal Assembly,® choosing for their place of meeting scorn οὗ
any city which they think best. And, among the cities, the Gonatitu.
greatest are possessed ὁ of three votes apiece, the middle ones of tion.
two, and the rest of one; and in the same proportion they pay
taxes,° and take their share of other public burthens. And the
six greatest cities, according to Artemidéros, are Xanthos,
Patara, Pinara, Olympos, Myra, Tlé6s, which lies in the direction
of Kibyra. And, in the Federal Assembly,’ first the Lykiarch
is chosen and then the other Magistrates of the League,’ and
bodies of Federal Judges are appointed ;® and formerly they
used to consult about war, and peace, and alliance; this now, of
course, they cannot do, but these things must needs rest with
the Romans, unless such action be allowed by them, or be found
useful on their behalf; and in like manner also judges and

1 ii, 116. ‘*The Lycians set an example of the manner in which the advan-
tages of aclose federal union might be combined with mutual independence. . .
Had the Greeks on the western coast of Asia adopted similar institutions, their
history, and even that of the mother-country, might have been very different from
what it became.”

3 Strabo, xiv. 3. 2. Ἡ πάτριος διοίκησις τοῦ Λυκιακοῦ συστήματος.

Σύστημα (Pol. ii. 41) is one of the technical names for a Federation. The
Lykians also used the more formal designation Λυκίων τὸ κοινὸν (C. 1. 4279) and
the equally familiar ἔθνος (C. I. 4239 et al.)

3 Strabo, xiv. 3. 38. Συνέρχονται δὲ ἐξ ἑκάστης πόλεως els κοινὸν συνέδριον.
{For a list of the Lykian cities see Appendix IT.]

4 Ib. Tpidy ψήφων ἐστὶν ἑκάστη κυρία.

5 Ib. Tas εἰσφορὰς εἰσφέρουσι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας λειτουργίας.

6 It would be worth inquiring whether all of these six great cities rejoiced in
the title of λαμπροτάτη μητρόπολις τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνους. It was certainly borne by
Tide, Xanthos, and Patara. See Ὁ. I. 4240c, 4276, 4280 et al.

7 Strabo, u.s. "Ev τῷ συνεδρίῳ. On the word συνέδριον, see p. 263.

8 Ib, "άλλαι ἀρχαὶ al τοῦ συστήματος.

9. ΤΌ Δικαστήριά τε ἀποδείκνυται κοινῇ

His testi-
mony to its
practical
working.

B.C. 29-—
A.D. 18.

Merits of
the Lykian
Constitu-
tion ;
NoCapital;

The As-
sembly
Primary
not Repre-
sentative.

164 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE = cap.

-.....-... ET

magistrates! are appointed from each city, in proportion to the
number of its votes.

On the practical working of this constitution Strabo bestows
the highest praise. Lykia was, in his day, a Roman dependency,
but it retained its own laws and internal government, which he
himself beheld in as high a state of efficiency as was consistent
with the dependent condition of the commonwealth in its external
relations.

The merits of this Lykian constitution are obvious. It
avoids nearly every error into which other Confederations had
fallen. There is no capital, no Thebes, not even a Megalopolis :
the Federal Assembly meets wherever it finds it convenient to
do so. At the same time, it avoids the opposite evil, from which
we shall find that even the Achaian League was not free, that of
giving the greatest city no more weight in the Federal Assembly
than the smallest. A League of cities must always find it very
difficult to steer clear of both these opposite dangers. The
Lykians seem to have done so very successfully.

There can, I think, be no doubt that the Lykian Assembly,
like the Achaian and other Assemblies of the kind, was a primary
and not a representative body. I cannot believe that it was
composed merely of deputies from the several cities? The words
of Strabo seem to me to imply, not that each city sent one, two,
or three representatives, but that each city had one, two, or three
votes. According to the general analogy of the Greek and Italian
commonwealths, every Lykian citizen® would have a right to
attend, speak, and vote, but the citizens of each town would
vote separately. Thus, in a government not Federal, the Roman
Tribes voted separately; thus the Nations in the Scotch
Universities do to this day. The vote of each City, Tribe, or
Nation, is determined by a majority within itself, and the final
vote is determined by the majority, not of heads, but of Tribes

1 Strabo, us. Δικασταὶ καὶ ἄρχοντες. This of course means Federal Judges
and Federal Magistrates, the ἀρχαί and δικαστήρια mentioned just before. Mon-
tesquieu perverts this into “les juges et les magistrats des villes.” He has also
misled Hamilton in the “ Federalist,” No. ix. (p. 48).

4 Dr. Schmitz (Dict. Geog. art. Lycia), and Kortiim (Geschichte Griechenlands,
iii. 313), seem to maintain this view.

3 The democratic character of the League is clear both from the democratic
character of the several cities, the local δῆμοι of which are constantly mentioned
in the Inscriptions, and from the distinct testimony of one inscription at Tlés
(C. I. 4289) where an anonymous worthy is praised as εὐεργέτην τοῦ δήμου and
διατηρήσαντα τούς τε νόμους καὶ τὴν πάτριον δημοκρατίαν.

Iv MERITS OF THE LYKIAN CONSTITUTION 165

or Cities. In the Primary Assembly of a large district some
such arrangement as this is absolutely necessary, in order to put
distant Tribes or Cities on an equality with those which are near
the place of meeting. If the votes in the Roman Assembly had
been taken by heads, the mob of the Forum could always have
outvoted the genuine agricultural plebeians. But, in most of Apportion-
the ancient constitutions, each member, each Tribe or City, vine of
. . otes to

whether great or small, had only a single vote. This was numbers.
manifestly unfair, and might easily lead to discontents. Thus
the Italian Allies of Rome bitterly complained when they were,
after the Social War, admitted indeed to the Roman citizenship, s.c, 88.
but distributed among eight tribes only among the thirty-five.'
They were.equal in number to the former citizens, but, by this
arrangement, they could, at the utmost, command only eight
votes, less than one-fourth of the whole number. Thus, on any
questions which concerned their special interests, they were left
in a perpetual and hopeless minority. The Lykians avoided this
danger by giving to their cities a greater or less number of votes
according to their size, being the first recorded instance of an
attempt to apportion votes to population. Those Xanthians who
might be present in any Assembly determined the vote of
Xanthos by a majority among themselves ; that vote counted as
three in reckoning up the decisive vote of the Assembly. The
vote of a smaller city, ascertained in the same way, counted as
two or as one.” But though such a system was not really
representative, it was a very near approach to the representative
principle. No doubt, alike in Lykia, Achaia, and Rome, the
vote of a distant Tribe or City was often canvassed at home, and
perhaps practically decided, before the general Assembly met.
At any rate those citizens of any city who were present would
know and express the wishes of their fellow-citizens who remained

1 Vell. Pat. ii. 20. 2.

2 A small confederation (σύστημα), consisting of Kibyra and three other towns,
in which Kibyra had two votes and the other towns one each, was probably a
humble imitation of the Lykian League. Strabo, xiii. 4.17. [Cf. the small con-
federation of Zug; see the French Continuation of J. von Miiller’s History of the
Swiss Confederation, xiv. 226.] As Kibyra was always under Tyrants, though well
disposed Tyrants (ἐτυραννεῖτο δ᾽ ἀεί" σωφρόνως δ᾽ Suws), one would like to know
how the Monarchic and the Federal elements were reconciled. The mere use of
the word Tyrant, and not King, implies republican forms.

Even the Gauls in Asia (Strabo, xii. 5. 1) seem to have made some rude
approach to Federal ideas; but these utterly obscure constitutions are really

matters of archeology rather than of politics.
3 See Niebuhr, Hist. Rom. ii. 29, 30. Eng. Tr.

Approach
to Repre-
sentative
Govern-
ment.

A Senate
not men-
tioned, but
its exist-
ence to be
inferred
from
analogy.

Federal
Magis-
trates.

166 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cnar.

at home. It would have been a comparatively small change, if
each city had formally elected as many of its citizens as it had
votes, and had sent them with authority to speak in its name in
the Federal body. But the change does not seem ever to have
actually been made. In this, as in so many other cases, the
ancient world trembled on the very verge of representative
government without ever actually crossing the boundary.!

The description of Strabo does not mention a Federal Senate.
But the universal practice of the Greek commonwealths may
make us feel certain that there was a Senate, of some sort or
other, in Lykia no less than in Arkadia. The several cities of
Lykia had each their local Senates,? and we may be sure that
the Federal Constitution followed the same universal model. It
need not surprise us that a thing almost certain to be taken for
granted is not directly mentioned. The Athenian Senate is not
very often spoken οὗ ; it is never so prominent as at the moment
of its destruction by the Four Hundred.’ The very existence of
the Arkadian Senate has, as we have seen, mainly to be inferred
from the dimensions of an architectural monument. We may
therefore be sure that the Lykian Assembly, like other Greek
Assemblies, was assisted by a preconsidering Senate, but we
cannot tell what the exact constitution of that Senate was.

As for the Federal Magistrates mentioned by Strabo, their
titles are not mentioned, except that of Lykiarch, borne by
the President of the Union.* The magistrates of the several
cities may have borne the title of General ; at least Dién Cassius
speaks of the General of a particular city,5 as well as of the
common army of the whole League.®

1 See Mommsen’s Rimische Geschichte, ii. 347.

2 The style of each city is commonly the familiar one ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος.
C. I. 4270, 4303A et al. At Tlds we find a formula which seems to imply two
distinct Councils, Τλωέων ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ἡ γερουσία καὶ ὁ δῆμος. C. I. 4236, 4237,
4240. ΤΓερουσία isa word used once by Polybios (xxxviii. δ) in speaking of Achaian
affairs, meaning, as it would appear, the Council of Ministers. See Bachofen,
Das Lykische Volk (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1862), p. 24. 3 Thue. viii. 69.

“The Lykiarch seems to have borne the formal title of ἀξιολογώτατος
(Ὁ. 1. 4198, 4274), something like our ‘‘ Right Honourable.” This is a sort
of orientalism of which we find no trace in proper Greece. Compare the attempt
by the Senate in the first Congress of the United States to confer the title of
“Highness” upon the President. See Marshall’s Life of Washington, v. 238 ;
Jefferson’s Correspondence, iv. 14.

5 Dion. xlvii. 34. Καὶ τοῦτο καὶ οἱ Mupeis ἐποίησαν, ἐπειδὴ τὸν στρατηγὸν
αὐτῶν... ἀπέλυσεϊν ὁ Βροῦτος].

δ ΤΌ. Τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Λυκίων στράτευμα.

IV ORIGIN OF THE LYKIAN LEAGUE 167

The exact antiquity and origin of the Lykian League it
might be difficult to discover. Bishop Thirlwall' hints that Date and
Federal Government may have been of very early introduction Origin ef
into Lykia. Yet we must remember that the Lykians were govern.
not Greeks, and that they seem not even to have had that ment in
degree of ethnical affinity to the Greeks which it is easy to Lykia.
recognize in Macedonians and Epeirots. We need not suppose
a people who proved themselves so capable of receiving Hellenic
culture to have been wholly of an alien stock; but till philo-
logers are better agreed as to the nature of the Lykian
language, it is hardly the part of a political historian to
hazard vague conjectures about them. It is clear that the Relation of
early Lykians were, in the Greek sense of the word, Barbarians; |00%4,
that is, that they spoke a language unintelligible to the Greeks, the Greeke.
and that they were not then distinguished in any special way
from the other Asiatic races which passed under the dominion
of Persia. It is equally clear that they must have possessed
latent powers of assimilating themselves to Greek models in
a degree beyond all other Asiatic races. The later Lykians
clearly adopted the Greek language, Greek art, and general
Greek civilization. They doubtless followed and improved
upon Greek models, in the developement of their admirable
political constitution. Its details, as described by Strabo,
probably belong only to the last period of Lykian history.
But some germs of a Federal system must have existed earlier. Traces of
Aristotle found the constitution of Lykia, no less than that Federalism
of Thesprétia, worthy of a place in his collection.? This salyjection
seems to imply a Republic, and, in so large a country, most to Rhodes.
probably a Federal Republic. But the Lykian monuments
help us to no information on the subject. Our real knowledge
begins later. After the defeat of Antiochos, the Romans, in s.c. 188.
their division of the spoil, assigned Lykia and the greater
part of Karia to their Rhodian allies? Rhodes was governed
by a prudent and moderate aristocracy, which one is surprised Lykia sub-
to find seeking after continental dominions. But it would seem ite
that Theaitétos and Philophrén, who begged for the Lykians , ¢ 188.
as a gift,* acted as little for the true interest of their island 168.

1 ij. 116. Cf. Drumann, p. 482. 2 Phétios, Bibl. 104, 5. Ed. Bekker.

3 Pol. xxiii. 8.(. Liv. XXxxviii, 39.

4 Pol. xxiii. 3. ᾿Αξιοῦντες αὑτοῖς δοθῆναι τὰ κατὰ Λυκίαν καὶ Καρίαν ἊΝ
φάσκοντες Λυκίαν καὶ Καρίας τὰ μέχρι τοῦ Μαιάνδρου δεδόσθαι Ῥοδίοις ὑπὸ
Ρωμαίων ἐν δωρεᾷ.

Lykia in-
depen
c. 168.

Origin of
the Consti-
tution
described
by Strabo.

168 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE onar.

commonwealth, as Francesco Foscari did for the interest of |
his, when he made Venice a continental power. Perpetual
disputes arose between Rhodes and Lykia; perpetual appeals
were brought before the supreme power at Rome. The nature
of the gift was disputed ; the Rhodians looked on the Lykians
as mere subjects; the Lykians maintained that they were at
most dependent allies! It is certain that the gift did not
hinder the existence of some sort of Federal union. The
Lykians, even while subject to Rhodes, retained the ordinary
style of a Greek Confederation ;* much more then must they
have employed it during the earlier days of their independence.
Polybios, too, in his whole narrative of these times, constantly
speaks of Lykia as a national whole. Ambassadors appear at
Rhodes, Rome, and Achaia, speaking in the name of the whole
Lykian people,? in a way which implies a commission from
some central power. But the Federal Union could not as
yet have been quite perfect, as we also hear of Ambassadors
being sent by the single city of Xanthos,‘ which would have
been quite contrary to the principles of the constitution de-
scribed by Strabo. At last, after the war with Perseus, the
Rhodians were no longer in favour at Rome; they were deprived
of their lately acquired continental dominions, and Lykia and
Karia were declared free. Now it was, doubtless, that some
unknown Lykian Lykomédés, some statesman who had carefully
studied the working of all the existing Federal Governments
of Greece, devised the constitution which so happily avoided
all their errors. The Lykian Confederation steered its course

1 Pol. xxvi. 7. Εὕρηνται Λύκιοι δεδόμενοι Ῥοδίοις οὐκ ἐν Swpeg, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον
ὡς φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι. So Appian, Mithrid, 62. Πλὴν εἴ τινες Εὐμενεῖ καὶ
Ῥοδίοις, συμμαχήσασιν ἡμῖν, ἔδομεν, οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ προστάταις εἶναι"
τεκμήριον δ' ὅτι Λυκίους, αἰτιωμένους τι, ‘Podlwy ἀπεστήσαμεν.

2 τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Λυκίων. See Boeckh, C. I. 4677 (vol. iii. 326), where the
words occur in an inscription found in Egypt, the date of which comes between
B.C. 188 and 181. So, immediately after the recovery of their freedom, the
same Commune Luctorum dedicated its thank-offering at Rome. [See Boeckh,
C. I. 5880 (vol. iii. 768), Λυκίων τὸ κοινὸν κομισάμενον τὴν πάτριον δημοκρατίαν,
κιτ.λ.] See Bachofen, p. 28.

δ᾽ Pol. xxiii. 3. Ol μὲν Λύκιοι πρεσβεύοντες ἧκον. Pol. xxvi. 7. ‘H ovy-
κλητος ἐχρημάτισε τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Λυκίων ἥκουσι πρεσβευταῖς, κ.τ.λ.

‘Ib. Οἱ γὰρ Ξάνθιοι. . . ἐξέπεμψαν πρεσβευτὰς εἴς τε τὴν ᾿Αχαΐαν καὶ
τὴν Ῥώμην. These seem to be ‘the same with the παρὰ τῶν Λυκίων ἥκοντες
πρεσβευταί. Possibly Xanthos acted, by tacit consent, in the name of the whole
nation.

δ Pol. xxx. 5. ‘H σύγκλητος ἐξέβαλε δόγμα διότι δεῖ Κᾶρας καὶ Λυκίους
ἐλευθέρους εἶναι πάντας, ὅσους προσένειμε ᾿ Ῥοδίοις μετὰ τὸν ᾿Α»τιοχικὸν πόλεμον.

IV LATER HISTORY OF LYKIA 169

with admirable prudence through the Mithridatic and Piratic

Wars. Its opposition to Brutus, and the consequent destruction Β.6. 88-63.
of Xanthos,'! was indeed a terrible calamity; but a calamity no. 43.
endured in such a cause was a special claim upon the favour

of the Julian Emperors, and we find Lykia, as we have seen,

in the days of Strabo, prosperous, well-governed, and enjoying

full local independence.” But these happy days were not to Destruc-
last for ever. In the reign of Claudius internal dissensions,? tion of the
seemingly of great violence, arose, of which that Emperor took hoagie by
advantage to destroy this remaining vestige of ancient freedom, a.p, 41-54.
and to reduce Lykia, like her neighbours, to the dead level

of a Roman province. Such an ending, and for such a cause,

is especially sad after so bright a picture of days so very little

earlier. The last Greek Federation was now no more, and

many centuries were to pass by before the world was again

to see so perfect a Federal system, or indeed anything worthy

to be called a Federal system at all. Liberty was gone from

the earth, or lingered on, in an obscure and precarious form,

on the Northern shores of the Inhospitable Sea* But it is

a pleasing thought that, as the Achaians and the Lykians are

the nations who stand forth, in our first Homeric picture,’ as

the worthiest races of Europe and of Asia, so it was the
Achaians and. the Lykians who were the last to maintain, in

Europe and in Asia, the true Federal form of freedom in the

face of the advances of all-devouring Rome.

1 See Dion Cassius, xlvii, 34.

2 Strabo, xiv. 3.3. Οὕτω δ᾽ εὐνομουμένοις αὐτοῖς συνέβη παρὰ ἹῬωμαίοις
ἐλευθέροις διατέλεσαι, τὰ πάτρια νέμουσι.

5. Dion Cassius, Ix. 17. Τούς τε Λυκίους στασιάσαντας, ὥστε καὶ Ῥωμαίους
τινὰς ἀποκτεῖναι, ἐδουλώσατό τε καὶ ἐς τὸν τῆς Παμφυλίας νόμον ἐσέγραψεν.
Suet. Claud. 25. Lyciis ob exitiabiles inter se discordias libertatem ademit.
One would like to hear the Lykian version of these troubles. Disturbances
are easily produced in a small state which a great neighbour wishes to annex.

4 On the Republic of Cherson, see Finlay, Byz. Emp. i. 415 [History of
Greece (ed. Tozer), ii. 350, 351).

5 On the Lykians of Homer, see Gladstone’s Homer, i. 181, If the Homeric
Lykians (see Strabo, xii. 8. 5) do not occupy the same geographical position as
the historical Lykians, so neither do (except quite incidentally) the Homeric and
the historical Achaians. But it is hardly possible that the recurrence of the
two names, Lykian and Achaian, in this way can be purely accidental]. (Cf.
the position of Lykians as the last teachers of Old Greek philosophy. Hertzberg,
Geschichte Griechenlands unter der Herrschaft der Romer, iii. 508, 517, 518.}

CHAPTER V
ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE

IT is no easy task to write the history of Greek Federalism
with due regard at once to chronology and to geography. In
my last chapter I have been obliged to carry on parts of my
narrative down to a time even later than the suppression of
the two great Federal Governments of Greece. It seemed,
on the whole, the better plan to clear off both the earlier and
the minor instances of Greek Federalism, before entering on
any examination of the great Leagues of Achaia and At tolia.
But there is no reason to doubt that the Federal principle
was as old in Achaia and /®tolia as in any part of Greece
whatsoever. The history of the Achaian League, like the
history of the Boeotian League, extends over the whole period
during which we have any knowledge of Grecian affairs. But
there is this important difference between the two, that by
far the greater interest attaches to the earlier days of the
Boeotian, and to the later days of the Achaian, League. We
are led to trace the history of Boeotia to its dishonoured close
only because of the borrowed interest reflected from the earlier
days of Beotian glory. We are led to examine into the
obscure and scattered notices of the earlier days of Achaia
only because of the surpassing interest which attaches to the
full developement of the great Achaian Confederation. It is
natural then to deal with the Bceotian Confederation as a
whole before entering at all on the history of the Achaian
and AXtolian Confederations. Again, the Arkadian and Olyn-
thian Leagues were neither of them permanent ; those of Phékis,
Akarnania, and Epeiros were always of minor importance ; of
Lykia, as a Federal state, we should never have heard at all,
save from a single notice, and that left us, not by a historian,
but by a geographer. On the whole therefore it seemed the

ν CHARACTER OF LATER GRECIAN HISTORY 171

best arrangement, though at some sacrifice of chronological
exactness, to deal first with all these comparatively imperfect
instances of Greek Federalism, before entering on any description
of Achaian or Attolian politics. Having now cleared off these
minor examples, we are in a position to enter upon the first
of the great divisions of our subject, the first great developement
of the Federal principle which the world ever beheld, and which
forms the main centre of the last hundred and fifty years of
Old Greek independence.

§ 1. General Character of the History of Federal Greece

The later history of Greece has been, as it seems to me at Common
least, unduly depreciated by most English scholars. The great ποιοί ἣν
work οὗ Polybios lies almost untouched in our Universities. the History
The mythical books of Livy are attentively studied, while those of Federal
which record the struggle between Rome and Macedonia are Greece.
hardly ever opened. The last great English historian of Greece!
deliberately declines entering on the Federal period of Grecian
history as forming no part of his subject. In Germany the case
is widely different. The student who undertakes to master this
period with the help of German guides will certainly not have to
complain of any lack in point of number. He will rather be
puzzled at the difficulty of choice between many candidates, and Abundance
at the diversity of the paths through which they will severally οἷ erman
offer to guide him. The importance of this period was strongly on the
set forth by Niebuhr,” and few portions of history have ever met subject.
with a more enthusiastic and vivid narrator than the days of
Alexander and his Successors have found in the eloquent pages
of Droysen. Every state, Macedonia, Achaia, AZtolia, Boeotia,
has found in Germany its special historian. Of so vast a litera-
ture I am far from professing myself to be completely master ;
but, from such acquaintance with it as I can pretend to, I may
say without doubt that the English scholar will find the best
portions of the best writers carefully weighed in the balance by
the unfailing accuracy and unswerving Judgement of a country-
man of his own. Bishop Thirlwall has continued his great task

1 Grote, xii. 529. ’

2 Lectures on Ancient History, iii. 352 (Eng. Tr.) et al.

3 Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen; Hamburg. Geschichte des Hellen-
ismus, 2 vols. Hamburg: 1836. ᾿

172 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuap.

Narrative to its conclusion with unflagging powers. With him Aratos and

οἱ ΠΙΒΒΟΡ Kleomenés are as essential a part of Hellenic story as Themis-

' toklés and Periklés. His last volume must always lie before the

historian of Grecian Federalism as the best of comments on the

work of the illustrious Greek who has handed down to us the tale,

too often fragmentary, of the last days of his country’s freedom.

Earlier The truth is that, in reading the earlier history of Greece, we

Grecian are, for the most part, really reading little more than the history

history of Athens. We read events as chronicled by Athenian historians;
y the . . . .

history of we turn for their illustration to the works of Athenian philo-

Athens. gophers, orators, and poets. We look at everything from an

Athenian point of view ; we identify ourselves throughout with

that great Democracy which was the true mother of right and

liberty, of art and wisdom. We trace her fortunes as if they

were the fortunes of our own land; when we condemn her acts,

we do it with that sort of reluctant feeling with which we

acknowledge that our own country is in the wrong. Sparta

comes before us as the rival of Athens, Macedonia as the destroyer

of her greatness; of other states we barely think from time to

time as their fortunes become connected with those of the school!

and ornament of Greece. In turning to “the Greece of Polybios”?

we feel a kind of shock at finding ourselves in what is in truth

another world. It is still Greece ; it is still living Greece; but

it is no longer the Greece of Thucydidés and Aristophanés. The

sea is there and the headlands and the everlasting hills; Athéné

still stands, spear in hand, as the guardian of her chosen city ;

Nullity of Démos still sits in his Pnyx; he still chooses Archons by the lot

Athens in and Generals by the uplifted hand; but the fierce Democracy

the Federal has sunk into the lifelessness of a cheerless and dishonoured old

' age; its decrees consist of fulsome adulation of foreign kings ; ὃ

its demagogues and orators are sunk into beggars who wander

from court to court to gather a few talents of alms for the People

which once received tribute from a thousand cities.* Philosophers

1 Thue, ii. 41. Ξυνελών re λέγω τὴν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς ᾿Ελλάδος παίδευσιν
εἶναι, x.T.A. 2 Grote, xii. 528.

3 Pol. v. 106. ᾿Αθηναῖοι δὲ. . . τῶν μὲν ἄλλων Ἑλληνικῶν πράξεων οὐδ᾽
ὁποίας μετεῖχον, ἀκολουθοῦντες δὲ τῇ τῶν προεστώτων αἱρέσει καὶ ταῖς τούτων
ὁρμαῖς εἰς πάντας τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἐξεκέχυντο, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων εἰς Πτολεμαῖον,
καὶ πᾶν γένος ὑπέμενον ψηφισμάτων καὶ κηρυγμάτων, βραχύν τινα λόγον ποιούμενοι
τοῦ καθήκοντος διὰ τὴν τῶν προεστώτων ἀκρισίαν.

This is in B.c. 217. Compare, for a time seventy or eighty years earlier,
Grote, xii. 529—30.

+ Arist. Wasps, 707. Eloly ye πόλεις χίλιαι, af viv τὸν φόρον ἡμῖν ἀπάγουσιν.

Vv DEGRADATION OF ATHENS 178

still babble in her schools about truth and wisdom and virtue
and valour; but truth and wisdom and virtue and valour have,
not indeed fled from the earth, not indeed fled from the soil of
Hellas, but they have passed from the birthplace of Soldén, of
Aristeidés, and of Periklés to cities which they would have
scorned to acknowledge as rivals, even to cities which had no
place on earth when the warriors of Athens marched forth to
victory at Marathén and to defeat at Délion. A Greece in
which Athens has ceased to be the first power, or rather in which
Athens has sunk to be the most contemptible of all the cities of
the Grecian name, seems, at first sight, to be unworthy to bear
the name of Greece at all. We have to encounter unfamiliar
names and to thread our way through unfamiliar boundaries and
divisions. The first place among Grecian states is disputed
between the obscure, if respectable, cities of Achaia, and the
barely Hellenic! robbers of AtQtolia. States known only as
sending some small contingent to swell Athenian or Spartan
armies, cities which had themselves sprung into being since the
glory of Athens sank at Aigospotamos, now appear as powers
of greater weight than the Athenian commonwealth. Feeble
Akarnania, new-born Megalopolis, liberated Messéné, count for
more in Grecian politics than the city of Théseus. The circle of
Hellas is enlarged to take in lands which Thucydidés and Démos-
thenés despised as barbarous; Chaonians, Molossians, Thespré-
tians, take their place as members of an acknowledged Hellenic
state; the Macedonian himself is indeed still dreaded as a King,
but is no longer despised as a stranger of foreign blood and
speech.?, The very language itself has changed; fastidious
scholars, fresh from the master-pieces of Attic purity, look down
with contempt on the pages in which the deeds of Spartan and
Sikyénian heroes are recorded by historians brought up in
no politer schools than could be found at Megalopolis and
Chairoéneia.

It may at once be freely admitted that the later history of

1 Liv. xxxii. 34. tolos, tanquam Romanos, decedi Grecia jubere, qui,
quibus finibus Grecia sit, dicere non possint. Ipsius enim Xtolie Agreos,
Apodotosque et Amphilochos, que permagna eorum pars sit, Greciam non esse.

3 Liv. xxxi. 29. tolos, Acarnanas, Macedonas, ejusdem lingue homines,
leves ad tempus orte causse disjungunt conjunguntque ; cum alienigenis, cum
barbaris, aternum omnibus Grecis bellum est eritque.

Pol. vii. 9. Μακεδονίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα... Μακεδόνες καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων Ελλήνων οἱ σύμμαχοι, κ.τ.λ.

1724 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cnap

Compari. Greece, “the Greece of Polybios,” has nothing like the life and
son be- = richness and freshness of that earlier state of things which we
tween the may call the Greece of Thucydidés. The one still enjoyed the
later native freedom of youth; the other at best clung to the recovered
History of freedom of old age. The fervent lover of the earlier and fresher
Greece. —_ developement of Hellenic life is thus tempted to despise the records
of a time which seems to him feeble and decrepit. Yet the
recovered liberties of Achaia were a true shoot from the old
stem ;! they were the reward of struggles which would not have
disgraced the victors of Marathén or the victors of Leuktra ;
and the very circumstances which make the later fortunes of
Greece less interesting in the eyes of a purely Hellenic en-
thusiast make them really more instructive in the eyes of a
general student of the world’s history. The early history of
Greece is the history of a time when Greece was its own world,
and when town-autonomy was the only form of political life
known within that world. Beyond the limits of Hellas,? all
mankind were Barbarians ; they were to be ruled over or to be
used as instruments, they were to be flattered or to be oppressed,
but they were never to be admitted as the real political equals
of the meanest man of Hellenic blood. Within the bounds of
Hellas, the political struggle lay between single cities oligarchi-
cally governed and single cities democratically governed. In
either case the independent city-commonwealth was the one
ruling political idea. Monarchy was unknown or abhorred ;
Federalism was as yet obscure and undeveloped. The Greece of
Polybios opens to us a much wider and more varied scene.
Greece is no longer the whole world ; Greece proper, Greece in
Character the geographical sense, is no longer the world’s most important
of the later portion. Rome and Carthage dispute the empire of the West;
period. Syria and Egypt dispute the empire of the East; Greece and
Macedonia stand on the edge of the two worlds, to be swept in
their turn, along with all other combatants and spectators, into
the common gulf of Roman dominion. But if Greece had lost
her political pre-eminence, she had won for herself a wider and
Wide a more abiding empire. The Greek language, Greek art, general

spread of Greek civilization, were spread over the whole East: and were
ellenic
culture.
1 Paus. vii. 17. 2. “Are ἐκ δένδρου λελωβημένου, ἀνεβλάστησεν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος
τὸ ᾿Αχαϊκόν.
2 Hellas, it should be remembered, ‘is wherever Greeks dwell, not merely
Greece—) συνεχὴς ‘EXAds—-in the geographical sense.

v EARLIER AND LATER GRECIAN HISTORY COMPARED = 175

before long to make a conquest only less complete of her Italian
conquerors themselves. Philip, Alexander, and their Successors,

the destroyers of Greek political greatness, had been everywhere

the apostles of Greek intellectual life. The age of Polybios is, Import-
(in fact, the age when the world’s destiny was fixed for ever, |): ° or
when the decree of fate was finally pronounced that for all time jp ther:
Rome should be the political, and Greece the intellectual, mistress sal history,
of mankind. It is, in its true place in universal history, a period

of the very deepest and most varied interest. And to the
historian of the Greek race and language, as distinguished from and in the
the historian of the soil of Hellas, no period in the whole range ristory οἵ
of Grecian history assumes a deeper importance. The age of Race
Polybios is the age which connects the Greece of Mr. Grote with

the Greece of Mr. Finlay. Philip and Alexander were in truth.

the founders of that Modern Greek nation which has lasted down

to our own time. If they destroyed the liberties of Athens, Effects of
they laid the foundation of the general intellectual dominion of ean
Greece. By spreading the Greek language over lands into which quests.
Greek colonization could never have carried it, they did more

than any other single cause to open the way for the preaching

of Christianity. In founding Alexandria, Alexander indirectly
founded the intellectual life of Constantinople. By permanently
Hellenizing Western Asia, he conferred on the Empire of Con-
stantinople its great mission as the champion of the West against

the East, of Christendom against the Fire-Worshipper and the
Moslem. It is one of the many evil results of the shallow
distinction popularly drawn between “ancient” and “modern ”

history that the whole later life of the Greek people, from Philip

to our own day, is so utterly neglected. My present subject

brings me only upoy a very small portion of so vast a field. To

the historian of Federalism the Polybian age is important mainly

as the age of republican reaction in Greece itself against the
Macedonian monarchy. And it is surely something, to put it on

no other ground, to see what was the state of Greece herself in

an age in which, though the freshness of her glory was gone,

she was still important—no longer politically dominant, but Character
intellectually more supreme than ever. The Greek history of οἱ the age

or . . . ἢ ΜΝ of Poly-
this time is more like the history of modern times; it is less pios. ;

1 See the Edinburgh Review, vol. cv. p. 340, Art. Alexander the Great.
History and Conquests of the Saracens, Chap. I. The World at the coming of
Mahomet.

Compari-
son of
Thucy-
didés and
Polybios.

16 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE ΟΗΑΡ.

fresh than that of earlier days, but it is also less uniform, and
for that very reason it is more politically instructive. It is no
longer merely the history of single cities; it is the history of a
complex political world, in which single cities, monarchies, and
Federations, all play their part, just as they do in the European
history of later times. It is a time of deeper policy, of more
complicated intrigues; an age when men had lost the vigour
and simplicity of youth, but had almost made up for the loss
by the gain of a far more enlarged experience. Compare,
for instance, the two great historians of the several periods.
Thucydidés never went out of the immediate Greek world ; but
for his fortunate exile, he might never have gone out of the
dominions of Athens; his reading was necessarily small; he
spoke only one language ; he knew only one form of political
and civilized life. But an inborn genius, an intuitive wisdom,
a life spent amid the full youth and freshness of the first of
nations, set him at once above all who have come after him in
ages of greater experience. Polybios,! on the other hand, is like
a writer of our own times; with far less of inborn genius, he
possessed a mass of acquired knowledge of which Thucydidés
could never have dreamed. He had, like a modern historian,
read many books and seen many lands; one language at least
beside his own must have been perfectly familiar to him; he
had conversed with men of various nations, living in various

states of society, and under various forms of government. He

B.C. 222 or
204.

B.c. 188.

had himself personally a wider political experience than fell to
the lot of any historian before or after him. The son of a
statesman of Megalopolis, he could remember? Achaia a powerful
Federation, Macedonia a powerful monarchy, Carthage still free,
Syria still threatening; he lived to see them all subject provinces
or trembling allies of the great municipality of Rome. In his
youth he bore to the grave the ashes of Philopoimén, a Grecian

1 On the character of Polybios as a historian, see Mommsen, Romische
Geschichte, ii. 427.

2 Whether Polybios could, strictly speaking, remember all this, depends
partly on the disputed question of the year of his birth. (See Dict. of Biog. art.
Polybius.) Β.0. 222 certainly seems too early, but there is no need to fix it so
late as B.c. 204. The requirements on both sides would be met by such a date
as B.c. 210. But even the reckoning which places his birth latest would bring
all within his life, and the intermediate one would bring all within the compass
of his possible memory. The intelligent child of a distinguished statesman
would surely have some understanding of such an event as the battle of Zama ut
the age of eight years.

v CHARACTER OF THE AGE OF POLYBIOS 177

hero slain in purely Grecian warfare ; he lived to secure some

little fragments of Grecian freedom as contemptuous alms from 8.0. 145.
the Roman conqueror. A man must have lived through a
millennium in any other portion of the world’s history, to have

gained with his own eyes and his own ears such a mass of varied
political knowledge as the historian of the Decline and Fall of
Ancient Greece acquired within the limits of an ordinary life.}

This revived life, this after-growth of Hellenic freedom, dates Begin-

. ἱ of
from about the year B.C. 280, ἃ date marked out by Polybios 17% Sta

himself ? as signalized by the nearly contemporaneous deaths of Revival,
some of the greatest Princes of the age. The elder form of 3.0. 280.
Hellenic freedom and the universal empire of Macedonia were
now alike things of the past. Those only who belonged to a
generation already passing away could remember either the
oratory of Démosthenés or the conquests of Alexander. The
dominions of the great conqueror were divided for ever, and the
first generation of his Successors had passed away. Antigonos
and Kassander had long been dead; Démétrios Poliorkétés,
Seleukos, Lysimachos, Ptolemy the son of Lagos and Ptolemy

1 It is curious to see how Mr. Grote, in bis depreciation of ‘‘the Greece of
Polybios,” looks at everything from a purely Athenian point of view. (See the
close of his xcvith chapter, vol. xii. p. 527—30.) He sometimes almost reminds
one of a remarkable passage of Polybios himself, which, to be sure, goes almost
as much too far the other way. El δὲ τηροῦντες τὰ πρὸς ras πατρίδας δίκαια
κρίσει πραγμάτων διεφέροντο, νομίζοντες οὐ ταὐτὸ συμφέρον ᾿Αθηναίοις εἶναι καὶ
ταῖς ἑαυτῶν πόλεσιν, οὐ δὴ που διὰ τοῦτο καλεῖσθαι προδότας ἐχρῆν αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ
Δημοσθένους᾽ ὁ δὲ πάντα μετρῶν πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἰδίας πατρίδος συμφέρον καὶ πάντας
ἡγούμενος δεῖν τοὺς “EXAnvas ἀποβλέπειν πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους, εἰ δὲ μὴ, προδότας
ἀποκαλεῖν, ἀγνοεῖν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ πολὺ παραπαίειν τῆς ἀληθείας. (xvii. 14.) In
Mr. Grote’s view, Athens has become contemptible ; Greece is no longer the
whole world ; the autonomous city is no longer the single type of Grecian govern-
ment. Therefore Grecian history has come to an end; or at all events Mr.
Grote has no heart to continue it. The very passages in which Polybios (i. 8, 4 :
. ii. 37) sets forth the greatness of his own subject, the connexion of the local
history of his own land with the general history of the world, are quoted to prove
that Polybios himself looked on later Greece as having ‘‘ no history of its own,”’
Mr. Grote, in earlier volumes, has pointed out with delight the beginnings of a
Federal system in Arkadia and at Olynthos. One might have expected him to
have gone on with equal delight to trace out its full developement in Achaia.
But in Mr. Grote’s eyes the whole charm of Grecian history passes away with
the greatness of Athens. Mr. Grote’s defence of the Athenian democracy has
won him such everlasting gratitude from every true student of Grecian history,
that it is much to be mourned that he should be so enamoured of that one
object as to see the whole history of monarchic and Federal Greece from a dis-
torted point of view.

* Pol. ii. 41.

N

B.C. 284-0.

Gaulish
Invasion,
B.o. 280—
279.

Β.Ο. 322,

Recon-
struction
of Mace-
donia and
Greece.
Β.σ. 289-
272.

The Anti-
gonids in
Macedonia,
B.c. 278-
168.

178 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuar.

the Thunderbolt,! all died, mostly by violence, within three or
four years.of each other. Alexander’s own line had long been
extinct ; his realm was left without an heir; usurper after
usurper had seized upon the Macedonian throne ; and a scourge
more fearful than even the old Median invasion was bursting
upon Macedonia and Greece alike. The storm of the Gaulish
inroad swept all before it in Macedonia, but the arm of the
Delphian Apollo? checked its progress, like that of the Persians
of old, when it presumed to threaten the most venerated shrine
of Greece. The fierce tolians, turbulent brigands as they too
often showed themselves, stood forth, as before in the Lamian
War, as the true champions of Hellas. The whole barbaric host
was destroyed or took refuge in Asia, there, strangely enough,
to learn some measure of Grecian civilization, and to be thought
worthy, by strangers at least, of some approximation to the
Grecian name. After this deluge a new state of things arose.
Its natural developement was, it may be, checked for a while by
the splendid and erratic career of the one prince who seemed
to have been preserved from the earlier period. Pyrrhos the
Molossian, after threatening alike Rome and Sparta, died before
Argos by an ignoble death. The removal of the Epeirot knight-
errant left the field open for the growth of two opposing powers.
Monarchic Macedonia began again to reconstruct herself, and
again to aspire to dominion, under the able and ambitious prince
who founded her last dynasty.* Antigonos Gonatas, son of
Démétrios Poliorkétés, and grandson of Antigonos who fell at
Ipsos, secured the Macedonian throne. He kept it, with one
short interval, till his death; he carried out the Macedonian

1 Ὁ Kepauvés, like Hamilcar Barcas and Bayezid Yildirim. See Thirlwall,
viii. 45. .

2 Paus. i. 4. 4; viii. 10. 9 et al. Cf. Herod. viii. 85 οἱ seqq.

3 Gallogrecia. Liv. xxxvii. 8. See above, p. 165.

4 On the position of Macedonia in this age see Droysen’s Hellenismus, ii. 553.
Allowance must of course be made for the writer's ultra-Macedonian bias, just as
for Mr. Grote’s ultra-Athenian bias. When Droysen however goes on to com-
pare the progress of Macedonia in Greece with the progress of Prussia in Ger-
many, he forgets or despises the difference between small principalities and small
republics. A German County or Bishoprick loses nothing, but rather gains, by
being incorporated with a great German Kingdom ; a Greek city lost everything
by being incorporated with Macedonia. The sympathy which would attend the
King of Italy in any uttempt to recover Rome and Venice—I might add Dalmatia
and the Italian Tyrol—would not extend to an attempt to annex a Swiss Canton,
even of Italian speech, or to an attempt to overthrow the immemorial liberties of
San Marino.

Υ BEGINNINGS OF THE FEDERAL REVIVAL 179

policy during a long reign, and transmitted his crown and his so. 278-
Hellenic position to four successors of his house, three of them 289.
the natural heirs of his body. In the meanwhile the scattered Revival
members of the Achaian Confederation began to draw together οἵ the
again, and to form the centre of the revived political life of ne mie.
republican Greece. It is the varying relations between the great 3.c. 281.
Greek monarchy and the great Greek Confederation, diversified

by the strange phenomenon of Xtolia, at once a Democratic
Confederation and an aggressive tyranny, and by the brief but
splendid revival of Spartan greatness, which form the staple of

the history of Federal Greece.

The objects of these two rival powers, the Achaian nation Opposite
and the Macedonian house,! were exactly opposite to each other. sims oF
The aim of the Antigonid Kings was to reduce as large a portion nq
of Greece as possible under either their immediate sovereignty Achaia.
or their indirect influence. The aim of the Achaian Federation
was to unite the greatest possible number of Greek cities in the
bonds of a free and equal League. In these later Macedonian
Kings, though some of them were far from insignificant men, we
must not look either for the personal greatness or for the politi-
cal position of the old monarchs of the line of Héraklés. Philip Position
and Alexander made it their chief boast to be the chosen leaders οἵ the —
of a Greek Confederacy. And, though Athens, Sparta, and oe
Thebes were naturally of another mind, there can be no doubt
that many of the smaller cities willingly accepted their su-
premacy.? It is true that neither Philip nor Alexander shrank
from any act of severity which suited their purposes. Philip
destroyed Olynthos ; Alexander destroyed Thebes ; if he expelled 8.0. 348.
Tyrants from some cities, he established Tyrants in others. .c. 335.
But during the reigns of the two great Kings there was no Condition
systematic interference with the internal independence of the of Greece
Grecian cities. One or two fortresses only were held by Philip and
Macedonian garrisons. The two great Athenian orators, during Alexander.
Alexander’s lifetime, discussed the whole policy of Athens and
Macedonia in a way which would have been offensive alike to
Kassander the oppressor and to Démétrios the deliverer. The

1 Polybios draws this distinction very forcibly (ii. 37); περὶ δὲ τοῦ τῶν
᾿Αχαμῶν ἔθνους, καὶ περὶ τῆς Μακεδόνων οἰκίας.

2 See the passage from Polybios (xvii. 14) quoted in p. 177. The Megalo-
politan historian, the hereditary friend of Macedonia, of course carries matters

too far, but we are so apt to look at everything with Athenian eyes that it is well
to stop sometimes to consider how things seemed to Greeks of other cities.

B.C. $23, 2.
Greece
under the
Successors.
B.C. 323—
281.

180 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuaap.

darkest times for Greece began when Alexander was gone. The
unsuccessful, though truly glorious, struggle of the Lamian War
laid Greece far more hopelessly prostrate at the feet of inferior
masters. During the wars of the Successors, Greece became
one of the chief battle-fields of the contending princes. The
various cities were indeed often flattered and cajoled. First
Polysperchén and then Démétrios—Démétrios, it may be, for a

‘while, in all sincerity—-gave himself out as the liberator of

B.¢, 280.

Position of
revived
Macedonia
and
Greece.
Β.σ. 281-
223.

Greece ; but Polysperchén and Démétrios alike liberated cities
only to become masters of them themselves. Generally speak-
ing, each Greek town became a fortress to be struggled for, to
be taken and retaken, by one or other of the selfish upstarts who
were laying waste Europe and Asia in quarrels purely personal.
At last, as we have just seen, about forty years after the death
of Alexander, nearly sixty after Philip’s crowning victory at
Chairéneia, a more settled order began to arise out of the chaos.
The field was now cleared for a second struggle between Mace-
donia and Greece, but between Macedonia under a new dynasty
of Kings, and Greece represented by new champions of her
freedom. Macedonia, lately a prize for every soldier of fortune
to struggle for, became, if no longer mistress of East and West,
yet at least a powerful Kingdom under a settled dynasty.
Greece was no longer the battle-field of many contending rivals ;
she had one definite enemy to struggle with in the single King
of Macedonia. The interests of Macedonian princes elsewhere,
especially of the Egyptian Ptolemies, were rather linked with
those of Grecian freedom. The Antigonid Kings were rivals
whose power it suited them to depress, while the wise rulers of
Alexandria were far too clear-sighted to attempt the acquisition
of any supremacy in Greece for themselves. The history, then,
of the growth of the Achaian League is the history, not only of
a political struggle between Federalism and Monarchy,’ but of a
national struggle of Greece against Macedonia. It is a struggle
which at once recalls to mind the most glorious event of our own
day. The Macedonian power in Greece in some respects re-
sembled the Austrian power in Italy ;! but, allowing for the
difference of times and manners, it was by far the less hateful

1 No historical parallel is ever completely exact. Macedonia, for our present
purpose, has strong points of analogy to Austria ; I have elsewhere pointed out

resemblances between the position of Macedonia in Greece and that of Naples in
Italy—some even between Macedonia and Piedmont itself. Oxford Essays, 1857,

p. 154

Υ͂ COMPARISON OF MACEDONIA AND AUSTRIA 181

of the two. The Macedonian in Greece, like the Austrian in Compari-
Italy, held part of the land in direct sovereignty, as an integra] #0 °of
. ΡΟ _ ae .19 . Macedonia
portion of his kingdom. Amphipolis and the Chalkidian penin- ;, Greece
sula were irrevocably annexed to the monarchy of Pella, and with _
Thessaly, though nominally a distinct state, was held in a con- Austria in
dition of dependence not easily to be distinguished from sub- ~””
jection.’ Besides this extent of continuous territory, many
strong detached points in various parts of Greece were held by
Macedonian garrisons. In other cities the Macedonian King
ruled indirectly through local Tyrants who held their power
only through Macedonian protection.2, Where no opportunity
presented itself for any of these forms of more complete absorp-
tion, it was enough to do all that might be to prevent the
growth of confederations and alliances, and to ensure that those
states which still retained some degree of independence should
at least remain weak and disunited.* This had been of old the
policy of Sparta; it was the policy of all the Macedonian
Kings ; it is equally the policy of tyrants in our own time, when
we see the despots alike of Paris and Vienna gnashing their
teeth at every accession of strength to the free Italian Kingdom.
The establishment of the Antigonid dynasty seems to have been
accompanied by a special impulse given to the worst of all these
forms of oppression ; Antigonos Gonatas is described as relying
more than any of his predecessors on the indirect way of ruling
through local Tyrants.‘
We can well believe that this last condition was far worse

than incorporation with the Macedonian Kingdom, worse even
than the presence of a Macedonian garrison. So in our own

1 See above, p. 119. See Dem. Phil. iii. 42. Cf. Arr. vii. 12.4. Κρατερῷ
δὲ... ἐκέλευσε [᾿Αλέξανδρος]. . . Μακεδονίας re καὶ Θρᾷκης καὶ Θετταλῶν
ἐξηγεῖσθαι, καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Thessaly is here clearly reckoned
as an integral part of Alexander’s dominions, not as part of the Hellenic Con-
federacy of which he was the elective head.

2 Pol. ix. 29. Τά ye μὴν Κασσάνδρῳ καὶ Δημητρίῳ πεπραγμένα, σὺν δὲ
τούτοις ᾿Αντιγόνῳ τῷ T'ovarg, τίς οὐκ οἷδε: . . . ὧν οἱ μὲν φρουρὰς εἰσάγοντες εἰς
τὰς πόλεις, οἱ δὲ τυράννους ἐμφυτεύοντες οὐδεμίαν πόλιν ἄμοιρον ἐποίησαν τοῦ τῆς
δουλείας ὀνόματος. The whole speech of the tolian Chlaineas, where these
words occur, should be studied as a powerful summing up of the anti- Macedonian
case.

3 All this will be found drawn out at length by Polybios (ii. 41). The words
of the historian speaking in his own person quite bear out the rhetorical
expressions of the Ztolian orator just quoted.

4 Pol. ii. 41. Πλείστους γὰρ δὴ μονάρχους οὗτος ['Avriyovos] ἐμφυτεῦσαι δοκεῖ

τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. To ‘plant a Tyrant” (ἐμφνυτεύειν τύραννον) seems to be a sort of
technical term.

182 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cnap.

times, the Austrian annexation of Venice, the French occupation
of Rome, have not involved the same permanent horrors as the
local tyrannies of Parma and Naples. But the rule of Mace-
donia, sharp as the scourge doubtless was, was certainly in some
respects less irksome than the rule of Austria. It was not so
completely a rule of strangers. The Macedonian Kings, and
doubtless their subjects too, at least studiously claimed to be
Greeks ; whatever the merits of the claim, it was prominently
put forward on all occasions.! If not Greek by blood—and
Philip and Alexander at least were Greek by blood—they were
rapidly becoming Greek in language and intellectual culture.
Doubtless it was a poor substitute for the true independence of
old times for the Greek to be able to say that his master was
half a countryman; but it at least makes a wide difference
between the lot of Greece under the half-Greek Macedonian, and
the lot of Italy under the wholly foreign Austrian.? Greece
indeed soon found that Macedonia was far from being her worst
enemy. During the whole of this period, ever since the Gaulish
invasion, Macedonia at least efficiently discharged the functions
of a bulwark of Greece against the restless barbarians on her
northern frontier. And the time at last came when the Mace-
donian King was felt to be the champion of Greece in a truer
sense than when Alexander marched forth to avenge Hellenic
wrongs upon the Persian. Every patriotic Greek must have
sympathized with the Macedonian nation, if not with its con-

1 See above, p.174. So Alexander, in his letter to Darius, talks of Μακεδονίαν
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ᾿Ελλάδα (Arr. ii. 14. 4) and continues ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμὼν
κατασταθεὶς, κιτιλ, So the style of the Confederacy of which Alexander was
chief seems to have been ᾿Αλέξανδρος καὶ of Ἕλληνες. Arr. ii. 2. 2,3; i. 16. 7,
cf. 6. Isokratés fully recognizes Philip as a Greek (Phil. 10), but a Greek
reigning over foreigners (οὐχ ὁμοφύλου γένους. § 126)—foreigners, so far un-Greek
as to need kingship (§ 125), but still carefully distinguished from mere barbarians
--φημὶ yap χρῆναί σε τοὺς μὲν “EAXnvas εὐεργετεῖν, Μακεδόνων δὲ βασιλεύειν, τῶν
δὲ βαρβάρων ὡς πλεῖστον ἄρχειν, κιτ.λ. (§ 178). He was to conquer barbarians
to give them the advantages of a Greek master. Cf. also Isok. Archid. 51.
Arr. ii. 7. 4—7.

2? I am of course speaking here solely of the modern sway of the so-called
‘* Emperors of Austria,’’ not of the old Teutonic Cesars, whose Imperial title and
bearings they venture to assume. Otto, Henry, and the Fredericks were Emperors
of the Romans and Kings of Italy, recognized by all Italians, zealously supported
by many. Frederick the Second, the greatest of them all, was himself an Italian
by birth, language, and temperament; his Italian home was ever the dwelling-place
of his choice, The Imperial claims doubtless gradually dried up into a mere
legal fiction, but even a legal fiction is something different from the high-handed
usurpation of modern Austria.

Vv OBJECTS OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE 188

temptible King, in the final struggle between Perseus and
Rome. Through the whole history our feelings lie, naturally
and rightly, against Macedonia and for republican Greece. But
there is no reason for looking upon Macedonia with any special
abhorrence, or for representing her Kings as perfect monsters,
or even as barbarian invaders. The Great Alexander, with all
his faults, still stands forth, alongside of the Great Charles,
among the heroes of whom human nature is proud. And, taking
the common standard of royal virtue,! the merits of Antigonos
Gonatas and Antigonos Désén will assuredly not fall below
the average. In extending their dominions and their influence
they did but follow the natural instincts of their class, and
Antigonos Désén at least sinned far less deeply in accepting
Akrokorinthos than Aratos and the Achaian Congress sinned
in Offering it.

The object of the Achaian League, on the other hand, was Generous
the union of all Peloponnésos, or, it may: be, of all Greece, into 2ims of the
a free and equal Democratic Confederation. Such at least was 4° alan
the wide scope which it assumed in the days of its fullest
developement, under Aratos, Philopoimén, and Lykortas. And
surely no nobler vision ever presented itself to a Hellenic states-
man. We shall soon see but too clearly the defects in the
general constitution of the League, and the still greater defects
in the personal character of 18 great leader. But the general
objects of both were as wise, generous, and patriotic as any state
or any man ever laboured to effect. Other Greek statesmen had
worked mainly for the mere aggrandizement of their own cities ;

Periklés lived for Athens, Agésilaos for Sparta, Epameinéndas

for Thebes ; but the worthies of Sikyén and Megalopolis spent

and were spent in the still nobler cause of Hellas. And they

came at the right time. From one point of view we may be An earlier
tempted to regret that their lot had not been cast in an earlier estab
day, and that an effective Federal System had not been long Federalism
before established in Greece. The establishment of such a system in Greece
might indeed have saved Greece from many evils; but it was at ἢ
once utterly impossible and, in the general interests of the world,
utterly undesirable. How impossible it was we see by the whole

Jeairable,

1 “The station of kings is, in a moral sense, so unfavourable, that those who
are least prone to servile admiration should be on their guard against the opposite
error of an uncandid severity." Hallam’s Constitutional History, ch. x. vol. i.
p. 647, ed. 1846.

Effects of
the League.

5.6, 191.

184 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuap.

tenor of Grecian history, by the nullity of the Amphiktyonic
Council, by the failure of attempts, like that of Lykomédés, to
establish even partial Federal Unions, by the little which, after.
ali, Aratos and his successors were able actually to effect. And,
if it had been possible, it was no less clearly undesirable. A
Federal system in the days of Athenian and Spartan greatness
might have spared Greece the miseries of Athenian and Spartan
warfare ; it might have saved her from Macedonian conquest ;?
it might even have warded off, or at least delayed, her ultimate
subjection to Rome. But Greece united in a Federal bond could
never have become the Greece which has challenged the love and
admiration of all succeeding ages. The brilliant developement of
Hellenic greatness, alike in war, in politics, in art, in eloquence,
and in poetry, was inseparably linked to the system of inde-
pendent city-commonwealths. The dissensions and the wars of
Greece are the price which she paid for becoming the world’s
teacher for all time. Again, had Greece never sunk beneath the
armed force of Macedonia and Rome, she would never have won
the Macedonian and the Roman as the permanent apostles of her
civilization and intellectual life. It was well that Greece was
disunited ; it was well that Greece was conquered ; but it was
well also that she should revive, if only for a moment, to give
the world the first great example of a political teaching of yet
another kind. Greece had already done her work as the land of
autonomous cities ; she was now to give mankind a less brilliant,
but more practical, lesson in the way of free government on a
more extended scale. Positively indeed but little was done ; all
Greece was never united even in a nominal bond; even all
Peloponnésos was at best only nominally united after the true
glory of the League had passed away. Yet it was something,
even in its own day, to restore freedom to a considerable portion
of Greece, to give the liberated cities some generations of free
and orderly government, to render the inevitable fall of Greece
at once more gradual and less disgraceful; and it was yet more,
in the history of the world, to give to the political thinkers of
after times one of the most valuable subjects for reflection which
all ancient history affords.

1 Droysen, Hellenismus, ii. 503. Hiatte sich die delphische Amphiktyonie
zu einer nationalen Verfassung auszubilden vermocht, so wiirde Philipp nicht bei
Chaironeia gekiimpft haben.

τ᾿ EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL REVIVAL 185

§ 2. Origin and Early Growth of the League

In the last chapter we have seen the growth of Federal Growth of
ideas in many parts of Greece during the fourth century before ᾿ ederal
Christ. The evils caused by the disunion of the great cities Greece in
made the smaller ones at last understand the need of a closer the fourth
union among themselves.. We have therefore seen several century,
attempts, unsuccessful indeed, but still marking the direction in δ
which men’s thoughts were tending, at establishing Federations
in several parts of Greece. Then came the days of Macedonian
conquest and Macedonian influence. The policy of the Mace-
donian Kings set itself against all Federations, against all unions
of any kind. Even Philip and Alexander, chosen Captains of all
Greece as they boasted of being, would have hindered any union
among Grecian states which could in the slightest degree have
interfered with their supremacy. Their Successors, the usurpers
who rose and fell, even the more lasting and high-minded dynasty
of the Antigonids, could afford still less consideration for Grecian
freedom. They never ventured to put themselves forth as the
chosen leaders of Greece, called to that rank by something which
at least pretended to the character of a national vote. How
they maintained their influence we have already seen, by foster-
ing local divisions and by supporting local tyrannies. But this
state of things naturally gave the Federal principle an influence Further
which it had never before possessed. Modern Europeans, Federal
accustomed to the compact monarchies of modern Europe, are against
apt to look on the Federal system as a system of weakness and Macedo-
disunion ; to a Greek of the third century before Christ, accus- 77.
tomed only to a choice between town-autonomy, local tyranny,
and foreign bondage, it presented itself as a happy combination,
by which freedom could be made to coexist with union, and
therefore with strength. The Federal form of government
henceforth became predominant, and at last almost universal, in
the independent portion of Greece. Every city which achieved
its own independence sought, by a natural instinct, to maintain
that independence by an union with other cities. And that
union was now freely made upon terms from which, a century
before, nearly every Greek commonwealth would have shrunk as
an unworthy surrender of its separate dignity and separate
freedom.

__J

Early
History of
Achaia.

Early
Union
among the
Cities.

B.C. 391.

186 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE c#ap.

Among the cities which had thus become disunited through
Macedonian influence were the cities of the Peloponnesian Achaia.
If we may trust the half mythical history of the Dorian migra-
tion, the Achaians of Peloponnésos were the only independent
remnant of that mighty race which, under the Pelopid Kings of
Mykéné, had ruled over many islands and all Argos.1 The
Achaians fill the most prominent place in the Greece of Homer
and in the Greece of Polybios, but in the Greece of Thucydidés
they are utterly insignificant. Polybios, with a commendable
national pride, collects several instances? to show that, if they
were insignificant in power, they were at least highly respected
for upright and honourable dealing. No people in Greece bore
a higher character either for discretion or for good faith, and
they were more than once called upon to act as mediators in the
dissensions of more powerful states. We are, however, more
concerned with the degree of union which may have existed
among their several cities in times before the growth of the
Macedonian power. That Achaia then contained twelve cities,
democratically governed,’ and united by some sort of Federal tie,
admits of no doubt. But, as in the case of most of these early
Greek Federations, we have no details of the old Achaian con-
stitution. There is however no reason for the supposition that
it was a religious rather than a political union, a mere Amphi-
ktyony to the temple of Poseidén at Heliké.* The whole history
shows that a real Federal union existed among them, and that,
even then, the League sometimes extended itself to take in cities
beyond the strict limits of Achaia. Early in the fourth century
before Christ we find the Aitolian town of Kalydén not only an
Achaian possession, but admitted ta the rights of Achaian citizen-
ship.5 Naupaktos also appears as held by the Achaians, but on
what terms is not 80 clear.° In every account of these transac-

1 Tliad, B. 108. Πολλῇσι νήσοισι cal” Apyet πάντι ἀνάσσειν.

2 Pol. ii. 39. (Cf. Strabo viii. 7. 1.]

3 Pol. ii. 41. Μετέστησαν els δημοκρατίαν τὴν πολιτείαν. λοιπὸν ἤδη τοὺς ἑξῆς
χρόνους μέχρι τῆς ᾿Αλεξάνδρου καὶ Φιλίππου δυναστείας ἄλλοτε μὲν ἄλλως ἐχώρει
τὰ πράγματ᾽ αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὰς περιστάσεις, τό γε μὴν κοινὸν πολίτευμα καθάπερ
εἰρήκαμεν, ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ συνέχειν ἐπειρῶντο. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἣν ἐκ δώδεκα πόλεων.

4 Dict. Antiq. art. Achaicum Feedus,

5 Xen. Hell. iv. 6. 1. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ ᾿Αχαιοὶ ἔχοντες Καλυδῶνα, ἢ τὸ
παλαιὸν Αἰτωλίας ἦν, καὶ πολίτας πεποιημένοι τοὺς Καλυδωνίους, φρουρεῖν ἠναΎ-
κάζοντο ἐν αὐτῇ. [Soin Roman times ἃ harbour in the region of Kalyd6n belonged
to Patrai; Strabo, x. 2.21. "Ἔστι δέ τις καὶ πρὸς τῇ Καλυδῶνι λίμνη μεγάλη καὶ
εὔοψος, ἣν ἔχουσιν οἱ ἐν Πάτραις Ῥωμαῖοι.

6 Démosthenés says (Phil. iii, 44) that Philip promised to take Naupaktos

v EARLY HISTORY OF ACHAIA 187

tions we find the Achaian people spoken of as one whole, acting

with one will both in diplomatic and military affairs. They

placed Federal garrisons in cities endangered by the enemy,! and
commissioned Federal ambassadors to foreign powers.” At the

same time it is easy to believe that the Federal tie may have

been much less closely drawn than it was in the revived Con- Probable
federation of after-times. Still that Confederation, as we shall greater
presently see, was looked on as a mere revival of a past state of the Pind
things interrupted for a while by foreign interference. We are during the
hardly entitled to judge whether it was from any laxity in the ——
formal constitution, or only from the fluctuations of parties so
common in all Greek states, that the Achaian League did not, Achaia
any more than that of Akarnania, invariably act as an united πα δον
body throughout the Peloponnésian War. When that war broke nésian
out, all the Achaian cities remained neutral, except Pelléné, War,
which took the side of Sparta; but ata later stage all twelve ὅδ Οὐ
were enrolled as members of the Lacedsemonian alliance.‘ Yet, 5c. 413.
in an intermediate stage, we find Patrai at least on the side of s.c. 419.
Athens, and, under Athenian influence, extending herself by Long

Walls to the sea.© During the wars of Epameinéndas, Pelléné History of
adhered firmly to her Spartan policy, at a time when the other Pelléné,
cities were, to say the least, less strenuous in the Spartan cause.® ἢ 368.
At the same time we also get some glimpses of the internal state

of the several cities. We read of local oligarchies,’ which
Epameinéndas found and left in possession, but which the home

from the Achaians and to give it to the Xtolians; οὐκ ᾿Αχαιῶν Ναύπακτον
ὁμώμοκεν Αἰτωλοῖς παραδώσειν ; Naupaktos, therefore, in B.c. 341, was an
Achaian possession. But we read in Diodéros (xv. 75) that Epameindndas, in
BO. 867, Δύμην καὶ Ναύπακτον καὶ Καλυδῶνα φρουρουμένην ὑπ᾽ ᾿Αχαιῶν
ἠλευθέρωσεν. If then we trust Diodéros, as Mr. Grote (x. 866) seems to do,
we must suppose that the Achaians recovered Naupaktos between B.0. 367 and
B.c. 841, But can we trust a writer who seems to think that Dymé needed
deliverance from Achaian oppression ἢ

1 Xen. Hell. iv. 6.1. Φρουρεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο. .

2 ΤῸ, Οἱ ᾿Αχαιοὲ πρεσβεῖς πέμπουσιν εἰς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα.

5. Thuc. ii. 9, cf. v. 58, where we find Pelléné supporting Sparta against Argos
after the Peace of Nikias.

+ Thuc. ii. 9. Cf. Arnold’s note, and vii. 34, where the Achaians are in-
cidentally mentioned as Lacedwemonian allies.

5 Thue, v. 52.

i. Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 15, 18. Afterwards Pelléné is found on the Theban
side. 2.11.

7 ΤΌ. vii. 1.42. Στρατεύουσι πάντες ol σύμμαχοι ἐπ᾽ ᾿Αχαΐαν, ἡγουμένου Exapew-
ὥνδον. προσπεσόντων δ᾽ αὐτῷ τῶν βελτίστων ἐκ τῆς ᾿Αχαΐας, ἐνδυναστεύει ὁ
᾿Επαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φνγαδεῦσαι τοὺς κρατίστους, μήτε πολιτείαν μεταστῆσαι, etc.

188 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cmap.

Government of Thebes thought good to expel, and to substitute
democracies under the protection of Theban harmosts. This
policy did not answer, as the large bodies of exiles thus formed
contrived to recover the cities, and to bring them to a far more
decided Spartan partisanship than before.1 But these oligarchies,
probably introduced by Spartan influence, seem to have formed
ἃ mere temporary interruption to that general democratic
character of the Achaian polity to which Polybios bears witness.
Certain it is that Achaia was democratic at the accession of

Tyranny of Alexander. He established as Tyrant in Pelléné one of her own
Chairdn at citizens named Chairén.2 This Chair6én was famous as a wrestler;

Pelléné,
before
B.c. 335.

B.c. 330.

he was also a Platonic philosopher, which leads Athénaios
sarcastically to say that, in some of the worst features of his
tyranny, he did but carry out his master’s doctrines as to the
community of goods and women.’ How Pelléné had offended
the Macedonian King we know not, but it appears that the
establishment of the tyranny was accompanied by the expulsion
of a large proportion of the citizens.4 This seems to mark some
special ground of quarrel with the particular city of Pelléné; for
Alexander would hardly have thus punished a single town for
the share which all Achaia had taken in the resistance to his
father at Chairéneia.5 The presence of this domestic Tyrant
prevented Pelléné from joining with the other Achaian cities in
the movement against the Macedonian dominion set on foot by
Agis, King of Sparta. After the disastrous battle in which

1 Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 41—3. Grote, x. 365. Helwing, Geschichte des Ach.
Bundes, p. 225,

2 Pseudo-Dém. w.7.7. ᾿Αλεξ. 12. ᾿Αχαιοὶ μὲν of ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ἐδημοκρα-
τοῦντο, τούτων δ᾽ ἐν Πελλήνῃ νῦν καταλέλυκε τὸν δῆμον ὁ Μακεδὼν ἐκβαλὼν τῶν
πολιτῶν τοὺς πλείστους, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκείνων τοῖς οἰκέταις δέδωκε, Χαίρωνα δὲ τὸν
παλαιστὴν τύραννον ἐγκατέστησεν. Paus. vii. 27. 7. Ἑαατέλυσε [Σαίρων]
πολιτείαν, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, τὴν ἐν Πελλήνῃ, δῶρον τὸ ἐπιφθονώτατον παρὰ ᾿Αλεξάνδρον
τοῦ Φιλίππον λαβὼν, τύραννος πατρίδος τῆς αὑτοῦ καταστῆναι. This Chairdn
could not therefore be, as Dr. Elder (Dict. Biog. art. Cheron) thinks, the same
as the Chairén who is mentioned by Plutarch (Alex. 3), for the latter was a
citizen of Megalopolis, while both Pausanias and Athénaios distinctly mark Chairén
the Tyrant asa citizen of Pelléné.

3 Athén. xi. 119. [509b.] Χαίρων ὁ Πελληνεὺς, ὃς οὐ μόνῳ Πλάτωνι ἐσχό-
λακεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ξενοκράτει καὶ οὗτος οὖν τῆς πατρίδος πικρῶς τυραννήσας ov
μόνον τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξήλασεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς τούτων δούλοις τὰ
χρήματα τῶν δεσποτῶν χαρισάμενος, καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων γυναῖκας συνῴκισεν πρὸς
γάμου κοινωνίαν, ταῦτ᾽ ὠφεληθεὶς ἐκ τῆς καλῆς Πολιτείας καὶ τῶν παρανόμων
Νόμων. 4 Pseudo-Dém. u. 8.

5 Paus. vii. 6.5. Ἰοῦ μὲν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ Φιλίππου τ᾽ ἐνάντια καὶ Μακεδόνων
[πολέμου] οἱ ᾿Αχαιοὶ μέτεσχον.

5. Asch. Ktés. 165. ᾿Ηλεῖοι δ᾽ αὐτοῖς [Λακεδαιμονίοι:] συμμετεβάλοντο καὶ

τ ACHAIA UNDER THE SUCCESSORS 189

Agis fell, the Achaians and Eleians are said to have been con-

demned, by the anomalous body which then issued decrees in the

name of Greece, to pay a hundred talents as indemnity to

Megalopolis, which had embraced the Macedonian cause and had

stood a siege at the hands of the allies. The establishment of

Chairén by Alexander was the beginning of the system which

was more fully carried out by the succeeding Macedonian Kings.

Kassander held several of the cities with his garrisons, which

were driven out by Aristodémos the general of Antigonos from

Patrai, Aigion, and Dymé.? In the case of Patrai and Aigion, 8c. 314.

this expulsion is spoken of by our informant as a liberation,® but Actala ie

the Dymaians resisted the liberators in the cause of what the guccessors;

same historian calls their independence.* Whatever we make

of this language, it at least points to a difference of political

feeling in the different cities. Démétrios also, in the days when

the son of the King of Asia gave himself out as the champion of

Grecian freedom, expelled Kassander’s garrison from Boura, and 8.0. 808.

gave to that city also something which is spoken of as inde-

pendence. But when Démétrios became King of Macedonia, B.c. 294.

he seems to have walked in the way of his predecessors, and

both he and his son Antigonos are mentioned among the princes

under whom some of the cities were occupied by Macedonian

garrisons and others by local Tyrants. At what moment the under

League definitely fell asunder it is hard to say: the process, qntigonos

doubtless, was gradual ; but as Antigonos Gonatas‘ is mentioned οἱ
B.C. 288.

᾿Αχαιοὲ πάντες πλὴν Πελληναίων καὶ ’Apxadla πᾶσα πλὴν Μεγάλης πόλεως, αὕτη
δὲ ἐπολιορκεῖτο, K.7.A.

10. Curt. vi. 1. 19, 20. They were condemned by the “Concilium
Grecorum.” So Diodéros (xvii. 73) speaks of τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ᾿Ελλήνων συνέδριον.
That is to say, Alexander's synod at Corinth. See above, p. 100. Yet it is
possible that Diodéros may here too have been dreaming of the Amphiktyons.

2 Diod. xix. 66.

3 Ib. Πάτρας μὲν ἠλευθέρωσε. . . . τοῖς Αἰγιεῦσι κατὰ δόγμα τὴν ἐλευθερίαν
βουλόμενος ἀποκαταστῆσαι.

4 ΤΌ. Παρακαλέσαντες ἀλλήλους ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς αὐτονομίας.

5 Ib. xx. 103. Δημήτριος. . . . Βοῦραν μὲν κατὰ κράτος εἷλε, καὶ τοῖς
πολίταις ἀπέδωκε τὴν αὐτονομίαν.

6 Pol. ii. 41. Pausanias (vii. 7. 1) strangely says that πὸ Achaian city but
Pelléné was ever under a Tyrant, seemingly confounding the time of Alexander
with that of the Antigonids ; τυράννων τε γὰρ πλὴν Πελλήνης al ἄλλαι πόλεις
τὸν χρόνον ἄπαντα ἀπείρως ἐσχήκεσαν.

7 Antigonos Gonatas first began to play a prominent part during his father’s
lifetime, about B.c. 288, when he was left in command of Démétrios’ garrisons in
Greece. This was probably the time when Antigonos completed the dissolution
of the Teague. Its complete dissolution is expressed by Polybios (ii. 40, cf. 41)

Final Dis-
solution of
the old

League.

Twelve
original
cities.

Loss of
Heliké
[Β.6. 373]
and of
Olenos,

190 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE onap.

among the Kings who had a hand in the evil work ; and, as it
was at no very advanced stage of his reign that the cities began
again to draw together, it would seem that the period of complete
isolation cannot have been very long, and that the work of
reunion must have been found proportionably easy.

The twelve cities of the ortginal League, as enumerated by
Polybios,! were Heliké, Olenos, Patrai, Dymé, Pharai, Tritaia,
Leontion, Aigeira, Pelléné, Aigion, Boura, and Keryneia. Of these
Heliké seems to have been originally the chief; its great temple
of Poseidén? was the seat of the religious meetings of the
Achaian people, and the city was probably also the seat of the
Federal Government.’ But Heliké was swallowed up by an
earthquake, and its site covered by the sea, long before the
dissolution of the old League.* Olenos also was deserted by
its inhabitants © at some time before the revival of the League,
so that ten cities only were left. Of these, since the loss of
Heliké, Aigion was the greatest. It was the seat of the
Federal Government under the revived League in the
very latest times,’ as it most probably had been during the
later days of the earlier one. Of the exact nature of the
Federal union under the old system, of the titles and duties of

in the words κατὰ πόλιν διαλυθέντος τοῦ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἔθνους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας
βασιλέων. The formula ἐκ Μακεδονίας may well express Démétrios and Antigonos
when they were not in actual possession of the Macedonian throne. Cf. Niebuhr,
Lect. on Anc. Hist. iii. 259, Eng. Tr. Strabo, viii. 7. 1.

1 Pol. ii. 41.

2 See Strabo, viii. 7.2. Paus, vii. 24. 5.

3 Not necessarily, for Koréneia was the religious centre of Beotia, while Thebes
was the political head.

4 Paus. vii. 24. 6, et seqq. Strabo, u.s. Pol. ii. 41. This destruction is by
Pausanias ascribed to the wrath of Poseiddn at some suppliants being dragged
away from his altar. In this, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 88) says, ‘‘ we perceive
a symptom of some violent political agitation.”

5 See Leake, Morea, ii. 157. Thirlwall, viii. 90. The expression of Strabo
(viii. 7. 1), οὐ συνελθούσης, might, hy itself, have inclined one to Colonel Leake’s
view that Olenos survived till the Roman times, and refused to join the revived
Achaian League. But there can be no doubt that Bishop Thirlwall is, as usual,
right. Had Olenos remained as a considerable city during the time of the
second League, we could hardly fail to have come across some mention of it in
the history of Polybios. And Polybios himself distinctly implies that Olenos
had perished before his day. ii. 41. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἣν ἐκ δώδεκα πόλεων, ds ἔτι καὶ νῦν
συμβαίνει διαμένειν, πλὴν Ὥλένου καὶ Ἑλίκης τῆς πρὸ τῶν Λευκτρικῶν ὑπὸ θαλάσσης
καταποθείσης. It is an important point in the Federal history that the revived
League was joined by all the Achaian cities which still existed.

6 Paus, vii. 7. 2. 7 Ib. vii. 24. 4.

Vv FIRST BEGINNINGS OF THE REVIVED LEAGUE 191

the Federal magistrates, we know absolutely nothing. In a

curious story told by Strabo when recording the destruction of Traces of

Heliké, we find a distinct mention of the Federal Assembly as ἣν eral

something appealed to and passing a vote; but we also find the under

vote as distinctly disobeyed by the contumacious canton of the Old

Heliké.! League.
Thus, at the time of the Gaulish invasion, ten Achaian cities

existed, but there was no Achaian League. The ten cities were

ten distinct political units; some of them too were held by

Macedonian garrisons, others by local Tyrants. It was the

interest of every Macedonian prince to prolong this state of

things ; it was the interest of every Achaian, and indeed of

every Greek, to put the speediest possible end to it. At last

the favourable moment came. Several of the Kings were Begin-

dead; Pyrrhos was absent in Italy ; Macedonia was in utter ee οὐ

confusion. The cities of Patrai and Dymé, which, since League.

the desertion of Olenos, were the two most western cities Union of

of the Achaian shore, took the first steps towards the revival sie aud

of the old confederacy.2, The inland cities of Tritaia and [s.c. 280],

Pharai soon joined them, ‘and these four became the nucleus οὗ Tritaia

of the great Federal republic of Peloponnésos. Their union was py acai

looked on so completely as a mere revival of a past lawful state

of things that its terms were not publicly recorded on a pillar, as

was usually done with treaties between separate Grecian states,

and as was done in after-times on the accession of fresh cities to

the League.2 Of the circumstances of their union we know

nothing; Polybios does not mention the presence either of

garrisons or of Tyrants in these particular cities; his words

might seem rather to imply that they were free from either

scourge, but only that the circumstances of the time had led to

an opposition of feelings and interests among them.‘ ΑΒ to the

1 The ‘‘Ionians expelled from Heliké ;” that is, probably their descendants
in Asia, ask either for the actual image of Poseid6n, or at least for leave to make
a mod 1 of it. The people of Heliké refuse, the Ionians appeal to the Federal
body (Strabo, viii. 7. 2), od δόντων δὲ, πέμψαι πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν" τῶν
δὲ ψηφισαμένων, οὐδ᾽ ὡς ὑπακοῦσαι. If one can trust the details of such a story,
the word πέμψαι might imply that the Federal Assembly was in session, and not
at Heliké, 2 Pol. ii. 41. See Clinton, Fast. Hell. ii. 204.

> Pol. ii. 41. Οὐδὲ στήλην ὑπάρχειν συμβαίνει τῶν πόλεων τούτων περὶ τῆς
συμπολιτείας. Cf. xxv. 1; xxvi. 1. Τοὺς ὅρκους, τοὺς νόμους, τὰς στήλας, ἃ
συνέχει τὴ» κοινὴν συμπολιτείαν ἡμῶν.

4 Pol. ii. 41. Πατρεῖς ἤρξαντο συμφρονεῖν καὶ Δυμαῖοι. . . ἤρξαντο μετανοή-
σαντες συμφρονεῖν. His general description does not imply that every city had

Union of
Aigion
[p.c. 275],
Boura,

and Kery-
neia.

Extension
of the
League to
all Achaia.

Loss sus-
tained by
Patrai in

192 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cHap.

next stages of the process the historian is more explicit. Aigion
had a garrison, Boura and Keryneia were ruled by Tyrants.
Five years after the union of Patrai and Dymé, the people of
Aigion themselves expelled their garrison and joined the Union.
Boura was freed, and its Tyrant slain, by the people of the city,
aided by their already liberated brethren.! Iseas, the Tyrant of
Keryneia, watching the course of events and seeing that he would
probably be the next attacked, voluntarily surrendered his power,
and, having obtained security for his own safety, he annexed his
city to what Polybios, now for the first time, calls by the proud
title of the Achaian League.

Seven cities were now in strict union; we know not the steps
by which the two eastern towns of Aigeira and Pelléné were re-
covered, but their annexation could not have been long delayed ;
and the inland city of Leontion, already hemmed in by the terri-
tory of the liberated towns, must have been recovered even
sooner. The ten cities of Achaia Proper thus formed the revived
League in its first estate, and for about thirty years they grew
up in peace and obscurity. Their very insignificance was no
doubt among their advantages, as sheltering them from the
notice of enemies. A germ of freedom was thus allowed to
grow steadily up in a corner of Greece, which, if it had
appeared at Athens or Corinth, would have been at once crushed
in the bud. One city indeed, immediately after the reconstruc-
tion of the League, suffered a blow which forms almost the whole
of the external history of Achaia during this period. The people
of Patrai crossed over to help the A‘tolians, with whom they
were then on friendly terms, in their struggle with the Gaulish
invaders. The Patrian contingent suffered so severely that this
loss, combined with the general poverty of the time, led most of

the Gaulish the inhabitants to leave the city of Patrai, and to found smaller

War,
B.c. 279.

towns in the adjoining territory.? It does not however appear

either a garrison or a Tyrant. Συνέβη πάσας τὰς πόλεις χωρισθείσας ἀφ᾽ αὑτῶν
ἐναντίως τὸ συμφέρον ἄγειν ἀλλήλαις ἐξ οὗ συνέπεσε τὰς μὲν ἐμφρούρους αὐτῶν
γενέσθαι. . . τὰς δὲ καὶ τυραννεῖσθαι.

1 The words ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις Βούριοι τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείναντες (Pol. ii. 41)
followed preseutly by ἀπολωλότα δὲ τὸν ἐν τῇ Βούρᾳ τύραννον διὰ Μάρκον καὶ τῶν
᾿Αχαιῶν show the combined action of the Bourians themselves and of the con-
federate cities.

2 Ib. Προσέθηκε τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὸ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν σύστημα.

3 Paus. vii. 18. 6. Κατὰ χώραν ὑπὸ φιλεργίας ἐσκεδάσθησαν. He goes on to
say that these small townships were all reunited to Patrai by Augustus Cesar,
and the restored city raised to the rank of a Roman colony. These townships

v THE LEAGUE EXTENDED OVER ALL ACHAIA 198

that this process at all affected the political position of Patrai as

an Achaian city; the inhabitants of Argyra, Bolimé, and the

other country towns, doubtless retained their Patrian franchise,

just like Athenian citizens living in an Attic Démos. And
indeed the Gaulish invasion itself, by its temporary overthrow

of the Macedonian power, must have conferred indirect benefits

on the League in general which far more than counterbalanced

any losses sustained by the single city of Patrai. Unobserved,
apparently, and uncared for, the ten Achaian cities had time to
strengthen their habits of freedom and good government, to Quiet and
develope their political constitution, and gradually to prepare peaceful
themselves for the day when their League was to step forward er the
as the general champion of Grecian freedom and as one of the League,

great political lights of Greece and the world. Oe 280-

During this time there are only two names of individuals Names of
which we can connect with the course of our history ;* these are indivi-
two citizens of the small town of Keryneia, Iseas and Markos. °"
Of neither of them is much recorded, but quite enough to make
us wish that we knew more. Of Markos we shall hear again, Markos of
and always honourably; Polybios gives his whole career the Keryneia
highest praise ;! twenty years after his first appearance he was
chosen the first sole General of the League ; 5 twenty-six years 8.6. 255.
later still, the noble old man, still in the active service of his
country, perished in a sea-fight against the pirates of IIlyria? 3.c. 229.
But it is the earlier exploits of Markos which we desire to know
more in detail. He would almost appear to have been the Markos
Washington of the original League, though his fame has been probebly
obscured by the later and more brilliant services of Aratos. A day Founder
came when the deliverance of Boura seemed a small matter com- of the
pared to the deliverance of Sikyén and Akrokorinthos ; but, in Lege.
the day of the deliverance of Boura, that small success was of
greater moment than the greatest successes of later and more
prosperous times. The very name of the hero, Italian rather

must be the Πατρεῖς καὶ rd μετὰ τοῦτο συντελικόν in Pol. xl. 83, Cf. v. 94, fora
similar phrase about another town. Strabo (viii. 7. 5.) says that each of the
original twelve cities consisted of seven or eight δῆμοι [ἐκ δήμων συνειστήκει
ἑπτὰ καὶ ὀκτώ].

1 Pol. ii. 10. Μάρκος ὁ Kepuveds, ἀνὴρ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τῷ κοινῷ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν
πολιτεύματι πεποιηκὼς μέχρι τῆς καταστροφῆς.

3 Ib. 48. 3 Ib. 10.

O

Iseas of
Keryneia
abdicates
the Ty-
ranpy.

Nature of
the Greek,
Tyrannies.

Difference
between
the earlier
and later

Tyrannies.

194 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHATIAN LEAGUE cuap.

than Greek,! raises curiosity as to his origin and history. He
was a citizen of Keryneia, but we find him acting in the interests
of the League, and apparently as the leader of its councils, at a
time when Keryneia itself was still under the sway of its Tyrant.
Markos was the chief leader? in the movement, of whatever
nature it was, by which the liberated cities were able to extend
their help to the patriots of Boura. It is impossible to believe
that Markos can have been at this time an inhabitant of his
native town; it can hardly be doubted that he was an exile in
the cause of freedom, who offered his services to the infant
League, and was most likely admitted to the citizenship of one
of its members. Iseas again, the Tyrant of Markos’ own city, is
a man of whom we should gladly know more. He was the first
of several Tyrants who had the wisdom and magnanimity to give
up their ill-gotten and dangerous power, and to confine their
ambition within the bounds of such honours as a free state
can confer upon its citizens. If Markos was the precursor, in
some respects the nobler precursor, of Aratos, Iseas may well
have been the worthy precursor of Lydiadas. (We must always ;
remember what a Greek Tyranny was. It was royal, or more
than royal, power possessed by one man in a state where
monarchy was not the lawful constitution. It therefore neces-
sarily implied the internal political bondage of the city yy At this
period of Grecian history a Tyranny also commonly implied,
what in earlier times it did not, a state of external dependence
on a foreign power. The Tyrant ruled under Macedonian pro-
tection, often by the help of Macedonian troops. The Tyrannies
of this age were therefore, for the most part, something far worse
than the earlier Tyrannies of Peisistratos or even of Periander.
Two widely different periods, in both of which Tyrannies were
common, are divided by a long interval. During the fifth
century before Christ and the greater part of the fourth,
Tyranny was rare in Greece proper, and almost unknown in
the chief cities® The Tyrant of the old times, Peisistratos of

1 Brandstiiter (Geschichte Ztoliens, 202) makes the true form Mdpyos and
not Μάρκος. But would not Mdpyos be a name quite as strange on other grounds ἢ
I follow Thirlwall and Bekker’s Polybios.

2 Pol. ii. 41. Διὰ Μάρκον καὶ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν.

3 Tyrants were common enough at this time in Sicily and elsewhere among the
colonial Greeks, but there were very few in Old Greece between the fall of the
Peisistratids and the age of the Successors. Euphrén at Sikyén and Timophanés
at Corinth are the most famous exceptions. The Thessalian Tyrants have per-

aN

x
.

tt ies πὐπὄδυδιυσσιιι,

|

ie ΝΒ

Vv EARLIER AND LATER TYRANNIES 195

Athens or Kleisthenés of Sikyén, was a party leader, who
commonly reigned with the good will of at least a part of the
citizens ; at all events nothing hindered him from seeking either
the external greatness or the internal splendour of his city. 5.6. 625-
Corinth was never so great as under Periander, or Samos so 585.
great as under Polykratés. But the Tyrant of the Macedonian 599. ὅ80-
age commonly obtained his power by sheer violence, and ruled
simply by the spears of foreign mercenaries. (si it must be §/
remembered that the mere word Tyrant, in Greek use,
expresses only the illegal nature of the Tyrant’s power, and
does not necessarily imply any oppressive exercise of it. The
Tyrant’s position indeed offered every opportunity of oppres-
sion and every temptation to oppress, but the position itself does
not necessarily convict a man of cruelty or rapacity. When the |
Tyrant came to his power by hereditary succession, the son
would often be, like the younger Dionysios, if weaker, at all
events less oppressive than his father. In the later period
Tyrannies were less commonly transmitted from father to the son
than in the earlier, but on the other hand it is easy to under-
stand that absolute power may now, from another set of causes,
have sometimes fallen into better hands, and have been employed
for better purposes. Tyranny was now quite common and L,
familiar ; though hereditary dynasties were seldom founded, yet >
many cities were under the government of several Tyrants in
uninterrupted succession; republican government may often
have been unknown to two’Or three generations of citizens.2_ In
such an age, a man ambitious of power, and to whom no nobler
way of obtaining it presented itself, may have grasped at the
Tyranny as his only path to greatness, without the least inten-
tion of inflicting any wanton oppression upon his countrymen.®
It is clear that there were the same sort of differences among
haps more in common with the Tyrannies of the later period, of which they may
be looked upon as the beginning.

1 See above, p. 17. I do not see the gain of substituting, with Mr. Grote,
the word “Despot” for “Tyrant” as the translation of the Greek τύραννος.
Whichever we use'must be used in a fixed technical sense, differing somewhat
from its usual modern meaning. Eurepe now contains several Despots, but only
one τύραννος.

3 When Aratos delivered Corinth in B.c, 243, the Corinthians had not had
the keys of their own city since the time of Philip—ninety-five years, Plut.

Tat. δ
Α ὴ “The Tyrants consisting of his [Antigonos Gonatas’] partisans were men of

very different characters : some were moderate and bearable persons, while others
were extremely cruel.” Niebuhr, Lect. on Anc. Hist. iii. 259.

196 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuwar.

the Greek instruments of Macedonia as we have seen in our own
times among the Italian instruments of Austria! No fair person
would confound the government of the deposed ruler of Tuscany
with the government of the deposed ruler of Naples. But Greece
saw, what Italy has not seen, Tyrants prudent and noble-minded
enough to lay down the Tyranny of their own will, and honestly
to adapt themselves to a change which they could not, and may
not have wished to, avert. Such was the noble Lydiadas of
Megalopolis, whom we shall soon meet with as one of the
brightest glories of the League. Such may well have been
Iseas of Keryneia in its earlier days. And it must have re-
quired yet greater vigour in Iseas to set such an example?” than
it required in Lydiadas, a generation later, to follow it. For
Iseas, when alarmed for the security of his power, did not fly, as
many a meaner tyrant has done, and leave his city to its fate ;
he did not ask his royal patron for support against the encroach-
ing spirit of freedom ; he laid down his power, and, trusting to
the faith of the Confederate cities, he himself annexed Keryneia
to the League. Of his subsequent career we know nothing ;
Polybios does not tell us whether Iseas, like Lydiadas and Aris-
tomachos, lived to know how much really greater is the position

1 An objection may be brought against a parallel between the Greek Tyrants
and “legitimate” rulers like the deposed Italian Princes. But all the dynasties
lately reigning in Italy reigned only by virtue of treaties contracted by foreign
powers, to which those who alone were concerned were no parties. The Princes
of Lorraine, though one of them was probably the best despot that ever reigned
in Europe, had really less right in Tuscany than the old Visconti had in Milan.
This sort of legitimacy was something quite unknown in old Greece, and I cannot
help thinking that if a specimen had appeared, whether in the form of an indi-
vidual ruler or a whole dynasty, Greek political thinkers would have set it down
as a case of τυραννίς rather than of lawful βασιλεία.

2 I know of only one clear example of a Greek Tyrant in the earlier period
willingly surrendering his power. This is Kadmos, Tyrant of Kids, contemporary
with the Persian War, who gave up his Tyranny—éxwy re εἶναι καὶ δεινοῦ ἐπιόντος
οὐδενὸς, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης ἐς μέσον Κῴοισι καταθεὶς τὴν ἀρχήν (Herod. vii.
164). He did not however, like Lydiadas, remain as a private citizen in the city
where he had ruled.

There is also the story of the contemplated abdication of Maiandrios of Samos.
Herod, iii. 142.

3 The article Iseas in the Dictionary of, Biography hardly, does justice to our
Keryneian Tyrant. Mr. Bunbury says that Iseas “judged it prudent to provid
for his personal safety by voluntarily abdicating the sovereign power, whereupon
Ceryneia immediately joined the Achaians,” as if Iseas had no hand in uniting
Keryneia with the League. Now the words of Polybios (ii. 41) are ἀποθέμενος
τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ λαβὼν τὰ πιστὰ παρὰ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀσφαλείας προσέθηκε
τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὸ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν σύστημα. This surely implies that Iseas, just
like Lydiadas, was himself the chief promoter of the union.

Υ THE ACHAIAN CONSTITUTION 197

of the republican magistrate than that of the despotic prince.
But the conduct of Iseas shows a prudence or a magnanimity, or
rather an union of the two, which at once stamps him as no
common man. And it is honourable to the otherwise insigni-
ficant town of Keryneia to have produced the only two men
whose names we know during this first period of the League’s
history, and both of them men of whom the little that we
know makes us anxious for a more intimate knowledge.

§ 3. Of the Achaian Federal Constitution

It must have been in the course of these years, during which
the League was growing up in peaceful obscurity, that that
Federal Constitution was formed which was afterwards extended
over so large a portion of Greece. As usual, however, we have
to frame our account of it from incidental notices, from general
panegyrics, and from records of particular changes in detail.
We cannot lay our hands on any one document, on any Declara-
tion of Independence, on any formally enacted Federal Constitu-
tion, to act as a decisive authority in our inquiries.. We may
console ourselves with the thought that an inquirer at any equal
distance of time will have to frame his picture of the British
Constitution from information of exactly the same Kind. Cer-
tainly he will not find any one authoritative document clearly
setting forth the powers of King, Lords, and Commons, or |
exactly defining the Prerogative of the Crown, the Privilege of
Parliament, and the Liberty of the Subject. Still less will he
find any such document setting forth such hardly less important
’ points as the nature of Government and of Opposition, or ex-
plaining the exact constitution of the Cabinet and the functions
of the Leader of the House of Commons. But, though no such
document has survived to our time, we have every reason to
believe that the Achaian Constitution, unlike the British Con-
stitution, was enacted and recorded ‘by public authority. The
first union of the four towns was looked on as a mere revival of
the old League, probably on the laxer terms of union on which
that old League seems to have been formed. We have seen that
it did not hinder Patrai from acting independently of its con-
federates in the Gaulish War! just as we saw Pelléné, under the

1 See above, p. 192.

Probable
enactment
of the
Federal
Constitu-

Sources of
Informa-
tion,

The Con-
stitution
formed
for the
Achaian
Towns
only.

Demo-
cratic Con-
stitution
of the

League.

18 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuaap.

old League, acting independently of its confederates in the
Peloponnésian War.! Such a course would have been contrary
to every principle of the Federa] Constitution in the days of its
maturity. Most probably, when all the surviving Achaian towns
were reunited, the union was intentionally made more intimate,
and its terms were enacted and recorded by common consent.”
No such document however is preserved to us; and we have to
form our ideas of the Achaian Constitution chiefly from the
incidental notices and general comments of Polybios, and from
such further incidental notices as are to be found in writers like
Plutarch, Pausanias, and Strabo. Polybios unfortunately does
not begin his detailed narrative till a later period, when in truth
the most interesting portion of the League’s history had passed
by. Of its foundation and its earlier fortunes he gives a mere
sketch, but it is a sketch for which we may well be thankful, a
sketch clear and masterly as might be looked for from such a
hand. We have abundant evidence to show that the Federal
Constitution was formed while the League still embraced only
the small towns of the original Achaia. The greater cities which
afterwards joined the Union were admitted into a body the
relations and duties of whose members were already fixed and
well understood. This will plainly appear, if only from one or
two points in the constitution which were suited only to the
circumstances of the original Achaian towns, and which were
found to be a source of inconvenience, and even of unfairness,
when the Union was extended over a wider territory.

The whole constitution of the League.--was Democratic.

Polybios constantly praises it as the truest and purest of all -

Democracies.2 Yet we shall soon see that Democracy in Achaia
was practically a very different thing from Democracy at Athens.
It is possible that Polybios might have looked upon the constitu-
tion of Athens as an Ochlocracy as opposed to the true Demo-
cracy of his own land. But the fact rather is that in theory
Achaia was as strictly democratic as Athens, but that the
circumstances of the League unavoidably tempered the -Achaian
Democracy in practice in a way in which nothing occurred to

1 See above, p. 187. 2 Thirlwall, viii. 89, 90.

3 Pol. ii. 38. ᾿Ισηγορίας καὶ παρρησίας καὶ καθόλου δημοκρατίας ἀληθινῆς
σύστημα καὶ προαίρεσιν εἰλικρινεστέραν οὐκ ἂν εὕροι τις τῆς παρὰ τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς
ὑπαρχούσης.

v DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF THE LEAGUE 199

temper the Athenian Democracy. In both alike the sovereign
power was vested in a Popular Assembly, in which every free
citizen had an equal right to attend, speak, and vote. In both
alike the People, and the People alone, enacted laws, elected
magistrates, contracted alliances, declared war and peace. But Differences
in Achaia conditions which never_arose at Athens modified this between
popular sovereignty in many ways. Far greater legal power }” Achalan
was placed in the hands of particular magistrates. Far greater an entan
power of an indirect, though n not an illegal, kind was thrown into Demo-
the hands both of magistrates and other leading men. The το
Assembly indeed always remained the supreme and undisputed
authority, but the powers even of that sovereign body would
have appeared sadly curtailed in the eyes of a democrat whose
ideas were formed solely on Athenian models.

The constitution of the League was strictly Federal. The
Federal form of government now appears in its fullest and purest
shape. very city remained a distinct State, sovereign for all
purposes ποῖ inconsistent with the higher sovereignty of the
Federation, retaining its local Assemblies and local Magistrates,
and ordering all exclusively local affairs without any interference
from the central power. There is no evidence that the Federal
Government, in its best days, ever directly interfered with the
internal laws, or even with the political constitutions, of the
several cities._ We read, as elsewhere in Greece, of local parties Inde-
and local dissensions, and, in one case at least, at Megalopolis Penvlence
after the fall of Kleomenés, of a y purely Tocal lawgiver. 3. Kynaitha, oovoral
after her union with the League, retained her local Polemarchs,$ Cities,
and Aratos himself was once chosen General of the State of 8.0. 221-
Argos,‘ as an office quite distinct from that of General of the 218. 298.

1 On this subject see the excellent remarks of Schorn, p. 74 et seqq.

3 Antigonos Désén is said by Polybios (v. 93) to have given one Prytanis to
the Megalopolitans as a lawgiver (ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς νομοθέτην). It was however by
no means the policy of Antigonos to break through constitutional forms, and we
may fairly conclude that Prytanis was named by the King at the request of the
Megalopolitans themselves. His legislation however only gave rise to fresh
disputes, and at last Aratos was sent by decree of the Federal Assembly (κατὰ τὸ
τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν δόγμα) to reconcile the contending parties, which he effectually did.
Here again there was no breach of the cantonal rights of Megalopolis. Aratos
acted simply as a mediator. The two parties agreed on certain conditions, which
the City of Megalopolis, not the Federal Government, caused to be engraved on a
pillar in one of its temples. (’Eq’ ols Exntay τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφορᾶς, γράψαντες
εἰς στήλην. ἀνέθεσαν.) 3 Pol. iv. 18.

ὁ Plut. Ar. 44. "Ἄρατος δὲ στρατηγὸς αἱρεθεὶς ὑπ᾽ ᾿Αργείων ἔπεισεν αὐτούς.
K.T.A. .

Districts
subject to

particular
Cities.

Tendencies
to assimi-
lation
among the
Members
of League,
both in
Achaia and
America,

200 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuaap.

League. So little indeed did the Federal power meddle with
the internal affairs of the several cities that it tolerated distinc-
tions within their territories which seem hardly in accordance
with the principles of ‘universal equality on which the League
itself was founded. That the League did not interfere with
the peculiar relations between Patrai and her townships is not
wonderful ; they probably did not interfere with the full Patrian
citizenship of their inhabitants.'_ But Megalopolis certainly,’ and
Corinth probably,® had subject districts, whose inhabitants appear
to have had no direct share in the general Federal citizenship.
We have seen this sort of relation among the aristocracies of
Bootia ; we shall meet with it again among the Swiss Cantons,
aristocratic and democratic alike. But one would hardly have
expected to find it amid the Equality and Fraternity of the
Achaian League. But the toleration of such inequalities is really
a necessary deduction from the doctrine of the sovereignty of
each State within its own limits, just like the toleration of the
“domestic institution” of the Southern States of America by a
Federation which scrupulously excludes the word Slave from its
own Constitution. But, though the several cities remained
internally independent, we cannot doubt that their close union
for all external purposes strongly tended to assimilate them to
one another in their internal constitution and laws. It can
hardly be supposed that the political constitution of any member
of the League was other than democratic. We see the same
phenomenon in the United States. The Federal Constitution
merely provides that each State shall have a republican govern-
ment ‘ and shall not grant titles of nobility ;° within these limits
it may be as oligarchic or as democratic as it pleases. Any State
that chose might transact all its affairs in a primary Assembly
like those of Athens or Schwytz, and might give its chief magis-
trate no higher powers than those of an Athenian Archon. Or

1 See above, p. 192.

2 Plut. Phil. 18. ὁ Φιλοποίμην ἀπέστησε πολλὰς τῶν περιοικίδων κωμῶν.
See Droysen, ii. 464. Thirlwall, viii. 364. Whether these townships were
strictly subject to Megalopolis will be found discussed afterwards, p. 488. It is
possible that they may have been more analogous to the Patrian townships men-
tioned in p..192.

3 Strabo’s account of Tenea in the Corinthian territory sounds very much as
if it had been a κώμη περιοικίς of Corinth. viii, 6.22. Ta δ᾽ ὕστατα καὶ καθ᾽
αὑτοὺς πολιτεύεσθαι' προσθέσθαι τε τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἀποστάντας Κορινθίων. Cf.
the Messénian districts mentioned by Polybios, xxy, 1.

4 Art. iv. § 4. 5 Art. i. § 10. 1.

v PRESERVATION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 201

it might, as far as appears, make as near an approach to monarchy
as would be implied in the creation of a Polish King or a Venetian
Doge. For the existence of those Princes was never held to
destroy the claim of Venice and Poland to the title of Republics, A "
and if any State chose to elect its Governor for life, he would
certainly fill a position of greater power than either of them. . 4 --
Or, to come to differences which have really existed, the elective ~
franchise in different States has at different times varied from
universal suffrage and no property qualification to the require- QD
ment of a considerable freehold both in the elector and in the A\ _
representative. And the Federal Constitution respects all Ν
systems alike; the Federal franchise belongs to those, few or Δ.
many, who possess the franchise in their own State? But the =="
different States have, since the establishment of the Federal
Union, moved with remarkable unanimity in two directions.
Nearly all have advanced in a democratic path by abolishing
property qualifications, and all have advanced in what was once
thought to be an aristocratic path by establishing two Legislative
Chambers. So in Achaia a local oligarchy in any particular
city could not possibly have kept its ground, while the constitu-
tion of thé League itself and the local constitutions of .the-other
‘cities were all of them democratic. It seems certain also that a
citizen of any Achaian city was admitted to at least the private
rights of citizenship, those of intermarriage and possession of
landed property, in the other cities of the League. But it is
hardly likely that an Achaian citizen could, as a citizen of the
United States can, exchange at will, or after a short time of
residence, the franchise of his native State for that of another.‘
But the tendency to assimilation among the several cities was
very strong. In the later days of the League it seems to have

1 Smith’s Comparative View of the Constitutions of the Several States, etc.
νὰ ΟΝ 1796). Tables i. and ii.

Art. i.§2.1. Cf. § 4. 1.

: Thus much at least seems implied in 1 the words πολιτεία and συμπολιτεία,
which are so often used. Accordingly we find that Aratos, a citizen of Sikyén,
had a house at Corinth. (Plut. Ar. 41. Kleom. 19.) So, when the League
was broken up by the Romans, this intercommunion of property between different
cities was forbidden. (Paus. vii. 16. 9.) It may be remembered that in the
Olynthian Confederacy (see above, p. 151) these private rights were promised to
the annexed cities.

4 Aratos, as we have seen (p. 199), was once elected chief magistrate of Argos,
but this was in a moment of great political excitement, and the fact hardly proves

that a less distinguished Sikyénian could have held the office in an ordinary
year.

The
League
really a
National
Govern-
ment.

No inde-

pendent -

Diplo-
matic
Action

in the
several
Cities.
Compari-
son with
America.

202 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE caap.

developed with increased force, till at last Polybios could say ὦ
that all Peloponnésos differed from a single city only in not
being surrounded by a single wall. The whole peninsula em-
ployed the same coinage, weights, and measures, and was governed
by the same laws, administered by the same magistrates, senators,

- and judges.

But .while the Achaian Constitution strictly respected the
local rights of the several cities, it in no wise allowed their local
sovereignty to trench upon the higher sovereignty of the League.
The Achaian League was, in German technical language, a
Bundesstaat and not a mere Staatenbund.* There was an Achaian
nation,® with a national Assembly, a national Government, and
national Tribunals, to whith every Achaian citizen owed a direct
allegiance. The whole language of Polybios shows that every
Achaian citizen stood in a direct relation to the Federal authority,
and was in full strictness a citizen of the League itself, and not
merely of one of the cities which composed it. The Achaian
cities were not mere municipalities, but sovereign commonwealths.‘
But in all external matters, in everything which concerned the
whole Achaian body and its relations to other powers, the
Federal Government reserved to itself full supremacy. No
single city could, of its own authority, make peace or war, or
commission Ambassadors to foreign powers. But it would
appear that the separate action of the several cities was not
quite so rigidly limited in the last respect as it is in the American
Union. The cause of the difference is obvious. The American
States, before their union into a Federal Republic, had been
mere Colonies, mere dependencies of a distant Kingdom. In-
dependent diplomatic action was something to which they had
not been accustomed, and which they could cheerfully do
without. It was a great advance in their condition when the
right of acting on their behalf in dealings with other nations
was transferred from a King over whom they had no control
to a Federal President in whose appointment they themselves
had a share. But the cities of the Achaian League, those at

1 See the famous passage, ii. 37. The identity there spoken of seems to me
merely to express the result of the assimilation spoken of in the text. It need
not imply any compulsory introduction of uniformity, still less any extension of
the powers of the Federal body in later times.

3 Helwing, p. 237. See above, p. 8. Cf. Tittmann, p. 675.

3 "Ἔθνος. See above, pp. 10, 144.

ὁ In Greek phrase, πόλεις and not δῆμοι.

ν NO DIPLOMATIC ACTION IN THE STATES 203

all events which lay beyond the limits of the original Achaia,
had been, before their union, absolutely independent powers,
accustomed to carry on wars and negociations in their own
names without reference to any superior authority. Even the
rule of a Tyrant did not destroy this sort of independence; a
single citizen indeed usurped powers which belonged of right
to the whole body of citizens, but they were not transferred to
any individual or any Assembly beyond the limits of the city.
When the Tyrant was overthrown, this power, with the other
powers which he had seized on, at once reverted to the people
of the city. The right of direct intercourse with foreign powers
is one of the last which an independent city or canton is willing
to surrender to any central power, as we may see by the history
of both the Swiss and the Dutch Confederations. For Sikyén,
or Mantineia, or Megalopolis to forego this high attribute of
sovereignty, and to entrust powers which it had once exercised
without restraint to an Assembly in which it had only one voice
among many, was really no small sacrifice for the public good.
It is rather to be wondered at that it was so easily surrendered
by so many Peloponnesian cities, and that the loss was for the
most part so peaceably acquiesced in. But while an Ambassador Restriction
sent to or from New York or South Carolina is a thing unheard jose strict
of, an Ambassador sent to or from Corinth or Megalopolis wasa
thing rare indeed, and perhaps irregular, but not absolutely
without precedent. The Corinthians, after their union with 8.6. 228.
the League, received separate Ambassadors from Rome,’ before
Rome was dangerous. They came indeed on a purely honorary
errand:; another embassy had transacted the political business
between Rome and the League; still, whether of right or of
special permission, the single city of Corinth did give audience
to the Ambassadors of a foreign power. It is quite possible
that for a single city to receive an embassy was not so strictly
forbidden by the Federal Constitution as it was for a single
city to commission an embassy. This last, it is clear, was
1 Pol. ii. 12. On this Embassy (see p. 327) the explanation of the apparent
breach of rule is probably to be found in the religious character of the mission.
The Roman envoys were received by the Corinthians, not as members of the
Achaian League, but as administrators of the Isthmian games. In this character,
they must have been in the constant habit of receiving the θεωρίαι of Greek cities.
As the administration of the games always remained a matter purely of State,
and not at all of Federal, concern, the reception of this political sort of embassy

—necessary in the presidents of the games—must have been held not to interfere
with the general external sovereignty of the League.

Particular
Embassies
by licence
of the

B.C. 224.

Later ex-
ceptions
under
Roman
influence.

B.c. 198.

204 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cunap.

forbidden by the general law of the League, just as it is
forbidden! by the Constitution of the United States. Cases
however occur in the course of Achaian history alike of the
law being dispensed with and of the law being violated.2 We
have a full account’ of one very curious instance of a single
city entering into diplomatic relations with a foreign power by
special permission of the national Congress. The fact of such
a permission being asked shows that, without it, the proceeding
would have been unlawful, but the fact of the permission being
granted equally shows that the request was not looked upon as
altogether unreasonable and monstrous. The occasion was no
other than the fatal application to Macedonia for aid against
Sparta, which was first made by an embassy sent from the
single city of Megalopolis, but with the full permission of the
Federal body.‘ This is perhaps the only recorded case of a
breach of the rule during the good times of the League; and
this took place in a season of extreme danger, and was the
result of a deeply laid scheme of the all-powerful Aratos. In
later times, when unwilling cities were annexed to the League
by force, and when Roman intrigue was constantly sowing
dissension among its members, we shall find not unfrequent
Instances of embassies sent from particular cities to what was
practically the suzerain power. The old law now needed special
confirmation. It was agreed, in the first treaty between Achaia
and Rome, that no embassy should be sent to Rome by any
particular Achaian city, but only by the general Achaian body.®
But this agreement was of course broken whenever its violation
suited Roman interests. Sparta especially, and Messéné, cities
joined to the League against their will, were constantly laying

1 The Constitution (Art. i. § 10. 1) absolutely forbids all diplomatic action on
the part of the several States, and the confederate Constitution (Art. i. § 10. 1)
repeats the prohibition. The looser Confederation of 1778 only forbade the
receiving or sending Ambassadors “ without the consent of the United States in
Congress assembled.” Art. vi.§ 1. Cf. § 5.

3 Tittmann (678) mistakes these exceptions for the rule.

3 Pol. ii. 48-50

4 I shall narrate this curious proceeding in detail at the proper point of the
history.

5 Paus. vii. 9.4. ᾿Αχαιῶν μὲν γὰρ εἴρητο ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ παρὰ τὴν Ῥωμαίων
βουλὴν ἀπιέναι πρέσβεις, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἀπείρητο μὴ πρεσβεύεσθαι τὰς πόλεις ὅσαι
συνεδρίουζ τοῦ ᾿Αχαιῶν μετεῖχον. See Thirlwall, viii. 90 (note). That this
prohibition was an exception, and not simply the confirmation of an ancient rule
rendered more needful on entering into relation with so powerful an ally, seems
quite inconceivable.

Υ THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 205

their real or supposed grievances at the feet of the Roman
Senate. Here again we may learn the lesson that a Federal
body can derive no strength from the incorporation or retention
of unwilling members.

The supreme power of the League was vested in the sovereign The As-

Popular Assembly. This was the Congress of the Union, differ- reed
ing from the Congress of the American Union mainly in this, that, League.

according to the common political instinct of the Greek mind,
it was a primary and not a representative Assembly.! The
latter notion has indeed been maintained by two German
scholars,? but no sound arguments are brought in support of
their opinions, and it does not seem to have met with favour in
any other quarter. There can be no doubt that every citizen of The De-
every city in the League, at all events every citizen who had ™mocratic
attained the age of thirty years,® had a right to attend, speak, Fonstitu-
and vote. Every free Achaian, no less than every free Athenian,
could give a direct voice in the election of the magistrates by
whom he was to be governed, in the enactment of the laws
which he was to obey, and in the declaration of the wars in
which he might be called on to bear a part. The Achaian

1 It is spoken of as ᾿Αχαιοί, ἔθνος, σύνοδος, πλῆθος (Pol. iv. 9, 10, 14; v. 1;
xxxviii. 2), of πολλοί (xxxviii. 4; xl 45; xxi. 7), ἀθροισθέντες els ἐκκλησίαν ol
πολλοὶ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν, ἐκκλησία (Pol. xxviii.'3), ὄχλος (xxviii. 7), ἀγορά (xxviii. 7 ;
xxix. 9). These expressions explain those like σύνεδροι (Plut. Ar. 35) and
συνέδριον (Paus. u.s.) which might at first sight convey another idea, and which
probably arose out of the practice of later times. See Niebuhr’s Hist. Rome, ii.
30, Eng. Tr. Thirlwall, viii. Ὁ. 91, note. ‘Tittmann, 680. The formal title of
the body, as usual, is rd κοινὸν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν. Pol. xxviii. 7. Boeckh, C. I. no.
1542. Paus. u.s.

3 Helwing, p. 229. Drumann, p. 463. The chief argument adduced in
behalf of this opinion is a single place of Polybios, where he remarks that a
particular Assembly, in the very last days of the League, was attended by a
greater number of people, and those of a lower class, than usual (Pol. xxxviii. 4):
. καὶ γὰρ συνηθροίσθη πλῆθος ἐργαστηριακῶν καὶ βαναύσων ἀνθρώπων, οἷον οὐδέποτε.
This is merely the sort of language which a Tory historian would use in describ-
ing the first Reformed Parliament. It evidently implies that these people had
a right to be there, but that so many of them had never before been known to
come. Helwing argues that their presence was “gegen Gewohnheit und Gesetz.”’
It was doubtless “ gegen Gewohnheit,”’ but not “gegen Gesetz.” Droysen, who
is generally disposed to make the constitution of the League more aristocratic
than it really was, fully admits the popular character of the general Congress (ii.
462). Cf. K. F. Hermann, § 186, n. 5, Eng. Tr. and the important note of
Schorn, 371.

3 So Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 91) infers from Polybios, xxix. 9, where be speaks
of a σύγκλητος, ἐν ἣ συνέβαινε μὴ μόνον συμπορεύεσθαι τὴν βουλὴν ἀλλὰ πάντας
τοὺς ἀπὸ τριάκοντα ἑτῶν.

Ze

Aristo-
cratic Ele-
ment in
Achaia,

Contrast
with
Athens,

|

J+
Achaian
Constitu-
tion
a nearer
approach
to modern
systems,

> an

206 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuap.

Constitution therefore is rightly called a Democratic Constitution.
And yet nothing is plainer than that the practical working of
Democracy in Achaia was something altogether different from the
practical working of Democracy at Athens! At the first glance
we might almost be tempted to call the Achaian Constitution
practically aristocratic rather than democratic. It is evident that
birth, wealth, and official position carried with them an influence
in Achaia which they did ποῦ carry with them at Athens. The
Athenian Assembly was sovereign in the very highest sense ;
Démos was Tyrant, and he did not shrink from the name ;?
the Assembled People were not only a Parliament, but also a
Government :8 an eloquent speaker might wield the fierce
Democracy at pleasure, but a private citizen could do so just
as easily as the highest Magistrate. The Assembly, in short,
was really a master, and Magistrates were its mere servants
to carry out its bidding. But in the Achaian Democracy we
find a wholly different state of things. We find a President of
the Union with large personal powers, a Cabinet Council abting
as the President’s advisers, and a Senate invested with tar higher
functions than the mere Committee of the Assembly which bore
the same title at Athens. In short, at Athens the People really
governed; in Achaia they did little more than elect their
governors and say Aye or No to their proposals.

It will be at once seen that these differences all tend to make
the Achaian Constitution approach, far more nearly than that of
Athens, tothe state of things to which we are accustomed in
modern Republics and Constitutional Kingdoms. And they all
spring from the different position of Democracy as applied to
the single City of Athens and Democracy as applied to a Federal
State embracing a large portion of Greece. The Athenian

1 Kortiim (iii. 158)*gives the Achaian system the appropriate name of.“ die
gemissigte Demokratie.”’

2 Thuc. ii. 68. Τυραννίδα yap ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτὴν [τὴν ἀρχήν]. Ib. iii. 37.
τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν. Aristoph. Knights, 1111. Ὦ Δῆμε, καλήν γ᾽ ὄχεις
᾿Αρχὴν, ὅτε πάντες ἄν -Θρωποι δεδίασί σ᾽ ὥς-Πεῤ ἄνδρα τύραννον. Ib, 1830.
δείξατε τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡμῖν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆσδε μόναρχον. Ib. 1832. χαῖρ᾽, ὦ
βασιλεῦ τῶν Ἑλλάνων. Isok. Areop, 26. Δεῖ τὸν μὲν δῆμον ὥσπερ τύραννον
καθιστάναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας καὶ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν
ἀμφισβητουμένων, τοὺς δὲ σχολὴν ἄγειν δυναμένους καὶ βίον ἱκανὸν κεκτημένους
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν κοινῶν ὥσπερ οἰκέτας. Aristot. Pol. ii. 12. Ὥσπερ τυράννῳ
τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενοι. Ib. iv. (vi) 4. Μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἷς
ἐκ πολλῶν. [Compare the free democracy of Outer Appenzell and the action of the

people in 1732; Miiller, Hist, de 1a Confédération Suisse (Continuation) xiv. 186.]
See above, p. 33.

ν DEMOCRATIC THEORY OF THE ASSEMBLY 207

Assembly was held at a man’s own door; the Achaian Assembly
was held-in-e-distantcity.!. It follows at once that the Athenian Causes

Assembly was held much oftener than the Achaian Assembly ° the
Difference,

and was much more largely attended by citizens of all classes. arising
The Athenian Assembly was held thrice in each month; the mainly
Achaian Assembly was held of right only twice in_each year, from the

The poorest citizen could regularly attend at Athens, where a ee of
small fee recompensed his loss of time; the poor Achaian must Territory.
liave been unusually patriotic if he habitually took two journeys
in the year at his own cost to attend the Assembly at Aigion.
For the Athenian Treasury could easily bear the small fee paid
to the citizens for attendance in the Assembly, but no amount of
wealth in the Federal Treasury of Achaia could have endured
such a charge as the payment of travelling expenses and recom-
pense for loss of time to the whole free population of Argos and
Megalopolis. The poor Athenian then was both legally and
practically the political equal of his richer neighbour ; the poor

Achaian, though he laboured under no legal disqualification,
laboured under a practical disqualification almost bordering on
disfranchisement. The Achaian Assembly practically consisted The As-

of those among the inhabitants of each city who were at once ‘bY

wealthy men and eager politicians. Those citizens came together attended

who were at once wealthy enough to bear the cost of the journey by rich
and zealous enough to bear the trouble of it. It was, in fact, πθ΄ ας.

practically an aristocratic body, and it is sometimes spoken of a8 sembly
such.? Its aristocratic character may have been slightly modified practically
Tis

1 Some of the Attic Démoi are undoubtedly further from Athens than some of cratic.
the old Achaian towns are from Aigion ; but no point of Attica is so distant from
Athens as Dymé, for instance, is from Aigion, so that, on the whole, the rural
Athenians were nearer to the capital than the Achaians, even of the older towns,
were to the seat of the Federal Government. Also the city of Athens and its
ports must always have contained a very large proportion df the citizen popula-
tion, while Aigion was merely one town out of ten or twelve. Still the old
Achaia is not very much larger than Attica—in superficial extent it is probably
smaller—and it might perhaps have been possible to have united it by a
συνοικισμός instead of by a merely Federal tie. The essential differences between
Athens and Achaia begin to show themselves most clearly when the League began
to extend itself over much more distant cities, which no tie but a Federal one
could, according to Greek notious, ever have connected.

3 In Livy (xxxii. 21) the Achaian General Aristainos addresses the Assembly
as Principes Acheorum. But, especially as it comes in a speech, we cannot be
quite certain that this expression really answers to anything in Polybios or any
other Greek author. But it would fairly enough express the class of persons of
whom the Assembly was mainly composed, for Principes (see Wivy, xxxiii. 14)
does not always mean magistrates, but leading men, whether in office or not.

Not under-
stood by
Conti-
nental
Scholars.

.208 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuap.

by the possible presence of the whole citizen population of the
town where the Assembly met. But we may doubt whether
even they would, on ordinary occasions, be so eager to attend
an Assembly of such a character as they might have been if the
democratic spirit had been more predominant in it. But, if
they did, though some effect is always produced by the presence
and the voices of any considerable body of men, still, as they
could at most control a single vote, their presence would be of
but little strictly constitutional importance. The Congress,
democratic in theory, was aristocratic in practice. This contrast
of theory and practice, which Aristotle! had fully understood
long before the days of the League, runs through the whole of
the Achaian institutions. By Continental scholars, less used to
the working of free governments than those of our own land, it
seems not to have been thoroughly understood. They have
often imagined the existence of legal restrictions, when the

restriction was in fact one which simply made itself. They see

that the Assembly was mainly filled by members of an aristo-
cratic class, and they infer that it must have been limited by
law to a fixed body of representatives. They see that offices

Polybios (iv. 9) has the phrase ol προεστῶτες τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν, but this evidently
means the Δαμιοργοί as Presidents of the Assembly, not any aristocratic class.
It is just possible that the words in Livy may be a formal address to the
Δαμιοργοί as Presidents, like our ‘ Mr, Speaker.”

1 Arist. Pol. iv. [vi.] 5. Οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβέβηκεν wore
τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἔθος καὶ τὴν
ἀγωγὴν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν wap’ ἄλλοις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς
νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ 8 ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι
μᾶλλον.

So again, in a passage which almost reads like a prophetic description of the
League, and which indeed may have been true of the small Achaia of his times
(Pol. v. [viii] 8. 17); μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται dua εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ
ἀριστοκρατίαν . .. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ἄρχειν δημοκρατικὸν, τὸ δὲ τοὺς
γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικόν. He says that this happens when
offices are unpaid, as they were in Achaia.

Compare Hamilton’s remarks in the “ Federalist,” No. lviii. (p. 318). “The
people can never err more than in supposing, that by multiplying their repre-
sentatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the govern-
ment of a few. Experience will for ever admonish them, that, on the contrary,
after securing a sufficient number for purposes of safety, of local information, and
of diffusive sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract their own views
by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government
may become more democratic; but the soul that animates it will be more
oligarchic. The machine may be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more
secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.”

The Achaian Government however never deserved the name of an Oligarchy.
Tt was an Aristocracy in the literal sense of the word.

v ARISTOCRATIC ELEMENTS IN PRACTICE 209

were mainly confined to the rich and noble, and they infer that
the rich and noble must have had a legal monopoly of office.
To an Englishman both phenomena are perfectly simple. What Analogies
happened in Achaia is merely what happens daily before our own ™ πὰ
eyes in England. Every Achaian citizen had aright ἴο ἃ seat τς
in the Assembly, but practically few besides the high-born and
wealthy exercised that right. Every Achaian citizen was legally
eligible to the highest offices, but practically the choice of the
nation seldom fell upon poor men. So the poorest British sub-
ject is legally eligible to the House of Commons equally with
the richest, but we know that it is only under exceptional cir-
cumstances that any but a rich man is likely to be elected.
Even while the property qualification lasted, it was not the legal
requirement which kept out poor men, but the practical necessity
which imposed, and still impvuses, a standard of wealth much
higher than that fixed by the old law.t And moreover, it is in
the most purely democratic constituencies, in the “ nfetropolitan ”
boroughs for instance, that a poor man has even less chance of
election than elsewhere,

But though the Democratic Constitution of Achaia produced
what was practically an Aristocratic Assembly, it must not be
thought that Achaian democratic institutions were mere shadows.
The working of the Federal Constitution was aristocratic, but it
was not oligarchic. The leading men of Achaia were not a close
and oppressive body, fenced in by-_ distinct and odious legal
privileges ; their predominance rested merely on sufferance and The As-
conventionality, and the mass of the people had it legally in sem
their power to act for themselves whenever they thought good. cratic but
The members of the Assembly, meeting but rarely, and gathered not oli-
from distant cities, could have had none of that close corporate 8**chic.
feeling, that community of interest and habitual action, which is
characteristic of the oligarchy of a single town. An Achaian
who was led astray from his duty to the national interests, was
much more likely to be led astray by regard to the local interests
of his own city than by any care for the promotion of aristocracy
or democracy among the cities in general. And, of whatever
class it was composed, every description of the Assembly sets it

1 The original form of the property qualification had at least an intelligible
object. The requirement of real property was meant to serve a class interest.
It included the landowner, even of moderate estate, while it excluded the merely
monied man, however wealthy. But the property qualification, in its later form,
when real property was not required, seems to have been absolutely meaningless.

P

210 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE onap.

_ before us as essentially a popular Assembly, numerous enough

Practical
Demo-
cratical
elements.

to share all the passions, good and bad, which distinguish popular
Assemblies. It had all the generous emotions, all the life,
heartiness, and energy, and all the rash impetuosity and occa-
sional short-sightedness, of a really popular body. So our own
House of Commons may, if we look solely to the class of persons
of whom it is still mainly composed, be called an aristocratic
body ; but, when it comes together, it shows all the passions of
a really democratic Assembly. Contrast it with a Spartan or
Venetian Senate ; contrast it even with our own House of Lords.
So the Achaian Congress, though the mass of those present at
any particular meeting might be men of aristocratic position, was
still in spirit, as it was in name, an Assembly of the Achaian
People. Its members could not venture on any oppressive or
exclusive legislation against men who were legally their equals,
and who had a perfect right, if they chose to encounter the cost
and trouble, to take their places in the same Sovereign Assembly
as themselves. We cannot doubt, and we find it distinctly
affirmed of one occasion,! that, in times of great excitement,
many citizens appeared in the Assembly who were not habitual
frequenters of its sittings. Extraordinary Meetings, summoned
by the Government to discuss special and urgent business, would,
as a rule, be far more largely attended than the half-yearly
Meetings in which the ordinary affairs of the Commonwealth
were transacted.2 And we must always remember that each
city retained its independent democratic government, its Assembly
sovereign in all local affairs, and in which Federal questions,
though they could not be decided, were no doubt often dis-
cussed.> In the Assembly of the State, if not in the Federal
Congress, rich and poor really met on equal terms, and many
opportunities must have arisen for calling in question the
conduct of those citizens who took an active part in Federal
business. A Federal politician whose votes at Aigion were ob-
noxious to his fellow-citizens at home might be made to suffer
for his delinquency in many ways. Thus the pgople at large
held many checks upon those who were practic#fly their rulers,
and it was legally open to them to undertake at any time the

1 Pol. xxxviii. 4. See above, p. 205. Compare the description of the tumul-
tuous Assembly in Livy, xxxii. 22.

2 See Pol. xxix. 9.

8 Liv. xxxii. 19. Neque solum quid in senatu quisque civitatis sue: aut in
communibus conciliis gentis pro sententia dicerent ignorabant, etc.

Υ͂ VOTES TAKEN BY CITIES 211

post of rulers themselves. One can hardly doubt but that those
citizens of any particular town who attended the Federal Con-
gress practically acted as the representatives of the sentiments of
that town. Thus, though the mass of Achaian citizens rarely
took any part in the final decision of national affairs, yet the
vote of the national Assembly could hardly ever be in opposition
to the wishes of the nation at large.

The votes in the Assembly were taken, not by heads, but by Votes
cities! Ori this’ mode of Voting I have already had’ occasion to taken by
make some remarks. It was one common in the ancient re- by beads
publics, and it has become familiar to us by its employment in
the famous Assembly of the Roman Tribes. Nor is it at all
unknown in the modern world. It was the rule of the American
Confederation of 1778,5 and the present Constitution of the
Union retains it in those cases where the election of a President
falls to the House of Representatives.‘ In a Representative
Constitution this mode of voting must be defended, if it be
defended at all, upon other grounds ; in a Primary Assembly,
like that of Achaia, it was the only way by which the rights of
distant cities could be preserved. Had the votes been taken by
heads, the people of the town where the Meeting was held could
always have outvoted all the rest of the League. This might Evils
have been the case even while the Assembly was held at Aigion, against
and the danger would have been greater still when, in after system "
times, Assemblies were held in great cities like Corinth and guarded.
Argos. The plan of voting by cities at once obviated this evil.

It involves in truth the same principle which led the Patrician
Fabius and the Plebeian Decius to join in confining the city-
populace to a few tribes, and which has led our own House of
Commons steadily to reject all proposals for an increase in the
number of ‘‘ metropolitan” members. The representative system
would of course have effectually secured the League against all
fear of citizens from a distance being swamped by the multitude
of one particular town. But the representative system had not

1 See Niebuhr, Hist. Rome, ii. 29, Eng. Tr. Thirlwall, viii. 92. Kortiim
(iii. 160) maintains the contrary ; but it is impossible to believe that passages
like Liv. xxxii. 22, 23 and xxxviii. 82 merely mean that the citizens of the same
town sat together in the theatre.

4 See above, p. 165.
3 Articles of Confederation, Art. v. § 4.
4 Art. ii. § 1. 8, and the 12th Amendment. The Confederate Constitution

preserves the same rule, and introduces it in another case, namely the voting of
the Senate on the a of new States. Art. iv. § 3. 1.

4

Evils

of the
Achaian
arrange-
ment of
votes.

212 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuap.

been revealed to the statesmen of Achaia, any more than to
those of other parts of Greece. As matters stood, the only
remedy was to put neighbouring and distant cities on an equality
by ordering that the mere number of citizens present from each
town should have no effect on the division. And of course the
most obvious form which such a regulation could take was to
give a single vote to each city. And probably, while the League
was confined to the ten towns of the old Achaia, no bad conse-
quences arose from this arrangement. Some of the towns were

doubtless larger than the others, but there could have been no |

very marked disparity among them. But it was quite another

matter when the League took in great and distant cities like

Siky6n, Corinth, Megalopolis, Argos, at last even Sparta and
Messéné. It was clearly unjust that such cities as these should
have no greater weight in the national Congress than the petty
towns of the old Achaia. It was the more unjust, because we
can easily conceive that questions might arise on which the old
ten towns would always stick close together, and so habitually out-
vote five or six of the greatest cities of Greece! While the
personal influence of Aratos lasted, questions of this sort seemed
to have remained pretty much in abeyance, but to provide a
counterpoise to this undue weight of the old towns was one
great object of the administration of Philopoimén. The most
effectual remedy would of course have been to let the vote of
each town count, as in the Lykian League,’ for one, two, three,
or more, according to their several sizes. But this was a political
refinement which was reserved for a later generation, and it was
one specially unlikely to occur to the mind of an Achaian legis-
lator under the actual circumstances of the League. The cities
external to the old Achaia were admitted, one by one, into an
Achaian League, already regularly formed and practically work-
ing. In the earlier stages of its extension, above all when the
first step was taken by the union of Sikyén, the admission of
new towns into the League was doubtless looked upon as a
favour ; in more degenerate times they were sometimes compelled
to enter into the League by force. In neither of these cases was
it at all likely that a city newly entering into the League should

1 Schorn, p. 61, In dieser Hinsicht strebte der Bund nach villig demo-
kratischer Freiheit und Gleichheit, was zwar spiterhin einer Aenderung bedurft
hatte, damit nicht die Herrschaft und Gesetzgebung bei den Schwachen gewesen
wire, 2 See above, p. 165.

Vv CONSEQUENCES OF THE MODE OF VOTING 218

receive any advantage over those cities which already belonged to

it. To have given Sikyén two votes and Corinth three, while the No fair
small Achaian towns retained only one each, would have been no cron
more than just in itself—if indeed it would have reached the strict soainst the
justice of the case—but it would have been a political develope- League.
ment for which there was as yet no precedent, and which we can

have no right to expect at the hands of Aratos or of any other
statesman.’ It was a great step in advance of anything that
Greece had seen, when new cities were admitted into the League

at all on terms of such equality as the Achaians offered. Greece

had already seen petty Leagues among kindred towns or dis-
tricts; she had seen great Confederacies gathered around a
presiding, or it may be a tyrant, city ; but she had never before

seen any state or cluster of states offer perfect equality of
political rights to all Greeks who would join them. The League
offered to its newest members an equal voice in its Assemblies

with the oldest ; it made the citizens of all alike equally eligible

to direct its counsels and to command its armies. It is hardly

fair to blame a state which advanced so far beyond all earlier
precedent merely because it did not devise a further improve-

ment still. Had that improvement been proposed, anterior to

the experience which proved its necessity, it would have
appeared, to all but the deepest political thinkers, to contradict

that equality among the several members which was the first
principle of the Federal Constitution. Had any patriotic Corin-

thian claimed a double vote as due to the superior size and glory

of his native city, he would have seemed to threaten Dymé and
Tritaia with the fate which Thespia and Orchomenos had met with

at the hands of Thebes. Lykia made exactly the improvement
which was needed, because her legislators had the past experience

of Achaia to profit by. The Achaian principle was revived in

all cases under the first American Confederation, and it is re-
tained in one very important case in the actual Constitution of

the United States. Nor is it in all cases an error; the principle

of equality of votes for every State, great and small, has always

been adhered to in one branch of the Federal Legislature, and it

has always been rightly defended as a necessary check on the
supremacy of mere numbers. In short, though the Achaian

1 See Schorn, 67, 68. His strictures are perfectly just in themselves, but
they are rather hard on Aratos and the Achaians merely for not possessing
premature wisdom.

General
merits

of the
Achaian
Constitu-
tion. |

Short and

unfrequent

Meetings
of the
Assembly.

From
Βα. 217.

214 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE onap.

Constitution failed, in this respect, to attain to the full theore-
tical perfection of the Lykian constitution, yet the League fully
merits the enthusiastic praises of its own historian as the body
which, without retaining selfish privileges or selfish advantages,
first freely offered Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity to every
inhabitant of Peloponnésos.}

The same causes which made the Achaian Assembly practi-
cally an aristocratic body served also to make its sittings short
and unfrequent. The League had no capital and no court;
there was nothing to tempt men to stay at the place of meeting
any longer than the affairs of the nation absolutely required.
Every man’s heart was with his hearth and home in his own
city: he went up to do his duty in the Federal Assembly, and
to offer sacrifice to the Federal God ; but to tarry half the® year
away from his own house and his own fields was an idea which
never entered the head of an Achaian politician. The Assembly
met of right twice yearly,? in Spring and Autumn. The Magis-
trates were originally elected at the Spring Meeting, afterwards
most probably in the Autumn. The Session was limited to
three days.‘ Besides the two yearly Meetings, it rested with
the Government to summon extraordinary Meetings, on occasions
of special urgency. From the shortness of the Assembly’s

1 Pol. ii. 39, 42.

2 The two yearly Meetings are clearly implied in Pol. xxxviii. 2, 3. The
Roman Ambassadors come to the Autumn Meeting at Aigion (διαλεγομένων τοῖς
᾿Αχαιοῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν Αἰγιέων πόλει, c. 2). It is agreed that, instead of the
Assembly coming to a decisive vote, the Ambassadors should meet some of the
Achaian leaders in a diplomatic conference at .Tegea. Kritolaos meets them
there, and tells them that he can do nothing without the authority of the next
Assembly, to be held six months after (εἰς τὴν ἐξῆς σύνοδον, ἥτις ἔμελλε γενέσθαι
μετὰ μῆνας ἔξ). This was, of course, mere mockery, as a special Assembly could
have been called, or special powers might have been obtained from the Meeting
at Aigion, but the pretext shows the regular course of things.

The Autumn Meeting appears in Pol. ii. 54; iv. 14; xxiv. 12; the Spring
Meeting in iv. 6, 7, 26, 27, 87; v. 1. So seemingly in xxviii. 7, by the name of
ἡ πρώτη ἀγορά.

See Schorn, p. 210. Thirlwall, viii. 295. Cf. Clinton, Fast. Hell. A. 146.

4 Pol. xxix. 9. Liv. xxxii. 22. Both of these are cases of an extraordinary
Meeting (σύγκλητος). If this rule prevailed on such occasions, much more would
it in the common half-yearly Meetings.

5 Pol. v. 1. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Φίλιππος. . . . συνῆγε τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς διὰ τῶν
ἀρχόντων εἰς ἐκκλησίαν. Bee below, p. 426. The words κατὰ νόμους in the next
sentence show that this was a perfectly regular proceeding. Cf. Pol. xxiii. 10.
12; xxiv. 5.

In one case (Pol. iv. 7) we meet with a strange phenomenon of a Military

Vv TIMES AND PLACE OF MEETING 215

Sessions naturally followed certain restrictions on its powers, Conse-
certain augmentations of the powers of the executive Govern- ext Re-

ment, which to an Athenian would have seemed the utter striction

destruction of all democratic freedom. It has been thought, on Powers.
the highest of all authorities,’ that, in an extraordinary Assembly

at least—and an extraordinary Assembly would, almost by the

nature of the case, have to deal with more important: business

than an ordinary one—a majority of the Executive Cabinet

could legally refuse to allow any question to be put to the vote.

This seems at least doubtful ;? but it is evident that, in a Session The

of three days, the right of private members to bring in bills, or Initiative

even to move amendments, must have been practically very much practically

curtailed. No doubt the initiative always practically remained Govern-
in the hands of the Government. In an extraordinary Assembly ment.
it was so in the strictest sense, as such an Assembly could only
entertain the particular business on which it was summoned to
decide. And in all cases, what the Assembly really had to do
was to accept or reject the Ministerial proposals, or, it may be,
to accept the counter-proposals of the leaders of Opposition.

The ordinary Assemblies were, at least during the first period Place of
of the League, always held at Aigion ; but it seems to have been Meeting ;
in the power of the Government to summon the extraordinary Apion,

Assembly, an idea tolian or Macedonian rather than Achaian. The ordinary
Meeting votes that the General shall summon the whole force of the League in
arms, and that the army thus assembled shall debate and determine (συνάγειν
τὸν στρατηγὸν τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, ὃ δ᾽ dy τοῖς συνελθοῦσι βουλευομένοις
δόξῃ τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι κύριον). This looks like an unusually small attendance at the
regular Assembly. Cf. Livy, xxxviii. 33.

1 Thirlwall, viii. 91, 92.

2 The passage referred to is Liv. xxxii. 22. See Schorn, 242. Here the
δαμιοργοί are equally divided whether to put a certain question to the vote or
not; but this does not prove that they had the power to refuse to put any
question, because the objectors ground their refusal on the illegal nature of the
particular motion. The case seems rather to be like the famous refusal of
Sdkratés, when presiding in the Athenian Assembly, to put an illegal motion to
the vote. See Xen. Hell. i. 7. 15. Cf. Grote, viii. 271.

8 Liv. xxxi. 25. Non licere legibus Achzorum de aliis rebus referre, quam
propter quas convocati essent.

It does not however follow from this that private members could not propose
amendments, or even substantial motions, relating to that business, and it seems
clear from a passage in Polybios (xxix. 9) that they might. (τῇ δὲ δευτέρᾳ τῶν
ἡμερῶν, ἐν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἔδει τὰ ψηφίσματα προσφέρειν rods βουλομένους,
k.T.X.) In the Assembly which he describes two quite different motions are
made and discussed. Most probably the Government proposals were made on
the first day, those of private members on the second, and the vote taken on the
third.

afterwards

other
Cities.

Advan-
tages of
Aigion.

B.c. 189.

Greater
power of
Magis-
trates in
Achaia
than at
Athens.

216 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cmap.

Assemblies, as at any time, so in any place, which might be
convenient.! Aigion had been chosen as the place of meeting for
the original League? as being the most important of the old
Achaian towns after the destruction of Heliké. In after times it
was at least as well adapted for the purpose for an opposite
reason. It might be the greatest member of the original League,
but it ws insignificant compared with the powerful cities which
were afterwards enrolled in the Union. Aigion was a better
place for the Federal Government than Corinth or Megalopolis,
for the same reason that Washington is a better place for the
American Federal Government than New York. There was not
the least fear of Aigion ever being to the League of Achaia what
Thebes had, in times past, been to the League of Bootia. Still,
however, a certain dignity, and some material advantage, must
have accrued to Aigion from the holding of the Federal
Assemblies, and from the probable frequent presence of the
Federal Magistrates at other times. This may well have aroused
a certain degree of jealousy among the other towns, and we shall
see that, at a later time,'Philopoimén carried a measure which left
the League without even the shadow of a capital, and obliged the
Federal Assemblies to be held in every city of the League in turn.®

I have several times, in discussing Achaian affairs, used the
words Government, Ministers, Cabinet, and such like. I have
done so of set purpose, in order to mark the most important of
all the differences between the city-Democracy of Athens and
the Federal Democracy of Achaia. In speaking of Athenian
politics no words could be more utterly inappropriate ; Démos
was at once King and Parliament; the Magistrates whom he
elected were simply agents to carry out his orders. This was
perfectly natural in a Democracy whose Sovereign Assembly
regularly met once in ten days. Another course was equally
natural in a Democracy whose Sovereign Assembly regularly met
only twice in each year. It was absolutely necessary in such a case
to invest the Magistrates of the Republic with far greater official

1 See Helwing, p. 227.

3 Strabo, viii. 7. 8. Καὶ κοινοβούλιον els Eva τόπον συνήγετο αὐτοῖς (ἐκαλεῖτο
δὲ ᾿Αμάριον) ἐν ᾧ τὰ κοινὰ ἐχρημάτιζον καὶ οὗτοι καὶ Ἴωνες πρότερον, and ib. 5.
Alytéwy δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ Ἑλίκη καὶ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄλσος τὸ ᾿Αμάριον ὅπου
συνήεσαν οἱ ᾿Αχαιοὶ βουλευσόμενοι περὶ τῶν κοινῶν.

See Helwing, 227, 228, Thirlwall, viii. 393. That it was actually carried,

though Tittmann (682) thinks otherwise, appears from Pol. xxiv. 12, where an
ordinary meeting is held at Megalopolis.

Vv POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT 217

— — -- - -..ο..ο.

powers than any Magistrates possessed at Athens from the days

of Kleisthenés onwards. It was, in short, necessary to give them

the character of what we, in modern phrase, understand by a
Government, and to confine the Assembly to the functions of a
Parliament. We must of course make one exception, required The —
by the universal political instinct of Greece ; the final vote on an
matters of Peace, War, and Alliance rested with the Assembly. trates
This follows at once from the difference between a republican form ἃ
Assembly, sovereign in name as well as in fact, and the Parlia- we
ment of a Monarchy, which in theory is the humble and dutiful
Council of a personal Sovereign. All the differences between
Athens and Achaia naturally flow from the differences between

the position and extent of the two commonwealths. In the single

City of Athens the democratic theory could be strictly carried

out ; in the large Federal territory of Achaia it could be carried

out only in a very modified form. The extent of territory led

to the infrequent Meetings of the Assembly; the infrequent
Meetings of the Assembly led to the increased authority of the
Magistrates; for a ruling power must be lodged somewhere
during the three hundred and fifty-nine days when the Sovereign
Assembly was not in being. We therefore find the Federal
Magistrates of Achaia acting with almost as little restraint as

the Ministers of a modern constitutional state. They are the
actual movers and doers of everything; the functions of the
Assembly are nearly reduced to hearing their proposals and
saying Aye or No to them. And, as the Magistrates were
themselves elected by the Assembly, we should naturally expect,

what the history at every step shows us to have been the case,

that the vote of the Assembly would be much oftener Aye than

No. The Achaian Assembly was addressed by Ministers whom

its own vote had placed in office six months before ; it would,

under all ordinary circumstances, give them a very favourable
hearing, and would not feel that sort of jealousy which often

exists between the American Congress and the American
President. In fact, the relations between an Achaian Govern-

ment and an Achaian Assembly were in some respects more like Compari-
those between an English Government and an English House of con with
Commons than the relations between an American President and gna Eng-
an American Congress. The Achaian Magistrates, being Achaian land.
citizens, were necessarily members of the Achaian Assembly ; so

in England the Ministers are, by imperative custom, members of

Points of
greater
likeness
to Eng-
land.

218 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuHap.

one or other House of Parliament. In Achaia therefore, just as
in England, the members of the Government could appear
personally before the Assembly to make their proposals and to
defend their policy. But in America the Ministers of the
President are strictly excluded from seats in Congress, and the
President communicates with that body only by a written
Message. Again, as Congress does not elect,” so neither can it
remove, either the President or his Ministers; it therefore
follows that the Legislative and Executive branches may remain,
during a whole Presidency, in complete opposition to one another.
In England the House of Commons does not either formally
appoint or formally depose the Ministry, for the simple reason
that the Ministry has no legal existence ; but it does both in a
way which, if indirect, is still highly effectual. In Achaia, the
Government was, not indirectly but directly, chosen by the
Assembly. There was not, any more than in America, any
constitutional means of removing them before the end of their
term of office; a Government which had ceased to enjoy the
confidence of the House had therefore to be constitutionally
borne with for a season. But, as their term of office was only
one year instead of four, such a season of endurance would be
much shorter than it sometimes isin America. Even in England,
a Government must be weak indeed which, when once in office,
cannot, by the power of Dissolution or otherwise, contrive to
retain power for as long a time as an unpopular Achaian Govern-
ment could ever have had to be borne with. Altogether the
general practical working of the Achaian system was a remarkable
advance in the direction of modern constitutional government.
And it especially resembles our own system in leaving to usage,
to the discretion of particular persons and Assemblies, and to
the natural working of circumstances, much which nations of
a more theoretical turn of mind might have sought to rule by
positive law.

1 Constitution, Art. i. § 6. 2. This restriction is modified in the Confederate
Constitution.

2 Congress never elects the President freely ; under certain circumstances (see
Amendment 12) the House of Representatives have to choose a President from
among three candidates already named. The President again may be (Art. i.
8 8, 6; ii. § 4) deposed by a judicial sentence of the Senate on an impeachment
by the House of Representatives, But this of course requires proof of some
definite crime ; there is no constitutional way of removing him simply because his
policy is disapproved.

Vv FEDERAL MAGISTRACIES 219

The Achaian Government then, when its details were finally Federal
settled, consisted of Ten Ministers, who formed a Cabinet Offices.
Council for the General of the Achaians, or, in modern language,
the President of the Union. Besides these great officers, there
was also a Secretary of State,! an Under-General,? and a General General of
of Cavalry.* It is probable that the latter two functionaries Cavalry.
were merely military officers, and did not fill any important
political position. It is clear, for instance, that the Under- Under-
General, was, in civil matters at least, a less important person General.
than the Vice-President of the American Union. The American +
Vice-President is ex-officio President of the Senate, and, in case
of any accidental vacancy in the Presidentship, he succeeds to:
the office for the remainder of the term. But of the Achaian
Under-General we hear nothing in civil affairs, and if the General
died in office, his place for the remainder of the year was taken,
not by the Under-General, but by the person who had been
General the year before.‘ The active officers of the League in
civil matters were clearly the General, the Secretary, and the
Ten Ministers. The exact functions of the Secretary are not
described, but it is easy to guess at them. He was doubtless, as Secretary
Secretaries of State are now, the immediate author of all public οἱ State.
despatches, and in minor matters he may often have been
entitled, as Secretaries of State are now, to act on his own
responsibility. It is evident from the way in which both Polybios
and Strabo speak of it, that the office was one of high dignity
and importance.

1 Tpappareds. Pol. ii. 48. Strabo, viii. 7. The office was as old as the League.

2 "Lwoorpdriyos. Pol. iv. 59; xl. 5. Inv. 94 one Lykos of Pharai is called
ὑποστράτηγος τῆς συντελείας τῆς πατρικῆς. ThisI take to mean a local magistrate
of some little confederacy formed by Pharian townships like those of Patrai. See
above, p. 192. Or, in the particular place where the phrase occurs, it may refer
to the temporary union of Dymé, Pharai, and Tritaia in B.c. 219. See below,
Chapter viii. Either of these views seems more likely than that he was “ com-
mander of the pure Achaian forces, as distinguished from those of the whole
League.” K. F. Hermann, 186. 9. Such a distinction is quite alien to the whole
spirit of the constitution. But no explanation seems quite satisfactory. The use
of πατρικῆς seems 80 very strange that, when one remembers the expression in
Polybios (xl. 3), Πατρεῖς καὶ rd μετὰ τούτων συντελικόν, one is strongly tempted
to read 1] ατρικῆς. Yet would Πατρικός be a correct Gentile form, and could a
citizen of Pharai be a Magistrate at Pharai? There is certainly the case of
Aratos’ State-Generalship at Argos. See p. 201.

3 Ἱκπάρχης. Pol. v.95; x. 22; xxviii. 6. Schorn (p. 62) supposes that this
Officer took the place of the second General, when the number was reduced to two.
This may well be true in his military, but hardly in his civil, capacity.

Pol. xl. 2.

The Ten
Ministers.

Probably
chosen
from all
the Cities.

220 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE onap.

The Ten Ministers, the Cabinet Council of the President, are
called by various names.1 They seem to have been the Federal
Magistrates of the League in its earlier and looser state. Their
number ten, as several writers have observed,” evidently points
to the reduced number of the old Achaian towns after the loss of
Heliké and Olenos. This at once suggests a question as to the
position of these Magistrates when new cities were added to the
League. The number remained unaltered : ὃ and it has hence
been inferred that the Cabinet Council always continued to be
filled by citizens of the old Achaian towns.* Yet it would be
of itself almost impossible to believe that this important office
was confined to citizens of the old Achaia, and that an Argive,
a Corinthian, or a Megalopolitan would have been ineligible.
Had such been the case, we should hardly have found Polybios,
himself a citizen of a non-Achaian town, using such strong
language as he does as to the liberality of the League in extend-
ing full equality of rights to every city which joined it, and
reserving no exclusive privileges to the elder members.° In
conformity with these professions, the General, as we know, was
freely chosen from any of the towns enrolled in the League, and
indeed he seems to have been, oftener than not, a citizen of a
non-Achaian canton. These arguments alone would almost lead
us to believe that, when the League had attained its full develope-
ment, the old number Ten, though still retained, ceased to bear
any practical reference to the ancient number of towns, and that

1 Their formal title was δημιουργοί, δαμιοργοί, Damiurgi. Pol. xxiv. 5.
Plut. Ar. 48, Liv. xxxii. 22; xxxviii. 30. Boeckh, O. I. 1542 (vol. i. p. 711, ef.
p. 11). There were also local δαμεοργοί as Magistrates of particular cities. They
are also more vaguely called ἄρχοντες, ἀρχαί (Pol. v. 1; xxiii. 10, 12; xxiv. 5;
xxix. 9, 10; xxxviii. 4), and—with evident reference to their joint action with
the General—ouvdpxovres, συναρχίαι (Pol. xxiv. 12; xxvii. 2; xxxviii. 5); also
προεστῶτες (Pol. ii. 46; iv. 9), πρόβουλοι (?) (Plut. Phil. 21), and, apparently, οἱ
τῆς γερουσίας (Pol. xxxviii. 5). See Thirlwall, viii. 92, 491. Neither Tittmann
(683, 6) nor Kortiim (iii. 161) is perfectly clear about this last unusual title.

Polybios uses the verb cuvedpedw to express a meeting of the Cabinet, xl. 4.

2 Schorn, 62, 68. Thirlwall, viii. 91. 3 Livy, xxxii. 22.

41 take this to be Bishop Thirlwall’s meaning (viii. 111) when he says, “Strange
as it appears, we are led to conclude that the places in both these boards continued
to be filled by Achzans.” [The rule in the Swiss Bundesverfassung as to the
constitution of the Bundesrath is different. Art. 84. ‘‘Die Mitglieder des
Bundesrathes werden von der Bundesversammlung aus allen Schweizerbiirgern,
welche als Mitglieder des Nationalrathes wahlbar sind, auf die Dauer von drei
Jahren ernannt.’’]

5 Pol. ii. 38. Οὐδενὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν ὑπολειπομένη πλεονέκτημα τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἴσα
δὲ πάντα ποιοῦσα τοῖς ἀεὶ προσλαμβανομένοις, x.7.A. CF. ο. 42 throughout. Cf.
Κ. F. Hermann, 8 186, n. 10.

Vv THE TEN MINISTERS 221

the office of Minister, as well as the Presidency, was open to
every citizen of the League. It not uncommonly happens, in
the growth of constitutions, that numbers of this sort are retained
long after they have ceased to bear any practical meaning. So
the Ten Achaian Ministers may have once really represented the
Ten Achaian Towns, and yet, at all events after the accession of
Sikyén, they may have been chosen indiscriminately from any of
the confederate cities! But weare hardly left to argue the point
from probabilities. There is a full description in Polybios of the
proceedings in an Achaian Cabinet Council,” with the names of
several of the members. Four of the Ministers are mentioned,
and, of these, three, besides the General, are citizens of Megalo-
polis ; 8 the fourth is a citizen of Aigeira, one of the old Achaian
towns.

The exact relations of the Ten Ministers and of the Secretary
to the executive Chief of the State are not very clearly marked.
It must have been essential to the good government of the Relations
League that they should be able to work together in tolerable ΜΕΝ
harmony, and that their differences, if they had any, should not to the
go beyond a debate and a division among themselves. For “eneral.
Achaian statesmen had certainly not reached that pitch of
refinement Wy which a division in the Cabinet is held: to be a
thing not to be thought of. They had not discovered that all
differences of opinion must be compromised or concealed, or that,
if this is impossible, the minority must resign office. This is
ἃ political refinement which can exist only where, as among
ourselves, the whole constitution of the Ministry is something
wholly conventional, where the Cabinet has no legal existence,
and where the rights and duties of its members are regulated
purely by usage. But the Achaian Cabinet was directly elected
to a definite office to be held for a definite time ; if differences
of opinion arose among its members, they were simply to be

1 The only expression which looks the other way, is that of Damiurgt civi-
tatium. Liv. xxxviii. 30. On the other hand, in xxxii. 22, he calls them
Magistratus gentis, which tells at least as much for their strictly Federal
character.

2 Pol. xxiii. 10, 12. These ἀρχαί, ἄρχοντες, summoned by the General, must
be the council of Ministers. Indeed we find nearly the same story over again in
Pol. xxiv. 5, where the formal word δημιουργοί is used, clearly as synonymous
with ἄρχοντες.

3 Aristainos the General, Diophanés, Philopoimén, and Lykortas, all from
Megalopolis ; Archén from Aigeira. The General himself takes no part in the
debate, but his party is outvoted.

The
Ministers
probably
generally
united
among
them-
selves.

An
Achaian
** Caucus.

222 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cxap.

settled by a majority, like differences of opinion in the Senate
or in the Assembly itself. In the United States the President
chooses his own Ministers, and that with a much greater
freedom of choice than is allowed to any Constitutional King.
The Achaian President had his Ministers chosen for him;
but then they were chosen along with himself, at the same
time, and by the same electors; the majority which carried
the election of the President himself would probably seldom
give him colleagues who were altogether displeasing to him.
If, on some occasions,! we find the General and his Cabinet
disagreeing, the special mention of the fact seems to show that
it was something exceptional. Altogether the science of
electioneering seems to have obtained a very fair develope-
ment in the League. Polybios in one place gives us a vivid
description of an Achaian “ Caucus,”? where several leading men

, of a particular party met to discuss the general affairs of that

party, and especially to settle their “ticket” for the next
election. They agreed upon a President and upon a General of
Cavalry. It is not expressly said that they agreed upon other
Magistrates as well, but we may reasonably infer that they did.
At least we cannot infer the contrary from the sole mention of
an officer who does not commonly appear in coffnexion with
politics. One cannot help suspecting that the President alone
would have been mentioned, if his subordinate officer had not

chanced to be the historian himself.

In comparing the constitution of the Achaian League with
the constitutions of modern free states, it is difficult to avoid
speaking of its Chief Magistrate by the modern name of

1 See Pol. xxiii. 10; xl. 4. But in the first case, the disagreement does not go
beyond a division in the Cabinet itself.

2 Pol. xxviii. 6. Nothing can be plainer than that this was simply what the
Americans call a ‘‘Caucus.” Yet two distinguished German scholars, Schorn
(p. 64) and Droysen (ii. 468), have built upon this passage a theory that the
δαμιοργοί (who are not mentioned) had the sole right of proposing candidates for
the Presidency. Bishop Thirlwall of course sets them right (viii. 91). Indeed
Schorn himself, by the time that he reached the event itself in his actual narra-
tive (p. 354), seems to have better understood the state of the case. What
Polybios here describes is simply the preliminary process which must go before
every public election. This is one of the many cases in which a citizen of a
free country has a wonderful advantage in studying the history of the ancient
commonwealths. Many things which the subject of a continental monarchy can
only spell out from his books are to an Englishman or an American matters of
daily life.

v OFFICE OF THE GENERAL 228

President. But we must remember that his real official title The Pre-
was Stratégos or General. In all the democratic states of sident or
Greece there was a strong tendency to strengthen the hands Se!
of the military commanders, and to invest them with the func

tions of political magistrates. Thus, at Athens, the Archons
remained the nominal chiefs of the state, but their once kingly
powers gradually dwindled away into the merest routine. The

Ten Generals, officers seemingly not known before Kleisthenés,! powers of
became really the most important persons in the commonwealth, Generals
entrusted with as large a share of authority as Démos would in other
entrust to anybody but himself. The transition between the Greek
two systems is clearly seen at the battle of Marathén, where 5 ¢, 490.
Kallimachos the Polemarch, one of the Archons, is joined in
command with the Ten Generals. Earlier, he would have been

the sole commander ; later, he would have had no part or lot in

the matter. In most of the later Grecian states, especially

in the Federal states, we find the highest magistrates bearing

the title of General. The number of Generals differed in pjigrent
different Leagues, but it was always much smaller than the numbers in
Athenian Ten. The Epeirots had at one time as many as ‘ifferent
three,? but the Arkadians under Lykomédés,® the Akarnanians,* * states.
and the Attolians® had each a sole General. The Achaians, Two
for the first five-and-twenty years of their renewed Confederacy, Generals
elected two Generals. Then an important change was made °f the
in the constitution by reducing the number to one. In the oven
emphatic words of Polybios,® “they trusted one man with all reduced
their affairs.” ‘“ Now,” he continues, “the first man who to One.
obtained this dignity was Markos of Keryneia.” Markos, it δ 255.

1 Grote, iv. 181. 2 See above, p. 118. 3 See above, p. 159.

* See above, p. 116. δ᾽ See next Chapter.

6 Pol. ii. 438. Εἴκοσι μὲν οὖν ἔτη τὰ πρῶτα καὶ πέντε συνεπολιτεύσαντο
μεθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν αἱ προειρημέναι πόλεις, γραμματέα κοινὸν ἐκ περιόδου προχειρι-
ζόμεναι καὶ δύο στρατηγούς" μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἕνα καθιστάνειν
καὶ τούτῳ πιστεύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων, καὶ πρῶτος ἔτυχε τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης
Μάρκος ὁ Κερυνεύς. ([Cf. Strabo, viii. 7. 8, εἶτα ἔδοξεν ἕνα χειροτονεῖσθαι
στρατηγόν. After reading this passage, and after considering the tendency
in Federal Greece, in America, and in Switzerland, to give to every Federal body
a single President, it is curious to find Calhoun (Works, i. 398) arguing against
a single President, saying that no commonwealth ever retained freedom under ἃ
single President, wishing to bring the United States to a double Presidency, like
that before Markos, and fortifying his position by the examples of the Roman
Consuls and the Spartan Kings. It is curious to find all these American writers
—Mr. Motley, indeed, is an exception—so thoroughly anxious to find classical
precedents, and so constantly missing those which really bear upon their case.

Extensive
powers of
the Office.

Compari-
son with a
modern
First
Minister.

224 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cnap.

will be remembered, was the gallant deliverer of Boura, and
probably, more than any other one man, the true founder of
the revived League. He obtained, like Washington, his due
reward, to be chosen as the first chief of the land which he
had delivered. The practical extent of the General’s powers
is here plainly set forth. Everything was entrusted to him;
he was not indeed to rule, like a Tyrant, with unlimited
powers, or even, like a lawful King, for an unlimited time;
he was to govern for a single year with a commission limited
by Law; but, while his term of office lasted, he was to be
the Chief of ὑπ State in a sense in which no man, or body
of men, had been chief under the elder Democracy of Athens.
His will was indeed limited by the necessity of consulting his
colleagues in the Government and of bringing all great questions
to the decision of the Sovereign Assembly. The will of the
most powerful Minister of modern days is limited by the same
conditions. No Minister in a free state can legislate at his
own pleasure, in his own name or in the name of his Sovereign ;
he can impose no tax, he can touch no man’s life or estate:
he may indeed, in his Sovereign’s name, make war or peace
without formally consulting Parliament, but he cannot venture
to declare war or to conclude peace on terms which he knows
will be offensive to the majority of the House. Yet it is
not the less true that such a Minister may be practically all-
powerful; that his colleagues in the Cabinet, and his fellow-
members in the House, may accept all his proposals; that he
alone may be the real mover in everything, possessed of a
practical initiative in all matters, and leaving to other powers
in the state a mere right to say No, which they probably never
think good to exercise. Such is a powerful European Minister
in our own time; such too was the General of the Achaians.
The Republic trusted him with all its affairs; the Assembly
of course reserved to itself the final power of saying Aye or
No; but every earlier stage of every affair—the beginning of
all legislation, the beginning of every negociation,' the bringing
of all measures up to the point at which they cold be brought
forward as motions in the Assembly — everything, in short,
which a modern nation looks for at the hands of a strong

1 The process of negociation is clearly set forth in Pol. xxviii. 7. A diplo-
matic communication is first made to the General, who is favourable to it: he
then brings the Ambassadors personally before the Assembly.

Vv COMPARISON BETWEEN ATHENS AND ACHAIA 225

Government —all was left to the discretion of the General,
in concert with a body of colleagues who commonly looked
up to him as their natural leader. Now all this is utterly
contrary to the practice of the earlier democratic states.
Periklés exercised as great a power as Aratos; Periklés, like
Aratos, was practically prince ;+ but Periklés ruled purely by
the force of personal character and personal eloquence ; Aratos
ruled by virtue of a high official position. It is true that
the official position of Aratos was the result of his personal
character ; it is true that Periklés, like Aratos, held the most
important office in his own commonwealth; the difference is
that the official position was necessary to the influence of
Aratos and that it was not necessary to the influence of
Periklés. Periklés was General of the Athenians, one General
out of Ten; he was General, both because of his personal
inclination and capacity, and because, in that stage of the
republic, a man who pretended to advise measures was ex-
pected to be ready to carry them out himself. But the
position of Periklés in the Athenian Assembly was not the
result of his office; it was a position wholly personal; it was
a position which was not shared by the other Generals; it
was a position which it was soon found that a man might
hold without being General. The Assembly listened to Kleén
as obediently as it listened to Periklés; Kleén became, no
less than Periklés had been, the leader of the People, the
originator of all its policy; but Kleén was simply a private
citizen with no official character whatever ; it was only towards
the end of his days that he foolishly? took upon him an
office for which he was unfit, and which had not been needed
to support an influence which ended only with his life. Dé-
mosthenés again, without any official position, if he did not
rule as effectually as Kleén, yet contended on at least equal
terms with the official chief Phékién, and often succeeded in
carrying measures of which Phékién utterly disapproved. Now
the power of Aratos undoubtedly rested on his personal char-
acter; the League trusted him officially because it trusted him

1 Thue. ii 65. ᾿Εγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ! πρώτου
ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. The words ὁ πρῶτος ἀνήρ are not an official title.

21 do not refer to the expedition to Sphaktéria, for which Mr. Grote makes
vut at least a plausible case, but to his last expedition to Thrace. Probably his
success at Sphaktéria had turned his head, and made him seek for an office which

he had never before thought of.
Q

Compari-
son of
Aratos and
Periklés.

Influence
of men
without
Office at
Athens,

Ν

Greater
import-
ance of
Office in
Achaia.

226 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE caap.

personally ; indeed it trusted him in a way in which it trusted
no one else; other Generals, with the same legal powers, could
never exercise anything like the same practical authority.' This
is simply the difference, with which we are all familiar, between
8 weak Government and a strong one. But the influence of
Aratos was nevertheless of a kind which could not be exer-
cised without a high official position; he could not have ruled
the League, as Kleén ruled Athens, as a private citizen in
the Assembly, any more than the greatest of statesmen and
orators could govern England from the cross benches. During
the whole history of Athens, we find the counsels of the
Republic directed by eloquent speakers in the Assembly, who
hold office or not as it happens to suit them personally. During
the whole history of the Achaian League, we find its counsels
constantly directed by those citizens whom it chose to its
high magistracies. It is clear that an Athenian statesman
could dispense with office if he pleased; it is equally clear
that an Achaian statesman sought office as naturally as an
English statesman; without it, he might indeed win fame as
an opposition speaker, but he could not hope to be the real
guiding spirit of the commonwealth. It is clear also that an
Athenian General, though warfare and diplomacy formed his
immediate department of the public business, was by no means
the necessary originator of military and diplomatic measures.
An Athenian General might, as Nikias and Phdékiédn were, be
sent, without any loss of official dignity, to carry out plans
against which he had, as a citizen in the Assembly, argued
with all his force. It is equally clear that an Achaian General
was the very soul of the League, the prime deviser of every-
thing. Aratos did not often see his proposals rejected, though
that might happen now and then. But it certainly never
happened that he was ordered, like Nikias, to carry out the
opposite proposals of anybody else.

The whole history then shows that the Achaian General
really stood at the head of the League, in a way in which
no one stood at the head of any of the earlier Greek republics,
but in a way very like that in which a powerful Minister
stands at the head of a modern constitutional state. He

1 See the account given by Polybios (v. 30) of the contemptible adminis-
tration of Epératos. Everybody despised him, nobody obeyed him, nothing was
ready, etc.

~~

v COMPARISON OF ACHAIA, ENGLAND, AND AMERICA 227

resembled the American President in being formally elected Compari-
for a definite time, while the position of an English Minister % of the

. : : . Achai
is at once conventional and precarious. But in many respects General,

his duties came nearer to those of an English First Minister the
than to those of an American President. The main difference mene
is one which has been already hinted at, namely that the «πὰ we
Achaian President was a member, and the leading member, English
of Congress itself, while the American President is something Fir
external to Congress. The Achaian President did not com- inister.
municate his sentiments by a Message, but by a speech from

the Treasury Bench.! It follows therefore that he formally

made motions on which the House voted, while in America

the Houses vote first and send their conclusions to the Presi-

dent.2, An Achaian Federal Law was a motion of the General cioser
passed by the Assembly ; an American Federal Law is an Act approach

of Congress confirmed by the President. In America, in short, ον

there is no Ministry in our sense, because there is no King. system, / |

Or, perhaps more truly, the President is a four-years’ King, owing to

° 7. as or the Gene-
a King with very limited powers, but who, within the extent τὸ being

of those powers, really governs as well as reigns. Being a himself a
King then, he cannot be a member of his own Parliament ; member
all he can do is to recommend measures from outside, and, ἌΝ
when they are passed, either confirm them or send them back μ
for reconsideration.* Our monarchical forms really come nearer

to the Parliamentary relations which existed in the Achaian
Republic than is done by the Republic of the United States.

An English Minister, being himself a Member of Parliament,

1 The first two Presidents, Washington and Adams, opened each Session of
Congress with a speech ; at other stages of the Session they sent messages. In
both these respects they followed the common practice of Kings. Jefferson
extended the custom of the written message to the opening of the Session (see
Tucker’s Life of Jefferson, ii. iii. 2). Such speeches were “King’s speeches,”
proceeding from an external power, not “ ministerial statements,” proceeding
from a Member of the House.

2 The President may recommend measures to Congress (Constitution, Art. ii.
§ 3), just as a King does, but he cannot make a motion in Congress, like the
Achaian General. Congress passes bills, and sends them to the President, for
approval (Art. i. § 7. 2), as toa King. On the other hand, the Senate (Art. ii.
§ 2. 2) can confirm or reject many official acts of the President; but here the
Senate is not acting in a strictly legislative character, and the House of Repre-
sentatives is not consulted.

3 The Pi-sident has no absolute veto, but a measure sent back by him cannot
be passed «115 except by a majority of two-thirds of both Houses (Art. i. § 7. 2).
This is p .tiva'ly a more valuable power.

Greater
power

in the
General
necessary
ina Federal
than in

a City
Demo-
cracy.

228 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuar.

retains his power of making direct motions, and, as Minister,
he practically acquires the sole right of making important
motions with any chance of success. And, as the Royal Veto
is never used, the decision of the Houses is practically as final
as that of the Achaian Assembly.

This lofty position of the Achaian General, as compared
with that of any Athenian Magistrate, is the crowning example
of those tendencies which naturally arise from the different
position of a City Democracy and of a Federal Democracy.
In either case the Republic needs some centre, some visible
head. At Athens the Ten Generals were really that head ;
some of them were always on the spot; but if any unforeseen
emergency took place, there was no need for them to act on
their own responsibility ; an ordinary Assembly of the People
could not be many days distant, and an extraordinary one
might, if need be, be summoned even sooner. In such a state
of things there was really no occasion to give the Magistrates
any large powers. But turn to Achaia; if an unforeseen
emergency arose ;—if a foreign Ambassador, for instance, arrived
with important proposals; if King Kleomenés threatened or
King Ptolemy made friendly advances—where was he to look
for the Achaian League? The Athenian Démos was never very
far from his Pnyx, but the League was, for three hundred
and fifty-nine days in the year, scattered to and fro over all
Peloponnésos. In such a state of things there must be some
one to represent the nation; some one who can be found at
once; some one who can enter into negociations, who has
authority to give a provisional answer, and who can summon
the Assembly to give a final one. Such a representative of
the nation the constitution of the League provided in its
General. Every application was first made to him; he con-
sulted his Ministers; in concert with them, he either brought
the matter before the next ordinary Assembly, or, if the
business was specially urgent, he called an extraordinary As-
sembly specially to consider it. In that Assembly his proposals
were not merely those of an eloquent citizen, they carried with
them all the weight of a modern Government measure. On
any weighty matter, it was his business to come forward and
declare! his mind, exactly as it is the business of the Leader

1 Pol. xxviii, 7. ᾿Εκάλει yap τὰ πράγματα τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ γνώμην.
Cf. Livy, xxxv. 25. Multitudo Philopamenis sententiam exspectabat. Pretor

v INCREASED POWERS OF MAGISTRATES IN A FEDERATION 229

of the House in our own Parliament. The main difference
is that, if by any ill luck his proposals were rejected, the
General on the one hand could not dissolve the Assembly,
and on the other he was not expected to resign his own office.

The same chain of reasoning, which shows the necessity of
the large powers which were vested in the Achaian Government,
leads also irresistibly to the conclusion that the members of that
Government were always men of wealth and high social position.
As every Achaian citizen wasa member of the Achaian Assembly, Members
so, in the absence of the slightest proof to the contrary, we of the /
cannot doubt that every Achaian citizen was legally eligible to nent
every office in the Achaian commonwealth. But if only well-to- necessarily
do citizens could habitually attend the Assembly, it is clear that wealthy
only very wealthy citizens could be commonly chosen to the -
high offices of the State. There is commonly, even under the
most democratic forms, a tendency in the people themselves to
give a preference to birth and wealth. It is only in days of
strong reaction against oligarchic oppression that this tendency
utterly dies away. In most ages and countries the aristocrat of
liberal politics is the most popular of all characters. Even in
the Athenian Democracy, though low-born Demagogues! might
guide the counsels of the Assembly, the office of General was
almost always conferred on members of the old nobility. In
the Achaian League this natural tendency must have become a
practical necessity. There is no evidence that any public officer Offices
of the League was paid; there is distinct evidence that some in the
important public officers were not paid ; ;? and the office of General ap parently
is distinctly spoken of as one which involved great expense.? unpaid
Now none but men who were at once rich, ambitious, and zealous,

is tum erat, et omnes eo tempore et prudentia et auctoritate anteibat. In both
these cases the General, like an English Minister, does not speak till after several
other speakers, and apparently not till the House began to call for him.

1 I use this word in its original neutral sense, a Leader of the People, whether
for good or for evil. An Athenian δημαγωγός in later times is a citizen, be he
Hyperbolos or be he Démosthenés, who is influential in the Assembly without
holding office. But Isokratés (wept Edp. 126) applies the word to Periklés him-
self.

2 This is clear in the case of the Senators. See Pol. xxiii. 7 and Thirlwall,
viii, 92. Of course I suppose only the great magistracies to have been unpaid.
In Achaia, as everywhere else, there must have been plenty of paid subordinates.

3 Polybios (xxviii. 7) incidentally mentions the expensiveness of the General’s
office ; διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἱκανὸν χρημάτων els τὴν ἀρχὴν δεδαπανηκέναι [Αρχωνα].
This passage alone would be enough to prove the unpaid nature of public office
in Achaia.

Natural
effect of
unpaid
offices.

280 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuiap.

would or could accept offices which involved onerous duties and
large expenses, and which carried with them only honorary
rewards. We are ourselves familiar with an unpaid Magistracy,
an unpaid Parliament, a Government not unpaid indeed, but
whose highest members receive salaries barely covering their
expenses, and therefore do not seek for office as a source of
personal gain. We therefore can fully understand the working
of a similar system in Achaia. We can understand how the
system might be safely left to its own practical working, how an
unpaid Magistracy would necessarily be an aristocratic Magis-
tracy, without the requirement of any property qualification.
Here again, we see how great an advantage a student of ancient
history derives from familiarity with the usages of a free state.
One of the very best of German scholars,! finding that in practice
the men who held the high magistracies and who filled the
Federal Tribunals? were always rich men, has supposed the
existence of a property qualification for office, of whose existence
no proof or likelihood whatever is found in our authorities.
Had such a qualification been enforced by law, Polybios could
never have spoken as he does of the strictly democratic character
of the Achaian constitution. Our own great historian of this
period,® as usual, instinctively sees the truth of the case. Every
Englishman knows that no law forbids the poorest man to become
a Member of Parliament, or even a Cabinet Minister. Yet,
though no law forbids him, the poor man is so far from being
likely to be elected a member himself, that he has small chance
of being listened to even as the proposer of a candidate. Even
where there is a qualification, as in the case of Justices of Peace,

1 Droysen, ii. 461, 2. I am quite at a loss to guess what the use of the word
κτηματικοί in one of the passages of Polybios (v. 93) which Droysen quotes has to
do with the matter. The historian is speaking of a local quarrel between rich
and poor at Megalopolis.

4 One cannot doubt either that there were Federal Courts or that their members
were commonly wealthy men. Poor men could not often appear in an unpaid
court sitting at a distance. But I am not quite sure that the passage commonly
cited in proof of the fact really bears on the matter. According to Plutarch
(Phil. 7), the Knights (ἱππεῖς) were μάλιστα κύριοι τιμῆς καὶ κολάσεως. This is
generally taken to mean that the judges or jurors—the Greek δικασταί are some-
thing between the two—in the Federal Courts were commonly men of the eques-
trian census. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 93. But I do not feel quite certain whether
the κόλασις here spoken of may not be parliamentary rather than judicial, as the
τιμή clearly refers to the influence of the equestrian class in disposing of the great
Federal magistracies. See the parallel passage of Polybios, x. 22.

8 Thirlwall, viii. p. 93.

eee eee ha, oe Δ

v EFFECT OF UNPAID OFFICES 231

a man is seldom appointed who does not possess much more—
or at least who does not belong to a class whose members com-
monly possess much more—than the legal qualification for the
office. In Achaia, as in England, these things doubtless settled
themselves. There is everywhere a certain natural influence
about birth and wealth, which does not spring from legal enact-
ments, and which no legal enactments can take away. All that
Democracy—legal and regular Democracy !—can do is to deprive
birth and wealth of all legal advantage, and to let birth, wealth,
talent, happy accident, all start fair and all find their level.
This the Democracy of Athens and the Democracy of Achaia
both did; only circumstances, not laws, fixed the practical
standard of eligibility at a much higher point in the Democracy
of Achaia than in the Democracy of Athens.

We will now attempt to gather what information we can
from our authorities as to the exact legal powers of the Achaian
General and his Councillors. It has been doubted ? whether the Power of
power of summoning extraordinary Assemblies rested with the SU™mon

ing Assen-

General or with the Ten Ministers. One can hardly doubt that pjies vested
it was vested in the General acting with the concurrence of his inthe —
Ministers.* This union of a Governor and a Council is not Generar m
unknown either in American States or in English Colonies. ~
But the formal presidency of the Assembly, and the duty of The
putting questions to the vote, clearly rested with the Ten Ministers
Ministers and not with the General. The reason is obvious. Speakers

of the

1 A constitution which by legal enactments excludes any class, be that class Assembly.

the rich or the poor, the patrician or the plebeian, has no right to the name of
Democracy—it is essentially Oligarchic.

2 K. F,. Hermann, § 186, p. 392, Eng. Tr.

3 Pol. v. 1. (See above, p. 214, and below, 426.) Compare xxiii. 10
throughout. The General and ἄρχοντες meet the Roman Ambassador and decline
to call an Assembly. °

4 See the passage in Livy (xxxii. 22) quoted already. If Bishop Thirlwall be
right, as he clearly is, in thinking that ol τῆς γερουσίας in Pol. xxxviii. 5 mean
the δαμιοργοί (viii. 92, 491), we find them distinctly acting as Speakers of the
Assembly. They seem to be the ἄρχοντες mentioned just before, and ἄρχοντες
in Polybios means the Sajuopyol. They call the President of the Union, Krito-
laos, to order for unparliamentary language. This was in very late, bad, and
violent times ; one cannot fancy Aratos or Philopoimén receiving or needing such
an interruption, though doubtless they were legally open to it, just as an English
First Minister may be called to order by the Speaker.

Drun:» ἐν, 462) seems to confound this γερουσία with the βουλή or Senate.
Tittmann (83, accurately distinguishes them, though he is not quite clear about
their ide: ity with the δαμιοργοί.

Joint
action in
diplomatic
matters.
B.C, 228.

283 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cnHap.

The General was necessarily an important speaker; he had to
explain and to defend his policy; he would have been as unfit
to act as President of the Assembly as the Leader of the House
of Commons is to be at the same time its Speaker.! Theoreti-
cally the same objection might seem to apply to his ten colleagues ;
they were as responsible as he was for the measures on which
they had to take the votes of the Assembly. But they were
not so personally bound as he was to be active speakers on their
behalf. Our own House of Lords presents a close analogy.
The Lord Chancellor is Speaker of the House ; he presides, and
puts the question. But, unlike the Speaker of the Commons, he
is also a member of the Government, an active member of the
House ; he can vote, speak, bring in bills of his own, just as
much as any other Peer ; one class of bills indeed it is his special
duty to bring in rather than any other Peer. Still it is felt that
the Speaker of the House cannot fittingly be the Government
Leader in the House; some other Peer is always looked upon
as the special representative of the Cabinet in the House of
Lords. This division of parliamentary duty exactly answers to
what I conceive to have been the division of duties in the
Assembly between the Achaian Ministers and the Achaian
General. Out of the House, the General and his Ministers
doubtless acted in concert in all important civil business. On
some great occasions we distinctly see the whole Government
acting together. For instance, Aratos and his Ten Councillors 3
all went to meet King Antigonos, and to make arrangements
with him for his coming into Peloponnésos. In short, in all
civil and diplomatic business the General acted together with the
other members of the Government. He was chief of a Cabinet,
and we know what powers the chief of a Cabinet has. He could
not indeed get rid of a refractory colleague, as a modern First
Minister can; but we may be sure that, in the good times of the
League—the days of Kritolaos are another matter—a General who

was in the least fit for his place could always command a majority |

among his colleagues, and a majority was all that was needed.

1 That in some other Federations, as those of AStolia and Akarnania (see pp.
264, 484, note 1), the General presided in the Assembly shows the higher political
developement of the Achaian System. The Achaian institution of the Ten
Ministers seems to have no exact parallel elsewhere. To their existence it is
probably owing that we hear less of the Senate in Achaia (see p. 239) than in
some other commonwealths.

3 Plut. Ar. 48. ᾿Απήντα μετὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ὁ "Aparos αὐτῷ.

Vv UNRESTRAINED POWERS OF THE GENERAL IN WAR 238

In military affairs the case was different. The Ten were a Unre.
purely civil magistracy ;! the General, besides being the political strained
chief of the state, was also, as his title implies, 108 military chief, Py
and that with far more unrestrained power than he exercised in General in
civil affairs. The Sovereign People declared war and concluded Wer.
peace; but while war lasted, the General had the undivided
command of the Achaian armies. The Achaians, as Polybios
says, trusted their General in everything: they did not hamper
his operations in the field in the same way as was too often done .
by the Venetian, Spartan, and Dutch Republics. There was not
the same reason or temptation for doing so. The hereditary
Kings of Sparta were naturally looked upon with jealousy by
the Ephors, who represented another principle in politics. And
Venice, in her land campaigns, had commonly to do with
mercenary leaders, whose fidelity might not always be absolutely
trusted. But if an Achaian General, a citizen chosen for a year
by the free voices of his fellow-citizens, cannot be fully trusted
by them, no man can ever be trusted at all. In fact he commonly
was both fully and generously trusted. He was allowed to act
for himself, subject only to the after-judgement of the Assembly,
in which his proceedings might be discussed after the fact.?

But it is in this union of the chief military and the chief political Union of
power in the same person that we see the main point of differ- military
ence between the Achaian system and that of all modern states, ane een
republican or monarchic. No First Minister of a constitutional tions
monarchy thinks of commanding its armies; it is felt that his unlike
duties lie in quite another sphere. The American President is ™°0e™
indeed, by the Constitution,* Commander-in-Chief of the Federal

forces by sea and land; that is to say, they are necessarily at

his disposal as the chief executive Magistrate; but it is not
implied that the President shall always be the man personally

to lead the armies of the Republic to battle. Butin the Achaian

League the General was really a General ; his command in the

field was as much a matter of course as his chief influence in the

1 I only remember one instance (see p. 419) of the Ministers being mentioned
in military affairs, and this is on the reception of a new city into the League, a
business as much diplomatic as military.

3 Thirlwall, viii. 102. “ἘΦ wielded the military force of the League in the
field with shs"ute, though not irresponsible, authority.”

3 I spei+ " the civilized states of Europe and America ; I do not answer for
Mexican er «ith American Republics.

4 Art. ii, § 2. 1.

His title
mnilitary,
but his
badge of
office
civil.

234 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuap.

Assembly ; his only official title! was a military one ; though it
should be noticed that the outward symbol of his office was one
purely civil. We have seen a Theban Archon with nothing
military about him, but whose badge of office was a spear ;* we
now find, in curious contrast, that the badge of office of the
Achaian General was the purely civil symbol, a seal. The
General kept the Great Seal of the League; and his admission
to or resignation of office is sometimes spoken of as accepting or

. laying down the Seal,’ much as we speak, not indeed of a Com-

Athenian
experience
on the
union of
civil and
nilitary
powers.

mander-in-chief, but of a Lord Chancellor. This union of civil
and military duties, which was usual in the later Greek Republics,
looks at first sight like a retrograde movement, after the experi-
ence of the Athenian commonwealth on the subject. At one
time it was held at Athens that the functions of statesman
and General should go together. In Miltiadés, Themistoklés,
Aristeidés, we see the union in its fulness. In the next
generation we discern the first signs of separation between the
two. Periklés and Kimén indeed still unite both functions ;
Periklés could fight and Kimén could speak. But it is clear
that, though the functions were united, they were not united in
equal proportions in the two men. Periklés was primarily a
statesman and secondarily a general; Kimén was primarily a
general and secondarily a statesman. The military abilities of
Periklés were considerable, but they were a mere appendage to
his pre-eminent civil genius; and most certainly Kimén was far
more at home when warring with the barbarians than when
contending with Periklés in the Assembly. It showed the good
sense of both the rivals, when they agreed upon the compromise
that Periklés should direct the counsels, and Kimén command
the armies, of the commonwealth. In the next stage of things
the schism between the two callings becomes wider and wider.

1 Polybios is singularly fluctuating in the various titles which he gives to the
Assembly and to the Ministers, but I do not remember that the General is ever
called anything but στρατηγός, or, perhaps, its equivalent ἡγεμών (see iv. 11;
v. 1); προεστώς (ii. 45) is hardly meant as a formal title.

2 See above, p. 129.

3 Plut. Ar. 38. ᾿Εβουλεύσατο μὲν εὐθὺς [ὁ Ἄρατος] ἀποθέσθαι τὴν σφραγῖδα
καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν ἀφεῖναι. Pol. iv. 7. Παραλαβὼν [ὁ “Aparos] παρὰ τοῦ
Τιμοξένου τὴν δημοσίαν σφραγῖδα. [So in Outer Appenzell. Miiller, Hist. de la
Conféderation Suisse (Continuation), xiv. 213. Wetter, the Landammann,
resigned his office; his son was elected in his stead and ‘‘recut le sceau des
mains de son pére.”’]

4 See Grote, v. 450.

a hha, _

Vv UNION OF CIVIL AND MILITARY DUTIES 235

The versatile genius of Alkibiadés indeed united both characters,

or rather all characters; but Nikias was a professional soldier,

whose position as a statesman is quite incidental, while the elder
Démosthenés, an admirable soldier, does not appear as a states-

man at all. On the other hand Kleén and his brother Dema- Gradual
gogues are mere politicians, who do not in any way profess to separation
be military commanders! In the next century the callings military "
were utterly separated. Phdékién is the only man in whom there functions.
is the least approach to an union of them. Iphikratés and
Chabrias were strictly professional soldiers, who eschewed politics
altogether. Démosthenés, Atschinés, Hyperidés, never thought

of commanding armies. Indeed in their days it was but seldom

that the armies of Athens were formed of her own citizens and
commanded by her own Generals; they were too commonly Employ-
mere mercenary bands commanded by faithless soldiers of fortune. ment of
It may have been the remembrance of the evils inflicted on (i.
Greece by these hireling banditti, which induced both the
Achaian League and the other later Greek commonwealths to The

fall back upon the old system, and to insist upon the union of acnaien
military and civil powers in the chief of the state. The arrange- reaction,
ment doubtless gave greater unity and energy to Federal action ; pisaa-
but it undoubtedly had a bad side. It by no means followed vantages
either that the wisest statesman would be also the bravest and οἵ the
most skilful captain, or that the bravest and most skilful captain” ~”
would be also the wisest statesman. Aratos was unrivalled as

a diplomatist and parliamentary leader, but his military career
contains many more failures than successes. Could he and
Lydiadas have divided duties, as Periklés and Kimén did, the
League might perhaps never have been driven to become a
suppliant for Macedonian protection. It is also clear that the

union aggravated one difficulty which perhaps can never be
entirely avoided in any government where magistrates are
elected for a definite time. Once a year, or once in four years, The Presi-
what we call a Ministerial Crisis comes round as a matter of dental in-

1 Kle6n’s command at Amphipolis is, as we have seep, something quite
exceptional. Brt of course a Demagogue, like another citizen, might be called
upon to serve in war. Hence the point of Phékidn’s retort to a troublesome
ογϑίοι-- -πολέμου μὲν ὄντος ἐγὼ σοῦ, εἰρήνης δὲ γενομένης ov ἐμοῦ ἄρξεις. Plut.
Phék. 16. (ἋΟἿΞ pare also the story οἵ Phékién and Archibiadés in the same life,
ce. 10. Τ᾽ 1... 16η88 and Aschinés both served in the army, and Aschinés gained
some credit 1..“ >versonal gallantry, just as Sdkratés did, but no one ever thought
of choosing .ny one of the three to the office of General.

I

terregnum
aggravated
by the
union of
powers,

B.C. 220.

Question

of re-elec-
tion of the
President.

26 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cnar.

course. It is felt to be a practical fault in the American system
that the President is chosen so long before he actually enters on
his office! A practical interregnum of some months takes place ;
the incoming Government are still private men; the outgoing
Government, though still invested with legal powers, cannot
venture to use them with any effect in the face of their desig-
nated successors. A circumstance recorded by Polybios ? shows
that this difficulty was felt in Achaia also. The A‘tolians chose
for an inroad the time when the official year was drawing to its
close, as a time when the Achaian counsels were sure to be weak.
Aratos, the General-elect, was not yet actually in office ;® the
outgoing General Timoxenos shrank from energetic action so
late in this year, and at last yielded up his office to Aratos
before the legal time. We know not exactly how long the
Achaian interregnum lasted, but it is evident that we here
find the American difficulty, and that aggravated by the fact
that the President had himself personally to take the field. At
Rome the change of Consuls seems to have sometimes had the
same effect; but, in the best days of Rome, the danger was
tempered in two ways. It was lessened by that habitual devo-
tion of every Roman to the public interest, to which neither
Achaia nor America nor any other state can supply a parallel.
And the custom, by which a Consul whose services were really
needed was commonly continued in his command as Proconsul,
prevented the occurrence of any interregnum at all in the cases
where it would have been most hurtful.

It may perhaps be doubted whether, in another point, the
practice of the League diminished or aggravated an evil which
has often been pointed out in the American system. The power
given by the Constitution, and, at one time, often exercised in
practice, of re-electing the President, at least for one additional
term of office,* has often been made the subject of grave com-
plaint. It places, it is argued, the Chief Magistrate of the
Union in the somewhat lowering position of a candidate for the

1 In the United States this evil is aggravated by the utter failure of the con-
stitutional provisions for the double election of the President. The President
not only does not enter on office immediately on his legal election, but, long before
the legal election takes place, it is already practically decided who will be elected,
and the interregnum at once begins.

2 iv. 6, 7. 3 See below, p. 397.

4 The Constitution puts no restriction upon re-election ; in practice no Presi-
dent has ever remained in office for more than two terms.

v PRESIDENTIAL INTERREGNUM 237

suffrages of the citizens; it causes him too often to adopt a

policy, which may not be in itself the best, but which may be

the most likely to lead to re-election ; and it causes the latter

part at least of a Presidency to be often spent in canvassing

rather than in governing! The Achaian President held office qcnaiae
for a year only ; he was incapable of immediate re-election, but jcoable of
he might be chosen again the year after.?. In conformity with immediate
this law, Aratos, during his long ascendency, was commonly elected re-election.
seemingly quite as a matter of course, in the alternate years.

In those years when he was not himself in office, he was often

able to procure the election of some partisan® or kinsman,‘

whose policy he practically guided. We may well believe that,

when he was not General, he often filled some other high office,

and indeed it is not clear whether he was not sometimes, in

defiance of the law, himself re-elected in consecutive years.© It

is certain that he was once, and that while another citizen was B.c. 223.
in office, elected by a thin Assembly to the anomalous post of

General with Absolute Power,® and that, in that character, he

1 On the other side see the ingenious arguments in the ‘‘ Federalist,” No. Ixxii.
Ῥ. 890. Doubtless, as in most political questions, there is something to be said
on both sides, but practically the disadvantages of re-election seem decidedly to
predominate. This view is strongly taken by Tocqueville, i. 228 et seqq., and
Jefferson (see his life by Tucker i. 281) strongly objected to the power of re-electing
the President, on the ground that a re-eligible President would be always re-elected,
and would in fact become a Tyrant. That this fear was chimerical in America
was proved by Jefferson’s own case, but it was a very real one in Greece. See
p. 238. The new Southern Confederation has made the President incapable of
re-election, but has given him a longer term of office, namely, for six years, Art.
ii. § 1.

2 Plut. Ar. 24. ᾿Επεὶ μὴ κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐξῆν, wap’ ἐνιαντὸν αἱρεῖσθαι orpary-
γὸν αὐτὸν [τὸν Αρατον), ἔργῳ δὲ καὶ γνώμῃ διὰ παντὸς ἄρχειν. So 30. 38.
Kleom. 15. Three of these passages are strangely quoted in the Dictionary of
Antiquities (p. 5, art. Achaicum Foedus) to show that ‘‘ persons of great merit
and distinction were sometimes re-elected for several successive years.” So
Kortiim, iii. 162. The law may sometimes have been broken—it certainly was
once in the case of Philopoimén (Liv. xxxviii. 33)—but Plutarch clearly means
that the law forbade immediate re-election. (See Thirlwall, viii. 191. Droysen,
ii. 438.) παρ᾽ ἐνιαυτόν, to make any sense, can only mean ‘‘ every other year.”

5. Timoxenos (Pol. iv. 6, 7. 82. Tov Tiudtevov . . . τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν
Aparopr εἰσαγόμενον), Hyperbatés, etc. seem mere nominees and instruments of
Aratos. Even with Lydiadas and Aristomachos he interferes in a strange way.

# As his son the younger Aratos. Pol. iv. 37; v. 1.

5 See Droysen, ii. 488. I shall examine this question in a note at the end of
Chapter viii.

6 Plut. Ar. 41. Τῷ δ᾽ ᾿Αράτῳ συνῆλθον εἰς Σικνῶνα τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν οὐ πολλοί
[but Sintenis in his text gives οἱ πολλοί], καὶ γενομένης ἐκκλησίας ἠρέθη στρατηγὸς
αὐτοκράτωρ, καὶ περιεστήσατο φρουρὰν ἐκ τῶν ἑαντοῦ πολιτῶν. See Thirlwall,
viii. 194. On the position of the στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, see below, p. 377. The

288 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE caar.

was, for a while at least, attended by a body-guard like a Tyrant.
A man at once so fond of power, and so fully trusted as Aratos
was, may probably have now and then ventured on violations
of the letter of the law, especially when they took the form of
illegal motions passed by the Sovereign Assembly. The question
as to the working of the law against re-election was probably of ᾿
more importance before the rise, and after the death, of Aratos.
Where office is held for so short a time as a year, there is only
one way which will absolutely prevent a Magistrate from shaping
his conduct with a view to re-election. This is the extreme
measure of forbidding the same man to hold office more than

' once in his life. An election in the next year but one is near

Special
position of
Aratos.

enough to come pretty closely before his eyes and practically
to influence his conduct in office. But the prohibition of re-elec-
tion at any time, however distant, may lead to still worse evils.
It was tried at Rome in the case of the Consulship,! but it was
afterwards given up. Such a rule, it is obvious, might often
deprive the State of the services of its best citizens at the very
time when they were most wanted. But the Achaian system of
forbidding immediate re-election, though it could not entirely
remove, probably did a good deal to lessen, the evil complained
of in America. And it effectually stopped what was really the
danger in Greece, that of the same man being elected, year after
year, till he contrived to convert a permanent Presidency into a
Tyranny. Aratos indeed, even when not in the highest office,
was the practical ruler of the League; still the alternation of
official and non-official years at least marked the distinction
which separates the republican leader, however great his official
power and personal influence, from the Tyrant reigning by force.
If his government once, for a moment, assumed something like
the outward form of Tyranny, even that extreme measure had
some shadow of constitutional sanction, and it was ventured on
only in a moment of extreme danger to the Union and its chief.
The laws of the Achaian commonwealth allowed an able and
eloquent statesman to exercise an almost unbounded influence,

title was one familiar at Athens (see Thuc. vi. 26), but an Athenian στρατηγὸς
αὐτοκράτωρ had no larger powers than an ordinary Achaian στρατηγός. It meant
merely that exemption from the interference of colleagues and that absence of
all instructions in detail which distinguish an Achaian from an Athenian General.
On the other hand this title was the first step of Dionysios of Syracuse to the
Tyranny. But the guard of Aratos was at least a guard of citizens, not of
mercenaries. 1 Liv, Epit. lvi.

v RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT 239

———— «-.. —_ ———_—__—— —

but they supplied an easy means of checking him if he displayed

the least tendency to abuse his power. Every alternate year at

least he had to descend to the legal rank of a private citizen,

and it rested wholly with his fellow-citizens whether he should

ever rise above it again. It is clear that the Achaian League

did not, as Republics are sometimes charged with doing, exhibit

any jealousy of distinguished men. The whole career of Aratos

shows the contrary. After his death no one inherited his full
influence ; but we always find the Federal President a person

high in both personal and official position. Unless -it were Position
during the few wretched years before the final Roman Conquest, οὗ suc-
the best men in the country never shrank from public affairs or ood
stood aloof from the great offices of the State. Achaia, like all
other countries, was not free from personal jealousies and party
divisions ; but the several parties seem commonly to have fairly
striven to place their best men in the chief office of the Common-
wealth. It is only twice or thrice, and that, in one case at least,
through an overwhelming foreign influence, that we find a con-
fessedly incapable President set at the head of the League.’ It

is ἃ great problem in government to secure power enough in the

rulers without trenching on the rights of the whole body. This
problem the Achaian League seems very satisfactorily to have
solved.

Between the Government and the Popular Assembly there The
stood, as in all other Greek commonwealths, a Senate. Of this Senate
Senate we have less knowledge than we could wish. Its men-
tion in our authorities is not so frequent as one might have ex-
pected, and in some passages it is hard to distinguish its action
from that of the Popular Assembly. There are however other
passages which make it clear that the Senate was a distinct body.®

1 As in the case of Epératos. Pol. iv. 82; v. 1, 30,91. Cf. xi. 8.

? Pol. iv. 26; xxviii. 3 (a passage which I shall deal with hereafter), where
βουλή might almost be taken for one of the many synonyms of the Assembly.
So in xxiii. 9, βουλευτήριον seems to be used for the place of Meeting of the
Assembly, which elsewhere is a theatre. xxix. 10; xxxviii. 4. Cf. Tittmann,
Staatsverfassung, 684.

8 In Pol. ii. 37, the βουλευταί are clearly mentioned as distinct Federal
Officers, just like the ἄρχοντες and δικασταί, with whom they are joined. So
in ii. 46, xxiii. 7, 8, xxix. 9, the βουλή seems to be a distinct body. In xxiii.
7, 8, indeed, the βουλή of Polybios answers to the σύνοδος of Diodéros (Exc. Leg.
13), but it is dangerous to make constitutional inferences from Diodéros. Cf.
Tittmann, 655,

240 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuar.

The apparent confusion between the two may arise from the
fact that the Senate was essentially a Committee of the Assembly,
and that a meeting of the larger body probably always involved
@ previous meeting of the smaller. But we know not the exact
nature of its constitution, nor do we know anything of its times
of meeting, except so far as they were determined by those of
the Assembly. But we do know, from a most curious incidental
notice,! that it consisted of one hundred and twenty unpaid
members. If this number points to the original ten or twelve
Achaian towns, we must believe that the Senate also, as well as
the inner Cabinet, was afterwards opened to all citizens of the
Union. This Senate discharged the usual functions of a Greek
Senate. The Government brought their proposals before it, to
be discussed, and perhaps amended, by this smaller body, before
they were submitted to the final decision of the Assembly.”
Ambassadors were introduced to it before their audience of the
assembled Nation, and perhaps in some cases they transacted
business with the Senate alone.’ In other cases again the Senate
might be invested by the Assembly with delegated powers to act
in its name. And it is really not unlikely, especially in the
latter times of the League, when assemblies were being con-
stantly summoned at the caprice of Roman officers, that a sum-
mons to a Public Assembly may often have been answered by
few beside those citizens who happened to be Senators.4 These

1 Pol. xxiii. 7, 8. See above, p. 229.

2 The joint action of the three bodies, Ministers, Senate, and Assembly, seems
clearly marked in Pol. ii. 46. Ol προεστῶτες τοῦ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν πολιτεύματος. ..
συναθροίσαντες τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς ἔκριναν μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς.

4 In Pol. iv. 26, the ordinary meeting—7 καθήκουσα σύνοδοε---ἰα held; King
Philip attends it, but he seems only to have addressed the Senate (προσελθόντος
τοῦ βασιλέως πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν ἐν Αἰγίῳ).

‘In Pol. xxix. 8, a body meets which is called σύνοδος and ἀγορά, and
we hear of τὸ πλῆθος and of πολλοί. Presently another special Meeting
(σύγκλητος) is held, at which Polybios remarks, as if it were something un-
usual, that not only the Senate, but everybody, attended ; ἐν ῃ συνέβαινε μὴ
μόνον συμπορεύεσθαι τὴν BovAny ἀλλὰ πάντας τοὺς ἀπὸ τριάκοντα éray. (See
above, p. 205.) The former meeting can hardly have been anything except a
Public Assembly, summoned as such, but at which few or none but Senators had
actually attended.

By the present Constitution of the University of Oxford, Convocation and
Congregation are two distinct bodies, Congregation consisting of a certain class
of the Members of Convocation. On exciting occasions a large body of Members
of Convocation is drawn together, but it often happens that a meeting of Convo-
cation is attended by none but Members of Congregation.

So, in Cathedral Chapters, the smaller body of Residentiaries, by constantly

Vv THE FEDERAL SENATE 241

last two considerations may help to explain the cases where the
Senate and the Public Assembly seem to be confounded. In
either case, the Senate would practically discharge the functions
of the Assembly, and the body so acting might be roughly called
by either name. The Achaian Senate was no doubt legally pos-
sessed of higher and more independent powers than the Senate
of Athens ; still we doubt whether it exercised any very formid-
able check on the will of an able and popular General. For the
analogy of other Achaian institutions would lead us to believe
that the Senators were appointed together with the Magistrates
at the ordinary Spring Meeting, and that they were really
elected by the Assembly, and not left to the lot, as at Athens.
If so, the party in the Assembly which carried the election of a
General and his Ten Councillors would doubtless be able to carry
also the election of Senators of whom a large majority would be
of the same way of thinking.

On the financial and military systems of the Achaians it is Financial

hardly my business to enlarge. But a few points must be men- and ke
tioned which have a direct bearing on the Federal Constitution. orihe >
That the Achaian League was essentially a national Government, League,
that its laws and decrees were directly binding upon Achaian
citizens, can admit of no reasonable doubt. But it is not equally
clear that it had in all cases advanced beyond that system of
requisitions from the particular members, instead of direct
agency on the part of the Federal power, which, in modern
politics, is held, more than anything else, to distinguish an
Imperfect from a Perfect Federation.! It would hardly have
been in harmony with the common instincts of the Greek mind
to have scattered an army of Federal officers, in no way respon-
sible to the local Governments, over all the cities of Peloponnésos.
And, in truth, questions of taxation by no means held that
important place in an ancient Greek commonwealth which is
acting in the name of the whole body of Canons, has gradually drawn into its
own hands nearly all the powers of the Chapter.

So again, in England, when a Privy Council is held, it is not attended by all
the Privy Councillors, but by those only who are immediately connected with the
Government.

In these last two cases the attendance of the whole body is so unusual that it
would doubtless be resisted as something irregular. At Oxford, the whole body
is contented to leave many matters in the hands of one class of its members, but
it reserves to itself the undoubted power of assembling in full foree whenever it

pleases. The relations between the Achaian Senate and Assembly seem to have
been very similar. 1 See above, p. 9.

R

System of
Requisi-
tions pro-
bably more
conve-
nient.

Military
Contin-
gents
ordered
by the
Assembly.

Merce-
naries.

Federal
Garrisons.

B.0. 243-
228.

242 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE omar.

attached to them in every modern state. Probably, under the
circumstances of the League, the requisition system was the more
convenient of the two; but it is perfectly plain that the Federal
Assembly and the Federal Magistracy were powers to which
every citizen owed a direct obedience, and not merely an indirect
one through the Government of his own city. We once geta
glimpse of the Federal system of taxation, when we find certain
cities, and those too cities of the original Achaia, refusing to pay
the contributions which were due from them to the Federal
Treasury.! This seems to show that the Federal Assembly, or
the Government acting by its authority, assessed each city at a
certain sum, which the city had to raise by whatever form of
local taxation it thought best. And really, though the United
States prefer a system of more strictly Federal taxation, there
seems nothing in the other method necessarily inconsistent with
the strictest Federal Unity.2. In military matters, we find the
Assembly sometimes requiring particular cities to furnish particu-
lar contingents,® and sometimes investing the General with power
to summon the whole military force of the League. Beside
these citizen soldiers, the League, according to the custom of the
age, made large use of mercenaries, whose pay must have come
out of the Federal Treasury. But they seem to have been kept
strictly under the orders of the Federal General and his sub-
ordinate officers ; we never see Achaia, like Florence and other
Italian states, at the mercy of a hired Captain. Out of these
two classes of citizen and mercenary soldiers, the League kept
up a small standing army, enough at least to supply a few
important places with Federal garrisons. The immeasurable
importance of Akrokorinthos caused a Federal garrison to be
kept there, after the deliverance of the city,® as regularly as
a Macedonian garrison had been kept during the days of its
bondage. We also read of garrisons being kept in one or two
cities, like Kynaitha® and Mantineia,’ whose loyalty to the

1 Pol. iv. 60. Συνεφρόνησαν ἀλλήλοις els τὸ τὰς μὲν κοινὰς εἰσφορὰς τοῖς
᾿Αχαιοῖς μὴ τελεῖν. Cf. v. 80, 91. In v. 1, we see the Federal Congress dis-
tinctly voting supplies, but we have no hint as to the way in which they were to
be levied. 2 See above, p. 11. * Pol. v. 91.

4 Pol. iv. 7. "Eyndloayro . . . . συνάγειν τὸν στρατηγὸν τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς ἐν
τοῖς ὅπλοις. See above, p. 215.

5 Four hundred heavy-armed foot, fifty hounds, and fifty huntsmen. Plut.
Ar. 24.

ν Pol. iv.17. Φυλακὴν ἔχοντας τῶν τειχῶν καὶ στρατηγὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐξ "Axatas,

7 Three hundred Achaian citizens and two hundred mercenaries. Pol. ii. 58.

v FEDERAL GARRISONS 248

League was doubtful, or whose local Governments required
Federal help against a discontented party.! But, beside what

was necessary for these purposes, the League is not likely to

have kept any force, whether of citizens or mercenaries, con-
stantly under arms. But the extensive military reforms of
Philopoimén? show that the citizens must have been in the habit 307 210,
of frequent military training, or he would hardly have had the ”
opportunity of introducing such considerable changes as he did ©

into both the cavalry and the infantry of the League.

In considering the constitution of the Achaian League, it is General
impossible to avoid comparing it, almost at every step, with the Compari-
constitution of the United States. If I have pointed out some tween the
points of diversity, it is because the general likeness is so close Achaian
that the slightest unlikeness at once makes itself felt. The two πρυτα
constitutions are as like one another as, under their respective United
circumstances, they could be. They arose in different quarters States.
of the globe, among men of different races and languages, and Close
with an interval of two thousand years between the two. The general qe:
elder Union was a Confederation of single Cities, which had betw een
once been strictly sovereign Republics, invested with all the the two.
rights of independent powers. The younger Union was a Con-
federation of large States, which had hitherto, been mere colonies
of a distant Monarchy, and which, before the War of Independ-
ence, never thought of pretending to sovereign rights. Even
the New England colonies, though the circumstances of their
foundation gave to their early days much greater independence
than European colonies commonly possess, were still colonies,
and fully recognized their allegiance to the mother-country.

With this difference of position to start from, it is much more
remarkable that there should be any considerable degree of
likeness between the two constitutions than that there should be

some considerable degree of unlikeness. The chief differences Differ-
between them are the natural results of the difference between a arising
Confederation of Cities and a Confederation of large States. from the
From this distinction at once follows the main difference of all, difference
that the Achaian Congress was a primary Assembly, while the cotween ᾿
American Congress is a Representative Assembly. From this ration of
again follow certain differences of detail ; the American Congress Cities and

1 A similar power is given by the Constitution of the United States, Art.
iv. § 4. | 3 Plut. Phil. 7, 9.

a Confede-
ration of
States.

Analogies
and diver-
sities in
the posi-
tion of the
President.

Different
origin of
the office
in the two
Systems.

Kingly
powers

of the
American
President.

244 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuap.

could be, and is, bi-cameral, which the Achaian Congress could

not be; the Achaian President was chosen by Congress, or by
the nation, as we choose to put it, while the American President
is legally chosen by special electors ; the Achaian President was
a member, and the leading member, of Congress, while the
American President is a power external to Congress.- On this
latter very important point we have seen that the practical
working of our own Constitutional Monarchy makes a nearer
approach to the Constitution of Achaia than is made by the
Constitution of the United States. From a Primary Assembly,
where every citizen has a right to appear, it is obviously im-
possible to exclude the Chief Magistrate of the State. So the
forms of a modern Constitutional Monarchy require the actual,
though not the avowed, wielder of the royal power to be himself
a member of one or other House of the Legislature. But such
ἃ position would be hardly consistent with the office of a
President whose kingly functions are conferred on him by Law
and not by an unwritten conventionality. Still the general
position of the Chief Magistrate in the two constitutions is
strikingly alike, and the more so when we remember that the
historical origin of the two offices was wholly different. The
American President, like the Athenian Archon or the Roman
Consul, inherited, under the necessary limitations of a republican
system, the powers of which the King was deprived by the
Revolution. He answers very exactly to the Athenian Archon
in his second stage, when a single Chief Magistrate was chosen
for ten years. The powers of the President are essentially
kingly ; he lacks indeed the power of declaring war, but it is
his function ‘to negociate treaties of peace ; he has the command
of the national forces ; he has the mass of the national patronage ;
and he possesses a legislative veto, which is the more practical
because it is only suspensive. ΑἹ] these powers are strictly

royal ; only, when put into the hands of a republican magistrate, .

they are necessarily limited in various ways. In some cases the
confirmation of the Senate is legally required for the validity of
the President’s acts; he is, like the Consul, the sole mover and
doer, but another power in the State possesses the Tribunician
function of forbidding.’ In all cases his power is practically

1 This analogy is not quite perfect. The President’s acts have to be formally
confirmed by the Senate ; the Consul’s acts needed no formal confirmation from
the Tribunes. All that the Tribune did was to step in with his Veto when he

Vv COMPARISON BETWEEN ACHAIA AND AMERICA 245

limited by the temporary tenure of his office, and by his personal
responsibility} for any illegal act. Still, limited as they are
in their exercise, the powers are in themsclves kingly ;* the
President stepped into the King’s place ;* he has really more
power than a Constitutional King has personally, though less
than belongs to a powerful First Minister acting in a Constitu-
tional King’s name. But the Achaian General did not succeed Nothing

any King; if there ever was one King over all the Old Achaian royal
cities it was in a long past and mythical time ; the single General ρου the

succeeded to the functions of the two Generals whom the League General.
originally elected. There was therefore nothing kingly about
his origin; the Achaians deliberately decided that one Chief

thought good. But the right of confirmation, in the hands of a body which can
originate nothing, is practically reduced to a right of rejection.

1 I mean responsibility in the old Greek and in the egal English sense, not
in that in which we often speak of Ministers being “responsible to Parliament.”
This last phrase simply means that the House of Commons may discuss their acts,
and that, if it disapproves of them, it can easily drive them to resignation. But
a Greek Magistrate was, and an American President is, liable to legal trial and
punishment for his official acts. So isan English Minister, but not asa Minister.
If it can be proved that the First Lord of the Treasury has been guilty of mal-
versation at the Treasury, if it can be proved that he has, as a Privy Councillor,
given the Sovereign illegal advice, the Law can in either case touch him, by
impeachment or otherwise. But as ‘Prime Minister,” with a good ora bad
“policy,” the Law cannot touch him, because it knows nothing of his existence.
In our system, Parliamentary responsibility has become so effective as to make
strictly legal responsibility nearly a dead letter. But in the American system,
there is no such thing as Parliamentary responsibility; ten thousand votes of
censure cannot displace the President, but an impeachment can.

4 Hamilton, in the “ Federalist” (No. lxix. p. 371), labours hard, as his argu-
ment requires, to show the points of difference between the elective and responsible
President and the hereditary and irresponsible King. That is, he brings forward
the republican limitations of the President’s powers more strongly than the kingly
nature of the powers themselves. He then compares the President with the
Governors of particular States, showing that the President’s powers do not, on
the whole, exceed theirs. But the powers of a State Governor are no less kingly
within their own range, and they are also kingly in their origin. The Governor
of the independent State succeeded the Governor of the dependent Colony, and
he, whether elected or nominated, was essentially a reflected image of Kingship.
The Governor of the State retained the position of the Governor of the Colony,
with such changes as a republican system necessarily required. It may be
doubted whether republics which had had no sort of experience of monarchical
institutions would have invested any single magistrate with the large powers
possessed by the American Governors.

3 The fact that the chaotic period of the old Constitution, 1776-1789, inter-
vened makes but little difference. The memory of Kingship had not died out,
and the anarchy of the Confederation proved the need of a head of some kind.
The Federalists were always charged by their Republican opponents with en-
deavouring to restore Monarchy, and, in a certain sense, the charge was un-
doubtedly true.

General
resen-
blance of
the two

Presidents.

No exact
parallel
in Achaia
to the
American
Senate.

246 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE ΠΑ».

Magistrate was better than two, and that it was well to clothe
that Chief Magistrate with powers unknown to earlier Demo-
cracies.! But the general resemblance between the Heads of
the two Unions is obvious ; whatever may be the differences in
detail, we see, in both cases, that a highly democratic constitu-
tion can afford to invest a single chief with nearly the whole
executive power, and we see, in both cases, that so great an
extent of legal power may be sufficient to gratify the ambition
of the citizens who are successively raised to it. Neither Union
hesitated to create something like a temporary King, and neither
Union ever fell under the sway of anything like a permanent
Tyrant.2_ In both these respects the Achaian and American
Democracies stand together, and are distinguished alike from
the earlier Democracies of Greece and from the Democracies of
medieval Italy. Florence indeed, and other Italian cities,
invested their magistrates with far greater powers than those of
either the Achaian General or the American President. But
those powers could be safely vested only in a Board or College ;
a single chief came in only as a temporary Dictator,® and the
temporary Dictator often contrived to convert himself into a
Tyrant. The Achaian and the American Confederations stand
together as the two Democracies which have entrusted a single
Chief Magistrate with the greatest amount of power, and those
in which that power has been less abused than anywhere else.

The American Senate .is an institution to which there is no
exact parallel in the Achaian system. The founders of the
American Constitution adopted the general principle of a Second
Chamber from the constitution of the mother-country. They
adapted it to republican ideas by making its seats elective instead
of hereditary, and they invested it with some powers which the
British House of Lords does not possess. It is the constitutional

1 The days when Athens had a single Archon were of course long before she
became a Democracy. In fact the gradual advances of Democracy were largely
made at the expense of the Archonship.
᾿ 2 The doubtful stretches of authority on the part of the President during the
present struggle can hardly fail to remind us of the irregular proceedings of
Aratos in the crisis of the Kleomenic war. See below, Chapter vii. But I see
as little reason to suspect Mr. Lincoln, as there was to suspect Aratos, of any
real intention to establish a Tyranny.

3 The Podesta of so many cities, the Roman Senator, and so forth, were origin-
ally Dictators vequired by special emergencies, though those emergencies some-
times lasted so long as to convert the Dictatorship into a permanent Magistracy.

I do not remember any magistrate in a democratic city really analogous to the
American President.

Vv POSITION OF THE SENATE 247

check on the power of the President, and it is the special guardian
of the rights of the several States. Each State, great and small,
has its two Senators, while in the House of Representatives
members are carefully apportioned to population. Where the
Assembly is primary, a Second Chamber, in the same sense as A Second
the British House of Lords or the American Senate, cannot exist §' amt
It is of the essence of such a Chamber that its members should';, Ὲ pri.
not be at the same time members of the Lower House. But in mary As-
a constitution like that of Achaia, no citizen, whatever office he %e™5ly.
may hold, can cease to be a member of an Assembly whose very
essence is that it consists of all the citizens. A Senate is neces-
sary for many purposes; sometimes it prepares measures for
discussion in the Assembly, sometimes it acts independently by
commission from the Assembly ; but in either case it is a mere
Committee of the sovereign body, a portion of its members acting
on the behalf, and by the authority, of the whole. The special
duties of the American Senate were, in Achaia, part of the
duties of the Sovereign Assembly itself. The Assembly finally
confirmed the treaties which the General negociated; the
Assembly, in which each city had an equal voice, was itself
the natural guardian of State independence, The principle of
State equality which America confines, in most cases, to one
branch of her Legislature, was applied in Achaia, in a more
rigid form,! to her single Assembly. The Achaian Senate is Analogy of
more analogous to the Norwegian Lagthing than to anything the Nor-
in the constitution either of England or of America. The Nor- Lagthing.
wegian Storthing is, like most other European Assemblies,
Representative and not Primary ; it is indeed doubly representa-
tive, being chosen by indirect election. But it so far approaches
to the nature of a Primary Assembly that there is no distinct
Second Chamber. The Storthing chooses a Lagthing from among
its own members, and the body thus chosen discharges several of
the functions of a Senate or House of Lords. But even here
the analogy is very imperfect ; for the Lagthing, being a mere
portion of the Storthing, exists only while the Storthing is
sitting, while it is of the essence of a Greek Senate to act when
the Public Assembly is not sitting. A less important difference

1 In the Achaian Assembly, each city, great or small, had one vote. In the
American Senate each State, great or small, sends an equal number of Senators, but
the votes are not taken by States ; the two Senators of a State may vote on opposite

sides of the question, like the two members for an English county or borough.
2 Constitution of Norway, § 74-6 (Latham’s Norway, ii. 87).

248 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cuHaAp.

between the Achaian and American Constitutions may be seen
in the far higher legal position of the Ministers or Councillors of
Higher the Achaian General, as compared with the Cabinet of the
pee American President. But, even here, we have seen that, in all
Achaian probability, the Achaian Ministers were practically almost as
Ministers much the General’s chosen Councillors as if they had been of his
[Δαμιοργοί] own nomination. Here again the difference arises from the
different origin of the two offices. The Achaian Ministers were
a Magistracy more ancient than the General, by whose powers
they must have been thrown somewhat into the background.
But of the President’s Cabinet the American Constitution makes
no distinct mention at all. “ The different departments of admini-
stration were arranged | by an Act of the first Congress.’

Such are the chief points of likeness and of unlikeness
between the two great Federal Democracies of the ancient and
the modern world. It is singular that that which was practically
the less democratic of the two should be that which had theo-
retically the more democratic constitution.2 Every Achaian
citizen was himself a permanent member of Congress, with a
voice in all Federal legislation, in declaring peace and war, and
in electing the Magistrates of the Union. The American citizen,

Achaia the on the other hand, has only a vote in electing the Representatives
more de- of his State, in electing electors of the President, in electing the
in theory State Legislature which again elects the Senators of his State.
and Ame- Yet nothing is clearer than that the tone and feeling of govern-
ricain ment and policy is far more democratic in the United States than
practice. it, was in ancient Acha‘1. Here again comes in the difference
between the Primary and the Representative system. The
Primary system, theoretically the most democratic system
possible, that which invests every citizen with a personal share
in the Federal Government, becomes, in a large territory, prac-
tically the less democratic of the two. The franchise which i
confers can be exercised only under circumstances which act on
the mass of the people as a practical property qualification.®
The franchise which the American Union confers on every citizen
is far more restricted in its powers, but it is one which every
citizen can exercise without cost or trouble. The real power of
the mass of the people is therefore far greater ; the franchise is

1 Marshall's Life of Washington, v. 228 et seqq.
2 See above, p. 208.
3 See Federalist, lviii. (p. 818) quoted above, p. 208.

Vv AMERICA NOT A COPY OF ACHAIA 249

universally exercised, or abstained from only by the very class
by which the Achaian franchise was almost solely exercised.
Two constitutions, framed two thousand years and seven thousand
miles apart, naturally present no small diversity. Yet, after all,
the diversity is trifling compared with the likeness. Probably
no two constitutions, produced at such a distance of time and
place from one another, ever presented so close a resemblance to
each other, as that which exists between the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the Achaian League.

The question then naturally arises, Was the younger of these
two Constitutions, so like in their provisions, so distant in time The
and place, in any degree a conscious imitation of the elder? 1 american
am inclined to think that it was not. The founders of the son not
American Union were not scholars, but practical politicians. conscious
They were fully disposed to listen to the teaching of history, but imitation
they had small opportunity of knowing what the true and un- g ohaian.
corrupted teaching of Grecian history really was. Those chapters
of the “ Federalist”! which are devoted to the consideration of Remark-
earlier instances of Federal Government show every disposition ble treat-
to make a practical use of ancient precedents, but they show ot the
very little knowledge as to what those precedents really were. Achaian
It is clear that Hamilton and Madison knew hardly anything history
more of Grecian history than what they had picked up from the in tne
“Observations” of the Abbé Mably. But it is no less clear that ralist.”
they were incomparably better qualified than their French guide
to understand and apply what they did know. Mably’s account
of the Achaian League,* like his accouwt of the Amphiktyonic®
Council, is in the style of the French scholarship of the last
century. How that looks by the light of English and German
scholarship of the present century, hardly needs to be told.
Of course the Amphiktyonic Council appears as the “ States-
General” of a regular Confederation, which is paralleled with
the Confederation of Switzerland. In treating of the Achaian
League, Mably confounds the Assembly with the Senate ;*

1 Federalist, No. xviii. p. 91.

2 Observations sur ]’Histoire de Grice. (Euvres de Mably, iv. 186, ed. 1792.

3 Ib, iv. 10. See above, p. 110

4 “On créa un sénat commun de la nation ; i] s’assembloit deux fois l’an ἃ
Egium, au commencement du printemps et de l’automne, et il étoit composé des
députés de chaque république en nombre égal. Cette assemblée ordonnoit la
guerre ou la paix,” etc., p. 187. The confusion is the more curious, because in
matters of mere detail, like the two yearly meetings, Mably is accurate enough.

Mably’s
account
of the

League,
followed
by the
American
writers.

250 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE cmap.

he has hardly any notion of the remarkable powers vested
in the General, or, as he calls him, the Pretor;! finally, he
loads Aratos with praises for that act of his life which Plutarch
so emphatically condemns, which Polybios has so much ado to
defend, his undoing his own work and laying Greece once more
prostrate at the feet of a Macedonian master.2 The comments
of the American statesmen on such a text are curious, and more
than curious; they are really instructive. Their vigorous
intellects seized on, and practically applied, the few facts which
they had got hold of, and even from the fictions they drew con-
clusions which would be perfectly sound, if one only admitted
the premisses. They instinctively saw the intrinsic interest and
the practical importance of the history of Federal Greece, and
they made what use they could of the little light which they
enjoyed on the subject. One is at first tempted to wish that,
instead of such a blind guide as Mably, such apt scholars had
had the advantage of the teaching of a Thirlwall, or that they
had been able to draw for themselves from the fountain head of
Polybios himself? Had they known that, in the Achaian
Assembly, Keryneia had an equal vote with Megalopolis, how
dexterously would they have grappled with the good and evil
sides of such a precedent. How they would have shown that
the principle of State equality which the Achaians thus affirmed
was amply secured by the constitution of the Senate,* while the
unfairness which could not fail to attend this part of the Achaian
system was carefully guarded against by the opposite constitution
of the House of Representatives.© Had they fully realized the
prominent position of the Achaian General, so different from any-

He had evidently read his books with care, but without the least power of under-
standing them.

1 He does indeed say (p. 190), ‘Elle fit la faute heureuse de ne confier qu’a
un seul préteur l’administration de toutes ses affaires.” This is of course a trans-
lation of those famous words of Polybios to which I have so often referred ; but
no words ever stood more in need of a comment.

2 “ἐγ ῃ ne peut, je crois, donner trop de louanges ἃ Aratus pour avoir recouru
ἃ la protection de la Macédoine méme, dans une conjoncture facheuse ot il s’agis-
soit du salut des Achéens. Plutarque ne pense pas ainsi,” etc., p. 197. This
very curious argument goes on for several pages. Polybios had praised Aratos 8
little ; Mably was determined to praise him much.

2 The elder President Adams seems to have gone to Polybios, at least ina
translation. He gives a long extract on the Achaian history. Defence of the
Constitution, etc., i. 298. But he is far from entering into its practical value
like the authors of the ‘‘ Federalist.”

4 See Federalist, No. Ixii. (p. 384). 5 ΤΌ, liv. (p. 298).

Υ GREATER VALUE OF AN UNCONSCIOUS PARALLEL = 251

thing in earlier Democracies, what an example they would have

had before them to justify those large powers in the President

for which they so strenuously contend.! But it was really better

for mankind, better for historical study, that the latter of these

two great experiments was made in practical ignorance of the An uncon-
former. A living reproduction, the natural result of the recur- scion ke:
rence of like circumstances, is worth immeasurably more than ancient
any conscious imitation. It is far more glorious that the wisdom parallel
and patriotism of Washington and his coadjutors should have Vii.
led them to walk unwittingly in the steps of Markos and Aratos, than a
than that any intentional copying of their institutions should conscious
have detracted ought from the freshness and singleness of their °°*
own noble course. Had it been otherwise, the later generation

of patriots might have shone only with a borrowed light; as it

is, the lawgivers of Achaia and the lawgivers of America are
entitled to equal honour. In truth the world has not grown

old ; the stuff of which heroes are made has not perished from

among men; when need demands them, they still step forth

in forms which Plutarch himself might have pourtrayed and
worshipped. The dim outline of Markos of Keryneia grows

into full life in the venerable form of Washington ; a Timoleén,
unstained even by Tyrants’ blood, still lives among us under the

name of Garibaldi; it remains for us to see whether the modern

world can attain to another no less honourable form of greatness,
whether, among the rulers of later days, one will ever be found

who shal] dare to enter upon the glorious path of Lydiadas.

1 Ib. lxix. (p. 371 et seqq. ).

General
Resem-
blances
and Dif-
ferences
between
the
Le

CHAPTER VI
ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ZTOLIAN LEAGUE

Tue Achaian Confederation is an object of such surpassing
interest, both in Grecian history and in the general history of
Federal Government, that I have dwelt upon its smallest begin-
nings and its minutest constitutional details at a length which
seemed no more than their due. But, alongside of the League
of Achaia, there existed, during nearly the whole time of its
being, a rival Union, differing from it but slightly in constitu-
tional forms, equal or superior to it in military power, but
whose general reputation in the eyes of the contemporary world
was widely different. The League of Attolia preceded that of
Achaia in assuming the character of a champion of Greece
against foreign invaders. But, in that period of Grecian history
with which we are most concerned, the League of A‘tolia most
commonly appears as an assemblage of robbers and pirates, the

es of Common enemies of Greece and of mankind. The Achaian and

Achaia and the AXtolian Leagues, had their constitutions been written down

AEtolia.

in the shape of a formal document, would have presented but
few varieties of importance. The same general form of Govern-
ment prevailed in both ; each was Federal, each was Democratic ;
each had its popular Assembly, its smaller Senate, its General
with large powers at the head of all. The differences between
the two are merely those differences of detail which will always
arise between any two political systems of which neither is
slavishly copied from the other. Both are essentially Govern-
ments of the same class. If therefore any general propositions
as to the moral effect of particular forms of Government had
any truth in them, we might fairly expect to find Achaia and
Astolia running exactly parallel careers. Both Achaia and
Aétolia were alike Federal states; both were alike Democracies
in theory ; both were alike tempered in their practical working

OHAP. Vi COMPARISON BETWEEN ACHAIA AND ATOLIA 253

by an element of liberal Aristocracy. If therefore Federal states, Mustra-
or Democratic states, or Aristocratic states, were necessarily “58
. . which

weak or strong, peaceful or aggressive, honest or dishonest, we they give
should see Achaia and Aitolia both exhibiting the same moral of the

characteristics. But history tells us another tale. The political ¢mPtiness

. . . of general

conduct of the Achaian League, with some mistakes and some pronosi-

faults, is, on the whole, highly honourable. The political conduct tions in
of the Attolian Léague is, throughout the century in which we Politi
know it best, almost always simply infamous. The counsels of
the Achaian League were not invariably enlightened ; they were
now and then perverted by passion or personal feeling; but
their general aim was a noble one, and the means selected were
commonly worthy of the end. But the counsels of the AXtolian
League wére throughout directed to mere plunder, or, at most,
to selfish political aggrandizement. Some politicians might tell us
that this was the natural result of the inherent recklessness and
brutality of democratic governments. If so, the same evil results
should have appeared in the history of the Democracy of Achaia.
If it be said that Achaia was saved from such crimes by the
presence of an aristocratic element, Attolia should have been
saved in the like manner. For the tempering of democratic
forms by aristocratic practice is as visible in the history of ADtolia
as in the history of Achaia. If, on the other hand, it is argued
that a Federal Union is necessarily weak, and that even Achaian
history contains instances of such weakness, it is easy to answer
that no Monarchy, no ing vistble-Bepublie, ever showed greater
vigour and unity than ὙΠῸ original A‘tolian Confederation
There are absolutely no signs of disunion, no tendency to
separation, visible among any of its members. If <A:tolia fell,
and fell before Achaia, it fell through causes wholly unconnected
with its Federdl constitution, through war with an irresistible
foreign foe, through grievous errors of its own committing, but
errors to which Consolidated and Federal states, Monarchies and
Republics, Oligarchies and Democracies, are all alike equally
liable. The history of A®tolia indeed shows that the Federal
form of’ Government is no panacea for all human ills ; it shows
that a well-planned constitution at home is no guaranty for wise
or honourable conduct in foreign affairs ; but these propositions
are so self-evident ‘that we need hardly go to Attolia for the
proof of them. But the combined history of the two great
Greek Confederations certainly does show the utter fallacy of

Early His-
tory of
ABtolia.

B.C. 426.

Probable
early

254 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ATOLIAN LEAGUE cuap.

all general propositions as to the good or evil moral effect of
political forms. It proves, aboye_all, the utter fallacy of the
declamations in which it is fashionable to indulge against
Republican, and especially against Federal, Governments.
National character, national circumstances, no doubt both
influence the political constitution and are influenced by it.
But the two things are essentially distinct from one another.
The Achaians, an upright and highly-civilized people, capable
of noble and patriotic designs, but somewhat deficient both in
moral and military vigour, lived under nearly the same political
constitution as the A‘tolians, an assemblage of mountain hordes,
brave, united among themselves, and patriotic in a narrow sense,
but rude, boastful, rapacious, and utterly reckless of the rights
of others. The forms-of a Democratic Federation did mot hinder,
among either people, the developement of its characteristic virtues
and vices. Neither have we any reason to suppose that their
developement would have been hindered by the forms of a pure
Democracy, of an Oligarchy of birth or of wealth, or of a
Monarchy either despotic or constitutional.

The early history of the A‘tolians is very obscure, and it is
hard to say at what time a Federal system was first organized
among them. Our chief knowledge of them in ante-Macedonian
times comes from the account which Thucydidés gives of the
unlucky campaign of the Athenian Démosthenés in their country.!
They there appear as the most backward portion of the Hellenic
race; their language was difficult to understand, and their
greatest tribe, the Eurytanes, were said to retain the barbarous
habit of eating raw meat.? Above all, they still lived in de-
tached and unfortified villages.* Indeed at no time do the
étolians seem to have attained to the full perfection of Greek
city-life. When their League was at the height of its power, we
still find but small mention of Aitolian towns; indeed we may
distinguish the Attolian League, as an union of districts or
cantons, from the Achaian League, which was so essentially an
union of cities.‘ Some sort of union would seem to have ‘existed

1 Thue. iii. 94 et seqq.

2 Τὸ ᾿Αγνωστότατοι δὲ γλῶσσαν καὶ ὠμοφάγοι εἰσίν, ws λέγονται. See Nie-
buhr’s Anc. Hist. iii. 270.

3 Ib. Οἰκοῦν δὲ κατὰ κώμας ἀτειχίστους καὶ ταύτας διὰ πολλοῦ.

4 Strabo, ix. 4. 18 seems to make the opposite remark as to the Homeric
Atolians, Αἰτωλοὺς δ᾽ Ὅμηρος μὲν del ἑνὶ ὀνόματι λέγει, πόλεις, οὐκ ἔθνη τάττων

-_

VI EARLY HISTORY OF ZTOLIA 255

among them even in the fifth century before Christ. Thucy- union
didés speaks of the Aitolians as a nation,! and his whole narrative among the
shows that they were not quite capable of combining for common tripes.
defence against an invader. The historian however gives no de- Kingship
scription of their form of government, except that he incidentally not extinct
mentions one Salynthios as King over one of their tribes, namely '" the fifth
the Agraians.? The Aitolians of this age certainly do not seem yc, y
at all in advance of their Epeirotic neighbours ; yet Thucydidés

fully accepts them as Greeks ; at least he never applies to them

the name Barbarian, which he freely bestows on the Chaonians

and Thesprétians. In after times indeed we find the Hellenic
character of a large portion of the nation called in question,®

and that, strange to say, by the last Philip, who, unlike his

earlier namesake, -would certainly have had great difficulty in

tracing up his own pedigree to any Hellenic stock.* In the

period dwelt-with by Xenophén we hear but little of Attolia.

He mentions the occupation of Kalydén by the Achaians,5 and 8.0. 391.
he tells us that the Atolians were anxious to obtain possession

of Naupaktos, which also was then in Achaian hands. This

they hoped to gain through the agency of Agésilaos,® but it ztolian
does not appear that it ever came permanently into their pos- acquisition
session, till it was given them by Philip after the battle of τα κέρας
Chairéneia.” The language employed in speaking of this cession 8.0, 338.
shows that the Attolians already formed one body, capable of
receiving and holding a common possession. So, before that

time, there were public monuments at Thermon, dedicated in

the common name of the Aftolian nation.2 On the other hand,

ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῖς, K.7.A. This is one of several signs that the historical Actolians had
gone backward, at all events comparatively, from their position in the heroic
azes. The distinction between the Achaian Federation of Cities and the Xtolian
Federation of Districts—the Stadtebund and the Bauernbund—is well put by
Kortiim, Geschichte Griechenlands, ii. 146. Cf. 149, 166.

1 Thue. iii. 94. Td γὰρ ἔθνος μέγα μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ μάχιμον.

2 Ib. 111. 3 Pol. xvii. 5.

4 Pol. v. 10. Ὁ δὲ [Φίλιππο:] ἵνα μὲν καὶ συγγενὴς ᾿Αλεξάνδρου καὶ Φιλίππον
φαίνηται, μεγάλην ἐποιεῖτο wap’ ὅλον τὸν βίον σπουδὴν, ἵνα δὲ ζηλωτὴς, οὐδὲ τὸν
ἐλάχιστον ἔσχε λόγον.

Xen. Hell. iv. 6.1. See above, p. 186. 6 Tb. 14.

7 Dem. Phil. iii, 44. Οὐκ ᾿Αχαιῶν Ναύπακτον ὁμώμοκεν [ὁ Φίλιππος]
Αἰτωλοῖς παραδώσειν ; Strabo, 1. ix. ο. 47. ἔστι δὲ [Ναύπακτος] νῦν Αἰτωλῶν,
Φιλίππου προσκρίναντοςς. See Thirlwall, vi. 20.

8 See the inscription which Strabo, x. 3, 2, quotes from Ephoros, a writer
contemporary with Philip ;

᾿Ενδυμίωνος παῖδ᾽ Αἰτωλὸν τόνδ᾽ ἀνέθηκαν
Αἰτωλοὶ σφετέρας μνῆμ ἀρετῆς ἐσορᾷν.
See Thirlwall, viii. 226.

B.c. 888,

The
League

in the
Reign of
Alexander,
B.c. 336-
322.

Bc. 823-2.

256 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF XTOLIAN LEAGUE cnap.

Arrian speaks of Attolian embassies to Alexander in a way
which has been supposed to imply that no A‘tolian Confedera-
tion then existed.! But the passage may be explained in other
ways, and it is clear that, if the League did not exist at the
beginning of the reign of Alexander, it had acquired a good deal
of consistency before his death. The acquisition of Naupaktos
was only the beginning of a long series of Attolian annexations,
which stand out prominently in the later history of Greece.
While Alexander was conquering Persia, the A‘tolians had com-
pelled Oiniadai and some other portions of Akarnania to unite
themselves, on some terms or other, with the Aétolian body.?
Vengeance for this aggression was strongly denounced against
the offenders by Alexander himself,? and either he, or Antipater
and Krateros after him, formed the scheme of transporting the
whole Aétolian nation into some distant part of Asia. Certain
it is that either dread of Macedonian vengeance, or, as we
may hope, some nobler feelings of Hellenic patriotism, led the

1 Arrian, 1.10.2. Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ πρεσβείας, σφῶν κατὰ ἔθνη, πέμψαντες ξυγ-
γνώμης τυχεῖν ἐδέοντο. [Arrian’s κατὰ ἔθνη is the exact opposite of Strabo’'s
remark about πόλεις.]7 On this Schorn (p. 25) says, “In der ersten Zeit der
Regierung desselben [Alexanders] fand diese [die Contéderation] noch nicht Statt ;
denn als sie sich ihm unterwarfen, schickte jeder Stamm fiir sich Gesandte zu
dem Kénige.” So Manso, Sparta, iii. 292. But considering the evidence the
other way, one might rather be tempted to suppose that the Ambassadors were
sent on behalf of the whole Atolian nation, but that it was thought desirable
that there should be an Ambassador from each tribe. Kortiim (iii. 149) takes
the ἔθνη to be the three chief tribes, which he holds to have themselves formed
separate Leagues (Sonderbiinde). This would agree with a common use of the
word ἔθνος, and would make the League of Atolia, at this time at least, some-
thing like that of the Grisons. ([Cf. Pol. xvii. 5. Αὐτῶν γὰρ Αἰτωλῶν οὐκ
εἰσὶν "EXAnves ol πλείους᾽ τὸ yap τῶν ᾿Αγραῶν ἔθνος καὶ τὸ τὼν ᾿Αποδοτῶν, ἔτι
δὲ τῶν ᾿Αμφιλόχων οὐκ ἔστιν ᾿Ελλάς.] Cf. above, p. 126, on the constitution
of the Beeotian League.

2 Plutarch (Alex. 49) speaks of τὴν Οἰνιαδῶν ἀνάστασιν, and Dioddros
(xviii. 8) of Αἰτωλοὶ τοὺς Oduddas ἐκβεβληκότες ἐκ τῆς warpldos. But Pausanias,
in enumerating the Greeks who took part in the Lamian War, speaks of 'Axap-
vaves és τὸ Αἰτωλικὸν συντελοῦντες (i. 25. 4). This would seem to show that
some at least of the conquered Akarnanians had been incorporated (on whatever
terms) rather than expelled or extirpated.

3 Diod. u.s. Kal γὰρ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἡπειληκὼς ἣν ws οὐκ Οἰνιαδῶν παῖδες ἀλλ᾽
αὐτὸς ἐπιθήσει τὴν δίκην αὐτοῖς. So Plut. us.

4 This was agreed upon by Antipater and Krateros in the Lamian War
(Diod. xviii. 25), but Bishop Thirlwall (vii. 218) hints, with every look of pro-
bability, that such may have been the mind of Alexander himself. Sucha
scheme was quite in the spirit of Alexander's other plans (Diod. xviii. 4.
Thirlwall, vii. 141); but it hardly suits either the position or the character of
Antipater or Krateros to devise it, though they might be ‘quite ready to carry it
out, if already conceived by Alexander.

vI AETOLIA UNDER ALEXANDER 257

AEtolians to be foremost, along with the Athenians, in the brave

but fruitless struggle known as the Lamian War. By the result

of that war, Athens was, for the first time since the days of the

Thirty, deprived of freedom as well as of greatness ; she had to
surrender her orators, to restrict her franchise, to receive a foreign
garrison, humiliations which Philip and Alexander had never
inflicted on her. The A‘tolians were more fortunate ; when the

course of the war had turned utterly against them, they were
delivered by the necessity under which Antipater and Krateros

found themselves of resisting Eumenés in Asia. They were left

wholly untouched, partly, it would seem, because it was still

hoped, some day or other, to carry out the sentence of deporta-

tion against them.! In the later wars of the Successors, the tolia
Etolians play a considerable part, and they are always spoken i ἊΝ
of as a single people, acting with a common purpose. But the of the
glimpses afforded us of their internal state and constitution are Successors.
few and feeble. On one occasion we find an Attolian army Glimpses
leaving the field for a while to go home and discharge the duties of the

of citizens in the National Assembly.2 In another passage we Ait ta
find our first personal mention of an Avtolian General ;* in tion at
others we see the Attolian Federal Assembly discharging its this time.
proper function of commissioning Ambassadors in the name of

the whole nation,* and of listening to the representatives of
foreign powers.5 In the defence of Greece against the Gauls we Share
again find the AXtolians honourably prominent. Here also we % the ;
obtain one or two more glimpses of their internal condition ;, the
and their foreign policy. The year before the invasion they had Gaulish

compelled the Trachinian Hérakleia to enter into their. Con- War 30

279.
1 Diod. xviii. 25. Διεγνωκότες ὕστερον αὐτοὺς καταπολεμῆσαι καὶ μεταστῆσαι

παγοικίους ἅπαντας els τὴν ἐρημίαν καὶ πορρωτάτω τῆς ᾿Ασίας κειμένην χώραν.

3. There can hardly be any doubt that this is the true meaning, as argued by
Droysen (i. 73) and Thirlwall (vii. 197), of the expression did rwas ἐθνικὰς
χρείας, in Diod. xviii. 18. “E@vos is the set formula, in Polybios at least, for a
Federation, and ἐθνικαὶ χρεῖαι cannot be so well translated as by the words
‘* Federal purposes.” But it would be a strange phrase indeed to describe an
Akarnanian inroad, as Schorn (3) and Kortiim (iii. 150) suppose.

3 Diod. xviii. 88. Ὧν fv στρατηγὸς ᾿Αλέξανδρος Αἰτωλός. This need not
imply a General of the League ; but, as we find a single General soon afterwards,
it seems most natural so to interpret it.

‘Ib. xx. 99. Tod κοινοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἀποστείλαντος πρεσβευτὰς περὶ
διαλύσεων.

5 Ib. xix. 66. Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων ᾿Αριστόδημος. . .. ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν
Αἰτωλῶν δικαιολογησάμενος προετρέψατο τὰ πλήθη βοηθεῖν τοῖς ᾿Αντιγόνον
πράγμασιν.

5

Annexa-
tion of

Hérakleia.

Earlier
Develope-
ment of
ZE&tolia

in some
points,

Its causes,

Closer
union
among the
AXtolians,

258 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ATOLIAN LEAGUE cuap.

“9

federacy, antl they now, says our informant, fought for it as for

a possession of their own.! We also come across the names? of
several Aitolian officers, and apparently of at least one General
of the League. Every mention of the people gives the strongest
impression of national unity.

It appears then that, if we looked only at the Federal period
of Grecian history, we might be inclined to give the palm of
antiquity to the A‘tolian rather than to the Achaian League.
The Federal system of AXtolia was clearly in full working before
the first four cities of the original Achaia had begun to draw
together. The whole AXtolian nation was united, as one body
under one head, for years before the ten Achaian cities invested
Markos of Keryneia with the Presidency of the whole Achaian
nation. But this was merely the natural result of the violent
separation of the Achaian cities by the Macedonian power. The
Achaian League was the revival of an ancient union after a
season of forced disunion. No such blow ever fell upon A<tolia,
though, as we have seen, a heavier blow still was threatened.
The Attolians were thus enabled to improve and to enlarge, at a
time when the Achaians were driven to rebuild from the founda-
tion. It is not wonderful then if some steps in the developement
of Federalism were taken in A‘tolia earlier than they were in
Achaia. It is certain that AXtolia was united earlier than
Achaia under the presidency of a single General, but it appears,
on the other hand, that the legal powers of the AXtolian Chief
Magistrate were more restricted than those of his Achaian
brother. It should be remembered that the precedent of a
single General at the head of a Federal State had been long
before set by the Arkadians in the days of Lykomédés.®

There can be no doubt that the union among the members
of the Aitolian League was still closer than the union among the
members of the Achaian League. This is clearly true of all the
original Attolians, whatever may have been the case with the

1 Paus. x. 21. 1. "Eres γὰρ πρότερον τούτων of Αἰτωλοὶ συντελεῖν τοὺς
‘“Hpakdedras ἠνάγκασαν és τὸ Αἰτωλικὸν" τότε οὖν ἠμύνοντο ws περὶ πόλεως οὐδέν
τι Ἡρακλεώταις μᾶλλον ἣ καὶ αὑτοῖς προσηκούσης.

2 Ib. 20,4. Αἰτωλοὺς δὲ ἦγον ἸΠολύαρχος καὶ ἸΠολύῴρων τε καὶ Λακράτης.
Polyarchos was probably the General of the League, and Polyphrén and Lakratés
his subordinates. Another General, Eurydamos, is more distinctly mentioned
by the same writer. Ib. x. 16. 4. Εὐρύδαμον δὲ στρατηγόν τε Αἰτωλῶν καὶ
στρατοῦ τοῦ Γαλατῶν ἐνάντια ἡγησάμενον ἀνέθεσαν ol Αἰτωλοί.

8 See above, p. 159.

vi ATOLIA A LEAGUE OF DISTRICTS NOT OF CITIES 259

non-Attolian states which were afterwards admitted or forced

into the Confederacy. This is the natural result of the differ-

ence between an Union of Tribes and an Union of Cities.1 It

has been already more than once remarked that Federalism took

root earliest among those portions of the Greek race which were

in every way the least advanced, and which were furthest
removed from the ideal perfection of Greek city-life. When
several closely-allied tribes occupy a continuous territory, the
feeling of political independence in each will be weaker, and the
feeling of national unity in the whole body will be stronger, than

it can be in the case of seyeral cities, each capable of, and
accustomed to, the exercise of the fullest rights of sovereignty.

To unite cities which have once tasted of full autonomy is far The
more difficult than to unite districts where either there are no atolians ἃ
cities or else the cities are quite secondary. Thus, in England, Districts
the distinctions between the old Anglian, Saxon, and Jutish rather
Kingdoms were soon and easily effaced; but it has required than of
many more centuries, and the teaching of a long and bitter
experience, to bring the great cities of Italy to act as members

of one united nation. Hence, though the union of the Achaian
Cities was never so close as the union of the Atolian Tribes,

yet it was a far greater triumph of the Federal principle to
bring Corinth, Sikyén, and Megalopolis to act together at all,

than it was to bring about a much closer union between this and

that horde of Attolian plunderers. For, after all, the close
union of the AXtolian Tribes was little more than the union of a

band of robbers, faithful to each other, and enemies to the rest

of the world.? It would be hard to say exactly how close that

1 So Brandstiter (p. 306): ‘‘ Vielleicht hatte es sonst den Aetolern forderlich
sein kénnen, dass sie urspriinglich nicht sowohl ein Stddtebund (wie die Achier)
sondern mehr ein Volkerbund waren, und folglich nicht in so viele einzelne
lnteressen sich zertheilen durften."’ [Compare in Switzerland the strict union of
the Three Cantons, as compared with the rest. ]

Tittmann (723) remarks that there is no recorded instance of separate action on
the part of any Atolian canton, while, in every other League, some instances do
occur. ᾿

2 Compare what Isokratés says of the Lacedemonians (Panath. 245): ὥστ᾽
οὐδεὶς dy αὐτοὺς διά γε τὴν ὁμόνοιαν δικαίως ἐπαινέσειεν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον F τοὺς
καταποντιστὰς καὶ λῃστὰς καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀδικίας ὄντας" καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι
σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὁμονοοῦντες τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπολλύουσιν. He then goes on to liken
them to the Triballians, οὖς ἅπαντές φασιν ὁμονοεῖν ὡς οὐδένας ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους,
ἀπολλύναι δ᾽ οὐ μόνον τοὺς ὁμόρους καὶ τοὺς πλησίον οἰκοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς
ἄλλους ὅσων ἂν ἐφικέσθαι δυνηθῶσιν. He might have said nearly the same of the
tolians.

260 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ATOLIAN LEAGUE ounap.

union was, and what measure of independence was left to each
of the constituent members οὗ the League.! But it seems pro-
bable that those cities which were incorporated with the League
did not lose those rights which were essential to the existence of
any Greek city. The exact terms of admission will be discussed
presently ; but it would be far easier to believe that Naupaktos
and Hérakleia were reduced to the condition of dependencies,
without any share in the general deliberations of the A‘tolian
nation, than that they lost the universal rights of local legisla-
tion and free choice of local magistrates? The relation of
dependent alliance was familiar in Greece ; the sacrifice of local
independence in exchange for a share in the general government
was an idea confined to the pre-historic statesmen of Attica

The constitution of AXtolia was Democratic in the same sense
in which the constitution of Achaia was Democratic. That is to
say, the supreme power was vested in the Popular_Assembly,
the Panaitélikon,? in which, as in Achaia, every citizen had a
vote. But it is evident that, in so large a country as even the

1 Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 226) goes so far as to say, ‘“‘ Nor indeed is it quite
certain that it is more correct to consider the whole body as a league than as a
single republic.” What follows at least is true. ‘It seems that the union of
the Atolians was still closer than that of the Achaians ; that there was a deeper
consciousness of the national unity, and a greater concentration of power in the
national government.”

3 In the two inscriptions 2350, 2851, in Boeckh (C. I. ii. 280), the Canton of
Naupaktos (ὁ δᾶμος ὁ Ναυπακτίων) votes all the private rights of citizenship to
the people of Keos ; δεδόσθαι δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ πολιτείαν ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ καὶ γᾶς καὶ
οἰκίας ἔγκτασιν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὧνπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Νανυκάκτιοι μετέ-
χουσιν, τοὺς Kelous μετέχειν. But the Atolian Union (ἔδοξε τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς) seems
to promise them nothing more than exemption from plunder at the hands of all
4#tolians and all persons sharing in Attolian citizenship (μηθένα ἄγειν Αἰτωλῶν
μηδὲ τῶν ἐν Αἰτωλίᾳ πολιτευόντων τοὺς Kelous). It may however be that a grant
of citizenship lurks in the words ws Αἰτωλῶν ὄντων τῶν Κείων.

3 ΠΙαναιτωλικά (Boeckh, C. I. ii. 632) or Panetolicum, Liv. xxxi. 29. Livy
(xxxi. 32) seems to use the word /’ylaicum as synonymous. Possibly Panertoli-
cum means an AStolian Assembly, if held in its proper place in the old capital
Thermon, or seemingly even at Naupaktos (Liv. xxxi. 29, 40), while Pylaicum
is the same body held, as it sometimes was, at Hérakleia or elsewhere in the
neighbourhood of Thermopyle.

4 See Schorn, p. 26. Thirlwall, viii. 226. Diod. u.s. (see p. 257). To
κοινὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, τὰ πλήθη. Pol. iv. 5. Η κοινὴ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν σύνοδος.

The nature of the Aitolian Assembly is plainly set forth im the description of
Livy (xxxvi. 28, 29). Censebant ef ex omnibus oppidis convocandos ditolos ad
concilium ; Omnis coacta multitudo, etc. This comes from Polybivs (xx. 10),
γράφειν ἔδοξεν els τὰς πόλεις καὶ σνγκαλεῖν τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς χάριν τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι
περὶ τῶν προσταττομένων. He goes on to speak of τὸ πλῆθος, οἱ πολλοί, etc. Yet
Dean Liddell (Hist. of Rome, ii. 10) talks of ‘‘ deputies,” and seems to think
that the Assembly had nothing to do but “ to elect a Captain-General.”’

νι CONSTITUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY 261

original 4tolia, the same causes must have been at work which

infused so stvong an aristocratic element into the Democracy of tempered

Achaia. One may however easily conceive that members of en ae

robber hordes would be more easily drawn from their mountains elements.

to arrange schemes of plunder, than the orderly citizens of Achaia

would be drawn to discuss subtle points of diplomacy, which

were safely left in the hands of those who were practically their

representatives. It is probable then that an Attolian Congress

was, as a rule, more largely attended than an Achaian Congress.

But in such a state of society the feelings of clanship and of

personal attachment are always strong. A freebooting chief, at

whose call many warriors had enriched themselves with plunder,

would command a deference blinder and more devoted than was

paid in Achaia or at Athens to the wisest and most eloquent

statesman. It is easy to believe that the decisions of the Influence

Assembly were yet more completely in the hands of a few ° leading

leading men than they were in Achaia.’ It is evident from men

the history that expeditions, or rather wars, could be undertaken

with impunity by popular chiefs without any commission from

the Assembly or any one else? The regular meetings of the

Assembly were less frequent than they were in Achaia; at least

we have not, as we have in Achaia,® any evidence for the exist-

ence of a second yearly Meeting besides that at which the

Magistrates were elected. This last, in A‘tolia, was held at the

autumnal equinox.* But it seems that, as in Achaia, it was in

the power of the General to summon extraordinary Meetings for

the discussion of urgent affairs.5 The Assembly possessed the Powers

usual powers of a Greek National Assembly. Besides electing οἵ the tI
1 Brandstater (Gesch. Ait. 272), who is inclined to make out as good a case ”

as he can for the Atolians, allows “dass die mangelhaften Gesetze des Bundes

und der allzu grosse Einfluss einzelner hervorragender Charaktere in demselben
die Réauberei zum Vortheile der Einzelnen gestatteten, und insofern auch
begiinstigten.”

4 See the whole history of Skopas and Dorimachos, Pol. iv. 5.

3 See above, p. 214.

4 Pol. iv. 37. Τὰς γὰρ ἀρχαιρεσίας Αἰτωλοὶ μὲν ἐποίουν μετὰ τὴν φθινοπωρινὴν
ἰσημερίαν εὐθέως, ᾿Αχαιοὶ δὲ τότε περὶ τὴν τῆς Πλειάδος ἐπιτολήν.

5 This seems implied in Livy, xxxi. 32, and Pol. χχ 10. On certain limita-
tions of the powers of Special Assemblies in Atolia, see p. 476. Such an
Assembly, at least up to Bc. 200, could not make war or peace. The restriction
seems a strange one, as one would have thought that a Special Assembly was
most likely to be called when some sudden emergency demanded a warlike or
peaceful decision. The Law was probably altered in B.c. 200, as afterwards, in
B.C. 189 (see p. 495), we find a Special Assembly summoned to decide on the
great question of submission to Rome.

The
Senate or
Apoklétoi.

262 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ATOLIAN LEAGUE onapr.

Magistrates, it made peace and war; it commissioned Ambas-
sadors ; it received the Ambassadors of other states.1 The body
called the Apoklétoi 3 seem to have been the Senate, and to have
discharged the usual functions of a Greek Senate. They were a
numerous body, for we hear, in one case, of a Committee of
Thirty being appointed from among them.® This Senate, as
usual, considered matters before they were brought forward in
the General Assembly ;* in concert with the General, it summoned
the Assembly to discuss proposals which needed its sanction :
and sometimes, whether by commission or by usurpation, it acted
in the name of the nation without consulting the Assembly at all.®
That it represented particular noble families,’ or that it was an
aristocratic body in any other sense than that in which all

1 Boeckh, C. I. (ii. 632), No. 3046. ᾿Επεὶ Thoe πρεσβευτὰς ἀποστείλαντες
. παρεκάλεον τοὺς Αἰτωλούς, K.T.X.

2 Pol. ἱν. ὅ : χχ, 1. 10. So Livy, xxxv. 84. Apocletos (ita vocant sanctius
concilium ; ex delectis constat viris).

3 Pol. xx. 1. Τριάκοντα τῶν ἀποκλήτων προεχειρίσαντο τοὺς συνεδρεύσοντας
μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως. Liv. xxxv. 45. Triginta principes, cum quibus si qua
vellet consultaret, delegerunt.

This election was made by the Assembly. See Schorn, 27, note 4. Thirlwall,
viii. 226.

A passage in Livy (xlv. 28) might lead one to believe that the ZXtolian Senate
was a body so large as to contain more than 550 members of one party. In Bc.
167 the Romanizing leader Lykiskos procured the murder, by Roman hands, of
that number of citizens of the patriotic party. “ Quingentos quinquaginta
principes ab Lycisco et Tisippo, circumsesso senatu per milites Romanos, missos
a Bebio prefecto presidii, interfectos; alios in exsilium actos esse.” It is
however possible that the meeting may really have been one of the Popular
Assembly, and that Livy uses Senatus vaguely, as Polybios once at least (xxiii.
9) does βουλευτήριον. Still ἃ Senate of a thousand members, the number most
naturally suggested, is quite possible according to Greek ideas.

4 This seems implied in the words of Polybios (iv. 5), οὔτε κοινὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν
προσδεξάμενοι σύνοδον οὔτε τοῖς ἀποκλήτοις συμμεταδόντες, K.7.A. and (xx. 10)
ἔφη γὰρ αὑτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἀποκλήτους ποιήσειν τὰ προσταττόμενα, προσδεῖσθαι δὲ
καὶ τῶν πολλῶν, εἰ μέλλει κυρωθῆναι τὰ παραγγελλόμενα. Drumann (p. 504)
says, “Die Apocleten unterschieden sich darin von den Demiurgen der Achier,
dass sie in dringenden Fallen im Namen des Volkes beschliessen durften.” But
the Achaian parallel to the Apoklétoi is not the Démiourgoi, but the Senate,
which doubtless did often receive such a delegated power from the Assembly.

δ Pol. xx. 10. Liv. xxxvi. 28, 29. See above, p. 260.

6 See Livy, xxxv. 34. The Apoklétoi here decree certain important military
expeditions, for which secrecy, or rather treachery, was needed.

7 Schorn, p. 27. ‘‘ Dieser [Rath] scheint die edlen Geschlechter vertreten und
aus den Hiauptlingen bestanden zu haben.” If Schorn, as Bishop Thirlwall
suggests, gets his ‘‘Hauptlinge”’ from Livy's Triginta Principes just quoted, it
is really a very slight foundation to build on, The word Principes is constantly
used by Livy to denote men of influence in a commonwealth, whether actually in
office or not.

VI THE SENATE, MAGISTRATES, AND GENERAL 268

f&tolian and Achaian institutions may be called practically
aristocratic, is an idea supported by no evidence whatever. Of
other Magistrates, besides the General, we find but few notices. Magi-
There was a body called Synedroi,! and another body called *#*
Nomographoi.? It would be a natural guess that the Synedroi
were, like the Achaian Démiourgoi, the Accessors or Ministers

of the General, but our only notice represents them as a Court
acting with the General to take cognizance of cases of piracy.®

In Aétolia such a function may well have been vested in the
Executive Government of the League; probably no inferior
power would have been able to act with efficiency on those
occasions when the national interest required that the national
tendency to plunder should be restrained. It is at least evident

that the Synedroi were a permanent Magistracy, and not merely
appointed on occasion. The language used about the Nomo-
graphoi* seems to show that the A‘tolian state-papers were
revised at certain times, when these officers had to insert such
laws, treaties, and other public acts, as had been passed since

the last revision. It certainly implies that they were a regular
permanent Magistracy. Therefore when we read of Dorimachos 8.0, 205.
and Skopas® effecting large changes in the Attolian laws by
virtue of this office, we may believe that they were appointed
Nomographoi with enlarged and unusual powers, but not that

the office itself was something extraordinary or occasional.

At the head of the League, as in Achaia and elsewhere, stood Powers
the Federal General. His main powers, civil, military, and ae
diplomatic, were much the same as those of the General of the
Achaians. He commanded the armies of the League, and repre-

1 Boeckh, C. I. 2350, 3046 (vol. ii. p. 280, 632), cf. i. 857.

2 Tb. 3046.

3 The Téians in the one case and the Keians in the other obtain from the
tolian Assembly letters of protection against tolian inroads. Any cases of
infraction are to be referred to the General and Synedroi. 2350. El δέ ris xa ἄγῃ
τοὺς Kelous, τὸν orparaydy del τὸν ἐνάρχοντα τὰ ἐν Αἰτωλίαν καταγόμενα κατα-
δικάζοντα κύριον εἶμεν, καὶ τοὺς συνέδρους καταδικάζοντας τοῖς Κείοις τὰν τῶν
ἀγόντων αὐτοὺς faulay, Ay κα δοκιμάζωντι, κυρίους εἶμεν. 8046. El δέ τίς κα ἄγῃ
ἢ αὐτοὺς 4 τὰ ἐκ τᾶς πόλιος ἢ χώρας, τὰ μὲν ἐμφανῇ ἀναπράσσειν τὸν ἐγδικήσαντα
πρὸς συνέδρους ἀεὶ τοὺς ἐνάρχου".

4 The Téian decree is thus ordered to be enrolled. Ib. 8046. Ὅπως δὲ καὶ εἰς
τοὺς νόμου: καταχωρίσθῃ ἁ ἀνιέρωσις καὶ ἁ dovAla, τοὺς κατασταθέντα: νομογράφους
καταχωρίξαι, ἐπεί κα αἱ νομογραφίαι γίνωνται, εἰς τοὺς νόμους.

δ Pol. xiii. 1. Οἱ Αἰτωλοὺ, . . οἰκείως διακείμενοι πρὸς καινοτομίαν τῆς
οἰκείας πολιτείας, εἵλοντο νομογράφους Δορίμαχον καὶ Σκόπαν, . . . of καὶ
παραλαβόντες τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην ἔγραψαν νόμου:.

264 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF XTOLIAN LEAGUE cuaap-

sented it in negociations with foreign powers. But what we
may call his parliamentary functions seem to have been some-
what different from those of the Achaian chief magistrate. In
Achaia we have seen that the General was required to be an
effective speaker in the Assembly, like our own Leader of the
House of Commons, while the formal Presidency was vested in
his Ministers! In £tolia, on the other hand, the General
appears to have been strictly the President of the Assembly,
and, being President, he was expressly forbidden to give any
opinion on questions of peace and war.® We may take for
granted that an Attolian General would be far more likely to
take the warlike than the peaceful side of any such question ;
such would doubtless be the bias of the mass of the Assembly
also ; it was therefore wisely provided that they should not be
exposed to have their passions yet further roused by inflam-
matory harangues from the chief magistrate of the common-
wealth. But the restriction seems also to point to a certain feel-
ing of jealousy towards the General and his high powers of which
we find no trace in the Achaian body. As President of the
Assembly, he could, as we have seen, summon extraordinary
Meetings. He was elected ® at the regular Autumnal Congress,
and he seems to have entered upon his office the same day,®
1 See above, pp. 231-232.

2 Liv. xxxi. 32, where the General Damokritos clearly acts as President.

3 Liv. xxxv. 25. Bene comparatum apud AStolos ease, ne Pretor, quum de
bello consuluisset, ipse sententiam diceret.

Some editions have Achaos, but it is clear that no reading but tolos has any
force. On the causes of the restriction, see Thirlwall, viii. 227.

4 See above, p. 261.

δ Tittmann (Staatsverfassung, 387) and Dr. Schmitz (Dict. Ant. art. Ztolicum
Foedus) infer from an obscure passage of Hésychios (v. κυάμῳ πατρίῳ) that “ the
Assembly nominated a number of candidates, who had then to draw lots, and
the one who drew a white bean was strategus.”” The passage in Hésychios is,
Κυάμῳ πατρίῳ. Σοφοκλῆς Μελεάγρῳ, ws καὶ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς xvapev-
ὀντων" διεκλήρουν δὲ αὐτὰς κυάμῳ, καὶ ὁ τὸν λευκὸν λαβὼν ἐλάγχανεν᾽ ἀνάγει δὲ
τοὺς χρόνους, ὡς καὶ ἐν ἸἸνάχῳ κυαμοβόλον δικαστήν. There is not a word
here about the Assembly nominating candidates who drew lots. If the words of
Hésychios prove anything, they prove that the election of all tolian magi-
strates was left wholly to the lot. To make us accept so improbable a story, we
should need some much better authority than Hésychios. The lot was never
applied, even at Athens, to really important offices, like that of General, and we
hear nothing of it in Polybios or any trustworthy author. No doubt Sophoklés,
as usual, transferred the practice of Athens in his own day to the mythical days
of Atolia, and Hésychios, by way of explanation, transferred it to historical
Ztolia also.

6 Pol. ii. 3. Δέον τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρᾳ γενέσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ rip
παράληψιν τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶν Αἰτωλοῖς. iv. 67. Παρὰ δὲ τοῖς

γι FOREIGN POLICY OF ΤΟΙΙΑ ᾿ 265

without the delay which took place between the election of an

Achaian General and his actual entrance upon office. Besides Com-

the General, there were, as in Achaia, a Commander of Cavalry aan of
and a Secretary of State. These three seem to be spoken of 88 καὶ Serre.

and Secre-

the three chief officers of the Republic.? tary of
Our notices of the internal constitution of Attolia are 80 Foreign

slight, and they present so few important points of contrast with Policy

that of Achaia, that a more interesting field of inquiry is opened veagve.

with regard to the foreign policy of the League. One point

which calls for special examination is the relation of the League

to those non-Attolian states which were induced, or more often

compelled, to become, in some sense or other, members of it.

The history of A®tolia is conspicuously a history of annexation.

So, it may be said, is the history of Achaia also. From Markos

to Philopoimén the League was ever extending itself over a

wider territory, ever increasing the number of the cities which

formed its component members. Some of the Achaian annex-

ations may have been unjust and impolitic ; those at all events

were so which were effected against the will of the annexed

cities. But it does not appear that any city, when once Contrast

admitted, by whatever means, into the Achaian League, was with

ever placed in a position of dependence, or of any kind of formal Achaia.

inferiority to those cities which were in the League before it.

The object of the League was to unite Achaia, Peloponnésos, if

possible all Greece, in a single free and equal Federation. - The

end at least was noble, even if over-zeal sometimes misled

Achaian statesmen into the employment of questionable means.

But it is hardly possible, by the widest stretch of charity, to

attribute such a broad and enlightened patriotism to the brigands

of the Attolian mountains. It is true that their character is

known to us only from the descriptions of enemies, and some-

thing may fairly be abated from the general pictures of A‘tolian

depravity ? which we find in our Achaian informants. But the

facts of the case plainly show both that powerful men in AXtolia

Αἰτωλοῖς ἤδη τῶν ἀρχαιρεσίων καθηκόντων στρατηγὸς ἠρέθη Δωρίμαχος, ὃς
παραντίκα τὴν ἀρχὴν παραλαβών, κ.τ.λ.

1 Pol. xxii. 15. Liv. xxxviif. 11. The tolians (B.c. 189) are required to
give hostages to Rome, but these three great officers are exempt.

2 Pol. ii. 45. Αἰτωλοὶ διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀδικίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν, x.r.A. Cf. ix.
34 et seqq. xviii. 17, and especially iv. 3. θηριώδη ζῶσι βίον, x.r.X. Tho
favourite process of “rehabilitation” has not failed to be extended to the

AXtolian
Treason
against
Greece.

B.c. 211.

266 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ATOLIAN LEAGUE cuap.

could venture upon the grossest breaches of International Law
without any fear of restraint from the national Government,}
and also that the avowed policy of the Government itself was
seldom swayed by any regard to good faith or to the rights of
others. Notwithstanding the gallant behaviour of their ances-
tors both in the Lamian and in the Gaulish War, the Aftolians
of the times with which we have most to do could make less
claim than any other people in Greece to a character for
extended Hellenic patriotism. The Greek commonwealth which
deliberately introduced the strong arm of Rome into Grecian
warfare? was far more guilty than even the commonwealth
which gave up Akrokorinthos to the Macedonian. Long before
that time, Attolia had agreed upon a partition, first of Akar-
nania and then of Achaia, with a Macedonian King ;* she now
agreed with Rome to make a series of conquests at the expense
of Akarnania* and other Grecian states, in the course of which
the soil of the conquered countries was to remain an Aitolian
possession, while the moveable spoil was to be carried off by the
barbarians of Itajy.© Aratos made at least no such infamous

tolians. They have found vigorous advocates in Lucas (Ueber Polybius Dar-
stellung des Aetolischen Bundes. Konigsberg. 1827) and Brandstater (Die
Geschichten des Aetolischen Landes, Volkes, und Bundes. Berlin. 1844).

No doubt the judgement of Polybios about the Atolians, just like his judge-
ment about Kleomenés, must be received with some caution ; but I see nothing
to shake one’s general confidence in his narrative. The worst deeds attributed to
the Atolians are too clear to be denied.

1 See above, p. 261. Compare the curious declamation of Philip in Pol.
xvii. 5. Tots Αἰτωλοῖς ἔθος ὑπάρχει μὴ μόνον, πρὸς οὖς ἂν αὐτοὶ πολεμῶσι, τούτους
αὐτοὺς ἄγειν καὶ τὴν τούτων χώραν" ἀλλά, κἂν ἕτεροί τινες πολεμῶσι πρὸς
ἀλλήλους, ὄντες Αἰτωλῶν φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι, μηδὲν ἧττον ἐξεῖναι τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς
ἄνευ κοινοῦ δόγματος καὶ παρεῖναι ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς πολεμοῦσι καὶ τὴν χώραν ἄγειν
τὴν ἀμφοτέρων" ὥστε παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς μήτε φιλίας ὅρους ὑπάρχειν μήτ᾽
ἔχθρας, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσι περί τινος ἑτοίμους ἐχθροὺς εἶναι τούτους καὶ
πολεμίους. Brandstiter (272) calls on us to distinguish between the piratical
doings of individuals and the national action of the League, but the charge is
that the Federal Government did nothing to stop the piratical doings of indi-
viduals.

2 The first diplomatic intervention of Rome in Grecian affairs was indeed made
ut the intercession of Akarnania (see the next Chapter), and, curiously enough, it
was in support of Akarnania against Atolia. But the tolians were un-
doubtedly the first to bring Roman fleets and armies into Greece, and the first to
plan and carry out the destruction of Grecian cities in partnership with Roman
commanders.

3 Pol. ii. 48, 45; ix. 38. See the next Chapter.

4 Pol. ix. 38; xi. 5. So Livy, xxvi. 24. Darent operam Romani ut Acar-
naniam A&toli haberent.

5 Pol. ix. 39, (Speech of Lykiskos,the{Akarnanian.) !}Ηδη παρήρηνται μὲν
᾿Ακαρνάνων Οἰνιάδας καὶ Νῆσον, κατέσχον δὲ πρώην τὴν τῶν ταλαιπώρων ᾿Αντι-

VI ACHAIAN AND ATOLIAN ANNEXATIONS 267

terms as these with his Macedonian patron. In all this we see

a system of mere selfish aggrandizement, quite different even

from the mistaken policy which occasionally led Achaian
statesmen to enlarge their League by the incorporation of un-
willing members. The annexations made by Achaia were at Compari-
least made on terms of perfect equality; the annexations of βοὴ b-
Aétolia were, in many cases, simple conquests by brute force. xiolian
As might be expected, there were wide differences in the con- and
dition of the annexed countries, and in their relation to the Achaian
Aitolian state. That relation seems to have varied, from tion.
full incorporation on equal terms, to mere subjection, veiled

under the specious forms of dependent alliance. It should be
remembered that the Achaian League, besides the generous
principles which it professed, and on which, in the main, it

acted, had a great advantage in the continuity of its territory.

The League gradually spread itself over all Peloponnésos ;

under more favourable circumstances it might have spread itself

over all Greece; in either case its territory would have been

one continuous sweep, an inestimable advantage in the process

of fusing the whole into one political body. No Achaian Continuity
citizen, however remote, had, in the best days of the League,! ni ne
to cross a foreign territory in order to reach the seat of the territory ;
Federal Government. No Achaian citizen, with the single scattered
exception ef the people of Aigina, had to expose himself, even meee
during the shortest voyage, to the risk of capture by sea. wtolian.
Achaia then knew only two forms of political connexion—the
alliance of wholly independent powers on equal terms, and the
incorporation of cities as equal members of the national Achaian
League. But the Attolian possessions and alliances were
scattered over all parts of Greece, inland and maritime. Man-
tineia? in her Arkadian valley, Keés in the middle of the
ἄραι, Kios® on the shores of the Propontis, all were com-

κυρέων πόλιν, ἐξανδραποδισάμενοι μετὰ Ρωμαίων αὐτήν. καὶ τὰ μὲν τέκνα καὶ τὰς
γυναῖκας ἁπκάγονσι Ῥωμαῖοι, πεισόμενα δηλονότι ἅπερ εἰκός ἐστι πάσχειν τοῖς ὑπὸ
γὰς τῶν ἀλλοφύλων πεσοῦσιν ἐξουσίας" τὰ δ᾽ ἐδάφη κληρονομοῦσι τῶν ἡτνχηκότων
Αἰτωλοί.

1 The outlying cantons of Pleurdn and Hérakleia are exceptions, but they
were united to the League only in very late times.

2 As also Tegea and Orchomenos. Pol. ii. 46.

3 As also Lysimacheia and Kalchédén. Pol. xv. 23. Kios had an Xtolian
Governor; στρατηγοῦ wap’ Αἰτωλῶν ἐν αὐτῇ διατρίβοντος καὶ προεστῶτος τῶν
κοινῶν. This is something more than the mere commander of ἃ Federal garrison.

Bc. 220.

Variety of
relations
in the
A&tolian

League.

268 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ZTOLIAN LEAGUE cuHap.

pelled, or found it expedient, to enter into some relation or
other, be it subjection, alliance, or incorporation, with the
fEtolian Federation. Nor was the League less busy in ex-
tending its borders nearer home. I have already had occasion
incidentally to mention some of the Attolian acquisitions in
central Greece, such as Naupaktos, Hérakleia, Stratos, and
Oiniadai. Even the whole Bootian League at one time
entered into relations with A‘tolia which seem to have been
more intimate than those of mere alliance between two inde-
pendent powers.! Delphi must have been seized upon in some
way or other, as the Temple and the Amphiktyonic Council are
spoken of as at one time needing deliverance from Attolian
bondage. Now these annexations were made in various ways.
Some of them were simple conquests; in others, including,
strange to say, Mantineia,® the inhabitants are said to have
deliberately preferred the AXtolian to the Achaian connexion.
Between these two classes would come two others; namely
those cities which, like Hérakleia, were united indeed by force,
but still on terms which, nominally at least, included political
incorporation,* and those which, like Teds and Keds, merely
found some sort of connexion with the Attolian League to be
better than exposure without defence to unrestrained Attolian
incursions. It almost naturally follows that allies or subjects
gained in so many different ways were admitted to union with
the League on widely different terms. But it does not follow
that the nature of their relation to the League was always
determined solely by the way in which they were acquired.
Geographical position would have a good deal to do with it.
It is evident that Naupaktos and Hérakleia could be really in-
corporated as component members of the League, and it is
equally -evident that Teds, Kios, and Mantineia could not.
And again, in many cases of absolute conquest or of forced
adhesion, the existing inhabitants may well have been wholly or

Mommsen (Rém,. Gesch. i. 513) seems to take him for the General of the
League.
1 Pol. xx. 5. Προσένειμαν Αἰτωλοῖς τὸ ἔθνος. See above, p. 142, and the
next Chapter.

2 Pol. iv. 25. See above, p. 110.

3 Pol. ii. 57. Μαντινεῖς. . . ἐγκαταλιπόντες τὴν μετὰ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν πολιτείαν
ἐθελοντὴν Αἰτωλοῖς ἐνεχείρισαν αὑτοὺς καὶ τὴν πατρίδα.

4 On Hérakleia see above. Compare their attack on Mededn, Pol. ii. 2.
Αἰτωλοὶ οὐδαμῶς δυνάμενοι πεῖσαι Medewvlous μετέχειν σφίσι τῆς αὐτῆς πολιτείας
ἐπεβάλοντο κατὰ κράτος ἑλεῖν αὐτούς.

VI VARIETY OF RELATIONS IN THE LEAGUE 269

partially expelled, and their place supplied by Aftolian settlers.}

Thus, under the terms of the Atolian treaty with Rome, the Differ-
inhabitants of Aigina, and doubtless of other conquered places ences of
also, were regarded as part of the moveable spoil, and were sold, among the
or put to ransom, by their Roman owners.” The A‘tolians must conquered
therefore, in some cases at least, have entered on possession of States.
empty cities and districts, which they doubtless speedily filled

with the inhabitants of their own nation. _An Akarnanian town
which, by such a process, became Aétolian, was doubtless freely
admitted to equal rights with the other Xtolian cantons. And,

even when the former inhabitants were allowed to retain posses-

sion, it is easy to imagine cases in which incorporation on equal,

or nearly equal, terms may have suited Attolian policy better

than simple dominion. Important points like Naupaktos and
Hérakleia could not be safely left in the hands of discontented
subjects; their inhabitants must either be expelled ὃ or be con-
verted into willing Confederates. These various considerations,
combined with such little direct evidence as we possess, will lead

us to prefer, among the various opinions on the subject, that
which holds that the relation between the acquired territories

and the original Attolia varied from absolute equality to absolute
subjection. Cities on the Atolian border, whether repeopled by
AXtolian settlers or not, were fully incorporated with the League;

their inhabitants are spoken of as Xtolians,* and Attolian
Federal Assemblies were held within their walls.° Distant

cities, which could not be really incorporated, to which the

1 In Pol. ix. 39 the word κληρονομεῖν at once suggests the Athenian
κληρουχίαι.

2 See Pol. ix. 42; xi. 6; xxiii. 8.

3 This would seem to have been the case with the Phthidtic Thebes. This
city was held by the Atolians (Pol. v. 99. κατεχόντων αὐτὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν),
when it was taken by King Philip, the inhabitants enslaved (Pol. v. 100), and
Macedonian settlers put in their places. As Philip and his allies had engaged to
liberate all cities annexed to Atolia against their will, either the then popula-
tion of Thebes must have been A®tolian, or else Philip must have been guilty of a
greater breach of faith than seems likely at that stage of his reign. On the whole,
the explanation less creditable to Philip seems the more probable. See p. 430.

4 In the Inscription in Boeckh, No. 2352 (vol. ii. p. 382), which contains the
Keian decree in return for the Naupaktian and Pan-tolian decrees already
quoted, the Naupaktians are at least included under the word Αἰτωλοί, In fact
we shall, ay we go on, find two Naupaktian citizens, Kleonikos and Agelaos,
among the most eminent men in Astolia; Agelaos even rose to the office of
General.

5 The Federal Government, and apparently the Federal Assembly also, trans-
act business at Hypata. Pol. xx. 9; xxi. 2, 8.

Compari-
son with
the dif-
ferent re-
lations of
British

Dependen-

cies,

270 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ATOLIAN LEAGUE σπᾶν.

offer of the Attolian political franchise would have been simply

a mockery, received charters of security against A‘tolian rapine,
together with admission to the private rights of citizenship,
either throughout Aitolia or in some particular Aitolian canton.
The Téian or Keian ally had probably no great desire for a vote
in the Aitolian Federal Assembly which he could hardly ever
exercise. But it was a great matter for him to be guaranteed,
even if it were by payment of tribute, against the ravages of
itolian privateers ; and it was something for him to find him-
self, at that point of A‘tolia which he was most likely to visit,
dealt with, not as a foreigner, but as one clothed with all the
private rights of a Naupaktian citizen. Important outlying
points, inland or maritime, points suited to act as checks upon
enemies or to be made the starting-points for plundering excur-
sions, seem to have been seized upon without scruple ; and these,
whether their inhabitants received any sort of franchise or not,
were held as Aitolian outposts, defended by Xtolian garrisons,
and, sometimes at least, paying tribute to the A‘tolian Treasury.!
Such was certainly the case with the Arkadian town of Phi-
galeia ;? such was also most probably the case with the island of
Kephallénia.> These various kinds of relations between a
dominant country and its dependencies are familiar enough in
our own political experience. The inhabitants of Kephallénia
and of the other Ionian Islands are held by our own nation in a con-
dition of dependent alliance, which, in the opinion of the weaker
ally, does not differ from absolute subjection. The inhabitants
of Malta and Gibraltar legally possess all the rights, public and

1 The Atolian garrison and governor of Kios have been already mentioned.
So the allies in the Social War speak of the cities in their several territories
which the Atolians have seized (ef τινα κατέχουσιν αὐτῶν Αἰτωλοὶ χώραν ἢ πόλιν),
and go on to speak of ΑἸ ο] αη aggressions in general ; παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς
ὑπὸ τῶν καιρῶν ἠναγκασμένους ἀκουσίως μετέχειν τῆς Αἰτωλῶν συμπολιτείας, ὅτι
πάντας τούτους ἀποκαταστήσουσιν εἰς τὰ πάτρια πολιτεύματα, χώραν ἔχοντας καὶ
πόλεις τὰς αὑτῶν, ἀφρουρήτοὺς, ἀφορολογήτους, ἐλευθέρους ὄντας, πολιτείαις καὶ
νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις. (Pol. iv. 25. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 232.) Fiathe,
whom Thirlwall quotes, calls these expressions “ Redensarten” (ii, 237), and
retorts on Macedonia as an enslaver of Greeks no less than Mtolia. It is how-
ever hard to see how this perfectly fair fu quoqgue affects the fact of Atolian
domination.

2 Pol. iv. 3. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 232.

8 Schorn, 29. Thirlwall, u.s. Schorn’s argument seems to me to prove that
Kephallénia was not admitted to even a forced συμπολίτεια. It does not follow
that some cities which were, like Phigaleia, nominally incorporated — for Phi-
galeia was συμπολιτευομένη τοῖς AlrwXots—may not have been practically in the
same subject condition.

VI ANALOGY OF BRITISH DEPENDENCIES 271

a ο΄“ ΄ὙὙ΄΄-΄΄΄-΄ΠΦἘΠἐἔῸ΄ἴἵὯἝ;ἝὌὋο΄ῆ΄΄.-΄-΄΄Φ[ΠὁΠὦὖ΄ρὃὄνὝὉν»σἁυϑ7εὲο.)ἝἝὋὋἝἷἝἷἝὔἕὕἃἝὩἷὙἷὙἷ΄ἷἵὯ;}ὲἧῤὖΦΔΦᾧο’;’͵Ῥ.. --.. ς.ν..-.-..-...

private, of British subjects, but they have no opportunity of re-
ceiving anything more than that general protection which is
equally afforded to the Ionian ally. The inhabitants of Guernsey,
Jersey, and Man, though their islands are not formally incorporated
with the United Kingdom, are not looked on as foreigners ; their
position practically combines the advantages of protection and
of incorporation, they unite the strength of a great monarchy
with the local freedom of a small commonwealth. We can
thus easily understand the great variety in the practical con-
dition of the various states which formed the outlying portions
of the Attolian Federation. And besides these dependencies
and half-incorporated members, A‘tolia of course had, like other
states, equal allies, united only by the ordinary bonds of inter-
national engagements. The ancient connexion between Aitolia
and her supposed colony Elis lasted down to the latest days of
Grecian history; and, though the weaker state doubtless often
humbly followed the lead of the stronger, it does not seem ever
to have deviated, in form at least, from the nature of a free
alliance between two independent and equal powers.

I have, in my last Chapter, endeavoured to trace at some Compari-
length the points of analogy and diversity between the League £m be-
of Achaia and the United States of North America. There are Btntia and
several points in which the League of Attolia suggests a similar Switzer-
comparison with the Swiss Confederation. But the parallel !#4-
between AXtolia and Switzerland is far from being so close as
the parallel between Achaia and the United States. That the
part played by Switzerland in modern Europe is far more
honourable than the part played by A¢tolia in ancient Greece
is a distinction not directly to the purpose, as we are not
discussing the moral characters of nations, but their political
constitutions. But it is certainly only in the weaker points of Atolia and
the Swiss constitution, and in the less honourable features of pwitzer-
the Swiss character, that we find the chief points of likeness to .uhie
Aétolian models, while the likeness between Achaia and America each other
is mainly shown in those points which are most honourable to in their
both nations. In most of those respects in which the League worst
of AStolia differs from the League of Achaia it approaches to the Achaia and
old constitution of Switzerland. The AX®tolians, like the Swiss, America
were a nation of mountaineers, and their League, like that of vine
Switzerland, was originally an union not of cities, but of tribes

Both
originally
Leagues
of Tribes
not of
Cities.

Later civic
element in
Switzer-
land.

A.D. 1352.

A.D. 1332.

Grandeur
of the con-
servative
history of
Switzer-
land,

A.D. 1815-
1860.

Aggressive
warfare of
the Swiss
in Italy.

272 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ZTOLIAN LEAGUE cnar.

or districts. The oldest members of the Swiss League, the
famous Forest Cantons, contained, and still contain, no con-
siderable town; they still remain the most perfect examples
of rural Democracy which the world ever saw. A mountain
Democracy of this sort is something very different from the
Democracy of a great city ; it is sure to be brave and patriotic,
but it is also sure to contain a stronger conservative, not to say
obstructive, element than can be found under any other form of
government. Nowhere does the wisdom of our forefathers meet
with greater reverence than in a small community of democratic
mountaineers. That the A‘tolians lagged behind the rest of
Greece, that the rural Cantons lag behind the rest of Switzer-
land, is no more than any one would naturally expect. In Switzer-
land, the accession of considerable towns to the original League
of the Forest Cantons, probably saved the whole body from
reproducing some of the worst features of A‘tolian life. When
Bern attached herself to the mountain alliance, it was as if
Athens or Corinth had joined the Aftolian League and had
become its ruling spirit. Even the earlier accession of the much
smaller town of Luzern had a considerable effect on the character
of the League. This civic element in Switzerland saved her
both from remaining in perpetual obscurity, like some of the
Leagues of Northern Greece, and from obtaining an importance
purely mischievous, like that of Aitolia. And, even as it was,
the history of Switzerland exhibits only too many instances of
an Attolian spirit. The tendency to serve as mercenaries, re-
gardless of the cause in which they serve, is the least disgraceful
form which this spirit has taken. The purely conservative and
defensive history of Switzerland is the most glorious portion of
modern European history. It is one tale of unmixed heroism,
from the day when the heroes of Morgarten first checked the
course of Austrian tyranny, to the day when their descendants
calmly appealed to admiring Europe against the base perfidy of
their own apostate citizen, who had robbed them of the bulwark
which Europe had guaranteed, and which the robber himself
promised to respect up to the very moment of the consummation
of his crime. But the warmest admirer of the brave Confedera-
tion cannot deny that, at the only time when Switzerland played
an important part in general European affairs, it was a part
conceived far too much in the spirit of Skopas and Dorimachos.
The Swiss too often appeared in the Italian wars of the fifteenth

v1 COMPARISON BETWEEN ZTOLIA AND SWITZERLAND 278

and sixteenth centuries in a character not very unlike that in

which the Attolians appeared in the days of Aratos and Philo-

poimén. The betrayal of Lewis Sforza by his Swiss Guards was a.p. 1500.
an act which required the devotion of the Swiss Guards of a a.p. 1792.
later Lewis to atone for it. The territories south of the Alps,
whether possessed by the Confederation at large or by particular
Cantons, were won by aggressions as little to be defended as the
annexations of either Buonaparte. Now that the Canton of 4.p. 1503-
Ticino enjoys equal rights with its German and Burgundian} 1512:
fellows, no one would degrade the citizens of a free republic

into the subjects even of an Italian King; but history cannot

forget that there was a time when the Switzer was to the
Lombard as truly an alien master as the Gaul, the Spaniard, or

the Austrian. It is in relation to these subject districts that Subject
the resemblance between Aitolia and Switzerland becomes most districts of
close. The union between the original Attolian tribes was ein
indeed far closer than that between the old Thirteen Cantons, of Xtolia.
closer even than that between the Achaian cities or the American

States. But while Achaia, like America, admitted no. members

to the League except on terms of perfect equality,” Aitolia, like
Switzerland in her old state, possessed allies and subjects in

every conceivable relation, from equal friendship to absolute
bondage. The state of things under the old Swiss League—

the various positions of Confederate States, Allied States,
Protected States, Districts subject to the League as a whole,
Districts subject to this or that Canton, Districts subject to

two or more Cantons in partnership—relations, all of them,

which a Greek might well express by his elastic word Sympolity

—all this teaches us, better than anything else, what was the

real condition of the cities, districts, and islands, which were
brought into connexion with Aitolia in such various ways and

on such various terms. The Swiss territory, Confederate, Swiss
Allied, and Subject, was indeed continuous, or nearly 80,8 territory

1 Burgundian, not French. No one who regards either the past or the future,
will ever apply, as is too often done, the name “ French Switzerland ” to that part
of the Confederation where a Romance language is spoken. See above, p. 24.

3 The peculiar circumstances of the District of Columbia prevent it from being
looked on as a real exception, and a “ Territory ” is simply an infant State.

3 Miihlhausen was an isolated ally of Switzerland, which, after the French
annexation of Elsass, was entirely surrounded by French territory ;—we are now
unhappily driven to use nearly the same language of Geneva itself. Miihlhausen,
by more recent arraugements, has been handed over to the same fate as Colmar
and Strassburg.

T

continu-
ous,
Atolian
not so.

274. ORIGIN ,AND CONSTITUTION OF ATOLIAN LEAGUE ocnap. v1

while the allies and subjects of Attolia were scattered over the
whole mainland and islands of. Greece. This is the natural
difference between a purely inland country, like Switzerland,
and one which, like Attolia, always possessed some sea-board,
and soon found means to acquire more. But, if our analogy
fails in this purely external and physical point, the experience
of our own nation, or of any other nation which has conquered
or colonized by sea, steps in to supply the deficiency. Thus
does history ever reproduce itself, at all events within the great
circle of European civilization. The Greek, the Swiss, the
Englishman, are all beings of the same nature, all possessed of
the same good and evil qualities, ready to be called out by the
recurrence of the same excitements and temptations. Till we
learn wholly to cast away the silly distinction of “ Ancient ”
and “‘ Modern,” and freely to employ every part of history to
illustrate every other part, we shall never fully take in the true
unity of the political life of Europe, or realize as we should that
the experience of man in times past, alike in great empires and
in single cities, is no mere food for antiquarian dreams, but is
the truest and most practical text-book of the philosopher and
the statesman.

CHAPTER VII a
“ “΄
HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE, FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE “

ACHAIAN LEAGUE TO THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA. B.C.
281—222

I po not propose to give, in this and the following Chapters,
any complete narrative of the later history of Greece. Such
a task belongs to the historian of Greece or of the Greek people,
not to the historian of a particular class of governments. But
a certain amount of direct narrative seems essential at this stage
of my subject. We have now traced out the origin and the
political constitutions of those two great Federations which
became the leading powers in the last days of independent
Greece. It seems necessary to the completeness of the subject -
to show their systems actually at work, and to give some account

of the eminent_men who guided their internal developement
and their foreign policy. With this view I propose to go
through the last century and a half of Old Grecian history,
passing lightly over such points as do not concern my immediate
subject, but stopping to narrate and comment in detail when
we come across things or persons directly interesting to a
student of the history of Federalism.!

1 Of this period, as of so many others, we have no complete contemporary
history : for a great part of it we have no contemporary history at all. Polybios
narrates in detail from the beginning of the War of the Leagues in B.o. 221 ; of the
earlier times he gives merely an introductory sketch. But we have Polybios’
history in a perfect state only for about five years; from B.c. 216 onwards, we
have only fragments, though very extensive and important fragments. Down to
B.C. 168, we have the history of Livy, who, in Greek matters, commonly followed,
and indeed often translated, Polybios. From B.c. 168 to Bc. 146, that is, till the
final loss of Achaian independence, we have only the fragments of Polybios. We
have also Plutarch’s Lives of Aratos, Philopoimén, Agis, Kleomenés, and Titus
Quinctius Flamininus. These are largely derived from contemporary writers now |
lost, especially from Phylarchos, a strong Kleomenist writer, and from the
Memoirs of Aratos himself. We are thus often enabled to hear both sides of a
question. There are also occasional notices in Pausanias, Strabo, and other

276 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Revolu. ὃ 1. From the Foundation of the Achaian League to the Deliverance
tion of of Corinth, B.C. 281—243

Greece and
Macedonia The first years of the growth of the Achaian League are

during the . . . β
first years contemporary with the invasion of Macedonia and Greece by

ofthe § the Gauls and with the wars between Pyrrhos and Antigonos
age Gonatas. Pyrrhos, for a moment, expelled Antigonos from the
272, Macedonian throne, which Antigonos recovered while Pyrrhos
B.c. 273, δᾶ warring in Peloponnésos. By the time that Pyrrhos was
c. 272. dead, and Antigonos again firmly fixed in Macedonia, the League
had grown up to maturity as far as regarded the cities of the

s.c. 272- old Achaia. For the next ten years also Antigonos had his
268. hands full in other quarters. Ηδ was engaged in a war with
ΒΟ. 268- Athens, in the earlier stages of which the republic had the
263. support of Sparta and Egypt. He had also a much nearer and
more dangerous enemy in Alexander the son of Pyrrhos, who

had succeeded his father on the throne of Epeiros. Alexander
inherited all Pyrrhos’ enmity towards Antigonos, and, like

Cirea B.c. Pyrrhos, he actually succeeded in expelling him for a short
264. time from Macedonia.! The war with Athens, known as the
Chreménidean War, ended in the capture of Athens, the placing

of Macedonian garrisons in the city and its ports, and apparently

in the destruction of the Long Walls. This was the last blow

to the little amount of power which Athens still retained. Of

Stateof the Peloponnésian cities, many, especially Sikyén and Megalo-
Felopon- polis, were held by Tyrants in the Macedonian interest. Corinth
mse was in the more singular position of being held, not by a native
Tyrant, but by a Macedonian prince of the royal house, who

was, virtually at least, independent of the King.® It was held
successively by Krateros (half-brother to Antigonos through his

mother Phila), by Alexander son of Krateros, and by Alex-

writers, which, in the case of Pausanias, often swell into considerable fragments

of history. It is evident therefore that to study this period in detail is a very

different business from studying the history of the Peloponnésian War, where a

man has little more to do than to read his Thucydidés, and then to turn for
illustrations to Aristophanés and Plutarch. In the later period, not merely

the illustrations, but the history itself, has to be dug from a variety of

sources. The English scholar will generally find it enough to read Bishop
Thirlwall’s last volume, accompanied by those portions of Polybios and those

Lives of Plutarch which belong to the subject. Having compared every word of

Bishop Thirlwall’s narrative with the original writers, I can bear witness to its

unfailing accuracy, as every reader can to its unswerving impartiality and wisdom.
1 See Thirlwall, viii. p. 98. 2 Ib. p. 100. 3 Ib, p. 118.

Vit FIRST YEARS OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE 277

ander’s widow Nikaia. Sparta remained independent, with her old State of
constitution and laws, with her two Kings, her Ephors, and her Sparta.
Senate ; but she was sadly fallen both from her Hellenic position

without and from the purity of her Lykourgeian discipline within.

The old spirit however, as we shall soon see, was still there, and

she was able to drive back Pyrrhos from her gates with as much 5,6. 272.
energy as a hundred years before she had driven back Epamei-

néndas. Still it marks the decay alike of her power and of her
discipline that she had gates from which to drive him back.

Thus far, then, circumstances had favoured the quiet and peace- Favour-
ful growth of the League. Achaia was surrounded by enemies, ®ble Pos
but all were so occupied with what appeared more important ΗΝ °
matters that there was little fear of their meddling with her. League.
Such a period of danger, ever threatening, but never striking,

was admirably suited to strengthen the feeling of union, and to

give an impulse towards good government and improvement of
every kind. This period embraces the first twenty years of the 8.0. 281-
League, during which, beyond the gradual growth of the League 261.
itself, we have not a single notice of its history. Then follow 3.0. 261- |
ten years during which all Greece is ‘nearly a blank to us, but 3251:

in the course of which one most important change was effected

in the Achaian polity.

It was in the twenty-fifth year of the revived League that, Institution
instead of the two Generals who had hitherto been yearly Οἱ ὅδ sole
chosen, the Achaians for the first time placed at the head of the ship,
Federal Commonwealth a single General or President with full 3.0. 255.
powers. Markos of Keryneia, as he deserved, was the first
citizen thus called upon to wield in his own hands the full
authority of the state. Polybios! records the fact and its date,
but he gives no explanation of the causes which led to this great
constitutional change. In those threatening times, the feeling of
union among the members of the League must have been growing
stronger and stronger. To vest the chief power of the nation
In one man’s hands expressed a clear national conviction of the
advantage and the need of unity of purpose and vigour of action.

It is easy to conceive that practical evils may have arisen,
especially in a Federal state, from the existence of two supreme
magistrates with equal powers. The working of the Attolian
League, which, with all its faults, was a model of united and
vigorous action, may well have taught the Achaians that, in this

1 if, 48.

Biogra-
phical
character
of the
Achaian
history.

Results
of the
annexa-
tion of
Sixr6n
to the

League.

278 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

respect, their constitution was inferior to that of their neighbours.
Be this as it may, the change was made, and it was made at a
time when it led the way to still greater changes. From this
time forward, the history of the League becomes mainly the
biography of several eminent men, who, in their turns, presided
over its councils. This personal character of the Achaian history
gives it a peculiar kind of interest, an interest more like that of
modern history, and one widely different from the feeling with
which we study the records of aristocratic commonwealths. In
the stately march of the Roman annals, greater men, it may be,
than any that the League produced seem as nothing beside the
superior greatness of the commonwealth in and for which they
lived. The Roman polity did not derive its impress from them,
but it stamped its own impress upon them. The Achaian
League, on the—other_hand, derived, as we can hardly doubt,
its first character from Markos of Keryneia; there can be no
doubt whatever that, in its wider and more re ambitious form, it
was essentially the work of Aratos of Sikyén.

Up to this time the League had been confined to the ten
cities of the original Achaia. We have no reason to suppose
that its extension beyond those limits had ever presented itself
to the mind of any Achaian statesman. Within those narrow
bounds, it had doubtless given an example of all those republican
virtues of equality and good government for which Polybios
gives it credit; it had already displayed, on a small scale, that
generous zeal for freedom, that readiness of exertion for the
freedom of others,! which he claims for it as its distinguishing
virtue. But the Achaian League had ‘hitherto been strictly
an Achaian League ; it had not aspired to become a League of
all Hellas, or even of all Peloponnésos. It was now to receive
a new member and a new citizen, who were to impress upon its

_ policy a wholly different character, or, more truly, to find for
‘ its original character a wider field of action. The League, by

receiving Siky6dn into its fellowship, ceased to be Achaian in any
strict ethnical sense; it might now consistently advance till it
embraced all Peloponnésos or all Hellas. And by receiving
Aratos along with the city which he had delivered, it received
the citizen who was, for nearly forty years, to be the guiding

1 Pol. ii. 42. ᾿Αντὶ πάσης τῆς ἑαυτῶν φιλοτιμίας, ἣν παρείχοντο τοῖς συμμάχοις,
ἀντικατηλλάττοντο τὴν ἑκάστων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν Πελοποννησίων.
Cf. c. 38, and Plut. Ar. 9.

VII EARLY HISTORY OF SIKYON 279

spirit of its councils, and who was to do, for Achaia and for al] Araros ;

Greece, more good and more evil than any other man of his age. his lasting
Aratos, like his precursor Markos, had learned love of freedom

and hatred of tyranny_in the school of exile. His native city

Sikyén had once stood high among Grecian commonwealths of History of

the second rank, and, inferior as it was to Thebes or Sparta or Siky6n.

Athens, it held a position far above any of the towns of the

Achaian shore. The prevailing blood among its citizens was

Dorian, and its ancestral government, when not interrupted by

periods of tyranny or revolution, was the old Dorian aristocracy.

In early times indeed that aristocracy had been supplanted by tts early .

one of the most splendid lines of Tyrants in all Grecian history. Tyrants,

The reigns of Orthagoras and Myrén and Kleisthenés form the *.5)°. 680

most brilliant period in the Sikyénian annals, and the last of the

dynasty had ‘the honour of transmitting his blood and name to

the founder of the Democracy of Athens. In later times we

find another Sikyénian statesman, whom the ruling oligarchy

branded with the name of Tyrant, but whom the mass of his

fellow-citizens worshipped as the founder of their freedom.”

Euphrén founded a _Democracy 3. What was_its tater history, or guphrén

how long it outlived its founder, we know not. We read vaguely founds De-

of factions and demagogues,* but we get at no details till, in the πιοῦν

Macedonian times, the unhappy city was ‘handed over from one "—

oppressor to another. During the wars of the Successors Sikyé6n gixydn

had its share of calamities as well as other Grecian cities. At under the

one stage of those days of sorrow, Sikyén had to endure the arti

ignominy of being ruled by a female usurper. Kratésipolis, the 301.

widow of Alexander, son of Polysperchén, held possession of the

city, and proved herself a worthy rival of her fellow-oppressors

of the other sex. At another time it was garrisoned for five

years by Ptolemy, when he liberated Greece.5 When Démétrios

came to liberate Greece back again,° he not only expelled Ptolemy’s

garrison, but persuaded the Sikyénians to change the site of

their city and even to alter its name to Démétrias. This inno-

vation probably lasted no longer than the power of its author.

1 Kleisthenés of Sikyén was, through his daughter Agaristé the wife of
Megaklés, the grandfather of Kleisthenés of Athens. See Herod. vi. 126-131.

2 Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 44. Diod. xv. 70.

3 Plut. Ar. 2. Els στάσεις ἐνέπεσε καὶ φιλοτιμία: δημαγωγῶν.

* Diod. xix. 67. 5 Ib. xx. 37.

6 ΤΌ, xx. 102. Plut. Démétr. 25.

280 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Period #§ After this, we find Sikyén in the hands of local oppressors,

of Local whose appearance seems to have nearly coincided with the fall
no, 301. Of the power of Démétrios at Ipsos! Tyrant now succeeded

251. Tyrant, and Tyrants, we may well believe, of a very different
order from Orthagoras and Kleisthenés.? At last a gleam of
better things appeared for a moment. Kleén, the reigning
Tyrant, was slain, seemingly in some popular movement, and
two eminent citizens, named Timokleidas and Kleinias, were

Admini placed by common consent at the head of affairs.2 The exact

»-.--..-....

stration nature of their office is not described ; our brief notice of it

OTe en gxveads like an extraordinary commission, for life or for some

Kieinias, considerable time, to reform and govern the commonwealth.‘
Under their administration something like settled order and
prosperity had begun once more to appear, when Sikyén un-
happily lost both her patriotic magistrates. Timokleidas died ;

Tyranny of Kleinias was murdered by a citizen named Abantidas, who

Abantidas, seized the Tyranny and again subjected Sikyén to a reign of

po. 264. ‘terror. The friends of Kleinias were for the most part banished
or put to death ; his young son,° Ayratos, then seven years old,
was destined to the same fate;® but he found a friend in the

Escape of family of his persecutor. Sés6, the sister of Abantidas, was

Aratos. married to Prophantos the brother of Kleinias ; the child sought
refuge in his uncle’s house, and Sés6 found means to shelter him

1 Schorn (p. 69) ingeniously infers this from the statement of Plutarch (Ar. 9)
that, at the return of Aratos in B.c. 251, there were Sikydnian exiles who had
been nearly fifty years in banishment. These fifty years go back exactly to the
date of the battle of Ipsos.

2 Droysen (ii. 304, 5) stands up for them on the ground of Strabo’s expression
(viii. 6. 25), ἐτυραννήθη δὲ πλεῖστον χρόνον" ἀλλ᾽ del rods τυράννους ἐπιεικεῖς
ἄνδρας ἔσχεν᾽ Αρατον δ᾽ ἐπιφανέστατον, κιτιλ. It is much more likely, though
Droysen despises the notion, that Strabo was thinking of the old Orthagorids ;
and, if his words are to be construed quite literally, Aratos himself must be
reckoned among the Tyrants. It is very likely that some of these Tyrants may
have been patrons of art—-we know that one of the worst of them was something
of a philosopher—but what then?

8 By some strange confusion, Pausanias (ii. 8. 2) makes, Timokleidas, after the
fall of Kleén, reign as joint-Tyrant with a certain Euthydémos. The people
under Kleinias rise and expel them.

4 Plut. Ar. 2. Εἴἵλοντο Τιμοκλείδαν ἄρχοντα καὶ Κλεινίαν... . ἤδη δέ τινα
τῆς πολιτείας κατάστασιν ἔχειν δοκούσης Τιμοκλείδας μὲν ἀπέθανε, x.7.X.

5 In after times, the local legends of Sikyén attributed to the deliverer a
miraculous origin, like that of Aristomenés and Alexander. The God Asklépios
had visited his mother Aristodama in the form of a dragon. Pans. ii. 10. 3;
iv. 14. 8.

δ Paus. ii, 8. 2. ΓΑρατον δὲ ᾿Αβαντίδας φυγάδα ἐποίησεν, ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς
ἀπεχώρησεν “Aparos ἐθελοντή:. He was now seven years old. Plut. Ar. 2.

͵

VIT YOUTH OF ARATOS 281

from her brother, and to send him in safety to Argos, where

his father had many powerful friends. Here he was brought up

till his twentieth year. His literary education seems to have Education
been neglected, but it is quite possible that the neglect may of Aratos
have been no real loss. That Aratos was an eloquent and per- ἡ Argos.
suasive speaker we need no proof; without eloquence of some

kind no man could have remained for life, as he did, at the head

of a Greek commonwealth. Perhaps the very absence of
rhetorical and sophistic training may have left room for some-

thing more nearly reproducing the native strength of Themistoklés

and Periklés. His physical education was well cared for; the

future deliverer of Sikyén and Corinth contended in the public

games, and received more than one chaplet as the prize of bodily
prowess. It is possible that this devotion to bodily exercises

may not have been without influence on his future career. The
discipline of the athlete and the discipline of the soldier were
inconsistent,’ and these early laurels were perhaps won at the
expense of future defeats of the Achaian phalanx. Further

than this we have no details of his early life; but we find him,

at the age of twenty, vigorous, active, and enterprising, full of

zeal, not only against the Tyrants who excluded him from his

own home and country, but against all who bore usurped rule

over their feHows-in-any-oity of Hellas. _

Meanwhile matters in Siky6én went on from bad to worse. Succession
Abantidas had a turn for those rhetorical exercises which Aratos οἵ FS haere
neglected ; he frequented the school of two teachers of the art y
named Deinias and Aristotelés, who, from what motive we are
not told, one day assassinated the Tyrant in the midst of his
studies. His place was at once filled by his own father Paseas, 8.0. 252-1.
who was in his turn slain and succeeded by one Nikoklés. The
eyes of men in Sikyén now began to turn to the banished son
of their old virtuous leader. Aratos was looked to as the future Expecta-
deliverer of his country, and Nikoklés watched his course with a tions from
degree of suspicion proportioned to the hopes of those whom he“.
held in bondage. But, as yet, the Tyrant deemed that he had
little to fear from the personal prowess of the youth. Indeed
Aratos purposely adopted a line of conduct suited to throw
Nikoklés off his guard. He assumed, at all events when he knew

1 See Plut. Phil. 3. The remark however is as old as Homer. IL rxiii.
668-671. Certainly Alexander of Macedon (Herod. v. 22) and Dérieus of Rhodes
combined the two characters (see Grote, viii. 217 and cf. x. 164), but one can

hardly fancy Periklés stripping at Olympia.

Early

282 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

that agents of the Tyrant were watching him, an appearance
of complete devotion to youthful enjoyments and frivolous
pursuits. Men said that a Tyrant must be the most timid
of all beings, if such a youth as Aratos could strike fear into
one.! But the real fears of Nikoklés were of another kind. He
did not so much dread the personal prowess of Aratos as the
influence of his father’s name and connexions. The position
which the family of Kleinias must have held is marked by the
fact that the Kings both of Macedonia and Egypt were among
his hereditary friends.2 We may see also the first signs of a
weakness which pursued Aratos through his whole life, when we
hear that he at first hoped to obtain freedom for his country

Schemes of through royal friendship. To look for the expulsion of a

Deliver-
ance of

Tyrant at the hands of Antigonos Gonatas was a vain hope
indeed. It appears however that the King did not absolutely
refuse the new character in which the inexperienced youth
prayed him to appear: he put him off with fair words; he
promised much, but performed nothing. Aratos then looked
to Ptolemy Philadelphos of Egypt, whose rivalry with Mace-
donia seemed to guarantee his trustworthiness as an ally of
Grecian freedom, and whose actions did not always belie his
pretensions. But in leaning on Egyptian aid Aratos soon found
that he was leaning on the staff of a broken reed; whatever
might be the good intentions of Ptolemy, he was far off, and
the hopes which he held out were slow to be fulfilled. The
young deliverer at last learned no longer to put his trust in
princes, but only in the quick wits and strong arms of himself
and his fellow-exiles. A Sikyénian exile named Aristomachos,

and two Megalopolitan philosophers named Ekdémos and Démo-

phanés,* are spoken of as among his principal advisers. The
details of the perilous night-adventure by which Aratos and

1 Plut. Ar. 6.

2 Schorn (p. 70) suggests, ingeniously enough, that the connexion between
the house of Kleinias and the Ptolemies began during the Egyptian occupation
of Sikyén in B.o. 8308-3. But how came the same family to be on such terms
with both the rival dynasties at once, with the descendants of Ptolemy and with
the descendants of Démétrios ?

ὃ Something may be allowed to the inexperience of a youth of twenty ;
it is indeed hard measure to hint, as Schorn (p. 70, note) does, that Aratos
at first merely wished to be Tyrant himself instead of Nikoklés. Every act
of his life belies the imputation. Niebuhr (Lect. Anc. Hist. iii. 277, Eng. Tr.)
does Aratos more justice.

4 The names are variously given. They are Ekdémos and Démophanés

in Pol. x. 22. (25). Plut. Phil. 1. Suidas, v. Φιλοποίμην ; Ekdélos and Mega-

VII DELIVERANCE OF SIKYON BY ARATOS 288

his little company surprised and delivered Sikyén have all the sixyon by
interest of a romance! Here, in the last days of Greece, our ato
path is strewed with tales of personal character and personal *° πο
adventure, such as we have met with but seldom since we lost
the guidance of Herodotos. For our purpose it is enough that
all Sikyén lay down at night under the rule of Nikoklés, and
heard at dawn the herald proclaim to the delivered city that
Aratos the son of Kleinias called his countrymen to freedom.
Never was there a purer or a more bloodless revolution ; Sikyén
was delivered without the loss of a single citizen; the very mer-
cenaries of the Tyrant were allowed to live, and Nikoklés himself,
whom public justice could hardly have spared, contrived to
escape by an ignoble shelter. Never did mortal man win glory
truer and more unalloyed than the young hero of Sikyén.

Sikyé6n was now free, but she had dangers to contend
against from within and from without. Antigonos, to whom
the youthful simplicity of Aratos had once looked for help,
now hardly concealed his enmity.2 The infection which he External
thought he could afford to neglect while it spread no further ne
than the petty Achaian townships, was now beginning to ex- gimculties
tend itself to cities of a higher rank. And, within the walls of Sikyén.
of Sikyén, Aratos had to struggle against difficulties which were
hardly less threatening. With the restoration of freedom came
the return of the exiles Under this name are included both
those who had been formally banished, and those who had
voluntarily fled from the city, during the days of tyranny.®
Nikoklés, during his short reign of four months, had sent
eighty into exile; those whose banishment dated from the
days of earlier Tyrants reached the number of five hundred.
Some of these last had been absent from their country fifty years.‘
lophanés in Paus. viii. 49. 2; Ekdélos in Plut, Ar. 5. Suidas also turns
Nikoklés into Neoklés.

1 One is strongly tempted to tell the tale once more; but the Greek of
Plutarch, the German of Droysen, and the English of Thirlwall are enough.
It should be remembered that all the details rest upon good authority, namely
the Memoirs of Aratos himself.
~ 3 Plut. Ar. 9. ᾿Ἐπιβουλευομένην μὲν ἔξωθεν καὶ φθονουμένην ὑπ᾽ ᾿Αντιγόνον
τὴν πόλιν ὁρῶντι [τῷ ᾿Αράτῳ] διὰ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ταραττομένην δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ αὑτῆς καὶ
στασιάζονσαν.

2 The word φυγάς includes both classes. Many fled to escape death, but
some were formally banished. τοὺς μὲν ἐξέβαλε, rods δ᾽ ἀνεῖλεν [ὁ ’ABayridas].
Plat. Ar. 2. [Cf Cicero, De Off. ii. c. 23.]

4 So says Plutarch (Ar. 9); but why did they not return during the admini-
stration of Kleinias and Timokleidas ?

Internal
pacifica-
tion by
Aratos.

284 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Many of these_men had Jost houses and lands, which they
naturally wished to recover, but which their actual possessors
as naturally wished to keep. Doubtless, in so long a time,
much of this property must have changed hands more than
once, 80 that the.actual possessor would often be an honest
purchaser, and not a mere grantee of a Tyrant’s stolen goods.
The young deliverer was expected to satisfy all these opposing
claims, as well as to guard his city against Antigonos and all
other enemies. What was chiefly wanting for the former
purpose was money ; and here the friendship of King Ptolemy
really stood him in good stead. He obtained, at various times,
a sum of one hundred and seventy-five talents, partly, it would
seem, as a voluntary gift,’ partly as the result of Aratos’ own
request, for which purpose he made a voyage to Egypt in
person. By the help of this money he contrived to satisfy
the various claimants. Some of the old owners were glad
to accept the value of their property instead of the property
itself ; some of the new ones were willing to give up possession
on receiving a fair price for what they resigned. We are told
that by these means he succeeded in pacifying the whole city.?
It is added, as a proof of his true republican spirit, that, on
being invested with full and extraordinary powers for the
purpose, he declined to exercise them alone, but, of his own
accord, associated with himself fifteen other citizens in the
office.®

Against danger from without Aratos sought for defence by
that step which first brings him within the immediate sphere
of this history. He annexed Sikyén to the Achaian League.

1 Plut. Ar. 11. ἭΝε δ᾽ αὐτῷ καὶ χρημάτων δωρεὰ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως.

2 See Plutarch (Ar. 9-14) and the well-known passage of Cicero (De Off.
ii. 25), who winds up, as a Roman of his day well might, “O virum magnum,
dignumque qui in nostra republica natus esset. Sic par est agere cum civibus,
non (ut bis jam vidimus) hastam in foro ponere, et bona civium voci subjicere
preconis, ”

5 Plut. Ar. 14. ᾿Αποδειχθεὶς γὰρ αὐτοκράτωρ διαλλακτὴς καὶ κύριος ὅλως ἐπὶ
τὰς φυγαδικὰς οἰκονομίας μόνος οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ πεντεκαίδεκα τῶν πολιτῶν
προσκατέλεξεν ἑαυτῷ, κιτιλ. So Cicero “" Adhibuit sibi in consilium quindecim
principes.” This is hardly done justice to by Schorn (p. 72) in the words,
‘*Nach Hause zuriickgekommen setzte er eine Commission nieder, an deren
Spitze er selbst trat.”

These internal measures of Aratos, or some of them, seem to have been later
than the annexation of Sikyén to the League. But it seemed better to finish
the account of the deliverance and pacification of Sikyén before entering on the
career of Aratos as a Federal politician. '

vit ANNEXATION OF SIKYON TO THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE 285

This of course implies both that he prevailed on his own Annexa-
countrymen to ask for admission to the Achaian body, and tion of ©
that he persuaded the Achaian Government and. Assembly to ἐς Smxrbx
grant what they asked. It is much to be regretted that. no Aonarat
record is preserved of the debates either in the Sikyénian or LBaqvg,
the Achaian Assembly on so important a proposal. The step ~~ 261.
was a bold and a novel one. For a Greek city willingly to sur-
render its full and distinct sovereignty was a thing of which
earlier times presented only one recorded instance. Corinth
and Argos had once removed the artificial limits which separated nc. 398.
the Argeian and the Corinthian territory, and had declared
that Argos and Corinth formed but a single commonwealth.!
But so strange an arrangement lasted only for a short time,
and it was offensive to large bodies of citizens while it did
last. Still Argos and Corinth were, at least, both of them
Doric cities; their citizens were kinsmen in blood and speech,
sharing alike in the traditions of the ruling race of Peloponnésos. "
It was a far greater change when Sikydn, a city of the Dorian Import.
conquerors, stooped to ask for admission to the franchise of ance and
the remnant of the conquered Achaians.” Federalism, as we ἔων oy of
have seen, was nothing new in Greece, but the Federal tie P
had as yet united only mere districts or very small towns,
and those always districts or towns of the same people. For
one of the greater cities of Greece to enter into Federal relations
with cities belonging to another division of the Greek race was
something. altogether unknown. But now the Doric Sikyén was
admitted into a League consisting only of small Achaian towns,®
any one of which singly was immeasurably her inferior, and
whose united strength hardly equalled that of one of the great
cities of Greece. The Sikyénians were to lose their national
name® and being; Sikyén indeed would survive as an inde-

1 Xen. Hell. iv. 4. 6. See Grote, ix. 462. The change, in the opinion
of Xenophén and the Corinthian oligarchs, amounted to a wiping out of
their city ; αἰσθανόμενοι ἀφανιζομένην τὴν πόλι. The whole description is
very curious. ͵

2 Paus. ii. 8. 4ἅ. ἘἸοὺς Σεκνωνίους ἐς τὸ ᾿Αχαιῶν συνέδριον ἐσήγαγε Δωριεῖς
ὅτῳ plat Ar. 9. Δωριεῖς ὄντες ὑπέδυσαν ἑκουσίως ὄνομα καὶ πολιτείαν τὴν
᾿Αχαιῶν οὔτε ἀξίωμα λαμπρὸν οὔτε μεγάλην ἰσχύν ἐχόντων τότε" μικροπολῖται
γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ πολλοί, κι τ.λ.

410. Οἱ [οἱ ᾽Αχαιοὶ) τῆς μὲν πάλαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀκμῆς οὐδὲν, ὡς εἰπεῖν,
pépos ὄντες, ἐν δὲ τῷ τότε μιᾶς ἀξιολόγου πόλεως σύμπαντες ὁμοῦ Niveux οὐκ
TT: So Polybios (ii. 38), πώς οὖν καὶ διὰ τί viv εὐδοκοῦσιν οὗτοί τε καὶ

Beginning
of a new
Epoch.

General
extension
of the
League
and its
Objecta.

Siky6én
admitted
on equal
terms.

286 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE | CHAP.

pendent canton, untouched in the freedom of her local govern-
ment; but in all dealings with other states the name of Sikyén
would be sunk in the name of Achaia. The warriors of Siky6n
would be commanded by Achaian Generals,! and her interests
would be represented in foreign Assemblies and at foreign courts
by Ambassadors commissioned by the whole Achaian body.?
Such a change must have given a complete shock to all ordinary
Greek feeling on such subjects. The accession of Siky6n to the
League was the beginning of a new state of things in Greece.
No more striking testimony could be borne to the prudent and
honourable course which the League had hitherto followed
within its own narrow limits.’ This first extension beyond
the limits of Achaia at once put the League on quite a new
footing. Hitherto it had been a merely local union; it now
began to_ swell into Pan-hellenic importance.t When once
Siky6n had joined the League, other cities were not slow
in following her example. From the moment ‘of the admis-
‘sion of Siky6n, it was an understood principle that the
arms of the League stood open to receive any Grecian city
‘which was willing to cast in its lot among the Confederates.
‘The League now became the centre of freedom throughout
all Greece; the supremacy of Macedonia in Peloponnésos was
doomed.

Sikyén was admitted to the League on perfectly equal terms.
She was subjected to no disqualifications as a foreign city, and
she claimed no superiority on account of her power and fame
being so vastly superior to those of any of the old Achaian
towns. Like other Achaian cities, she obtained one vote, and
no more, in the Federal Congress. The evil of this arrangement

τὸ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἅμα τὴν πολιτείαν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν καὶ τὴν
προσηγορίαν μετειληφότες ;

1Plut. Ar. 11. Ὁ δ᾽ “Aparos . . . καίπερ συμβολὰς τῷ κοινῷ μεγάλας
δεδωκὼς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δόξαν καὶ τὴν τῆς πατρίδος δύναμιν, ὡς ἑνὶ τῶν ἐπκιτνχόμκτων
χρῆσθαι παρεῖχεν αὑτῷ τῷ ἀεὶ στρατηγοῦντι τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν, εἴτε Δυμαῖος, εἴτε
\Tpiraceds, εἴτε μικροτέρας τινὸς ὧν τύχοι πόλεως.

2 Aratos seems to have gone to Alexandria in a purely private character to
ask help of King Ptolemy as a friend of his family.

3 See Plutarch’s panegyric on the League (Ar. 9), and Polybios passim,
especially ii. 38 and 42.

4 Droysen, ii. 369. ‘Durch den Beitritt von Sikyon und durch Aratos
Verbindung mit Aegypten wur die Rolle, welche die Achaier zu tibernehmen
hatten, bezeichnet; Arat war es, der die Thatigkeit des Bundes zuerst und
vielleicht nicht ohne Widerstreben der bisher nur fiir die innere Ruhe und
Selbststandigkeit bedachten Eidgenossen nach Aussen hin wandte.”

VII IMPORTANCE OF THE ANNEXATION OF SIKYON 287

has been already! spoken of. It was right that Sikyén should
possess no privilege which could endanger the common rights of
all; it was wise to avoid making Sikyén the seat of government,
or in any way giving her the character of a capital; but it was
not abstractedly just that her large population should possess in
the national Assembly only the single vote which belonged
equally to Dymé and Tritaia.2 Sikyén, whose strength must
have been equal_to half, or more than half, that of the League
as it then stood, could at any moment. be outvoted ten times
over by the petty Achaian townships. Not that we are at all
entitled to blame, or even to wonder at, the omission. Federal-
ism was then, not indeed exactly in its infancy, but still making
its first experiment on a large scale. It could not be expected
to hit upon every improvement at once, and this particular im-
provement had been as yet suggested by no practical necessity.
To give Sikyén a double vote would have seemed to sin against
the great -principles of freedom and equality among all the
members of the League. We may well believe that, though the
accession of Sikydn was such a clear gain to the League, there
were Achaians who looked on its admission on any terms as a
sort of favour. A proposal for giving Sikyén a double vote in
the Federal Congress would doubtless have met with great
opposition, and would probably have shipwrecked the whole
scheme of annexation. [70 is still more probable that the thought
of such a proposal never occurred either to Aratds or to any one
else.

For five years Aratos remained, either officially or through πο. 251-
his personal influence, at the head of the locat Sikyémian govern- 245.
ment, the Governor, so to speak, of the State of Sikydén, but Position
only a private citizen of the Achaian League. Now it was-that of Aratos.
he pacified the factions in his native city ; now it was that, while
serving in the Achaian cavalry, he won the admiration of his
new countrymen by his strict discipline and punctual obedience

1 See above, p. 212 et seqq. ΄

3. Niebuhr, Lect. Anc. Hist. iii. 277. ‘‘The Sicyonians made a great sacrifice
in joining the Achaeans, because each of the insignificant Achaean towns had the
same rights and the same votes as Sicyon, which was itself as large as several of
the Achaean towns put together. Achaia, on the other hand, gained consider-
ably by the accession.” This is perfectly true as a statement of one side of the
case ; but it is evident that Siky6én gained also by the union, even if it were not
made on perfectly equitable terms.

His rela-
tions to
Antigonos
and
Ptolemy.

manent
position
and influ-
ence.

288 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

to orders. The deliverer and leader of Sikyén was never wanting,
as his biographer tells us, even when command was vested in
citizens of the pettiest Achaian towns. We can well understand
with what eyes King Antigonos watched his growing fame. He
did not however profess open enmity; he rather professed his
admiration of the young statesman; he showed him marked
personal honours ;” he talked ostentatiously of his good will
towards him, and professed to believe that Aratos entertained
an equal good will towards himself. Thus he hoped either
really to win over Aratos to his interest, or at all events to
make him suspected at the court of Alexandria. This last effect
was actually produced, at all events for a season.

At last Aratos received the noblest tribute of confidence
which his new countrymen had it in their power to pay; he was
raised to the highest office in the Achaian commonwealth. At
the age of twenty-six he was chosen General of the Achaians,
that is, as we have seen, President of the Achaian United States.
He thus became, not only the executive chief of the League in
all civil and diplomatic affairs, but also its parliamentary leader
and its personal Commander-in-chief. This office, from that day
onwards, he held, as a general rule, in alternate years, till the
day of his death, thirty-two years later. During all this time
he was the soul of the League,® the first man of independent
Greece. As such the merits and defects of a singularly mixed
character had full scope for their developement.‘

1 See above, p. 286.

2 Plut. Ar. 15. ᾿Αντίγονος δ᾽ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀνιώμενος ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ καὶ βουλόμενος ἣ
μετάγειν ὅλως τῇ φιλίᾳ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἣ διαβάλλειν πρὸς τὸν Πτολεμαῖον ἄλλας τε
φιλανθρωπίας ἐνεδείκνυτο μὴ πάνν προσιεμένῳ καὶ θύων θεοῖς ἐν Κορίνθῳ μερίδας
εἰς Σικυῶνα τῷ ᾿Αράτῳ διέπεμπε. This presence οὗ Antigonos at Corinth is
puzzling. It was certainly not actually in his possession till after the first
Generalship of Aratos. The explanation of Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 118) must
probably be adopted, though it is not without difficulties. Plutarch may easily
have made some confusion, but what other place near enough to Sikyén was in
the possession of Antigonos ?

3 Plut. Ar. 24. Οὕτω δὲ ἴσχυσεν ἐν τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς, ὥστ᾽. . . ἔργῳ καὶ γνώμῃ
διὰ παντὸς ἄρχειν. Pol. ii. 43. Μεγάλην δὲ προκοπὴν ποιήσας τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἐν
ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ λοιπὸν ἤδη διετέλει προστατῶν μὲν τοῦ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἔθνους, κ-τ΄.λ.

See the character of Aratos drawn by Schorn, p. 66. He is however
altogether too severe. It is surely too much to say, ‘“‘ Demgemiiss besass Aratus
nicht ein grosses hellenisches, sondern nur ein enges achdisches Herz.’’ (This is
curiously contrasted with Plutarch’s words, οὐ Σικυωνίων οὐδ᾽ ᾿Αχαιῶν κηδόμενος,
ἀλλὰ κοινήν τινα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὅλης, κιτιλ. Ar. 16.) The vision of Aratos was
often blinded as to means, but surely, as to ends, no man ever had a more purely

Pan-hellenic patriotism. Droysen (ii. 376, 7) is still more severe, and his language
raises the indignation of Kortiim (iii. 168), who likens Aratos, perhaps not alto-

VII CIVIL CHARACTER OF ARATOS 289

That Aratos remained so long at the head of a free people,
who could, at any time, simply by not electing him, have reduced
him to a private station—that for so long a time he could guide Character
the councils, not of a single city only, but of a great Federation, of Aratos.
and could guide them alike for good and for evil—all this is
of itself proof enough that he possessed many of the highest
qualities of a statesman. It shows at once that he had the gift civil
of persuasive eloquence, that he understood the management of Merits of
popular bodies, and that he was master alike of the domestic Aratos.
and the foreign affairs of the Confederation. It speaks also,
especially in Greece, for the possession of some very high moral
qualities. It shows that his fellow-citizens knew that in him
they had one whom they could thoroughly trust, one who would
not, wittingly at least, betray their interests for personal profit
or personal ambition. Like Periklés, like Nikias,' Aratos was
utterly inaccessible to bribes; and doubtless the confidence of
his countrymen in his perfect pecuniary probity had much to do
with his long-continued influence. He conformed so far to the
evil practice of his time as to accept, both for himself and for
his country, presents from friendly Kings;* but all that he
derived from this source, aided by large contributions from his
private fortune, was always freely devoted to the public service.®
He was zealously devoted to the cause of freedom ; to overthrow
a Tyranny, to set free a commonwealth, to extend the area of
free Greece, in a word, to win new confederates for the Achaian
League, became the ruling passion of his soul. In that cause
Aratos spared neither personal cost nor personal exertion ; for
the liberties of Greece he was ever ready to spend and to be

gether without reason, to William the Silent. Niebuhr (iii. 275) is much fairer
than Schorn or Droysen.

1 On the pecuniary probity of Nikias and his consequent political influence,
see Grote, vi. 387.

2 Besides the large present at the beginning of his career, he received a yearly
pension of six talents from Ptolemy. Plut. Ar. 41. This was seemingly paid by
both Philadelphos and Euergetés. I see no ground for Flathe’s suspicion (Gesch.
Mak. ii. 156) that this Egyptian subsidy was the chief cause of Aratos’ influence
over the League.

5. See Plutarch (Ar. 19, 34), for his large contributions towards the deliverance
both of Corinth and of Athens.

4 Pol. ii, 48. Διετέλει. . . πάσας τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις πρὸς ἕν τέλος
ἀναφέρων. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν τὸ Μακεδόνας μὲν ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, τὰς δὲ
μοναρχίας καταλῦσαι, βεβαιῶσαι δ᾽ ἑκάστοις τὴν κοινὴν καὶ πάτριον ἐλευθερίαν.
Plut. Ar. 24. ‘“Ewpwy γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐ πλοῦτον, οὐ δόξαν, οὐ φιλίαν βασιλικὴν, οὐ
τὸ τῆς αὑτοῦ πατρίδος συμφέρον, οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῆς αὐξήσεως τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἐπίπροσθεν
ποιούμενον.

U

Faults of
his civil
character.

Ill effects

of his con-

nexion
with the

Ptolemies.

290 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

spent. And again, in this also resembling Periklés, he was
wholly free from the fault which upset so many eminent Greeks,
which ruined Themistoklés, Pausanias, and Alkibiadés, to say
nothing of Alexander and Démétrios—incapacity to bear success.
Aratos, like Aristeidés and Periklés, remained, till his last day,
the contented citizen of a free commonwealth. Even in the
times of his worst errors, we can still see the difference between
the pure gold of the republican chief and the tinsel of the Kings
and courtiers with whom he is brought in contact. But these
great and good qualities were balanced by several considerable
defects. The ambition of Aratos was satisfied with being the
first citizen of Achaia and of Hellas, but he could as little bear
a rival near his throne as any despot. It was, in his view,
absolutely essential, not only that Achaia shouldbe the first
power of Greece, but that Aratos should be the first citizen of
Achaia. National envy made his foreign policy unjust to Sparta ;
personal.envy made his home policy unjust to Lydiadas; a
mixture of the two converted a national struggle between Sparta
and Achaia into a personal rivalry between Kleomenés and
Aratos. His hatred to Tyranny, his zeal for freedom, his
anxiety for the extension of the League, often carried him too
far. He did not scruple to seek noble ends by dishonourable
means ; he did not avoid the crooked paths of intrigue and con-
spiracy ; he was thus led into many unjustifiable, and some
illegal, actions. And, clear as his hands were of actual bribes,
he cannot be acquitted of fostering, or at least of not withstand-
ing, the most baleful habit of his age. He allowed his country-
men to look to foreign aid, when they should have looked only
to their own wits and their own arms; he allowed them to trust
to foreign mercenaries and foreign subsidies, and, for their sake,
to practise an unworthy subserviency to foreign princes. As
long as this subserviency took no worse form than that of
flattering successive Ptolemies, the nation was indeed humiliated, .
its feelings of independence were weakened, but no actual danger
to freedom could arise from friends at once so distant and so
prudent. But had not Aratos and the Achaians already ac-
quired the habit of looking to Ptolemy, they might never
have fallen into the far more grievous error of looking to
Antigonos. This fatal habit of putting trust in princes, com-
bined with national and personal envy carried to an extreme
point, led Aratos at last to the great error of his life, the

Vil MILITARY CHARACTER OF ARATOS 291

undoing-of his own work, the calling again of the Macedonian
inte-Gueece.—

Such was Aratos as a man and a statesman. Asa military Character
commander, the contradictions in his character are more glaring οὗ ane ;
still. No man was more skilful or more daring in anything like ya),

a military adventure; no man risked his life more freely in His skill
ἃ surprise, in an ambuscade, in a night assault; no man knew and daring
better how to repair failure in one quarter by unexpected success tures,

in another. But then no man who ever commanded an army His inca-
had more need of the faculty of repairing failures. When Aratos pacity and
led the Achaian phalanx to meet an equal enemy in a pitched (owe
battle, he invarfably led it to defeat. It was ποὺ the fault of open field.
the men whom he commanded. Their discipline indeed was, in

his age, very defective, but they had good military stuff in them,

and Philopoimén, when it was too late, converted them with very

little trouble into efficient soldiers. Nor was it mere want of
military skill in Aratos himself. The true cause lay deeper.
Strange as it sounds, this man, so fearless in one sort of warfare,

the deliverer who scaled the wallsof Sikyén and Corinth, was,

in the open field, as timid as a woman or a slave who had never

seen steel ΔΒ in earnest. One understands a similar pheno-

menon when irregular troops are suddenly called on to practise

ἃ mode of warfare to which they are unaccustomed. In the

Greek War of Independence, some of the warriors who were

most valiant in their own way of fighting, where personal
strength, personal daring, and personal skill were all that was
wanted, fairly ran away when they were expected to stand still

in a line to be shot at. But Aratos was not a klepht from the
mountains ; he was a soldier and a general of a civilized Greek

state; and if he and his countrymen had not reached the full
perfection of Spartan or Macedonian discipline, they must at

least have known the ordinary tactics common to all Pelopon-

nésian armies. The marvellous inconsistencies of Aratos’ mili-

tary character were the subject of much curious disputation in

his own age ;/ it may be left either to soldiers or to philosophers

to explain the fact how they can; but history puts the fact

itself beyond doubt—Aratos in the open field was a coward.

And he was worse than a coward, he was a meddler. Accus-

tomed, in political life, to exercise unbounded influence even

when not in office, he carried the same habit into the camp, and

1 See Plut. Ar. 29.

Effect of
the union
of civil
and mili-
tary
powers.

First
General-
ship of
Aratos,
B.C. 245—
244,

War
between
Achaia and
Z2tolia.

Alliance
of the
Achaians
with

292 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

often interfered with and spoiled the plans of commanders more
skilful and more daring than himself. Anyhow, as his devoted
admirer Polybios is driven to confess, he allowed Peloponnésos
to be filled with trophies commemorating not his victories but
his defeats! That the League could not reap the benefit of his
political skill, without at the same time reaping the evils of his
military incapacity, is a speaking comment on that part of the
Achaian system by which the functions of Commander-in-Chief
and of Leader of the House of Commons were inseparably united.
And yet it would naturally take a long time, and would require
much sad experience, before a nation could fully realize that the
deliverer of Sikyén and Corinth was a man utterly unfit to
command an army in the open field.

The first official year of Aratos was not to pass away without
actual service; but as yet it was service of a kind which did
not reveal his deficiencies. ‘The two great Greek Leagues were
at war; we know not whether the quarrel was of older date
than the union of Sikyén with the Achaian body, or whether
a feud between Aitolia and Siky6n had grown, now that Sikyén
was Achaian, into a feud between A‘tolia and Achaia. It is
certain that the Autolians had made an attempt upon Sikyén
in the time of the Tyranny of Nikoklé ;*~it- is certain that
the two Leagues were now in sucha state of hostility that the
Achaians ventured on offensive operations on the other side of
the Corinthian Gulf. One can hardly fancy this happening
without previous A‘tolian incursions into Achaia, and the good
character which Aratos had already won, as a private horseman
or as a subordinate officer, was probably won in resisting some
of their plundering expeditions. It was more likely at this
time than at any other that the A’tolian League made its famous
agreement with Antigonos for the partition of the Achaian
territory.2 On the other hand the League was in alliance with
Alexander, the Macedonian Prince of Corinth. Aratos had
contemplated an attempt to drive out 80 dangerous a neighbour,

1 Polybios records (iv. 8) his chief exploits, and continues, ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς οὗτος
ὁπότε τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἀντιποιήσασθαι βουληθείη, νωθρὸς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐπινοίαις,
ἄτολμος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἐν ὄψει δ᾽ οὐ μένων τὸ δεινόν. διὸ καὶ τροπαίων ἐπ᾽
αὐτὸν βλεπόντων ἐπλήρωσε τὴν Πελοπόννησον, καὶ τῇδέ πῃ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀεί ποτ᾽

ἣν εὐχείρωτος.

3 Plut. Ar. 4.

8 Pol. ii. 48, 4δ ; ix. 84. See Thirlwall, viii. 116, Niebuhr (iii. 282) places
it after the deliverance of Corinth, and Droysen (ii. 387) later still.

VII FIRST GENERALSHIP OF ARATOS 298

but Alexander seems to have proffered his friendship to the Alexander
League,’ an act which, under such circumstances, was equivalent οἷ Corinth.
to throwing off all allegiance to his royal uncle. This friendly
position of Corinth must have been a great advantage in any
movement of the Achaian troops either by land or sea, but it
does not appear that either Alexander on the one side or
Antigonos on the other took any active part in the war. This
struggle was_therefore more strictly a Social War, a War of the
Leagues, than the later war to which the name is usually con-
fined. The belligerents were the three Leagues of Achaia,
Boeotia, and Attolia, the Bootians having entered into an
alliance with Achaia against the common enemy, Aratos
crossed the Gulf; he ravaged the coast, from Kalydén, the
old Achaian outpost,? now again an Aitolian city, to the
Ozolian Lokris, now in willing or forced union with the
robber League. He was then about to march into Beotia to
join his allies; but the Bootarch Amaiokritos*® did not wait Defeat
for him; he engaged the Aftolians at Chairéneia; he himself ne ae
fell, and his army was utterly defeated: Ὑπὸ Bosotians now at Chaird-
joined the ®tolian alliance,t and sank for ever into utter neia.
insignificance. Whether the failure of the intended meeting
between the Achaian and Beoeotian forces was the fault of the
Achaian or of the Boeotian commander does not very clearly
appear ;° but probably Aratos was thereby saved from a defeat
in his first year of command. Had he had an opportunity of
displaying his characteristic weakness so early in his official
career, the course of the subsequent history might have been
greatly changed.

The Achaian constitution, as we have seen, did not allow the
immediate re-election of the General; but after the necessary
lapse of one year,® Aratos was again placed at the head of the
state. The year of his second Generalship was one of the most Second
memorable in the history of the League. Four new cities, one Genersl-

ship of
1 Plut. Ar. 18. 2 See above, p. 186. Aratos,
3 ᾿Αμαιόκριτος, Pol. xx. 4. ᾿Αβοιώκριτος, Plut. Ar. 16. B.C. 243.

ὁ See above, pp. 142, 268.

5 Plutarch says that Aratos ὑστέρησε τῆς μάχης (Ar. 16). Polybios, as Bishop
Thirlwall (viii. 117) says, clearly lays the blame on Amaiokritos. See his whole
description, xx. 4, 5.

6 Plut. Ar. 16. ᾿Ενιαυτῷ δὲ ὕστερον αὖθις στρατηγῶν. This is explained by
the constitutional passage in cap. 24. Polybios (ii, 43) says, ὀγδόῳ δὲ πάλιν
ἔτει στρατηγὸς αἱρεθεὶς τὸ δεύτερον, that is, the eighth year from the deliverance
of Sikydén.

294 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

of them the most important point in Peloponnésos, were added
to the Achaian Union. We left the League at war with Anti-
gonos, and on friendly terms with his rebellious vassal Alexander

Position of of Corinth. We know nothing of Alexander’s personal character

Corinth
under.
Alexander,

and his
widow
Nikaia.
Acquisi-
tion of

or of the nature of his government; but we may believe that
the rule of a kinsman of the royal house, one too who came
of a good stock, the grandson of Krateros and Phila, may have
been some degrees less irksome than the rule of mere local
oppressors like the Tyrants of Sikyén. However this may be,
Alexander died just at this time, poisoned, as some said, by the
emissaries of Antigonos. His widow Nikaia succeeded to his
power; the King of Macedonia did not scruple to make her
the victim of a ludicrous deception, by which he contrived to
win Corinth for himself.1_ The enemy was now brought to the

Corinth by very gates of the League, and Aratos’ own city was the most

Antigonos,
B.C. 244,
Deliver-
ance of
Corinth
and its
accession
to the
League,
B.C. 243.

Accession
of Megara,

exposed of all. Another brilliant enterprise of his own peculiar
kind, a night-adventure as perilous as that which had rescued
Sikyén, restored Corinth to freedom.” For the first time for
nearly a hundred years the Corinthians were masters of their
own city. Aratos easily persuaded them to join the League ; *
their mountain citadel now became a Federal] fortress ® instead of
a stronghold of the oppressor. The port of Lechaion at once
shared the fate of the capital; that of Kenchreia remained for
a time in the hands of the enemy.® So great a success raised
alike the fame and the power of the Achaians and their
General. Megara was occupied by a Macedonian garrison ;7
its people now revolted, probably with Achaian help, and at

1 The tale is well told by Plutarch, Ar. 17. It naturally moves the indigna-
tion of the Macedonian Droysen (ii. 371). According to him the story comes
from Phylarchos, and therefore is not to be believed. Why may not Phylarchos
have sometimes told the truth ὃ and why may not the story have come from the
Memoirs of Aratos ?

2 Plut. Ar. 18-23. The tale is brilliantly told by the biographer. Cf. Pol.
ii. 48.

3 Plut. Ar. 28. See above, p. 195, note 2.

4 The scene in Plutarch (c. 23) is a fine one, Aratos, weary with his night’s
labour, appears in the Corinthian theatre leaning on his spear, unable for a while
to speak, amid the cheers of the delivered people. Then, συναγαγὼν ἑαυτὸν
διεξῆλθε λόγον ὑπὲρ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν τῇ πράξει πρέποντα καὶ συνέπεισε τοὺς Κορινθίους
᾿Αχαιοὺς γενέσθαι.

5 Plut. Ar. 24. See above, p. 242.

6 It must have been acquired soon after, as we find it Achaian a few years later.
Plut. Ar. 29.

7 Plut. Ar. 24. Μεγαρεῖς re γὰρ ἀποστάντες ᾿Αντιγόνου τῷ ᾿Αράτῳ προσέθεντο.
Cf. Pol. ii. 48. °

VII ATTEMPTS ON ATHENS 295

once joined the League. Within Peloponnésos, the cities of Troizén,
Troizén and Epidauros! followed their example. The territory and Epi-
of the fifteen Confederate cities now stretched eontinuously ©
from the Ionian to the Atgean Sea, from Cape Araxos to the
extreme point of the Argolic peninsula. The key of Peloponnésos
was now in the hands of the Union—the fetters of Greece?
were broken.

But, immediately beyond the new Achaian frontier, two of
the most famous cities of Greece were still in bondage. To
win Corinth, Athens, and Argos to the League in a single year
would have raised Aratos to a height of glory which the heroes
of Marathén or Thermopyle might have envied. Athens, fallen Position of
as she was, still retained her great name and the shadow of her Athens
ancient freedom, and she was now beginning to assume the “δ 4's°.
character which she held under her Roman lords as the sacred
city of literature and philosophy. How far this last claim spoke
to the heart of the Sikydénian athlete it is hard to say, but certain
it 18 that to win Athens to the cause of Grecian freedom was an
object on which the heart of Aratos was always strongly bent.

To Argos he was bound by still closer ties ; his youth had been
spent within her walls; her deliverance was the payment which
he owed her for the shelter which she had given him in the days
of his adversity. The condition however of the two cities was
different. Athens seems to have been at this moment in posses-
sion of as much liberty and democracy as was consistent with
the presence of Macedonian troops, not indeed in the City
itself, but in the other fortresses of the Attic territory. The Achaian
League was at war with Macedonia; and Attica was, under Invasion
such circumstances, clearly liable to be dealt with as an enemy’s of Attica.
country. Attica was once more, as in the days of Archidamos,
invaded by a Peloponnésian army; even the isle of Salamis
occupied as it was by a Macedonian garrison, was ravaged by
the Achaian troops. But Aratos took care to show that it was
not agamst Athens, but against her oppressors, that he was
warring. He released all his Athenian prisoners without
ransom. This, it must be remembered, was, according to the
1 Plut. Ar. 24.
2 Corinth, Chalkis, and Démétrias, so called by the last Philip.
5 Plat. Ar. 25. ᾿Αργείοις δὲ δουλεύουσιν ἀχθόμενος ἐπεβούλευεν ἀνελεῖν τὸν
τύραννον αὐτῶν ᾿Δριστόμαχον, ἅμα τῇ τε πόλει θρεπτήρια τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀποδοῦναι

φιλοτιμούμενος καὶ τοῖς, Αχαιοῖς προσκομίσαι τὴν πόλιν.
4 See Thirlwall, viii. 99, 100.

Vain
attempt
to attach
Athens
to the

League.

Condition
of Argos ;
succession
of the
Argeian
Tyrants.

B.c. 272.

296 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

received rules of Grecian warfare, a piece of extraordinary favour.
The ordinary fate of prisoners of war was to be sold as slaves ;
even to put them to death, though a rare and extreme act of
severity, did not actually violate Greek International Law.! It
was not likely that Aratos should show any special harshness
towards a people who were enemies only through their mis-
fortune; but his extreme lenity might fairly be expected to
call forth some marks of Athenian gratitude. Aratos doubtless
expected by this means to open negociations which might lead
to the union of Athens with the League? No such result
happened ; Athens gave no sign. Fear of Antigonos may well
have been a stronger feeling.than hope from Aratos, but this
was not all. The Federal charmer always charmed in vain

in Athenian ears. No Greek city ever needed the help of

Confederates more than did Athens in the days of Aratos; but
the Athens of the days of Aratos had, unluckily for herself, not
quite lost the memory of the Athens of the days of Periklés.
The once imperial city could not bring herself to give up the
shadow of her old sovereignty; she could not endure to see
her citizens march at the bidding of a General from Sikyén ;
she could not endure to exchange absolute independence for
a place in a Peloponnésian Assembly where the vote of Athens
might be neutralized by the vote of Epidauros or of Keryneia.
A degrading subserviency to Macedonia and Rome, an abject
worship of every foreign prince who would send alms to her
coffers, was not inconsistent with a nominal independence and
a nominal Democracy. Incorporation with the League would
have given her the substance at the expense of the shadow ;
Athens would have been once more really free, and the borders
of liberated Greece would have been advanced to Kithair6n and
Orépos. But the shadow of independence must have been sur-
rendered, and to that shadow Athens clave to the last.

The position of Argos was different. That famous city was
now ruled by a Tyrant named Aristomachos. Either he had
first risen to power, or else the character of his government had
become more distinctly oppressive, since the days when Aratos
himself dwelt at Argos and there organized his schemes for the
deliverance of Sikyén. When Pyrrhos attacked Argos, the

1 See above, p. 45.
3 Plut. Ar. 24. ᾿Αθηναίοις δὲ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκεν ἄνευ λύτρων ἀρχὰς
ἀποστάσεως ἐνδιδοὺς αὐτοῖς.

VIE ATTEMPTS ON ARISTOMACHOS OF ARGOS 297

supreme power was disputed between his partisan Aristeas and
Aristippos a partisan of Antigonos.! But it does not appear quite

certain whether Argos had been continuously ruled by Tyrants

ever since? There may have been an interval of freedom there,

like that at Sikyén under Kleinias and Timokleidas. But at any

rate Argos was now subjected to a grinding tyranny; Aristo- Tyranny
machos forbade the possession of arms by the citizens under οἵ ΑΥἱεῖο-
heavy penalties.* Against Aristomachos Aratos did not think it iy. First,
necessary to employ the same means of open warfare which he

had employed against Antigonos and the A‘tolians. He found

men in Argos willing to take the Tyrant’s life, if they could only Aratos
get swords to take it with. The General of the Achaians U0 ἀῃ.
presently provided them with daggers. We must not judge spiracies
of this action by our modern English notions. English feeling against
revolts against assassination under any circumstances. Some- »!™-
times it goes so far as to see more guilt in the conspirator who

plots the slaughter of a single public enemy than in the con-
spirator who plots schemes of treason which involve the slaughter

of innocent thousands. Greek feeling was very different. The Greek
Tyrant, that is, the successful conspirator, the triumphant plotter tyraute
of ἃ coup d'état, the man who had overthrown the freedom of his ana
country, who had sacrificed the property, the liberty, and the Tyrant-
lives of his fellow-citizens, was looked on as no longer a man but ‘!#¥¢™-
a wild beast. He who had trampled all Law under his feet,

whose power rested wholly on the destruction of Law, had no

claim to the protection of Law in his own person. As his hand

was against every man, so every man’s hand might righteously

1 Plut. Pyrrh. 30.

3 Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 124) suggests that Aristomachos was the son o.
Aristippos. :The order of the names, Aristippos, Aristomachos, Aristippos,
Aristomachos, certainly looks very like a family succession, and Phylarchos, as
quoted by Polybios (ii. 59), distinctly calls the second Aristomachos a descendant
of Tyrants (πεφυκότα ἐκ τυράννων). On the other hand, had Aristippos the
Second been the son of Aristomachos the First, one might have expected Plutarch
to introduce him with some mention of his kindred to his predecessor, and not
simply as a worse Tyrant than he was (ἐξωλέστερος ἐκείνου τύραννος. Ar. 25),
The enterprise of Aratos on Sikyén also seems to show that Argos was free, or at
least not under any very oppressive or inquisitorial government, in s.c. 251. Still,
if the dynasty was a hereditary one, we may well believe that it was less oppressive
than the common run of Tyrannies, till the advance of Aratos and the League
began to put all Tyrants on their guard. If Aristomachos had any border feud
with Nikoklés, especially if he thought that Aratos merely intended to substitute
himself for Nikoklés as Tyrant of Sikydn, he might even have encouraged his
design.

8 Plut. Ar. 25.

298 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

be against him. Against a criminal who, by the very greatness
of his crimes, was placed beyond the reach of ordinary justice,
every citizen was entitled to act as at once accuser, judge, and
executioner. As Tyranny was the greatest of crimes, if for
no other cause than that it involved all other crimes,! so the
slaying of a Tyrant was looked on as the noblest of human
actions? The Tyrannicide, the man who had broken the yoke,
who had jeoparded his life to free his country, who had abolished
the dominion of force and had brought back the dominion of
Law, received honours among the foremost benefactors of man-
kind. In such a cause the ties of blood went for nothing; the
rights of a man’s kindred weighed as nothing against the wrongs
of his country; Timoleén himself, the purest of heroes, the
deliverer of Corinth and the deliverer of Syracuse, scrupled not
to slay the brother who held his native city in bondage.* The
glory of the deed admitted of no doubt or controversy ; Tyranni-
cide was as undoubtingly inscribed on the list of Hellenic virtues
as Tyranny was inscribed on the list of Hellenic crimes. The
Tyrant-slayer had votes passed in his honour by free common-
wealths ; philosophers argued, and rhetoricians declaimed, in his
praise; poets twined their choicest wreaths of song upon his

1 Pol. ii. 59. Αὐτὸ γὰρ τοὔνομα [τὸ τύραννος] περιέχει τὴν ἀσεβεστάτην
ἔμφασιν, καὶ πάσας περιείληφε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας.

2 Mr. Grote (iii. 37) has collected some of the most important passages bearing
on Greek feeling towards Tyrannicide. So also Isokratés (περὶ Elp. 91), τῶν μὲν
γὰρ ἀρχόντων ἔργον ἐστὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ταῖς αὑτῶν ἐπιμελείαις ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονεσ-
τέρους, τοῖς δὲ τυράννοις ἔθος καθέστηκε τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων πόνοις καὶ κακοῖς αὑτοῖς ἡδονὰς
παρασκευάζειν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοὺς τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειροῦντας τυραννικαῖς καὶ ταῖς
συμφοραῖς περιπίπτειν, καὶ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν οἷά περ ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δράσωσιν.
So also Polybios, ii. 56. Καὶ μὴν τό γε τοὺς πολίτας ἀποκτιννύναι μέγιστον ἀσέβημα
τίθεται καὶ μεγίστων ἄξιον προστίμων᾽ καίτοι ye προφανῶς ὁ μὲν τὸν κλέπτην
ἡμοιχὸν ἀποκτείνας ἀθῴός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τὸν προδότην ἢ τύραννον τιμῶν καὶ
προεδρείας τυγχάνει παρὰ πᾶσιν. Ib. 60. Οὐδ᾽ ᾿Αντιγόνῳ προσαπτέον οὐδ᾽ ᾿Αράτῳ
παρανομίαν, ὅτι λαβόντες κατὰ πόλεμον ὑποχείριον τύραννον στρεβλώσαντες
ἀπέκτειναν, ὅν γε καὶ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν εἰρήνην τοῖς ἀνελοῦσι καὶ τιμωρησαμένοις
ἔπαινος καὶ τιμὴ συνεξηκολούθει παρὰ τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις. Two things are
remarkable in this last passage. Polybios goes beyond all ordinary Greek
feeling in justifying torture as applied to a captive Tyrant ; he also recognizes in
the King Antigonos as much right to chastise a Tyrant as in Aratos himself.
The facts of the case will be considered hereafter.

ὃ The debates held at the time on the conduct of Timoleén (Plut. Tim. 5-7)
are among the most instructive pieces of evidence on the subject. Men doubted
whether Timoledén was a fratricide or a Tyrannicide ; that is, they doubted whether
he had killed Timophanés from patriotic motives or to gratify a private grudge ;
but no one doubted that, if he did kill him from patriotic motives, the deed was
praiseworthy. It is worth notice that Timoledn could not bring himself to kill
his brother with his own hand (ib. 4).

VII GREEK FEELING TOWARDS TYRANNICIDE 299

brow ; men sang his praises at their festal banquets, and, in their
brightest pictures of another world, they spake of him as
dwelling in the happy island among the heroes and demigods of
old. Englishmen cannot enter into the feelings with which the The Greek
Greek looked upon the Tyrant-slayer, because Englishmen have View unin-
never in any age known the full bitterness of Tyranny. We talligibve h
. . ° giisn-
have had our oppressors and unrighteous rulers, our evil Kings men, be-
and their evil Ministers, but we have never seen a powér which cause
wholly rested on the utter trampling down of law and right. οἱ i?
We have seen bad laws and unjust judgements, we have seen stances of
civil wars and revolutions, but no age of English history ever English
beheld a Government which was founded solely on perjury and history.
massacre. The nation has always had strength to resist by the
might either of reason or of armed force. Our oppressors have
been overthrown in peaceful debate, or they have been smitten
to the earth upon the open field of battle. They have been sent
to the block by sentences, sometimes, it may be, unjust, some-
times, it may be, illegal, but which still, by the very form of a
judicial process, showed that the dominion of Law had not utterly .
passed away. Kings and rulers have indeed died by private
murder, but such murder has always been a base and needless
crime, condemned by the unanimous voice of the nation. No
English Doctor of the fifteenth century would have ventured, as
was done in contemporary France, to defend one of the basest a.v. 1408.
assassinations on record by the abstract doctrine of the lawfulness
of slaying Tyrants.1 Once only, when a power, illegal indeed
and founded on force, but neither degrading nor practically
oppressive, showed some faint likeness to the Tyrannies of
earlier and of later days, did Englishmen ever venture to
maintain the thesis that there are times when Killing is no
Murder.? With the feelings naturally produced by such a past a.p. 1657.
1 When Lewis, Duke of Orleans, was murdered in 1407 by John the Fearless,
Duke of Burgundy, the act was defended in an elaborate discourse by John Petit,
a theologian, who lays down the abstract doctrine of Tyrannicide, and justifies it
by many examples, most of them very little to the purpose. See the whole speech
in Monstrelet, cap. 39, p. 35, ed. 1595. Cf. Jean Juvenal des Ursins, A. 1407.
p. 191, ed. 1653. Certainly the likeness between Duke John and Timoledn is
not striking. [But long before John Petit, John of Salisbury had asserted the
abstract doctrine of tyrannicide: Policraticus, iii. 15, “‘Tyrannum occidere non
modo licitum est sed zquum et justum.” The whole passage should be read.]
3 The famous pamphlet bearing this title is well known. In 1662 we find a
Captain Thomas Gardiner petitioning Charles the Second “for relief ;” besides

his services in the Civil War, he pleads as a title to the King’s bounty that he
‘in 1657, intended an attempt on Cromwell, but was taken in the Gallery at

In the
estimate
of their
own time
the Ar-

geian con-

spirators
were
praise-
worthy,
Aratos

not so.

Aratos’
special
position
with re-
gard to
Argos.

300 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

history as this, if our sympathy does not lie absolutely with the
Tyrant, it lies strongly against the Tyrant-slayer. When seen
through the mist of ages we do not refuse him a kind of reverence;
we respect the names of Ehud, of Brutus, and of William Tell .1
but we shrink from him as an assassin when he appears in the
form of a man of our own age. We must learn to put aside a
morality which arises mainly from the conditions of our own
past history, if we wish to judge aright of a Greek of the days
of Aratos. That the slaughter of Aristomachos at the hands of
any citizen of Argos would have been a virtuous and noble action
no Greek politician or moralist could have doubted for a moment.
Whether Aratos was justified in having any hand in such a
transaction is quite another matter. Aratos was the chief
magistrate of a commonwealth with which Aristomachos was
not at war, and to which apparently he had done no injury.
And, if he had been at war with the League, the assassination
of an open enemy was deemed as odious in Greek warfare as it
is deemed now; Aratos would never have thought of employing
assassins against the General of the A‘tolians or even against the
King of Macedonia. We can hardly be wrong in saying that,
however praiseworthy the slaying of Aristomachos might be in
an oppressed Argeian, it in no way became the President of the
Achaian League to encourage plots against his life. But in the
mind of Aratos the hatred of Tyrants had become a kind of
passion, under the influence of which he often forgot the dictates
both of honour and of prudence. And Argos was all but his
native city : there he had spent his youth; thence he had gone
forth to his great work; the freedom of Argos was as dear to
his heart as the freedom of Sikydn, and he felt towards a Tyrant
of Argos all the intensity of hate which would glow in the bosom
of a native Argeian. In his eyes the Argeian Tyrant was not
a mere foreign power, a national rival, capable either of honour-

Hampton Court with two loaded pistols and a dagger, kept 12 months a prisoner,
and only failed to be sentenced to death by want of evidence on the trial.”
Calendar of State Papers, 1661-2, p. 623. We may doubt whether Aristomachos
and Aristippos let conspirators go so easily.

11 trust to have a more fitting opportunity for discussing the story of the first
deliverance of Switzerland. It is enough here to say that, in the tale as com-
monly told, the old Swiss Revolution appears as one of the purest of all
Revolutions ;{there is only one act which the most rigid moralist could denounce
as a crime, namely the slaughter of Gessler by William Tell. Now, strange to
say, this one doubtful action is the one feature of the tale which has permanently
fixed itself in popular memory ; and it is never spoken of without admiration.

vil POSITION OF ARATOS TOWARDS ARGOS 801

able peace or of honourable war; he was a common enemy of
mankind, against whom all means were lawful; he might be
picked off from behind a tree or ensnared in a pitfall, with as
good a conscience as men would pick off or ensnare a wolf or a
tiger. Antigonos was a King, an enemy, not always, it may be,
a very scrupulous or honourable enemy ; but he was still an
enemy, entitled to be dealt with according to the laws of war
and the laws of nations. Let him only keep within his own
realm, and nothing hindered him from being the friend, or even
the ally, of the Achaian commonwealth. Alexander of Corinth,
a Prince and a Macedonian like himself, and the immediate ruler
of a Grecian city, had not been deemed unworthy of the closest
friendship of the League. Towards the Macedonian King of
Egypt Aratos and his countrymen were only too lavish of their
honours. But the Tyrant of Argos could, in the eyes of Aratos,
never be an ally, a friend, or even an honourable enemy. No
Law of Nations could protect him whose very existence was the
contradiction of all Law. With him short rede was good rede ;
the only question was how to get him out of the way with the
least cost of time and trouble. Aratos, with these feelings,
mingled without scruple in all the Argeian plots against
Aristomachos. Those plots failed ; the conspirators quarrelled
and denounced one another. Soon after indeed Aristomachos Death of
was killed by his own slaves, but Argos was not delivered. In Arig”
his stead arose a second Aristippos, a Tyrant, we are told, yet the First ;
more cruel than himself.’ Aratos seized, as he thought, the succession
favourable moment. He entered Argolis with such Achaian οἱ aT ΠΝ
troops as he could collect at so short a warning, hoping that the το “
Argeians themselves would at once rise and join him. But
Tyranny had done its work, the worst of all its evil works; men’s Vain
hearts were bowed down by oppression, and they had not courage a
to meet the deliverer. Aratos was of course in no position to op Argos.
undertake the conquest of Argos with his hurried levies, raised
probably without any formal authority from the Achaian
Assembly. He retired; had he succeeded, the technical error
in his proceedings would doubtless have been forgiven, and the
deliverance of Argos would have been reckoned as glorious as
the deliverance of Corinth. As it was, he earned only the
questionable reputation of having led the Achaian troops
against a city with which the Achaian League was not at

— 1 Plut. Ar. 25. See above, p. 297.

Suit at
Mantineia
between
Aristippos
and the
League.

Ptolemy
Philadel-
phos be-
comes the
ally of the
League.

302 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE . CHAP-

war.! This breach of international right was referred, according
to a custom not uncommon in Greece, to the arbitration of a
friendly city. Aristippos pleaded his cause before a Mantineian
tribunal ;? Aratos, who did not appear, was condemned to a
small fine. The condemnation shows that the Mantineian judges
appreciated the formal wrong of which Aratos had been guilty ;
the insignificant amount of the penalty showed ‘equally that
they appreciated the circumstances and motives which extenuated
his conduct. .

It would seem also to have been during this second General-
ship of Aratos, that Ptolemy Philadelphos, hitherto the ally of
Aratos and of Sikyén, was prevailed on by him to become the
ally of the Achaian League. The King was, in return, invested
with the supreme_command of the Achaian forces by land and
sea.> The title and office were of course purely honorary ; the
only way in which Ptolemy could really help his Greek friends
was by subsidies in money. We have seefi how efficacious his
aid in that way had been in the local affairs of Sikyén. Either
then or now Aratos accepted a yearly pension of six talents from
the King.* This has an ill look; but the only real evil was the
habit of looking to Kings at all. Six talents a year could never
have been meant as a bribe to the man who had spent sixty to
achieve the deliverance of Corinth. The interests of Ptolemy,

1 Plut. Ar. 25. Τῶν δὲ πολλῶν [τῶν ᾿Αργείων] ἤδη διὰ τὴν συνήθειαν ἐθελοδούλω 5
ἐχόντων, καὶ μηδενὸς ἀφισταμένου πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἀνεχώρησεν ἔγκλημα κατεσκευακὼΣ
τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς ὡς ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόλεμον ἐξενηνοχόσι.

2 We must suppose (see Thirlwall, viii. 126) some treaty or agreement, general
or special, by which the Mantineians were recognized as arbiters between Argos
and the League. The way in which Plutarch tells the story implies that, though
Aratos did not appear, the League did not at all decline the authority of the

‘ judges. The suit too was against the League, though the sentence was against

Aratos personally. (Plut. Ar. 25. Δίκην ἔσχον [ol 'Axaol] ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρὰ
Μαντινεῦσιν, ἣν ᾿Αράτου μὴ παρόντος ᾿Αρίστιππος εἷλε διώκων καὶ μνῶν ἐτιμήθη
τριάκοντα.) This seems to show that Aratos had acted without due authority
from the League. Schorn’s (p. 94) wild notion that the tribunal here spoken of
was a Macedonian court to which all the Peloponnésian Tyrants held themselves
responsible, is well refuted by Droysen (ii. 399). Aristippos might accuse before
such a court, but neither the Achaian League nor any Achaian citizen would
acknowledge its jurisdiction ; indeed one can hardly fancy Aristippos being so
foolish as to accuse Achaians before it. What the story does prove is that
Mantineia, in B.o. 248, was independent, and neither Achaian, tolian, nor
Macedonian.

ὃ Plut. Ar, 24. Πτολεμαῖον δὲ σύμμαχον ἐποίησεν [ὁ ”Aparos] τῶν ᾿Αχαιών
ἡγεμονίαν ἔχοντα πολέμου καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν.

4 See above, p. 289, note 2.

vit SURVEY OF THE EARLY GENERALSHIPS OF ARATOS 808

of Aratos, and of the League were all the same; the pension Aratos’

was simply @ sum placed at the personal disposal of Aratos for pension

the common good of all. Ptolemy.
In these two years of office the League had abundant oppor- Survey

tunity of testing the character of its new chief. The events of οἵ ne

the first two Presidencies of Aratos brought into full light all General.

his great qualities and many of his defects. He had abundantly ships of

displayed his zeal for the League and for Greek freedom in Aratos.

general, his liberality and self-devotion, his skill and daring in

warfare of a particular kind. He must also have shown,

although, except the scene in the Corinthian theatre, no details

are preserved to us, parliamentary and diplomatic powers of the

highest order. On the other hand he had shown that his zeal

against Tyranny could sometimes carry him too far, and could

place both himself and the League in positions not altogether

honourable. He had also set the first example of that fatal

habit of looking to foreign help, which, in such an age, was

possibly excusable, but which in the end proved fatal both to

himself and to his country. His two greatest defects did not as

yet appear. He had no opportunity of showing his marvellous

gift of losing pitched battles, because, the only time when a

pitched battle was fought, he came too late to join in it. He

had no opportunity of showing his incapacity to endure a poli-

tical rival, because no political rival had as yet appeared. His

administration had not been crowned with perfect success, but

on the whole it had been glorious. Macedonia had become an

open enemy ; but the wealth, if not the strength, of Egypt had

been won to the side of the League. The alliance of Beotia

had been lost; but Troizén, Epidauros, Megara, above all

Corinth, had been incorporated with the Achaian.bady. Aratos

had taught Aitolia and Macedonia that the new power could

venture to strike at both of them on their own ground. His

campaign in Attica had utterly failed of its ulterior diplomatic

object, but, as a campaign, it was successful, if not specially

Argos. On_the whole, the League found itself, under his guid-

ance, raised to a height of power and reputation which, a few

years before, it had never dreamed of. The local Union of

Achaia, aiming at nothing beyond its own independence, had

grown into a great Pan-hellenic power, the centre of Grecian

freedom, the foe of Tyrants and the refuge of the oppressed.

Jilustra-
tion of the
Achaian
Constitu-
tion sup-
plied by
these

years.

Great
powers
of the
Federal
General.

304 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

No wonder that the author of such a change won and kept the
boundless confidence of the whole League ; that he was elected
to the supreme magistracy as often as the Law allowed ; and
that, even when out of office, he still guided the councils of the
republic, and that the actual holder of the highest office was
looked upon as little more than his vicegerent.

The events of these important years clearly show how great
and important was the office of the Federal chief in the Achaian
constitution. Aratos seems to do everything; the Achaian
people seem to do nothing. Doubtless this appearance arises
in a great degree from the form in which our information as to
these years has come down tous. What we know comes from
the brief sketch of Polybios and from the Life of Aratos by
Plutarch. But this is not all. In the analogous sketch by
Thucydidés, and in Plutarch’s Life of Periklés, the Athenian
People are not thus overshadowed by their leader. The differ-
ence arises mainly from the difference between Athenian and
Achaian Democracy, and especially from the totally different
position in which each placed its first citizen. Periklés was
practically the master of the Athenian Assembly, because that
Assembly habitually voted as he counselled it. Legally he was
the servant of the Assembly, bound to carry out whatever the
Sovereign People had decreed, Aratos was practically as great
as Periklés, and he was legally much greater. It was the
Assembly which determined war and peace; but the whole plan
of every campaign, where he would go and where he would not
go, was the General’s own affair. It is clear also that the details
of diplomatic proceedings were left to his discretion, at most
after conference with his Cabinet Council. It is evident that
many of the things done and attempted by Aratos during these
two years could not possibly have been debated beforehand in
the Federal Assembly, or even in the Federal Senate. Achaia
was at war with Antigonos; Antigonos held Corinth; whether
to make a night-attack on Corinth or to forbear was a question
for the General to settle on his own responsibility. That re-
sponsibility, like that of a modern Minister, came after the fact.
These great powers vested in a single man undoubtedly tended
to give the policy of the League a character of unity and con-
sistency, above all of secrecy, where secrecy was needed, which
could not possibly exist under the older form of Democracy.
On the other hand, an officer holding such great powers was

VII RELATIONS BETWEEN ACHAIA AND SPARTA 805

exposed, almost by the Constitution itself, to a constant tempta-
tion to overstep them. The invasion of Argos, if not a crime,
was certainly a blunder; but it was a blunder which no Athenian
General could ever have been tempted to make.

§ 2. From the Deliverance of Corinth to the Annexation of Argos
B.C. 243—228.

Aratos may now be looked upon as the permanent chief of
the League. He filled the highest magistracy in alternate years,
and, even when out of office, he was still practically the guiding

spirit of the commonwealth.__In_ his third d Third

the League still at war with Atolia, but now in close alliance General:
with Spar ta. Agis was now one_of the Spartan Kings, Agis the ‘Aratos,

ee ee

pure enthusiast and the spotless martyr, who perished in a cause 8.0. 241.
than which none could be either nobler or more hopeless, the King Agis.
attempt to restore a corrupted commonwealth to the virtue and
simplicity of times long gone by. His whole career is one of the

most fascinating pieces of later Grecian history; but his attempts

at reform, his selfish adversaries and his no less selfish friends,

the beautiful pictures of his domestic life, of his self-sacrifice and

his martyrdom, do not directly bear on the history of Achaian
Federalism. It is enough for our purpose that Sparta and the Relations
League were now closely allied, that the Attolians were expected of the
to enter_Peloponnésos by way of the Isthmus, and that Agis Neague
appeared at Corinth at the head of a Lacedemonian contingent.! Sparta.

1 Those who have studied the history of these times know well that the
circumstances of this war are involved in much confusion. According to Pau-
sanias (ii. 8. 5) the League was, some time or other, at war with Agis, who took
Pelléné, and was driven out by Aratos. This account Droysen (ii. 380) adopts,
and supposes that the alliance between Sparta and the League was concluded
after this campaign, because the Lacedemonians, in Pausanias, depart ὑπόσπονδοι.
Pausanias also elsewhere (viii. 10. 5—8 ; 27. 13, 14) tells us of a siege of Megal-
opolis by Agis, and also of a pitched battle near Mantineia, in which Aratos and
Lydiadas command the Achaians, and in which Agis is killed! This tale is
utterly absurd ; all the world knows that Agis was not killed in any battle at
Mantineia or anywhere else. The whole question has been thoroughly sifted by
Manso (Sparta, iii. 2. 123), who is confirmed by Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 127, 148).
The supposed capture of Pelléné by Agis is a stupid perversion of the real capture
of Pelléné which will presently be mentioned. His imaginary Arkadian campaign
comes from a confusion between this Agis and his predecessor of the same name
in the century before (see above, p. 188), who really besieged Megalopolis and
fell in battle near Mantineia. I might add that the details of the battle in Pau-

x

Contrast
between
Agis and
Aratos.

Difference
in their
plans for
the cam-

paign.

306 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE OHAP.

The two allied commanders were singularly contrasted. Agis
was a hereditary King, yet he was, in a certain sense, a revolu-
tionist ; Aratos was a republican chief, the sworn enemy of
Tyrants, and no lover of Kings, but he was at the same time a
politician_essentially conservative and aristocratic.' Both were
reformers; the reforms of both consisted in restoration not in
innovation, but while Aratos aimed at, and succeeded in, possible
political reforms, Agis dreamed of social changes, the restoration
of a past state of things, which it was as hopeless to attempt as
to turn back the planets in their courses. Both were young—
Aratos was still only thirty—but Aratos, even ten years before,
had an old head on young shoulders, while Agis had all the best
qualities of youth, its hopefulness, its daring, its pure and un-
selfish enthusiasm. One is tempted to believe that Aratos
looked on Agis as a hare-brained fanatic, and that Agis looked
on Aratos as a cold-blooded diplomatist, intriguing, disin-
genuous, and cowardly. The gallant young king longed for
an opportunity to win credit for himself and his army; military
renown would be of all things the most valuable towards his
ulterior objects at home; to his Spartan heart war meant victory
or death in the open field ; schemes, surprises, night-adventures,
were not his element ; above all, if Lakonia had just before been
pitilessly ravaged by these very Attolians, every feeling of
honour and revenge led him to wish for a decisive action.
Aratos, on the other hand, looked on a battle as the last re-
source of an ignorant general; he had never fought a pitched
battle yet, and he was not going to fight one now to please the
young man from Lacedemon. Let the Attolians come; the

sanias seem to be a mixture of those of the battle last mentioned and of those of
the battle of Ladokeia, to be hereafter spoken of, where Aratos and Lydiadas
did command against a Spartan King, though that King was not Agis but
Kleomenés.

There is also a story, alluded to more than once, but never directly narrated,
both by Polybios and by Plutarch (Pol. iv. 34; ix. 84, Plut. Kleom. 18), about
a great Atolian inroad into Lakonia, in which the plunderers carried off a wonder-
ful amount both of spoil and captives. No date is given ; Schorn (p. 91) and
Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 185) place it later than this. It is, to say the least, very
tempting to put it, with Droysen (ii. 387), about this time. It seems to agree
well with a time when Sparta and Achaia are allied against Ztolia. This is one
of the many things which make us wish that Polybios had begun his detailed
history earlier.

1 J have already often shown that the Achaian Democracy was practically an
Aristocracy in the best sense of the word, an ἀριστοκρατία as distinguished from
a mere ὀλιγαρχία.

VII CONTRAST BETWEEN ARATOS AND AGIS 807

harvest was gathered in; the country people might take refuge
in the towns till the storm had passed by ; the enemy could not
do so much damage in a passage through Achaia as they would
do if they won a battle at Corinth. Agis, unconvinced, yielded
to the superior authority of the Achaian General,’ and, soon Agis
after, for some reason or other, he and his army retired. The Tires.
common feeling of the Achaian army was strongly with Agis.
Aratos had to bear many bitter reproaches on his supposed
weakness and cowardice.‘ But military and constitutional dis-
cipline prevailed; the chief of the League was obeyed. The Capture
Aétolians passed the Isthmus undisturbed ; they passed through andre
the Sikyénian territory; they entered the old Achaian land ; Palléve.
they burst on the city of Pelléné, took it, fell to plundering,
and were scattered about the town, fighting’with one another
and carrying off the spoil and the women. This was doubtless
the moment for which Aratos had waited ; in a surprise he was
as much in his element as in a battle he was out of it. The
plunderers soon heard that the Achaians were in full march ;
before they could recover discipline and form in order of battle,
they were attacked by Aratos and utterly routed. The whole
army retreated, and we hear no more of Attolian incursions for
some-time- == =

The result in this case was of course held to approve the Estimate
foresight of Aratos. It is certain that he obtained a great and οἵ me tof
lasting success at a comparatively small price. But we may Aratos in
doubt whether it is the part of a patriotic ruler to stand by and this cam-
allow_eyen one city of his countrymen to be sacrificed rather P#ign.
than mn the risk of defeat in the open field. And we may feel

1 Here Plutarch definitely quotes the Memoirs of Aratos. (Agis, 15.)
Βέλτιον ἡγεῖτο, τοὺς καρποὺς σχεδὸν ἅπαντας σνγκεκομισμένων τῶν γεωργῶν,
παρελθεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους ἣ μάχῃ διακινδυνεῦσαι περὶ τῶν ὅλων.

2 Τὸ. "Edn [(6*Ayis] . . . ποιήσειν τὸ δοκοῦν ᾿Αράτῳ, καὶ γὰρ πρεσβύτερόν
τε εἶναι καὶ στρατηγεῖν ᾿Αχαιῶν, οἷς οὐχὶ προστάξων οὐδὲ ἡγησόμενος, ἀλλὰ συ-
στρατευσόμενος ἥκοι καὶ βοηθήσων.

8 Aratos dismissed them — τοὺς συμμάχους ἑπαινέσας διαφῆκε (ib.). But
why? Droysen (ii. 8390) makes Aratos afraid of the revolutionary principles of
his allies. This is quite possible; but it seems simpler to suppose with Bishop
Thirlwall (viii. 128) that Agis, “considering his presence useless if no battle was
to be fought,” “requested leave to withdraw,” and received it.

4 Plut. Ar. 31. Πολλὰ μὲν ὀνείδη, πολλὰ δ᾽ els μαλακίαν καὶ ἀτολμίαν
σκώμματα καὶ χλευασμὸν ὑπομείνας οὐ προήκατο τὸν τοῦ σνμφέροντος λογισμὸν
διὰ τὸ φαινόμενον αἰσχρόν. How differently would Plutarch have had to write
if the policy of Aratos had failed ; Κλέων Προμηθεὺς ἐστὶ μετὰ τὰ πράγματα.

5 See the pretty story of the daughter of Epigéthés, Plut. Ar. 32.

Truce
with
Antigonos,
Alliance
between
the two

Leagues.
Death of
Antigonos

Gonatas,
B.O. 239.

The Démé-

trian War.

308 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

sure that, if the policy of Aratos had been unsuccessful, had he
failed to recover Pelléné, or even failed to deal some decisive
blow at the enemy, such failure would have been probably far
more disastrous, and certainly far more ignominious, than any
possible defeat in a pitched battle. The case is not like that of
Periklés allowing the Lacedemonians to ravage Attica undis-
turbed. Athens was strong in her fleet, but utterly unable to
resist the Peloponnésian land-army. To be passive by land and
active by sea was her only means of defence. But the com-
bined forces of Sparta and the extended League ought to have
been a fair match for any A‘tolian invaders, and probably any
other General than Aratos would have fought a battle at the
Isthmus. Aratos, whether in prudence or in cowardice, judged
otherwise. He ran a greater risk than that of any battle, but he
succeeded, and, of course, as he succeeded, he added to his fame.

This relief of Pelléné and defeat of the AXtolians was in its
results a very important event. Antigonos! concluded a truce
with the League, which remained in force till his death. With
the AXtolians the League, either then or soon after, concluded
not only peace but alliance. This was brought about by Aratos
and Pantaleén, who is spoken of as the most powerful man in
A&tolia, and who was doubtless the General of the year.?. After
the death of Antigonos, the combined forces of the two Leagues
carried on a war with his successor Démétrios,® of which hardly
any details have been preserved. It was now, most probably,
that the Aitolian power extended itself over so many of the
towns of Thessaly and the Phthidtic Achaia.* It is certain that
Aratos fought a battle with the Macedonian Bithys, at a place
which there is every reason to believe was in Thessaly.° This
seems to have been his first pitched battle, and he lost it. It is
also certain that the Bootians, for fear of an invading Macedonian
army, now forsook the Attolian for the Macedonian alliance.®

1 This is implied in Plut. Ar. 33. Σπονδὰς πεποιημένων αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς Maxe-
δόνας, K.7.X.

2 Ib. Πανταλέοντι τῷ πλεῖστον Αἰτωλῶν δυναμένῳ συνέργῳ χρησάμενος
[ὁ “Aparos]. Cf. Pol. ii. 44.

3 Pol. ii. 44, 46. ‘O Δημητριακὸς πόλεμος.

4 See Schorn, p. 88. He reckons up Hypata, Lamia, the Phthidtic Thebes,
Melitaia, Pharsalos, Larissa Kremasté, and Echinos.

δ Phylakia. Plut. Ar. 34. See Thirlwall, viii. 188, for an examination of
several small controversies which have arisen about the details of the Démétrian
War, but which do not at all bear upon the subject of this history.

6 Pol. xx. 5. See above, p. 142.

VII ALLIANCE WITH ZTOLIA 809

Altogether, the little that we hear of this war does not give us
the notion of any great glory won by the Achaian arms in war-
fare so far from home, nor does it supply any details which
illustrate constitutional questions. It is far more interesting to
trace the progress of the League in Southern Greece.

Th j -the-heart-of Aratos were still the Unsue-
deliverance of Athens and the deliverance of Argos. Over and ἐαδείαὶ αἰ
over again did he attempt both.! Peiraieus was still held by its jratos on
Macedonian garrison. Even before the death of Antigonos, Peiraicus,
while the League was still at peace with Macedonia, Aratos did ®° 289.
not scruple to cause one of his agents to attempt a surprise of
the fortress. In his own Memoirs he strove to make the world
believe that this man attacked Peiraieus on his own account,
and that, when he was beaten back, he affirmed that Aratos had
sent him. His name was Erginos, a native of Syria, but doubt-
less of Greek or Macedonian descent, who had been one of the
instruments of Aratos in the capture of Akrokorinthos.* He
was therefore a tried and trusty agent of the Achaian General,
very likely to be employed by him on such an adventure, but
hardly the man to attempt to capture cities on his own account.

So unlikely a story met with no credit at the time, and Aratos
suffered somewhat in reputation among his countrymen® for
bringing on the League the discredit of a breach of truce. This

piece of information is valuable on many grounds. It shows us

the true position of Aratos as chief of the League. It illustrates

the great powers which were vested in an Achaian General.

The attack on Peiraieus must have been made wholly on Aratos’

own responsibility, or he could never have attempted to throw

off that responsibility on the shoulders of a private foreigner.
Aratos had undoubtedly exceeded his legal powers, but it was Ilustra-
only the legal extent of those powers which gave him the oppor- oe οἱ
tunity or the temptation of exceeding them. But it also sets tion of ᾿
him before us as the really accountable chief of a free common- Ασαῦοβ.
wealth. Great as Aratos was, he had to undergo the free criti-

cism and censure of a popular Assembly, and to meet and answer
orators who evidently did not scruple to withstand him to his

face. But it would seem also that the Assembly was satisfied

with such criticism and censure; the permanent influence of

: Plut. Ar. 88. Οὐ δὲς οὐδὲ τρὶς ἀλλὰ πολλάκις, ὥσπερ οἱ δυσέρωτες.
Tb. 18, 33.
3 Ib. 33. Διεβλήθη καὶ κακῶς ἤκουσεν ὑπὸ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν.

Various
attempts
on Athens,
Β.6. 239-
229.

Feeling
towards
Aratos at
Athens.

810 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Aratos was clearly not diminished, nor is it certain that there
was any intermission in the practice of electing him President in
alternate years! We may also observe that the international
morality of the League is higher than that of its chief. Aratos
did not scruple at a breach of treaty which the feeling of the
Achaian Assembly evidently condemned. We may remark again
the different feelings with which a King and a Tyrant were
looked upon. King Antigonos has his rights ; he is entitled to
all the advantages of International Law; the League at once
feels that any breach of treaty towards him is a stain upon the
national honour. But it does not appear that what we should
call the far more dishonourable attempts of Aratos upon the
Argeian Tyrants called forth any such indignation at home, and
we have seen how lenient was the censure pronounced upon them
even by neutral judges. When war again broke out with Mace-
donia, Aratos was able to renew his attempts on Athens ina
more honourable form. He took a personal share in repeated,
but always unsuccessful, invasions of Attica, in one of which he
received a severe wound.” After his defeat in Thessaly two
rumours were afloat, one that he was taken prisoner, the other
that he was dead. The former was that which reached King
Démétrios, who sent a ship from Macedonia to bring the captive
to his presence. But in Athens and Peiraieus men believed that
Aratos was dead, and the inference was somewhat hastily drawn
that the Achaian League had died with him. Diogenés, the
Macedonian commander in Peiraieus, at once summoned Corinth
to surrender ; Aratos was dead, and the Achaians would do well
to retire quietly. In Athens men wore crowns at the report of
his death, as their forefathers had done at the report of the
death of Philip. A certain amount of real repugnance to union
with the League was probably mingled with a certain amount of
flattery towards their Macedonian masters.2 But Aratos, alive
and within the walls of Corinth, himself dictated the answer to
the summons of Diogenés, and the Achaian army, with its
General at its head, presently advanced as far as the Academy.

1 The whole question of the Presidential years of Aratos will be discussed in a
note at the end of the next chapter. ;

2 Plut. Ar. 88. “Απαξ δὲ καὶ τὸ σκέλος ἔσπασε διὰ τοῦ Θριασίου φεύγων᾽ καὶ
τομὰς ἔλαβε πολλὰς θεραπευόμενος καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐν φορείῳ κομιζόμενος ἐποιεῖτο
τὰς στρατείας.

5 ΤΌ. 84. Πᾶσαν δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι κουφότητα κολακείας τῆς πρὸς Μακεδόνας ὑπερβάλ-
λοντες ἐστεφανηφόρησαν, ὅτε πρῶτον ἠγγέλθη τεθνηκώς.

VII ATTEMPTS ON ATHENS AND ARGOS 811

The would-be deliverer was cut to the heart that Athens should

look, or even pretend to look, upon him as an enemy; but he
allowed himself to be persuaded by an Athenian embassy, and

he retired without doing hurt to the city or its suburbs.

' Meanwhile the Achaian leader was not a whit less anxious to Attempts
restore freedom to the city where he had spent his own days of οὗ Aratos
exile. After Aratos’ first attempt in his second Presidency, a 7 σον
constant warfare seems to have gone on, not so much between 229.
Argos and the League as between Aristippos and Aratos.2 The

Tyrant was always plotting the death of the patriot, at which

indeed we cannot wonder when we remember that the patriot

had equally plotted the death of the Tyrant’s predecessor,
possibly his father. But one would rather not believe that

King Antigonos was a fellow-conspirator, and it may well be

that the report to that effect was only an unauthorized conjecture

of Aratos himself. On the part of Aratos, every sort of attack,

secret or open, was employed for many successive years, The

war was of the usual kind; Aratos fought and lost one or two
pitched battles, but in diplomatic dealings, in surprises, in night-
marches, he was as skilful and as daring as ever. In the open

field, by the banks of the river Charés, the General of the
Achaians ran away, when victory was declaring for his army ; *

yet the same General could in his own person scale the walls of

Argos, fight hand to hand with the Tyrant’s mercenaries, and

only retire when disabled by a severe wound. Bitter was his
disappointment when he found that the Argeians, whom he came

to deliver, stirred not hand nor foot in his behalf, but sat by and

looked on at his exploits as if they were sitting to adjudge the

prize in the Nemean Games.° But if he ran away at the Charés,

if he had to retire from Argos, he presently gained the city of

1 Plut. Ar. 34. Πρὸς ὀργὴ» εὐθὺς ἐκστρατεύσας ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἄχρι τῆς ᾿Ακαδημείας
προῆλθεν᾽ εἶτα πεισθεὶς οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν.

2 See the comparison in Plutarch (Ar. 25, 26) of the position of the two.
Compare also the description of the private life of Aristippos with that of
Alexander of Pherai in Plut. Pel. 35. Alexander however has a wife, Aristippos
has only an ἐρωμένη with a complaisant mother.

3 “ Συνεργοῦντος ’Ayrryévov. Plut. Ar. 25,—perhaps only a suspicion expreased
by Aratus in his Autobiography.” Thirlwall, viii. 126.

4 See the whole story in Plut. Ar. 28.

δ᾽ Ib. 27.

6 Ib. Ol μὲν ᾿Αργεῖοι, καθάπερ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίας τῆς μάχης οὔσης,
GAN’ ὡς τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Νεμείων βραβεύοντες, ἴσοι καὶ δικαιοὶ θεαταὶ καθῆντο τῶν
γινομένων πολλὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντες. This, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 126) says,
is probably Aratos’ own comparison.

Kleénai
joins the

League.

Death

of Arist-
ippos the
Second.
Tyranny
of Aristo-
machos the
Second.

$12 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE OHAP.

Kleénai as a member of the League. When the Tyrant marched
against this new acquisition, Aratos, by a forced march, fore-
stalled him, entered the city, sallied forth vigorously, drove back
the enemy, chased them to Mykéné, and left Aristippos dead
upon the field. The victory, however, was for the present fruit-
less ; a_second Aristomachos; perhaps the son~of Aristippos,’
seized upon the government with Macedonian help,? and Argos
was as far from deliverance as before.®

1 See above, p. 297, note 2.

3 Plut. Ar. 29. Ὁ δὲ “Aparos, οὕτω λαμπρῶς εὐτυχήσας . . - ὅμως οὐκ ἔλαβε
τὸ "Αργος οὐδὲ ἠλευθέρωσε, τῶν περὶ ᾿Αγίαν καὶ τὸν νεώτερον ᾿Αριστόμαχον μετὰ
δυνάμεως βασιλικῆς παρεισπεσόντων καὶ κατασχόντων τὰ πράγματα. Agias was
doubtless the Macedonian commander,

3 The accession of Aristomachos involves a question of some importance. Was
this the time mentioned by Polybios (ii. 59), when Aratos entered Argos, but
retired on finding that the Argeians did not support him, on which Aristomachos
put eighty of the chief citizens to death with torture as adherents of the Achaians
The point is worth examining, for this Aristomachos was afterwards General of
the League, and one naturally wishes to know whether any man who held that
Office had ever been guilty of such a monstrous crime. Droysen (ii. 486) and
Bishop Thirlwall—the latter perhaps not quite positively—place it at this time.
(See the narrative and note, Thirlwall, viii. 184.) According to this view, Aratos
pressed on in his pursuit to Argos itself, and entered the city ; but Aristomachos
had already seized on the government, and, as soon as Aratos had retired, he
murdered the eighty citizens. I confess that the narrative of Plutarch does not
give me the idea that Aratos continued the pursuit beyond Mykéné, and the words
of Polybios do not give me the idea that the massacre was the very first act of the
rule of Aristippos. It may well be doubted whether the story in Polybios and
the story in Plutarch have anything to do with one another. Dr. Schmitz, in the
Dictionary of Biography (art. Aristomachus) places the massacre much later, in
the time of the Kleomenic War, after Aristomachos had joined the Achaian
League, and again forsaken it. I can find no point in the history of those times
which suits the events, and the whole language of Polybios points to the days
when Aratos was trying to deliver Argos from the Tyrants, not to the days when
Argos was a revolted city of the Achaian Union. Schorn, on the other hand (p.
118), throws out a hint which seems to me to have great probability. ‘‘ Das
Verbrechen, welches ihm [Aristomachus] der genannte Schriftsteller [Polybius}
(2, 59, 8 f.) zur Last legt, hat jener wahrscheinlich nicht begangen. Aus Plutarch
(Arat. 25 und 27) lisst sich vermuthen, dass Polybius den jiingeren Aristomachus
mit dem alteren oder vielmehr mit Aristippus verwechselt hat.’ That Polybios
has thus confounded Aristomachos with one of his predecessors seems really very
likely. The description which he gives of Aratos entering Argos, and retiring
because he found no help from the citizens, agrees with nothing which is else-
where mentioned of the rtign of Aristomachos the Second. But it very well
agrees with the first passage quoted from Plutarch by Schorn, in the time of
Aristomachos the First, and still more with the second one, in the time of Aris-
tippos. The question then arises whether Polybios could have made such a mis-
take. We must remember that Polybios, in this part of his work, is writing of
events which happened before his own birth, and that Plutarch had before him
the same contemporary writers that Polybios had. The difference between the
authority of the two is therefore not so very great. And Polybios does not men-

vit ACCESSION OF KLEONAI TO THE LEAGUE 818

The accession of Kleénai, though in itself an inconsiderable Accession
city, must have added somewhat to the position of the League in οἵ mieonal
general estimation. The Kleénaians were doubtless willing and League.
zealous confederates. Their city had hitherto occupied a position Its effects.
with regard to Argos somewhat like that which had been
occupied by Pisa with regard to Elis. As the Pisatans claimed
to be the lawful presidents of the Olympic festival, so the
Kleénaians claimed to be the lawful presidents of the Nemean
festival. But, for ages past, their rights had been usurped by
their powerful neighbours of Argos, who seem to have held
Kleénai in the condition of dependent alliance. Accession to
the League was, to a city in such a position, promotion in every
sense. The League knew of no distinctions between its members,
and Kleénai was doubtless admitted as an equal confederate, on
a perfect level with Sikyén and Corinth. And, more than this,
the Kleénaians were now, for the first time, able to vindicate
their rights, and to celebrate their own Nemean Games. The
League, numbering Corinth and Kleénai among its members,
had now two out of the four great national festivals of Greece
celebrated within its territory. But the Argeians did not tamely
surrender their privilege. Like the Eleians, when the Arkadians
celebrated Olympic Games under Pisatan presidency,’ they s.c. 364.
ignored the Kleénaian festival, and celebrated Nemean Games of
their own. It was part of the International, or rather of the
Canon, Law of Greece, that all competitors on their way to or
from any of the national games had free passage, even through the Rival cele-
territories of states with which their own cities might be at war. Drations
This immunity is said never to have been violated before ; but nemean
now all competitors at the Argeian Nemeia who passed through Games.
any Achaian territory—and none could come by land from
Northern Greece without doing so—were seized by the Achaians
and sold as slaves.2, This unjust and cruel act was doubtless
vindicated on the technical ground that the Argeian Nemeia were
not the true festival, and that therefore competitors going to or
tion this massacre in any part of his own regular narrative, but as an obiter dictum
in a somewhat rhetorical attack on the historical credibility of Phylarchos. In
the very next chapter (ii. 60) there is a flat contradiction as to the fate of this
very Aristomachos between Polybios and Phylarchos followed by Plutarch. It
therefore really does not seem so very unlikely that Polybios may have here con-
founded the younger Aristomachos with one of his predecessors.

1 Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 28 et seqq. On this occasion the claimants came to a

regular battle within the sacred precincts, of which we do not hear at Nemea.
2 Plut. Ar. 28.

Extension
of the
League in
Arkadia.

€tolian
acquisi-
tions in
Arkadia.

Accession
of Kynai-
tha and
other
Arkadian
towns

to the
Achaian
League.

814 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP

coming from them had no right to any privilege. But anyhow
they were travellers from friendly or neutral states, who were
not injuring the League or any of its cities. Plutarch calls this
proceeding a proof of Aratos’ inexorable hatred! towards
Tyrants ; it was at all events a strange and pitiful way of
showing it.

We must now trace the progress of the League on the side
of Arkadia. It is evident that the old Arkadian Union, the
work of Lykomédés, had now utterly passed away. No Assembly
of Ten Thousand could, for many years past, have been gathered
together in the theatre of the Great City. The Arkadian cities
now appear altogether single and disunited, and many of them
were ruled by Tyrants. And, up to this time, those cities which
had joined either of the two great Confederations had, whether
by choice or by compulsion, attached themselves to Xtolia
rather than to Achaia. It must be remembered that, inaccessible
as Arkadia and Aitolia look to one another on the map, the
close alliance which always existed between Attolia and Elis gave
the Aitolians constant opportunities of meddling in the internal
affairs of Peloponnésos.2 Tegea, Phigaleia,$ Orchomenos, became
fEtolian allies or subjects. Kynaitha, on the other hand, at
some time of which we do not know the exact date, had joined
the Achaian League. This city had been torn to pieces by
internal struggles, till at last the party which had the upper
hand asked for Achaian help, and received a garrison under an
Achaian commander. This precaution does not show that
Kynaitha was admitted to the Union on any but the usual equal
terms ; for we have already seen that a Federal garrison was
also kept at Corinth, which was beyond doubt an independent
and highly-important member of the League. Other Arkadian
towns were also won to the League, as Stymphalos, Kleitér,
Pheneos, Kaphyai, Héraia, and Telphousa, but generally we
know nothing of the time or manner of their acquisition, but

1 Plut. Ar. 28. Οὕτω σφοδρὸς ἣν καὶ ἀπαραίτητος ἐν τῷ μισεῖν τοὺς τυράννους.
2 Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 186) connects these Arkadian acquisitions of Atolia
with pe great 4&tolian invasion of Lakonia. See above, p. 806.

4 Ib. 17. See above, p. 242. We may suppose that the failure of Aratos
before Kynaitha, mentioned incidentally by Polybios (ix. 17), took place at some
early stage of these events. Aratos was νέος ἀκμήν, which can only refer to the

time of one of his earliest Generalships, or possibly to some subordinate command
before he was General. See Brandstiiter, p. 237.

VII LYDIADAS TYRANT OF MEGALOPOLIS 815

learn the fact only from afterwards finding them incidentally
spoken of as Achaian towns.1 Mantineia went through a series Revolu-
of revolutions, of which we should like to know the exact dates.? tions of |
She first united herself to the Achaian body, and then—our Mantinele.
first. recordéd instance of secession—deserted it for a connexion,

on whatever terms, with A‘tolia. We have no eertain informa-

tion when this revolf took place, except that, it was before the

war with Kleomenés, and therefore at some time within our Before
present period. Mantineia was perhaps induced to forsake the 5.0. 227.
League, when the League admitted to its fellowship a city which

was Mantineia’s special rival. For we have. now reached the

time when the League made, in point of actual strength, its
greatest acquisition since that of the Corinthian Akropolis, and

one which proved in its results the greatest of all its acquisitions

since that which made Aratos himself its citizen. Megalopolis, Union of
the Great City, once the Federal capital of Arkadia, now became MEcato-
a single canton of the Federation of Achaia. No greater gain ΤΗΝ °u.,
did the Achaian Union ever make than this which gave her one Achaian
of her greatest cities, and a long succession of her noblest citizens. League,
It was a bright day indeed in the annals of the League which *” 254.
gave her Philopoimén and Lykortas and Polybios, and, greater

than all, the deathless name of Lydiadas. _

Lydiadas, Tyrant of Megalopolis, and thrice General of the Character
Achaian League, is a man of whom but little is recorded, but of bY>¥4-
that little is enough at once to place him among the first of men.°® “
We know him mainly from records tinged with the envy of a
rival, and yet no fact is recorded of him which does not in truth
redound to his honour. In his youth he seized the Tyranny of
his native city, but he seized it with no ignoble or unworthy
aim. We know not the date 4 or the circumstances of his rise to
sovereign power, but there is at least nothing to mark him as

1 See Pol. ii. 52. 55; iv.19. Polyainos (ii. 86) records a stratagem by which
the Achaian General Dioitas obtained possession of Héraia. It is a silly story
enough, and Polyainos shows how little he understood the Achaian constitution,
by making the Héraians offer themselves as subjects of the Achaians ; ἱκετεύοντες
ἀπολαβεῖν τὴν πατρίδα, ws εἰσαῦθις ὑπήκοοι γενησόμενοι τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς. But the
tale preserves to us the name of an otherwise unknown Achaian General. On the
date of the acquisition of Héraia, see p. 470, note 1.

2 Pol. ii. 57.

3 Besides the account of Lydiadas in Plutarch’s Lives of Aratos and Kleomenés,
and the brief mention of Polybios (ii. 44), there is an admiring picture of him
drawn by Pausanias, viii. 27. 12.

4 Droysen (ii. 872) places it about B.c. 244, soon after the seizure of Corinth
by Antigonos, but this date rests on no certain evidence.

316 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

one of those Tyrants who were the destroyers of freedom. He
is not painted to us as a midnight conspirator, plotting rebellion
against a state of things which made him only one free citizen
among many. Still less is he painted as the chief magistrate of
a free state, bound by the most solemn oaths to be faithful to its
freedom, and then turning the limited powers with which his
country had entrusted him to overthrow the liberties of which
he was the chosen guardian. We do not read that he rose to
power by driving a lawful Senate from their hall by the spears
of mercenaries, or by an indiscriminate massacre of his fellow-
citizens in the streets of the Great City. We do not read that
he reigned by crushing every nobler feeling, and by flattering
every baser passion, of his subjects; we are not told that every
man of worth or talent shrank from his service, and left him
only hirelings and flatterers as the agents of his will. There is
no evidence that the dungeons of Megalopolis or the cities of
free Greece were filled with men whose genius or whose virtue
was found inconsistent with his rule. We do not hear that his
_ foreign policy was one of faithless aggression ; that he gave out
that Tyranny should be Peace, and then filled Peloponnésos
with needless wars. It is not told us that he seized on city after
city, prefacing every act of plunder with solemn protestations
that nothing was further from his thoughts. Still less do we
find that he ever played the basest part to which Tyranny itself
can sink; that he stretched forth his hand to give a hypocritical
ald to struggling freedom, and then drew back that he might
glut his eyes with the sight of a land wasted by anarchy and
brigandage to which a word from him could at any moment put
an end. No; Lydiadas was, in the sense of his age and country,
a Tyrant, but it was not thus that he either gained or used a
power which in formal speech alone deserved to be called a
Tyranny. Others had reigned in the Great City far less worthy
to reign than he; he felt within himself the gifts and aspirations
of the born ruler; and, in a city which had long been used to
the sway of one, the vision of his youthful imagination took,
pardonably enough, the form not of a republican magistrate but
of a patriot King. Men told him that the sway of a single man
was best for times like his, that his heart and arm could better
guard his native land than the turbulence of the many or the
selfish narrowness of the few. He looked on sovereign power
as a means of working his country’s good and of winning for

VII LYDIADAS RESIGNS THE TYRANNY 817

himself a glorious name ; he would fain be a King of Men, a
Shepherd of the People, like the Kodros of legend or the Cyrus
of romance. He grasped the sceptre, and for a while he wielded
it. But he soon found that his dreams of patriotic royalty were
not suited to the land or the age in which he lived. And soon
a nobler path stood open before him. He saw the youth of
Sikyén enter upon a higher career than that into which he him-
self had been deluded. He saw that a man might rule by better
means than an arbitrary will, and might rest his power on better
safeguards than strong walls and foreign mercenaries. He saw
Aratos, the chosen chief of a free people, wield a power greater
than his own, purely because his fellow-citizens deemed him the
wisest and the worthiest among them. He saw how far higher
and nobler a place in the eyes of Greece was held by the elective
magistrate of the great Confederacy than by the absolute master
of a single city. He heard himself branded by a name which
he shared with wretches like Nikoklés and Aristippos; he
saw the arm raised against him, which was, whenever the favour-
able moment came, to hurl him from power by a doom like
theirs. Aratos had already marked Lydiadas for the next
victim, and Megalopolis as the next city for deliverance.1 The
Lord of Megalopolis, like Iseas at Keryneia, had now his choice
to make, and he made it nobly and wisely. He called his rival
to a conference, he laid aside his power, he dismissed his guards,
he went back to his house, Tyrant ‘now no longer, but one free
citizen of the free commonwealth of Megalopolis. The first act
of that commonwealth was naturally union with the Achaian
League; the name of Lydiadas was passed from tongue to Lydiadas
tongue through every city of the Confederation,? and at the next chosen.
annual election of Federal magistrates, the self-dethroned Tyrant sc. 233.
of Megalopolis was raised to the highest place in his new country
as the General of the year. Lydiadas, in resigning absolute
power, did not wish to resign power altogether, but only to hold
it by a tenure at once worthier and safer. He lived to be three

1 It should be noticed that Plutarch, following doubtless the Memoirs of
Aratos, puts this motive far more prominently forward than Polybios and
Pausanias, who represent Megalopolitan traditions. The words of Pausanias are
especially strong; ἐπεὶ δὲ ἤρχετο φρονεῖν, xaréwavey ἑαντὸν ἑκὼν τυραννίδος,
καίπερ ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἤδη οἱ τῆς ἀρχῆς καθωρμισμένης.

3 Paus. viii. 27. 12. Μεγαλοπολιτῶν δὲ συντελούντων ἤδη τότε ἐς τὸ
Αχαϊκὸν, ὁ Λυδιάδης ἔν τε αὐτοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ ἐνὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ᾿Αχαιοῖς
ἐγένετο οὕτω δόκιμος ὡς ᾿Αράτῳ παρισωθῆναι τὰ ἐς δόξαν.

Effects

of the ac-
quisition
of Megalo-
polis,

318 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP,

times General of the League, to distinguish himself alike as a
statesman and as a soldier, and at last he died in battle within
sight of his native city, and was honoured in death by a conquer-
ing enemy whose career was only less noble than his own.

The acquisition οὗ Megalopolis as_an Achaian city, and of
Lydiadas as a leading Achaian citizen, were important in many
ways. The Sey was now _brought into the very thick of
been given - its ΞΕ ΕΣ throughout Arkadia, and the
Tyrannies which still remained in the Argolic peninsula must
have become more completely isolated. But the acquisition of
Megalopolis and the conversion of Lydiadas had two results
which were more important still. They made the territories of
the League continuous with Lakonia, and they gave Aratos a

Rivalry of rival. Hitherto the policy of Aratos and the policy of the

Aratos and

Lydiadas.

League have been the same thing; except the one obscure
mention of Dioitas, we hear the name of no other Achaian
statesman ; Markos was still living, still serving his country ; we
may well believe that he was placed in the chief magistracy in
some of those years in which Aratos could not legally hold it,
but he has well-nigh passed out of memory, and there is nothing
which brings either him or any one else before us as a rival of
the recognized chief of the League. We read indeed that some
acts of Aratos brought on him a certain amount of censure in
the Assembly, but none of them had given any lasting shock to
his predominant influence in the commonwealth. The accession

\ of Lydiadas to citizenship, his election to the chief magistracy,
} at once gave Aratos his match. Lydiadas was as ambitious and

as energetic as himself, and, as events proved, a far abler soldier.
Placed at the head of the armies and the councils of the League,
he had not the slightest intention of acting as the instrument of
another man. Our account of their disputes comes doubtless
from the Memoirs of Aratos himself; it must therefore be taken
with the necessary allowances, as we have no counter-statement
from the side of Lydiadas. We can well believe that two veins
of feeling ran through the Achaian public mind, as men spoke of
the great citizen whom they had just adopted. Admiration
would be the first feeling. The man who had voluntarily given
up sovereign power, who had deliberately preferred the position
of a republican magistrate to that of an absolute ruler, would
be extolled as a hero indeed, as the very first and noblest of the

VII LYDIADAS GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE 819

friends of freedom. And of a truth the angel of freedom might

well rejoice over such a repentant sinner, more than over a
Markos or a Washington who needed no repentance. But, on

the other hand, it is easy to believe that there were men who

held that the Ethiopian could never change his skin, that the

man who had once been a Tyrant would be at heart a Tyrant

still, and that the destinies of a free Confederation could never

be safe in the hands of a man who had once wielded an absolute

sceptre over one of its cities.1 By such men every action and

every word of Lydiadas would be subjected to a far more ngid
scrutiny than had ever attended the political or military career

of Aratos. That Lydiadas was thrice chosen General—once at Second
least in the teeth of Aratos’ strongest opposition *—that, when General-
that opposition prevented further re-elections, he still served the Lydiadas,
League faithfully in subordinate commands, is quite proof enough 8.0. 281.
that all such suspicions were utterly unfounded. We are told

that he was constantly exhorting the League to needless under-
takings,® which the superior wisdom_of Aratos discountenanced.
Considering what we know of the two men, it is hardly going

too far to explain this as meaning that Lydiadas was ever the
champion of open and vigorous action, in opposition to the
surprises. and diplomatic triumphs in which his rival delighted.

But when we find Lydiadas charged with trying to induce the
League to attack Sparta, we can more readily believe that we Lydiadas’
are here listening to a true accusation, and that Aratos had amare to
really found out the weak side of the Megalopolitan hero. Most ©
certainly, as events a few years later proved, Aratos was, of all

1 Plut. Ar. 30. ᾿Απερρίφη καὶ παρώφθη πεπλασμένῳ δοκῶν ἤθει πρὸς ἀληθινὴν
καὶ ἀκέραιον ἀρετὴν ἁμιλλᾶσθαι. καὶ καθάπερ τῷ κὀκκνγί φησιν Αἴσωπος ἐρωτῶντι
τοὺς λεπτοὺς ὄρνιθας, ὅ τι φεύγοιεν αὐτὸν, εἰπεῖν ἐκείνους, ὡς ἔσται ποτὲ ἱέραξ,
οὕτως ἔοικε τῷ Λυδιάδῃ παρακολουθεῖν ἐκ τῆς τυραννίδος ὑποψία βλάπτουσα τὴν
πίστιν αὐτοῦ τῆς μεταβολῆς. This curious comparison probably comes from Aratos
himself.

2 ΤΌ. Kal τό γε δεύτερον ὁ Λυδιάδης στρατηγὸς ἠρέθη, ἀντιπράττοντος ἄντικρυς
᾿Αράτου καὶ σπουδάζοντος ἑτέρῳ παραδοθῆναι τὴν ἀρχήν.

8. ΤΌ. “AAAas τε πολλὰς πράξεις οὐκ ἀναγκαίας εἶναι δοκούσας καὶ στρατείαν ἐπὶ
Λακεδαιμονίους παρήγγελλεν. Droysen (ii. 446) conjectures that these needless
‘ proposals of Lydiadas had reference to changes in the constitution of the League,
especially to a reform in the Council of Ministers, which Droysen supposes to have
been still confined to the old Achaian towns. But surely the words used sound
much more like military expeditions than political changes, and why should there
be any feud between Aratos and Lydiadas upon the point supposed by Droysen ?
Any Constitutional advantages possessed by the Ten Cities were a wrong to Siky3n
as much as to Megalopolis, and, if Aratos could counterbalance them by purely
personal influence, Lydiadas might hope to do the same.

Affairs of
Northern
Greece.

Revolu-
tion in
Epeiros,
B.c. 239-
229,

320 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

men, the last who ought to have brought such a charge; but
we can well understand that Lydiadas might advocate even an
unjust war with Sparta, and he may have exhorted the Assembly
to operations in that quarter, even to the discouragement of
Aratos’ darling schemes upon Athens and Argos. e lis,
the creation of Epameinéndas, had been_at deadly feud with
Lacedzemon ever since it had been a city, and we can well
imagine that the hope of gaining the help of the League against
this ancient enemy had been one motive which had led Lydiadas
to unite his birthplace to the Achaian body. At all events we
find a rivalry, a constant opposition of projects, between these
two great citizens, which at last grew into a deep personal
enmity. Aratos—for Plutarch here speaks as the mouth-piece
of Aratos—tells us how Lydiadas’ charges against him were
rejected as the ebullitions of false virtue contending against true.!

‘Lydiadas unfortunately left no memoirs; but even Aratos lets

us know that his own opposition to Lydiadas was, by some at
least, attributed to envious feelings against a greater rival.?
Before our tale is over, we shall find the two chiefs contending
on points both of policy and of war, and in neither case shall we
have much doubt in pronouncing Lydiadas to. have been the
sounder and the nobler counsellor.

We must now turn our eyes for a while to Northern Greece.
Démétrios is still reigning in Macedonia; the two Leagues,
Achaian and Attolian, are still on friendly terms with each
other ; Démétrios is hostile to both, though we hear nothing
of any vigorous warfare. His attention seems to have been
mainly occupied by those barbarous tribes on his northern
frontier, in repelling which Macedonia undoubtettly acted as an
outpost of Greek civilization. Against the Achaians he seems
to have worked chiefly by dispensing lavish subsidies among
the petty Tyrants of Peloponnésos;% these were doubtless
devoted to the maintenance of mercenaries to act as guards
against the plots of Aratos. It was about this time that Epeiros
was transformed from a hereditary monarchy into a Federal
Republic.* Déidameia, the last of the line of Achilleus, found
herself unable to withstand the revolutionary spirit of the
nation ; she surrendered her royal powers to the people, retain-

1 Plut. Ar. 30.

2 Ib. ᾿Ἐνιστάμενος δὲ ὁ “Aparos αὐτῷ φθονεῖν ἐδόκει.

3 Pol. ii. 44. [Δημήτριος], ὃς ἣν αὐτοῖς [τοῖς ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ μονάρχοις] οἱονεὶ
χορηγὸς καὶ μισθοδότης. 4 See above, p. 117.

VIL FOUNDATION OF THE EPEIROT LEAGUE ᾿ς 82]

ing only the property and the honorary privileges of her fore-
fathers. It was a bad beginning of freedom, and one which

shows that the Epeirots had neither an Aratos nor a Lydiadas

among them, that this innocent princess, the descendant of
victorious Kings and deified heroes, was soon afterwards murdered

in a temple in which she had taken sanctuary. The Democracy Character
which succeeded is spoken of as turbulent and unruly,} as we of the
can well believe it to have been among a people only half Republic.
Greek, and utterly unaccustomed to regular freedom. The

young Republic soon became involved in a chain of events

which brought quite new actors upon the stage of Grecian
politics. The pirates of [lyria now begin to be heard of, and

a common interest in repressing their depredations first brings

the Greek commonwealths into any practical relations with the

Senate and People of Rome. These were, in their results, First
great events in the history of Greece and of the world. But political
just now we are more interested in the glimpses which are DATOOEY
given us of the political life of the Confederation of A‘tolia.

We are introduced not only to a siege by an Attolian army,

but to an election and a debate in the Attolian Assembly.
Characteristically enough, the army and the Assembly are but

the same persons invested with two different functions, and the
subject of the debate turns, as we might have expected, on
questions of plunder and annexation?

The restless hostility of the Attolians towards their neighbours Hostility
of Akarnania seems to have been in no way relaxed by the οὗ the
friendly relations between AXtolia and Achaia. Not long before, ‘Etohians
at least at some time during the reign of Démétrios, the Akar- Akar-
nanians had, in a fit of desperation, applied for help to the nani.
great commonwealth on the other side of the Hadriatic. They Akar-
alone, so they pleaded, among all the Greeks, had no share in nanan
the war waged by Greece against the Trojan ancestors of Rome ; to Rome,
the Akarnanians were not enrolled in the Homeric Catalogue 8.0. 239-
even as an independent people, much less as countrymen or 229:
subjects of their Aitolian oppressors.2> The Akarnanian embassy

1 Paus. iv. 35. 5. ᾿Ηπειρῶται δὲ ws ἐπαύσαντο βασιλεύεσθαι, τά re ἄλλα ὁ
δῆμος ὕβριζε καὶ ἀκροᾶσθαι τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὑπερεώρων. Cf. Justin, xxviii. 3.
One would like however to hear the answer of a democratic Epeirot to this charge.

7 Pol. ii. 2-4.

3 Strabo, x. 2. 25. Οἱ ᾿Ακαρνᾶνες σοφίσασθαι λέγονται Ῥωμαίους. .
λέγοντες, ws οὐ μετάσχοιεν μόνοι τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς προγόνους τοὺς ἐκείνὼν στρατείας"
οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ Αἰτωλικῷ καταλόγῳ φράζοιντο, οὔτε ἰδίᾳ, Cf. Justin, xxviii. 1.

Y

Siege of
Medeoén
by the
Atolians,
B.c. 231,

tolian
Assembly
in the
camp
before
Medeoén.

322 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

to Rome produced much the same effect as the Ionian embassy
to Sparta in the days of Cyrus.1 In both cases the power
appealed to interfered by a haughty message, but sent no
effectual aid. Rome ordered the Atolians to desist from- all
injuries towards Akaxnania,*:a mandate which only led, in
mockery of the barbarian interference, to a more cruel inroad
than Akarnania had ever before suffered. At the time which
we have now reached, we find the Attolians engaged in their
usual business of extending their Confederation by force of
arms. They were besieging the Akarnanian town of Medeén,
which had refused to become a member of their League.®
While the siege was going on, and when the inhabitants were
already counted on as a certain prey, the autumnal equinox
brought round the time for the yearly election of the A®tolian
Federal Magistrates. The Assembly summoned for that purpose
was evidently held beneath the walls of Medeén. The Attolians
had come with their whole force,* and, under such circumstances,
with Atolians, as with Macedonians, the army and the nation
were the same thing. Doubtless those citizens of Aitolia proper
who remained at home would be summoned ; but it is clear that
the outlying cities incorporated with the League could have no
share in a Meeting so collected. In this Assembly of citizen-
soldiers, the General who was going out of office—his name is
not mentioned—set forth his hardships before his hearers. He
had begun the siege of Medeén; he had brought it to a point
at which no man doubted of the speedy capture of the city ;
had it been taken within his year of office, he would have been
entitled to the disposition of the spoil and to have his name
inscribed on the arms which were preserved as trophies.® It
would be an injustice unworthy of a nation of soldiers, if

1 Herod. i, 141, 152.

3 The evidence for this Roman embassy to AStolia seems quite sufficient.
Justin—that is, Trogus Pompeius—doubtless, as Niebuhr says (ΚΙ. Schr. i. 256),
followed Phylarchos. But it involves an apparent contradiction to a passage of
Polybios, in which he seems to imply that the Roman Ambassadors who not long
after visited Atolia and Achaia were the first of their nation who had visited Greece
in an official character. (See Pol. ii 12; Niebuhr, u.s. ; Thirlwall, viii. 140. )
But I am not certain that the words of Polybios positively, or at all events in-
tentionally, deny the fact of this earlier embassy. As it led to no results, it
probably was not in his thoughts, and even his words need hardly imply any
direct contradiction of the story in Justin.

3 Pol. ii. 2. 4 Ib. Στρατεύσαντες οὖν πανδημεί.

5.1}, Δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῶν λαφύρων, ἐπὰν κρατήσωσι, καὶ Thy
ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν ὅπλων ἑαυτῷ σνγχωρεῖσθαι.

VII SIEGE AND RELIEF OF MEDEON 323

_

another commander should be allowed to step in, and to reap
the fruits which he had sown amid so much of danger and of
endurance. He therefore prayed the Assembly to decree that,
whatever might be the result of the election, these honours and
advantages might be reserved to himself as the true conqueror
of Medeén. Other speakers, especially those who were them-
selves candidates for the chief magistracy,! took the other side.
Let the spoils and the honours go, according to the law, to him
to whom fortune shall assign them. Some man of moderate
views must have proposed a compromise; for the Assembly
finally voted that the disposition of the spoil and the inscription
of the name should be shared by the outgoing General with the
General about to be elected. This discussion occupied that day ;
on the next day the new General was to be chosen, when, accord-
ing to Aitolian law, he would enter upon his office at once.”
But that very night help came tothe besieged. King Démétrios Relief of
was the ally of Akarnania ; his help took the same shape as the Mededu
support which he gave to the Peloponnésian Tyrants, but it Tilyrians
proved in this case very effectual. No Macedonian army marched
to raise the siege of Mededn; but Démétrios had, by a subsidy,
engaged the Illyrian King Agrén to send a large body of his
subjects by sea. The fleet, a hundred of the light piratical
vessels of Illyria, must have entered the Ambrakian Gulf and
landed the troops at Limnaia. By a swift and well-concerted
march, they surprised the A‘tolians, apparently while actually
engaged in electing their General. This attack, supported by
a sally from the city, completely routed the besiegers. Great
spoil fell into the hands both of the Illyrians and of the people
of Medeén. The latter presently in turn held their Meeting,
and the Medednian Assembly voted that the decree of the
AEtolian Assembly should be duly carried out, and that the
names both of the outgoing AXtolian General and of his successor
should be inscribed on the trophy raised by the victorious
Akarnanians.*

1 Pol. ii. 2. Τινῶν δὲ, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν προϊόντων πρὸς τὴν dpxiv, ἀμφισ-
βητούντων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα. 2 Ib. 8. See above, p. 264.

3 Brandstater (269) derides what he calls ‘das Episodische und Unwesentliche
dieser Anekdote.” I confess to being thankful for so life-like a report of an
tolian debate.

The independent action of the Medednian Assembly (ἐκκλησία) should also be
noticed. Akarnania formed one commonwealth in all dealings with other nations,

but, just as in Achaia, the canton of Mededn had its own local Assembly, with
full sovereignty in local matters.

Ravages
of the
Illyrians
in Pelo-
ponnésos.

Illyrian
capture of
Phoiniké,
B.C. 230.

324 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

The Illyrian King Agrén, and his widow Teuta, who presently
succeeded him, were emboldened by this success over such
renowned warriors as the Attolians_to—carry on. their piratical
excursions ona yet wider scale. They ravaged the coasts of _
Elis and Messénia, as they had often done before. Both coun-
tries had a long sea-board, and the principal towns were inland,
so that invaders by sea could gather a large booty without
danger of resistance! They now ventured on a bolder achieve-
ment. A party of them had occasion to land near Phoiniké in
Chaonia. This place, one of the greatest cities of Epeiros, had
been entrusted to the care of eight hundred mercenary Gauls,
who betrayed the town to the Illyrians. This form of national
defence certainly gives us no very favourable impression of the
wisdom of the new Epeirot Republic. Nor had its native armies
another Pyrrhos at their head; they utterly failed in the
attempt to recover Phoiniké. The young League of Epeiros
now applied for help to the elder Leagues of A‘tolia and Achaia.”
Help was sent, but no battle was fought; the cause of inaction

Alliance of is not mentioned, but Aratos was General of the year. Phoiniké

Epeiros
and Akar-
nania

with the
Iilyrians.

however was restored on terms to its owners, and the Epeirots,
together with the Akarnanians, concluded an alliance with the
Illyrians, by virtue of which they for the future helped the
barbarians against their benefactors from Southern Greece.®
The two Leagues were now generally looked to as the protectors
of Hellas. Epidamnos, Apollénia, Korkyra, were all attacked
or threatened. All three are spoken of as independent states,
from which we may infer that Korkyra, which had formed part
of the Kingdom of Pyrrhos, did not form part of the Epeirot
League.*_ Of these three cities, Epidamnos had gallantly beaten
off an Illyrian attack ; Korkyra was actually besieged, when a
joint embassy from all three implored the help both of A‘tolia

1 Pol. ii. 5.

2 Ib. 6. ᾿Επρέσβευον πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ τὸ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἔθνος.

3 Pol. ii. 6, 7, where the matter is discussed at length. Mommsen (Rom.
Gesch. i. 369) says, “ Halb gezwungen halb freiwillig traten die Epeiroten und
Akarnanen mit den fremden Riubern in eine unnatiirliche Symmachie.” The
Leagues of Akarnania and Epeiros thus became hostile to Achaia. The next
time we hear of them (see pp. 383, 389), they are Achaian allies. The probable
explanation is that the two northern Leagues became allied with Macedonia as
soon as Macedonia became hostile to Atolia, and, as Macedonian allies, became
Achaian allies along with Antigonos. As they had no direct cause of enmity
towards Achaia, they could have no repngnance to the Achaian alliance, as soon as

Achaia was again unfriendly to Atolia.
* See Dict. of Geog. art. Corcyra.

VII DEATH OF MARKOS 325

and of Achaia! The petition was listened to with favour by Joint ex-
the Assemblies of both Leagues, and ten Achaian ships, manned Pedition
with contingents from both nations,? were sent to the help of legac
Korkyra. Lydiadas was now General; there was therefore no to relieve
delay, no shrinking from action. Whether he himself com. Korkyra,
manded is not recorded, but the ships were sent at-ence,® and ~~ 229.
they were sent, not to intrigue or to lie idle, but to fight. This

is the first time that we hear of any naval operations on the

part of the League, and that, singularly enough, at a moment

when ita chief was an Arkadian landsman. The Achaians of the
original towns, though dwelling on a long sea-board, seem never

to have been a maritime people; their coast had no important
harbours,‘ and we hear nothing of any Achaian exploits by sea.

But the acquisition of so many maritime cities, above all of the

great Corinth with its two havens, would naturally tempt the
League to aspire to the character of a naval power. And it

would well agree with the lofty spirit of its present chief to seek

to win glory for his country on a new element. The original
4Etolians too were essentially a still more inland people than the
Achaians, but the possession of Naupaktos would naturally give

& maritime impulse to them also. The treaties with distant

cities like Teds and Kios® show that A‘tolian pirates infested

the Augean and even the Propontis, but the language of Polybios

seems to imply that the Attolians had no Federal navy, while

the Achaian League habitually kept ten ships.’ This combined

naval enterprise of the two Leagues unluckily failed. The
Achaian squadron, with its half Achaian, half Ztolian crews,

was defeated by the combined fleets of Illyria and Akarnania.
Among other ships lost or taken, a quinquereme was sunk which Death of
carried Markos of Keryneia, the original founder of the League, Markos of
still, in his old age, rendering faithful service to a commonwealth ΠΤ
of which he had long ceased to be the guiding spirit. Korkyra

1 Pol. ii. 9.

2 Ib Οἱ δὲ [᾿Αχαιοὶ καὶ of Αἰτωλοὶ) διακούσαντες τῶν πρέσβεων καὶ προσδεξ-
άμενοι τοὺς λόγους ἐπλήρωσαν κοινῇ τὰς τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν δέκα ναῦς καταφράκτους.

5. 10. Καταρτίσαντες δ᾽ ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας, ἐλπίζοντες
λύσειν τὴν πολιορκίαν.

* Plut. Ar. 9. Θαλάττῃ προσῴκουν [οἱ ᾿Αχαιοὶ] ἀλιμένῳ, τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ
ῥαχίας ἐκφερομένῃ πρὸς τὴν ἤπειρον. Yet Patrai has become a great port in later
times.

5 This may well have been among the πράξεις οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι proposed by
Lydiadas. 6 See above, p. 268.

7 This seems implied in the words τὰς δέκα vais.

Deéemétrios
of Pharos.

Inter-
ference
of Rome.

Korkyra,
Apollonia,
and Epi-
damnos
become
Roman
allies.
Humilia-
tion of
Illyria.

326 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

had to surrender ; she received an [Illyrian garrison, commanded
by a man who was one of the chief pests of Greece and the
neighbouring lands, Démétrios of Pharos. This man, a Greek of
the Hadriatic island from which he took his name, here began a
career of treachery which lasted for many years. He was now
in the service of Queen Teuta, but he soon found that her cause
was not the strongest. Rome had declared war against the
pirate Queen, in what was in truth the cause of all civilized
states on both sides of the sea. The Consul Cneus Fulvius
came against Korkyra with the Roman fleet; Démétrios, who
was already out of favour at the Illyrian court,! joined the
citizens in welcoming the invaders, and surrendered the Illyrian
garrison to Fulvius. Korkyra and, soon afterwards, Apollénia
and Epidamnos, became the first Roman Allies*—a condition
which so easily slid into that of Roman subjects—on the Greek
side of the Ionian Sea. The Illyrian kingdom was dismembered,
and the adventurer Démétrios suddenly grew into a consider-
able potentate, a large portion of the dominions of Teuta being
conferred upon him by the Roman conqueror.’ In the small
part of her kingdom which she was allowed to retain, she was
hampered with conditions which’ effectually hindered her from
being any longer dangerous to Greece. Not more than two
Illyrian ships, and those unarmed, might appear south of Lissos.

This is the first real interference of Rome in Grecian affairs.
The former haughty message to the XMtolians had no effect.
But now Rome appeared as an active, though as yet only asa
beneficent, actor on the Greek side of the sea. She had broken
the power which was just then’ most dangerous to Greece, and
had delivered three Greek cities from a barbarian yoke. The
wrongs of Akarnania and the defiance of Atolia were doubtless
by this time forgotten. Attolia, like Rome, was an enemy of
Illyria, while Akarnanian galleys, if they had not sailed to Troy
at the bidding of Agamemnén, had undoubtedly swelled the
numbers of the pirate fleet of Teuta. Aulus Postumius, the

1 Pol. ii. 11. Ἔν διαβολαῖς ὧν καὶ φοβούμενος τὴν Τεύταν.

2 Polybios (u.s.) uses a somewhat different word for the reception of each of
the three. Oi Κερκυραῖοι. .. αὐτοί re σφᾶς ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἔδωκαν παρακληθέντες
els τὴν τῶν Ρωμαίων πίστιν. . . . Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς Κερκυραίους
εἰς τὴν φιλίαν ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τῆς ᾿Απολλωνίας. . . καὶ τούτων ἀποδεξαμένων καὶ
δόντων ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν, . . . Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ᾿Ἐπιδαμνίους παρα-
λαβόντα εἰς τὴν πίστιν προῆγον, κιτιλ. [For Roman “faith” cf. below chap. ix.
p. 494.

3 See Thirlwall, viii. 140, note.

Vil INTERCOURSE WITH ROME 327

final conqueror of the Illyrian Queen, sent Ambassadors to the Roman
two Leagues, who explained the causes of the war with Teuta, Embassies
and of the appearance of Roman armies in a quarter where their Senge aw
presence might seem threatening to Greece.! They then related p.¢, 228.
the events of the campaign, and read out the treaty which had

just been concluded, the terms of which were so favourable to

the interests of every Greek state. The Roman envoys were
received, as they well deserved, with every honour in the Assem-

blies of both Confederations. The political embassy was followed Yonorary
by one, apparently of a religious or honorary character, to Embassies
Corinth and to Athens. The Corinthians bestowed on the io pornth
Romans the right of sharing in the Greek national festival of the Athens.
Isthmian Games.? This was equivalent to raising the Roman

People from the rank of mere barbarians to the same quasi-

Greek position as the Epeirots and Macedonians? It shows

also that the administration of the Isthmian Games was still in

the hands of the State of Corinth, and had not been at all trans-

ferred to the general Achaian body. As administrators of those

games, the Corinthians might lawfully receive and honour a

Roman Embassy which was charged with no political object, but

merely came on a pilgrimage to Corinth and its holy places.

Such an Embassy in no way interfered with the Federal sover-

eignty in matters of foreign negociation ; those had been already

dealt with by the Federal Assembly.4 And truly Rome might

just then seem worthy of any honours on the part of Greece.

Not but that a feeling of shame° might arise in the breast of

1 This seems implied in the expression of Polybios (ii. 12), ἀπελογίσαντο τὰς
αἰτίας τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς διαβάσεως.

4 Pol. ii. 12. ‘Awd δὲ ταύτης τῆς καταρχῆς Ρωμαῖοι μὲν εὐθέως ἄλλους πρεσ-
βευτὰς ἐξαπέστειλαν πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους᾽ ὅτε δὴ καὶ Κορίνθιοι
πρῶτον ἀπεδέξαντο μετέχειν Ῥωμαίους τοῦ τῶν ᾿Ισθμίων ἀγῶνος.

**Soon afterwards the Romans sent other embassies to Corinth and to Athens,
with no other object, so far as appears, than of introducing themselves to some
of the most illustrious states of the Greek name, which many of the Romans had
already learned to admire.” Arnold’s Rome, iii. 40.

3 Arnold, u.s. Thirlwall, viii. 140. The act, though done by a body of less
authority, had somewhat the same effect as the admission of Macedonia to the
Amphiktyonic franchise.

4 Td τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἔθνος. Pol. ii. 12, of the other embassy. See above, p.
208,

5 ** Man kann fragen, ob der Jubel in Hellas grisser war oder die Scham, als
statt der zehn Linienschiffe der achaeischen Eidgenossenschaft, der streitbarsten
Macht Griechenlands, jetzt zweihundert Segel der Barbaren in ihre Hafen einliefen
und mit einem Schlage die Aufgabe listen, die den Griechen zukam und an der
diese so kliglich gescheitert waren.’"’ Mommsen, Rim. Gesch. i. 371.

Eventual
results of
Roman
inter-
ference.

Inaction
of Mace-
donia.

Death of
Démétrios,
B.0. 229.

328 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

any patriotic Greek, when he thought that the freedom of three
cities, which the two greatest powers of independent Greece had
in vain attempted to deliver, had now to be received as a gift
from a barbarian conqueror.! The conduct of Rome throughout
this war was thoroughly just and honourable ; there is no reason
to charge either the Senate or individual Roman leaders with
any ulterior views of selfish aggrandizement ; but it is clear that,
when the Roman arms had once been seen before a Greek
fortress, when the wiles of Roman diplomacy had once been
listened to by a Greek Assembly, a path was opened which
directly led to the fight of Kynoskephalé and to the sack of
Corinth.

The inaction of Macedonia during all these events is remark-
able. Since Démétrios first engaged the Illyrians to help
Medeén, we hear of absolutely no Macedonian interference,
either warlike or diplomatic, in matters which would seem to
have very directly touched Macedonian interests. We are not
told with what eyes Macedonian statesmen looked upon the first
appearance of so formidable a power as-Reme in lands so closely
bordering upon their own. Nor do we hear that Rome thought
it necessary on this occasion to enter into any relations with the
Macedonian Kingdom. Roman embassies went on_ political
errands to Aigion and Thermon, and on honorary errands to
Corinth and Athens, but no envoy seems to have been dis-
patched in either character to the court of Pella or to the
sanctuary of Dion. This apparent temporary insignificance of a
power lately so great, and soon to be so great again, is explained
by the unusual activity of the restless northern tribes, and by
the commotions which commonly attended a change of sovereign
in Macedonia.2_ The reign of Démétrios ended about the time
when the Romans first crossed into Illyria® He appears to have
died in battle with the Dardanians ; certainly he had lately been
defeated by them.* The heir to his crown was his young son

1 ““Tn the course of this short war, not only Corcyra, but Apollonia also, and
Epidamnus, submitted to the Romans at discretion, and received their liberty, as
was afterwards the case with all Greece, as a gift from the Roman people.”
Arnold, iii. 39.

2 See Flathe, Gesch. Mac. i. 143 et seqq.

3 Pol. ii. 44. Δημητρίου δὲ βασιλεύσαντος δέκα μόνον ἔτη καὶ μεταλλάξαντος
τὸν βίον περὶ τὴν πρώτην διάβασιν εἰς τὴν ᾿Ιλλυρίδα Ρωμαίων.

4 See Thirlwall, viii. 141.

Vil AFFAIRS OF MACEDONIA 329

—_— a ---.

Philip, but the royal authority was assumed——first,, it would

a distinct ἢ reservation “of the ae of_young Philip as heir- antigonos
apparent. A new King of Macedonia seldom ascended the Dosdn,
throne without some disturbance, and a King reigning on such 2: 31 229-
terms as these was even less likely than usual to find his power ~
perfectly undisputed. We hear vaguely of fresh Dardanian
inroads, of commotions in Macedonia itself, and even of some
movements in Thessaly of which one would gladly know some-

thing more.” ΑἹ] these it appears that the energy of Antigonos
sufficed to put down; but his hands, like those of Démétrios

during the last years of his reign, must have been far too full for

him to give much attention to the advance either of Achaia or of

Rome-_

It is evident that the death of Démétrios, and the events Advance

which followed it, must have greatly shaken the Macedonian of me

influence in Southern Greece, and must have given a_propor- after the

tionate advantage to the cause of Greek independence.* The Death of
two great desires of Aratos were now to be gratified ; Athens Démétrios.
and Argos were both to be delivered. It would seem that

Aratos and the Athenians had at last come to. an_understanding.

The Achaian chief was no longer looked on as an enemy at
Athens, and he no longer pressed for the. incorporation of
Athens with the League. Both sides agreed to be satisfied if Deliver-

all Macedonian garrisons were withdrawn from Attica, and if Athers,

Athens, again restored to freedom, became the ally of Achaia. 5 ¢ 299,
The way in which this desirable end was brought about curiously
Ulustrates the position and character of Aratos. He was not
then in office, the Presidency of the League being held by his
rival Lydiadas.5 But it was not to Lydiadas, but to Aratos, that

1 Justin, xxviii. 3.

3 Ὃ Δώσων, he who is about to give, that is, he who promises and does not
perform. It does not appear how he came by the nickname, as his general con-
duct is honourable and straightforward.

+ Justin, xxviii. 3. See Thirlwall, viii. 164.

4 Pol. ii. 44. Δημητρίου δὲ. . . μεταλλάξαντος τὸν βίον. . ἐγένετό τις
εὔροια πραγμάτων πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιβολὴν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν. Plut. Ar. 84. Καὶ
Μακεδόνων μὲν ἀσχόλων ὄντων διά τινας προσοίκους καὶ ὁμόρους πολέμους, Αἰτωλῶν
δὲ συμμαχούντων, ἐπίδοσιν μεγάλην ἡ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἐλάμβανε δύναμις.

5 So Flathe, ii. 156. Plutarch (Ar. 34) says only ἑτέρου μὲν, ἄρχοντος τότε
τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν, but it clearly was Lydiadas. This year, B.c. 229, is that of his
third and last Generalship.

Applica-
tion of the
Athenians
to Aratos
when out
of office.

Aratos
buys the
Mace-
donians
out of
Attica.

330 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

the Athenians applied for help.' To them Aratos, whether as
friend or as enemy, had always appeared as the one representa-
tive of the League ; we hear of no application to the Achaian
General, of no audience given to Athenian Ambassadors by the
Achaian Assembly ; he who had delivered Sikyén and Corinth is
prayed to deliver Athens also somehow or other. Probably the
Macedonian garrisons would have hindered the progress of
avowed Athenian envoys on such an errand ; but nothing need
have hindered Aratos from communicating the message which he
had secretly received, if not to the Assembly or to the Senate,
yet at all events to the Chief Magistrate of the year. But so to
have done would have been to run the risk of winning glory and
influence for a rival; it would have been giving the rash ex-
Tyrant a fresh opportunity tO propose some of his needless
enterprises. Lydiadas might have gone the length of an open
attack on the Macedonian garrisons, and have exposed the
armies of the League to all the hazards of a pitched battle.
Aratos, as ever, is zealous for the deliverance of a Greek
state, above all for the deliverance of Athens; to promote
that deliverance he is ready to undergo any amount of
personal cost, personal exertion, and personal danger; he will
gladly free Attica from the presence of the stranger, but he
must be allowed to free her himself, and to free her in his own
way. This time he did not try a night escalade; a long illness,
which obliged him to be carried in a litter, prevented him from
leading an attack on Peiraieus or Mounychion ; probably, as the
Macedonians occupied four distinct fortresses, even a successful
attack on one garrison might have done little more than increase
the watchfulness of the others.2, His way of compassing his end
was simple but daring. He went in his litter to a private con-
ference with Diogenés, the Macedonian officer of whom we have
already heard, and negociated a bargain, by which, in considera-
tion of a sum of one hundred and fifty talents, Diogenés restored
Peiraieus, Mounychion, Sounion, and Salamis to the Athenians.
At this particular juncture the position of Diogenés must have
been very precarious and ambiguous. Macedonia had lost her
King, and was in a state of utter confusion ; he could expect no

1 Plnt. Ar. 84. Οἱ δ᾽ ᾿Αθηναῖοι συμφρονήσαντες αὐτοῦ [’Apdrov] τὴν ἀρετὴν,
ἐπεὶ Δημητρίου τελευτήσαντος ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἐκεῖνον ἐκάλουν.

2 Paus. ii. 8.6. Οὐ γὰρ ἤλπιζε δύνασθαι πρὸς βίαν αὐτὰ ἐξελεῖν.

3 See above, p. 310.

VII DEALINGS OF ARATOS WITH ATHENS AND ARGOS 3881]

aid from home, nor could he tell what might be the policy of
the new reign. The idea of such independence as Alexander had
enjoyed at Corinth might have occurred to him, but one hundred
and fifty talents in ready money may well have seemed more valu-
able than such a hope accompanied by so many risks. The money
was paid; Aratos himself contributed a large sum,’ either out of
his private estate or out of the accumulations of his Egyptian
pension. The Macedonians departed; Athens was again free,
but her incorporation with the League was not pressed. Aratos
had won a victory after his own heart; he had achieved one of
the foremost and noblest objects of his ambition. He had
delivered a famous city, and had won a new ally for his country,
and that without shedding a drop of blood, and at no one’s risk
or cost but his own. But we can well understand that Lydiadas
might be displeased at seeing a private citizen do even such good
deeds, without deeming the -Chief Magistrate of the League
worthy of any share in them ; and he may have looked on the de-
liverance of Greek cities by gold instead of steel as an unworthy
substitution of the merchant’s craft for that of the warrior.

Though Athens had not actually joined the League, yet this ex- Progress
ploit of Aratos, and the consequent close alliance of Athens, greatly of the
raised the Achaian credit and influence. Aigina at once joined Union of
the League ;? Xenén, Tyrant of Hermioné, followed the example Aigina and
of Lydiadas, laid down the Tyranny, and made Hermioné another Hermione.
member of the Achaian body. We may also infer from a vague
notice in Plutarch that some more of the Arkadian towns were
gathered in at the same time.‘ And now came the great acquisi-
tion of Argos. In the narrative of this event we_have the
rivalry between Aratos and Lydiadas more vividly set before us
than ever. Lydiadas was General of the League; but Aratos Unautho-
did not think it inconsistent with the duty of a good citizen to ried nF
make private advances to Aristomachos, to send messages to ‘Araton
him, to invite him to follow the example of Lydiadas in laying with Ari-
down his Tyranny and uniting his city to the Achaian League. stomachos
Private action of this sort had long been familiar to Aratos, and” ~ ©”
it had never been, at all events when successful, very severely
scrutinized by his countrymen. But then the chief place in the

1 Twenty talents, according to Plutarch (Ar. 34); twenty-five, according to
Pausanias (ii. 8. 6). 2 Plut. Ar. 34. 5. Plut. u.s. Pol. ii. 44.
+ Plut. u.s. Ἥ re πλείστη τῆς ’Apxadlas αὐτοῖς τοῖς [᾿Αχαιοῖς] συνετέλει.

Lydiadas
interferes

as General.

His pro-
posal for
the Union
of Argos

332 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

League had never before been filled by a personal rival, and a
rival who was at least his equal in ability and ambition. Aratos
continued his tiegociations with the Argeian Tyrant ; he enlarged
to him on the miseries of absolute power, and on the far loftier
position of a General of the Achaians, a post which, on the union
of Argos with the League, Aristomachos might aspire to fill as
well as Lydiadas. Aristomachos agreed to the proposal, on
condition of. receiving fifty talents to pay off his mercenaries.
Money seems never to have been any difficulty with Aratos; he
undertook to provide this large sum, and began to collect it, from
what sources we know not. Large as was doubtless his private
estate, and inexhaustible as was the wealth of his friend King
Ptolemy, it was a bold undertaking 80 soon after his large con-
tribution towards the ransom of the Attic fortresses. While the
money was collecting,! the negociation came to the ears of the
Achaian General. As Chief Magistrate of the League, Lydiadas
was naturally and rightfully offended that a private citizen
should undertake these unauthorized negociations with foreign
powers. As the personal rival of Aratos, we can hardly blame
him for wishing that the glory of winning Argos, especially in
his own year of office, should fall, not to Aratos, but to himself.*
He entered into communication with Aristomachos ; Plutarch—
that is, of course, Aratos—tells us that he counselled the Argeian
Tyrant to trust him, Lydiadas, the ex-Tyrant, rather than
Aratos the sworn foe of Tyrants. However this may be,
Lydiadas simply did his duty, as head of the League, in taking the
matter into his own hands. His position was that of an Ameri-
can President or an English Foreign Secretary who should find
that his predecessor in office and rival in politics was busily
engaged in planning treaties and alliances with foreign states.
Lydiadas arranged the terms of union with Aristomachos ; he
laid them before the Assembly for confirmation, inviting Aristo-
machos himself, as his own Ambassador, to plead his own cause
before the Achaian People.* A proposal was thus made, in the
most regular and constitutional way, to bring about an object

1 Plut. Ar. 85. Τῶν χρημάτων ποριζομένων.

2 Ib. Φιλοτιμούμενος ἴδιον αὑτοῦ πολίτευμα τοῦτο πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς γενέσθαι.

5. Ib. Τοῦ μὲν ᾿Αράτου κατηγόρει πρὸς ᾿Αριστόμαχον ὡς δυσμενῶς καὶ ddiad-
λάκτως ἀεὶ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννου: ἔχοντος.

4 ΤΌ, Αὐὑτῷ δὲ πείσας τὴν πρᾶξιν ἐπιτρέψαι προσήγαγε τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς τὸν
ἄνθρωπον. Helwing (p. 102), the idolater of Aratos, sees in all this only a very
improper interference with Aratos on the part of Lydiadas,

SN

which had been for years one of the darling wishes of the heart

of Aratos, and which he had himself been endeavouring at some
sacrifice to effect. We can understand the natural disappoint-

ment of Aratos at seeing the accomplishment of his own cherished

scheme transferred to his rival; but this in no way justifies the
factious and unpatriotic conduct to which he now stooped.

What arguments could have been brought, above all by Aratos,

against a Government proposal for the annexation of Argos,

history does not tell us, and it is certainly very hard to guess

them by the light of nature. He could hardly have had the

face to argue that the General of the League had no right to
discharge one of his constitutional functions, because a private

citizen or an inferior magistrate! wished unconstitutionally to

usurp it. But it is certain that Aratos spoke in strong opposi- rejected
tion; that on the division the Noes had it, that the Government * the
motion was thrown out, and that Aristomachos was dismissed pene of
from the Assembly, apparently with a degree of disrespect which, [n.c. 229-
Tyrant as he was, he certainly had not deserved.? But, before 8),

long, things are quite altered; Aratos is again General ;* he has but carried
made his peace--with Aristomachos ; he brings forward, and on the
triumphantly carries, the very motion which a few months aon οἱ
before he had caused to be ignominiously thrown out; Argos General,
is united to the League; and, at the next election of Federal ?.c. 228.
Magistrates, Aratos is succeeded in his _Office, not,.as had now Aristo-
become the rule, by Lydiadas, but by Aristomachos himself, machos
This election was doubtless made through the personal influence sent
of Aratos, and the narrative seems rather to imply that it was
part of the bargain between him and Aristomachos. Along with

Argos and Aristomachos, Phlious and its Tyrant Kleénymos®

1 It is always possible that Aratos may have filled some other Federal magis-
tracy in the years when he was not General.

2 Plut. Ar. 35. ᾿Ἀντεπόντος μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ [᾿Αράτου] δι’ ὀργὴν ἀπήλασαν
τοὺς περὶ τὸν ᾿Αριστόμα

3 See Flathe, ii. 157. Thirlwall, viii. 166. The Assembly at which Lydiadas
produced Aristomachos was probably the regular Spring Meeting of the year
228. At that meeting Aratos would be elected General for the year 228-7.
‘When he came into office, he might either summon a special Assembly for the
discussion of the question, or might introduce it at the regular Autumnal
Meeting.

4 Plut. Ar. 35. ᾿Επεὶ δὲ συμπεισθεὶς πάλιν αὐτὸς ἤρξατο περὶ αὐτῶν δια-
λέγεσθαι παρὼν, πάντα τάχεως καὶ “προθύμως ἐψηφίσαντο καὶ προσεδέξαντο μὲν
τοὺς ᾿Αργείους καὶ Φλιασίους εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐνιαυτῷ δὲ ὕστερον καὶ τὸν
᾿Αριστόμαχον εἵλοντο στρατηγόν.

5 Pol. ii. 44,

Union of
Phlious
with the
League.

Estimate
of the

conduct of

Aratos.

Com-
manding
Position
of the
Achaian
League,
B.C. 228,

334 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

were also admitted into the League, which thus included all
Argolis. By these annexations Aratos doubtless gained much
fame, but it was at the expense of his true honour. Plutarch
tells us of the wonderful proof of the national goodwill and con-
fidence which the Achaian Assembly showed to Aratos.! One
who is not a professed biographer of heroes might be tempted
to say that neither Aratos nor the Assembly ever showed them-
selves in a more paltry light. It is perhaps not quite unknown
in other constitutional governments for a statesman’s view of a
measure to differ a good deal, according as he is in office or in
opposition. But to an impartial spectator this proceeding of
Aratos will perhaps appear an extreme, not to say shameless,
case of such sudden conversion. One cannot help wondering
how any Assembly could be got to follow him to and fro in such
a course. But, granting that some ingenious misrepresentations,
some fervent declamations, had once beguiled the Assembly to
reject the proposal of Lydiadas, yet afterwards to accept the pro-
posal of Aratos was, on the part of the Assembly, whatever we
say of Aratos himself, merely a return to common sense.

The League was_now at the height of its glory. Days were
indeed in store when its territorial extent was to be far greater,
but those were days when its true greatness and independence
had passed away for ever. But now it was wholly independent
of foreign influences ; the Egyptian connexion did not practically
hamper its action, and, in the political morality of those times,
it carried with it no disgrace. The League was now the greatest
power of Greece. A Federation of equal cities, democratically
governed, embraced the whole of old Achaia, the whole of the
Argolic peninsula, the greater part of Arkadia, together with
Phlious, Siky6n, Corinth, Megara, and the island of Aigina.
Within this large continuous territory we hear of no discontent,
no hankering after secession, save only in the single turbulent city
of Mantineia. Achaians, Dorians, Arkadians, had forgotten their
local quarrels, and lived as willing fellow-citizens of one Federal
state. Tyrants and Tyrannicides confined their warfare within
the limits of parliamentary opposition, and appeared in alternate
years at the head of the councils and armies of the League. The
rival League of AMtolia was still a harmonious ally ; its alliance
carried with it the alliance of Elis; Athens was bound to the

1 Plut. Ar. 35. Ἔνθα δὴ μάλιστα φανερὰν ἐποίησαν οἱ σύνεδροι τῶν 'A χαιῶν
τὴν πρὸς τὸν “Aparoy εὕνοιαν καὶ πίστιν.

VU CONDITION OF SPARTA 835

League by every tie of gratitude; the breed of local Tyrants
had ceased to exist; some had béén extirpated, others had been
converted into Achaian citizens and leaders. Macedonia was
doubtless not friendly, but she was not ina position to be actively
hostile; Rome herself, a name which doubtless already commanded
a vague respect, though as yet no servile fear, had entered into
the friendliest relations, cemented by the choicest honours on
either side. The work of the League seemed to be done;
Greece, all Greece at least south of Thermopyle, was free; all
her noblest cities enjoyed freedom from foreign garrisons and
foreign tribute ; none of them was hostile to the League; many
of them were incorporated as its principal members. Never did
the League itself stand so high in power and reputation; never
had Greece, as a whole, so fair a prospect of peace and good
government. The time was now come when the man who had
done all this goed-for—his_native land was to undo it with his
own hands.

ὃ 3. From the Beginning of the War with Kleomenés to the Opening
of Negociations with Macedoma

B.C. 227—224

The one possible rival of the Achaian League within Pelo- condition
ponnésos was Sparta. That famous city had now indeed, for of Sparta.
nearly a hundred and fifty years, utterly fallen from her ancient , ο, 371..
greatness. The day of Leuktra had not only cut her off from 227.

all hope of retaining or recovering her old supremacy, it had cut

off the fairest portion of her home territory from her dominion.

The President, we might almost say the Tyrant, of Greece was

brought down to the rank of one Peloponnésian city among

many. Instead of sending her armies to lord it over Thebes and
Olynthos, she was hemmed in on one side by her new-born rival
Megalopolis, on another by her own liberated serfs of Messénia.

As for her internal state, we are told of corruptions of every

kind ; the Laws of Lykourgos had become a name; all power

and all property were centred in a few hands; Kings and people

alike were held in bondage by the ruling oligarchs. And yet,

on the whole, the history of Sparta during this age is more
honourable than that of any other of the great Hellenic cities.

Her supremacy, her greatness, had passed away; but, within

the narrow bounds in which she was pent up, she preserved her

B.c. 338.

Her
internal
condition.

336 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

independence and her dignity in a way that Thebes and Corinth
and Athens had failed to do. During the times of greatest
violence and confusion, she had been free alike from foreign
conquest and from domestic revolution. She could not indeed
always defend her territories from invasion ; still she had never
seen either a native Tyrant or a Macedonian garrison. Philip had
marched along her coasts, he had contracted her borders, but his
phalanx had never appeared before her unwalled capital.! The
democratic hero of Thebes and the royal hero of Epeiros had
alike been driven back when they assaulted her in her own
hearth and home. She had never recognized the Macedonian as
chief of Greece; she had sent no deputies to the Corinthian
Congress ; her name was formally excepted in the inscriptions
which described Alexander and all Greeks, save the Lacede-
monians, as victorious over the Barbarians of Asia. But she was
not dead to the cause of Greece; her kingly Hérakleids could
still command armies on behalf of Hellenic freedom; one Agis
had died fighting in a vain attempt to break the Macedonian
yoke; another had come ready, if Aratos would but have let
him, to fight as bravely to free Peloponnésos from the robbers
of Aitolia. At home, whatever were her political or social cor-
ruptions, they were the mere gradual decay of old institutions,
not the lawless usurpations of high-handed violence. Her Kings,
her Ephors, her Senate, her Assembly, were no longer what they
once were; but the venerable names and offices remained
unchanged. No Spartan King had ever trampled on the rights
of Senate or People, none had even ventured to resist the far
more doubtful pretensions of the despotic Ephors. And, on the
other hand, Sparta had seen no usurping citizen holding her in
bondage by a mercenary force, nor had she ever acknowledged
any chief but her own lawful and Zeus-descended Kings. Sparta
lay quiet, seldom touched by the revolutions of the rest of
Greece, fallen indeed, but neither crushed like Thebes, enslaved
like Thessaly, nor degraded like Athens. She was still inde
pendent within her own borders; she might yet again become
powerful beyond them. And now the day had come when
Sparta was once more for a moment to stand forth as the first
of Grecian states, and, after a short career of glory, to sink into
a state of degradation, both within and without, almost lower
than that of Athens itself.
1 [See Thirlwall, vi. 114. Cf. Strabo, viii. 5, 6.]

vII REVOLUTION OF KLEOMENES AT SPARTA 337

First came Agis the reformer, Agis the martyr, the purest Reform
and noblest spirit that ever perished through deeming others as rae
pure and noble as himself. Then, for the first time, internal 5 .. oA.
revolution began in Sparta, and the hand of the executioner was
raised against the sacred person of a Hérakleid King. But his Reign
memory died not; a successor and an avenger arose from the οὗ wero:
very hearth of his destroyer ; Sparta had at last a King indeed 1 πο οὐδ.
no Tyrant, no invader, but a Spartan of the Spartans, a Hérakleid 222.
of the divine seed ; one who grasped the sceptre of Agis with a
firmer hand, and who scrupled not to carry out his schemes by
means from which his gentle spirit would have shrunk in horror.
Kleomenés burst the bands with which a gradually narrowing Revolution
oligarchy had fettered alike the Spartan Kings and the Spartan of Kleo-
people. He slew the Ephors on their seats of office, and 5. od6-
summoned the people of Sparta to behold and approve the deed. 225.

An age which has condoned the most deliberate perjury and the
most cold-blooded massacre which history records is hardly
entitled to be severe on the comparatively mild coup d'état? of the
Lacedemonian King. He put out of the way by violence,
because Law could not touch them, men who, there is every
reason to believe, had put to death his own royal colleague, and
then charged him with the deed. The slaughter of the Ephors
was a stroke in which Agis or Epameinéndas would have had no
share, but it was one at which Ehud, Tell, or Timoleén could
not consistently have scrupled. The Ephors, the real Tyrants,
once gone, Kleomenés stood forth as the King of a free people,
the General of a gallant army. He was no longer the slave of
a narrow caste of ruling families ; he was the beloved chief of a
nation, which, recruited by a large addition from the subject
classes, was now a nation once more. A people thus springing

1 The character of Kleomenés has been a subject of warm dispute both in his
own days and in ours. Polybios, as a Megalopolitan, of course draws him in the-
darkest colours; in Plutarch we find the counter-statement of his adiniring con-
temporary Phylarchos. I do not feel called upon minutely to examine questions
which are matters of Spartan, not of Federal, history ; but I believe that my
notion of Kleomenés will be found quite in harmony with the views of Bishop
Thirlwall. See his History, viii. 160-183.

2 Four of the Ephors were killed, with ten persons who attempted to defend
them. Eighty citizens were banished, that is, not sent to some Spartan Cayenne,
but allowed to live in any Greek city except Sparta, retaining their rights of pro-
perty, and encouraged by a promise to be allowed to return home at some future
day. So small an allowance of bloodshed and confiscation would be counted ἃ
very poor day's work at the “inauguration” of an Empire or a Red Republic.

3 See Thirlwall, viii. 172. Cf. 163.

Ζ

Relations
bet ween
Sparta
and the
League.

Causes
of war
between
Sparta
and the
League.

838 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

into a revived life is sure to be warlike, if not positively aggressive.
The discipline of victory—and only a chief like Aratos can lead
such a people to defeat—is needed to teach it to feel its own
powers ; it is needed to efface all divisions, all hostile memories,
by common struggles and common triumphs in the national
cause. How was Peloponnésos to_contain two such powers, each
in the full vigour of recovered_freedom, each fresh with all the
lofty aspirations of regenerate youth? What were to be the
mutual relations of the revived League and of the revived King-
dom? Above all, what were to be the personal relations of two
such chiefs as Aratos and Kleomenés? Free and equal alliance
would be the bidding of cold external prudence. Sparta, such a
counsellor would say, is far too great to become a single city of
the League ; Achaia, on the other hand, is far too free and happy
as she is to be asked to admit the slightest superiority on the
part of Sparta. Live in friendship side by side; and hang up
your shields till the ΖΕ ΟΠ απ again proves faithless, or till the
Macedonian again becomes threatening. Advice sound indeed,
advice at once prudent and benevolent, but advice which two
ambitious chiefs and two high-spirited nations were never likely
to take.

The war between Sparta and the League began before Kleo-
menés had accomplished his great revolution at home. There
can be no doubt that it was a war which was equally acceptable
to the leaders on both sides, and that in no case could peace
have been kept very long. It was like the old Peloponnésian
War between Sparta and Athens; in both cases war was the
natural result of the position occupied by two rival powers ;! in
both cases the grounds of warfare which were alleged on either
side were at most the occasions, and not the real causes, of the
struggle. In the eyes of Aratos, Sparta was a power which
stood in the way of his darling scheme of uniting all Pelopon-
nésos into one Confederation.? On that object his mind had
dwelt so long that he had begun to regard himself as having
a mission to compel as well as to persuade the refractory ; the

» Thue. i, 28, Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ,
τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ηγοῦμαι, “μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς
Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν αἱ δ᾽ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι
ald’ ἦσαν ἑκατέρων. This is as true of Orchomenos and Athénaion as of Epi-
damnos and Korkyra.

2 Plut. Kl. 3. Ὁ γὰρ Ἄρατος. . ἐβούλετο μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς els μίαν σύνταξιν
ἀγαγεῖν Πελοποννησίους, κ. τ. λ.

VII SPECIAL POSITION OF SPARTA 339

deliverer was at last beginning to share some of the feelings of a
conqueror. Elis, Sparta, and some Arkadian towns! were still
wanting to the completion of his great work. Now Sparta, and Different
Elis also, stood in a wholly different position from the cities Postion
which Aratos had incorporated with the League in earlier days. fro a the
Siky6n, Corinth, Megara, Argos, had every reason to rejoice in cities de-
their annexation. Instead of foreign or domestic bondage, they | vere by
obtained freedom within their own walls, and true confede- ἡ
rates beyond them. Sparta had no such need; she had no
foreign garrison, no domestic Tyrant ; she lived under a Govern-
ment which, whether good or bad, was a national Government,
resting on the prescriptive reverence of eight hundred years.
No enemy threatened her, and, had any enemy threatened her,
she was fully able to resist. She was far greater than any one
city of the League; indeed the event proved that she was able
to contend on more than equal terms with the League’s whole
force. Her immemorial polity, the habits and feelings of her
people, were all utterly inconsistent with the position of a single
member of a Democratic Confederation.2, What was deliverance
and promotion to Corinth and Argos would to Sparta have been
a sacrifice of every national feeling, and a sacrifice for which no
occasion called. Sparta was never likely to enter the League as
a willing member, and Aratos had yet to learn that none but
willing members of a League are worth having. Sparta was
too strong to be herself directly attacked; but she might be
weakened and isolated, till she was either actually conquered, or
else led to think that accession to the League would be the less
of two evils. On this point Aratos, Lydiadas, and Aristoma-
chos would be of one mind. To Lydiadas the matter would
seem very simple: Sparta was the old enemy of his city ; Sparta
and Megalopolis had, as usual, border disputes ; territory was
said to be unjustly detained on either side ,3 the hope of
Achaian help against Sparta was doubtless one among the

1 Plut. Kl. 8. ᾿Απελείποντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ᾿Ηλεῖοι καὶ ὅσοι Λακεδαιμονίοις
᾿Αρκάδων προσεῖχον --- that is, doubtless, Mantineia, Tegea, and Orchomenos.
Phigaleia, too, and perhaps some other Arkadian towns, were not yet incor-
porated. He should also have added Megséné.

2 See the remarks of Schorn, p. 96.

5 Plut. Kl. 4. ᾿Εμβολὴ δὲ τῆς Λακωνικῆς τὸ χωρίον ἐστὶ, καὶ τότε πρὸς τοὺς
Μεγαλοπολίτας ἣν ἐπίδικον. Pol. ii. 46. Td καλούμενον ᾿Αθήναιον ἐν τῇ τῶν
Μεγαλοπολιτῶν χώρᾳ. To the Megalopolitan historian the right of Megalopolis
to Athénaion did not seem open to those doubts which were intelligible at the
distance of Chairéneia,

War ac-
ceptable
on both
sides.

Ampbigu-
ous rela-
tions of
AAtolia
to Sparta
and to
Achaia,

340 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

objects which had led him to join the League at all. To Aristoma-
chos, if he had in him a spark of the old Argeian spirit, Sparta
would be the object of a hatred no less keen than it was to Lydi-
adas. The day was at last come when the old wrong might
be redressed, when Argos, if not, as of old, the head of Pelopon-
nésos, might at least see Sparta brought down to her own level.
The three chief men of the League would thus be agreed, or, if
there was a difference, it would be a difference as to the means
rather than the end. We can well believe that, while Aratos
was weaving his subtle web, Lydiadas and Aristomachos would
be clamouring for open war with Lacedemon, and setting forth
the standing border-wrongs of their several cities. To Kleo-
menés, on the other hand, war was just as acceptable as it could
be to the most warlike orator at Aigion. He had not as yet
appeared as a revolutionist; he was a young and orderly King,
humbly obeying his masters the Ephors. But he was doubtless
already meditating his daring plan of carrying out the dreams
of Agis with the strong hand. A war in which he might win the
popularity and influence which attend a victorious general, a war
in which he might show himself forth as the retriever of Sparta’s
ancient glory, was of all things that which best suited his pur-
pose.! He rejoiced at every hostile sign on the Achaian side,
and nourished every hostile disposition among his own people.
Small] as was the actual authority of a Spartan King, all Spartan
history shows that his position was one which allowed an able
and active prince to acquire a practical influence in the state far
beyond the formal extent of his royal powers. Kleomenés, even
thus early, was evidently popular and influential; Sparta felt
that one of her old Kings, a Leédnidas or an Agésilaos, had again
arisen to win back for her her ancient place in the eyes of men.
The position of the AXtolian League just at this time is
singular and ambiguous. If we may believe Polybios, that is,
doubtless, the Autobiography of Aratos, A‘tolian intrigue was at
the bottom of the whole mischief. The tolians, urged by
their natural injustice and rapacity,® stirred up Kleomenés to

1 Plut. Kl. 8. Οἰόμενος δ᾽ ἂν ἐν πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἢ κατ᾽ εἰρήνην μεταστῆσαι τὰ
παρόντα συνέκρουσε πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς τὴν πόλιν αὐτοὺς διδόντας ἐγκλημάτων
προφάσεις. The whole state of the case could hardiy be more tersely expressed.
See also Droysen, ii. 478.

2 See Oxford Essays, 1857, p. 154.

3 Pol, ii. 45. Αἰτωλοὶ διὰ τὴν ἔμφντον ἀδικίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν φθονήσαντες,

κι. τ. λ.

VII WAR ACCEPTABLE ON BOTH SIDES 341

make wrongful attacks on the Achaian League; they once more
plotted with Macedonia to partition the Achaian cities ; it was

only Aratos who, by skilfully winning over Antigonos to the
Achaian side, saved the League from being overwhelmed by three
enemies at once. On the other hand, we have the facts that the

two Leagues were still on friendly terms, and that there had

been, to say the least, no open war between Achaia and Mace-

donia since the beginning of the reign of Antigonos. It might

be doing the A‘tolians too much honour to suppose that a
scrupulous regard to the faith of treaties would have kept them

back from any aggression which might be convenient at the
moment. But there is the fact that the A‘tolians did not strike Inaction
a blow throughout the whole Kleomenic War, even though the ΜΉΝ
Achaians were, at one stage of it at least, at war with their through-
cherished allies of Elis. There is the other fact, which we shall out the ~
come to presently, that Aratos himself, before he took the final Meomenic
step of asking for Macedonian help, first asked for help from ὁ
Aitolia. Had_the two Leagues been on the same cordial terms

on which they were a few years before, that help would never

have been refused; but had the Aétolians been such bitter
enemies to Achaia as Polybios represents, that help would never

have been_asked for. In the latter case they would doubtless.

have taken an open part against the League long: before. The

truth doubtless ig! that the A‘tolians were jealous of the pro-

gress of the Achaian League in Arkadia, but. that, just now,
Peloponnésian affairs seemed to them of secondary moment.

Their hands appear to have been at this time full of enterprises “tolian
for extending their power nearer home. They were hostile to (ony
Macedonia, and were occupied in some of their Thessalian con- Thessaly.
quests. This extension of their continuous territory was a more
important object than the retention of a few inland towns in
Peloponnésos. They were doubtless well pleased to see the two

great Peloponnésian powers at war with one another; they may

even have taken such steps as were likely to embroil them
together ; but their agency was clearly something quite secon-

dary throughout the matter. It is evident that, in the explana-

tion given by Polybios of the causes of the war, we have not the
historian’s own statement of matters of fact, but only the best
apology which Aratos could think of for his own unpatriotic
conduct. In fact, no very remote causes need be sought for to

1 See Thirlwall, viii. 168.

Spartan
acquisition
of the
AEtolian
towns in
Arkadia,
B.C. 228.

Achaian
interests
involved
in this an-
nexation.

342 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

account for the Kleomenic War; Sparta and Achaia, Kleo-
menés and Aratos, were shut up within one peninsula; and that
was enough.

It will be remembered that the Aitolians had certain posses-
sions in Arkadia, the nature of whose relation to the League,
whether one of real confederation or of subjection, is not very
clear. One of these towns, Mantineia, had, as we have seen,
from whatever Cause, forsaken thé Achaian for the AXtolian con-

nexion. ~ Mantineia now, together with Tegea and Orchomenos,

— se eee

‘ooedogthede onesie On what terms these towns were
united to Sparta, whether as subjects, as dependents, or as free
allies, does not appear. But in any case their new relation was
one which involved separation from the Attolian body. The
A&tolians however made no opposition, and formally recognized
the right of Sparta to her new acquisitions.* Such distant
possessions were doubtless felt to be less valuable to the A‘tolian
League than the certainty of embroiling Sparta and Achaia.
For it is evident that their occupation by Sparta was a real
ground for alarm on the part of the Achaians. As the territory
of the League now stood, these cities seemed naturally designed
to make a part of it. As independent commonwealths, or as out-
lying dependencies of Atolia, they had doubtless been always
looked upon as undesirable neighbours. But it was a far more
dangerous state of things now that a long wedge of Lace-
deemonian territory had thrust itself in between the two Achaian
cantons of Argos and Megalopolis.* But however much such a
frontier might in Achaian eyes seem to stand in need of rectifi-

1 Pol. ii. 46. Τὰς Αἰτωλοῖς οὐ μόνον συμμαχίδας ὑπαρχούσας ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπο-
λιτευομένας τότε πόλεις, See above, p. 270.

2 Ib. Κλεομένους πεπραξικοπκηκότος αὐτοὺς [τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς] καὶ παρῃρημένου
Τέγεαν, Μαντίνειαν, ᾿Ορχόμενον.

8 ΤΌΘ, Οὐχ οἷον ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀλλὰ καὶ βεβαιοῦντας αὐτῷ [Κλεο-
μένει] τὴν παράληψιν. .. ἑκουσίως παρασπονδουμένους καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀπολ-
λύντας πόλεις ἐθελοντί. The sentence of which these extracts are parts is one of
the longest I know in any language.

4 “Durch sie war plitzlich das Spartanergebiet tief in den achdischen Bereich
hinein vorgeschoben ; die Eidgenossenschaft musste inne werden dass sie auf das
Gefihrlichste bedroht sei.” Droysen, ii. 480. So Kortiim (iii. 183); ‘ Auch
blieb jene (die Eidgenossenschaft der Achder], welche das Gefihrliche einer frem-
den keilférmig in die Bundesmark hineingeschobenen Ansiedelung vollkommen
erkannte, keineswegs ruhige Zuschauerin.”

vii ATTEMPT OF ARATOS ON TEGEA AND ORCHOMENOS 343

cation, no formal injury was done to the League by the Lace-
dzemonian occupation of Orchomenos and Tegea, cities which were
not, and never had been, members of the Achaian body. Man-
tineia indeed might, to an Unionist of extreme views, seem
deserving of the chastisement of rebellion, but it was rather late
in the day to take up such a ground, after quietly seeing the
city—seemingly for several years—in /Mtolian occupation. But
nations and governments are seldom swayed by such considera-
tions of consistency. Any nation, any government, would have
been stirred up by seeing the frontier of a rival power suddenly
carried into the heart of its territory, and that by the occupation
of one district at least to which it could put forth some shadow
of legal right. The course taken by Aratos was characteristic. Delibera-

movements of Kleomenés. The mode of watching and hinder- Attempt
ing was doubtless left to Aratos himself. He began to lay of Aratos

plans for gaining Tegea and Orchomenos by one of his usual 95 ce’.

nocturnal surprises.2 The policy of such a scheme is clear. If menos.
Tegea and Orchomenos were gained, Mantineia would be
isolated, and the rebel city would be at his mercy. The justice
of the scheme is another matter. The League was not at war
with Tegea, with Orchomenos, or with Sparta, nor were those
cities oppressed by Tyrants or occupied by Macedonian garri-
sons. But Tegea and Orchomenos contained a party favourable
to the Achaian connexion,’ and this, or much less than this, was
always enough to blind Aratos to every other consideration,
when he had the chance of winning new cities for the League.

1 Pol. ii. 46. "ἔγνω δεῖν els ταῦτα βλέπων οὗτός τε [ὁ “Aparos] καὶ πάντες
ὁμοίως οἱ προεστῶτες τοῦ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν πολιτεύματος πολέμου μὲν πρὸς μηδένα
κατάρχειν, ἐνίστασθαι δὲ ταῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιβολαῖς. The joint action of
the President and his Cabinet is here well marked. In this particular year it is
unlikely that Lydiadas was even in subordinate office.

2 I follow Bishop Thirlwall in the narrative (viii. 168, 9) which he seems to
have put together by a comparison of Plutarch (ΚΙ. 4) and Polybios ; that is,
of Phylarchos and the Memoirs of Aratos, There is no contradiction between
the two, but each naturally dwells on different points in the story. Polybios
tells us that the Achaian Government determined to hinder the further progress
of Kleomenés ; Plutarch tells us in what way it was that they sought to hinder it.

3 Plutarch (KL 4) calls them προδόται, a touch clearly borrowed from Phyl-
archos.

Kleomenés

fortifies

Athénaion,

B.c, 227.

Achaian
Declara-
tion of
War.

Aratos
annexes
Kaphyai
to the
League.

General-
ship of
Aristo-

844 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

But Aratos had at last met with his match abroad as well as at
home. Kleomenés found out what was going on, and, with the
consent of the Ephors, he fortified a place called Athénaion, in
the frontier district which was disputed between Sparta and
Megalopolis. At the same moment the night attacks on Tegea
and Orchomenos failed; the party favourable to Achaia lost
heart, and Aratos had to retire amid the jeers of his rival.}
Kleomenés was anxious for a battle, or at least for what, with
the numbers on both sides,? would rather have been a skirmish.
For this of course Aratos had no mind, and Kleomenés was
recalled by the Ephors. Aratos, on his return home, procured
a declaration of war against Sparta, on the ground of the seizure
of Athénaion, The passage of this proposal through the several

, Stages of the General and his Cabinet, the Senate, and the

Public Assembly, is, happily for our knowledge of the Achaian
constitution, described by the historian with more than usual
formality.*

The language of Polybios would lead us to believe that the
Assembly at which war was declared was an Extraordinary
Meeting summoned for the purpose. It was probably not till
after the declaration that Aratos was enabled once more to
enlarge the League by the acquisition of a new, though not
a very important, member. He got possession of the Arkadian
town of Kaphyai.‘ If, as seems likely, Kaphyai was then in
the position of a subject district of Orchomenos, its citizens
would doubtless embrace with delight the opportunity of enter-
ing the Achaian Union as an independent state. War now
began in earnest; but the first important campaign fell in a
year when Aratos was not at the head of the Federal armies.
It was the year when Aristomachos, the Ex-Tyrant of Argos,
was General. The election of Aristomachos at such a moment

1 See the curious correspondence in Plutarch (u.s.). It would be a relief if
diplomatic dispatches were more commonly written in so amusing a style.

2 Plut. us. Κλεομένει μετὰ ἱππέων ὀλίγων καὶ πεζῶν τριακοσίων ἐν ’Apxadla
στρατοπεδευομένῳ.

3 Pol. ii. 46. Tére δὴ συναθροίσαντες τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς ἔκριναν μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς
ἀναλαμβάνειν φανερῶς τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπέχθειαν.

+ Plut. ΚΙ]. 4. Plutarch does not mention the declaration of war, Polybios does
not mention the taking of Kaphyai, but this seems the most natural order of
events, if the Meeting at which war was declared was an Extraordinary one. If
Kaphyai was taken before the declaration, it would be easier to suppose that
ed was declared at the regular Spring Meeting, when Aristomachos was elected

neral.

ΤΠ ARISTOMACHOS GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE 345

—— -..-

-.-- ..-. ---.-...--.--

merits some consideration. There could not be a stronger proof
of the bitterness of the feud between Aratos and Lydiadas.
War had been declared on account of a violation of the
Megalopolitan territory; a Megalopolitan citizen was one of
the foremost men of the League; he had thrice filled the
office of General; we cannot doubt that he aspired to it a
fourth time; we cannot doubt that he would have the strong
support of his own city, now that the main business of the
General ‘would be to defend the Megalopolitan territory.
Everything, one would have thought, specially pointed to
Lydiadas as the man fitted above all others to be the General
of this important year. But his claims were rejected, and the
defence of Megalopolis and of all Achaia was entrusted to that
very Aristomachos, the glory of whose-admission_to_the—League
had been so unfairly snatched by Aratos from Lydiadas himself.
Many men and many cities have deserted the cause of their
country on much slighter provocation. We can well believe
that Kleomenés would willingly have purchased the alliance
or the neutrality of Megalopolis by the surrender of the petty
territory in dispute. It is even possible that Kleomenés was,
in the plan of his campaign, partly guided by that subtle policy
which has often led invading generals to spare the lands of
their special rivals.1 An attack on Megalopolis would seem
the natural object for a Spartan commander in such a campaign,
as indeed the later course of the war plainly shows. But
Kleomenés first carried his arms into the territory of Argos,
the country of the newly-elected General, and though he seized
on one point, Methydrion, in the Megalopolitan district, yet it
was one in a remote part of the Canton, and which did not
immediately threaten the capital. One can hardly avoid the
suspicion that Kleomenés was expecting either to gain over
Lydiadas and his countrymen, or at least to discredit them
with the other members of the League. If so, his policy
utterly failed; not a word of secession was breathed by the
Megalopolitan leader or his countrymen. As for Aristomachos,
his fault was that he was afraid to act independenly of Aratos.?

1 The most famous cases are those of Archidamos'and Periklés, Thuc. ii. 13 ;
and of Hannibal and Fabius, Liv. xxii. 23. Plut. Fab..7. Others are collected
by the commentators on Justin, iii. 7. Tacitus (Hist. v. 23) calls it ποία ars
aUuUCcumM.

3 The narrative has here to be made up from two accounts in Plutarch. Ar.
35 and ΚΙ. 4.

nachos,
B.c. 227-6.

Designs
of Kleo-
menés.

Campaign
of Aristo-
machos.

Battle
hindered
by the in-
terference
of Aratos.

Indigna-
tion
against
Aratos.

Lydiadas
stands
against
Aratos
for the

346 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

He took the field with an army far superior in number to the
enemy,! whom he naturally wished to engage. But he did not
venture to do so without consulting his patron. Aratos was
at Athens, on what business we know not, and he wrote thence
strongly warning the General against running such terrible risk.
Aristomachos was a brave man, and was now high in popular
favour ;* he was anxious to distinguish his Generalship by some
exploit, and even aspired to an invasion of Lakonia. The
temptation to do something might have been too strong for
Aristomachos to resist, had not Aratos now appeared in person,
and, as it would seem, pretty well relieved® the constitutional
chief of the League of his command. The two armies met
face to face near Pallantion, between Megalopolis and Tegea ;
but Aratos seems to have thought that one Spartan would be
more than a match for four Achaians, and the host of the
League departed without striking a blow. A loud cry of
indignation was raised against the cowardly meddler who had
hindered the General of the League from doing his duty with
every prospect of success.‘ That Lydiadas was foremost in such
accusations © we are not surprised to hear. So loudly did public
opinion make itself heard against Aratos that the Megalopolitan
chief ventured on a step on which no man, probably, had ever
ventured before. The Generalship in alternate years had, with
one doubtful exception,® belonged to Aratos ever since he had
been General at all; it was enough if Markos or Dioitas or
Lydiadas or Aristomachos held the office when Aratos could
not legally do so; no man had yet appeared as an opposition
candidate when Aratos himself could lawfully stand. Now,
trusting to the general feeling aroused by the disgrace of
Pallantion, Lydiadas ventured on this extreme course ; he stood
forward, at the next Federal election, as a candidate to succeed

1 The Achaians had 20,000 foot and 1000 horse; the Lacedemonians were
under 5000. Ki. 4.

2 Ar. 35. Εὐημερῶν παρὰ rots ᾿Αχαιοῖς καὶ βουλόμενος els τὴν Λακωνικὴν
ἐμβαλεῖν.

3 1b. Ὡρμημένου δὲ πάντως [τοῦ ᾿Αριστομάχου] ὑπήκουσεν [ὁ “Αρατος) καὶ
παρὼν συνεστράτευεν. Kl. 4. Φοβηθεὶς τὴν τόλμαν ὁ ἼΑρατος οὐκ εἴασε διακιν-
δυνεῦσαι τὸν στρατηγόν.

ὁ ΚΙ. 4. ᾿Απῆλθε λοιδορούμενος μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν, χλευαζόμενος δὲ καὶ κατα-
φρονούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οὐδὲ πεντακισχιλίων τὸ πλῆθος ὄντων. This
clearly comes from Phylarchos.

S Ar, 35. Ὑπὸ Λυδιάδου κατηγορήθη. Was this a legal impeachment, or
merely an opposition speech in the Assembly ?

8 See note to Chapter viii.

vil LYDIADAS REJECTED FOR THE GENERALSHIP 347

Aristomachos in the Generalship.!. But the indignation of the General-
Achaian people against Aratos was never a very lasting feeling ; ; ap, 28.

he had the same gift of recovering a lost reputation that he had ἢ

of retrieving a lost battle. Lydiadas stood for the Generalship Twelfth (ἢ)
in vain; the force of habit was too strong; to elect Aratos in General-
alternate years was so old a prescriptive custom that it seemed ‘Aratos,

to have the force of law. And thus the man who dared not ac. 226-5.
look an enemy in the face on the field of battle was for the

twelfth ? time chosen General of the Achaians.

The campaign opened by an attack on Elis on the part of Aratos’
Aratos.2 How the Eleians had become engaged in the war campaign
does not appear.* Their close connexion with Attolia would in Elis.
seem to show either that the Northern League was already
looked upon as hostile, or else that the A‘tolians were held
to be so completely occupied with Thessalian and Macedonian
affairs that their hostility was not dreaded. The Eleians are
not said to have asked for help from “ΖΦ 0118, but they did obtain
help from Sparta. Kleomenés marched to their aid ; the Achaian
army was now on its return from Elis,> and its course seems
to show either that Aratos entertained offensive designs against
Sparta or else that he found it necessary to take measures for
the safety of Megalopolis. The two armies met unexpectedly Kleomenés
near Mount Lykaion, in the western part of the Megalopolitan creat
territory ; Aratos could not avoid a battle; the Achaians were 9+ Mount
utterly routed ; Aratos himself escaped, but for several days he Lykaion.
was believed to be dead, just as after his former defeat at
Phylakia.® This battle, one of the most disgraceful failures of
Aratos, was characteristically followed by one of his most
brilliant successes. He had lost a great battle ; he would atone
for it by recovering a great city. With such portions of his Aratos
scattéred army as he could collect, he marched straight upon surprises
Mantineia, where no one expected an attack from a routed army Mantineia.

1 Ar, 86. Περὶ τῆς στρατηγίας εἰς ἀγῶνα καὶ ἀντιπαραγγελίαν αὐτῷ [Λυδιάδῃ])
καταστὰς [ὁ “Aparos] ἐκράτησε τῇ χειροτονίᾳ καὶ τὸ δωδέκατον ἠρέθη στρατηγός.

3 According to the reckoning of Plutarch. I shall elsewhere give reasons for
supposing that it was more probably the tenth.

3 Plut. ΚΙ. 5.

4 “Die Aitolier haben ihren alten Verbiindeten keinen Beistand geleistet ; war
es nur ein Raubzug, den Arat gemacht? oder versuchte er auch die Elier zum
Eintritt in den Bund zu néthigen?” Droysen, ii. 482.

5 Plut. Kl. 5. Περὶ τὸ Λύκαιον ἀπιοῦσιν ἤδη τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς ἐπιβάλων ἅπαν μὲν
ἐτρέψατο καὶ διεπτόησεν αὐτῶν τὸ στράτευμα.

6 Tb. Ar. 36 (cf. 34).

Mantineia
readmitted
to the
League,

with some
changes in
its con-
stitution,

348 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

and a dead General. The city was taken, probably not without
some co-operation from an Achaian party within.! This was
the first time that the League had to deal with a city guilty of
the sin of Secession. But Aratos treated the conquered Mantineia
almost as gently as he had treated the rescued Sikyén or Corinth.”
He summoned a Mantineian Assembly ; he neither inflicted nor
threatened any hardship; he simply called on the citizens to
resume their old rights and their old duties as members of the
Achaian League. But he did not trust wholly either to their
gratitude or to their good faith. There was at Mantineia a
class of inkabitants® who did not possess the full political
franchise. These Aratos at once raised to the rank of citizens.
He thus formed a strong additional party, attached by every
tie of interest_and gratitude to himself and to the Union.

From a _Mantineian commonwealth thus reconstituted it was
not difficult to obtain a petition to the Federal Government ‘

1 The expressions κατὰ κράτος (Pol. ii. 57) and the like do not exclude this
supposition, which is so probable in itself.

* T again form my narrative from the different statements of Polybios (ii. 57,
58) and Plutarch (KI. 5. Ar. 36). Here too the colouring is different, but there
is no actual contradiction, Plutarch does not enlarge on the free pardon given
to the revolted city, on which Polybios is so emphatic ; neither does Polybios
mention the changes in the Mantineian constitution which Plutarch distinctly
records.

3 Plut. Ar. 36. Τοὺς μετοίκους πολίτας ἐποίησεν αὐτῶν. What μέτοικος
means δὲ Athens everybody knows. Everything at Athens fostered the growth
of a large class of resident foreigners, whose children, though born in Attica,
were, according to Greek notions, no more citizens than their fathers. Thus
there arose at Athens, mainly in the city itself and its ports, a large class,
personally free, but enjoying no political rights. But can we conceive the growth
of any large class of μέτοικοι in this sense in an inland city like Mantineia? One
is tempted to think that Plutarch here uses the word μέτοικος loosely, in much the
same sense as mweploxos. He seems to do the same in a following chapter (38),
where he speaks of Kleoments as πολλοὺς τῶν μετοίκων ἐμβαλὼν els τὴν
πολιτείαν. Now any large class of μέτοικοι in the Attic sense is still less likely
to have existed at Sparta than at Mantineia. And in the parallel passage in the
Life of Kleomenés (c. 11) Plutarch himself says, ἀναπληρώσας τὸ πολίτευμα τοῖς
xaperrdras τῶν περιοίκων. I am therefore inclined to think that these
Mautineian μέτοικοι were really περίοικοι, inhabitants of districts subject to
Mantineia, like those subject to Megalopolis and other cities spoken of already.
See above, p. 200. According to Appian (Mithr. 48), Mithridatés, besides the
usual policy of enfranchising slaves and abolishing debts, gave citizenship to the
μέτοικοι i in the Asiatic cities which submitted to him. This reads like the proceed-
ings of Aratos at Mantineia, but the existence of a considerable class of μέτοικοι
in the Attic sense is far more likely in the great commercial cities of Asia than
in an inland Arkadian town.

4 Pol. ii, 58. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, προορώμενοι τὰς ἐν αὑτοῖς στάσεις καὶ τὰς ὑπ᾽
Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιβουλὰς, πρεσβεύσαντες πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς ἠξίωσον

VII ARATOS RECOVERS MANTINEIA 349

asking for a permanent Federal garrison! Polybios extolls, and
and it was natural that he should extol, the wonderful mag- secured
nanimity of the Achaians and their General towards the revolted presence of

city. Undoubtedly it stands out in honourable contrast to the a Federal
cruel treatment of revolted dependencies at the hands of Athens, 8*Tison.
But he does not clearly bring forward the fact that this mag-
nanimity was mainly exercised on behalf of the Achaian party
in Mantineia itself. Indiscriminate massacres or banishments
in a city where there was one class already favourable to the
League, and another which could easily be attached to it, would
have been no less impolitic than cruel. It was enough to change

the-eenstitution in a way at once liberal in itself and favourable
to Achaian-interests, and to secure the domination of the Achaian
party by the presence of a Federal garrison.

The loss of Mantineia was a heavy blow to the Spartan Results

interests, at least as Spartan interests were understood by vecovery of

Kleomenés. Now that Mantineia was again Achaian, Orcho- wantineia.
menos was left quite isolated, and the hold on Arkadia which
had been gained by the possession of the three contiguous
districts was utterly lost. There was a party in Sparta, of Temporary

lenveae:
whom the Ephors were at the head, who opposed the war, at Sparta,

and who doubtless looked with special jealousy upon the young
conqueror of Lykaion. The loss of Mantineia depressed the
national spirit; and it required the use of every sort of influ-
ence” on the part of Kleomenés to obtain leave from the

δοῦναι παραφυλακὴν αὑτοῖς. This seems to imply a petition to the Achaian
Assembly (such is the general meaning of οἱ 'Axacol) or at any rate to the Senate,
and some little time must have elapsed between the taking of the city and the
sending and answering of such a message. Plutarch (Ar. 36) says that Aratos
φρουρὰν ἐνέβαλε (so in Kl. 5, εἷλε τὴν πόλι» καὶ κατέσχε) before he goes on to
mention anything else. Probably Aratos left some troops at once, ay 8 mere
military precaution, and this more solemn embassy came somewhat later.

For Mantineia, now once more a city of the League, to send Ambassadors
(πρεσβεύσαντες) to the League, as if to a foreign state, has an odd sound, but we
shall find the expression again. Why, it may be asked, could not the business be
despatched by those Mantineian citizens who might attend the Assembly? Probably,
when a city of the League wished to obtain some special object at the hands of
the National Government, it was thought that more weight would attach to the
demand, if it were made by citizens specially deputed by the State Government,
than if it were brought forward as an ordinary motion by those citizens who
night be present in their Federal capacity. [In Art. 81 of the Swiss Bundes-
verfassung, it is specially provided that the Initiative which belongs to every
individual member of the Nationalrath and of the Standerath may be also
exercised by the Cantons, by correspondence. ]

1 On the Achaian Federal garrisons, see above, p. 242.

2 He is said to have bribed the Ephors; his mother Kratésikleia married

Battle of
Lapo-
KEIA,
Bc. 226,

350 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Ephors to continue the war. But it was continued.! Kleo-
menés now directly attacked Megalopolis; he took the border
town of Leuktra, and threatened the Great City itself. Aratos
could not refuse help, and the whole force of the League
marched to its defence. Close under the walls of Megalopolis,
at a place called Ladokeia, the armies again met face to face.
Aratos again shrank from battle. Lydiadas ‘and his country-
men demanded it; they at least would not tamely see their
lands ravaged, their city, 10 might be, taken, because an in-
competent commander had been preferred to their own gallant
and true-hearted hero. And doubtless the men of Megalopolis
did not stand alone; in the wide compass of the League
other cities must have sent forth warriors as little disposed
as Lydiadas himself to turn themselves back in the day of
battle. The fight began; the Lacedzemonians were driven to
their camp by the light Achaian troops; the heavy - armed
were marching to support their brethren, now broken in the
pursuit, and perhaps engaged in plunder. But when they
reached a torrent-bed, the heart of Aratos failed him, and he
made them halt on the brink. This was too much for the
gallant soul of Lydiadas; to be called on, at the bidding of
a successful rival, to throw away a victory at the very gates
of his native city, was a sacrifice to strict military discipline
which it was hardly in human nature to offer.*° He denounced

the powerful Megistonous in order to secure his influence on her son’s side.
Here also comes in the story of Archidamos, the King of the other house,
murdered, some said by Kleomenés, some said by the Ephors. I will not enter
at large into the question, but I see nothing to inculpate Kleomenés. I must
again, on matters not immediately bearing on Federal history, refer generally to
the History of Bishop Thirlwall. See also Droysen, ii. 484, 6.

1 Droysen (ii. 483) infers, though doubtfully, that ἃ truce was concluded
with the League. But this rests only on the expression of Pausanias (viii.
27. 15), Κλεομένης ὁ Λεωνίδον Μεγάλην πόλιν κατέλαβεν ἐν σπονδαῖς. But
Pausanias deals with the history of Kleomenés much as he deals with the
history of Agis. The battle of Ladokeia and the death of Lydiadas in
B.c. 226 are jumbled up with the capture of Megalopolis by Kleomenés in
B.C. 222.

2 Plut. Ar. 87. Περὶ ras σκηνὰς διασπαρέντων.

8 Schorn (p. 110) seems to expect it of him. Helwing (p. 181), the
worshipper of Aratos, gets quite indignant that any one should doubt his hero's
valour. ‘‘Lysiades aber, der bestindige Gegner des Arat, beschuldigte den
Feldherrn, der bei Sikyon, Korinth, und Argos genugsam persdnliche Tapferkeit
bewiesen hatte, offen der Feigheit,” etc. In the next page Lydiadas is ‘der
unvorsichtige Lysiades,” “der unbesonnene Befehlshaber,” etc. It is hard for
a brave and good man to be maligned after so many ages.

VII BATTLE OF LADOKEIA- - 351

the cowardice of the General; he called on all around him
not to lose a victory which was already in their hands; he
at least would not desert his country; let those who would
not see Lydiadas die fighting alone against the enemy follow
him to a certain triumph.’ At the head of his cavalry? he
dashed on, but at the head of his cavalry alone; the Lacede-
monian right wing gave way before them; the ardour of
pursuit carried them upon ground unsuited for the action of
horse; the fugitives turned; they were reinforced by other
divisions of their army,* and by the King in person; and,

after a sharp struggle, Lydiadas fell fighting within sight of Death of

d LYDIADAS.

the walls of Megalopolis.‘ The rout of the cavalry followe
the loss of their chief, and the rout of the cavalry carried
with it the rout of the heavy-armed, who seem to have stood
all the while on the other side of the torrent-bed, without striking

a blow or advancing a step. The victory on the side of Utter de-
feat of the
? Achaians.

Kleomenés was complete; the Achaians fled in every quarter
and their_army finally ‘marched away, bitterly accusing t

-»- .---.ἔ .-

cowardice of Aratos, and openly charging him with the Silful Indigna-

betrayal of his valiant rival.° The charge was doubtless

groundless; Aratos acted at Ladokeia only as he acted in all Aratos.

his battles ; the torrent-bed and the enemy together were obstacles
too fearful to be encountered, and personal courage and common
sense alike deserted him. Lydiadas was left to perish by an
act of combined cowardice and folly, but there is no reason
to believe that, while he was fighting in the forefront of the
hottest battle, the Achaian phalanx was bidden to retire from
him that he might be smitten and die. But the noblest spirit
of the League was gone; the best life of the nation was
sacrificed to the incompetence of its chief; Lydiadas had fallen,
and it was left for an enemy to honour him. The hero of
‘Sparta could recognize a worthy foe in the hero of Megalopolis ;

1 Plut. Ar. 87. Ὁ δὲ Avdiddns περιπαθῶν πρὸς τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὸν ΓΑρατον
κακίζων ἀνεκαλεῖτο τοὺς ἱππεῖς ὡς αὑτόν.

2 Was Lydiadas ἱππάρχης of the League, or only commander of a Megalo-
politan contingent ?

δ Plut. ΚΙ. 6. Ὁ Κλεομένης ἀνῆκε τοὺς Ταραντίνους καὶ τοὺς Kpijras én’
αὐτόν. That is, not natives of Tarentum, nor necessarily natives of Crete,
but descriptions of troops so called, like modern Hussars and Zouaves. Sec
Thirlwall, viii. 298.

4 Plut. Ar. 37. "Ἔπεσε λαμπρῶς ἀγωνισάμενος τὸν κάλλιστον τῶν ἀγώνων
ἐπὶ θύραις τῆς πατρίδος.

5 Ib. Αἰτίαν δὲ μεγάλην ὁ "Aparos ἔλαβε δόξας προέσθαι τὸν Λνυδιάδην.

Assembly
at Aigion.

Strange
vote of
censure on
Aratos.

352 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

— = -

and the body of Lydiadas, clothed in purple and with a garland
of victory on his brow, was sent by Kleomenés to the gates
of the Great City.! The robe of royalty which he had thrown
away in life might fittingly adorn his corpse, now that he
had gone to the Island of the Blessed to dwell with Achilleus
and Diomédés and all the Zeus-born Kings of old.

Almost immediately after the defeat of Ladokeia an As-
sembly was held at Aigion. “The “account of it in our only
narrative reads as if the army had itself formed this Assembly,
or had compelled the General to summon it against his will.?
Never had the Achaian people come together with such feelings
of indignation against their Chief Magistrate. Bitter indeed
must have been their regret when they remembered the results
of their last election. Aratos had been preferred to Lydiadas ;
and now the choice of Aratos had led to two disgraceful defeats,
and Lydiadas was gone, some said betrayed to death by his
rival, at any rate sacrificed to his rival’s cowardice and in-
competence. The indignation of the Assembly spent itself
in a strange vote, which, while it shows their intense present
dissatisfaction with their General, shows also the marvellous
sort of fascination which he had acquired over the national
mind. The Assembly passed a resolution that, if Aratos
thought good to go on with the war, he must do it at his
own cost; the Achaian nation would give no more contributions
and would pay no more mercenaries.*> This vote is not to
be looked upon as a mere sarcasm. Aratos had carried on
so many wars at his own cost and risk that for him to carry
on a private war with Sparta seemed a thing by no means
impossible. It would only be doing on a great scale what
they had over and over again seen him do on a smaller one.
They would not take upon themselves to run directly counter
to his judgement on a matter of war and peace; he might,
if he chose, go on with the war in his own style; he might
win over Orchomenos or Tegea or Sparta herself either by
diplomatic wiles or by nocturnal surprises; his own wealth
and the contributions of King Ptolemy might possibly supply

1 Plut. Ki. 6.

2 Ib, Ar. 87. BracOels ὑπὸ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἀπερχομένων πρὸς ὀργὴν ἠκο-
λούθησεν αὐτοῖς εἰς Αἴγιον.

5 ΤῸ. κεῖ δὲ συνελθόντες ἐψηφίσαντο μὴ διδόναι χρήματα αὐτῷ μηδὲ
μισθοφόρους τρέφειν, ἀλλ᾽ αὑτῷ πορίζειν, εἰ δέοιτο πολεμεῖν.

VII VOTE OF CENSURE ON ARATOS 858

him with the means; if they did, the Federal Assembly would
not stand in his way; but it should be his war and not that of
the Achaian people; they would neither serve themselves, nor
yet pay mercenaries, merely that Kleomenés might set up
trophies against Aratos. Some such line of thought as this
would seem to be the most natural explanation of a resolution,
which at first sight seems the very strangest ever passed by
a sovereign Assembly.

Aratos was naturally bitterly mortified at this vote of the
Assembly. His first impulse was to resign his office—to lay Aratos
down his seal 1—and to leave those who censured him to take comem:
the management of affairs into their own hands. But on second Pigna
thoughts he determined to bear up against the popular indig- tion.
nation. The very terms of the resolution showed his extra-
ordinary influence over the nation, and that influence was, before
long, busily at work again. Deference to Aratos was too old a
habit for the League to throw off, and the national indignation
had no doubt in a great measure spent itself in the mere passing
of the vote of censure.* Before long that vote was either He re-
formally or practically rescinded, and Aratos again, in the 5 twer his
year of Lykaion and Ladokeia, found himself at the head of στο
an Achaian army. Orchomenos was now, after the recovery
of Mantineia, the natural object of attack;% Aratos did not
take the town, but he gained some advantages over the Spartan
troops in its territory. By the end of the official year, he
seems to have been as powerful as ever. When the time of
the elections came round, the office of General fell, not to
Aristomachos—he might possibly have taken an independent General-
course—but to a certain Hyperbatas, who is described as a uP of
mere instrument of Aratos,* and who was doubtless chosen at 4, Hyper:
his nomination. ͵ mo 5 325-4,
revolution at Sparta. Its details belong to Spartan history ; menés’ Re-
for our subject it is important mainly on account of the sine
increased strength which it gave to the Spartan King in his 5.0. 225.

1 Plut. Ar. 38. ᾿Αποθέσθαι τὴν σφραγῖδα. See above, p. 234.

2 Compare the remarks of Grote, vi. 337.

3 But why did not Kleomenés attack Megalopolis immediately after
Ladokeia ἢ

4 Plut. ΚΙ]. 14. ᾿Εστρατήγει μὲν γὰρ Ὑπερβατᾶς τότε, τοῦ δὲ ‘Apdrov τὸ way
ἣν κράτος ἐν τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς.

JA

His suc-
cesses in
Arkadia.

Mantineia
revolts

to Kleo-
menés.

Third
victory
of Kleo-
menés at
Hekatom-
baion,
B.C. 224,

354 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

war with the League. Up to this moment he had had to
manage how he best could a body of Magistrates who disliked
the war, and who were specially jealous of himself. When
the one blow had been struck, Sparta and her King could put
forth their full strength. The revolution itself came as a sort
of episode in the war. Kleomenés was marching to and fro
through Arkadia, he took Héraia on the confines of Elis and
Alea on the confines of Phlious;! he introduced supplies into
Orchomenos ; he pitched his camp near Mantineia; thence, with
ἃ chosen band, he hastened to Sparta, slew the Ephors, justified
himself to the people, enfranchised a multitude of new citizens,
divided the lands, and marched back into Arkadia, the chief
of a regenerated Lacedemonian people, to plunder at will the
lands of Megalopolis and to receive the voluntary surrender
of Mantineia. ‘The Lacedsemonian party in that city had now
recovered its superiority ; the Achaian garrison was massacred
or expelled ; 5 Kleomenés was introduced by night, and, in the
language of the party now dominant, the ancient laws and
constitution of Mantineia were restored. That is, the city
became again attached to Sparta instead of to the League,
and the citizens enfranchised by Aratos probably lost their
newly-acquired rights. Unchecked at home and _ successful
abroad, Kleomenés now ventured to carry the seat of war
into the enemy’s own hearth and home. Passing through the
whole breadth of Arkadia, he entered the old Achaia, and at
a place called Hekatombaion, in the canton of Dymé, in the
very north-west corner of Peloponnésos, he met the Achaian
army, under the nominal command of Hyperbatas, but under
the dominant guidance of Aratos. A total defeat, yet more
overwhelming than all that had gone before,t was the result
of this first meeting of Achaians and Spartans upon Old-Achaian
ground. .

1 Plut. Kl. 7.

2 Massacred according to Polybios (that is Aratos), ii. 58 ; expelled, according
to Plutarch (that is Phylarchos), Kl. 14.

3 Plut. Kl. 14. Τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἀποδούς.

4 Polybios (ii. 51) clearly distinguishes the three defeats οἵ Lykaion,
Ladokeia, and Hekatombaion as three stages in a climax. Ol δ᾽ ᾿Αχαιοὶ
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠλαττώθησαν περὶ τὸ Λύκαιον συμπλακέντες κατὰ πορείαν τῷ
Κλεομένει, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐκ παρατάξεως ἡττήθησαν ἐν τοῖς Λαδοκείοις καλου-
μένοις τῆς Μεγαλοπολίτιδος, ὅτε καὶ Λυδιάδας ἔπεσεν, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὁλοσχερῶς
ἕπταισαν ἐν τῇ Δυμαίᾳ περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Ἑκατόμβαιον πανδημεὶ διακιν-
υνεύοντες.

VI CONTINUED SUCCESS OF KLEOMENES 355

Aratos now utterly lost heart.1 For years he had been the
chief of the League, the first man of Peloponnésos and of all Position
independent Greece. He had done and suffered more in the of Aratos.
cause of Grecian freedom than any man of his own age, almost
more than any man of any other age. There was no longer
a Tyrant or a foreign garrison from Thermopyle to Tainaron.
The worst faults that could be laid to his charge were a certain
unscrupulousness as to means while pursuing the most glorious
of ends, and an unwillingness, after a long career of undivided
power, to share his commanding position with another. This he
had shown alike in his domestic rivalry with Lydiadas and in
his foreign rivalry with Kleomenés. He hag_led_the Teague ae
into a war with Sparta, in which the Achafan arms had been
utterly unsuccessful. It was now clear that, whatever might be
the result of the struggle, Sparta would never stoop to become a
single city of the League, and that Kleomenés would never
willingly be anything but, what he now was, the first man of
Peloponnésos. For the League to continue the war by its own
unassisted force was utterly hopeless; another such campaign as
those of the last three years would throw all Peloponnésos at
the feet of the conqueror. And Kleomenés was not only winning
battles, he was also everywhere winning hearts. Wo may feel
sure that Aratos, besides his national and personal rivalry,
honestly condemned the proceedings of the Spartan chief. In
his eyes he was a bloody and usurping revolutionist ; he had
changed himself from a lawful King into a Tyrant ;? he had
ventured on the final stroke of revolution, the general redistribu-
tion of lands. To a politician like Aratos, whose feelings were
essentially conservative and aristocratic, nothing could seem
more to be abhorred or more to be dreaded. The general
opinion of Greece was evidently quite otherwise. Kleomenés
appeared as something different from domestic Tyrants, from

1 The state of things at this time is set forth by Droysen (ii. 496 et seqq.)
with his usual power and eloquence. But he is, as usual, unduly hard both
upon the League and upon Aratos personally.

2 Pol. ii. 47. Τοῦ μὲν Κλεομένους τό τε πάτριον πολίτευμα καταλύσαντος, καὶ τὴν
ἔννομον βασιλείαν εἰς τυραννίδα μεταστήσαντος, χρωμένον δὲ καὶ τῷ πολέμῳ πρακτικῶς
καὶ παραβόλως. Ῥαυβ. ii. 9.1. Κλεομένης. . . . Ἰ]αυσανίαν ἐμιμεῖτο τυραννίδος
τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ νόμοις τοῖς καθεστηκόσιν οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. A string of the usual
charges follow. The introduction of Pausanias at least is singularly unlucky.
The Achaian view of Kleomenés reminds one of the Papal view of Manfred or
the Norman view of Harold.

Popularity
of Kleo-
menés,

General
dissatisfac-
tion with
Aratos.

Position
of Kleo-
menés,

856 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Macedonian conquerors, or even from veteran diplomatists like
Aratos himself. The hero-King, the model of every soldier-like
virtue,! was something more attractive than any of them. In-
stead of founding a Tyranny, he had put one down;? he had
restored both himself and his people to their ancient rights ; his
very division of lands was not a revolutionary interference with
private property, it was the restitution of a lawful state of things
which only modern corruptions had done away with.? There
was in every city a party which only wished that Kleomenés
would come and divide the land there too as well as at Sparta.
Even the leading men, those who filled the Senate and the sub-
ordinate magistracies, and who had the predominant influence in
the Assembly, were getting sick of the long-continued rule of a
single man, a rule which had of late led only to such unparalleled
national dishonour.4 Men were weary of Aratos, weary of the
war ; if the war went on much longer with Aratos at its head,
the League was clearly doomed. Each city would make what
terms it could with the conqueror, rather than go on submitting
to defeat after defeat, in the cause of the League, or, more
truly, in the cause of its General. The cry for peace on
any reasonable terms became universal throughout the Achaian
cities.

Kleomenés, on the other hand, was nowise disposed to push
the League to extremities. That he had joyfully entered upon
the war there can be no doubt; but he could say with perfect
truth that he had been forced to enter upon it by the attempts
of Aratos--upon. Tegea and Orchomenos. The war on his part
had been a series of victories. He had won three pitched battles ;
he had taken several fortresses and smaller towns; and, if he
had lost one great city, he had recovered it with its own good

1 See the description of his camp, Plut. Kl. 12, 13.

2 See his speech to the Lacedemonian people, Plut. Kl. 10.

3 Whether an equal division of lands had ever really existed at Sparta is
another matter; the point is that men believed that it had existed, and that
Agis and Kleomenés professed to be only restoring the ancient and lawful state
of things. See Grote, ii. 521-7, cf. 465. Kortiim (iii. 186 et al.), through for-
getfulness of this distinction, misrepresents the position of Kleomenés and his
party, as if they were at all like modern Socialists.

4 Plut. Kl. 17. ᾿Εγεγόνει δὲ κίνημα τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν καὶ πρὸς ἁπόστασιν ὥρμησαν
αἱ πόλεις, τῶν μὲν δήμων νομήν τε χώρας καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς ἐλπισάντων, τῶν δὲ
πρώτων πολλαχοῦ βαρυνομένων τὸν “Aparov. This description indeed belongs to
a later time, when the tendency to secession had become much stronger, but the
causes of discontent here mentioned must have already been busily at work.

Vil POSITION OF ARATOS AND KLEOMENES 857

will. He was in a position to dictate what terms he chose, but
neither inclination nor policy prompted him to dictate severe

terms. The main object of both sides was, in a certain sense,

the same. Both Aratos and Kleomenés wished to unite all

Greece, at any rate all Peloponnésos, into one free Greek Com-
monwealth. That they differed irreconcileably as to the form

which such a-Commonwealth should take was only the natural

result of their several positions. Aratos, a republican leader,

sought to bring about the union through the forms of a re-
publican Confederation, and, had not Sparta been so incompar-

ably greater than any other Peloponnésian city, he would
probably have succeeded in so doing. Kleomenés, a hereditary

King of Sparta, started with the greatness of Sparta and_her

King as his first principle; he would unite -Peleponnésos by Schemes
joining the Achaian League, but he would join it only with of Klee
Sparta for its recognized chief city, and with the Spartan King το
for its recognized constitutional head.1 That he wished to
establish a Kingdom of Greece,” in the sense that there was a
Kingdom of Macedonia, and had been a Kingdom of Epeiros,

seems in no wise probable. It is far more likely that he wished

to fall back upon the state of things which had existed in the

days of Sparta’s truest greatness, before the Peloponnésian War.

In that state of things the Harmost, the garrison, and the
Dekarchy were unknown ; Sparta was the constitutional president Probable
of a body of free allies. Those allies were perfectly independent meee

in their separate governments ; they did not surrender the right supremacy
of separate war and peace with states not belonging to the Con- claimed
federacy ; each state had a voice, and an equal voice,’ in deciding by him.
the policy of the Confederacy itself. But Sparta was still a
recognized and effective head; the Spartan people deliberated
apart, like a Senate, before the opinions of the other allies were

asked ;4 the Spartan King was the hereditary General-in-chief

of the forces of the whole alliance. This was probably the sort

of supremacy which Kleomenés demanded for himself and his

city. Such a supremacy would of course be utterly fatal to

the most cherished principles of the Achaian constitution. The

1 Plut. Kl. 15. "Exédevey αὐτῷ παραδιδόναι rip ἡγεμονίαν.

2 As Schorn (p. 115) seems to think, but there is much force and truth in his
general description of the position of Kleomenés.

5 See Thuc. i. 125. So 141, πάντες re ἰσόψηφοι ὄντες.

* See ib. 79, 87,119. Cf. Grote, vi. 105.

Tncon-
sistent
with the
Achaian
Consti-
tution,

but mode-

rate under

the circum-
stances.

Attrac-
tions

of the
Achaian
name to a
Hérakleid
King.

358 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

essential equality of the cities would be destroyed; the chief of
one city, and that chief a hereditary King, would possess the
powers which had hitherto belonged to a magistrate yearly
chosen by the votes of all. For it is evident that, were such a
supremacy once recognized in Sparta, if the League continued
to elect a Federal General at all, he would be for the future a
mere Vicegerent of the Lacedemonian King. The demands of
Kleomenés were such as the Achaians could not be expected to
agree to till they had undergone so severe a discipline at his
hands ; but they were demands which could not but be looked
upon as mild and generous when proceeding from one by whom
such a discipline had been inflicted. The demands of Kleomenés did
not require that the League should be dissolved, or that any of its
members should become Lacedemonian subjects; he did not
claim to increase the Spartan territory, or to enrich the Spartan
treasury, at its expense; he was ready to restore conquests
which he might have annexed to his own dominions, and to
release captives whom he might ha¥e sold towards defraying
the expenses of the war.! The League was to exist, it was
apparently to retain its name and position as an Achaian League ;
but he, Kleomenés King of the Lacedeemonians, was to become
its chief. We must remember that Kleomenés, as a Hérakleid,
was himself of old Achaian blood,? and that he had largely
enfranchised the subject population of Lakdnia, doubtless, in
some measure at least, of Achaian blood also. The Achaian
name was consecrated by all the old associations of the Homeric
poems; Kleomenés might dream that he was setting up again
the throne of Tyndareéds or of Agamemnén, and that he was
about to reign, as an Achaian King, over the Achaian cities of
Sparta and Argos and Mykéné. He proposed a scheme less
noble and generous, it may be, than the pure republicanism of

1 Plut. ΚΙ. 15. ᾿Αλλὰ καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους εὐθὺς ἀποδώσων καὶ τὰ χωρία.

2 Ὦ γύναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ Δωριεύς εἰμι ἀλλ᾽ ᾿Αχαιός, says the earlier Kleomenés to
the Athenian Priestess (Herod. v. 72). If Mr. Blakesley be at all right in his
explanation of the designs of that Kleomenés in Herod. vi. 74, they were not so
very different from those which I attribute to the great Kleomen(s. But Mr.
Grote (v. 59) takes a view which is easier and simpler, and at least I do not
understand Mr. Blakesley’s chronology, when he talks of “The Achean League
of nearly 400 years later ’’—than s.c. 509. Professor Rawlinson, as usual when
the civilized world is concerned, gives no help.

3 This of course partly depends on the view taken of the origin of the Lakénian
Perioikoi. Mr. Grote (ii. 491) holds them to have been Dorian, contrary to the
general opinion.

vil SCHEMES OF KLEOMENES AND ARATOS 859

Aratos in his best days, but a scheme as noble and generous as
a conquering King ever proposed to conquered enemies; a
scheme which was at least better for Peloponnésos than to
become a dependency of Macedon, or to be again parcelled out
among local Tyrants.

Aratos looked on things with different eyes. We have now
reached the time when the deliverer of Greece was so strangely
transformed into her betrayer. Rather than submit to the Aratos
slightest supremacy on the part of Kleomenés, he would call regins to
in Antigonos to protect the League against him. He would 12° Moca
undo his own work; he would again bring Macedonian armies donia.
into Peloponnésos ; he would even endure to see a Macedonian
garrison holding that very Akrokorinthos which he himself had
freed. We have no reason to believe that he desired any such
thing for its own sake, still less that he was actuated by any
personal motives meaner than the jealousy which blinded his
eyes. He would rather have resisted with the unaided force of
the League; he would rather have called in the help of the
sister League of Attolia;! but rather than yield to Kleomenés,
he would submit to become dependent upon Antigonos. Nor
was it hard to call up plausible sophisms by which the worse
cause might be made to appear the better. Plutarch, at his
distance of time, saw the matter exactly as we do;* but it is
clear that Polybios did not so see it ; 8 still less would it appear
in the same light in the eyes of Aratos himself. The fear of
Etolia, on which Polybios enlarges, was doubtless put forth by
Aratos both in his speeches and in his Memoirs; but it was a
fear which the state of things did not justify. There is not the
least sign of any understanding between Kleomenés and the
Aétolians ; what was most desirable in Htolian eyes was doubt-
less to see Sparta and Achaia weaken one another. The real Difference
question was, If the League was to become dependent on some between

one, should it become dependent, on Kleoments or on Antigonos ? Ee of

To Plutarch, to a modern writer, both removed from the petty Plutarch
passions of the time, there seems no room for any doubt. If οἱ
you must have a President, or even a King, take the Greck, the Juror.

writers.
Spartan, the Hérakleid, the gallant soldier, the generous con-

1 Plut. Ar, 41. See above, p. 341.

> He sets forth the case strongly and eloquently ; Ar. 38. Kl. 16.
5 Pol. ii. 47 et al.
4 See Thirlwall, viii. 187.

360 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

queror. To Aratos the case may not have been so clear. To
humble himself and the League before Kleomenés was a far
deeper personal and national humiliation than to do the like
to Antigonos. Kleomenés was a neighbour, a rival, a border
enemy; Antigonos was a great King at a distance, submission
to whom would be far less galling. And Kleomenés really
demanded submission ; he asked for a place in the League itself
which would utterly destroy its constitution: Amntigonos as yet
demanded nothing; Aratos might still flatter himself that the
Macedonian King would step in as an equal ally, a friendly
power_external to the League, one with whom all matters of
common interest would have to be debated, but whose alliance
need in no wise interfere with the constitutional functions of
the General, the Senate, or the Assembly. Kleomenés was the
enemy of the moment; his was the power which was actually
threatening; Antigonos came indeed of a hostile line, but he
had never been personally an enemy ; national feuds need not
last for ever; the loss of Akrokorinthos might by this time be
forgiven and forgotten. It was not more unpatriotic in Achaia
to call in her ancient enemy against her ancient friend than it
was in Sparta and Athens, after fighting side by side at Salamis
and at_Plataia, to call in the Mede as an ally or a paymaster
against their old comrades. When the Captain-General of
Greece marched forth against Persia, the vows of every patriotic
Greek were on the side of the Barbarian. And, if Aratos had
been gifted with prophetic vision, he might have gone on to
behold the League of Switzerland in alliance with Austria and
the Seven United Provinces in alliance with Spain. Why then
should an alliance with Macedonia be so specially disgraceful to
the League of Achaia? And Kleomenés was a Tyrant, a revolu-
tionist, the subverter of the laws of his own country, the apostle
of every kind of mischief elsewhere. Antigonos was a King;
the legitimacy of his title might be doubtful, but he was a King
and not a Tyrant; he had upset no Senate, he had murdered
no Ephors, he had divided no lands among a revolutionary
populace ; he was a steady, respectable, conservative Monarch,
who might not object to act in concert with a steady, respect-
able, conservative Republic. Anyhow he was much better to be
trusted than the young firebrand at Sparta, to calculate on
whose eccentric doings baffled even the experienced diplomacy
of Aratos himself. Such may well have been the process of

vir = NEGOCIATIONS WITH SPARTA AND MACEDONIA 361

self-delusion by which the deliverer of Corinth and Athens
persuaded himself that to call in the Macedonian was no treason
against Greece. Agfor Akrokorinthos, doubtless Aratos at first
contemplated no such sacrifice; it was only after a terrible
struggle, when it_was at last clear fhat none but Macedonian aid
was to be had, and that Macedonian aid was not to be had on
any milder terms, that even Aratos, much more that the Achaian ,
People, finally agreed to pay so fearful a price. |

8 4. From the Opening of Negociations with Macedonia to the
End of the War with Kleomenés

B.c. 224-2921

In the spring then of the year 224 before Christ, Kleomenés
stood completely victorious over the armies of the League. He
was willing to conclude peace on what, as proceeding from a Twofold
conquering enemy, could only be called most favourable terms. negocia-
But Aratos, rather than admit the slightest supremacy in the Soarta, ith
Spartan, had made up. his mind to seek for help from the and Mace-
Macedonian. From this time, two sets of negociations are going donia,
on side by side, one between the League and Kleomenés, the *° 72+
other between Aratos and Antigonos. The successive steps in
each are clearly marked by our authorities, but the chronological
parallelism of the two is less easy to follow. The first. proposals
of peace seem to have come from Kleomenés. The Spring
Meeting of the year apparently followed not very long after the
rout of Hekatombaion. It is not certain whether Spartan Beginning
ambassadors were then actually introduced to the Assembly, but οὗ περο-
it is probable that negociations had already begun. Possibly ce or leo.
they were not yet in a state advanced enough to allow of a menés.
formal vote being taken. Certain it is that the final decision
was adjourned toa Special Meeting to be held at or near Argos.”

1 Plutarch—that is, mainly Phylarchos, but Phylarchos compared with the
Memoirs of Aratos—gives us the internal history of the League and the negocia-
tions with Kleomenés. On these last Polybios is quite silent, but, as a native of
Megalopolis, he describes at full length the intrigues of Aratos with Antigonos,
in which his own city was so deeply concerned, and the facts of which are almost
lost amid Plutarch’s declamation, eloquent and righteous as it is.

3 Els “Apyos. Plut. Ar. 39. Els Λέρναν. KI. 15. Is not this last a confusion

Aratos
declines
the Gene-
ralship.
First Gene-
ralship of
Timo-
xenos,

B.c, 224—
223.

Begin-
ning ΟἹ
negocia-
tions with
Antigonos.

362 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP,

But it is clear that public opinion declared itself strongly in
favour of peace with Sparta,! and that the conduct of Aratos was
discussed with considerable freedom.? Still long habit, or the
peculiar way in which the votes were taken, caused the usual
custom to be followed, and Aratos was elected General for the
following year. For the first time in his life, as far as we know,
he declined the office, and the choice of the Assembly then fell on
a partisan of his? named Timoxenos. Perhaps he really shrank
from the personal responsibility of office at such a moment, a
cowardly failure in duty for which he is indignantly rebuked by
his biographer.* Or perhaps he merely hoped to carry on his
intrigues with the more ease when unfettered by the trammels
of office. Certain it is that, while public negociations were going
on between Kleomenés and. the League, a counter-negociation
was going on between Antigonos and one of its cities, and that
with a sort of licence from the National Congress itself. This
was ἃ very singular transaction, which illustrates several points
both in the constitution of the League and in the general politics
of Peloponnésos.

I have said in a former Chapter ὃ that the general Law of
the League forbade all diplomatic intercourse between foreign
powers and any particular city of the Union. Foreign Ambassa-
dors were to be received, and Achaian Ambassadors were to be
commissioned, by no authority short of that of the League itself.
I mentioned also that instances were occasionally met with both
of the law being dispensed with and of the law being broken.
Here we have a case of dispensation.® Aratos did not venture
to propose with his own mouth to the Assembly that the King

arising from the fact (Ar. 39) that Kleomenés, when on his way to Argos, got no
farther than Lerna? Lerna was not a city, and it seems a strange place for a
congress.

1 Ki, 15. Βουλομένων δὲ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις δέχεσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις.

2 Ar. 38. Ἐδόκει δὲ ἡ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ὄχλους ὀργή, K.T.r

3 See Pol. iv. 82. Cf. above, p. 237.

4 Plut. ΚΙ. 15. Οὐ καλῶς οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι πραγμάτων μείζονι μεθεὶς ἑτέρῳ τὸν
οἴακα καὶ προέμενος τὴν ἐξουσίαν. Cf. Ar. 38.

5 See above, pp. 203, 204.

6 ἐς Allerdings war mit solchen besonderen Verhandlungen einer einzelnen
Gemeinde das Wesen der Eidgenossenschaft und ihrer Verfassung gefihrdet.”
Droysen, ii. 501. This is true, but hardly the whole truth. An American
commentator would here be more valuable than a German.

Vil ARATOS DECLINES THE GENERALSHIP 363

of Macedonia should be invited into Peloponnésos; he artfully
contrived to throw the responsibility of taking the first step

upon a city, which, of all the cities of the League, might seem

the least likely to be under any irregular influence on his part.
Megalopolis, the city of Lydiadas, would seem to speak with Dealings
more independence than any other ; and, as the city more im- oS
mediately threatened by Sparta, it. had more claim than any jopolis. δ
other -te-—be-beard.1 With the help of two hereditary friends

in Megalopolis, Nikophanés and Kerkidas, Aratos planned his

whole scheme. These men appeared in the Megalopolitan
Assembly, and there moved and carried a resolution for their

own appointment. with a special commission to the Federal
Assembly. They were to ask leave, in the name of the State of Commis-
Megalopolis, to go into Macedonia and to ask Antigonos for @V°r
help.2- A more cunningly-devised scheme could not have been Megalo-
hit upon. Megalopolis was more -closely connected with polis to the
Macedonia than any other Peloponnésian city ; there had been yheaicet
no slight interchange of good offices between the two states,3 and 5 ¢, 994)”
Megalopolis had actually stood two sieges in the Macedonian
interest.‘ Had Megalopolis been a wholly independent common-

wealth, it would have been nowise monstrous, as seen from a

local Megalopolitan point of view, to ask for Macedonian help

against a Spartan enemy. Consequently the motion in the
Federal Assembly, unexpected as it doubtless was, would not

strike the hearers as something so utterly strange and unnatural

as if it had proceeded from Corinth or Megara, or from Aratos

himself. The Megalopolitan commissioners probably appeared

at the meeting at which Timoxenos was appointed General, that

is, the Spring Meeting of the year 224. They obtained the

1 Plut. Ar. 38. Οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπιέζοντο τῷ πολέμῳ μάλιστα, συνεχῶς ἄγοντος
αὐτοὺς καὶ φέροντος τοῦ Κλεομένους. So Pol. ii. 48.

2 Pol. ii. 48. ‘Padlws διὰ τούτων ὁρμὴν παρέστησε τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις εἰς τὸ
πρεσβεύειν πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς καὶ παρακαλεῖν πέμπειν πρὸς τὸν ᾿Αντίγονον ὑπὲρ
βοηθείας. οἱ μὲν οὖν Μεγαλοπολῖται κατέστησαν αὐτοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη καὶ τὸν
Κερκιδᾶν πρεσβευτὰς πρός τε τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς κἀκεῖθεν εὐθέως πρὸς τὸν ᾿Αντίγονον,
ἂν αὐτοῖς σνυγκατάθηται τὸ ἔθνος. The same account, according to Plutarch
(Ar. 38), was given by Phylarchos, On these special commissioners from particu-
lar cities to the Federal Assembly, see above, p. 349.

3 Pol. u.s. Σαφῶς δὲ γινώσκων οἰκείως διακειμένους αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὴν Μακεδόνων
οἰκίαν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸν ᾿Αμύντου Φίλιππον εὐεργεσιῶν.

4 One against Agis, B.c. 330; another against Polysperchén, B.c. 318. See
above, p. 161.

5 I do not feel at all certain as to the exact date. It should be remembered
that we have no annals of these transactious. Polybios gives, almost incidentally,

They are
allowed
to go as
Megalo-
politan
envoys
to Mace-
donia.

Their in-
terview
with Anti-
gonos.

364 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

permission for which they asked, permission namely to go into
Macedonia, not as Federal, but as. Megalopolitan, envoys.
One would be well pleased to have some record of the debate
which must have followed on such a request; but it is easy to
understand that it would not meet with the same strenuous
opposition which would certainly have befallen a proposal to send
a regular Federal Embassy on such an errand. Megalopolis had
a fair claim to ask for Macedonian help; if Antigonos chose to
bestow on the hereditary friends of his house a body of troops
for their protection, or a few talents to hire mercenaries for
themselves, the League, as a League, might not seem to be
dishonoured or endangered. But Aratos had gained his first
point, that of familiarizing the Achaian Assembly with the notion
of Macedonian help. He seems now to have withdrawn for a
moment from public life; he refused to resume office, alleging
that he felt the public indignation against him too strongly to
allow him to serve with honour.! Such a plea, coming from the
deliverer of Sikyén and Corinth, the man who had been twelve
times General, would be, of all others, the most likely to touch
the hearts of his hearers, and to pave the way for his speedy
restoration to his old influence. The avowed negociations between
the League and Kleomenés must have been going on at the time
when Nikophanés and Kerkidas, probably carrying with them
much less of the public attention, went on their strange errand
to Macedonia. They reached the court of Antigonos; they
briefly set forth their ostensible commission from their own city ;
they described its dangers, and asked help from their old ally.
They then went on to tell at much greater length the tale put
into their mouths by Aratos.2. The interests of the League and
of the House of Macedon were the same; Kleomenés and the
fEtolians together threatened Achaia, they threatened all Greece,
they indirectly threatened Macedonia. Nothing short of a

the account of the Macedonian negociations ; Plutarch gives the account of the
Spartan negociations. Each narrative is clear enough in itself, but it is hard to
arrange the two series side by side, and to fit each stage into its exact place.
Some of the expressions of Polybios (ii. 51) might make one think that this whole
negociation took place before the battle of Hekatombaion, but the passage, if
construed strictly, might imply that it took place not only before Hekatombaion,
but also before Lykaion, which it is impossible to believe.

1 Plut. Ar. 38. See above, p. 362.

2 Pol. ii. 48. Σπουδῇ δὲ συμμίξαντες ol περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη τῷ βασιλεῖ διελέ-
yovro περὶ μὲν τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος αὐτὰ τἀναγκαῖα διὰ βραχέων καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς,
τὰ δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῶν ὅλων κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς ᾿Αράτου καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις.

VII MEGALOPOLITAN EMBASSY TO ANTIGONOS 365

general supremacy over all Greece would satisfy the ambition of
the Spartan, and that supremacy could not be his without a
previous triumph over the Macedonian power. Which was the
wiser policy for Antigonos? To forestall so dangerous a
competitor, to meet him at once, in Peloponnésos, in a struggle
for the supremacy of Greece,! with Bootia and Achaia as
Macedonian allies, or to fight in Thessaly for the possession of
Macedonia itself, against the combined force of Lacedemon and
/Etolia, swelled, as by that time it would be, by the force of
conquered Achaia and Bootia? The AXtolians? were indeed
outwardly neutral, they still professed unbroken friendship for
the League; if they kept to these professions, the Achaians
would still do their best to maintain the struggle against Kleo-
menés without foreign help. If A{tolia should interfere, or if all
resistance should appear hopeless, then the League would call on
the King for help. Aratos would pledge himself that Antigonos
should receive every needful security, and he would himself point
out the proper moment for action.

All this, it must be remembered, was altogether private and
unauthorized dealing between Aratos, now a private citizen, and
the Macedonian King. The only public character in which
Nikophanés and Kerkidas appeared at Macedonia was that of
envoys from the single city of Megalopolis They were not
Ambassadors from the League, nor in any way entitled to speak
in its name. Antigongs, strictly respecting constitutional forms, Favour-
sent back the enyoys with a letter to the commonwealth of ae er of
Megalopolis, promising aid, if the Federal Assembly agreed to it.® antigonos
The Megalopolitan Assembly were delighted at the favourable to the
reception which their royal friend had given to their request. =¥°YS

. , from Me-

At the next Federal Assembly—or more probably at a Special patopolis.
Meeting called for the purpose ‘—the royal letter was read, first

1 Pol. ii. 49. Mer’ ᾿Αχαιῶν καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πρὸς Κλεομένη
πολεμεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας. ‘No arguments could have
heen devised better suited to the purpose of convincing and persuading the king.
It is only surprising that Aratos, while he suggested them, should not have felt
that they were so many reasons which ought to have deterred him, asa patriotic
Greek, from the prosecution of his attempt.” Thirlwall, viii. 188.

2 See Droysen’s note, ii. 500.

3 Pol. ii. 50. "“Eypaype δὲ καὶ τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις ἐπαγγελλόμενος βοηθήσειν,
ἐὰν καὶ τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς τοῦτο βουλομένοις ἢ.

4 10, Μετεωρισθέντες οἱ Μεγαλοπολῖται προθύμως ἔσχον ἰέναι πρὸς τὴν σύνοδον
τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν. Such a state of mind would hardly allow of waiting for the

Autunin Meeting, and Timoxenos, who was probably in the secret, would be
ready to summon a meeting if Aratos wished it.

The letter
from Anti-
gonos read
in the
Federal
Assembly.

Speech of
Aratos
in the
Assembly,

366 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

to the Senate! and then to the Assembly ; Megalopolitan orators
urgently pressed the application for Macedonian help, and the
inclination of both Senate and People was clearly favourable to
them. Whether any formal resolution was passed does not
appear.2. The League could not decently apply in its own name
for Macedonian help while negociations were going on with
Kleomenés ; but it is not impossible that the Assembly may
have passed a vote authorizing Megalopolis to receive assistance
on its own account. At any rate, it was on the reading of this
letter that Aratos made his first public appearance in the busi-
ness. No longer the chief of the League, apparently not even
one of its Senators, he stepped forward as a private citizen to
address the Assembly. In such a character he would be heard,
if possible, with even greater favour than when he spoke with
the weight of official authority. The reaction on which he had
reckoned was now beginning to set in. The whole state of the
case had been fully set before him by Nikophanés; everything
was going on exactly as he wished; the name of Macedonian
help was becoming familiar to the Achaian people, but Aratos
had not appeared as its first proposer. He wished to avoid
having recourse to it, if possible; but if need—the supposed
need of doing anything rather than submit to Kleomenés—drove
the League to such a course, it should be the act of the League,
not the act of Aratos; it should not even be the act of the
League on the motion of Aratos.2 If Antigonos should come, if
he should conquer Kleomenés, if he should alter the Federal
Constitution,s—it was more tolerable, it seems, to have it altered
by a Macedonian than by a Spartan—no man should say that it
was his doing ; Megalopolis and the whole League must bear the
responsibility of their own acts. Thus fortified, he came forward
in the Assembly ; he expressed his pleasure to hear of the good
will of the King, his satisfaction at the present disposition of the

1 Pol.ii.60. The Senate (rd κοινὸν βουλευτήριον) and the πλῆθος or πολλοί to
whom Aratos speaks, seem here, as Droysen (ii. 503, note) says, to be clearly dis-
tinguished. But βουλευτήριον is, as we have seen (see above, p. 239), sometimes
used for the place of meeting of the Assembly.

2 ΤΌ, 51. "Edote μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

8. Tb. 50. Μάλιστα μὲν yap . . . . ἔσπευδε μὴ προσδεηθῆναι τῆς
βοηθείας᾽ εἰ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τοῦτο δέοι καταφεύγειν, οὐ μόνον ἠβούλετο δι’ αὑτοῦ
γενέσθαι τὴν κλῆσιν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν.

ὁ Ib. El παραγενόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ κρατήσας τῷ πολέμῳ τοῦ Κλεομένους
καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀλλοιότερόν τι βουλεύσοιτο περὶ τῆς κοινῆς πολιτείας, μή
ποθ' ὁμολογουμένως τῶν συμβαινόντων αὐτὸς ἀναλάβῃ τὴν αἰτίαν.

VII NEGOCIATIONS WITH KLEOMENES 867

Assembly ; but he warned them not to be too hasty ; let them
make one more struggle to save themselves by their own
exertions ; it would be much better to do so if they could any-
how manage it; if they failed in the attempt, let them then call
in the help of their royal friend. The Assembly applauded the
speaker ; they agreed to save themselves if they could—if not,
to ask King Antigonos to save them.

To account for this disposition of the Achaian Assembly, we
must suppose that the favourable intentions of Kleomenés, of
which Polybios says not a word, were not as yet generally
known. The General Timoxenos, as a partisan of Aratos, would
doubtless conceal them as long as he could. But when it was
known how mild a supremacy Kleomenés sought for, men began Negocia-
once more to doubt whether Antigonos would not, after all, be tions with
more dangerous as a friend than Kleomenés was as an enemy. A mengs.
Special Assembly was called to meet at Argos.!. Public opinion
throughout the League was now so strongly in favour of Kleo. Strong
menés that there could be little doubt that peace would be con- eng i
cluded on his own terms, that is, that the Spartan King would
be accepted as Chief of the League.? It marks the diplomacy of
the time that Kleomenés, like Aristomachos,® was to plead his
own cause before the Achaian Popular Assembly. A sudden
illness on the road rendered him incapable of speaking. ΑΒ a Negocia,
sign of his good will, he released the chief among his Achaian ner
prisoners, and the Meeting was adjourned till he was able to by Kleo-
attend. This illness of Kleomenés decided the fate of Greece, menés’

It was probably during this interval that Aratos, having 1688:
found the Macedonian King a less implacable enemy than he
had expected, ventured to enter into direct communication with
him. He no longer needed the roundabout way of dealing
through Nikophanés and Kerkidas. He sent his own son, the Mission
younger Aratos, as ambassador—seemingly his own private oe
ambassador *—and arranged all necessary matters with Anti- antigonos.
gonos.5 To be sure there was one difficulty ; Antigonos was no

1 See above, p. 361.

3 Plut. Kl. 15. Βουλομένων δὲ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις δέχεσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις
καὶ τὸν Κλεομένη καλούντων ἐς Λέρναν, and (still more strongly) Ar. 39, πέμπειν
εὐθὺς ἐφ᾽ ἡγεμονίᾳ τὸν Κλεομένη καλοῦντες ἐς “Apyos.

3 See above, p. 332.

* Pol. ii, 51. peoBeurhy τὸν υἱὸν ἐξαποστείλας “Aparos πρὸς ᾿Αντίγονον
ἐβεβαιώσατο τὰ περὶ τῆς βοηθείας.

Plut. Kl. 17. "Hd7 διωμολογημένων αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν ᾿Α»τιγόνον τῶν μεγίστων.

Antigonos
demands
Akro-
korinthos.

368 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

more disposed than later potentates to do his work for nothing.
The price which he set on that work was one most natural for
him to ask, but most unnatural for Aratos to pay, the reunion to
Macedonia of Akrokorinthos. No one can blame Antigonos for
making the demand. He had not volunteered to meddle in
Peloponnésian affairs ; Kleomenés had done him no harm, and
the Achaians had done him no good; if any sentimental tie
bound him to Megalopolis, it did not extend beyond that single
city, and indeed it might be held to be cancelled by the union of
Megalopolis with the League. It was as much as could be expected
if the King of Macedonia merely sat still, and did not attack a
people who had destroyed so large a portion of the influence of
his house ; at any rate, he could not be expected to serve them
for nothing. The terms on which his services were to be had
were simply that Aratos should restore to Antigonos Dés6n the
invaluable fortress of which he had deprived Antigonos Gonatas.
In all this Antigonos acted in a perfectly straightforward way,
worthy of a ruler of the nation who called a spade a spade.!
Macedonia did not profess to make war for an idea; her King
made no rhetorical flourishes about liberating Peloponnésos from
the Isthmus to the Cretan Sea. Antigonos, like an honest
trader, named his terms; his price was fixed, no abatement
would be taken from the simple demand of Akrokorinthos. But
how was Akrokorinthos to be had? Aratos seems to have been
ready even then to make the sacrifice ; but it would be hard to
carry through the Achaian Senate and Assembly a resolution for
surrendering the most important Federal fortress ; it would be
harder still for the League to compel the Corinthians to admit a
foreign garrison into their city. Was Aratos to reverse the
exploit of his youth, and once more to scale the mountain citadel,
but this time to drive out an Achaian, and to bring in a Mace-
donian, garrison? And, beside this, the Achaian people were
evidently ready to accept Kleomenés as their chief ; if his terms
were once accepted, Akrokorinthos could be won only by a
struggle for life and death against the combined force of Sparta
and Achaia. Aratos seems not to have dared to make any open
proposal to the Assembly ; but he contrived that such deadly
offence should be given to Kleomenés 2 that the Spartan King

1 Plut. Apophth. Phil. 15. Σκαιοὺς ἔφη [ὁ Φίλιππος) φύσει καὶ ἀγροίκους
εἶναι Μακεδόνας καὶ τὴν σκάφην σκάφην λέγοντας.
2 The Accounts given by Plutarch in his two biographies (Ar. 39 and KI. 17)

VII ANTIGONOS DEMANDS AKROKORINTHOS 369

broke off the negociations, and, instead of appearing personally Kleo-
to plead his cause in the Assembly at Argos, he sent a herald to menvs ῇ
declare war against the League Here again Aratos contrived to tne nego=
get his work done for him by other hands. All hope of a fair ciations.
accommodation with Kleomenés was now at an end. Aratos

would not now have to endure the disgrace of seeing the
Spartan youth installed as his acknowledged Federal superior ;

he was several degrees nearer to the more pleasant prospect of

acting as the counsellor or the slave of a foreign master. And

the final step, the breaking off of all negociations, the last blow,

as it seemed, to any plan of union between the League and his

rival, had come, not from Aratos, but from Kleomenés himself.

In all this web of cunning intrigue the practised diplomatist
of Sikyén had overreached himself. What he had really done
was to proclaim the dissolution of the League. The Achaian
Union had hitherto advanced and prospered by strictly adhering
to its principles of perfect brotherhood and equality. Every
city, great or small, old or new, had equal rights; each member
was alike precious to the whole body; an injury done to one
was an injury done to all, and to be redressed by all alike. By
this course of action Aratos had, now for nearly thirty years,
won honour and power and influence for himself and for the
commonwealth at whose head he stood. But he had now gone
away backwards; he was not only willing to bring foreign New posi-
armies into Peloponnésos ; he was ready to give up, as the price tion of
of their aid, a city of the League, one of the great cities of το
Greece, a city which was the very gem and flower of the Con-

do not exactly agree. The first makes Aratos send ambassadors (πρέσβεις) to
Kleomenés, who had advanced with his troops as far as Lerna, bidding him come,
as to friends and allies, with only three hundred followers, and offering hostages,
if he felt any distrust. The other version is that he was to come alone, and to
receive three hundred hostages. This, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 192) hints, looks
like a contusion with the number of followers in the other story, which, though
Droysen (ii. 507) thinks otherwise, seems decidedly the more probable. But one
does not see in either story, as told by Plutarch, any ground for the excessive
indignation which he attributes to Kleomen¢s. There must have been something
specially offensive in the tone or form of the message. This was followed by
some more epistolary sparring between Kleomenés and Aratos, such as Plutarch
gave some specimens of at an earlier time. The two chiefs seem at last to have
got very abusive towards one another, and that on very delicate points ; ἐφέροντο
λοιδορίαι καὶ βλασφημίαι μέχρι γάμων καὶ γυναικῶν ἀλλήλους κακῶς λεγόντων.
(Ar. 39.) We know nothing of the domestic life of Aratos, but what could any
man have to say about the noble wife of Kleomenés ?

2B

Universal
indigna-
tion at the
thought
of sur-
rendering
Corinth.

Appear-
ance of
extreme
factions
in the
Achaian
Cities.

370 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

federacy, a fortress which was the key of the whole peninsula, a
spot whose name always suggested the most glorious exploit of
his own life. The moment it was suspected that the surrender
of Corinth had been hinted at by a Federal politician, the tie
was at once broken, a whole storm of concealed passions burst
forth. Secession, as Secession, had never been dreamed of ; but
if the League was about to cede its cities to the Macedonian, it
was high time for those cities to take care of themselves. No
one wished to separate from a League of free and equal Greek
cities, but, if they were to have a master, men would have Kleo-
menés for their master rather than Antigonos. The Assembly
had not deemed it its duty to hinder a single Canton, which it
could not protect, from asking and receiving aid from a heredi-
tary friend. But the Assembly had never dreamed that a
measure apparently so harmless really meant the surrender of
Akrokorinthos to the Macedonian King. If Corinth was to be
thus betrayed, who could answer for the freedom of Sikyén or
of Argos? Even a conservative Federal politician might con-
sistently argue in this way: The object of the League is to
preserve the liberties of its several cities ; if the League fails to
discharge that duty, those cities are at once absolved from their
Federal allegiance. And now parties began to show themselves,
which, in the quiet days of the League, had kept themselves
concealed. The practical working of the Achaian Constitution
threw all power into the hands of respectable well-to-do citizens,
led by chiefs whose ambition looked no higher than the rank of
an elective and responsible magistrate. Tyrants, oligarchs, Red
Republicans, were all alike without sympathizers in the Achaian
Congress. The two extremes of political faction, hitherto kept
in check by the legal restraints of the constitution, now burst
forth.1 There were powerful men who hated the sway of Law
in any shape, who would fain rule as Tyrants or as members of
some narrow oligarchic body. Then there were extreme Demo-
crats, Socialists, men of wild theories or of broken fortunes, who
longed for the abolition of debts and the division of lands.

1 Plut. Ar. 40. ᾿Ητρέμει γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἔστεργεν ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν, ἀλλὰ
καὶ Σικυωνίων αὐτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων ἐγένοντο πολλοὶ καταφανεῖς διειλεγμένοι τῷ
Κλεομένει καὶ πάλαι πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἰδίων ἐπιθυμίᾳ δυναστειῶν ὑπουλῶς ἔχοντες.
ΚΙ. 17. ᾿Εγεγόνει δὲ κίνημα τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀπόστασιν ὥρμησαν αἱ πόλεις,
τῶν! μὲν δήμων νομήν τε χώρας καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς ἐλπισάντων, τῶν δὲ πρώτων
βαρυνομένων τὸν Ἄρατον, ἐνιών δὲ καὶ δι’ ὀργῆς ἐχόντων ὡς ἐπάγοντα τῇ Πελοπο»-
νήσῳ Μακεδόνας.

VII VARIOUS PARTIES LEAN TO KLEOMENES > 871

Others, of all ranks and parties, were thoroughly tired of Aratos,

and thought Kleomenés, if only as a novelty, the more promis-

ing leader of the two. The disappointed men of rank and
wealth hoped that Kleomenés, whose foes called him a Tyrant,
might, like Antigonos Gonatas, patronize Tyranny everywhere,

and might set them up to lord it as his vassals over their several

cities. The populace, on the other hand, heard of his revolu-
tionary doings at home ; they longed for the day when a bonfire

of promissory notes should be kindled in the market-place of Both ex-
every city,! and when the lands of the wealthy should be divided remes
into equal lots for the benefit of the poor. Both parties mistook ΚΊωο.
their man. Whatever Kleomenés had done at Sparta professed menés.
to be the restoration of the off laws and discipline of the country ;

it therefore by no means followed that he would appear as an
apostle either of Tyranny or of confiscation anywhere lse.?

And it is easy to conceive that another set of motives, different

from any of these, might attract some partisans to the side of
Kleomenés. The question was no longer whether certain terms

should be agreed upon between Kleomenés and the League as a The
whole ; it now was whether each particular city should adhere of Keo
to the Achaian connexion or should embrace that of Sparta. Venas
Now the schemes of Kleomenés, if they were at all grounded on appealed
the old Pan-hellenic position of Sparta, would hardly include a ΝΥ τον
true Federal Union, a Bundesstaat. The tie by which he would against the
unite his conquests ‘would be alliance rather than incorporation ; Federal
they would form a Confederacy rather than a Confederation. 8 Principle,
Into such a Confederacy it was indeed quite possible that the
Achaian League, retaining its internal constitution, might enter

as a single member; it was highly probable that the ten towns

of the old Achaia would, if they entered it at all, enter it as a

2 Plut. Agis, 13. Καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν χρεωστῶν γραμματεῖα συνενέγκαντες els
ἀγορὰν, ἃ κλάρια καλοῦσι, καὶ πάντα συνθέντες εἰς ὃν συνέπρησαν. ἀρθείσης δὲ
φλογὸς οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι καὶ δανειστικοὶ περιπαθοῦντες ἀπῆλθον, ὁ δὲ ᾿Αγησίλαος
ὥσπερ ἐφυβρίζων οὐκ ἔφη λαμπρότερον ἑωρακέναι φώς οὐδὲ πῦρ ἐκείνου καθαρώ-
τερον. Cf. Kl. 10, 11.

2 Kortiim (iii. 188 et seqq.) seems throughout to picture Kleomenés as if he
were at the head of a sort of Socialist Propaganda. For this notion I can see no
evidence whatever. Kleomenés, from his own point of view, was as conservative
as Aratos or Antigonos.

3 The cities which went over to Kleomenés became, according to Plutarch
(ΚΙ. 17), σύμμαχοι Λακεδαιμονίων, ἔχοντος ἐκείνου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. This is the
old Lacedsemonian system, something wholly different from the συμπολιτεία of
the Achaians or even of the AStolians.

Kleo-
menés
wins the
Arkadian
and Argo-
lic cities.

372 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

single member ; but it was far more natural for the great cities
which had only lately joined the League to revert, under such
circumstances, to the principle of Town-Autonomy. <A Con-
federacy of cities under Spartan supremacy might easily give to
each of its members a greater measure of purely local independ-
ence than it possessed in the Federal Union. The position of
the citizen would be lowered; he would sink into a citizen of
one particular city instead of being a citizen of the great Achaian
League ; he would have far less direct influence in the general
affairs of the proposed Confederacy than he had in the general
affairs of the existing Confederation. But so long as Sparta
remained a president, and did not become a despot, the mere
principle of State Right would gain rather than lose! However
this may be, out of the several discontented elements which the
cities of the League contained, a strong Kleomenizing faction
began to show itself everywhere. In the cities which had been
united to the League during the administration of Aratos,? the
Federal administration quite lost its hold. In Sikyén itself, in
Corinth, above all in Argos, large parties called aloud for Kleo-
menés. Nearly all the cities of Arkadia*? and all the cities of +
Argolis fell away; Kaphyai, Phlious, Pheneos, Kleénai, Epi-
dauros, Hermioné, Troizén, were all lost to the League; some
towns Kleomenés took by force, others willingly went over to
him.5 Megalopolis, almost alone among the Southern members
of the League, stood faithful, if not to the Federal bond, at
least to 105 love of Macedonia and its hatred of Sparta. Even
Pelléné, in the old Achaia, was taken, and received a Lacede-
monian garrison. Nor was a greater prize long delayed—

1 Much the same view is taken by Droysen, ii. 495.

2 Plut. Ar. 89. “Ὅλως οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἐπικτήτων βέβαιον Fy τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς, ἀλλὰ
θορυβὸς πολὺς ἄφνω περιειστήκει τὸν “Aparov ὁρῶντα τὴν 1Ιελοπόννησον κραδαι-
νομένην καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐξανισταμένας ὑπὸ τῶν νεωτεριζόντων πανταχόθεν.

5. We may gather from Polybios (ii. 55) that Stymphalos and Kleitér remained
faithful ; Kynaitha also is not mentioned among the conquests of Kleomenés.

4 Plut. Ar. 40. Προσγενομένων αὐτῷ τῶν τὴν λεγομένην ᾿Ακτὴν κατοικούντων
καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐγχειρισάντων.

5 Pol. ii. 52. Ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης καταπληξάμενος τοῖς προειρημένοις εὐτυχήμασι
λοιπὸν ἀδεῶς ἐπεπορεύετο τὰς πόλεις, ἃς μὲν πείθων, αἷς δὲ τὸν φόβον ἀνατεινό-
μενος.

6 Droysen (ii. 508) makes Kleomenés occupy Pelléné with the goodwill of the
inhabitants. They rose, he says, and aided the Spartans against the Federal
troops. This must be grounded on the odd expression of Plutarch (Kl. 17), τοὺς
φρουροῦντας ἐξέβαλε μετὰ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν. But this would be a strange way of
expressing a very unlikely fact; in the old Achaia at least Kleomenés had no

VII SECESSION OF ARGOLIC AND ARKADIAN CITIES 878

indeed it preceded the fall of its own smaller neighbours. Argos,

the old-rival_of Sparta, Argos, which no Spartan King had ever

been able .ta subdue, Argos, which Pyrrhos had found as un-
conquerable as Sparta herself,' now opened her gates to ἃ Lace-
demonian master. The Achaian force had been withdrawn from Kleo-
the city to protect the Federal interest in Corinth and Sikydn, Vii
and Aratos had gone with it, armed with some strange arbitrary argos,
commission, how obtained we know not.? Kleomenés appeared 5.0. 223.
before Argos; Aristomachos, the former Tyrant, and late
General of the League, espoused his cause ;3 he hoped, so his
enemies said, to gain more by submission to Kleomenés than by
fidelity to the League. Through his influence the city was
surrendered, hostages were given, a garrison was received, and
Argos was admitted as an ally of Sparta, recognizing her supre-

macy. The whole Argolic peninsula followed its example.
Meanwhile Aratos, armed with his new authority, put to death Violent
some whom he called traitors in his native city ‘*—the first Pee of
recorded instance of civil bloodshed in the name of the Federal Aratos at
power. He then went on a like errand to Corinth, but there he Sikyén.
found the whole city stirred up against him. He and his
Federal troops were at once ordered to depart ;5 according to one
account he had to flee for his life. The Corinthians then sent Corinth

for Kleomenés ;’ he entered the city, and besieged Akrokorinthos, aon

partisans. Possibly oi φρουροῦντες may mean the mercenary garrison, and οἱ menes.

᾿Αχαιοί the citizen militia. Was Timoxenos (see Schorn, 118) then in Pelléné, or
does Plutarch use the words ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν (Ar. 39) loosely for the
Federal commander in the town ?

1 Plat. Kl. 18. Οὔτε γὰρ of πάλαι βασιλεῖς Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὰ πραγμα-
τευσάμενοι προσαγαγέσθαι τὸ "Apyos βεβαιῶς ἠδυνήθησαν, ὅ τε δεινότατος τών
στρατηγῶν Πύρρος εἰσελθὼν καὶ βιασάμενος οὐ κατέσχε τὴν πόλιν, K.T.A.

2 Ib. Ar. 40. ᾿Εξουσίαν ἀνυπεύθυνον λαβών. Polybios (ii. 52) speaks of
him at this time as στρατηγῶν, seemingly meaning the same thing, for Timoxenos
was still General, as appears by Plutarch's (K]. 17) mention of the Nemean Games,
which ton place earlier in the year than the Federal elections. See Thirlwall,
viii. 192-4.

> Pol. ii. 60. Ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιλαθόμενος τῶν προειρημένων φιλανθρώπων παρὰ πόδας,
ἐπεὶ μικρὸν ἐπικυδεστέρας ἔσχε τὰς ἐλπίδας ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐν Κλεομένει, τήν
τε πατρίδα καὶ τὴν ἑαντοῦ προαίρεσιν ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀναγ-
καιοτάτοις καιροῖς προσένειμε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. Plutarch does not mention Aristo-
machos in the business.

4 Plut. Ar. 40. Τοὺς μὲν ἐν Σικνῶνι διεφθαρμένους ἀπέκτεινε.

5 Pol. ii. 52. Τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων τῷ μὲν ᾿Αράτῳ στρατηγοῦντι καὶ τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς
παραγγειλάντων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν Κλεομένη διαπεμ-
πομένων καὶ καλούντων. δ See the story in Plut. Ar. 40. Kl. 19.

7 Pol. us. Plut. Ar. 40. Oi Κορίνθιοι. . . μετεπέμψαντο τὸν Κλεομένη
καὶ παρέδοσαν τὴν πόλιν, κιτ.λ.

Megara
joins the
Beeotian

League.

No real
argument
against
Federal
Govern-
ment to
be drawn
from these
events.

374 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

whose Federal garrison still held out.! The possession of
Corinth by Kleomenés cut off Megara from all communication
with her confederates. She did not revolt to the Spartan, but
attached herself, hy leave of fhe League, to the now nearer
Federation of Boeotia.2, We hear nothing of Aigina, which was
equally cut off. As Kleomenés had no fleet, it may have
retained its allegiance—it was again Achaian some years later—
but there must have been a temporary suspension of communi-
cation between it and the other cities. The League was now
reduced to nine Old-Achaian towns—Pelléné being lost—together
with Sikyén, Megalopolis, and a few other places in Arkadia.
Kleomenés had been provoked into becoming an enemy ; he had
been rejected as a Federal chief; he now came as a conqueror,
but, in most places, as a conqueror willingly received.

No better opportunity can be conceived for declamations on
the weakness of Federal States than this general break-up of the
most flourishing Federal State that the world had yet seen. But
a little consideration will show that the events which I have just
been recording really prove nothing of the kind. The true
question is, not whether a Federal Government can be warranted
to stand firm against every shock, but whether there are not
times and places in which a Federal Government is more likely
to stand firm than any other. It may be freely granted that
some of the special evils and dangers which beset Peloponnésos
in the year 224 arose from the Federal form of the Achaian
Government. But it is easy to see that any other form of
Government would have brought with it evils and dangers
greater still, The peculiar form taken by the dispute between
Sparta and the League could not have arisen except between a
single State and a Federation ; but we may be quite certain that
a Prince in the circumstances in which Kleomenés found himself
would soon have attacked, or been attacked by, his neighbours,
whatever might be their forms of government. Again, the

1 Plut. ΚΙ. 19. Ar. 40.

2 Pol. xx. 6. "Ore δὲ Κλεομένης els τὸν ᾿Ισθμὸν προεκάθισεν, διακλεισθέντες
προσέθεντο τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς μετὰ τῆς τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν γνώμης. Megara afterwards again
left the Boeotian for the Achaian connexion (Pol. ib.). In Roman times Megara
was again Beotian. Caius Curtius Proklos, whom we have already met with
(see above, p. 107, note 1) as a Megarian Amphiktyon, was also a Megarian
Beotarch. Boeckh, C. I. No. 1058. Among his merits was that of treating the

Megarians to a show of gladiators, a sight which would have somewhat amazed
either Kleomenés or Aratos.

Vu NO JUST INFERENCE AGAINST FEDERALISM 375

proposal to cede Corinth to Antigonos derived its chief sting from

the peculiarities of the Federal relation. For a League to pretend

to cede to a foreign power one of the Sovereign States which
compose it is clearly more monstrous, more threatening to the
rights of every other portion of the whole, than it is for a
Monarch to oede one of the provinces of his Kingdom. It is, as

the event showed, far more likely to excite general indignation

and rebellion. Yet it is easy to conceive that, even under a
Monarchy, the cession of ἃ province might raise serious disturb-

ances, and might even lead other provinces to offer their allegiance

to a master who seemed better able to protectthem. And, after

all, for 2 Federal power to pretend to cede one of its members is

not more iniquitous than the practice, 80 common among Princes,

of disposing of territories with which they have not even a
Federal connexion, without consulting either their rulers or their
inhabitants. Federal Government, like all other human things,

is imperfect, and there is a certain pressure to which it will give

way. But could any other form of government have stood the

trial better in that particular time and place? A Kingdom of No other
Peloponnésos was not to be thought of; the idea would have orm of
shocked every feeling of the Greek mind, and it could not have ment then
stood for an hour on any ground but that of naked brute force. possible in
Town-autonomy had had its fair trial; it had been found to reece:
mean, in that age, the presence either of local Tyrants or of
Macedonian garrisons. But the League had hitherto completely
excluded both evils; even in the degenerate days on which we

are now to enter, it completely excluded one and greatly restrained

and modified the other. And the cities which fell off from the
League asked neither for Monarchy nor for strict Town-autonomy ;

they were ready for a relation with Sparta, which, if not in
accordance with the most perfect Federal ideal, might still be
called Federal as distinguished from either of the other systems.

The truth is that, if the Federal Government of Achaia now Real
gave way, it gave way only because it fora moment deserted its teaching
own principles. There was clearly no general wish to secede, no history in
wish to exchange the Achaian for the Spartan connexion, as long favour of
as those who were at the head of the League did their duty as Fede
Federal rulers. When they were guilty of treason against Greece
by invoking Macedonian help, when they added the special treason
against Federal Law implied in the proposal to alienate a
Sovereign State of the Union, then, and not till then, did the

376 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Union begin to fall asunder. The fact that a Federal Govern-
ment, hitherto united and prosperous, fell in pieces as soon
as it deserted strict Federal principles, is surely rather an
argument for the Federal system than against it. And, after all,
the breaking-up of the League was very partial. Except at
Corinth, where no explanation need be sought for, the tendency
to Secession was confined to those cities which had lately joined
the League, and which may not as yet have become fully
accustomed to Federal principles and habits. The Old-Achaian
towns stuck closely together through the whole tempest;
Megalopolis stood firm, like an isolated rock against which
every wave dashed in vain. Even in the seceding cities the
party which desired separation from the League on any respectable
political ground seems to.have been nowhere the strongest.
Everywhere Secession was brought about mainly by the very worst
of political factions, by those classes whose impotence up to that
moment is the most speaking witness to the general good govern-
ment of the League. The opponents of Federalism are perfectly
welcome to ally themselves either with the would-be Tyrants of
Siky6n or with the Socialist rabble of Argos. It was only at
Corinth, in the city which Aratos offered to betray, that the
names of Aratos and his League stank, as they deserved, in the

Secession nostrils of every citizen. Everywhere else the movement towards

ΡΣ Dar - Secession was either merely. partial or merely temporary. It is

temporary, Clear that at Sikyén the mass of the inhabitants still clave to
their old deliverer amid all his short-comings ;! at Argos we shall
presently see that the very party which urged Secession soon
turned about and repented of it. The League, in short, was,
before long, reconstituted, with somewhat diminished extent and
with greatly diminished glory, but still in a form which, imper-
fect as it was, was better either than absolute bondage to Mace-
donia or than Town-autonomy, as Town-autonomy had in that
age become.

Effects The loss of Corinth—the remark is that of Polybios, in other
of the words that of Aratos himself—was felt by Aratos as a gain.? It

Corinth, took away all difficulties and all scruples as to the contemplated
B.C. 223.
1 Ses the description of the state of feeling at Sikydn in Plut. Ar. 42, a
remarkable contrast to the reception of Aratos at Corinth.
2 Pol. ii. 52. Tods δ᾽ ᾿Αχαιοὺς ἀπέλυσε τοῦ μεγίστου προβλήματος ; and,
directly after, παρεδόθη rots ᾿Αχαιοῖς ἀφορμὴ καὶ πρόφασις εὔλογος, κ.τ.λ.

Vil DICTATORSHIP OF ARATOS . 377

surrender of Akrokorinthos. The Corinthians were now rebels
with whom no terms need be kept ; their mountain-citadel was
now a fortress held by Achaian troops in an enemy’s country ;
it could now be handed over to the King without let or hindrance,
if only he would come with his army and take it. The loss of
Corinth and of so many other cities had also another result ;—
Aratos could now do what he pleased in the Federal Councils.
He had no longer to deal with a great Peloponnésian Confedera-
tion which gave hjm rivals like Lydiadas and Aristomdchos ; the
Achaian League once more meant ten cities on the Corinthian
Gulf. Their citizens, or some of them, met at Sikydn, elected Aratos

invested

Aratos General with absolute power, and voted him a guard for ΤΟΝ
the defence of his person.1_ To such a depth of degradation had absolute

the deliverer fallen, that now, after living for thirty years as power and

ΠΝ 9 ? _ defended
citizen and magistrate of a free state,? he needed a Tyrant’s pre by a Guard,

cautions to defend his life. And yet Aratos was not a Tyrant; 5°¢, 993.
he was not intentionally a traitor ; he was simply blinded by a
mischievous and obstinate prejudice, by a pride which, even in
such a moment, could not stoop to submission to Kleomenés. He
had brought his country into a state where her only choice was
a choice of evils; he now stubbornly persisted in choosing the
greater evil; he sacrificed the external independence, he risked

1 See above, p. 237.

2 Plut. Ar. 41. Ἰριάκοντα μὲν ἔτη καὶ τρία [1 shall consider these numbers
elsewhere] πεπολιτευμένος ἐν τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς πεπρωτευκὼς δὲ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ δόξῃ
τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τότε δ᾽ ἔρημος καὶ ἄπορος, συντετριμμένος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ναναγίου τῆς
πατρίδος ἐν τοσούτῳ σάλῳ καὶ κινδύνῳ διαφερόμενος. I need not stop to show how .
utterly unconstitutional all this was. But I may observe that this was not the
regular election for the year B.c. 223-2, nor was that election held at the Meeting
at Aigion to be presently mentioned, which comes too late in the year. (See the
τρεῖς μῆνας in Plut. Ar. 41, for which Kleomenés besieged Siky6n, compared with
the date supplied by the mention of Nemean Games which were celebrated in
February in Kl. 17. See p. 873, note 2.) The regular Spring Meeting of the
year B.c. 223 must have come between the two. At it Timoxenos (see Pol. ii. 53.
Thirlwall, viii. 196) was re-elected Genera] for the year—another unconstitutional
act—Aratos seemingly still retaining his extraordinary powers.

During the siege of Charlestown in 1780, Governor Rutledge of South Carolina
was made στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, like Aratos. The Legislature of the State passed
an act, “delegating to Governor Rutledge, and such of his council as he could
conveniently consult, a power to do everything necessary for the public good,
except taking away the life of a citizen without a legal trial.” (Marshall’s Life
of Washington, iv. 185.) Aratos (see above, p. 373) seems not to have felt him-
self under even this last restriction.

The appointment of a Dictator was also contemplated, though not carried out,
in Virginia, both in 1776 and in 1781. See Tucker's Life of Jefferson, i. 162.

The Roman formula, “ Dent operam Consules ne quid Respublica detrimenti
capiat,’’ is familiar to every one.

Aratos
refuses the
offers of
Kleo-
menés,

Aratos
asks for
help of

378 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

—_——— rc ee -ς-ς---.---α---ὄ.

the internal freedom, of his country, but he was no wilful con-
spirator against her. It was probably because he felt in his own
heart no wish to tyrannize that he did not scruple to assume the
power and the outward garb of a Tyrant. He soon showed his
strict personal integrity, perverted as was the form which even
his virtues now assumed. Kleomenés spared! his house and
property at Corinth; he made him splendid offers ; twelve
talents a year, double his Egyptian pension,® should be the
reward of the surrender of Akrokorinthos. Nay, in this hour of
success, he lowered his terms ; let the League, or what remained
of it, acknowledge his supremacy, and he and they should garrison
the key of Peloponnésos in common.‘ In attempting to bribe
Aratos, Kleomenés showed that he failed to understand the man
with whom he had been so long contending. Sad as were the
passions and weaknesses with which the mind of Aratos was now
clouded, mere personal gain was wholly absent from his thoughts.
He would not sell the least atom of his pride or his prejudice,
because such a sale would have been in his eyes a sale of his
country. His answer was enigmatical ; Circumstances were not
in his power, but he was in the power of circumstances.® This
reply was not satisfactory to the Spartan, whose rejoinder took
the form of an invasion of the Sikyénian territory, and a siege
of Sikyén itself. In this deplorable state,® Aratos sought for
allies, perhaps merely to satisfy his own conscience and the
opinion of his countrymen, by showing that the application to
Antigonos was really unavoidable. He asked, but of course he
asked in vain, for help from those very A‘tolians, whose expected

#tolia and hostility had been so prominently put forward in justification of

Athens.

his course.’ He stooped so low as to ask for aid from Athens,

1 Compare the instances quoted above, p. 345.

2 On Aratos’ possession of real property at Corinth, see above, p. 201, note 3.

8. Plut. Ar. 41. KI. 19. The Egyptian pension must now have been stopped.
Ptolemy was now on the side of Kleomenés ; Πτολεμαῖος ἀπογνοὺς τὸ ἔθνος
Κλεομένει χορηγεῖν ἐπεβάλετο. (Pol. ii. 51.) He naturally would take his side
as soon as he knew of the dealings of the League with Macedonia.

4 He used, as his agent for this offer, not one of his own subjects, but a
Messénian named Tritymallos (Plut. ΚΙ]. 19). This employment of a neutral
envoy is a clear sign of moderation, and may be compared with the practice (see
above, ἢ. 802) of referring disputes to the arbitration of a neutral state.

δ᾽ Plut. Ar. 41. ‘Qs οὐκ ἔχοι τὰ πράγματα, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἔχοιτο. So
Kl. 19.

5 See an eloquent description of his position at this time—more fair towards
him than is usual with the writer—in Droysen, ii. 511.

7 Plut. Ar. 41. See above, p. 341.

VII VOTE OF CESSION OF AKROKORINTHOS . 379

as if Athens could again occupy Pylos or Kythéra, or could again

win naval triumphs in the Corinthian Gulf. Incredible as it
sounds, we are told that the Athenian people, who had once worn

crowns on the report of Aratos’ death, were now ready, in their
gratitude, to send him help—such help as Athens could give.

Two orators, named Eukleidés and Mikién,} persuaded them not

to run the hazard, and Aratos was left wholly without allies.

And now there was no other hope—the die was cast. An Final vote
Assembly was called at Aigion ;? Aratos—cut off from the place οἷ the
of meeting by the Lacedemonian occupation of Pelléné—made to invite
his way thither by sea ;* and the Federal Rump, doubtless at his Antigonos

motion,‘ passed’ the final resolution to invite the help of ang code
Antigonos_and ‘to cede to him Akrokorinthos as_the price of ;inthos,
his help. B.C. 223.

Thus it was that the deliverer of Greece became, deliberately
and in the face of every warning, her betrayer. It would indeed Estimate
be unfair to judge Aratos by our light, or by the light of Plutarch, of the con-
but by this time he had been taught lessons which ought to have aratos.
opened bis eyes. He had passed a long and honoured political
career as the chosen chief of a free commonwealth ; he had had
to face parliamentary rivals and to undergo occasional rebuffs and
censures ; but on the whole his career had been one of prosperity
and honour singularly uninterrupted. The League, his own
work, had held together as long as he adhered to the principles
on which it was founded ; it fell asunder only when he deserted
the cause to which hitherto his life had been devoted. The -
moment Macedonian intervention is named, city after city falls
away ; heis driven to demand an unconstitutional authority from
the wretched remnant that is left ; and, in his own city, the city
whence he had expelled the Tyrant, the deliverer cannot venture
to appear without a guard. From that moment the glory of the Lowered
League passes away. It still survived; it still honourably dis- acws
charged many of its functions ; it still secured to a large part of League

Greece exemption from border wars and a good and equitable from this
time.

2 These must be the same as Eurykleidés and Mikén (Paus. ii. 9. 4), whom
Philip is said to have poisoned. See Thirlwall, viii. 196.

2 Plut. Ar. 42. Ol μὲν οὖν ᾿Αχαιοὶ συνεληλυθότες els Αἴγιον ἐκεῖ τὸν “Apatow
ἑκάλουν. The meeting therefore was not summoned by himself as στρατηγὸς
αὐτοκράτωρ, but by the regular General Timoxenos.

+ With ten friends and his son. (Plut. u.s.) These then formed the Sikyénian
contingent to the National Congress. What were its whole numbers ?

ὁ Plut. KI. 19. Ψηφίσασθαι τοὺς 'Axaods ἔπεισεν ᾿Αντιγόνῳ παραδιδόναι
τὸν ᾿Ακροκόρινθον. Cf. Ar. 42,

Compari-
son of
Cavour
and
Aratos.

Character
of An-
tigonos.

380 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

form of internal government. [0 still produced wise and patriotic
statesmen, and one chief of its armies far greater than Aratos
himself. But Achaia never again became the independent bul-
wark of Greece, the unassailable and incorruptible home of
freedom. It almost ceased to be an independent power; its
future warfare, even its future legislation, was carried on by the
sufferance, first of Macedonia and then of Rome. Its constitu-
tional forms lightened the yoke of either master; they made the
fall of Greece more gradual and less dishonourable ; and so far
the work of Markos and Aratos was even then not in vain. But
the free and glorious League of so many equal cities acting by a
common will, the League which had warred with Kings and had
overthrown or converted Tyrants, had now become a thing of
the past. And the fabric had been overthrown by the very
hands which had reared it; the Creator, the Preserver, and the
Destroyer, had been united in a single man.

We have in our own days beheld a sight in some respects
alike, but on the whole the parallel affords more of contrast than
of likeness. The deliverer of Peloponnésos, the founder of the
Achaian League, was also the man who surrendered a great
Achaian city into the hands of the greatest enemy of independent
Greece. So we have seen a statesman as subtle and as full of
resources as Aratos himself, the deliverer of Italy, the founder
of the Italian Kingdom, surrender two provinces of his native
land into the grasp of the common enemy of Italy and mankind.
That sad and subdued debate in the Italian Parliament which
confirmed the cession of Savoy and Nizza to the Tyrant of Paris
may give us some idea of what took place in that Assembly at
Aigion which voted the cession of Akrokorinthos to the King of
Macedon. In one respect indeed the modern side of the parallel
is the darker of the two. Antigonos was a King, and not a
Tyrant ; he had broken no oaths, he had destroyed no freedom,
he cloaked his ambition by no hypocritical pretences; when
asked to interfere in a quarrel not his own, he—from his own
point of view naturally and rightfully—demanded the restoration
of a fortress which had been but twenty years before wrested
from his predecessor. He did not trouble the world with Ideas
and Questions and Solutions and Complications; he asked
straightforwardly for a city which he had some decent pretext
for looking upon as his own. Antigonos was a King, a Mace-
donian, the enemy of Greece and the enemy of freedom ; but he

VI COMPARISON OF ARATOS AND CAVOUR 881

was ἃ fair and honourable enemy, openly seeking the natural
interests of his order and of his nation. He would have been in

his place asa member of the Holy Alliance, he might consistently

have helped to partition out Europe at Vienna; but he would

never have stooped to dictate pamphlets about mountain slopes

and natural boundaries, or to ground his right to Akrokorinthos

on the vote of a Corinthian Assembly, called on to say Yea or

Nay beneath the shadow of the Macedonian sarissa. But if one

would shrink from placing Antigonos Dés6n in the same rank

with Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, one would no less shrink from

placing the act of Cavour on a level-with the act of Aratos.

There is indeed much likeness in the character and career of the Likeness
two men; each sought the noblest of ends, but neither was so between
scrupulous as strict morality could wish as to the means by which Cratos anc
those ends were to be compassed. Each was, in his own age,
unrivalled for parliamentary and diplomatic skill; each indulged
in the same dark and crooked policy ; each could, when he chose,
throw himself, in all freedom and openness, on the vote of a
popular Assembly. But Cavour was never tried as Aratos was. Greater
The laws of his country did not require its parliamentary leader se aes
to act also as its military chieftain. While he himself spoke and°
plotted, he could use the sword of Garibaldi, of Cialdini, of the

King of Italy himself. Cavour was thus spared the humiliation

which always waited on the arms of Aratos, from Phylakia to
Hekatombaion. Cavour again was never tried by the severest

of all trials, the opposition of a rival on really equal terms, such

as Aratos found, in different ways, in Lydiadas and in Kleo-

menés. But the cession of Akrokorinthos was a deeper sin Greater
against freedom even than the cession of Savoy and Nizza. Both ἜΤΟΣ cssion
the Achaian and the Italian statesman surrendered a portion of of Axro-
the land which he had saved into the hands of a foreign despot ; korinthos
one surrendered his own ancestral province, the other surrendered ἑκα ion
the scene of his own most glorious exploit. Each deed was of gavoy.
equally the betrayal of a trust, the narrowing of the area of
freedom. But the circumstances of the two acts differed widely.

The cession of Savoy and Nizza was indeed a doing of evil that

good might come ; it was seeking to compass a glorious purpose

by a base means; still it was the price paid for help which,
hypocritically as it was given, was real help against a real enemy.

It might be fairly argued that to liberate Lombardy with the

aid of France was a less evil than to leave Lombardy helpless in

Change
in the
character
of the
war,

B.C. 223-
222.
Kleomenés
now the
champion
of Greece.

382 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

the jaws of Austria, and probably even Cavour’s sagacity did not
foresee the base perfidy which drew back long before it reached
the Hadriatic and left Venice in the grasp of the oppressor. To
make the bondage of Savoy and Nizza the price of the freedom
of Lombardy was a sin against all abstract morality ; but, striking
the balance in a mercantile way, the gain was on the side of
freedom, and a patriot not over scrupulous as to means might
not shrink from the bargain. But the surrender of Akrokorinthos
was simple treason ;—not wilful or corrupt treason, but treason
nevertheless ; it was the price paid not for freedom, but for sub-
jection ; it was not doing evil that good might come, but doing
evil for the further promotion of evil. It doubtless required
some personal and some national sacrifice to admit the claims of
Kleomenés; but it was a sacrifice which patriotism dictated,
when the choice lay between Kleomenés and Antigonos. To
have modified the constitution of the League so as to make
Kleomenés its chief would have been a far less sin against freedom
generally, even a far less sin against its special Federal form,
than to retain the constitution in its outward integrity, but to
make the League itself a mere dependency of a foreign power.
It would be hard to find in all history an instance of so sad a
fall as that from the Aratos of the year 251 to the Aratos of the
year 223. He saved his country, he raised it to the highest
pitch of glory, and then pulled it down to the dust. Yet at
heart he was not a traitor; he was only the saddest of all
instances of the way in which pride, passion, and obstinacy will
sometimes darken the judgement even of honourable and illustri-
ous men.

From this time the war loses its interest, or rather it assumes
an interest of quite another kind. Hitherto it has been a
struggle between two Grecian powers for ascendency in Pelo-
ponnésos ; it now changes into a struggle for Grecian freedom
waged by one of the last and noblest of Grecian heroes against
the overwhelming power of Macedonia. Our hearts now go
along with Kleomenés, as with Leénidas of old or with Kanarés
and Botzarés in the days of our fathers. Antigonos was indeed
a foe of a nobler stamp, but he was as truly the foe of Greece as
Xerxés or as Omar Brionés. Aratos the deliverer of Greece, and
the remnant which still clave to him, have sunk from being the
bulwark of Hellas into the rank of a medizing Theban at Plataia.

VII KLEOMENES NOW THE CHAMPION OF GREECE 883

Kleomenés had been refused as a chief, and now Antigonos came
as a master, or rather as a God. He was declared chief of all
the allies;! the Achaian League was now merged in a great
Confederacy together with the lesser Leagues of Boeotia, Phékis,
Akarnania, and Epeiros, together also with the Thessalians, who
were hardly better than Macedonian subjects. The League
deprived itself of the common rights of independent sovereignty ; ς
no letter or embassy was to be sent to any other King without
the consent of the King of Macedon. King Ptolemy had been
a friend and a paymaster; King Antigonos was a master who
required heavy wages for his services. The Macedonian army
was maintained and paid at the cost of the League. As for
Antigonos himself, sacrifices were offered to him, games were
held in his honour, and Aratos had to appear as something like
the High Priest of this new Divinity.2 All this impious flattery
was Indeed no more than the age was used to; Athens had long
before set the example towards Antigonos’ own ancestor Démé-
trios ;* but Athens at least did not take to King-worship till
Démosthenés had ceased to guide her councils, Who would
have dreamed, when Aratos scaled Akrokorinthos to expel the
garrison of one Antigonos, that the same Aratos would live to
welcome another Antigonos with the honours due to Zeus and
Poseidén? That much that Aratos beheld and did he beheld
and did most unwillingly* we may most fully believe. But he
was only reaping a harvest of his own sowing, a harvest whose
nature any eyes not blinded by passion would have foreseen
from the first.

The military details of the war between Antigonos and Kleo-
menés are worthy of careful study, and nothing in Grecian or
any other history is more attractive than the whole personal
career of the last Spartan King. For these I will refer to the

1 Pol. ii. 54. Karacradels ἡγεμὼν ἁπάντων τῶν συμμάχων. Cf. Thirlwall,
viii. 202. This was at the Autumn Meeting of B.c. 223.

2 Plut. Ar. 45. ᾿Εψηφίσαντο δ᾽ ἄλλῳ μὴ γράφειν βασιλεῖ μηδὲ πρεσβεύειν
πρὸς ἄλλον ἄκοντος ᾿Αντιγόνου, τρέφειν τε καὶ μισθοδοτεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο τοὺς
Μακεδόνας, θυσίας δὲ καὶ πομπὰς καὶ ἀγῶνας ᾿Αντιγόνῳ συνετέλουν. So Kl. 16.

Διαδήματι καὶ πορφύρᾳ καὶ Μακεδονικοῖς καὶ σατραπικοῖς προστάγμασιν ὑπέρριψε᾽

μετὰ τῆς ᾿Αχαΐας αὐτὸν, ἵνα μὴ Κλεομένει ποιεῖν δοκῇ τὸ προσταττόμενον,
᾿Αντιγόνεια θύων καὶ παιᾶνας ἄδων αὐτὸς ἐστεφανωμένος els ἄνθρωπον ὑπὸ φθόης
κατασηπόμενον. Helwing (p. 148, 9) seems to think the whole thing all right
and proper, and takes Plutarch severely to task for his freedom of speech.

3. See the details in Athénaios, vi. 62-4, cepecially the Ithyphallics in c. 63.

4 Plut. Ar. 45. ὑτιῶντο πάντων ἐκεῖνον... ἐπεὶ φανερῶς γε πολλὰ τῶν
πραττομένων ἐλύπει τὸν “Aparcy.

Degrada-
tion of the
League.

Monstrous
flattery of
Antigonos.

Recovery
of the
revolted
cities,
B.C. 223-

. 222.

Argos
returns
to the
League,
B.C. 223,

Execution
of Aristo-
machos,

384 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

general historians of Greece and to Kleomenés’ own special
biographer. A few points however stand out which more
immediately bear on my own subject.

The combined forces of Antigonos and the League had little
difficulty in recovering the cities which had revolted from their
Federal allegiance. Some were taken by force, others received
the conquerors, with what amount of willingness or unwilling-
ness it would be hard to say. In one case a remarkable internal
revolution restored the greatest of the seceding cities to its
place in the Union. At the very beginning of the war, before
Antigonos had entered Peloponnésos, while Kleomenés was still
master of a strong force at the Isthmus, and was still besieging
the Achaian garrison in Akrokorinthos, Argos, his greatest prize,
returned of its own accord to the Achaian connexion. The
party which had invited Kleomenés to Argos was dissatisfied
because the Spartan King had not proclaimed the abolition of
debts among his new friends.! At the persuasion of one Aris-
totelés, the multitude rose, and called in Aratos and the allies.
Now it was that Aratos, still, it would seem, Absolute General
of the League, was elected local General of the State of Argos.?
Aristomachos, once Tyrant of Argos, afterwards General of the
League, was put to death,® with the sanction, if not by the com-

1 Plut. ΚΙ. 20. Ὁ δὲ πράττων ἣν τὴν ἀπόστασιν ᾿Αριστοτέλητ᾽ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος
οὐ χαλεπῶς ἔπεισεν ἀγανακτοῦν, ὅτι χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς οὐκ ἐποίησεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Κλεο-
μένης ἐλπίσασι.

3 ΤΌ, Ar. 44. “Aparos δὲ στρατηγὸς αἱρεθεὶς ὑπ' ᾿Αργείων.

. 199.
P 8 Phylarchos asserted, and Plutarch (u.s.) repeats the assertion without ex-
pressing any doubt of its truth, that Aristomachos was put to death by torture, a
thing utterly repugnant to Grecian feeling. Polybios (ii. 59, 60) denies the fact,
and his denial is perhaps worth more because he argues that Antigonos and Aratos
would have been fully justified if they had done so. (See above, p. 298.) It was
no crime to torture a Tyrant, especially one whd lad himself tortured to death
eighty of his own citizens. But whatever Aristomachos had once been, he was
not a Tyrant now ; in strong Unionist eyes he might be a rebel, but torture was
no Greek punishment for rebellion. Moreover this charge of torturing the eighty
Argeians is in itself very doubtful (see above, p. 312, note 3), and, even if true,
it could not be decently urged against him by Aratos. Whatever were the old

See above,

‘ crimes of Aristomachos, the League had condoned them by admitting him as a

citizen and electing him as its Chief Magistrate.

The fate of Aristomachos, whatever it was, lies at the door of Antigonos and
Aratos ; but we may gather from a later allusion of Polybios (v. 16) that the
Macedonian Leontios was guilty of deeds of slaughter of some kind or other with-
out the authority of either. Aratos recounts the crimes of Leontios, and, among
them, τὴν γενομένην bx’ αὐτῶν [τῶν περὶ τὸν Λεόντιον] ἐν “Apye σφαγὴν, ἣν
ἐποιήσαντο μετὰ τὴν ᾿Αντιγόνου χωρισμόν.

VII FATE OF ARGOS, CORINTH AND MANTINEIA 385

—_— + -— a RINGS | EEN . ..-.-- -ο ο-Ἠ....

mand, of Aratos. It was a hard sentence. Aristomachos had
united a great city to the League; he had been chosen its
Chief Magistrate ; in that character he seems to have shown no
fault except over-deference to Aratos; his only crime now was
that, in the unavoidable choice of masters, he had preferred a
Spartan to a Macedonian.1 The property of other “Tyrants
and traitors,” whoever they may have been, was voted by the
Argeian commonwealth, on the motion of its new General, as a
benevolence or a testimonial to the King of Macedonia.? The
recovery of Argos was the turning-point in the war; as soon as
this first step took place, but of course before Aratos and his Antigonos
master had sated their vengeance, Kleomenés deserted his ροβὶ- Ραὺ ἴὰ
tion at Corinth in order to relieve his troops in the Argeian Pe Akro-
citadel. Aratos was thus able to fulfil his pledge, and to korinthos.
surrender Akrokorinthos to his royal ally. Twenty years of 5.6. 338-
freedom had succeeded a hundred years of bondage; thirty 243: 243-
years more of bondage now began; after that freedom was to 255.
be once more restored to Corinth, but this time not by the
hands of a Grecian deliverer, but as a gift from the Roman con- 5.6. 223-
queror of Macedon and lord of Greece. 196.

The other cities of Argolis and Arkadia were easily recovered
during the autumn of the year 223 and the spring of 222.
The fate of the three Arkadian towns which had given the first
occasion to the war, Tegea, Orchomenos, and Mantineia, calls for
some remark. The Mantineians, in the eyes of Antigonos or at Fate of -
least of Aratos, were double-dyed traitors; they had revolted a
once to the A{tolians and once to Kleomenés; no terms there- " άΛΑ
fore were to be offered them. Their city was taken, its in-
habitants were slain or sold,‘ and the “lovely Mantineia” was
handed over to the Argeians as a reward for their repentance ὃ
and amendment. Its new masters planted a colony there, of
which they chose their General Aratos as the Founder. His
own native Sikyén had once been called Démétrias ; the name

1 Plut. Ar. 44, Τὸν δὲ ᾿Αριστόμαχον ἐν Keyxpeats στρεβλώσαντες xare-
πόντισαν, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ καὶ μάλιστα κακῶς ἤκουσεν ὁ ΓἌρατος ὡς ἄνθρωπον οὐ πονηρὸν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ κεχρημένον ἐκείνῳ καὶ πεπεισμένον ἀφεῖναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ προσαγαγεῖν
τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς τὴν πόλιν ὅμως περιιδὼν παρανόμως ἀπολλύμενον. The Chairé-
neian, at his distance of time, does not share the passions of the Megalopolitan.

2 ΤΌ, “Επεισεν αὐτοὺς [δ΄ Αρατος] ᾿Αντιγόνῳ τά τε τῶν τυράννων καὶ τὰ τῶν
προδοτῶν χρήματα δωρεὰν δοῦναι. This sounds like the form of the decree.

3 Pol. ii. 54. 4 Plut. Ar. 46. Pol. ii. 58.

5 Pol. ii. 53. Tevvalus μὲν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν φιλοτίμως δὲ τῶν ᾿Αργείων ἐκ perape-
λείας αὐτὸν [Κλεομένη] ἀμυναμένων.

20

Tegea
united

to the
League.
Antigonos
keeps Or-
chomenos.

Kleomenés
takes Me-
galopolis,
B.0. 222.

First men-
tion of
PHILO-
POIMEN.

386 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

had been lost, if by nothing else, by his own exploits as her
deliverer ; as if now to wipe out the error of his youth, he now
changed the name of his refounded city to Antigoneia,!

Tegea and Orchomenos were also taken. To the people of
Tegea Antigonos restored. the constitution of their fathers,? a
strange boon, if what is meant is union to the Achaian League,
of which they had never been members. Orchomenos the
Macedonian King kept to himself; Polybios* complains that it
was not united to the League. It is hard to see on what ground
any such complaint could be made. It had never belonged to
the League; if conquest confers any rights, Antigonos had a
perfect right to keep it, and, as Polybios himself shows, he had
excellent reasons for so doing.

Meanwhile Megalopolis had, through the whole war, steadily
adhered to the Federal cause. The war had been originally
undertaken in its defence, and, through its whole course, it had,
more than any other city, borne the brunt of it. At last, in
almost the latest stage of the war, when Kleomenés, shorn of all
his allies and conquests, was bearing up alone with the soul of a
hero and the skill of a general, a blow, well timed and ably
struck, made him master of the Great City. Lydiadas was
gone, but Megalopolis contained a citizen worthy to take his
place, in Philopoimén the son of Kraugis. He, while the mass
of his countrymen fled to Messéné, headed a diversion which
secured their retreat. He, when Kleomenés offered to restore
their city unhurt on condition of their forsaking the League,
exhorted them to endure everything in the cause of their country
and their allies.© Kleomenés, when his offers were rejected,
utterly destroyed the city which, for a hundred and fifty years,
had been at once the memorial and the pledge of Spartan humi-
liation.

1 Plut. Ar. 45. Τῶν γὰρ ᾿Αργείων τὴν πόλιν wap’ ᾿Αντιγόνου δωρεὰν λαβόντων
καὶ κατοικίζειν ἐγνωκότων αὐτὸς οἰκιστὴς αἱρεθεὶς καὶ στρατηγὸς ὧν ἐψηφίσατο
μηκέτι καλεῖν Μαντίνειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ᾿Αντιγόνειαν, ὃ καὶ μέχρι νῦν καλεῖται" καὶ δοκεῖ
δι᾿ ἐκεῖνον ἡ μὲν ἐρατεινὴ Μαντίνεια παντάπασιν ἐξαληλίφθαι, διαμένει δ᾽ ἡ πόλις
ἐπώνυμος τῶν ἀπολεσάντων καὶ ἀνελόντων τοὺς πολίτας. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 204.

2 Pol. ii. 70. ᾿Αποδοὺς τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν. This was after the battle of
Sellasia, but the city was taken before. See c. 54.

3 iv. 6. 4 Pol. ii. 55. Plut. Kl. 23.

5 So says Plutarch (Phil. 5. Kl. 24), who makes the Megalopolitans inclined
to accept Kleomenés’ offer till they are dissuaded by Philopoimén. Phylarchos,
whom Polybios (ii. 61) seems to follow, describes them as hardly needing such
dissuasion. They would not hear Kleomenés’ letter to the end, and could hardly
be kept from stoning the bearer.

VI CONCLUSION OF THE WAR 387

a ce te

It was on the field of Sellasia,! one of the saddest names Battle of
in Grecian history, that the final struggle took place between Sellasia,
Sparta and Macedonia for the headship of Greece. One hardly ὅδ 221:
knows whether to count it as an aggravation or as an alleviation
of the blow that it was partly dealt by Grecian hands. Philo-
poimén and the Achaian cavalry had a distinguished share in
winning the victory. Philopoimén, like Lydiadas at Ladokeia,
charged without orders, but he was somewhat better supported
by Antigonos than his great countryman had been by Aratos.

After a valiant struggle, the Lacedemonians were defeated ; Defeat and
Kleomenés endured to survive, and to wait in vain, in the de- ome of
spotic court of Egypt, for better times. Sparta now, for the jones,
first time since the return of the Hérakleids, opened her gates

to a foreign conqueror. Antigonos treated her with the same

politic lenity which he had shown everywhere except at Man-

tineia. It would be his policy to represent the war as waged, not

against Sparta, but against her so-called Tyrant. The innova- Antigonos’
tions of Kleomenés were done away,” but Sparta was not required pron
to join the Achaian League. Her compulsory and useless union © ~? arta,
was reserved for a later stage of our history.

The death of Antigonos soon followed his settlement of Pelo- Death and
ponnésian affairs. Aratos, who had sung pans in his honour, character
gave him a bad character in his Memoirs.* It is hard to see the gone,
reason for this in his acts, and it clearly was not followed by so. 221.
Polybios.. Antigonos, a King and a Macedonian, was far less
blameworthy than Aratos, a Greek and a republican leader. An

1 The battle of Sellasia is commonly placed in the year B.c. 222; but the
succession of summers and winters given by Polybios (ii. 54) would rather bring
it to 221, in which it is placed by Bishop Thirlwall. On the whole, s.c. 221
seems the most probable date ; at the same time it requires the battle of Sellasia,
the settlement of Sparta and some other cities, the return of Antigonos to Mace-
donia, his death, the accession of Philip, and the events which led to the Social
War, to have followed one another with unusual speed. And in Pol. iv. 35, the
Spartans are said, seemingly in B.c. 219, to have been πολιτευόμενοι κατὰ τὰ
πάτρια σχεδὸν ἤδη τρεῖς ἐνιαντοὺς μετὰ τὴν Κλεομένους ἔκπτωσιν. This,
however, might possibly be satisfied by a period of two years and a frac-
tion. As the exact date does not bear very immediately on my own subject, I
would recommend the question to the attention of professed chronologers.

32 Pol. ii. 70. Πολίτευμα τὸ πάτριον αὐτοῖς καταστήσας. Cf. Plut. Kl. 80.

It is doubtful whether Antigonos did, or did not, leave Brachyllas the Theban,
for a time at least, with some authority at Sparta. See Pol. xx. 5. Thirlwall,
viii. 218. If he did, it must have been only with some temporary commission,
like that of Prytanis at Megalopolis.

3 Plut. Ar. 38. "Ev τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι λοιδορῶν διετέλει. Kl. 16. ᾿Αντίγονον
εἰρηκὼς κακὰ μυρία δι' ὧν ἀπολέλοιπεν ὑπομνημάτων. But see Pol. ii. 70.

B.c. 281~
221.

New posi-
tion of the
League.

B.c. 221-
146.

388 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP. VIT

opportunity was offered him for recovering an old and precious
possession of his house, and of vastly extending the power and
influence of his Crown. That he accepted it no man can
wonder ; one would be half inclined to blame him if he had not.
And, if we do not see in his career the wonderful magnanimity
ascribed to him by Achaian admirers, it was at least something
to win so many cities with so little needless cruelty. Both Sparta
and Athens, in the days of their power, had shed Grecian blood
far more freely. Altogether Antigonos Dés6én was a King who
need not shrink from a comparison with any but the selected few,
the Alfreds and the Akbars, among those whom the accident of
birth has called to rule over their fellows. Himself only a
distant kinsman of the royal house, born a subject, and called to
the throne by popular election, he better knew how to deal with
freemen than the mass of Kings and their satraps. We shall
soon see how both Macedonia and Greece could be made to
suffer at the hands of one born in the purple.

We have thus, for sixty years, traced the growth of the
League, from the union of two small Achaian towns, till it
became the greatest power of Peloponnésos and of Greece. We
have seen it fall from its high estate through the envy of the
man who had done most to raise it. We leave it now restored
nearly to its full extent, with the exception of that mountain
citadel, that key to its whole position, without which its extent
was a mockery, and its freedom little better thana name. We
have still, in the following Chapter, to continue its history for
another period of seventy-five years, retaining its internal consti-
tution, vastly increased in territorial extent, but, in external
affairs, with only a few very short intervals, reduced almost to
the condition of a dependent ally, first of Macedonia and then of
Rome.

CHAPTER VII

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE, FROM THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA
TO THE PEACE OF EPEIROS. B.C. 221—205

THE Do Soe et oes cheat he and the results of

the battle. of wholly changed the aspect of Grecian State of
affairs The greater part of Greece was now united in an Greece
alliance, of which the King of Macedonia was the real, if not the after the
acknowledged, head. Beside the Macedonian Kingdom and Kleo-
the Achaian League, this Confederacy included all the Federal menés.
powers of Northern Greece, with the exception of tolia.

The spectacle of so many Federal Commonwealths thus closely Grand
allied, both with one another and with a Government of another Alliance
kind, gives this Confederacy a special interest in the eyes of 8 Wace.
historian of Federalism. The formal relations between the donian
several allied powers were apparently those of perfect equality. headship.
The extraordinary authority which the Achaians had conferred

upon Antigonos seems to have lasted no longer than the dura-

tion of the Kleomenic War. It certainly did not descend to his
successor Philip. But Achaia and other republican members of

the Confederacy were exposed to all the dangers which com-
monly attegd alliances between the weak and the strong. It

would be too much to say that they stood to Macedonia in the
relation of dependent alliance ; but they seem to have stood
practically in 8 same sort of subordination in which the Pelo-
ponnésian alhes stood to Sparta at the beginning of the great

Peloponnésian War.? Sparta had now, by the fall of Kleo-

1 Pol. iv. 9. "Ere γὰρ Evopxos ἔμενε πᾶσιν ἡ γεγενημένη συμμαχία δι’
᾿Αντιγόνον κατὰ τοὺς Ἰζλεομενικοὺς καιροὺς ᾿Αχαιοῖς, Ἠπειρώταις, Φωκεῦσι,
Μακεδόσι, Βοιωτοῖς, ᾿Ακαρνᾶσι, Θετταλοῖς. Ib. 16. "Hy δὲ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς
᾿Αχαιοῖς ταῦτα, πρεσβεύειν πρὸς Ἤπειρώτας, Βοιωτοὺς, Φωκέας, ᾿Ακαρνᾶνας,
Φίλιππον. The Thessalians, as nominally independent, were enrolled in the
alliance ; but, as practically Macedonian subjects, they were not thought worthy
of a formal embassy being sent to them. 2 See above, p. 357.

Relations
of the
other
Greek
States.

Internal
and: ex-
ternal
condition
of the
Achaian

League.

390 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

menés, been reduced to an unwilling union with the Allies.
Messéné was friendly to the Allies, but was not formally enrolled
among them.” This enumeration includes pretty nearly all
Greece, except Athens, of which we have just now no mention,
and Elis, which of course retained its old connexion with A‘ tolia.
As for AXtolia itself, notwithstanding all that we have heard of
danger from that quarter, the old alliance between the Achaian
and AXtolian Leagues was not held to be dissolved by the new
engagements of the Achaians.? In like manner Attolia stood
towards Messéné also in a relation which is spoken of as one of
friendship aud-alliance.?

As for the Achaian League itself, its internal constitution
remained unchanged. Its General, its Senate, and its Assembly
still continued to exercise their old functions. There is no
reason to suppose that their practical working had at all de-
generated. Achaia still retained its mixture of moderate Demo-
cracy and moderate Aristocracy, its freedom from the rule alike
of mobs, Tyrants, and Oligarchs. There is no evidence that the
relations between the Federal Government and the several States
were in any way altered. We hear of no discontents, even in
those cities which had fallen away to Kleomenés and had been
recovered by Απύϊροποβ Nor does it appear that, with the
single exception of Mantineia, the position of any of those cities
had become worse by reason of their temporary secession. In
all this the work of Markos and of Aratos still bore its fruit.
An orderly democratic Federation still held together a large
number of Grecian cities, to which no other system could have
given any measure of peace and good government. But for
their Federal Union, those cities might either have been held in
bondage by local Tyrants or else occupied by foreign garrisons ;

1 Sparta does not occur in the list, but its relation is spoken of in the same
passage (Pol. iv. 9) by the name of συμμαχία. So also c. 23.

2 ThefMessénians (Pol. iv. 9) ask for admission to the Confederacy (ἡ κοινὴ
συμμαχία), which the Achaians cannot grant without the consent of the other
ont Pol iv. 15. “Ovres γὰρ αὐτοὶ [ol Αἰτωλοὶ] σύμμαχοι καὶ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν καὶ τῶν
Μεσσηνίων. Cf. iv. 7. Κατετόλμησαν [οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ] ἐπιβῆναι στρατοπέδῳ τῆς
"Axatas, παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας.

‘Ib. 15. So c. 6. Οὔτε τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς [Αἰτωλοῖς] ἐκ παλαιῶν
χρόνων πρὸς τοὺς Μεσσηνίους φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας οὐδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν ποιησάμενοι
πρόνοιαν. Soc. 8. Μεσσηνίων. . . φίλων ὄντων καὶ συμμάχων.

5 Megalopolis of course does not come under this head, and the dissensions of

which we shall presently hear there (Pol. v. 93) seem to have been purely local,
and not to have been at all connected with Federal questions.

VIII CONDITION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE 391

or, if free, they might have abused their freedom and wasted
their strength in ceaseless border-warfare with one another.
The League, even as it now stood, was a power with which
Macedonia, and Rome herself, felt it prudent to deal cautiously,
to respect constitutional forms, and to abstain, for a long time to
come, from high-handed acts of violence. But the old strength
and dignity of the League were gone. Its dimensions were cur-
tailed ; Megara was now Beotian, and, what was of far more
moment, Corinth was now Macedonian. Orchomenos too, in the
heart of the Federal territory, was held as a Macedonian outpost.
The whole position of the _League was changed ; it well nigh lost
its power of independent action, when it sank into a single
member of a great Alliance under Macedonian headship. The
Achaian League, in short, still] remained an important and well-
governed Federal Commonwealth, more important than Akar-
nania, better governed than Bwotia. But it had wholly given
up its old and glorious office as the destroyer of Tyrants, the
humbler of Kings, the deliverer and the uniter of Hellas.

Aratos still retained his old position and his old influence. Undi-
One would think that he must have bitterly repented the day minished
when he preferred Antigonos to Kleomenés. One might have of Aratos.
expected that the events of the Kleomenic War would have
utterly overthrown his power. But he still remained, the same
man inthe same place. He was still the chief of the League,
regularly chosen to its highest Magistracy as often as the Law
allowed his election. He still retained his faculty of losing
battles in the field and his faculty of winning votes in the
‘Assembly. We find indeed a party hostile to him,! which, as
before, could take advantage of his errors to raise a momentary
storm against him. But, so often as this happened, he was still
able to display his peculiar gift of allaying complaints and of
strengthening his position by every attack made upon him. For
his old career of surprising cities, of overthrowing or converting
Tyrants, the present state of things allowed no room. It gave
him instead an opportunity of displaying his peculiar powers in
a way, less glorious indeed, but, as affairs now stood, no less
indispensable.* The republican chief had stooped to become a
courtier and a Minister; he had to act, if sometimes as the

1 Pol. iv. 14. Τῶν ἀντιπολιτενομένων κατηγορούντων αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.
2 Plut. Ar. 48. Ἐδόκει τε πᾶσιν ὁ “Aparos οὐ μόνον δημοκρατίας ἀλλὰ καὶ
βασιλείας ἀγαθὸς εἶναι παιδαγωγός.

Relation
of Aratas
to the
Mace-
donian
Kings.

Character
of PHILO-
POIMEN.

392 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

obsequious flatterer, yet sometimes also as the honest adviser, of
two successive Kings. Putting aside his one great error, assum-
ing the ignominious position in which his own fault had placed
both himself and his country, his conduct in his new office is
honourable enough. We must now look on him as a sort of
Minister for Peloponnésian Affairs, first to Antigonos and then
to Philip. In this position, we find his obsequiousness mainly
confined to acts of homage which, if degrading, were merely
formal. The counsels which he gives are commonly both
prudent and honourable; even .in his new and fallen position,
the personal worth and dignity of the old republican leader stand
forth in marked contrast to the utter villainy of the Macedonian
courtiers. He paid the penalty of royal friendship ;! like the
Jehoiada of Jewish, and the Seneca of Roman, history, he under-
took the guidance of a lion’s whelp whose harmlessness was con-
fined to the days of childhood.’?

Yet at this very moment the League possessed a citizen,
perhaps not endowed with all the varied gifts of her old chief,
but a man, on the whole, of higher aims, and especially eminent
in those very respects in which Aratos was so lamentably wanting.
Megalopolis, the city of Lydiadas, had produced, in Philopoimén,
a worthy successor of that hero. Assuming, as a native of
Megalopolis could hardly fail to assume, that Kleomenés was to
be resisted to the uttermost, Philopoimén had displayed, in the
last stage of the Kleomenic War, every quality of a great citizen
and a great soldier. A discerning historian has well remarked
that the natural places of the two successive chiefs of the League
seem to have been transposed by fortune. Had Philopoimén -
been in the place of Aratos, fewer surprises and diplomatic
triumphs might have been won; but the Achaian phalanx and
the Achaian General would never have become the laughing-stock
of Peloponnésos. What Philopoimén might have made of the
Achaian army in better times we may judge by seeing what he
did make of it when Achaian armies were beginning to be useless.
As a general, he needed only a wider field to have been the rival
of his contemporaries Hannibal and Scipio. The man who at
once transformed such military materials as Aratos had left him

1 Plut. Ar. 52. Tair’, εἶπεν, ὦ Κεφάλων, ἐπίχειρα τῆς βασιλικῆς φιλίας.

2 isch. Ag. 699. "Ἔθρεψεν δὲ λέοντα, «.7.A. Aristoph. Frogs, 1427. Ov
χρὴ λέοντος σκύμνον ἐν πόλει τρέφειν.

5. Thirlwall, viii. 406. Cf. Liddell’s History of Rome, ii. 80.

VI CHARACTER OF PHILOPOIMEN 393

into an army capable of winning a pitched battle over Lacede-
monians was, in his own sphere, as great. a commander as either

of them. His policy, as well as that of Aratos, sometimes erred

on the side of too great eagerness for the extension of the League.

This error took a characteristic form in each of the two men.
Aratos sometimes pushed the arts of the diplomatist almost to Compa-
the verge of treachery ; Philopoimén sometimes pushed the ren
honest vigour of the soldier beyond the verge of violence and Philopoi-
vindictiveness. In internal Federal politics, we find him the mén and
author of reforms designed to carry out in greater fulness the Arates.
true ideas of Federal union and equality. These great qualities

might have been of eminent use in the days of Aratos; in the

days of Philopoimén they were nearly thrown away. During a

great part of his life, all that he could do was, by a policy neither

servile nor obstinate, to mitigate the bitterness of Roman en-
croachment, and to ward off the day of final bondage. For this
purpose we can hardly doubt that the unrivalled diplomatic
powers of Aratos would have been more useful than the straight-
forward energy of Philopoimén. He was a brave soldier and an
upright citizen, but he had no special gift of influencing the

minds of Macedonian Kings or Roman Proconsuls. Philopoimén,

in short, was one of the heroes who struggle against fate, who

are allowed to do no more than to stave off a destruction which it

is beyond their power to avert.

It is very remarkable that, for several years after the begin- Temporary
ning of our present period, we lose sight of Philopoimén alto- with
gether.! His conduct at Sellasia procured him the marked notice ἐξ Philo-
of Antigonos. The King made him the most splendid offers ;* poimén
wealth and high command were ready for him, if he would only ‘rom Pelo-
enter the Macedonian service. That Philopoimén utterly refused ponnésos.
to sell himself for all that Macedonia could give is no more than
we should have expected from his general character. But his
conduct in other respects is not so intelligible. He went into
Crete to learn the art of war amid the constant local struggles
of that island. While there, he contrived to do his country some
at least apparent service, by extending her alliance among the

1 Brandstater (358) strangely introduces him, without any explanation, into
the middle of the Social War, transferring thither an exploit which happened ten
years later. See Plut. Phil. 7. Thirlwall, viii. 290.

3 Plut. Phil. 7. He refused, according to his biographer, μάλιστα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ
φύσιν καταμαθὼν πρὸς τὸ ἄρχεσθαι δυσκόλως καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔχουσαν.

Probable
explana-
tion of his
conduct.

Accession
of Philip,
Β.Ο. 221.

Causes of
the Social
War.

394 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

ee ee

Cretan cities.__ But if Philopoimén wanted a field of action, why
did he not seek it in Peloponnésos? Why did he refuse to his
own country the direct advantage of his skill and valour in the
struggle with AXtolia which we are just about to record? History
gives no answer to this question; but an obvious conjecture
presents itself. Philopoimén absented himself from Peloponnésos
during the whole remaining life of Aratos ; shortly after his death
he returned. Was he warned by the example of the great citizen
whom Megalopolis must still have been bewailing? Did he see
that it was as hopeless for him as it had been for Lydiadas to
depose Aratos fromthe first place in the League, and that, while
Aratos held the first place in the League, his own great qualities
would be as much thrown away as those of Lydiadas had been
He may have had no mind to enter on a vain rivalry, which was
certain to issue in his being baffled and rejected in the Assembly,
which was not unlikely to issue in his being forsaken, or even
betrayed, on another field of Ladokeia. He might do his country
more real service by winning foreign states to her alliance, and
by gaining, in a school of foreign war, the military experience
which might one day be useful to her. Possibly the highest
patriotism of all might have bid him devote himself to the
immediate service of his country, at all hazards, under whatever
difficulties, and in however subordinate a post. But the con-
jecture on which 1 have ventured seems to explain, in a way
neither improbable nor wholly dishonourable to Philopoimén, a
line of conduct which at first sight seems altogether inexplicable.

The death of Antigonos so soon after his victory at Sellasia
seemed to promise some of those disturbances and revolutions
which commonly attended a change of rulers in Macedonia.
Young Philip however succeeded to the throne without opposition,
but the accession of a prince who had scarcely emerged from
boyhood opened a prospect to those who hoped to profit by any

‘momentary weakness of Macedonia and her allies. It was,

according to Polybios, the restless rapacity of the AXtolians which
seized on so favourable an opportunity for the ravages which led
to the struggle known as the Social War.’ As we now have the
direct narrative of Polybios, and no longer his mere introductory

sketch, we know far more of the details of this war than of that

1 See Thirlwall, viii. 287.
2°O συμμαχικὸς wodenos. (Pol. iv. 13.) The War of the Leagues, or rather
of the Confederacies, might perhaps better express the meaning.

Vu CAUSES OF THE SOCIAL WAR 395

which ended at Sellasia. But its inherent interest is far less. It

has none of the heroic charm which attaches to the names of
Lydiadas and Kleomenés; and the Achaian League itself no
longer acts the primary part. It will be enough for our purpose
here, as throughout the history, to run hastily over the purely
military events, stopping only to comment on points which either
illustrate Federal politics or throw light on the characters of the
great Federal politicians.

81. The Social War
ΒΟ. 221—217

We have seen that most of the Atolian possessions in Pelo-
ponnésos had fallen into the hands, first of Kleomenés, and then
of the Achaians or their Macedonian protector. The AXtolians
however still retained the smaller city of Phigaleia, lying on the
confines of Arkadia, Messéné, and Elis. The town stood to the
Aételian League in that doubtful relation in which we find so

Timoxenos
General

of Achaja,
Β΄. 221-
220.
Phigaleia

held by the

‘®tolians.

many of its outlying possessions ; its inhabitants bore the name’

of citizens,’ but their condition probably approached nearer to
that of subjects, or, at best, of dependent allies. Phigaleia could
not have been valuable to AXQtolia in any way but as a military
post ; it was held by an A®tolian Governor,” and therefore doubt-

less by an Attolian garrison also. Soon after the accession of Dori-

Philip, Dorimachos, the Htolian commander at Phigaleia, began

machos
plunders

to be guilty of various acts of plunder on the neighbouring and Messéné,
friendly territory of Messéné. A strange diplomatic quarrel 8.c. 221.

followed,® which led to the most bitter hatred on the part of
Dorimachos towards those whom he had injured. In conjunction
with a kinsman and kindred spirit named Skopas, and with the
connivance of the /Etolian General Aristén,* but without any

} Pol. iv. 8. ᾿Ετύγχανε δὲ τότε συμπολιτενομένη rots Αἰτωλοῖς. But we soon
afterwards (iv. 79) find the Phigaleians dissatisfied with the tolian connexion,
which there is called συμμαχία.

2 Dorimachos was sent, according to Polybios (iv. 3), λόγῳ μὲν παραφυλάξων
τήν τε χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τῶν Φιγαλέων, ἔργῳ δὲ κατασκόπου τάξιν ἔχων τῶν ἐν
Πελοποννήσῳ πραγμάτων. Brandstiter (342) asks, with some simplicity, ‘‘ War
das etwas so Schlimmes?” There is something really amusing in this writer’s
half apologies for his clients.

3 See Pol. iv. 4 and, more briefly, Thirlwall, viii. 233.

4 Aristén had some bodily infirmity (διά τινας σωματικὰς doGevelas) which
disqualified him from service; he was a kinsman of Dorimachos and Skopas ;
practically the chief power was in the hands of Dorimachos. Pol. iv. 5.

Extensive
incursions
of the

tolians.

May,
B.C. 220.

396 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

sort of authority from either the Popular Assembly or the Senate,
he planned a series of incursions which amounted, as Polybios
expresses it, to a declaration of war against Messéné, Achaia,
Epeiros, Akarnania, and Macedonia, all at once. Various acts
of aggression on all these states followed ; among other things,
a fort named Klarion, in the territory of Megalopolis, was seized
upon, but the Attolians were soon driven out by the Achaian
General Timoxenos, with the help of Taurién, the Macedonian
commander at Corinth. An Attolian army also passed through
the western cantons of the old Achaia; its leaders indeed dis-
claimed all hostile intentions, but their followers passed on to
Phigaleia, plundering as they went, and from Phigaleia they
began the devastation of Messéné in good earnest.

The narrative of these events brings forward one or two points
of political interest, of which I have already spoken in my general
description of the Achaian Constitution. The Attolians chose
for the time of their inroad the season when the Achaian official
year was drawing to its close, when Achaia, in short, was in the
throes of a Presidential election. Timoxenos, the General actually
in office, was a friend and partisan of Aratos, and apparently no
opposition was expected to the election, according to the usual
custom, of Aratos himself as his successor.* Still the A%tolians

1 Pol. u.s. Κατὰ κοινὸν μὲν οὐκ ἐτόλμα παρακαλεῖν Τοὺς Αἰτωλούς, κ.τ.λ.
οὔτε κοινὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν προσδεξάμενοι σύνοδον οὔτε τοῖς ἀποκλήτοις συμμετα-
δόντες, κιτ.λ.

2 Pol. u.s. Κατὰ δὲ τὰς αὑτῶν ὁρμὰς καὶ κρίσεις διαλαβόντες ἅμα Μεσσηνίοις,
᾿Ηπειρώταις, ᾿Αχαιοῖς, ᾿Ακαρνᾶσι, Μακεδόσι, πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν. Of course this
does not imply, but excludes, any formal declaration of war by tolia against all
these powers.

3 Polybios’ (iv. 6) words are, ἐν ᾧ λοιπὸς ἣν Τιμοξένῳ μὲν ὀλίγος ἔτι χρόνος τῆς
ἀρχῆς, Ἄρατος δὲ καθίστατο μὲν εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν ἐπιόντα στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τῶν
᾿Αχαιῶν, οὕπω δὲ ἔμελλε τὴν ἀρχὴν ἕξειν. These words, by themselves, would
most naturally imply that Aratos was already actually General-Elect. But,
directly after (c. 7), ἡ καθήκουσα ἐκ τῶν νόμων otvodos—that is, surely, the
regular Spring Meeting of the year B.c. 220—comes together. At this Meeting
the injured cantons complain of the AXtolian aggression ; the inroad therefore
must have been before the actual day of meeting. After the Meeting, Timoxenos
is still actually in office, though Aratos is known to be his successor. We must
therefore infer that Aratos was formally elected at the meeting mentioned in c. 7,
and that the words of Polybios in c. 6, only imply that his election was, before
the Meeting, an understood thing, to which no opposition’ would be made. He
was then, at the time described in c. 6, not General-Elect, but what some people
would call General-Designate.

So in the American Presidential interregnum there are two stages. There is
first the interval between the election of electors (which practically determines the

Vu ZTOLIAN INVASION OF ACHAIA 397

knew ! that even so slight a change would cause some additional Invasion
weakness in the Government, and that the holding of the regular during 4

Spring Assembly for the election would draw away most of the gentia

leading men from the defence of their homes. At this moment Election.
the Aitolians marched, plundering as they went, through the
cantons of Patrai, Pharai, and Dymé. The Assembly met; Aratos
Aratos was elected General for the next year, but he would not, General,
by Achaian Law, immediately enter upon his office. The 19. 220-
Assembly also decreed that help should be sent to Messéné, that

the existing General should summon the whole military force of

the nation in arms, and that the body thus gathered together
should be invested with the ordinary powers of the regular
Assembly. Timoxenos was unwilling to enter upon any import-

ant business, whether civil or military, just before the end of his

term of office.* Moreover he distrusted the military efficiency

of his countrymen; their defeats in the early part of the
Kleomenic War, and the habit of looking for Macedonian help

which had grown upon them during its later years, had greatly
relaxed the courage and discipline of the nation.‘ Timoxenos
therefore delayed carrying out the resolution of the Assembly.
Aratos, on the other hand, seems to have been seized with a
sudden fit of military enthusiasm. He who had been the quench-

coal to the warlike ardour of Lydiadas and Aristomachos now

election of the President) and the formal election of the President himself; there
is secondly the interval between the formal election of the President and his
actual‘ Inauguration.”

1 That the Ztolians really had an eye to all this, is manifestly implied in the
words of Polybios (iv. 6), παρατηρήσαντες τὸν καιρόν.

2 Pol. iv. 7. See above, pp. 215, 216. The small] attendance at the regular
Meeting may be understood, if no opposition was to be offered to the election of
the General.

3 Pol. iv. 7. Ὅσον οὕπω ληγούσης τῆς ἀρχῆς. In the American War, in the
year 1777, we find the operations of part of the American force hampered by a
cause which, though not exactly the same, reminds one of this affair of Timoxenos
and Aratos.

‘‘The usual difficulty of obtaining the service of the militia was at this time
very much increased, by an event by no means common. The time for which the
governor [of New Jersey] was elected had expired, and no new election had been
made. The late executive, therefore, did not think himself authorized to take any
measures as an executive, and had not General Dickinson ventured to order out
the militia by his own authority, they could not have been put in motion.”
Marshall’s Life of Washington, iii. 206.

4 Pol. u.s. “Apa δὲ τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς ἀπιστῶν διὰ τὸ ῥᾳθύμως αὐτοὺς ἐσχηκέναι κατὰ
τὸ παρὸν περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις γυμνασίαν, κιτιλ. So Plut. Ar. 47. ᾿Εθισθέντες
γὰρ ἀλλοτρίαις σώζεσθαι χερσὶ καὶ τοῖς Μακεδόνων ὅπλοις αὑτοὺς ὑπεσταλκότες ἐν

ἀργίᾳ πολλῇ καὶ ἀταξίᾳ διῆγον.

Aratos
enters on
office
before the

legal time.

Military
Assembly
at Mega-
lopolis,
B.C. 220.

Disgrace-
ful cam-

paign of

Aratos,

His de-
feat at
Kaphyai.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE

398 CHAP.

began to complain of the delays and lack of energy of Timoxenos.!
He felt sure that nothing effectual could be done till the reins of
power were again in his own hands. He at last actually pre-
vailed on Timoxenos to give up to him the seal, the badge of the
Presidential office, five days before the legal time.? Aratos at
once issued his summons to the several cities;® the military
Assembly met under arms at Megalopolis, and acted in all
respects as if it had been the regular Assembly at Aigion.* It
received Messénian Ambassadors who asked for the admission of
their city to the Grand Alliance.© The Achaian Government ®
answered that the Achaians could not admit them without the
consent of the other members of the Confederacy, but that they
would themselves help them on the delivery of hostages to be
kept at Sparta. The campaign which followed displayed, on the
part of Aratos, something which even Polybios can only describe
as the height of folly.’ He was not only beaten in the field as
usual, but he had the incredible folly to send away the greater
part of his army, and to allow himself to be altogether out-
generalled. He underwent a defeat at Kaphyai, which was
almost as destructive as any which he had undergone at the hands
of Kleomenés. “fhe --Attotians traversed Peloponnésos without
Opposition, and at last returned home by way of the Isthmus.’

1 Pol. us. Σχετλιάζων καὶ παροξυνόμενος ἐπὶ τῇ τόλμῃ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν θυμικώτερον
ἐχρῆτο τοῖς πράγμασιν. The ἀλλοτριότης spoken of directly after means hostility
to the Atolians, not to Timoxenos. See Lucas, p. 98, note.

2 Pol. us. So Plut. Ar. 47. See above, p. 234.

3 Pol. us. Πρὸς τὰς πόλεις Eypage—This is the usual formula.

4 Polybios calls them πλῆθος (iv. 9) and ὄχλοι (iv. 7), just like the regular
Assembly.

5 Pol. iv. 9. See above, p. 390. Drumann (p. 464) mistakes this for an
application for admission to the Achaian League. For that purpose the word
used would have been πολιτεία or συμπολιτεία, not συμμαχία.

6 Pol. iv. 9. Οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν, that is, the δημιουργοί. The pro-
posal for the Messénian alliance being contrary to treaty, the δημιουργοί would
not put it tothe vote ; but the promise of Achaian help must have required a vote
of the Meeting.

7 Ib. 11. Οἱ δὲ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἡγεμόνες [he tries to veil the real culprit by the
plural form] οὕτω κακῶς ἐχρήσαντο τοῖς πράγμασιν ὥσθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν ἀνοίας μὴ
καταλιπεῖν.

8 Ib. 138. Κατὰ τὸν ἰσθμὸν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν. So Schorn (142),
“ Κρηχίθῃ nach Verheerung der Gegend von Sicyon durch den Isthmus nach
Hause zuriick,” and Thirlwall (viii. 238), “ Returned home by the Isthmus.”
Lucas (p. 103) seems to take the words ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν in the sense of
‘disbanded ” or “separated ’—“ gingen auf dem Isthmus auseinander.” He
adds, “ wo also fiir sie, etwa in Megara, freundliches Gebiet sein musste.” But
Megara was now (see above, p. 374) part of the Bootian Confederation, therefore

VU DISGRACEFUL CAMPAIGN OF ARATOS 399

~

An Achaian Assembly was held a few days after the departure Accusation
of the Aitolians. The national feeling was strong against Aratos. and de
He had displayed unusual zeal for action; he had seized on 4retos
office prematurely and illegally ; and his haste had led only to in the
greater national ignominy, and to the display of greater military Assembly.
incapacity, than ever. His political adversaries strongly pressed
all the disgraceful points of the campaign, in accusations of which
Polybios has preserved to us the heads.1 One would be still
more anxious to read the answer of Aratos. For answer he did,
and with wonderful effect. Helpless as he had been on the
battle-field of Kaphyai, in the parliamentary campaign of Aigion
he was irresistible. We gather from Polybios that he denied
some of the charges, asked indulgence upon others, and was
eloquent about his old exploits. Anyhow he contrived, as he
had so often done before, to turn the tide of popular feeling in
his own favour. He succeeded in diverting the public indignation
from himself to his accusers, and he again found himself directing
the counsels of the League with all his old infiuence.*

At the same time the Assembly passed a series of decrees for Votes
the conduct of the war. The General was to gather a fresh oe
army, and to concert measures with the Governments of Lace-
dzemon and Messéné for the common defence against the A‘tolians.
Ambassadors were also sent to all the members of the Grand
Alliance,‘ at once asking for help and proposing the admission
of Messéné into the Confederacy. An Attolian Assembly was
held about the same time, and it passed a decree which, on first
hearing, sounds incredibly strange and contradictory.° The and _
ZEtolians, allies of the Achaians, allies of the Messénians, voted ditolian
to keep the peace with the Lacedemonians, Messénians, and bles.
everybody else, the Achaians included, unless the Achaians
admitted the Messénians into their alliance. This last course

part of the Macedonian Confederacy. Also the Isthmus would be in any case a
strange place to disband, with a Macedonian garrison at Corinth, and the hostile
territory of Bootia to be passed through.

1 Pol, iv. 14. 8

2 Pol. us. ΙΠερὶ τῶν ἑξῆς πάντα βουλεύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ᾿Αράτον γνώμην.
Schorn (p. 142) might have spared the remark, “‘ Wie anders wtirde sein Loos
ausgefallen sein, wenn er ein Athener gewesen ware !’’—at least if it is meant as
a censure upon Athens. Surely Athenian confidence in Nikias and Phékién was
wellnigh as blind as Achaian confidence in Aratos.

2 Pol. iv. 15. 4 See above, p. 389.

5 Pol. iv. 15. Πρᾶγμα πάντων ἀλογώτατον. Lucas (p. 104) seems to see
nothing wonderful in it.

Probable
explana-
tion of the
Aitolian
Vote.

Relations
between
ZEtolia and
Messéné,

400 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

-----.-. ps ep - ͵οπἣοπυ --οες΄-.ς. ---- ---.-οΘ..--. ---- +

they would look upon as ἃ casus belli. Such a decree, in its
naked form, seems so preposterous that we cannot help suspect-
ing that there must be something behind, which our Achaian
informants have not told us. The terms of alliance between
/Etolia and Messéné may well have contained some provision
which would be infringed by an alliance between Messéné and
Achaia. The alliance between AXtolia and Achaia was of course
an equal alliance, a partnership on equal terms between two
great Confederations of nearly equal power. As allies on such
terms, A‘tolia and Achaia had, in better days, appeared side by
side as the defenders of Greece against barbarian inroads. But
we may doubt whether an alliance between Aitolia and Messéné
was an alliance on perfectly equal terms. Messéné was not
annexed ; it did not become part of the Attolian League ;? it
retained a perfectly distinct Government of its own.? But all
this is quite consistent with a state of practical, and even formal
dependence. Messéné may well have stood to Atolia in much
the same relation in which Chios and Mityléné had once stood
to Athens. Had Sparta, even when Sparta was the friend and
ally of Athens, interfered, either in a friendly or in a hostile way,
in Chian or Mitylénaian affairs, such interference would certainly
have been looked upon by Athens as a breach of friendship and
alliance on the part of Sparta. If the present case was at all
similar, we can understand the otherwise unintelligible vote of
the Aitolian Congress. Their motive was doubtless what
Polybios tells us; they wished to isolate the several Pelopon-
nésian states, in order that each, when isolated, might be the
better exposed to their rapacity. But nations and governments
do not commonly avow such motives, however commonly they
may act upon them. The tolians may have been robbers and
pirates, but they were not fools or madmen; their Federal

1 The word used to express the connexion between AXtolia and Messéné is
always συμμαχία not συμπολιτεία. Neither of these words implies anything as
to the terms of union, but each implies a union of a different kind. Σύμμαχοι
may be either equal or dependent allies ; συμπολῖται may be either really equal
citizens or cives sine suffragio. But σύμμαχοι are always mere allies of some
kind ; συμπολῖται are always actual citizens of some kind. Συμμαχία is union
(forced or willing) in a mere Confederacy, συμπολιτεία is union (forced or willing)
in a Confederation.

2 The Messénian Government at this time was oligarchic (Pol. iv. 32); the
chief magistrates bore the Spartan title of Ephor (Pol. iv. 4). Polybios applies
the term συναρχίαι to their meetings, as to those of the Achaian δημιουργοί. See
above, p. 220. 3 See above, p. 19.

VIII RELATIONS BETWEEN ATOLIA AND MESSENE 401

Assembly would hardly have passed a resolution utterly repug-
nant not only to International Law, but to common sense.
The received policy of A‘tolia was not so much to do acts of
avowed injustice by the national authority as to connive at gross
misconduct on the part of individual officers. The doings of
Dorimachos and Skopas at this very time had all been done
without any commission from the Attolian Senate or Assembly.
Those bodies might affect to be ignorant of what had happened,
or even, as the words of the resolution may perhaps imply,
gravely to condemn it. The historian tells us, doubtless with
great truth, that the A®tolians rejected all demands for repara-
tion, and rejected them with mockery.!_ But such mockery may
well have taken a diplomatic form. No mockery could be more
bitter than a grave answer that the Federal Government of
AXtolia was guiltless of inroads on Achaia or Messéné ; that, if
/Etolian citizens had misconducted themselves—say, by plunder-
ing Messénian lands or by defeating the Achaian General at
Kaphyai—such Attolian wrong-doers, while on Achaian or
Messénian territory, were subject to Achaian or Messénian law.
An Attolian Assembly, in such a frame of mind, when it heard
of the application of Messéné to be admitted into the Achaio-
Macedonian Alliance, might well vote any such admission to be
a breach of friendly relations with Atolia. In all this there
would be not a little solemn and transparent hypocrisy. But it
is with such solemn and transparent hypocrisy that international
disputes are most commonly carried on, very seldom with the
monstrous and irrational impudence which the words of the
/Etolian resolution seem at first sight to imply.

The Achaian Embassies to King Philip and to the Epeirot Achaian
League were so far successful that both those powers gave their Ἐπιβδεεῖθα
consent to the admission of Messéné into the alliance.2 But ἀοηία and
neither Epeiros nor Macedonia as yet sent any succours. Al] Epeiros.
Greece, we are told, was so familiar with the evil deeds of the

1 Pol. iv. 16. Οὐδ᾽ ἀπολογίας ἔτι κατηξίουν [Αἰτωλοὶ] τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας, ἀλλὰ
καὶ προσεχλεύαζον εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ἐς δικαιοδοσίας προκαλοῖτο περὶ τῶν γεγονότων
ἣ καὶ νὴ Δία τῶν μελλόντων.

3. Ib. Οἱ δ᾽ ᾿Ηπειρῶται καὶ Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀκούσαντες τῶν πρεσ-
βέων τοὺς μὲν Μεσσηνίους els τὴν συμμαχίαν προσέλαβον. That is, they gave
their consent to their admission ; they could not admit them of their own act,
any more than the Achaians could. Their formal admission would take
place at the General Congress of the Confederacy of which we shall presently
hear.

2D

tolian
incursions
in Pelo-
ponnésos.

Insincerity
of the
AEtolian
Govern-
ment.

Affairs of
Kynaitha.

402 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE OMAP.

A&tolians that they did not excite any particular emotion. Both
the King and the League refused for the present to declare war.’
The Astolians therefore continued their career of iniquity. They
procured Skerdilaidos the Illyrian and Démétrios of Pharos to
ravage the coasts of Peloponnésos, while three A‘tolian leaders,
Dorimachos, Skopas, and Agelaos,? pressed on into the heart
of the peninsula. They carried with them AXtolian troops in
vast numbers ; it was in fact an invasion of Achaia by the whole
force of AXtolia.* Still there was no avowed national action ;
all was the private piracy of particular A‘tolian chiefs ; it was
Agelaos who, of his own authority, made an alliance with
Skerdilaidos ; it was Dorimachos who, of his own authority,
besieged and sacked a city of the Achaian League. The AXtolian
Government knew nothing about it; the Attolian President sat
still at home, wondering what all his countrymen were gone
after, and professing that he at least had no war with Achaia,
but was at peace with all the world. Polybios argues that
such conduct was extremely foolish ;° so it doubtless was on the
principle that honesty is the best policy ; but it really was little
more than a stronger case than usual of an attempt to throw
dust into men’s eyes by diplomatic insincerity. Meanwhile
Dorimachos pressed on. He was invited by a party °in Kynaitha,
that turbulent Arkadian city whose internal dissensions have
been already mentioned.’ We left Kynaitha an Achaian city,
occupied by a Federal garrison. The ruling party were well

1 Pol. u.s, "Emi δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν πεπραγμένοις wapaurixa μὲν ἠγανά-
κτησαν, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐθαύμασαν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν παράδοξον τῶν εἰθισμένων δέ
τι πεποιηκέναι τοὺς Αἰτωλούς. διόπερ οὐδ᾽ ὠργίσθησαν ἐπὶ πλεῖον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐψηφίσαντο
τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν πρὸς αὐτούτ᾽ οὕτως ἡ συνεχὴς ἀδικία σνγγνώμης τνγχάνει μᾶλλον
τῆς σπανίου καὶ παραδόξον πονηρίας.

5 This seems to be the same Agelaos of Naupaktos whom we shall afterwards
find acting in a more honourable character.

3 Pol. iv. 16. Συναθροίσαντες πανδημεὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὴν ᾿Αχαΐαν
μετὰ τῶν ᾿Ιλλυριῶν.

ὁ ΤΌ. 17. ᾿Αρίστων δ᾽ ὁ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατηγὸς, οὐ προσποιούμενος. οὐδὲν τῶν
γιγνομένων, ἦγε τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκείας, φάσκων οὐ πολεμεῖν τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς
ἀλλὰ διατηρεῖν τὴν εἰρήνην. The comment of Lucas(p. 105) is curious, “ Wenig-
stens hatten die Aetoler den Krieg gegen die Achier nicht angefangen und ihn
selbst jetzt nur fiir den Fall erklirt, wenn die Bundesgenossenschaft mit den
Messeniern eingegangen wiirde. Behauptete ihr Strategos, doch wohl 6ffentlich,
nur in diesem Sinne, dass die Aetoler Frieden gegen die Achier hielten.”

5 Ib. Εὔηθες καὶ παιδικὸν πρᾶγμα ποιῶν.

6 Tb. 16. Πραττομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς τῶν Κυναιθέων πόλεως. It is clear however
from the narrative which follows that the tolian faction was only a small
party in the city. 7 See above, p. 314.

VUI CAPTURE AND SACK OF KYNAITHA ᾿ς 408

affected to the present state of things, and the exiles professed
anxiety to return home and dwell peaceably as citizens of the
Achaian League. With the consent of the Federal Government,}

the exiles were readmitted. At the same time the Federal
garrison was withdrawn ; it had been a necessary precaution in

days of dissension ; it was no longer needed now that Kynaitha

was again a united commonwealth. Some of the exiles were Return
leading citizens, who had in former times held the office of of the Ky-
Polemarch.? The reconciliation was in appearance so perfect orites.
that the exiled Polemarchs were restored to their office. But

the confidence both of the Kynaithaians and of the Federal
Government was infamously abused. The office of Polemarch Kynaitha
involved the care of the city-gates; the restored Polemarchs betrayed
slew their colleagues, and opened the gates to Dorimachos. nachos,
They gained little by their perfidy; the Xtolians plundered, Horrible
slew, and even tortured? all parties without distinction; they sack on
then offered the town to their Eleian friends, who prudently by. the
declined it ; next, they left it in the hands of an AXtolian garrison; Ztolians.
finally, on hearing of the approach of Macedonian succours, the
garrison burned the city and departed. Meanwhile Dorimachos Unsuc-
continued his devastations. He summoned Kleitér to revolt cessful
from the Achaian League, and to become an ally of A‘tolia.* xh °”
But here the citizens gallantly resisted. Aratos, all this time,
remembering, doubtless, his unlucky rashness earlier in the year,

did nothing at all. The Attolians again returned home un-
disturbed ; but Taurién won over the faithless Démétrios to the
Macedonian interest, and the Pharian’s share in the campaign

ended with a devastation of the coast of Aitolia.

1 Pol. iv. 17. Οἱ κατέχοντες τὴν πόλιν ἐπρέσβενον [on this word see above, p.
349] πρὸς τὸ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἔθνος, βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης ποιεῖσθαι
τὰς διαλύσεις. ἐπιχωρησάντων δ᾽ ἑτοίμως διὰ τὸ πεκεῖσθαι σφίσιν ἀμφοτέρους
εὐνοήσειν, K.T.X.

2 From the description given of their duties, one may doubt whether the
Polemarchs were the chief magistrates of Kynaitha. The Athenian Polemarch
it may be remembered, completely changed his functions at an early stage of the
Democracy.

3 Pol. iv. 18. ᾿Εστρέβλωσαν δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν Κυναιθέων, ols ἠπίστησαν ἔχειν
κεκρυμμένον διάφορον ἢ κατασκεύασμα ἣ ἄλλο τι τῶν πλείονος ἀξίων. On this
excess of cruelty, so unusual in Grecian warfare, I have made some remarks in my
second Chapter, p. 44.

4 ΤΌ. 19. ᾿Αποστάντας τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν πρὸς αὑτοὺς συμμαχία».
This sounds as if the Kleitorians were offered mere alliance, and not incorporation
on any terms. But see above, p. 395, note 1.

Philip at
Corinth.

Affairs of
Sparta,
B.0. 222-
220.

404 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

The young King of Macedonia had by this time made up his
mind to assist his allies in earnest. He marched with an army
to Corinth—now his own city—but he came too late; the
&tolians were already gone. He then sent letters summoning
a general Congress of all the allies at Corinth, and he meanwhile
advanced into Peloponnésos as far as Tegea, with a view of
settling the affairs of Lacedemon. We here sadly feel our want
of a Spartan historian, or at least of one not writing wholly in
the Achaian interest. During the Kleomenic War, Plutarch’s
Life of the Spartan King gives us at least an echo of the reports
on the Spartan side; but now we have to trust wholly to Poly-
bios. In his view, Antigonos and the Achaians had been the
greatest of benefactors to Sparta; they had freed her from a
Tyrant, and had restored to her her ancient constitution and
laws.1 Sparta was bound to the Macedonian Alliance by every
tie of thankfulness, and every step on her part contrary to
Achaian or Macedonian interests was a sin of the blackest
ingratitude. Since the departure of Kleomenés, the throne had
been carefully kept vacant,? a fact which may surely be taken
as implying that Sparta still looked upon him as her lawful
King. Kleomenés was not a Harold or a Sebastian, living only
in the fond imagination of a heart-sick people; the hero of
Sparta still lived, dwelling indced in the house of bondage, but
not without hope of being one day restored to his home and
kingdom.2 The government was in the hands of a College of
Ephors, whose opinions are described as being divided, three
favouring the Attolians and two favouring the Allies.‘ The
Etolian party was also the Kleomenic party, not assuredly out
of any love towards Attolia for her own sake, but because AXtolia
represented opposition to Philip and the Achaians. In this

1 Pol. iv. 16. Ol δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, προσφάτως μὲν ἡλευθερωμένοι δι' ᾿Αντιγόνον
καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν φιλοτιμίας, ὀφείλοντες δὲ Μακεδόσι καὶ Φιλίππῳ μηδὲν
ὑπεναντίον πράττειν. He repeats the words προσφάτως ἠλευθερωμένοι δι᾽ ᾿Αντι-
γόνου in c. 22, and in the same chapter, in the speech οὗ Adeimantos, we read of
Μακεδόνας τοὺς εὐεργέτας καὶ σωτῆρας.

* Ib. 22, 85. The later passage is more emphatic; πολιτευόμενοι κατὰ τὰ
πάτρια σχεδὸν ἤδη τρεῖς ἐνιαυτοὺς μετὰ τὴν Κλεομένους ἔκπτωσιν, οὐδ᾽ ἐπενόησαν
οὐδέποτε βασιλεῖς καταστῆσαι τῆς Σπάρτης. A strange turn is given to the fact
by Pausanias (ii. 9. 3); Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἄσμενοι Κλεομένου: ἀπαλλαγέντες βασι-
λεύεσθαι μὲν οὐκέτι ἠξίωσαν.

3 Pol iv.35. Οὐχ ἥκιστα διὰ Κλεομένη καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον εὔνοιαν, ἐλπίζοντες
ἀεὶ καὶ προσδοκίαν ἔχοντες τῆς ἐκείνου παρουσίας ἅμα καὶ σωτηρίας.

Ib, 22.

VII! AFFAIRS OF SPARTA 405

divided state of things, troops were sent to support Aratos in

his unlucky campaign, but Polybies implies that there was no

real intention of giving the Achaians any effective help,’ and he

even goes so far as to charge the Lacedewmonians—that is,
doubtless, the majority among the Ephors—with concluding

a secret treaty with the Mtolians.2_ More violent measures now Disturb-
followed ; Adeimantos, one of the philippizing Ephors, was Spart at
murdered, together with some citizens of his party, with the Ὁ
connivance—so our Achaian historian tells us—of his colleagues

of the other party.? Other citizens of Macedonian politics fled

to Philip, who gave audience at Tegea both to them and to an
Embassy from the de facto Government. The envoys affirmed

that the persons who had been killed had been the real cause of

the disturbance, and they professed their own full intention to
discharge towards the King every obligation of faithful allies.°

The debate which followed is well worthy of attention. It sets Philip site
Philip before us in a light personally honourable, but it shows ἴῃ δ judge-
how effectually Aratos had done his evil work. The Macedonian ,, the
King sits in_one Greek city to decide the fate of another. That Spartan
it rests with him to preserve or to destroy Sparta no one seems ence. at
to doubt.__ Everything is made to depend on the King’s personal ἐν

sense of justice and expediency ; we as yet see only Philip sober

and are not introduced to Philip drunk, but we see that, drunk

or sober, Philip is equally master of Peloponnésos. There were

not wanting counsellors who exhorted him to make an example

of Sparta, such as his great predecessor had made of Thebes.

No reasonable man could doubt that those now in power at
Sparta were wholly in the interest of /Etolia, and that the
victims of the late disturbance had perished solely on account of

their attachment to Macedonia. Sparta had once been spared ;

she had abused the mercy of Antigonos; her day of grace was

now past, and her destruction would be only an act of exemplary
justice. But the counsels which finally prevailed with the
young King were of a milder kind. According to Polybios,
Aratos was their inspiring spirit. This we may well believe,

2 Pol. iv. 9. ᾿Εφέδρων καὶ θεωρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ συμμάχων ἔχοντες τάξιν. Soc.
19, στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ δοκεῖν μόνον.
2 Ib. 16. 3 Ib, 22.
4 Ib. 23. Ol προεστῶτες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων : a formula applied to the Spartan
Ephors, as to the Achaian δημιουργοί.
: 5 Ib. Πάντα δ᾽ ὑπισχνοῦνται ποιήσειν αὐτοὶ τῷ Φιλίππῳ τὰ κατὰ Thy συμμαχίαν
Ib, 24.

Declara-
tion of
Philip in
favour of
Sparta.

Aratos’
liberal
views of
Inter-
national
right.

Congress

at Corinth.

War
agreed
upon,
B.c. 220,
Autumn.

406 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

nl —_——

but we may also well believe that Philip, young and as yet un-
corrupted, was himself disposed to take the more generous part.!
Aratos, save in that one terrible year of Secession, had never
been a man of blood or an advocate of violent measures. We
may fairly ascribe to him the answer which was finally given by
the King, one which forestalls some principles of international
right which modern diplomatists are only just beginning to
understand. As such, it does him the highest honour. But
one cannot help wishing that it had been dictated by him in the
Assembly at Aigion, as a free President of the Achaian League,
rather than suggested in Philip’s council-chamber at Tegea in his
new character of Macedonian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
King Philip was made to answer that the Lacedemonian Govern-
ment had been guilty of no crime against the common Alliance ;
that he accepted their professions of faithfulness to it, and
exhorted them to continue in the same mind; that the internal
crimes and revolutions of any allied city were matters which did
not come under his cognizance, so long as the city itself adhered
to its public obligations. He might exhort and recommend as
an ally, but he was entitled to go no further, except when the
common alliance was violated, and then only in concert with all
the other allies? Sounder doctrines were never put forth in
any age; pity that their accomplishment depended solely on the
will of a youth, of precocious talents indeed, and who had as
yet given no signs of any but generous dispositions, but who was
in danger, as the event proved, of being led astray by the cor-
rupting influence of unrestrained power, and by the advice and
example of some of the worst counsellors with whom any prince
was ever cursed.

Meanwhile the deputies of the allies were assembling at
Corinth. King Philip presided at the Congress; each member
of the Confederacy set forth its own wrongs, and war was agreed

1 So Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 243), “ Philip was of the age to which popularity
is most attractive, and a liberal sentiment most congenial.”

2 Pol. iv. 24. Ὁ γὰρ Φίλιππος τὰ μὲν κατ᾽ ἰδίαν τῶν συμμάχων els αὑτοὺς
ἀδικήματα καθήκειν ἔφησεν αὑτῷ μέχρι λόγου καὶ γραμμάτων διορθοῦν καὶ συνεπι-
σημαίνεσθαι" τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν ἀνήκοντα συμμαχίαν ταῦτ᾽ ἔφη μόνα δεῖν κοινῆς
ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ διορθώσεως τυγχάνειν ὑπὸ πάντων. Philip and Aratos here keep
the just mean between meddling interference in the affairs of foreign countries and
the ostentatious selection of great public criminals as special objects of personal
honour.

VIII DECLARATION OF WAR BY THE ALLIES _ . 407

upon by common consent. Juster grounds for war no state ever

had ; every one of the allied powers had wrongs to complain of,

any one of which would be looked upon by the most peacefully
disposed modern nation as supplying abundant reason for appeal-

ing to arms. Achaia, Epeiros, Phékis, Akarnania, Boeotia, each

had to tell of some territory ravaged, some venerated temple
despoiled ; Philip himself had as good a grievance as any; a
Macedonian ship had been seized by A‘tolian pirates, and the

crew sold into slavery. The decree passed by the Congress was
worthy of the occasion. The Allies agreed to recover whatever Opening
territory any of them had been deprived of by the enemy since er the
the death of King Démétrios ; to set free all cities which had W.,,
been joined to the AXtolian League against their will ;? and to Decree
restore to the Amphiktyons their lawful authority over the οἱ the
Delphian Temple, which the AStolians had usurped. But the or corinth
Treaty still needed ratification by the sovereign Assemblies of

the several Federations which made up the Alliance.* While
Embassies were sent round to obtain their assent, Philip wrote Philip’s
a spirited letter to the AXtolians. If they had any real defence etter
to make, let them send and make it; but he and his allies could Ayojians.
not listen to any excuses of the old sort. It would no longer

do, when Attolian fleets and armies were ravaging all Greece, to

say that it was the mere act of private men, for which the
Zétolian Government was not responsible. They must not
expect either to escape by means of such transparent sophistry,

or to throw upon the Allies the odium of beginning the war.

The Attolian Government, in answer, proposed a Conference at Shifts

Rhion, expecting that Philip would not come. But when they οἵ
1 Pol. iv. 6, Πειρατὰς ἐξέπεμψαν, of παρατυχόντες πλοίῳ βασιλικῷ τῶν ἐκ Govern

Μακεδονίας περὶ Ἰζύθηρα τοῦτό τε εἰς Αἰτωλίαν καταγαγόντες αὕτανδρον, τούς τε ment.
ναυκλήρον: καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάτας, σὺν δὲ τούτοις τὴν ναῦν ἀπέδοντο. Bishop Thirlwall

(viii. 234), as any one would, translates ἀπέδοντο, “ 8014.᾽ Schorn and Helwing

pass it by. Brandstater (p. 345) objects to this translation, and would have us
believe that ἀπέδοντο here means only “released on the payment of ransom”’

(Die Seertuber . . . geben dann tn Aetolien nur gegen Lésegeld Schiff und
Mannschaft frei). Be it so; the barbarity would, on this showing, be somewhat

less, but the breach of the Law of Nations would be just the same.

2 Tb. 25. Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν καιρῶν ἠναγκασμένους ἀκουσίως
μετέχειν τῆς Αἰτωλῶν συμπολιτείας, ὅτι πάντας τούτους ἀποκαταστήσουσιν
els τὰ πάτρια πολιτεύματα, χώραν ἔχοντας καὶ πόλεις τὰς αὑτῶν, adpoupirous,
ἀφορολογήτους, ἐλευθέρους ὄντας, πολιτείαις καὶ νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις.
See Thirlwall, viii. 232, note.

δ Pol. iv. 26. Οἱ δὲ σύνεδροι παραχρῆμα πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστελλον πρὸς τοὺς
συμμάχους, ἵνα παρ ἑκάστοις διὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπικυρωθέντος τοῦ δόγματος ἐκφέρωσι
πάντες τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας πόλεμον.

408 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

heard that he was really on the road, they sent to say that they

could do nothing without the authority of the Federal Assembly.!

op § The ordinary electoral meeting of that body took place shortly

ato after, and its principal act was to elect Skopas, one of the chief

nc. 220-} Wrong-doers, to the place of General of the League for the
219. following year.”

Achaian The deputies from the Corinthian Congress meanwhile went

Assembly round to the allied powers to obtain their ratifications of the

earn decree against the Attolians. The regular Achaian Assembly was

ratifies the now held at Aigion.; Philip appeared in person in the Senate,®

decree. © and spoke at length. He made, as he deserved, a favourable

impression, and all the honours voted to his predecessor were

renewed to him. The Assembly unanimously ratified the decree,

and proclaimed general licence of reprisals against -A&tolia.‘*

Philip then returned to Macedonia, to spend the winter in

preparations for the campaign of the next year, leaving behind

him in Greece the best possible expectations from his reign.‘

Behaviour Macedonia and Achaia, the two most important members of the

of Alliance, were thus zealous in the common cause. Akarnania

nania, too, though the most exposed of all to A‘tolian ravages, gave in

her adhesion faithfully and without reserve.® But the Ambassa-

dors from the Congress were not equally successful everywhere.

Epeiros, / The Epeirot League played a double part. The Federal Assembly

ratified the decree, and voted to begin hostilities as soon as

Philip himself should begin them. But at the same time they

assured—secretly, we must suppose—some AXtolian Ambassadors

. who were present, that it was their full purpose to remain at

peace. Of the Boeotian and Phékian Leagues we hear nothing.

1 Pol. iv. 26. ᾿Απέστειλαν [ol τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἄρχοντες) γραμματοφόρον διασα-
φοῦντες ὡς οὐ δύνανται πρὸ τῆς τῶν Αἰτωλῶν συνόδου δι᾽ abrav οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν
ὅλων οἰκονομεῖν. 2 Ib. 27.

3 Ib. 26. Προσελθόντος πρὸς τὴν βουλήν. Did he not address the Assembly
also? Or was this one of those Meetings where few but Senators attended? See
above, p. 240.

410. Τό re δόγμα πάντες ἐπεκύρωσαν καὶ τὸ λάφυρον ἐπεκήρυξαν κατὰ
τῶν Αἰτωλῶν,

5 Polybios, when, at a later stage of his history (vii. 12), he records the
degeneracy of Philip, can hardly find words to express the admiration which he
excited in Greece at this time ; καθόλου ye μὴν, ef δεῖ μικρὸν ὑπερβολικώτερον
εἰπεῖν, οἰκειότατ᾽ ἂν οἶμαι περὶ Φιλίππον τοῦτο ῥηθῆναι, διότι κοινός τις οἷον
ἐρώμενος ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως εὐεργετικόν.

6 Ib. 30. It is now that the historian pronounces that emphatic eulogy
on the Akarnanian people which I have quoted in an earlier chapter. See above,
p. 114.

Vill BEHAVIOUR OF THE VARIOUS FEDERATIONS 409

It has been aptly remarked that what remained of independent
Phékis was actually surrounded by the Attolian conquests, and

that the Beotians, like the Thessalians, were too dependent on
Macedonia to have a real voice in the matter! At Messéné,
though it was really in defence of Messénian intereste-that the

war was first undertaken, the envoys met with an.ambignous and
chilling answer. ‘The mass of the people were well disposed Messéné,
towards the allies; but the oligarchic chiefs, led by the Ephors
Oinis and Nikippos, caused an answer to be given, saying that

the possession of Phigaleia by the Atolians hindered Messéné

from joining the Allies till the Aftolians should be.driven ont of

that dangerous post.2 At Sparta the Ambassadors had to depart and
without any answer at all. Other envoys were sent to King Sparta.
Ptolemy, not to ask his alliance, but merely to request him to

send no money or help of any kind to the enemy.‘ This last
embassy seems to have been successful, as the neutrality of Egypt

was strictly preserved throughout the war.

These diplomatic proceedings illustrate one or two very Com-
obvious truths. It is clear that the actual strength of AXtolia parative
was far inferior to that of the Allies. It is equally clear that re
the Attolian League derived from its strong national unity an tions and
immeasurable advantage over the scattered members of the Single
Macedonian Confederacy. The policy of Ztolia was determined ‘°"°~
by a single vote of a single Assembly ; the Allies, before they
coutd. actin concert, had first to gather together the representa-
tives of half-a-dozen powers, and then to send about to ask for
ratifications—which, after all, might be refused—from a King
here and an Assembly there. We may also see the danger of

2 “D)ie noch selbststandigen, von den Phociern waren ringsum von 4tolischer
Herrschaft eingeschlossen ; von der Erklarung der Boéoter kann nicht die Rede
sein, denn sie gehorchten ohne Widerrede den Befehlen ihrer Schutzherren.”
Schorn, p. 148.

7 Pol. iv. 31.

3 Ib. 34. Tédos yap rods παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις ἀναποκρίτους
ἀπέστειλαν.

4 Ib. 80. I do not at all understand Brandstiter’s comment (p. 357). “So
war es also allem Ansehn nach nur ein Kampf des Philipp und der Achier mit
Hiilfe eines illyrischen Seeriubers gegen die Aetoler, da Ptolemius Philopator,
der neue Kinig Aegyptens, nicht die Freundschaft seines Vaters fiir Kleomenes
fortsetzte, und, mehr durch eigne Angelegenheiten als durch Philipps Bitte
bewogen, dem Kampfe fern blieb.” Does this refer to the winning over of
Démétrios of Pharos by Taurién (see above, p. 403), or what ἢ

5 Dr. Arnold (History of Rome, ii. 245), comparing the strength of Rome and
of Samnium in the fourth century B.C., says :—

Warning
against
general in-
ferences as
to forms of
Govern-
ment.

410 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

drawing general inferences for or against particular forms of
government. Monarchy never looked better than it did at the
Congress of Corinth ; we there see a King acting as moderate
and honourable a part as any man could act. We shall soon see
this same King degenerate into a cruel and faithless tyrant.
Single city-commonwealths, in the form of Messéné and Sparta,
appear in the poorest possible light. But we have whole
centuries of earlier and later history to set against any rash
inferences against Town-autonomy in the abstract. Federalism
appears in every sort of light at the same moment. The dis-
reputable filibustering of the Attolians, the double-faced policy
of the Epeirots, the honourable unanimity of the Achaians,
and the heroic devotion of the Akarnanians, all proceed
from nations whose political constitutions were very nearly
the same. All alike were citizens of Democratic Federa-
tions. The only inference to be drawn is that Federal
Governments, like all other Governments, are capable of
any degree either of good or of evil. But the perfect
unity and vigour, alike of Akarnania for good and of
Astolia for evil, is quite answer enough to the common talk
about Federal Government being necessarily weak government.
That the Attolian Government did not restrain Dorimachos
and Skopas was no sign of weakness. It was the received policy

“ΑΚ single great nation is incomparably superior to a coalition ; and still more
so when that coalition is made up not of single states but of federal leagues ; so
that a real unity of counsels and of public spirit is only to be found in the
individual cities of each league ; which must each be feeble, because each taken
separately is small in extent and weak in population. The German empire alone,
setting aside the Spanish, Italian, and Hungarian dominions of the house of
Austria, could never, even with the addition of the Netherlands, have contended on
equal terms with France.”’

Our present narrative amply confirms Dr. Arnold’s general remarks upon
coalitions, but it hardly bears out what he says specially about Federal coalitions.
In the present case the states in which a “‘real unity of counsels and of public
spirit” is most clearly wanting are certainly the non-Federal cities of Sparta and
Messéné, ͵

See also Lord Μαοδυ]αν β vivid description (Hist. of England, iv. 12, 13) of
the difficult position of William the Third as chief of the coalition against France
in 1691 :—

‘‘But even William often contended in vain against those vices which are
inherent in the nature of all coalitions. No undertaking which requires the
hearty and long continued co-operation of many independent states is likely to
prosper... . . Lewis could do with two words what William could hardly bring
about by two months of negociation at Berlin, Munich, Brussels, Turin and
Vienna. Thus France was found equal in effective strength to all the states which
were combined against her.”

VIII ZETOLIAN EMBASSIES TO ELIS AND SPARTA 411

of the nation, such as it was. It was not the power that was
lacking, but the will.

But the Aétolians, strong as they already were, both in their
own power and in the fears of their neighbours, were not to
remain much longer without allies in Peloponnésos itself. If the Atolian
soil of AXtolia was fertile in robbers and pirates, it was also by Embassies
no means barren in able diplomatists. While Dorimachos and ,onnésos,
Skopas undertook the plundering department, a certain Machatas 8.0. 220-
was the ordinary representative of the League towards foreign 219.
powers. He easily persuaded Elis, the old ally of Attolia, to Machatas
declare war against Achaia? His mission to Sparta is more Wins over
worthy of notice, as it is closely connected with important
changes in that now turbulent and revolutionary city. Political State of
parties in Sparta seem now to have been mainly determined by Sparta ; '
the respective ages of their members. In the present condition Pia ana
of the city this was just what one could expect. To the old men Young.
Kleomenés had from the beginning naturally seemed a reckless
innovator ; they would now as naturally argue that his innova-
tions had led to nothing but the ruin and disgrace of the state.
We may perhaps doubt whether they felt that fervent gratitude
towards Macedonia which the historian attributes to them ;* but
they would certainly wish to adhere to the Macedonian alliance,
if only as the side of quiet—they might add, in the immediate
dispute with Attolia, undoubtedly the side of justice. To the
young, on the other hand, Kleomenés was the hero of Sparta
and of Hellas. His kingly and soldierlike virtues had won every
heart ; his single deed of violence was atoned for by its motives
and by its results; his victories had revived the old feeling of
Spartan glory and greatness; his defeat, after a hard contested
struggle against overwhelming odds, had assuredly diminished
nothing from his fame. But the fight of Sellasia, and its results,
had made the names of Achaia and Macedonia, of Aratos and
Antigonos, hateful in the ears of every true-hearted Spartan.
As long as Kleomenés lived, though in exile or in bondage, he ects ο
was still their King ; when the news of his death was announced, of Eleo-
they would no longer crouch under the timid yoke of oligarchic menés.
Ephors ; they would again have Kings according to the old laws

1 What a well-disposed Atolian General could do we shall see presently. See
Pol. v. 107. 2 Pol. iv. 36.

δ See the frequent mention of πρεσβύτεροι, νέοι, νεανίσκοι, etc. Ib. 22, 34, 35.

4 Ib. 34. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τινὲς ἐπιστήσαντες τὸ πλῆθος ἐπί
τε τὰς ᾿Αντιγόνου καὶ Μακεδόνων εὐεργεσίας, x.7.X.

State
of the
Spartan
Govern-
ment.

Intrigues
of the
Kleo-
menists
with
ZEtolia,

First and
unsuccess-
ful mission
of Ma-
chatas.

412 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

of Sparta,! Kings who should be as Agis and as Kleomenés,

Kings who should reform every wrong at home, and who should
again lead them forth to avenge the loss of Sellasia, and to make
Sparta once more the head of a regenerate Greece. It was not
wonderful if, in the existing state of things, they did not shrink,
in the hope of attaining such ends, either from violent measures
at home or from the friendship of disreputable allies abroad.
Aatolia, whatever were her crimes, was the type of hostility to
Macedonia and Achaia ; to /Etolia therefore the popular party
at Sparta, the party of the young, the party of Kleomenés, clung
as to their natural ally. Our glimpses of the Spartan government
at this time set before us the Ephors as the ruling magistrates ;
but they set before us also a Senate and a Popular Assembly,
which the Ephors, like the ruling magistrates of other Greek
states, were bound to consult in public affairs. All these were
old Spartan institutions; the Ephors were doubtless revived
when Antigonos restored to Sparta her ancient constitution ;
the Senate and the Assembly had equally their place in that
constitution, but the Assembly at least was now a very different
body from what it had been in times past. In the old state of
things it had been lifeless, and almost nominal ; but it had been
restored to vigour by the reforms of Kleomenés, and the Spartan
Assembly is now spoken of in the same language as the Assemblies
of democratic Athens and Achaia.2 The negociations were begun
by the Kleomenist party in Sparta, who, doubtless through some
secret agency, requested the Aitohans to send an Ambassador to
their city. The Ephors now in office, as the historian distinctly
mentions, were the successors of those who had pleaded their
cause before Philip. They were themselves of the Macedonian
party,® but they were kept in awe by the prevalent tendencies of
the citizens the other way. The Attolian Government was not
likely to refuse an invitation which came from what was really
the dominant party in Sparta. Machatas appeared as an Etolian
Ambassador, and was admitted to an audience with the Ephors.
At the instigation doubtless of his Spartan confederates, he
exhorted the Ephors to restore the Hérakleid Kingship as the

1 Pol. iv. 35. “Aya δὲ τῷ τὴν φήμην ἀφικέσθαι περὶ τῆς Κλεομένους τελευτῆς,
εὐθέως ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ βασιλεῖς καθιστάναι τά τε πλήθη καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων

ἀρχεῖον.
| Td πλῆθος, of πολλοί, are the terms used by Polybios, iv. 84.
3 Pol. u.s. Δυσαρεστούμενοι τοῖς ὅλοις πράγμασιν.

.--.-- -τ τ, .- ,.--ϑ........-...-....- a eg

VIII STATE OF PARTIES AT SPARTA 413

only lawful constitution of Sparta, and he demanded an audience
before the Sovereign Assembly of the Lacedeemonian people.

The Ephors feared to refuse; they would consider about the
restoration of royalty ; but in any case the Aitolian Ambassador
might address the Spartan Assembly. The Assembly was
summoned, and Machatas addressed it. He strongly called on

the people to embrace the alliance of A‘tolia; he enlarged on

the merits of his own countrymen and on the crimes of the
Macedonians ; that his speech was impudent, false, and unreason-
able! in the eyes of Polybios we are in no way surprised to learn ;

but we have neither the speech itself, nor the comments of an
A&tolian or Kleomenist historian. The debate began; some
Lacedemonian speakers strongly advised their countrymen to
throw in their lot with Aitolia. The old, the prudent, spoke—

so we are told—of the mercy of Antigonos, and of the old
wrongs wrought by Attolian hands against Sparta ;* let Sparta
remain as she was, and observe the terms of her alliance with

the Macedonian, King. Age and prudence prevailed; the
Assembly resetved to adhere to the Macedonian alliance, and
Machatas departed unsuccessful. But presently—we are reading Revolu-
the accounts of enemies—the party which had been defeated in #0" δἰ
argument had recourse to violence; they murdered the Ephors ae
and certain Senators of the same party, disregarding in the act 219.
even the sanctity of their venerated temple of Athéné.2 They

then chose Ephors of their own party; they voted an alliance

with Aitolia ; and—Kleomenés being now dead—they determined

on the restoration of royalty. Two Kings, according to the old
precedent, were chosen, Agésipolis and Lykourgos. Agésipolis Agésipolis
was the lawful heir of the Agid Kings, and, as he was, a‘child, 204 Lyk-
he was placed under the guardianship of an uncle who bore the thocen
auspicious name of Kleomenés. The other royal house was not Kings.
extinct ; but Kleomenés had passed it by when he took his own
brother Eukleidas for his colleague. The second throne was
therefore filled by eleetion ;—Polybios says by bribery, and adds

that Lykourgos was no Hérakleid by birth, but became one by

1 Pol. iv. 84. Συναχθέντος δὲ τοῦ πλήθους παρελθὼν ὁ Μαχατᾶς παρεκάλει
διὰ πλειόνων αὐτοὺς αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς συμμαχίαν, εἰκῇ μὲν καὶ θρασέως
κατηγορῶν Μακεδόνων, ἀλόγως δὲ καὶ ψευδῶς ἐγκωμιάζων τοὺς Αἰτωλούς.

2 See above, p. 306.

δ The temple of Athéné of the Brazen House (Χαλκίοικος), famous in the history
of the Regent Pausanias. See Thuc. i. 128, 134.

Second
mission of
Machatas.
Sparta
joins the
AXtolian
alliance,
and begins
war with.
Achaia,

Beginning
of the

tary skill
of Philip.

414 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

paying a talent to each of the new Ephors.! On hearing of this
revolution, Machatas gladly returned to Sparta, and exhorted the
Ephors and Kings, now the allies of AXtolia, at once to declare
war on the Achaians. According to our Achaian informants,
Lykourgos first made incursions into Argolis, took some towns
and failed before others, and then, and not before, the Lacedz-
monians publicly proclaimed licence of reprisals against. the
Achaian League.*

The Social War now fairly began. On the one side was the
whole Macedonian Alliance ; for Epeiros joined with some zeal as
soon as the war actually began, and Messéné joined also as soon
as its course had removed the bugbear of Phigaleia. On the
other side was the A‘tolian League, with Elis and Lacedemon as
its Peloponnésian allies. The war lasted between two and three
years, and many of its military details are highly interesting,
those especially which illustrate the extraordinary and precocious
genius of the young King of Macedonia. His quick and enter-
prising spirit, his rapid marches, his winter campaigns, no less
than his as yet generous and conciliatory demeanour, all marked
him as a worthy successor of the Great Alexander, and make us
the more deplore the fall which followed upon such a beginning.
The daring and successful generalship of the young prince seems
to have taken his contemporaries by surprise, much as the
disciples of German military routine were taken by surprise at
the irregular victories of the first Buonaparte.® And this glory
at least was wholly his own; Aratos may have prompted many
of his just and conciliatory actions, but it was certainly not in
the school of Aratos that Philip learned the art of war. But
this very aspect of the Social War gives it a less attractive
character in the eyes of a historian of Federalism or of Greek
freedom in any shape. We cannot dwell on it with the same
interest as on the parliamentary strife between Aratos and
Lydiadas, or on the diplomatic and military strife between
Aratos and Kleomenés. The foremost figure of the picture is
no longer a Greek citizen, but a Macedonian King. Greece has
lost both her heroes ; her practised and wily diplomatist survives,

1 Pol, iv. 86. Ος δοὺς ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐφόρων τάλαντον Ἡρακλέους ἀπόγονος καὶ
βασιλεὺς ἐγεγόνει τῆς Σπάρτης. Ib. 86.

3 See Macaulay’ 8 Essays (Moore’s Life of Byron), p. 146, 1 ‘vol Ed. On
Philip’s campaigns see Pol. iv. 67. Finlay’s Greek Revolution, i. 109.

VIIE CHARACTER AND POSITION OF PHILIP 415

but he has sunk from the President of a free people into the Para- —
Minister of a foreign sovereign. Philip is palpably the master ; mount im-
he is not as yet an unjust or an ungenerous master, but he is a ὃς Philip.
master still. He acts as Commander-in-Chief of the whole
Allianca;—be disnatches orders to the Achaian-cities,! which, five

years before, they would have received from none but the
General of their own choice. The General himself becomes

little more than his Vice-gerent, and receives orders from him as

from his superior.2, On one occasion Aratos himself, the de-
liverer of Sikyén, the father of Peloponnésian freedom, had to

stand as something like an accused criminal before the throne of

his master.2 He was indeed honourably acquitted, but that did

not in the least diminish the ignominy of being tried. The
influence of Aratos can hardly be said to have been sensibly
weakened ; but his influence was now exercised far more in the

way of private counsel in the closet of the Macedonian King

than of open parliamentary eloquence in the Federal Congress at
Aigion. When the sunshine of royal favour was for a moment
withdrawn from him, popular favour was withdrawn also, and

the President-of the League was chosen at the bidding of Philip,

‘no longer at the bidding of Aratos.4 The true hero of Achaia

was absent; Philopoimén was studying his art, and indeed
serving his country, in the distant field of Crete; the state of
things in Peloponnésos, between the Macedonian King and his
Sikyénian counsellor, left no room for the true successor of
Lydiadas.

The war was spread over the Presidencies of three Achaian General-
Generals, of the younger Aratos, of Epératos of Dymé, and of ship of the
Aratos himself for the fourteenth time.® The younger Aratos, yates,
the son of the deliverer, was chosen to succeed his father at the nc. 219-
Spring Congress of the year 219, just as the war was beginning 218.
in earnest. Philip was on his march from Macedonia; the
Mtolians, under their General Skopas, were continuing their
depredations against Epeiros and Messéné, states which as yet
did not venture to stir in their own defence. King Lykourgos
of Sparta, in imitation, we are told, of Kleomenés,’ began his

1 Pol. iv. 67; v. 17, 102. (ἢ 2 Ib. iv. 67. 3 Tb. 85.
4 ΤΌ. 82.

5 According to the arrangement of the Presidential years of Aratos to be here-
after discussed. 6 Ib. 87.

7 Tb. Λυκοῦργος ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων βουλόμενος ἄρχεσθαι Κλεομένει.

Successes

of Philip.

Stolian
ravages
in the
Cantons
of Dymé,
Pharai,
and
Tritaia.

416 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

part by a second seizure of the Megalopolitan Athénaion. The
Cretan cities, at war with one another, sent help to their several
allies, and received help in return,' but their movements do not
greatly affect the general story. The year was distinguished by
many brilliant successes on the part of Philip. The young King
was everywhere ; from a career of victory in Epeiros and A‘tolia
he returns to drive a horde of barbarians out of his own king-
dom, and then astonishes all Greece by a rapid and successful
winter campaign in Peloponnésos. The Achaian General was
far from being the compeer of the Macedonian King. He fully
shared all his father’s military defects, and there is no sign of
his displaying any share of his father’s abilities, either military
or civil.? His neglect is said to have been the cause of a remark-
able transaction which I have already spoken οὐδ᾽ Of all the

territories of the League, the most exposed to AUtolian incursions

were the western Cantons of the old Achaia. They were open
to easy attack by sea, and by land they were almost hemmed in
by hostile territory, by Elis, by Pséphis, now incorporated with
Elis, and by the district of Kynaitha, which, if not in actual
Etolian possession,® must have been at least open to the free
passage of Attolian troops. Euripidas, the Atolian commander
at Elis, constantly ravaged the territories of Dymé, Pharai, and
Tritaia, and defeated Mikkos of Dymé, the Vice-General of the
League,® at the head of the whole force of the three Cantons.
He then occupied a fort called Teichos, in the territory of Dymé,
near Cape Araxos, and kept all Western Achaia in dread. The
three cities sent pressing messages’ to the Federal General, ask-

1 Pol. iv. 55.

3 Ib. 60. Καθόλου τε ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοῦ πολέμου πράγμασιν
ἀτόλμως ἐχρῆτο καὶ νωθρῶς.

3 See above, p. 219.

4 Pol. iv. 70. ᾿Επίκειται δ᾽ [ἡ Ψωφὶ:)] edpuds τῇ τῶν ᾿Ηλείων χώρᾳ μεθ᾽ ὧν
συνέβαινε τότε πολιτεύεσθαι αὐτήν. As Elis was not a Federal state, but ἃ single
city-commonwealth with an unusually large territory, this seems to imply that
Psdphis had become a municipal town, possessing an Eleian franchise of some
sort or other. Whether it possessed, like the Attic towns, the full franchise of
the capital, or whether it had merely a civitas sine suffragio, is not implied in the
word πολιτεύεσθαι. See above, p. 400.

> For the tolians had burned the city the year before. See above, p. 403.

6 Pol. iv. 59. Ὑποστράτηγος τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν.

7 Ib. 60. Td μὲν πρῶτον ἔπεμπον ἀγγέλους πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν
᾿Αχαιών, δηλοῦντες τὰ γεγονότα καὶ δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα
πρεσβεντὰς ἐξαπέστελλον τοὺς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιώσαντας. A distinction is
here evidently drawn between the ἄγγελοι and the πρεσβενταί. The ἄγγελοι
may have been mere messengers, bearing any sort of hasty and informal message ;

VT SONDERBUND OF THE WESTERN CANTONS 417

ing for help. But he was not in any position to help them.
Achaian military affairs were, at that moment, at a very low ebb.
We have seen how much the military spirit of the national
troops had decayed, and the League had just now great difficulty
in obtaining the services of mercenaries. Large arrears of pay
were still owing to those who had served in the war with Kleo-
menés; and, under these circumstances, few were disposed to
enlist under such bad paymasters. Thus deserted by the Federal
authorities, the three States most in danger set up a sort of
Sonderbund of their own. They were among the oldest members “Sonder-

of the League. It was the union of Dymé with Patrai which bud” of

had been the first step towards its reconstruction, and all three Western
were among the four whose union had formed the nucleus of the Cities.
revived Federation. Perhaps they may have felt themselves
specially aggrieved, when the Sikydénian strangers whom they

had allowed to become their citizens and their Presidents either
could not or would not help them in their need. They did not
secede ; they did not proclaim a new Confederation or a new
President ; but they did agree to refuse for the time being all
contributions to the Federal Treasury.? The money thus saved

was to be spent in hiring mercenaries, horse and foot, for their

own defence. The historian gravely censures this act,4 which

the πρεσβευταί, one would think, were regularly commissioned by the State
Governments of the three cities. They remind one of the πρεσβευταί whom we
have seen, on one or two occasions (see above, pp. 349, 363), commissioned by
the State Governments, to the Federal Congress. At the same time, Polybios uses
the word πρεσβευτής somewhat loosely ; in one place (v. 27) he applies it to the
persons who carried a message to King Philip from a division of the Macedonian
army, and he calls the messengers sent by Flamininus to the Roman Senate
πρέσβεις. xvii. 10; xviii. 25. 1 See above, p. 191.

2 Pol. iv. 60. See above, pp. 11, 241.

3 If these cities could hire mercenaries when the Federal Government could
not, are we to infer that in Achaia the credit of particular States stood higher :
than that of the Union ?

4 Pol. us. Τοῦτο δὲ πράξαντες ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶν καθ’ αὑτοὺς πραγμάτων
ἐνδεχομένως ἔδοξαν βεβουλεῦσθαι, περὶ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν τἀναντία᾽ πονηρᾶς γὰρ
ἐφόδου καὶ προφάσεως τοῖς βουλομένοις διαλύειν τὸ ἔθνος ἐδόκουν ἀρχηγοὶ καὶ
καθηγεμόνες γεγονέναι. He then draws out this position at some length.

Schorn (p. 153) says, ‘‘ Polybius tadelt zwar diesen Schritt, aber wie kann
man es den Stidten verdenken, dass sie nicht linger zahlen wollen, da das Geld
nicht zweckmissig angewandt wurde!" This is rather dangerous ground to be
taken by tax-payers, in any state, Federal or otherwise.

Brandstiter (p. 360) goes further still ; ‘‘ Der Geschichtschreiber ereifert sich
gegen diesen Entschluss der drei Stidte mit dem grossten Unrechte, indem er
nur den Vortheil des Bundes im Auge hat.” What else should he have in view ?
This is the doctrine of Secession with a vengeance. |

28

Loss and
recovery
of Aigeira,

418 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CRAP.

he looks on as specially unworthy of cities which might claim
the honour of being the founders of the League. In such an
emergency they were, he holds, justified in hiring mercenaries on
their own account,! but not in refusing to pay their Federal
taxes. Such a refusal was not Secession, but it was Nullification ;
it was, as Polybios says, dangerous as a precedent for any who
might hereafter wish to secede. The Federal General, who was
unable to protect them, was naturally equally unable to punish
them. Their separate union probably lasted no longer than the
immediate occasion. At the next election, a citizen of one of
these very cities ? was chosen President of the Union, and, soon
after that, the Attolians were expelled from their post by King
Philip, and the fort restored to the Dymaians.2 The choice of a
Pharaian General, while it was probably an act of special con-
cession to these cities, shows that they were not looked upon as
rebellious or suspicious members. The Western Sonderbund, if
it is ever mentioned again, is mentioned only in one very obscure
passage,* and then not in a way which implies that it was looked
upon as a hostile or unconstitutional body.

Among the military exploits of this year the most interesting,
from our point of view, is one in which we find an Achaian city
really acting for itself, and not begging for Macedonian, or even
for Federal, help. The main body of the A‘tolians,® under three
of their chief leaders, Dorimachos himself being one, fell upon
the Old-Achaian town of Aigeira, the defences of which seem to
have been strangely neglected. The enemy were admitted in
the night by a deserter,® and, while in the full swing of mas-
sacre, they were attacked and driven out by the people of
Aigeira themselves. This reminds one of Aratos’ old exploit
at Pelléné,’ only the people of Aigeira had not wilfully allowed
the enemy to occupy their city. Two of the Atolian leaders,

1 They would almost be justified by the provision in the American Constitu-
tion (Art. i. § 10. 2) which forbids any State to keep troops or engage in war,
unless actually invaded, etc. But the same article specially forbids any State to
enter into any agreement or compact with any other State. Neither American nor
Achaian foresight provided for the particular grievance of which these cities
complained, namely that of an incapable Executive presiding over a bankrupt
Treasury. 4 Epératos of Pharai. Pol. iv. 82.

3 Tb. 83. 4 Ib. v. 94. See above, p. 219.

5 Ib. iv. 57. Td πλῆθος τῶν Alrwrwy,

6 An tolian, who had deserted to the Achaians, and who now sought to win
his pardon at home by this double treason. Pol. iv. 57.

7 See above, p. 307.

VI LOSS AND RECOVERY OF AIGEIRA 419

Alexander and Archidamos, were killed; Dorimachos escaped, Dori-
and his reputation among his countrymen. does not seem to have machos
been permanently damaged, for at the next election he succeeded General
his friend Skopas as General of the Atolian League.! Skopas nc. 219-
had distinguished his year of office by an inroad into Macedonia 218.

and “a—barbarous—devastation..of the Macedonian sanctuary of

Dion. Dorimachos began his year by a still more flagrant Sacrilege
breach of Hellenic religion, the destruction of the venerated of the
temple of Zeus at Dédéna.® Philip’s brilliant campaign in Pelo- (0 .8™*
ponnésos is chiefly interesting to us, because, on the surrender and

of the once Arkadian, but now Eleian, town of Pséphis, he made Dédéna.
it over, with many expressions of good will,‘ to his Achaian

allies. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must Pséphis
suppose that Psdphis, like other Achaian acquisitions, was snnexed
admitted as a member of the League, with a vote in the to the
Achaian Assembly. But, as in other cases where strategic League.
position or doubtful loyalty required the precaution, both the

citadel and the town were secured by the presence of Federal
gatrisons.° Psédphis was, as Philip took care to inform his
friends, a valuable gift.6 An Achaian garrison there would do
something to cover the exposed canton of Tritaia, and to hinder

any more Aitolian visits to that of Kynaitha. But it does not
appear that Philip now made over to the League any of the

other cities which he took in Triphylia and the Eleian territory.”
Phigaleia itself, the cause of the war, soon after the cession of Philip's
Pséphis, dissatisfied with the Attolian connexion, gladly sur- conquests
rendered to Philip. Apparently he kept this important position oaleie and
in his own hands. In short, between Corinth, Orchomenos, and Triphylia.
the Triphylian towns, the League was pretty well hemmed in by
outlying Macedonian possessions. In all this there is nothing

for which Philip can reasonably be blamed ; but who had caused

the presence in Peloponnésos of Kings or of Macedonians at all ?

1 Pol. iv. 67. 3 Tb. ix. 62. 3 Ib. 67.

4 ΤΌ. 72. ᾿Απελογίσατο δὲ καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν εὔνοιαν ἣν ἔχοι πρὸς τὸ
ἔθνος.

5 This was done by authority of such of the ᾿Αχαΐϊκοὶ ἄρχοντες (Pol. u.s.) as
were present. The word would properly mean the δημιουργοί, but I do not
remember another instance of their interfering i in purely military affairs.

6 Pol. u.s. Τὴν ὀχυρότητα καὶ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν ἐπεδείκννε τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τὸν
ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον.

7 The Triphylian towns remained Macedonian till B.c. 208, perhaps till Bc.
198. See Livy, xxvili. 8 Cf. xxxiii. 34.

8 Pol. iv. 79.

BO. 219-
218.

Relations
between
Philip
and the
League.

Relations

Dissatis-
faction
of the
Mace-
donian
courtiers.

420 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CRAP.

It is also during the presidential year of the younger Aratos
that we come across the beginnings of a remarkable story, which
forms the best illustration of the unhappy policy of his father.
We have seen that the alliance between Achaia, Macedonia, and
the other allies was, in name at least, an equal alliance. The
King of Macedonia seems, as a matter of course, to have been
accepted as Commander-in-Chief of the whole Confederacy, but,
whatever might be his practical powers, whatever might be the
final results of so dangerous a partnership, nothing had yet been
done which formally violated the independence of the League.
The King of Macedonia might recommend, and it might be
imprudent to neglect his recommendations; still the Achaian
Assembly really discussed and voted upon them; the Achaian
General was still the independent chief of an allied army, not
merely the officer in command of a Macedonian division. The
prudence, perhaps the generosity, of Antigonos had respected
constitutional forms; the lord of Corinth knew that his friend-
ship or enmity was of vital moment to the League, and that any
direct interference with its liberties would not repay the cost and
the shame of the undertaking. Philip was young; the evil that
was in him had not yet shown itself; he had accepted Aratos as
his chief counsellor. The Sikyénian, with all his faults, was not
a wilful traitor; he had no pleasure in undoing his own glorious
work; he had no temptation to sacrifice the dignity or the
interest of his country, now that there was no Kleomenés to
awaken national and personal rivalry. He had brought his
country into what was practically a state of bondage, but he at
least did what he could to lessen the bitterness of that bondage.
As the adviser of the young King, he preached strict observance
of justice and mercy, strict fidelity to treaties, strict respect for
the rights of the Achaian League, and of every other power,
allied or hostile. There were no more Tyrants whom it was
lawful to get rid of at all hazards, and, when dealing with Com-
monwealths or with lawful Kings, Aratos was as sensible as any
man of the obligations of International Law. There was nothing
galling in all this either to the mature prudence of Antigonos or
to the youthful generosity of Philip. But to some of the Mace-
donian courtiers such a state of things was eminently unpleasing.
In their eyes the Macedonians were the natural masters of the
world ; at all events they were the natural masters of Greece ;
they had not come all this way to spend their blood and toil and

VIII RELATIONS BETWEEN PHILIP AND THE LEAGUE 421

treasure, merely as the equal allies of a cluster of petty republics.
The Achaian League was, after all, little more than an associa-
tion of rebels against the Macedonian Crown ; the restoration of
Corinth had only put that Crown into possession of a part of its
just rights ; no satisfaction had been made for the original insult
and injury of its capture, or for all the other sins of the League
and its chief against the dignity of Macedon. It was unworthy
of the successor of Alexander to act on terms of equality with
republican Greeks ; if the Achaians wished for Macedonian help,
let them become Macedonian subjects. They might keep their
constitutional forms, if they pleased; they might amuse them-
selves by electing a General and meeting in a Federal Assembly.
The Thessalians did something of the kind; they too fancied
themselves a republic, and piqued themselves on their re-
publican freedom.! But they were practically Macedonian sub-
jects all the same. The Achaians must be‘reduced to the same
level. No one had thought of consulting a Thessalian Assembly
as to any wrongs which Thessaly might have suffered from the
fEtolians, nor must the King of Macedon be any longer exposed
to the indignity of consulting an Achaian Assembly either.
The Thessalians obeyed the royal will without dispute or
examination, and the Achaians must learn to do the like. Such
thoughts, we may be sure, passed through the mind of many
a Macedonian courtier and captain, beside him to whom the
historian directly attributes the scheme for upsetting the liberties
of Achaia. This was Apellés, one of the great officers whom Plots of
Antigonos had left as guardians of the young King, and who Spells
naturally had great influence with him. With the view of @haian
breaking in the Achaians to slavery, he began to encourage the freedom.
Macedonian séldiers to insult and defraud their Achaian com-
rades in all possible-ways. Meanwhile he_himself constantly
inflicted corporal punishment on Achaian soldiers for the

1 Pol. iv. 76. Βουληθεὶς τὸ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἔθνος ἀγαγεῖν els παραπλησίαν διά-
θεσιν τῇ Θετταλῶν. . .. Θετταλοὶ γὰρ ἐδόκουν μὲν κατὰ νόμους πολιτεύειν καὶ
πολὺ διαφέρειν Μακεδόνων, διέφερον δ' οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ὁμοίως ἔπασχον Μακε-
δόσι καὶ way ἑποίουν τὸ προσταττόμενον τοῖς βασιλικοῖς. Cf. Thirlwall, viii.
255. We have seen already an illustration of their position in the fact that
they were enrolled in the Macedonian Confederacy as an independent power, but
that no one thought it necessary to ask for the consent of the Thessalians to any
of its acts. See above, pp. 389, 400, 409. In another place (vii. 12) Polybios
speaks of Thessaly almost as of an integral part of the Macedonian Kingdom ; μετὰ
τὸ παραλαβεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν τά τε κατὰ Θετταλίαν καὶ Μακεδονίαν καὶ ovAdHBSnv
τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρχὴν οὕτως ὑπετέτακτο, κ. τ. Δ.

His ill-
treatment
of the
Achaian
soldiers.

Redress
obtained
by Aratos
from
Philip.

Fresh
schemes
of Apellés
against
Aratos.

Philip's
inter-
ferences

422 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE AP,

ι
ee

slightest faults, and sent to prison any one who ventured to
interfere. The free citizens of the Achaian towns had not been
used to this kind of treatment, either at the hands of their own
Generals or at those of Philip’s predecessor. We hear of no
public remonstrance on the part of the League or of its Presi-
dent ; but a party of young Achaians laid their wrongs before
the elder Aratos, and the elder Aratos, in his private capacity as
Philip’s adviser, laid the matter before the King. Philip’s heart
was still sound, or the influence of Aratos was still paramount.
He strictly ordered Apellés to abstain from his injurious con-
duct towards the allies ; he was to give no orders to the Achaian
troops, and to inflict no punishment upon them, without the con-
sent of theirown General It is as yeta just master who is
speaking, but it is a master all the same.

Apellés now saw:that his course of action must be changed.
Nothing could be done to effect his evil purpose as long as Aratos
retained any measure of influence with the King. He therefore
made it his business to do all he could to undermine him in the
good opinion both of Philip and of his own countrymen. He im-
pressed on Philip’s mind that, while he listened to Aratos, he could
be nothing more than the limited chief of a free. Confederacy ; ; he
must treat the Achaians strictly according to the terms of the
alliance. But if -he listened to. him, he might soon become
absolute lbrd_of Peloponnésos. A more honourable tribute to
Aratos could hardly be paid; the old deliverer is again appear-
ing, though on a humbler and feebler scale, as the champion of
Grecian freedom. Apellés also made common cause with the
political opponents of Aratos—for such there were—in every
city of the League. He diligently sought them out, he admitted
them to his own friendship, and presented them to the King.’
He prevailed on Philip so far as to induce him to appear at the
Spring Meeting of the Federal Congress at Aigion, and to give
his countenance to the party opposed to Aratos. This was not

1 Pol. iv. 82. ᾿Εξετάζων τοὺς ἀντιπολιτευομένους τοῖς περὶ τὸν ΓἌρατον, τίνες

εἰσὶν, ἑκάστους ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἐπεσπάσατο, καὶ λαμβάνων εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἐψυχα-

γώγει καὶ παρεκάλει πρὸς τὴν ἑαντοῦ φιλίαν, συνίστανε δὲ καὶ τῷ Φιλίππῳ, κροσ-
ἐπιδεικνύων αὐτῷ παρ᾽ ἕκαστον ὡς ἐὰν μὲν ᾿Αράτῳ προσέχῃ, χρήσεται τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς
κατὰ τὴν ἔγγραπτον συμμαχίαν, ἐὰν δ᾽ αὐτῷ πείθηται καὶ τοιούτους προσλαμβάνῃ
φίλους, χρήσεται πᾶσι Πελοποννησίοις κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν. Were these
opponents of Aratos—7 ἐναντία στάσις, as Plutarch (Ar. 48) calls them—rem-
nants of the oligarchic or tyrannical faction which appeared at Sikyén and else-
where during the Kleomenic War ?

ὙΠ PHILIP INTERFERES WITH THE ACHAIAN ELECTION 428

Philip’s first appearance before an Achaian Assembly; but with the
hitherto he had only appeared, as personal sovereign of Mace- pcheian
donia, to discuss matters of common interest with the many- wav _
headed sovereign of Achaia. To this there could be no more 8.0. 218.
objection than to the appearance of a Macedonian Ambassador

for the same purpose; it was a sign both of earnestness and

of ability on the part of Philip, and the members of the
Assembly were probably gratified at the opportunity of talking

with their royal ally face to face. But it was another matter

when the King of Macedonia appeared at the Meeting which was

held for the purely domestic purpose of electing the Federal
Magistrates. This seems to have been felt; and a rather lame
excuse was made about the King being on his road through
Aigion on his way to a campaign in Elis! Apellés himself was

less scrupulous; he busied himself about the election * with all

the zeal of a native partisan. For some reason which is not
mentioned, the elder Aratos did not appear this time, according

to custom, as a candidate to succeed his son. His interest was

given to Timoxenos,® who had already twice held the seal of the
League. He was an old partisan, and he had by this time
apparently forgiven whatever wrong Aratos had done him two

years before. When the Congress came to vote, Timoxenos was
unsuccessful, there being a small majority ὁ in favour.of Epératos

of Pharai. This is attributed by Polybios wholly to the intrigues General-
of Apellés, but it must be remembered that Epératos was a mp οὗ
citizen of one of those Cantons which the neglect οὗ the younger ay 218,
Aratos had driven to the unconstitutional foundation of the 217.
Sonderbund.5 There can be little doubt that a wish to regain

the confidence of the three western cities had something to do

with the choice made by the Assembly on this occasion. These

two views are in no way inconsistent with each other. Apellés,

in influencing Achaian politicians, must have appealed to some

1 Pol. iv. 82. Πείθει Φίλιππον παραγενέσθαι πρὸς τὰς τῶν ᾿Αχαιςῶν ἀρχαι-
ρεσίας εἰς Αἴγιον ὡς εἰς τὴν ᾿Ηλείαν ἅμα ποιούμενον τὴν πορείαν.

3 Tb. Περὶ τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν εὐθὺς ἐσπούδαζε. Cf. Plut. Ar. 48.

δ Ib. Τιμόξενον . . . τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον εἰσαγόμενον. See Schorn’s
note, p. 167. He remarks that this illustrates the forgiving temper of Aratos
spoken of by Plutarch (ἐχθρὸς εὐγνώμων καὶ wpgos,—txGpas ὅρῳ καὶ φιλίας del
τῷ κοινῷ συμφέροντι χρώμενος. Ar. 10), looking on Timoxenos as an opponent
of Aratos, because of their dispute in B.o. 220. But surély this is making too
much of a mere passing quarrel.

4 Pol. iv. 82. Μόλις μὲν ἤνυσε, κατεκράτησε δ' οὖν ὅμως.

5 See above, p. 417.

B.c. 221-
220.

Philip
recovers
Teichos.

Further
schemes of
Apellés.

424 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Achaian political feeling. He could hardly have practised
bribery on so gigantic a scale as to secure by that means a
majority of votes in a majority of the cities. If he had some
hired partisans, neither he nor they could well attack Aratos
avowedly because he was the friend of Achaian freedom. But
the neglect of the Western Cantons by the outgoing General
would form an admirable cry for a dissatisfied party. A certain
amount of genuine and reasonable discontent would doubtless
exist, which Apellés and his creatures would turn to their own
purposes. We can thus see also why Aratos did not stand him-
self, but put forward Timoxenos as his candidate. The admini-
stration of the two Aratos’, father and son, had, for two successive
years, brought nothing but disgrace on the League. But the
Generalship of Timoxenos, three years earlier, had witnessed
some little success in the form of the recovery of Klarion,' and
he had appeared as an advocate of prudence during Aratos’
momentary fit of rashness.* Altogether we can understand that
Timoxenos was, just now, a better card for his party to play
than Aratos himself. It was probably on the question of relief
to the western cities that the division ostensibly turned, and we
may believe that the majority of the Assembly, ignorant of the
intrigues of Apellés, honestly meant the election of Epératos to
be a deserved vote of censure on those who had neglected them.
It falls in with this view that, immediately after the election,
Philip marched to reeover the fort of Teichos in the Dymaian
territory.? It was-emall, but-stronglyfortified ;* but its defen-
ders were Eleians and not Attolians. They at once surrendered
to the King, who gave over the fortress to its lawful owners,
and then proceeded to lay waste the territory of Elis. The
cause which had led to the discontent of the Western Cantons
was now effectually removed.

Apellés was naturally elated at his success. He had, as he
thought, effectually poisoned the royal mind, and he had seen
an Achaian President chosen at his own nomination. He now
made another attack on whatever influence Aratos may still
have retained over the mind of Philip. He now charged him
with treason to the Grand Alliance. Philip had, among other

ΤΡ, 396. ᾿ 2 Ῥ, 397. 3 See above, p. 416.

4 Pol. iv. 83. Χωρίον οὐ μέγα μὲν ἠσφαλισμένον δὲ διαφερόντως.

5 Tb. 84. Δοκῶν ἡνυκέναι τι τῆς προθέσεως τὸ δι᾽ αὑτοῦ καθεστάσθαι τὸν τῶν
᾿Αχαιῶν στρατηγόν.

VII ACCUSATION OF ARATOS BEFORE PHILIP 425

Eleian prisoners, captured Amphidamos, the General of the Affair of
Eleian commonwealth! He dismissed him without ransom, Amphi-
and employed him as a messenger to invite his countrymen to’.
exchange the A{tolian for the Macedonian alliance, promising

in such case to respect their liberties and constitution.? These

offers were rejected at Elis, but the transaction seems to have
awakened some suspicions against Amphidamos in the minds of

his countrymen, for, shortly afterwards, while Philip was ravag-

ing the Eleian territory, they determined to arrest him and send

him prisoner to Attolia. Meanwhile Apellés accused Aratos to Apellés
the King as the cause of the refusal of the Eleians to treat. eaage
He had, so his accuser said, dealt privately with Amphidamos, jason,
and exhorted him to use his influence on the anti-Macedonian

side, because it was against the common interest of Peloponnésos

for Philip to become master of Elis.2 This last was certainly, in

itself, a proposition too clear to be disputed by any patriotic
Peloponnésian, and it was quite reason enough for keeping
Philip out of Greece altogether. Still such arguments would

not, in the actual position of Aratos, have justified him in
underhand dealings contrary to the general interests of the
Confederacy. On this charge, Aratos, the deliverer of Pelopon-

nésos, the man who had been thirteen times President of the
Achaiayp League, had to stand something like a trial before the
Macedonian King.‘ He and his country could not have been
subjected to greater indignities, if they had made up their minds

to submit to the Federal headship of Kleomenés. Apellés
brought his accusation ; he even ventured to add that the King,
having met with such ingratitude at the hands of Aratos, would

1 Pol. iv. 84. Ὁ τῶν ᾿Ηλείων στρατηγός. This need not necessarily imply that
this General was the chief magistrate of Elis, and in earlier times the Eleian magis-
trates bore other titles. See Tittmann, p. 866. Still it is not unlikely that the
Eleians, though their constitution was not Federal, may now have so far imitated
the practice of other Greek states as to place a single General at the head of
their commonwealth.

2 Ib, Αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέρους, ddpouphrovs, ἀφορολογήτους, χρωμένους τοῖς ἰδίοις
πολιτεύμασι, διατηρήσει. The words are nearly the same as those used in the
decree of the Allies (c. 25) for liberating the cities in subjection to Ztolia. They
were probably a common formula for such occasions.

7 Ib. λέγειν ὅτι κατ᾽ οὐδένα τρόπον συμφέρει τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις τὸ γενέσθαι
Φίλιππον ᾿Ηλείων κύριον.

4 Ib. 85. Td μὲν οὖν πρῶτον Φίλιππος δεξάμενος τοὺς λόγους καλεῖν éxédeve
τοὺς περὶ τὸν “Aparov καὶ λέγειν ἐναντίον ἐκείνων ταῦτα τὸν ᾿Απελλῆν. The οἱ
περὶ seem to include both father and son, for directly after ὁ πρεσβύτερος Aparos
speaks,

Aratos
restored to
Philip's
favour.

Influence
retained
by Aratos
in the
Achaian
Assembly,
B.C. 218.

426 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

explain matters to the Achaian Assembly, and then retire from
the struggle to his own kingdom. All that Aratos could do at
the moment was to ask Philip not to condemn him on the mere
assertion of Apellés, but to search into the truth by every
possible means before he laid any such charge before the
Assembly. Philip had justice and candour enough to suspend
his judgement; Apellés could bring forward no evidence to
support his charge, while Aratos was soon able to bring forward
a most convincing witness to his innocence. This was no other
than Amphidamos himself, who, at this opportune moment, took
refuge with Philip at Dymé The King now fully restored
Aratos to his favour and confidence, and began to look with
equal displeasure on Apellés. It was about the same time that
the Achaians gave the King a signal proof of the influence which
their old chief still retained over their minds. Unless Apellés
wished, as he probably did, merely to weaken the League by
giving it an incompetent head, the election of Epératos had
proved a mistake. The Pharaian President was a man of no
skill or daring in the field, and of no weight in the Assembly.?
A special Meeting had been called by the Achaian Government
at Philip’s request,? in which the King appeared and asked for
supplies. The wishes of Epératos had no influence, and Aratos
and his party, if they did not openly oppose, did not at all
support Philip’s request. In such a state of things no supplies
were granted. Philip now perceived the importance of the
friendship of Aratos. The Assomvy had been held at Aigion,
the usual place of meeting; the King persuaded the Achaian
Government to adjourn it to Sikyén.‘ This was in itself a
compliment to Aratos, and in the interval he fully confessed
his errors both to the father and the son.5 He threw the whole

1 Pol. v. 1. Tov δ᾽ Ἔπήρατον ἄπρακτον ὄντα τῇ φύσει καὶ καταγινωσκόμενον
ὑπὸ πάντων. We must allow a little for Polybios’ admiration of Aratos.

2 The expression of Polybios (u.s.) is a strong one; ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Φίλιππος,
évdehs ὧν σίτου καὶ χρημάτων els τὰς δυνάμεις, συνῆγε τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς διὰ τῶν
ἀρχόντων εἰς ἐκκλησίαν. This last phrase is the formula used elsewhere (see
above, Ρ. 214) to express the calling of an Assembly by the Federal General.
(Cf. the relations of the Swiss Federation with France in 1777, and the Diet at
Solothurn, summoned at the instance of Louis XVI., Bluntschli, Gesch. des
schweiz. Bundesrechtes, i. 293—4.]

3 Pol. us. Ὁρῶν τοὺς μὲν wept τὸν “Aparov ἐθελοκακοῦντας διὰ τὴν περὶ ras
ἀρχαιρεσίας γεγενημένην εἰς αὐτοὺς τῶν περὶ τὸν ᾿Απελλῆν κακοπραγμοσύνην.

* Pol.v. 1. ᾿Αθροισθέντος δὲ τοῦ πλήθους εἰς Αἴγιον κατὰ τοὺς νόμους . ..

πείσας οὖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας μεταγαγεῖν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν εἰς Σικυῶνα.
5 Ib. Λαβὼν τόν τε πρεσβύτερον καὶ τὸν νεώτερον ἼΑρατον els τὰς χεῖρας.

VIIt TREASON OF APELLES AGAINST PHILIP 427

blame upon Apellés, and begged them to be his friends as of
old. Such an appeal was irresistible. In the adjourned Congress
at Sikyén the influence of Aratos was used on behalf of Philip,
and a liberal money-bill was the result.

Apellés now took to schemes which, in a Macedonian officer, Treason of
were even more guilty than any of his former evil deeds. He Apellés
now entered on plans of direct treason against his own sovereign. Philip.
He had already alienated the King’s mind from Alexander and
Taurién, two of his best officers, and both of thém aniong the
guardians named by Antigonos. He now, in concert with the
other two, Leontios and Megaleas, devised a plot by which all
Philip’s enterprises might be thwarted, till he should at last be
sufficiently humbled to put himself wholly under their guidance.

The details of this vile scheme, and the general details of Campaign
the campaign, belong rather to Macedonian than to Federal of &c. 218.
history. Philip and the Achaians fitted out a fleet and attacked
Kephallénia, which had long acted as the AXtolian naval station.

An all but successful assault on Palai, one of the towns in that

island, was hindered by the arts of the traitors. Philip was as
ubiquitous as usual; he invaded Lakénia; he invaded Attolia,

and avenged the destruction of Dion by the destruction of
Thermon.? By rare prudence and forbearance he gradually Philip
discovered, crushed, and punished the hateful plot of which he crushes
had been the victim. Throughout, Aratos acted as his wisest the plo
counsellor, and was therefore made the constant object of insult,
sometimes growing into personal violence,® at the hands of the
conspirators. It is interesting to trace, in the course of the

The relations between Philip and the younger Aratos gives us one of those strange

glimpses of Grecian manners which we come across ever and anon. ‘Eddéxe: δ᾽ ὁ

νεανίσκος ἐρᾶν τοῦ Φιλίππου. (Plut. Ar. 50.) Compare the relations of Kleomenés
with Xenarés (KI. 3) and with Panteus. (c. 87.)

1 Fifty talents down, as three months’ pay for his army, seventeen talents a
month as long as he carried on the war in Peloponnésos, and corn in abundance
(σίτου μυριάδας, Pol. v. 1).

If the Federal Government, a year before, could not pay its mercenaries (see
above, p. 417), where did it find the materials for such a subsidy now? But the
passage is remarkable as showing the full power of taxation which was in the
hands of the Federal Congress. It is a pity that we are not told how the money
was to be raised. See above, p. 241.

2 Polybios (v. 9-12) censures this act at great length, and doubtless with good
reason. Yet it is not fifty years since British troops destroyed the public build-
ings of Washington, and much more lately we have heard the savage yells of
English newspapers crying for the destruction of Delhi and Pekin.

Pol. v. 15. Plut. Ar. 48. Brandstiter's comment '(p. 374) is curious,
‘‘ Aratus wurde von der anti-achaischen Partei fast gesteinigt und nur durch des

Weak
adminis-
tration of
Epératos,
B.c. 218-
217.

Aratos
General,
Bc. 217-
216.

428 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

story, several notices of the substantial, though perhaps rather
unruly, freedom which the Macedonians still enjoyed under their
Kings. Polybios carefully points out the almost equal terms on
which the Macedonian army, not of assumption but of ancient
right, addressed their sovereign,! and we find one of the culprits,
just as in the days of Alexander, tried and condemned by the
military Assembly of the Macedonians.”

It is more important for our subject to trace one or two
points connected with the domestic history of the League. The
Pharaian General did not secure the safety even of his own and
the neighbouring cantons. His utter incapacity, and the general
lack of discipline which prevailed during his year, are strongly
set forth by Polybios.2 Doubtless we here read the character of
Epératos as given by his political opponents, but, though there
may be some exaggeration, there must be some groundwork for
the picture. The Atolians in Elis continued and increased their
devastations in the western districts, and the cities in that quarter
paid their contributions to the Federal Treasury with difficulty
and reluctance.t The expression however shows that they were
paid, so that the most objectionable resolve of the Sonderbund
of the year before must have been rescinded. At the next
election the elder Aratos was chosen General,5—we now hear
nothing of Macedonian influence either way—and then things
began to brighten a little. Incapable as Aratos was in the open
field, his genius was admirably adapted for winning back men’s
minds, and he seems easily to have allayed all discontents. He

Konigs specielle Theilnahme gerettet ; iiber die Beweggriinde sind verschiedene
Vermuthungen méglich.””

1 Pol. v. 27. Ἐϊχον γὰρ. del τὴν τοιαύτην ἰσηγορίαν Μακεδόνες πρὸς τοὺς
βασιλεῖς. See above, p. 16.

2 Ib. 29. Πτολεμαῖον. . . κρίνας ἐν rots Μακεδόσιν ἀπέκτεινε. Cf. Diod.
xvii. 79, 80. Arrian, iii. 26.2; iv. 14. 2.

I have cut short these details, as not bearing immediately upon Federal
history. The narrative is given at length by Polybios, and the English reader
will, as usual, find the best of substitutes in the History of Bishop Thirlwall (viii.
258-68).

3 Pol. v. 80. ἸΤοῦ δ᾽ ᾿Επηράτου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν καταπεφρονημένου
μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτικῶν νεανίσκων κατεγνωσμένου δὲ τελέως ὑπὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων,
οὔτ᾽ ἐπειθάρχει τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις οὐδεὶς οὔτ᾽ ἣν ἕτοιμον οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν τῆς
χώρας βοήθειαν. Cf. c. 91. Had Aratos or Timoxenos any hand in making
it so?

4 Tb. Al μὲν πόλεις κακοπκαθοῦσαι καὶ μὴ τυγχάνουσαι βοηθείας δυσχερῶς
πως εἶχον τὰς εἰσφοράς. Patrai is now mentioned as well as Dymé and Pharai.
Cf. c. 91, where the same seems to be said of the cities generally.

5 Ib. 30, 91.

VIII ARATOS’ MEDIATION AT MEGALOPOLIS 429

summoned an Assembly,' and procured a series of decrees for Decrees
the more vigorous prosecution of the war. The number of troops οἵ he
to be levied, both of citizens and mercenaries, was fixed, and the ‘Assembly,
number and nature of the contingents from at least two of the 8.0. 217.
cities, namely Megalopolis and Argos, were made the subject of

a special decree.2 No reason is given for the special mention

of these particular States, but we know that the troops of
Megalopolis were in every way more efficient than those of any

other city of the Union.® But these decrees illustrate the Full
thoroughly sovereign power of the Federal Congress in all * ederal
matters of national concern. At the same time another decree, reignty
passed apparently in the same Assembly, shows no less clearly combined
how careful the Federal power was to abstain from any undue With strict
interference with the State Governments in matters properly ste
coming within their own sphere. It was now that, as has been rights.
mentioned in an earlier chapter,* Aratos went as mediator to
Megalopolis. Violent local disputes had arisen; there was a Aratos’
dispute about the laws which had been enacted by Prytanis ; meen
there was a still more dangerous dispute between the rich and lopolis. ;
the poor, arising out of the restoration of the city after its
destruction by Kleomenés. Aratos was sent, by decree of the
Federal Assembly, to mediate between the contending parties,

and he succeeded in bringing them to terms of agreement. He

then returned to hold another Assembly; the A®tolians, as
before,> watched this opportunity for an inroad, but this time

Aratos was beforehand with them. He had entrusted the care

of the exposed districts to Lykos of Pharai,® with a strong body

of mercenaries, at whose head Lykos gained a complete victory

over the invaders. He afterwards, when the A‘tolians had left

Elis, retaliated the invasion by ravaging the Eleian territory in
company with Démodokos the Federal Master of the Horse,’ at

the head of the mercenaries, together with the citizen force of

1 Pol. v. 91. Παρακαλέσας τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς, καὶ λαβὼν δόγμα περὶ τούτων.

2 See above, p. 242. 3 Pol. iv. 69. See Brandstiter, 365.

4 Pol. v. 93. See above, Ὁ. 199.

5 Ib. 94. Ὅς [Evpewldas] τηρήσας τὴν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν σύνοδον. See above,

. 397.

P ὁ Polybios (v. 94) gives as a reason for this selection, διὰ τὸ τοῦτον ὑποστράτηγον
εἶναι τότε τῆς συντελείας τῆς warpixys. These words are not very clear, and
their meaning has been disputed (see above, p. 193), but one can hardly avoid
the suspicion that they have something to do with the late Sonderbund. See
above, p. 418.|

7 Ib. 95. Τὸν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἱππάρχην.

Philip’s
success in
Northern
Greece.

Mediation
of Chios

B.o, 218-7.

480 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Dymé, Pharai, and Patrai. Meanwhile Philip was dealing far
severer blows at the AXtolian power in Northern Greece. One
great success was the capture of the Phthidétic Thebes ; but it is
painful to read that, instead of liberating the city according to
the agreement entered into at the beginning of the war,! he sold
the inhabitants as slaves, planted a Macedonian colony in the
town, and changed its name to Philippopolis. This was perhaps
the first downward step in a career which had hitherto promised
so brightly.

The Social War was brought rather suddenly to an end during
this official year of Aratos. Before the year of Epératos had
ended, Ambassadors from Chios and Rhodes appeared before
Philip at Corinth, offering their.mediation- towards a peace.?
Those islands were now independent and important states.
Rhodes especially was governed by a prudent and moderate
aristocracy, whose career is among the most honourable things
in later Grecian history, and which preserved the independence
of the island after that of continental Greece was lost. Pan-
hellenic patriotism united with the natural interests of com-
mercial republics 8 to prompt both Chians and Rhodians to desire
the restoration of peace. Philip, in the full tide of success, had
no real wish for peace ; but he could not decently refuse the
proffered mediation. He professed his willingness to treat, and
bade the envoys go to Aitolia and offer their mediation there.
They returned with an AXtolian proposal for a thirty days’ truce,
and for a meeting at Rhion to discuss the terms of peace. Philip
accepted the truce, and wrote to the several members of his
Alliance to send deputies to a Conference. The Attolians were
perplexed ; the whole war had taken a turn quite different from
anything that they had expected ; they had looked upon Philip as
a mere boy,° over whom victory would be easy ; they had found

1 The words used by Polybios (v. 99, 100) certainly seemed to imply that the
people of Phthidtic Thebes were entitled to its benefits ; κατεχόντων αὐτὴν τῶν
Αἰτωλῶ»νγ ---παρέδοσαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι τὴν πόλιν. These expressions certainly sound
like the presence of an AStolian garrison in an unwilling city.

2 Pol. v. 24. 3 See Thirlwall, viii. 265.

4 Pol v. 28. Tots μὲν συμμάχοις ἔγραψε διασαφῶν πέμπειν els Πάτρας τοὺς
συνεδρεύσοντας καὶ βουλευσομένους ὑπὲρ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς διαλύσεως.

5 ΤΌ, 29. ᾿Ελπίσαντες γὰρ ὡς παιδίῳ νηπίῳ χρήσασθαι τῷ Φιλίππῳ διά τε τὴν
ἡλικίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, τὸν μὲν Φίλιππον εὗρον τέλειον ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ τὰς
ἐπιβολὰς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐφάνησαν» εὐκαταφρόνητοι καὶ παιδαριώδεις
ἕν τε τοῖς κατὰ μέρος καὶ τοῖς καθόλου πράγμασιν.

VIII ATTEMPTS ON BEHALF OF PEACE 431

in him a great King and a successful general. But he was just
now hampered ‘by the conspiracy of his great officers, out of
which they hoped that something might turn to their advantage.
The result of their doubts and procrastination was that, when Failure of
the appomnted-day-eame,-no Aitolian representative appeared at the pro-
Rhion. This exactly suited Philip; he could now continue the posed © one
war, without incurring the odium of refusing offers of peace.!
He had done his part, and the impediment came from the other
side. Envoys had already arrived from some at least of his
allies, but, instead of discussing terms of peace, they received an
exhortation to vigour in the war from the lips of their royal
Commander-in-Chief.?

The Chians and Rhodians however did not at once give up
their praiseworthy scheme of restoring peace to Hellas. Their Second
Ambassadors again appeared in Philip’s camp, immediately after mission
his conquest of the Phthidtic Thebes. They were now accom- Chios,
panied by the representatives of two other powers ; envoys from Rhodes,
the King of Egypt and from the republic of Byzantion accom- Byzan-
panied those of the islanders. There is no reason to doubt that Fert nd
Ptolemy Philopatér had strictly observed that neutrality which
was all that the Allies had asked of him at the beginning of the
war.* He might therefore appropriately join his voice in favour
of peace to that of the maritime republics. Philip, on this
second occasion, made much the same answer as he had done
upon the first ; he had no objection to peace; let the Ambassa-
dors again go and try the mind of the Aitolians.® At that
moment Philip had still no real mind for peace; in truth, a
young monarch, in the full tide of success in a thoroughly just
war,-zaay-be-forgiven if in his heart he longed for still further
triumphs.—But. before the matter could be discussed, before

1 Pol. v. 29. Ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἀσμένως ἐπιλαβόμενος τῆς προφάσεως ταύτης διὰ
τὸ θαρρεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ πολέμῳ, καὶ προδιειληφὼς ἀποτρίβεσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις, τότε
παρακαλέσας τοὺς ἀπηντηκότας τῶν συμμάχων οὐ τὰ πρὸς διαλύσεις πράσσειν ἀλλὰ
τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, κ.τ.λ.

2 I have not enlarged on Philip's campaign in Phékis, or on his general rela-
tions to the Phékian League. There are some good remarks in Schorn, p. 164,
note. Between Attolian enmity and Macedonian protection, it would seem that
the Phéikians had pretty well lost their independence. They are reckoned among
the States which needed liberation after Kynoskephalé, Liv. xxxiii. 32. Cf ce.
34 and Pol. xviii. 30.

8 Pol. v. 100. 4 See above, p. 409.

5 Schorn (169) remarks that the war injured Ptolemy by hindering him from
hiring Atolian mercenaries as usual. Cf. Pol. v. 63, 4.

Philip
turns his
mind
towards
Italy.

B.C. 332—
326.
B.0. 280—
274.

Opening
of a new
period.
Close con-
nexion of
the history
of Eastern
‘and
Western
Europe
from this
date.

482 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE , CHAP.

indeed the mediators returned, tidings had reached him which
changed his purpose. He was as anxious for war, as ambitious
of conquest, as ever; but his heart now began to be bent on war
on a greater scale than the limits of Hellas could afford ; he
began to dream of conquests greater than the destruction of
Thermon or the colonization of Phthdtic Thebes. Other Greek
Kings had before now sought glory and conquest on the other
side of the Hadriatic. Alexander of Epeiros had lost his life in
battle against the invincible barbarians of Italy. Pyrrhos him-
self, after useless victories, had returned to confess that the
Macedonian sarissa had at last found more than its match in the
Roman broadsword. But the might of Philip was far greater
than the might of either of the Molossian knights-errant. As
King of Macedonia and Head of the Greek Alliance, he might
summon the countrymen of Alexander and Pyrrhos as merely
one contingent of his army. And Italy was now in a state
which positively invited his arms. While he, the namesake of
the great Philip, the successor of the great Alexander, the un-
conquered chief of an unconquered nation, was wasting his
strength on petty warfare with A‘tolia and Lacedemon, Hanni-
bal was advancing, in the full swing of triumph, from the gates
of Saguntum to gates of Rome.

It is with a feeling of sadness that the historian of Greece
turns at this moment to behold the mighty strife which was
waging in Western Europe, the struggle between the first of
nations and the first of men. He feels that the interests of
Achaia and Aétolia, of Macedonia and Sparta, seem small beside
the gigantic issue now pending between Rome and Hannibal.
The feeling is something wholly different from that paltry wor-
ship of brute force which looks down on “ petty states,” old or
new. The political lessons to be drawn from the history of
Achaia and Aétolia are none the less momentous because the
world contained other powers greater than either of the rival
Leagues. Still it is with a mournful feeling that we quit a state
of things where Greece is everything, where Greece and her
colonies form the whole civilized world—a state of things in
which, even when Greece is held in bondage, she is held in
bondage by conquerors proud to adopt her name and arts and
language—and turn to a state of things in which Greece and
Macedonia form only one part of the world of war and politics,
and that no longer its most important part. We have already

VIII AFFAIRS OF ITALY 433

seen the beginning of this change; we have seen Roman armies

east of the Hadriatic; we have seen Greek cities receive their
freedom as a boon from a Roman deliverer.! From this point the

history of the two great peninsulas becomes closely interwoven.

Greece and Macedonia gradually sink, from the position of equal
allies_and equal enemies, into the position, first of Roman de-
pendencies and then of Roman provinces. We have now entered

upon that long chain of events reaching down to our own times

the History of Greece under Foreign Domination.?, Our guide gypehro-
has already begun diligently to mark the synchronisms of Greek nisms of
and Roman history. Hannibal first cast his eyes on Saguntum freek and
at the same time that Philip-and the Congress of Corinth passed history.
their first decree against the Attolians.* He laid siege to the city 5.6. 220.
at the time that the younger Aratos was chosen General* He Spring, |
took it while Philip, was on his first triumphant march through aytumn,
AXtolia.® He crossed the Alps about the time that the first sc. 219.
Chian and Rhodian envoys came to Corinth.® He defeated sc. 218.
Flaminius_ at Lake Trasimenus_while_Philip_-wae—besieging B.c. 217.
Phthidtic Thebes.’ The news was slow in reaching Greece; a Philip
letter—from whom we know not—brought the important tidings 5 an
to the King; it was sent to him in Macedonia, and, not finding BO. a
him there, followed him to Argos, where he was present at the
Nemean Games.® His evil genius was at his side ; Démétrios of Influence
Pharos, thé double traitor to Illyria and to Rome, expelled from οἱ Démé
his dominions by the Romans, had taken refuge with Philip, and Pharos,
was gradually supplanting Aratos as his chief counsellor. To

him alone the King showed the letter; the adventurer at once
counselled peace with AXtolia and with all Greece ; but he coun-

selled it only in order that Philip might husband all his strength

for an Italian war. Now was the time, now that Rome was He
falling,{for the King of Macedonia to step in at once and to claim counsels
his share of the prize. We could have wished to see the argu- ence in
ments of the Pharian drawn out at greater length. He could Italy.

1 See above, pp. 326-328.

2 This subject is at last concluded in the two final volumes of Mr. Finlay’s
great work, the most truly original history of our times.

3 Pol. iv. 28. 4 Ib. 37.

8 Ib. v. 29. 7 Ib. 101.

8 Ib. 101. The Nemean Games must therefore have been restored to Argos
(see above, p. 313). When Argos became a city of the League, the Federal
power could have no interest in asserting the rights of Kleénai, one of the smallest
members of the Union, against Argos, one of the greatest.

2F

5 Ib. 66.

Opening
of the
Congress
of Nau-
paktos,

B.C. 217.

484 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

not have looked upon Rome as completely overthrown ; for in
that case Macedonian intervention would have been mere inter-
ference with the rights of conquest on the part of Carthage.
Hannibal’s position must have seemed not so perfectly secure but
that he would still be glad to accept of Macedonian help, and to
yield to Macedonia a portion of the spoil. As Philip gave hin-
self out as the champion of Greek interests, the liberation of the
Greek cities in Italy and Sicily would afford him an honourable
pretext for interference. To unite them to his Confederacy,
perhaps covertly to his actual dominion, would be a natural
object of his ambition. The Greek cities of Italy, which Car-
thage had never possessed, would naturally fall to the lot of
Macedonia. Even Sicily would hardly prove a stumbling-block.
The surrender of the old claims of Carthage to dominion in that
island would hardly be thought too dear a price for an alliance
which, by rendering Italy no longer dangerous, would effectually
secure the Carthaginian dominion in Spain and Gaul. But the
views of Philip at this time are mere matters of speculation.
Before he actually concluded any treaty with Hannibal, the state
of affairs had materially changed.

When Philip was thus disposed, the negociation of peace was
not difficult. Without, as it would seem, even waiting for the
return of the mediating envoys, he entered into communication
with the Aitolian Government,” and gathered a Congress of his
own Allies at Panormos.? But he was determined that no man
should think that he sought peace because he dreaded war. He
again ravaged the territory of Elis; and, while waiting for the
arrival of the plenipotentiaries, he made the important conquest
of Zakynthos. The XMtolian Assembly* met_at Naupaktos ;
the Congress of the Allies was assembled on the opposite shore
of Achaia. Philip sent over Aratos 5—such is the language now
used—with his own general Taurién; their mission soon led to

1 See Flathe, Geschichte Makedoniens, ii. 279. Thirlwall, viii. 278, note.
See also the speech of Agelaos just below.

2 This was done through Kleonikos of Naupaktos, the πρόξενος of Achaia in
Etolia, who was therefore exempted from slavery. See above, p. 45, note 3. The
employment of Kleonikos for such a purpose is like the similar employment of
Amphidamus of Elis. See p. 425.

3 Pol. v. 102. IIpés μὲν τὰς συμμαχίδας πόλεις γραμματοφόρους ἐξαπέστειλε,
παρακαλῶν πέμπειν τοὺς συνεδρεύσοντας καὶ μεθέξοντας τῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν διαλύσεων
κοινολογίας.

4 ΤΌ, 108, Tots Αἰτωλοῖς πανδημεὶ συνηθροισμένοι ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ.

5 Ib. ᾿Ἐξέπεμψε πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς “Aparoy καὶ Tavplwva.

VUI CONGRESS OF NAUPAKTOS 4385

an itolian embassy, inviting Philip to cross with all his forces
and to discuss matters face to face. He did so, and encamped
near Naupaktos. The Attolian Assembly—only distinguished
from the itolian army by not being under arms !—took up a
position near him. The details of the negociation required
many meetings, many messages to and fro; but at last all seems
to have been settled without any serious difficulty. The principle
of the Uti Possidetis,? one highly favourable to Philip and his allies,
was soon agreed to on both sides. The most remarkable event Speech of
in the course of the Conference_was a speech by Agelaos of Agelaos.
Naupaktos, the substance of which has been preserved to us by
Polybios. It shows the strange union of” elements in the
4ttolian character, that this very Agelaos, whom we have seen
concerned in some of the worst deeds of Aitolian brigandage,®
should now appear as a profound statesman, and even_as a Pan-
hellenic patriot. “Let Greece,” he says, ‘he united ; let no
Greek state make war upon any other ; let them thank the Gods
if they can all live in peace and agreement, if, a8 men in crossing
rivers grasp one another's hands,‘ so they can hold together and
save themselves and their cities from barbarian inroads. If it is
too much to hope that it should be so always, let it at least be
so Just now ; let Greeks, now at least, unite and keep on their
guard, when they behold the vastness of the armies and the
greatness of the struggle going on in the West. No man who
looks at the state of things with common care can doubt what is
coming. Whether Rome conquers Carthage or Carthage con-
quers Rome, the victor will not be content with the dominion of
the Greeks of Italy and Sicily ; he will extend his plans and his
warfare much further than suits us or our welfare. Let all
Greece be upon its guard, and Philip above all. Your truest

1 Pol. v. 108. Οἱ δ᾽ Αἰτωλοὶ χωρὶς τῶν ὅπλων ἧκον πανδημεί.

3170. Ὥστ᾽ ἔχειν ἀμφοτέρους ἃ νῦν ἔχουσιν.

5 See ‘above, p. 403. It was worth noticing that the only two negociators
mentioned on the Atolian side, Agelaos and Kleonikos, are both of them citizens
of Naupaktos. It is thus clear that that city was now incorporated with the
/Etolian League on really equal terms, but we can well believe that the arts of
statesmanship and diplomacy were more flourishing among its citizens than
among the boors and brigands of the inland country. Of the diplomatic powers
of Agelaos we have seen something already when he persuaded Skerdilaidos to
join the Xtolians.

4 Pol. v. 104. Συμπλέκοντες τὰς χεῖρας καθάπερ οἱ τοὺς ποταμοὺς δια-
βαίνοντες. This curious comparison shows that we really have a genuine

speech.

436 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

defence, O King,” he continued, “ will be found in the character
of the chief and protector of Greece. Leave off destroying
Greek cities ; leave off weakening them till they become a prey
to every invader. Rather watch over Greece, as you watch over
your own body ; guard the interests of all her members as you
guard the interest of what is your own. If you follow such a
course as this, you will win the good will of Greece; you will
have every Greek bound to you as a friend and as a sure sup-
porter in all your undertakings; foreign powers will see the
confidence which the whole nation reposes in you, and will fear
to attack either you or them. If you wish for conquest and
military glory, another field invites you. Cast your eyes to the
West ; look at the war raging in Italy; of that war you may
easily, by a skilful policy, make yourself the arbiter; a blow
dealt in’ time may make you master of both the contending
powers. If you cherish such hopes, no time bids fairer than the
- present for their accomplishment. But as for disputes and wars
with Greeks, put them aside till some season of leisure ; let it be
your main object to keep in your own hands the power of making
war and peace with them when you will. If once the clouds
which are gathering in the West should advance and spread
over Greece and the neighbouring lands, there will be danger
indeed that all our truces and wars, all the child’s play with
which we now amuse ourselves,? will be suddenly cut short.
We may then pray in vain to the Gods for the power of
making war and peace with one-another, and indeed of deal-
ing independently with any of the questions which may arise
among us.” ὃ

The way in which Polybios introduces this remarkable speech
leaves hardly room for doubt that it is, in its substance at least,
& genuine composition of the Naupaktian diplomatist.* It
displays a Pan-hellenic spirit, sincere and prudent indeed, but
lowered in its tone by the necessities of the times. The policy of

1 T have thrown the somewhat lifeless infinitives of Polybios into the form of

a direct address, but I have put in nothing, of which the substance is not to be
found in his text.

2 Pol. v. 104. Τὰς ἀνοχὰς καὶ τοὺς πολέμους καὶ καθόλου τὰς παιδιὰς ἃς νῦν
παίζομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

δ It is amusing to see Justin’s version of this speech (xxix. 2, 3), which he
puts into the mouth of Philip.

4 The mere use of the oratio obliqgua throughout so long a speech would seem
to show that it is not, like so many other speeches, a mere rhetorical exercise or
an exposition of the historian’s own views.

VIII POLICY OF AGELAOS 437

Agelaos is substantially the old policy of Isokratés ! a hundred and Policy of
thirty years before. Let Greece, say both Agelaos and Isokratés, Agelaos
lay aside her intestine quarrels, and arm herself, under Mace- compared
donian headship, for a struggle with the barbarian. But the of Iso-
policy which, in the days of Isokratés, was a mere rhetorician’s kratés.
dream, had become, in the days of Agelaos, the soundest course

which a patriotic Greek could counsel. In the days of Isokratés,

the barbarians of Persia were not real enemies of Greece ; they

in no way threatened Grecian independence; it was only a
sentimental vengeance which marked them out as objects of
warfare ; the real enemy was that very Macedonian whom
Isokratés was eager to accept as the champion of Greece against

them. In the days of Agelaos, the barbarians of Rome and
Carthage were, if not avowed enemies of Greece, at least
neighbours of the most dangerous kind, against a possible struggle

with whom Greece was bound to husband every resource. As
Greek affairs then stood, an union under Macedonian headship Union
was probably the wisest course which could be adopted. But under
such a course was now the wisest, simply because of the way ance
in which Greece had fallen within a single generation. Thirty headship
years before, but for Autolian selfishness, all Greece might have ΠΟΥ
united into one compact and vigorous Federal commonwealth. “τ δ
Ten years before, but for Achaian jealousy, Greece might have

been united under the headship of one of her own noblest sons,

a King indeed, but a King of her own blood, a King of Sparta

and not of Macedon. Both these opportunities had passed away,

and an union under Philip was now the only hope. Philip at

least spoke the tongue of Greece, and affected to regard himself

as the Greek King of a Greek people. Macedonia had long

been the bulwark of Greece against Gaulish and Thracian
savages; she was now called upon to act in a yet higher
character as the bulwark of Greece against the civilized
barbarians of Rome and Carthage. But the scheme of Agelaos
required greater patriotism and greater clearness of vision than

1 See the oration or pamphlet of Isokratés, called “ Philip,” throughout.

* In Philip’s treaty with Carthage (Pol. vii. 9) we find throughout such phrases
as Μακεδονίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα, Μακεδόνες καὶ of ἄλλοι Ἑλληνες. So, in
his conference with Flamininus (Pol. xvii. 4), he says κἀμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
"EAAjver. Cf. Arrian, ii. 14. 4. So in the speech of Lykiskos (Pol. ix. 37-8),
we find the Achaians and Macedonians called ὁμόφυλοι, while the Romans are dis-
tinguished as ἀλλόφυλοι and βάρβαροι. Soin Livy, xxxi. 29. tolas, Acarnanas,
Macedonés, ejusdem lingua homines, ete.

Peace of
Naupak-
tos, B.C.
217.

Agelaos
Stolian
General,
B.c. 217-
216.

438 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP,

was to be found either in Greece or in Macedonia. A noble
career lay open before Philip, but he was fast becoming less and
less worthy to enter upon it. He was fast obscuring the pure
glory of his youth by schemes of selfish and unjust aggrandize-
ment; he had already taken the first downward steps towards
the dark tyranny of his later years. Agelaos’ own countrymen
were even less ready than Philip to merge their private advan-
tage in any plans for the general good of Greece. We shall soon
see Attolia appearing in a light even more infamous than any in
which she had appeared already. Achaia indeed presented more
hopeful elements. We shall soon see her military force assume,
when too late, an efficiency which, a generation earlier, might
have been the salvation of all Greece. But that force was now
to be frittered away in petty local strife, or in partnership with
allies who took the lion’s share to themselves. Peace was
concluded. For a few years Peloponnésos enjoyed rest and
prosperity. Athens was delivered from her fears of Macedonia,
and from the necessity of thinking at all about Grecian affairs.
She and her demagogues, Eurykleidés and Mikién, had now
abundant leisure for decrees in honour of King Ptolemy and of
all other Kings from whom anything was to be got by flattery.?
AMtolia at first rejoiced at the conclusion of a war which had
turned out so contrary to her hopes ; in a sudden fit of virtue
the League elected Agelaos himself as its President, on the
express ground of his being the author of the Peace. But the
Astolians, we are told, soon began to complain of a chief whose
government kept them back from the practice of their old
enormities, and who had negociated peace in the interest, not of
ZEtolia only, but of all Greece.2 But a vigorous chief of the
League had much power, and, for once, power in A¢tolia was
placed in hands disposed to use it well. Agelaos had the honour
of hindering, at least during his year of office, all violation of the
repose of Hellas on the part of his countrymen.

§ 2. From the End of the Social War to the End of the
First War with Rome

B.C. 217-205
The Peace of Agelaos may be compared with the Peace of

Nikias in the great Peloponnésian War. Each proved little more
1 Pol. v. 106. 2 Ib, 107.

VIIt PEACE OF AGELAOS 439

than a truce, a mere breathing-space between two periods of Analogy
warfare. Within a few years, the Leagues of Achaia, Akarnania, between
Beeotia, and Epeiros were again engaged in “war with Attolia, of acelaos
Sparta, and Elis. And, just as happened in the second part of and the
the Peloponnésian War, so, in what we may really look on as Peace of
the second part of the War of the Leagues, new allies step in on rp. Ὁ. 491.
both sides, and a wider field of warfare is opened. In the

earlier instance, Athens, strengthened by the alliance of Argos,

added Syracuse and nearly all Sicily to the number of her
enemies, and saw the treasures of the Great King lavished to

bring about her destruction. So now, Philip and his allies ran
themselves into dangers greater still, and called mightier com-

batants upon the stage than Greece had ever before beheld.

Except so far as Persian gold came into play, the Peloponnésian

War remained throughout a purely Hellenic struggle; but

the war in Greece now sinks, in ageneral view of the world’s
history, into a mere accessory of the mighty struggle between
Hannibal and Rome. Macedonia and her allies enrolled them- Connexion
selves on the side of Carthage, while A‘tolia was supported of the
by the alliance of Rome and Pergamos. But the bargain Mace:
between Hannibal and Philip proved in practice a rather and Punic
one-sided one. It does not appear that Philip and his allies War.
were in the least degree strengthened by the friendship of
Carthage, while they undoubtedly did Hannibal good service by

calling off some portion of the Roman force to the other side of

the Gulf. Rome indeed, while Hannibal was in Italy, was not

able to carry on a Macedonian war with the same vigour as in
aftertimes. But even a slight exertion of Roman power was Beginning
enough to turn the scale in Grecian affairs ; and, what was of of Roman
far more moment than any immediate success, Macedonia and ee
Greece were now fairly brought within the magic circle of
Roman influence. It was now only a question of time, how soon,

and through what stages of friendship or enmity, both Macedonia

and Greece should pass into the common bondage which awaited

all the Mediterranean nations.!. Nothing could be more impolitic

1 The gradual steps of the process by which Rome gradually and systematically
swallowed up both friends and enemies is perhaps best set forth in the History
of Mommsen. But the reader must be always on his guard against Mommsen’s
idolatry of mere force. Rome seems never to have definitely annexed any state
at once ; all had to pass throngh the intermediate stage of clientship or dependent
alliance. See Kortiim, iii. 276.

440 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Impolitic than the conduct of Philip throughout the whole business. With
et all his brilliant qualities, he was far inferior to his predecessor.
o“e™"P Had Antigonos Désén survived,! we may feel sure that the course
of Macedonian politics would have been widely different. So
prudent a prince would [either have kept out of the struggle
altogether, or else have thrown himself heart and soul into it.
So now, Hannibal and Philip together might probably have
crushed Rome. The Roman broadsword triumphed alike over
the horsemen of Numidia and over the spearmen of Macedon.
But it could hardly have triumphed over both of them ranged
side by side. And where Hannibal was weak, Philip was strong.?
Hannibal, unconquered in the open field, was baffled by the
slightest fortress which had no traitors within its walls. Philip
had the blood of the Besieger in his veins, and he had at his
command all the resources of Greek military science. He could
have brought to bear upon the walls of Rome devices as skilful
as those with which Archimédés defended the walls of Syracuse.
Aratos himself was not so old but that he might, on some dark
night, have led a daring band up the steep of the Capitol, as he
had, in earlier days, led a daring band up the steep of Akroko-
rinthos. But Philip shrank altogether from vigorous action ; he
did not deal a single effective blow for his Carthaginian ally or
against his Roman enemy. He simply provoked Rome to a
certain amount of immediate hostility, and caused himself to be
set down in her account as one who was to be more fully dealt
with on some future day. Probably Hannibal really cared but
Philip too little for his aid. Whether by accident or by design, Philip did
jate © , not conclude any treaty with the Carthaginian till after the
with effect, Crowning victory of Cannz had made his assistance of far less
Β.0, 216. value. Probably he waited to see the course of events, and
waited so long as to cut himself off from any real share in their
control. The adventures of his Ambassadors, as recorded by
Livy,* form a curious story in themselves, and they supply an
apt commentary on some points in the Law of Nations, which
have lately > drawn to themselves special importance. But they
concern us less immediately than some points both of the form
and of the matter of the Treaty.
Of this Treaty we have what seems to be the full copy pre-

1 See Kortiim, iii. 208. 2 See Arnold, iii, 158, 241, 265.
3 Thirlwall, viii. 277. Cf. Flathe, ii. 273.
4 Liv. xxiii, 838, 84, 39. App. Mac. 1. 5 January, 1862.

VII TREATY BETWEEN PHILIP AND HANNIBAL 441

served by Polybios,! and we have notices in Livy? and later Philip’s
authors. It is an offensive and defensive alliance between Car- Treaty
thage on the one side and Philip and his allies on the other. Hannibal,
Each party is to-help the other against all enemies, except where 8.6. 216.
any earlier obligation may standjin the way. The~Romans are ae
not, in any case, not even if they conclude peace with Carthage, Treaty in
to be allowed to retain any possessions, whether in_the form of Polybios.
dominion or alliance, on the eastern side of the Hadriatic. This

is simply all, as it stands in Polybios; and a treaty concluded

on such simple terms seems to have somewhat puzzled later
writers, both ancient and modern. ΑΒ it stands, there seems 80

little for either party to gain by it. The person really to profit

by its stipulations would seem to be Démétrios of Pharos, who

would regain his lost dominions. Philip was to help Carthage

in the war with Rome, and it is not said that he was to receive

any payment for his labours. It has excited surprise* that no Various
provision is made either for the independence of the Sicilian and stayements
Italian Greeks or for their transference from Roman to Mace- jectures
donian rule. On the other hand, later Greek writers* have of later
supposed provisions for the annexation of Epeiros and the rest of ¥™"-
Greece to the Macedonian Kingdom. But the explanation of Probable
the Treaty as it stands does not seem difficult. The key to the °xPans.
whole position is that Philip was too late; he had missed the Treaty.
favourable moment; he was negociating after Cannz instead of

before it. At an earlier time, Philip’s help might well have
seemed worth buying at the cost of a considerable portion of

Italy ; but, if it ever had been so, it was so no longer. Hanni-

bal now deemed himself strong enough, perhaps absolutely to
conquer Italy by his own forces, at all events to weaken Rome
thoroughly and permanently. In the case of complete conquest,

he would not be disposed to divide the spoil with an ally who
stepped in only at the last moment. But if Rome were not to

be conquered, but still to be dismembered, those parts of her

empire which Philip would have the best claim for demanding

as subjects or allies, namely Sicily and Greek Italy, were also
exactly the parts which Carthage also would most naturally

claim to have transferred to her dominion or protection. Still

Philip, though not now of the importance which he once was,

1 Pol. vii. 9. 2 Liv. xxiii. 33.
3 Flathe, ii. 279. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 278, note.
4 App. Mac. 1. Zé6naras ap. Thirlwall, viii. 279, note.

Position
assumed
by Philip
in the
Treaty.

442 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

—_—

was not to be wholly despised. He was no longer needed as a
principal ; still he might, especially with his fleet, be useful as
an auxiliary. For such services it would be reward enough if
the Roman possessions in his own neighbourhood were to be

transferred to himself-or~his friends, and if Carthage, in any

future war, gave him such help as he was now to give Hannibal.
This seems to be the simple meaning of the Treaty in Polybios,
and its terms agree very well with the position of things at the
time.

In this Treaty, Philip negociates as a Greek King, the head of
a great Greek alliance. How far he was justified in so doing,
that is, how far his negociations were authorized by the Federal
Assemblies of Achaia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Boeotia, we have
no means of judging. We have now lost the continuous guid-
ance of Polybios, and we have to patch up our story how we can
from the fragments of his history combined with the statements
of later and inferior writers. Happy it is for us when the
Roman copyist condescends to translate the illustrious Greek of
whom he speaks in so patronizing a tone.? But whether
authorized or not, Philip speaks in this treaty as the head of a
Greek alliance, almost as the acknowledged head of all Greece.
As such, he demands that Korkyra, Epidamnos, and Apollénia
be released from all dependence on Rome. Probably they were
to be formally enrolled as members of the Grand Alliance ;
practically they would most likely have sunk to the level of
Thessaly, or even to that of Corinth and Orchomenos. As chief
of such an alliance, Philip may not have been unwilling to stipu-
late for Carthaginian aid in any future struggles with Attolia.
ΑἹ] this would practically amount to making himself something
like chief of Greece, a chief who would doubtless be, in name,
the constitutional head of a voluntary alliance, but a chief whose
position might easily degenerate into practical Tyranny, or even,
before long, into avowed Kingship. But no such schemes could
possibly find a place in a public treaty concluded by Philip in
his own name and in that of his Greek allies® In the later

1 Liv. xxiii, 88. Philippus Rex quam maxima classe (ducentas autem naves
videbatur effecturus) in Italiam trajiceret.

2 Tb. xxx. 45. Polybius, haudquaquam spernendus auctor. Th. xxxiii. 10.
Polyhium secuti sumus, non tncertum auctorem.

8. One of Philip’s envoys (Liv. xxiii. 39) was a Magnésian. Does this simply
show the utter subjection of Thessaly to Philip, or was Sésitheos armed with any
commission from an imaginary Thessalian League ?

VIE EXPLANATION OF THE TREATY 443

writers, the simple terms recorded by Polybios gradually
develope into much larger plans of conquest. The Treaty in
Polybios provides for a joint war with Rome, but it contem-
plates the possibility of that war being ended by a treaty with
Rome, and it provides that, in such a case, certain definite
cessions shall be made to Philip or his allies. After this, if
Philip ever stood in need of Carthaginian help, Carthaginian
help was to be forthcoming. In the copy in Livy these terms Livy's
swell into something widely different. Italy is to be definitely verso
conquered for the benefit of Carthage by the joint powers of Trenty.
Carthage and Macedonia; the allied armies are then to pass
over into Greece; they are to wage war with what Kings they
pleased, and certain large territories, somewhat vaguely expressed,
are to be annexed to Macedonia. Philip is to take all islands
and continental cities which lie anywhere near to his Kingdom.!
All this has evidently grown out of the stipulated cession of
Korkyra and the Greek cities in Illyria. Appian goes a step
further. In his version the Carthaginians are to possess all Appian’s
Italy, and then to help Philip in conquering Greece.2 This was V2-
just the light in which the matter would look to a careless
Greek writer of late times, who probably had his head full of
Démosthenés and Alexander and the earlier Philip, and who had
no clear idea of the real position of the Greek states at this
particular time. Philip no doubt aimed at a supremacy of some
sort over Greece, but, when negociating in the name of a great
Greek Alliance, he could not well have publicly asked for
Carthaginian help for the subjugation of Greece. In Zénaras we Version of
reach a still further stage; Hellas, Epeiros, and the islands are 2°55".
to be the prize of Philip, as Italy is to be the prize of Carthage.
Now, in the genuine copy, Philip counts Macedonia as part of
Hellas, and acts in the name of the Allied Powers, of which
Epeiros was one. To ask for the subjugation of Hellas and
Epeiros would have been quite inconsistent with his own
language. There may of course have been secret articles, or the
Romans may have tampered with the treaty ; these are questions
to which no answer can be given. But the copy as given by

} Liv. xxiii. 88, Perdomita Italia, navigarent in Greciam, bellamque cum
quibus Regibus placeret, gererent. Que civitates continentis, que insule ad
Macedoniam vergunt, exe Philippi regnique ejus essent.

2 App. Mac. 1. Φίλιππος. . ἔπεμπε πρὸς ᾿Αννίβαν . . ὑπισχνούμενος αὐτῷ
συμμαχήσειν ἐπὶ τὴν ᾿Ιταλίαν, ef κἀκεῖνος αὐτῷ συνθοῖτο κατεργάσασθαι τὴν
Ἑλλάδα.

444 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Polybios seems perfectly to suit the conditions of the case, and
the variations of later writers seem to be only exaggerations and
misunderstandings naturally growing out of his statements.

Import- This Treaty had the effect of placing all the Federal States of
ance of this Greece, except Attolia, in a position of hostility towards Rome.
preaty in It is therefore an event of no small moment in a general history
History, Of Federalism. It was the first step towards the overthrow of
the earliest and most flourishing system of Federal common-

wealths which the world ever saw. From the moment that any
independent state became either the friend or the enemy of

Rome, from that moment the destiny of that state was fixed.

The war which I am about to describe made Achaia the enemy,

and &tolia the friend, of Rome ; but the doom of friend and of

enemy was alike pronounced ; as it happened, the present friend

was the first to be swallowed up. On the eve of such a struggle,

a struggle in which the republican Greeks had certainly no direct

interest, one would be glad to know how far the different Federa-

tions really committed themselves to it by their own act, and

how far Philip merely carried out Apellés’ principle of dealing

with Achaia and Epeiros as no less bound to submission than
Thessaly herself. However this may be, the Treaty was, in its

terms, one which Philip contracted on behalf of his allies as well

as of himself; Rome therefore, as a matter of course, dealt with

all the allies of Philip as with enemies. It was however some

time before the war directly touched any of the states of Pelo-

on the Illyrian coast which were. in alliance with Rome. They

were to be, in any case, his share of the spoil ; if he still cherished

any thoughts of an expedition into Italy, their possession seemed

Philip’s necessary as the first step. But he still found leisure to meddle
reo in the affairs of Peloponnésos, for which his possession of Corinth,
τ ένα, Orchomenos, and the Triphylian towns! gave him constant
opportunities and excuses. His character was now rapidly cor-

rupting ; his adviser was no longer Aratos, but Démétrios of

Affairs of Pharos. The first time that we hear of his presence is at
δἰοδθῦπα, Messéné. In that city, the oligarchical government, which was
"in possession during the last war,? had lately been overthrown by
a democratic revolution. But there was a powerful discontented

1 See above, p. 419. 2 See above, p. 401. 3 Pol. vii. 9...

VUI PHILIP’S INTERFERENCE AT MESSENE 445

party, and new troubles seemed likely to break out. Both the
King of Macedonia and the President of the Achaian League, a
place now filled by Aratos for the sixteenth! time, hastened to
Messéné, both, we may suppose, in the avowed character of
mediators. Certainly neither of them could have any other
right to interfere in the internal quarrels of a city which was
neither subject to the Macedonian Crown nor enrolled in the
Achaian Confederation. Aratos, we may well believe, went
with a sincere desire of preventing bloodshed, and not without
some hope of persuading both parties that their safety and tran-
quillity would be best secured by union with Achaia.2 With
what views King Philip went was soon shown by the event.
He arrived a day sooner than Aratos, and his arrival is spoken
of in words which seem to show that he was anxious to outstrip

Interfer-
ence of
Philip and
of Aratos.

him. The day thus gained he is said to have spent in working Disturb-
on the passions of both parties, till the result was a massacre in *2¢*

which the magistrates and two hundred other citizens perished.*
The younger Aratos did not scruple to express himself strongly

caused by
Philip.

about such conduct;® but the father still retained influence Last in-

enough to persuade Philip, for very shame, to drop an infamous

fluence of
Aratos

scheme, proposed to him by Démétrios, for retaining the Mes- over
sénian citadel in his own hands. The next year Philip’s crimes Philip.
increase ; he sends Démétrios, on what pretence we know not, to Philip's

attack Messéné, an attempt in which the perfidious adventurer
lost his life.’ We next find him charged with adultery with

1 Or fifteenth. See note at the end of the Chapter.

3 Plutarch’s (Ar. 49) expression of βοηθῶν may mean anything or nothing.

3 Pol. vii. 13. ᾿Αράτον xa@vorepjcavros. Plut. Ar. 49. Ὁ μὲν “Aparos
ὑστέρει. Cf. above, p. 293.

* It seems quite impossible to reconcile the details of Plutarch’s story (Ar. 49)
with the direct statements of Polybios (vii. 9). Plutarch makes Philip ask the
tmoagistrates, (στρατηγοὶ) if they have no laws to restrain the multitude, and then
ask the multitude if they have no hands to resist tyrants. A tumult naturally
arises, in which the magistrates are killed. This story implies an oligarchic
government, yet it is clear from Polybios that the government of Messéné was
now democratic, and Plutarch himself gives the magistrates the democratic style
of στρατηγοί, not the aristocratic style of ἔφοροι. Still it is perfectly credible
that Philip played, in some way or other, a double part between two factions, and
encouraged the worst passions of both.

5 Plut. Ar. 50. Ὁ νεανίσκος ... . τότε λέγων εἶπε πρὸς αὐτὸν, ws οὐδὲ
καλὸς ἔτι φαίνοιτο τὴν ὄψιν αὐτῷ τοιαῦτα δράσας, ἀλλὰ πάντων αἴσχιστος. (See
above, p. 426, note 5.) Was the subsequent business of Polykrateia at all meant
as revenge for this insult ?

6 See the story in Pol. vii. 11. Plut. Ar. 50.

7 Pol. iii. 19. See Thirlwall, viii. 282, note. Cf. Paus. iv. 29. 1, who

second
attempt on
Messéné,
B.C, 214.

Death of
Aratos,
B.C. 213.

Last days
of Aratos,
B.C, 2138.

446 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Polykrateia, the wife of the younger Aratos, and lastly, stung by
the reproaches of her father-in-law for his public and private
misdeeds, he filled up the measure of his crimes by procuring
the death of the elder Aratos by poison.’ Aratos himself
believed that such was the cause of his death; he spoke of his
mortal illness as the reward of his friendship for Philip.? Philip
was no doubt, by this time, quite degenerate enough for this or
any other wickedness; but one regrets to hear that his agent
was Taurién, whose conduct has hitherto stood out in honourable
contrast to that of the other Macedonian chiefs. Either now, or
at some later time, Philip carried off ‘Polykrateia into Mace-
donia, and gave her husband drugs which destroyed his reason.°
In short, the gallant young King and faithful ally has de-
generated into a cruel tyrant and a treacherous enemy.

Thus died Aratos, the deliverer and the destroyer of Greece,
while General of the League for the sixteenth or seventeenth
time. His career had been spread over so long a space, it
includes so many changes in the condition of Greece and of the
world, that one is surprised to find that at his death he was no
more than fifty-eight years of age.‘ Sad indeed was the fall of
Philip’s friend and victim from the bright promise of the youth
who, thirty-eight years before, had driven the Tyrant out of

characteristically confounds Démetrios the Pharian with Dtmétrios the son of
Philip. ,

1 Pol. viii. 14. Plut. Ar. 52.

3 Polybios (viii. 14) makes him say simply, ταῦτα τἀπίχειρα τῆς φιλίας, ὦ
Κεφάλων, κεκομίσμεθα τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον. In Plutarch (Ar. 52) this becomes,
ταῦτ᾽, ὦ Κεφάλων, ἐπίχειρα τῆς βασιλικῆς φιλίας. Here there seems to be a
slight touch of the rhetorical horror of Kings, which is hardly in character in the
mouth of Aratos. On the probability of the story of the poisoning, see Thirlwall,
viii. 283. Niebuhr, Lect. iii. 364.

δ᾽ Plut, Ar. 54. Liv. xxvii. 31. Uni etiam principi Achworum Arato adempta
uxor nomine Polycratia, ac spe regiarum nuptiarum in Macedoniam asportata
fuerat.

This comes in incidentally five years after. One is tempted to believe that
Livy had never heard of either Aratos till he came to the events of B.c. 208.

4 Niebuhr (iii. 864 and elsewhere) talks of ‘‘old Aratos.” So one is led to
fancy both Philip himself in aftertimes, and still more the Emperor Henry the
Fourth, as much older than they really were, because of the early age at which
they began public life. Livy (xl. 5, 54) calls Philip senex, and even senio con-
sumptus, when he was not above sixty; he makes (xxx. 30) Hannibal, at forty-
five, call himself senex, and talks (xxxv. 15) of the senectus of Antiochos the
Great, at about the same age. So historians almost always lavish the epithets
“old” and “aged” upon Henry, who died at the age of fifty-six. On the other
hand Justin (xxx. 4) makes Flamininus call Philip puer inmature etatis, when
he was about thirty-eight.

VIII DEATH OF ARATOS 447

Sikyén. Yet, granting his one fatal act, his later years had been
usefully and honourably spent, and he retained the affections of

his countrymen to the last. His own city of Sikyén and the
League in general joined in honours to his memory ; at Sikyén

he was worshipped as a hero; he had his priests and his festi-

vals, and his posterity were held in honour for ages! He was

cut off when he might still have hoped to keep his place for
some years longer as at least a spectator of some of the greatest, Com-
events in the world’s history. But he made way for a nobler are
successor, though one possibly less suited for the coming time ang Phfo-
than he was himself. The crafty diplomatist, the eloquent poimén.
parliamentary leader, the cowardly and incapable general,
passed away. In his stead there arose one of the bravest and

most skilful of soldiers, one of the most honest and patriotic of
politicians, but one who lacked those marvellous powers of per-
suasion by which Aratos had so long swayed friends and enemies,

and had warded off all dangers except the poisoned cup of
Macedonian friendship. The new hero of the League was
Philopoimén, a hero worthy of a better age. ΗΘ fell upon evil

days, because the Fates had cast his lot in them. If the days of
Aratos were few and evil, they were so by his own choice.

Meanwhile the Roman war had begun, though as yet the Beginning
Achaian League had no share in it. The storm first broke upon othe
the Federal States of north-western Greece, but it was not long War,
before Achaia herself learned how terrible was the danger into 5.0. 214.
which her royal ally had led her. Philip began by attacking the
towns of Orikon and Apollénia on the Illyrian coast. He took
Orikon ; but, while besieging Apollénia, he fied ignominiously
before a sudden attack of the Roman Pretor Marcus Valerius
Levinus.?. This happened between Philip’s two interferences at
Messéné, and this was doubtless the expedition in which Aratos,
disgusted with the King’s conduct, refused to take any share.®
Levinus continued for some years to command on the Illyrian
station, and he effectually hindered Philip—if indeed Philip had
any longer any such intention—from crossing over to Italy or
giving any sort of efficient aid to Hannibal. But Rome had as
yet no Grecian allies; her condition was still such as hardly to Roman
make her alliance desirable. But to win allies in the neighbour- ΒΟΟΣ oF or
hood of any prince or commonwealth with whom Rome was at

1 Plut. Ar. 53, 54. 2 Liv. xxiv. 40. 3 Plut. Ar. δ].

Position

of Rome.

B.c. 216.
B.C, 211.

448 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE | CHAP.

-- = ee . —_———— ——

war was an essential part of Roman policy. No line of conduct
was more steadily adhered to during the whole period of her
conquests. In each of her wars, some neighbouring power was
drawn into her alliance; his forces, and, still more, his local
knowledge and advantages, were pressed into the Roman service;
he was rewarded, as long as he could be of use, with honours and
titles and increase of territory ; and at last, when his own turn
came, he was swallowed up in the same gulf with the powers
which he had himself helped to overthrow. In the wars between
Rome and Macedonia this part, alike dishonourable and dis-
astrous, fell to the lot of AXtolia. The momentary fit of virtue
which had placed Agelaos at the head of the League had now
passed away. Skopas and Dorimachos were again in their
natural place as the guiding spirits of the nation. Skopas was
now General, and Dorimachos retained his old influence! It
does not appear that Philip or his allies had done the A‘tolians
any wrong, and the only intercourse between Rome and Attolia
up to this time had certainly not been friendly. A time had
been when Rome had threatened Attolia with her enmity, if she
did not scrupulously regard the rights of her Akarnanian neigh-
bours.2. But Rome had now forgotten the claims of Akarnania
upon the forbearance of the descendants of the Trojans. ΖΕ 0] 18
bade fair to be a useful ally, and Rome was again giving signs of
being a power which it was worth the while of Aitolia, or of any
other state, to conciliate.2 Rome had survived the defeat of
Canne ; her prospects were brightening ; Fulvius had recovered
Capua, and Marcellus had recovered Syracuse. Levinus, now
opened a negociation with Skopas and Dorimachos, possibly with
other leading men in Aétolia,* and he was by them introduced to
plead the cause of Rome before the Aitolian Federal Congress.
He enlarged on the happy position of the allies of Rome ; tolia,
the first ally heyond the Hadriatic, would be the most happy and

1 Liv. xxvi. 24. Scopas, qui tum pretor gentis erat, et Dorymachus princeps
A&tolorum.

Princeps, in Livy, as I have already observed, implies political influence,
whether with or without official rank.

2 See above, p. 322.

3 The connexion between Rome and AStolia is well summed up by Julian,
Cesars, 324. Tovrwy δὲ αὐτῶν [Γραικῶν] ὀλίγον ἔθνος, Αἰτωλοὺς λέγω, τοὺς
παροικοῦντας ὑμῖν, οὐ φίλους μὲν ἔχειν καὶ συμμάχους ἐποιήσασθε περὶ πολλοῦ,
πολεμωθέντας δὲ ὑμῖν, ὕστερον δι᾽ ἁσδήποτε αἰτίας, οὐκ ἀκινδύνως ὑπακούειν ὑμῖν
ἠναγκάσατε ; Alexander is speaking to Cesar.

4 Livy, u.e. Temptatis prius per secreta colloquia principum animis.

VIII ALLIANCE BETWEEN ROME AND 2ATOLIA 449

honoured among all the allies of Rome. No Samnite or Sicilian
orator was present to set forth the dark side of Roman con-
nexion, nor was there any envoy from Apollénia or Korkyra to
assert the claims of his own city to be Rome’s earliest ally in
the Hellenic world. A treaty was agreed upon, that infamous Alliance
league of plunder which made the name of Aétolia to stink between
throughout all Greece. Rome and. Aitolia were to make con- minis
quests in common; Attolia was to retain the territory, and so. 211.
Rome to carry off the moveable spoil.!_ But the great bait was
Rome’s old ally, Akarnania. What in modern political jargon Plots for
would be called “the Akarnanian question” had always been a the “re-
matter of primary moment in the eyes of Aitolian politicians. Wyo,”
The moment of its solution seemed now to have come; the nia.
gallant little Federation was to be swallowed up by its powerful
and rapacious neighbour. The negociators of Rome and AXtolia
forestalled the utmost refinements of modern diplomacy. /Etolia
revindicated_her natural boundaries; the reunion of Akarnania
was decreed upon the highest principles of eternal right.? An
end was to be put to the intolerable state of things which
assigned to Aitolia any frontier narrower or less clearly marked
than that ef the Ionian and Atgean Seas. Elis, Sparta, King
Attalos of Pergamos, and some Illyrian and Thracian princes,’
might join the alliance if they wished. The Romans began in
terrible earnest. They invaded Zakynthos, occupied all but the Roman
citadel, captured the Akarnanian towns of Oiniadai and Nésos, ee
and handed them over to their allies. Early in the next spring 5c. 210.
the Lokrian Antikyra shared the same fate; the inhabitants
were carried off as slaves by the Barbarians, and the A‘tolians
possessed the deserted city. Meanwhile the hosts of A‘tolia set
forth to take possession of the devoted land of Akarnania. The Invasion
march of their whole force, while Philip was, as usual, occupied of Akar-
with his barbarian neighbours, seemed destined to bring this ΤΣ
troublesome Akarnanian question to the speediest of solutions.

1 Pol. ix. 39. Liv. xxvi. 24. See above, p. 266.

2 Liv. u.s. Acarnanas, quos egre ferrent toli a corpore suo diremptos,
restiiuturum se in antiquam formulam jurisque ac dicionis eorum.

3 Skerdilaidos we have met with already ; on Pleuratos, see Thirlwall, viii.
ry Pol. ix. 89. “Ηδη παρήρηνται μὲν ᾿Ακαρνάνων Οἰνιάδας καὶ Νῆσον, κατέσχον
δὲ πρώην τὴν τῶν ταλαιπώρων ᾿Αντικυρέων πόλιν͵ ἐξανδραποδισάμενοι μετὰ
Ῥωμαίων αὐτήν. καὶ τὰ μὲν τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπάγουσι Ῥωμαῖοι, πεισόμενα
δηλονότι ἅπερ εἰκός ἐστι πάσχειν τοῖς ὑπὸ τὰς τῶν ἀλλοφύλων πεσοῦσιν ἐξουσίας"
τὰ δ' ἐδάφη κληρονομοῦσι τῶν ἠτυχηκότων Αἰτωλοί.

2G

Heroism
of the
Akar-
nanians.

Retreat
of the
AStolians.

Condition
of Sparta.

Sedition of
Cheildn,
BO. 218.

450 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE cHar.

But the invaders met, at the hands of a whole people, with a
resistance like that of the defenders of Numantia or of Mesolongi.
Every inhabitant of Akarnania stood forth with the spirit of a
Hofer or an Aloys Reding. Akarnania was a Federal Demo
cracy, but here at least Federalism did not imply weakness, nor
did Democracy evaporate in empty vaunts. Women, children,
and old men were sent into the friendly land of Epeiros; every
Akarnanian from sixteen to sixty swore not to return unless
victorious ; their allies were conjured not to receive a single
fugitive; the Epeirots were prayed to bury the slain defenders
of Akarnania under one mound, and to write over them the
legend, “Here lie the Akarnanians, who died fighting for their
country against the wrong and violence of the A‘tolians.”! Not
that this heroic frame of mind at all led them to despise more
ordinary help; they sent messengers praying King Philip to
come with all speed to their aid. The invaders shrank and
paused when they found the frontier guarded by men bent on
so desperate a resistance.» When they heard that Philip was
actually on his march, the invincible A®tolians, harnessed as they
were, turned themselves back in the day of battle. They
departed, apparently without striking a blow, to enjoy the
easier prey which the Roman sword had won for them, and the
difficulties and complications of Akarnania remained for the
present unsolved.

Among the Peloponnésian states, Elis and Messéné readily
joined the Roman and Aitolian alliance ;* but it was an important
object with both sides to obtain the adhesion of Sparta. A series
of revolutions had taken place in that city, some of them while
the Social War was still going on, and some since its conclusion.
One Cheil6n, a member of the royal family, who deemed himself
to be unjustly deprived of the kingdom, raised a tumult, begin-
ning his revolution with what was now the established practice
of killing the Ephors. But he failed in an attempt to surprise
King Lykourgos, and, finding that he had no partisans, he fled
to Achaia.* A short time afterwards, the Ephors suspected King

1 Liv. xxvi. 25. Hic siti sunt Acarnanes, qui, adversus vim et injuriam
AEtolorum pro patria pugnantes, mortem occubuerunt. Cf. Pol. ix. 40.

2 Liv. u.s. tolorum impetum tardaverat primo conjurationis fama Acar-
nanice ; deinde auditus Philippi adventus regredi etiam in intimos coegit fines.

3 Pol. ix. 30. 4 Th, iv, 81.

VIII RESISTANCE OF AKARNANIA 451

Lykourgos himself of treason, and he escaped with difficulty into Banish-
Aétolia.! Afterwards they found evidence of his i Innocence, and tar of
sent for him home again.” The other King Agésipolis is said to Lyk °
have been expelled by Lykourgos after the death of his guardian ourgos,
uncle Kleomenés.? Certain it is that he is found as an exile and 8.0. 218-
a wanderer many years after. Lykourgos left a son, Pelops,* a cesinotis
who seems to have retained a nominal royalty in common with Pelops.

a certain Machanidas, who is of course branded by Achaian Macha-
writers with the name of Tyrant.5 We must remember that the nidas.
same title is freely lavished on Kleomenés himself.° It was ztolian
during the reign of Machanidas that the Ambassadors of the,and Akar-

rival Leagues of AEtolia and Akarnania came to plead their ra aes

respective causes at Sparta. Machanidas, Tyrant_as_he was, at Sparta,
must have respected popular forms, for it is clear that the Bo. 210.
speeches given by Polybios on this occasion’ were addressed to

a Popular Assembly. The Attolian envoys were Kleonikos,® of

whom we have before heard, and Chlaineas, who was the chief
speaker. He;sets forth the good deeds of Attolia, which are

chiefly summed up in her resistance to Antipater and Brennus,

and also the evil deeds of Macedonia, which fill up a much longer

space. He tells the Lacedsmonians that whatever Antigonos

had done in Peloponnésos was done out of no love either for
Achaian or Spartan freedom, but simply out of dread and envy

of the power of Sparta and her victorious King. The speech of Speech of
Lykiskos, the envoy from the Federal Government of Akarnania,® L¥*skos.

1 Pol. v. 29. It is worth notice that the νέοι, who always figure conspicuously
in the Spartan revolutions of this age, appear on this occasion on the side of the
Ephors. The young were the party of Kleomenés, and TY Kourgos was suspected
of unfaithfulness to his principles. b. 91.

3 Such must be the meaning of Livy, xxxiv. 26. But he confounds this Kleomenés
with the great Kleomenés; Pulsus infans ab Lycurgo tyranno post mortem
Cleomenis, qui primus tyrannus Lacedemone fuit. But what shall we say to a
writer who tells us that Sparta had been subject to Tyrants per aliquot etates!
Livy's several generations stretch from the great Kleomenés to B.c. 195, about
thirty years.

4 About Pelops, see Manso, iii. 369, 389. Ido not however see the contradiction
between the two passages, Livy, xxxiv. 32, and the fragment of Diodéros, 570
(iii. 105, Dindorf), But the matter is of very little importance.

5 I can see no ground for the violent description of Machanidas given by Mr.
Donne in the Dictionary of Biography. He seems to fancy that Machanidas was
a Tarentine by birth, heedless of Bishop Thirlwall’s warning, viii. 298.

6 Pausanias (iv. 29. 10), by a strange confusion, makes Machanidas immediately
succeed Kleomenés.

7 Pol. ix. 28-39. 8 Ib. 37. See above, pp. 45, note 3, 434, note 2.

9 Tb. 82. See above, p. 115.

452 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

is more remarkable. It is an elaborate accusation of A‘tolia and
eulogy on Macedonia. It is worth notice, as showing that there
was, on every question, a Macedonian side, which was really
taken by many Greeks, and that we are not justified in looking
at the whole history purely with Athenian eyes. In the eyes
of Lykiskos, the representative of one of the most honourable
. and patriotic states in Greecé, Macedonians, Spartans, and
Achaijans are equally Greeks ;! the elder Philip is the pious
crusader who delivered Delphi from the Phékian ;* Alexander
is the champion of Hellas against the Barbarian, the hero who
smade Asia subject to the Greeks. Antigonos is of course the
deliverer from the Tyranny of Kleomenés, the restorer of the
ancient constitution of Sparta. The speaker sets forth with more
force the services of Macedonia as the bulwark of Greece against
Illyrian and Thracian Barbarians.© The old sins of Attolia
against Akarnania, Achaia, Bosotia, Sparta herself, are all strongly
put forward ; 5 the orator enlarges on the late infamous treaty
with Rome, the capture of Oiniadai and Nésos and Antikyra,
their inhabitants carried off into barbarian bondage, and their
desolate cities handed over to Aitolian masters.’ He warns his
hearers against the common peril; war with Achaia and Mace-
donia was, after all, a struggle for supremacy between different
branches of the same nation; war with Rome is a struggle for
liberty and existence against a barbarianenemy. The A®tolians,
in their envy and hatred against Macedonia, have brought a cloud
from the west,’ which may possibly overwhelm Macedonia first,
but which will, in the end, pour down its baleful contents upon
the whole of Greece.

The eloquence and the reasoning of Lykiskos were of no
avail against that feeling of hatred towards Macedonia and

1 Pol. ix. 87. ᾿Εφιλοτιμεῖσθε πρὸς ᾿Αχαιοὺς καὶ Μακεδόνας ὁμοφύλονς. Cf.
above, p. 437. Cf. Dion. xi. 13. Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συστρα
Ἑλλήνων.

2 Pol. ix. 33.

3 Ib. 34. ᾿γχήκοον ἐποίησε τὴν ᾿Ασίαν τοῖς "Ἕλλησιν.

4 ΤΌ, 86. ᾿Εκβαλὼν τὸν τύραννον καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ πάτριον ὑμῖν ἀποκατ-
ἔστησε πολίτευμα.

5 Ib. 85. Μακεδόνες of τὸν πλείω τοῦ βίον χρόνον οὐ παύονται διαγωνιζόμενοι
τρὸς τοὺς ,βαρβάρονε ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀσφαλείας. Cf. Pol. xviii. 20.

34, See above, p. 306.

7 th 89. See ahove, p. 449.

8 Ib. 87. ᾿Ἐπισπασάμενοι τηλικοῦτο νέφος ἀπὸ τῆς ἑσπέρας. The same
metaphor is found in the speech οὗ Agelaos at Naupaktos seven years earlier.
See above, p. 436.

vit DEBATE AT SPARTA 458

Achaia, which had been the ruling passion at Sparta ever since

the Kleomenic War. Sparta joined the “tolian alliance ; under Sparta in

her sole and enterprising King—I see no reason to refuse him Alliance

the title—she soon began to take a vigorous share in the war. Wictia

Achaia was now pressed by Sparta and Elis, just as she had been

in the Social War. But she soon found that she had also to deal

with an enemy far more terrible than any that could be found

on her own side of the Ionian Sea. Publius Sulpicius now Naval

succeeded Levinus in the command of the Roman fleet. He and warfare of

Dorimachos first attempted to relieve Echinos, one of the AXtolian RO 210.

possessions on the Maliac Gulf, which was now besieged by

Philip. The attempt failed, and the city soon after surrendered

to the King! An easier enterprise was presented by the Achaian Desola-

island of Aigina. The city was taken; by the terms of the ‘ion of

treaty, the moveables belonged to Rome, the real property to

fitolia. Thus the whole Aiginétan population became slaves,

and it was with a very bad grace that Publius allowed them even

to be ransomed.? As for the soil and buildings of the island,

those the Attolians sold for thirty talents to their ally King

Attalos.2 Thus did an illustrious Greek island, a Canton of the

Achaian League, see its inhabitants carried away by barbarian

conquerors, and its soil become an outlying possession of a half-

barbarian King. Meanwhile Machanidas was attacking the

Achaian territory from the south, and the Adtolians were, as

usual, plundering the north-west coast.‘ The President Euryleén,

whatever may have been his political merits, was in warfare only

too apt a disciple of the school of Aratos.© The League was once The

more driven to ask help from Philip.® League
Possibly they might have dispensed with his help altogether ; aa ΠΘΙΡ

at all events they might have confined themselves to asking for 5.0. 208. ᾿

a fleet to guard their coasts. The League was now fully able to

contend single-handed against any enemies that Peloponnésos

could send forth. Ifa new Kleomenés had arisen to threaten her

southern frontier, that frontier was now guarded by a new

Lydiadas, and there was no Aratos to thwart or to betray the

plans of the new-found hero. Now that Aratos was dead, Philo- Philo-

poimén had returned to his native land. He was at once elected FPO) of
Cavalry.
1 Pol. ix. 42. 2 Ib. Cf. xi. 6.
3 Ib. xxiii. 8. 4 Liv. xxvii. 29.

5 Pol. x. 21 (24). Evpuddwy ὁ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν στρατηγὸς ἄτολμος ἣν καὶ πολεμικῆς
χρείας ἀλλότριος. 6 Liv. xxvii. 29.

Abuses
in the
Achaian

Cavalry.

Philo-
poimén’s
reforms.

454 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

to the office of Master of the Horse, or Commander of the
Federal Cavalry,! a post which was generally understood to be
a step to that of General of the League. The whole military
system of Achaia had become utterly rotten during the long
administration of Aratos, but the ease with which Philopoimén
was able thoroughly to reform it shows that the nation must have
had in it the raw material of excellent soldiers. He began, as a
wise man should do, by reforming his own department. His
predecessors had allowed every kind of abuse. Some had mis-
managed matters through sheer incapacity, some through mis-
guided zeal ;* some had tolerated lack of discipline to serve their
own ambitious purposes. The cavalry was composed of wealthy
citizens, of those whose favour had most weight in the disposal
of political influence, and whose votes would commonly confer
the office of General. Some Masters of the Horse had knowingly
winked at every sort of licence, hoping to make political capital
out of a popularity so unworthily gained. Men bound to personal
service were allowed to send wretched substitutes, and the whole
service was in every way neglected. Philopoimén soon brought
the young nobles of Achaia toa more patriotic frame of mind. He
went through the cities of the League ;° by every sort of official
and personal influence he worked on the minds of the horsemen,
he led them to take a pride in military service, and carefully
practised them in the necessary lessons of their craft. An
efficient body of Achaian cavalry seemed suddenly to have sprung
out of the ground at the bidding of.an enchanter.®

1 ἹΠππάρχηΞς. See above, pp. 219, 429.

3 This is implied by Polybios, x. 22 (25) ; οἱ δὲ τῆς στρατηγίας ὀρεγόμενοι διὰ
ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς, κιτιλ. Cf. Plut. Phil. 7.

3 Pol. x. 22 (25). Διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀδυναμίαν . . . διὰ τὴν κακοζηλίαν, x.7.X.

* See above, p. 230, note 2.

5 Plut. Phil. 7. Τὰς πόλεις ἐπιών.

© Paus. viii. 49. 7. ᾿Επανήκων δὲ ἐς Μεγάλην πόλιν αὐτίκα ὑπὸ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν
ἤρητο ἄρχειν [καὶ] τοῦ ἱππικοῦ καὶ σφᾶς ἀρίστους Ἑλλήνων ἀπέφαινεν ἱππεύειν.

Philopoimén was more fortunate in his reform of the Achaian cavalry than
Washington in his attempt to raise a volunteer cavalry of the same sort in 1778.

“ Sensible of the difficulty of recruiting infantry, as well as of the vast import-
ance of a superiority in point of cavalry, and calculating on the patriotism of the
young and the wealthy, if the means should be furnished them of serving their
country in a character which would be compatible with their feelings, and with
that pride of station which exists everywhere, it was earnestly recommended by
Congress to the young gentlemen of property and spirit in the several states, to
embody themselves into troops of cavalry, to serve without pay till the close of
the year. Provisions were to be found for themselves and horses, and compensa-
tion to be made for any horses which might be lost in the service. This resolution

vir PHILOPOIMEN REFORMS THE ACHAIAN CAVALRY 455

The Achaians had placed the worthiest man of Greece in the King
second place of their commonwealth, with every prospect of Attalos
rising before long to the first. The rival League meanwhile made General of
a stranger election. The Achaians had once given'to a Ptolemy tolia,
the nominal command of all their forces;! the Atolians now 5.0. 209.
invested Atfalos with what seems to have heer meant to be a
more practical Generalship. Σ For, as the King of Pergamos was
taking an active part in the war, his election was quite another
matter from the purely honorary dignity which the Achaians
had conferred upon Ptolemy Philadelphos. Attalos first sent
troops into Phthidtis, and then came in person to what was now
his own island of Aigina. Philip, on his march towards Pelopon-
nésos, defeated near Lamia a combined Roman, -A&tchan,-and
Pergametitan force, and compelled the defeated ZZtolians to
retreatwipto the city. Things had strangely turned about since 5.0, 323-
the days when Lamia had been the scene of a war in which 822.
Macedonians appeared as the oppressors, and A‘tolians as the
defenders, of Greece. Before Attalos had reached Aigina, Attempts
ambassadors from Egypt, Rhodes, and Chios appeared in Philip's τ τροάϊαν
camp to offer their mediation; and one almost smiles to read part Of
that the diplomatic body was. on this occasion swelled by an Rhodes,
envoy or envoys from Athens. We seem to be reading over °t.
again the history of the Social War. All parties seemed inclined
for peace; men’s eyes began to open to the folly of letting
Greece become the battle-ground of Macedonia, Rome, and
Pergamos.® The AXtolians brought forward as a mediator a
power of whom we have seldom before heard in Grecian affairs,
Athamania and its King Amynander. This chief was the prince
of a semi-Hellenic tribe, whose territories were surrounded by
those of the ZStolian and Epeirot Leagues and of the Thessalian
did not produce the offect expected from it. The volunteers were few, and late
in joining the army.”’ Marshall’s Life of Washington, iii. 492.

1 See above, p. 302.

2 Livy’s statements are exceedingly confused. He says first (xxvii. 29),
Alialum quoque Regem Asie, quia Atoli summum gentis sue magistratum ad
eum proximo concilio detulerunt, fama erat in Europum trajecturum. Presently
(c. 30) we find “ον, duce Pyrrhia, quit pretor in eum annum cum absente
Attalo creatus erat. This might mean either that Attalos was chosen to be the
regular General of the League, with Pyrrhias for his Lieutenant, or that Attalos
was made στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ (cf. above, p. 377), Pyrrhias being the regular
General of the year. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 288.

3 Liv. xxvii. 30. Omnium autem non tanta pro Aitolis cura erat... quam
ne Philippus regnumque ejus rebus Grecia, grave libertatt futurum, immisceretur.
So, just after, Ne caussa aut Romanis aut Attalo intrandi Greeciam esset.

456 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

dependents of Philip. The Athamanians took a share on the
patriotic side in the Lamian War, but since then their name

has not been mentioned. Probably the tribe rose to independence

during the decay of the Molossian Kingdom, and, on its fall,
continued to form a separate principality, instead of joining the

Epeirot League. Of Amynander himself we shall often hear

again. Under his mediation, a truce was agreed upon, and a
diplomatic Conference was appointed to be held at Aigion,
simultaneously, it would seem, with a meeting of the Achaian

Federal Assembly.2 Any treaty which might be agreed upon

could thus be at once ratified by the two most important
members of the Macedonian alliance, by Philip himself and by

the Achaian League. Meanwhile King Attalos was to be

warned off or hindered from an attack on Euboia, which he

Philip at was supposed to meditate. Philip spent the time of truce at
Argos. Argos. It would have been very hard for any member of the
Antigonid dynasty to make out his descent from the old
Macedonian Kings, but, on the strength of such supposed
connexion, the Argeian origin of Philip was asserted and
allowed. In compliment to this mythical kindred, Philip was

chosen to preside both at the local festival of the Héraia and

at the Pan-hellenic Games of Nemea.? The management of

this great national festival was wholly a matter of Cantonal

and not of Federal concern; it was a vote of the Argeian

people, not of the Achaian Government or Assembly, which
conferred this high honour upon Philip.‘ Between the two
celebrations, the King attended the Conference at Aijgion.
Conference But meanwhile Attalos had reached, not indeed Euboia, but
at Aigo his own island of Aigina; the Roman fleet also had reached
ΠῚ Naupaktos ; the presence of such powerful allies drove away
any feelings of Pan-hellenic patriotism which were beginning to

arise in the minds of the AXtolians. The war had certainly not

been glorious for them; all that they had done had been to

enter into possession of empty cities conquered for them by the

1 Diod. xviii. 11. [On the Athamanians cf. Strabo, ix. 4. 11.]

3 This seems to be the meaning of the two expressions of Livy (xxvii. 30).
De pace dilata consultatio est in concilium Achaeorum ; concilio et locus et dies
certa indicta. And, just after, Afgiwm profectus est [Philippus] ad indictum
multo ante sociorum concilium.

3 See above, pp. 313, 433.

. 4 As in the case of the Isthmian Games, when Corinth was Achaian. See
above, p. 327.

Vill INEFFECTUAL CONFERENCE AT AIGION 457

Roman arms. Philip had taken Echinos in their despite; he

had beaten them and their allies before Lamia; their attack on
Akarnania had been baffled by the heroism of the Akarnanians
themselves. But, with the forces of Rome and Pergamos on

either side of Greece, they recovered an even greater degree of
presumption than usual. It was perhaps through an affectation Demands
of disinterestedness that they made no demands for themselves, 1 ihe
but they made very inadmissible demands on behalf of their
several allies. Besides some cessions of barbarian territory to

their Illyrian friends, Atintania was demanded for the Romans,

and Pylos for the Messénians. It is not very clear in whose

hands Atintania then was; it was demanded for Rome as ἃ
“reunion,” ! yet it does not seem ever to have been in the
possession of the Republic; at an earlier time it seems to have

been Epeirot,? at a later time we shall find it Macedonian. At

all events, Philip, who so ardently desired to expel the Romans

from Apollénia and the neighbouring cities, and who had so

lately defeated Romans, Attolians, and Pergamenians both in

sieges and in the open field, was not willing to allow a strip of

Roman territory to be interposed between himself and his
Epeirot allies. And, whichever Pylos is intended,’ it is hard to

see on what grounds Messéné could just now claim an increase,

or even a restitution, of territory. A spontaneous offering on the

part of Philip might have been a graceful atonement for former
wrongs ; but it was hardly a cession which could be demanded

of a victorious prince at a diplomatic conference. It is not Negocia-
wonderful that, on the receipt of such an wltimatum, Philip tons
abruptly broke off the negociation. He retired to Argos, and rowen Οὐ
there began the celebration of the Nemean Games, when he

1 Liv. xxvii. 80. Postremo negarunt dirimi bellum posse, nisi Messeniis
Achexi Pylum redderent, Romanis restitueretur Atintania, Scerdiledo et Pleurato
Ardyai.

2 See Pol. ii. 5, 11. It was admitted to Roman friendship in Β.0. 229;
hardly ground enough for the phrase restitueretur twenty years later.

3 According to Livy, the Achaians were to surrender Pylos. But it is quite
impossible that either the Triphylian or the Messénian Pylos can now have been
in the hands of the League. Philip had conquered Triphylia in the Social War,
and he had not yet given it to the Achaians. (Liv. xxviii. 8.) It is quite
possible that Philip may have seized on the other Pylos in one of his Messénian
expeditions, but it is still harder to conceive that this can have been an Achaian
possession. Whichever Pylos is meant, it is clearly of Philip that the cession
was demanded. Here, as throughout the period, we have to deplore the loss
of the continuous narrative of Polybios. Schorn (p. 185) accepts the Achaian
possession of the Messénian Pylos.

Philip
repulses
the
Romans.

His alter-
nate de-
bauchery
and ac-
tivity.

Exploits
of Philip
and Philo-
poimén.

458 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

heard that Sulpicius had landed between Sikyén and Corinth.
With that activity which he could always show when he chose,
he hastened to the spot with his cavalry, attacked the Romans
while engaged in plunder, and drove them back to their fleet,
which retired to Naupaktos. He returned to Argos, finished
the celebration of the festival, and then, casting aside his purple
and diadem, affected to lead the life of a private citizen in the
city of his ancestors. But, if he laid aside the King, he did
not lay aside the Tyrant; he made his supposed fellow-citizens
suffer under the bitterest excesses of royal lust and insolence.?
He was roused from his debaucheries by the most threatenmg
of all news for the Achaian cities, the news that an Atolian
force had been received at Elis.2 The luxurious Tyrant was at
once changed into the active King and the faithful ally ;* he
marched to Dymé, where he was met by Kykliadas the General
of the League, and by Philopoimén, who was still the Commander
of the Federal Cavalry.* Ina battle by the mver Larisos, the
AKtolians were defeated, and Philopoimén slew with his own
hand Damophantos, who filled the same post in the Eleian army
which he himself did in that of Achaia.© In another “battle, the
allies unexpectedly found that they had Romans to contend
with as well as A‘tolians and Eleians, and after a sharp struggle,
in which Philip displayed great personal courage, they had to
retreat.6 The advantages of the fight however seemed to remain
with the allies, who ravaged Elis without let or hindrance. One
of the constant invasions of Macedonia by the neighbouring
barbarians called Philip back to the defence of his own kingdom,

1 Pol. x. 26. Liv. xxvii. 81. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 289.

2 Livy’s notions of Grecian politics may be estimated by his idea that Elis was
a State which had seceded from the Achaian League; Eleorum accenst odio, quod
a ceteris Acheis dissentirent. (xxvii. 81.) What can he have found and mis-
understood in his Polybios ?

3 “Durch die Verhialtnisse gezwungen erduldeten die Biirger unwiirdige
Schmach und Beschimpfung; denn Philipp war ihr Schutzherr gegen Feinde,
denen der Staat die Spitze nicht bieten konnte.” Schorn, 189.

* One is almost tempted to believe that Philopoimén filled the office of Master
of the Horse for two years together, as we shall find that he afterwards did with
the Generalship itself. But, if we accept the belief of Schorn (210-4), considered
probable by Thirlwall (viii. 295), that the Achaian Federal elections were now
(ever since B.C. 217) held in the Autumn, it is possible that all the reforms and
exploits of Philopoimén may have taken place during the one Presidency of
Kykliadas, from November, 210, to November, 209. There would not however
be the same political objection to the re-election of the ἱππάρχης which there was
to that of the στρατηγός.

5 Plut. Phil. 7. Paus. viii. 49. 7. 6 Liv. xxvii. 32.

VIII EXPLOITS OF PHILIP AND PHILOPOIMEN 459

and about the same time Sulpicius sailed to meet Attalos at
Aigina. The two great Leagues were thus left to fight their
own battles, and the Achaians had now learned how to fight
theirs. In a battle near Messéné, the Aitolians and Eleians
were now defeated by the unassisted force of Achaia.' Such
was the difference between Achaian troops commanded by
Aratos and Achaian troops commanded by Philopoimén.

The war continued for about four years longer with various Character
success. It is needless to recount all the gains and losses on both year of
sides. The Aitolians continued their ravages in Western Greece, the war,
while the combined fleet of Rome and Pergamos cruised in the B.c. 208-
Egean, descending on any favourable points, sometimes for 206:
conquest, sometimes merely for plunder. Once or twice, on the
other hand, we get a momentary glimpse of a Punic fleet making
its appearance in the Grecian seas, as an ally of Philip and
the Achaians.? Philip himself shines here and there like a
meteor, now giving help to his allies in Greece, now defending
his own frontier against the Northern Barbarians. Notwith-
standing all his crimes, it is impossible to refuse all sympathy to
so gallant and active a prince, and one who was becoming more
and more truly the protector of Greece against the Barbarians of
the West as well as of the North. Only one of his many brilliant
expeditions and forced marches need be recorded here. An Philip's
AEtolian Assembly, or perhaps only a meeting of the Senate,* Seeuthe on

: . . . . Heérakleia,
met at Hérakleia to discuss the interests of the League with their 5 ο. 207,
ally and chief magistrate, King Attalos. The King of Egypt
and the Rhodians were also renewing their praiseworthy attempts

1 Liv. xxvii. 33. 2 ΤΡ, 15, 30; xxviii. 7.

3 Polybios (x. 41) gives a vivid description of the various calls made upon
Philip’s energies at one moment during the year 208, His own kingdom was
threatened by Illyrians on one side and by Thracians on the other ; he received
at the same time applications for help from Achaia, Bosotia, Euboia, Epeiros, and
Akarnania. Livy (xxviii. 5) translates Polybios.

4 Pol. x. 42. Πυθόμενος δὲ. .. τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας els

Ἡράκλειαν ἀθροίζεσθαι χάριν τοῦ κοινολογηθῆναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ τῶν
ἐνεστώτων, ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς Σκοτούσης ὥρμησε σπεύδων καταταχῆσαι
καὶ πτοήσας διασῦραι τὴν σύνοδον αὐτῶν. τοῦ μὲν οὖν συλλόγου καθυστέρει.
Liv. xxviii. 5. Eo nuntiatum est, concilium tolis Heracleam indictum,
Regemque Attalum, ad consultandum de summé belli, ventarum. unc con-
ventum, ut turbaret subito adventu, magnis itineribus Heracleam duxit. Et
concilto quidem dimisso jam venit.

Both Schorn (191) and Thirlwall (viii. 292, 298) take this meeting for a
General Assembly. Certainly o’vodos and Concilium are the regular words for

such an Assembly, yet the words of Polybios seem to imply that the ἄρχοντες
themselves formed the σύνοδος, and did not merely summon it.

Philip's
cessions
to the

Achaian
League,

B.C. 208.

460 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

to bring about a peace, and their envoys, as well as others from
Rome, sent doubtless on an opposite errand, were present at the
meeting at Hérakleia.! We have before seen the Attolians
select the time of meeting of the Achaian Federal Congress as
the time best suited for a safe and profitable inroad into the
Achaian territory.? Philip now sought to repay them in their
own coin; he hoped to surprise them in the act of debate, as the
Medeénians had once surprised them in the act of election. He
came however too late; the meeting, whether of the whole
Aktolian body or only of the Senate, had already dispersed.
The Egyptian and Rhodian ambassadors still continued to labour
for peace, but it is almost impossible to follow their movements
in detail,* and as yet both the contending parties still preferred

to make themselves ready for battle. We soon after find Philip -

at Aigion at an Achaian Assembly. He there made over to his
allies certain Peloponnésian districts which had been in Mace-
donian possession since the Social, some perhaps even since the
Kleomenic, War.’ These were the Arkadian city of Héraia,
which had once been a member of the League,® and the whole
district of Triphylia,‘ which had never before been part of the
Achaian body. Philip also restored to the State of Megalopolis
the town of Alipheira, which he had taken in the Social
War. This was an old possession of Megalopolis, which
Lydiadas, in the days of his Tyranny, had exchanged with
the Eleians for some compensation which is not distinctly ex-
plained.’ This increase of territory would extend the boundary

1 Liv. xxviii. 7. 2 See above, pp. 397, 429. 3 See above, p. 323,

4 Livy (u.s.) makos the Egyptian and Rhodian envoys meet Philip at Elateia ;
he tells them that the war is not his fault, and that he is anxious for peace; the
conference is broken up by the news that Machanidas is going to attack the
Eleians during the Olympic Games. Philip goes to oppose him, Machanidas
retreats, and Philip then goes to Aigion.

Now this is evidently one of Livy’s confusions. The Eleians were allies of
Machanidas and enemies of Philip. Livy’s narrative also gives no place for the
speech of the Rhodian envoys (Pol. xi. 5) addressed to an Atolian Popular
Assembly (οἱ πολλοί, c. 6), which cannot be the one at Hérakleia, because the
presence of Macedonian ambassadors (ol παρὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου πρέσβειξ) is distinctly
mentioned.

I can really make nothing of the account in Appian, Mac. ii. 1, 2. See
Thirlwall, viii. 295. One thing however is clear; from about this time (Livy,
xxix, 12) Rome, Pergamos, and Carthage take no active share in the war ; it is
reduced to the old Greek limits of the Social War.

5 Pol. ii. 545; iv. 77 et seqq. δ See above, p. 314.

7 Liv. xxviii. 8. See above, p. 419.

8 Pol. iv. 77. ᾿Ηλεῖοι προσελάβοντο καὶ τὴν τῶν ᾿Αλιφειρέων πόλιν, οὖσαν

ΨΙΙΙ PHILIP’S CESSIONS TO THE ACHAIANS 461

of the League to the Ionian Sea, and would interpose part of
Achaia between Elis and Messéné._ If it was really made over
to the League at this time,' it was an important acquisition, and
one made at an opportune moment. The League could now, as
of old, afford to liberate Grecian cities, for it was now able to
withstand any Grecian enemy by its own unassisted force.

Philopoimén was now at last chosen General of the League.? Philo-
For the first time since Markos and Lydiadas the Achaians had Poimén

eneral

at their head aman capable of fighting a battle. Aristomachos, or tn,

it may be remembered, had once wished to fight one, but he was League,
hindered by Aratos. During the long administration of Aratos, DOF 208-
pitched battles were rare, and victories altogether unknown. ἢ
The Old-Achaian cities had never been distinguished for martial
spirit ; and the Arkadian and Argolic members of the League
seem generally, on becoming Achaian, to have sunk to the
Achaian level. At Megalopolis and Argos indeed things were in

a better state ; we have seen the League, on one occasion, calling,

in a marked way, for Argeian and Megalopolitan contingents ; 4

and the Megalopolitan phalanx had been, even in the days of the
Kleomenic War, reformed after the Macedonian model.5 Else-
where, whatever military spirit there was had died away under Inefii-
Aratos. His successors, Euryleén, Kykliadas, and Nikias, seem ciency
to have been as incapable as himself of commanding in the open ΗΝ
field, and not to have redeemed the deficiency by his diplomatic army.
powers or his skill in sudden surprises. Polybios® speaks with

utter contempt of the Generals of this time, and we have seen

ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπ' ᾿Αρκαδίαν καὶ Μεγάλην πόλιν, Λυδιάδου τοῦ Μεγαλοπολίτου κατὰ
τὴν τυραννίδα πρός τινας ἰδίας πράξεις ἀλλαγὴν δόντος τοῖς ᾿Ηλείοις.

1 T speak thus doubtingly, because we find these towns, δὲ a later time, again
in the hands of Philip, and again ceded by him to the League. Liv. xxxii. 5;
xxxiii. 34.

3 See Schorn, 195; Thirlwall, viii. 295. That Philopoimén commanded at
Mantineia as General of the League is clear from the whole story, and follows
from Plutarch’s words (Phil. 11), στρατηγοῦντα τὸ δεύτερον, which otherwise are
not very clear. According to Schorn’s view, he would be elected in November
B.c. 208, so that he would be best called the General of the year Bc. 207;
whereas, under the earlier system, the greater part of the official year fell in the
same natural year as the election. The succession seems to have been 211-0
Euryleén ; 210-9 Kykliadas ; 209-8 Nikias (Liv. xxviii. 8) ; 208-7 Philopoimén.

5 See above, p. 346. 4 See above, p. 429.

δ᾽ Pol. iv. 69. See Brandstiiter, p. 365.

© He says (xi. 8) that there are three ways of attaining to military skill, by
scientific study (διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκ τούτων κατασκενῆς), by instruc-

Philopoi-
mén’s
Reforms.

462 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

that one common path to the highest office in the state was a
course of gross and wilful negligence in the administration of
the post next in importance.1 The League had learned, in the
early days of Aratos, to trust to Egyptian subsidies, to diplo-
matic craft, or, at most, to midnight surprises ; latterly they had
trusted to Macedonian help,? and to mercenaries, who never
fought with real zeal in the service of a commonweath.? But
the League had now at its head a man who was a native of the
most military city of the Union, who had given his whole life to
the study of the military art, and whose most ardent desire was
to see the League really independent. Philopoimén longed to
see his country defended by the arms of her own citizens, not by
mercenaries indifferent to her cause, or by foreign Kings who
used the Achaian League only as an instrument for their own
purposes. As Master of the Horse, he had reformed the Achaian
cavalry ; as General, he determined to reform the whole military
system of the League.* After so longa period of neglect, reform
might have seemed almost hopeless. Philopoimén had first to
carry proposals for improvement through a democratic Assembly ;
he had then to impose a course of severe discipline upon men
who were in the least favourable condition for it. He had not,
like his contemporary Hannibal, to bring brave but untutored
warriors under the restraints of military order ; he had the more
difficult task before him of making soldiers out of the citizens of
a highly-civilized and somewhat luxurious nation. The forms of
the Achaian constitution probably helped him in his work. If
he gained his first point, he gained everything. In the three
days’ session of the Achaian Assembly, it was possible that his
proposals might be wholly rejected ; it was not likely that they

tion from men of experience, and by actual experience of a man’s own. The
Achaian Generals at this time were altogether unversed in any one of the three ;
πάντων ἦσαν τούτων ἀνεννόητοι ol τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν στρατηγοὶ ἁπλῶς.

1 See above, p. 454.

2 Plutarch (Phil. 8) gives a good picture of the state of things in these
respects.

3 Pol. xi. 138. Under a Tyranny, he tells us, mercenaries fight well, because
their master will reward them, and will use them, if victorious, for future con-
quests ; but citizens fight ill (cf. Herod. v. 78), because they fight for a master
and not for themselves. Under a Democracy, on the other hand, citizens fight
well, because‘they fight for their own freedom, but mercenaries fight ill, because,
the more successful the commonwealth i is, the less it will need their services.

4 The admirable summary of Philopoimén’ 8 reforms by Bishop Thirlwall
(viii. 295-8) makes one almost shrink from going again over the same ground. I
have tried to bring out a few rpecial points into prominence,

VIII PHILOPOIMEN’S REFORMS 468

should be criticized, spoiled, patched, and pared down in detail.
When his proposals were agreed to, it was doubtless a hard task
to carry out his scheme in practice; yet his position had several
marked advantages. He had already reformed the service which
was filled by the highest class, and he had something like a model
infantry to show in the contingent of his own city. And, when
he had once received the necessary authority from the assembled
People, he had almost unlimited powers for the execution of his
plans. There was no King and no Ministry to thwart him;
there were no Councillors or Commissioners to meddle ; there
was no mob of a metropolis to be cringed to; above all, there
were no Special Correspondents to vex the soul of the hero.!
He had simply to deal with a people whose intellect he had
already convinced, a people who had themselves raised him to
his high office, a people whose fault was certainly not that of
disobedience, fickleness, or ingratitude towards the leaders whom
they placed at their head. One vigorous speech in the Assembly 2
—probably at the Meeting where he was chosen General—
settled everything. Let the Achaians, he told them, retain their
fondness for elegance and splendour; but let it be turned
towards fine arms rather than towards fine clothes and fine
furniture ; 8 let men vie with one another, not in objects of mere
luxury and show, but in those whose possession would of itself
prompt them to vigorous and patriotic action. Eight months
of severe training put Philopoimén at the head of an Achaian
phalanx which he could really trust. Their short spears and
small shields were exchanged for the full panoply and long
sarissa of the Macedonians; they were practised in every evolu-
tion of the phalanx; and, before his year of office was over,
Philopoimén assembled at Mantineia a force with which he did
not dread to meet the power of Sparta in the open field. He
did not wholly give up the use of mercenary troops, but strangers
and citizens had now changed places. His mercenaries were
now mainly Illyrian and other light-armed soldiers ; the real
strength of his army lay in the native phalanx and native
cavalry 4 of the League.

1 Contrast the good luck of Philopoimén in these respects with the position of
a Spartan, Byzantine, Venetian, or Dutch General in past times, or of an English
or American General in our own day.

3 Pol. xi. 10. 3 Pol. xi. 9, Plut. Phil. 9.

* As the Tarentines (Pol. xi. 12. Liv. xxxv. 28, 29. Thirlwall, viii. 298) on
both sides were not natives of Tarentum, but only a particular sort of cavalry,

The Three
Battles of
Mantineia ;

Bc. 418.

B.C. 362.

Third
Battle of
Mantineia,
B.C. 207.

464 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

With _this new force the Achaian General met the Spartan
King in a pitched battle near Mantineia! It was the third
great battle fought on the same, or nearly the same, ground.*
Here, in the interval between the two parts of the Pelopon-
nésian War, had Agis restored the glory of Sparta after her
humiliation at Sphaktéria ; here Epameinéndas had fallen in the
moment of victory ; here now was to be fought the last great
battle of independent Greece. One regrets that, at such a
moment, the forces of the two worthiest of Grecian states should
have been arrayed against each other ; still it cannot be without
interest that we behold the last act of the long drama of internal
Hellenic warfare. Rome, Carthage, Pergamos,? even Mace-
donia, had for a while withdrawn from the scene; the struggle
was to be waged, as of old, between Grecian generals command-
ing Grecian armies. If there were foreigners engaged on either
side, they were mere auxiliaries, like the barbarian troops which
had appeared in Peloponnésos even in the days of Epameinéndas.‘
And we have no reason to doubt that Machanidas was a worthy
foe, even of Philopoimén. His name of Tyrant he shares with
the great Kleomenés; but he was as clearly a real national
leader as Kleomenés himself. It is the old strife, the old
hatred, between Sparta and the city founded by Epameinéndas.
Machanidas marched forth, expecting a certain victory; like
earlier chiefs of his nation, he looked upon Arkadia as his
déstined prey. And no doubt it was with a special feeling of
delight that Philopoimén, the follower of Epameinéndas,® stood
ready, with the force of Megalopolis and the whole Achaian
League, to engage a Spartan King on the ground on which his
model had conquered and fallen. The details of the battle are
given at length by Polybios,’ who probably heard them from
there is no reason why they may not have been a citizen force on both sides.
Polybios does not imply that they, but rather that the εὔζωνοι, were mercenaries.
And, in any case, Philopoimén would have the native Achaian cavalry, which he
had himself organized.

1 Polybios (xi. 10) uses the name Mantineia, which doubtless still remained
in familiar use, and not the more formal title of Antigoneia.

2 On the three battles of Mantineia, see Leake’s Morea, iii. 57-98.

3 Attalos had been called back to his own kingdom to repel an invasion of
Prusias, King of Bithynia. Liv. xxviii. 7.

4 Dionysios sent Celts and Iberians to the support of Sparta. Xen. Hell. vii.
1. 20.
5 Herod. i. 66. ’Apxadiny p’ αἰτεῖς; μέγα pw αἰτεῖς" οὔ τοι δώσω, K.7.X.
6 Plut. Phil. 8.
7 Pol. xi. 11-18. Cf. Plut. Phil. 10. Paus. viii. 50-2.

VIII BATTLE OF MANTINEIA 465

Philopoimén himself. It is enough for my purpose to say that,
after a hard fought field, victory remained with the Federal
army. At the battle of Larisos, Philopoimén, Master of the complete
Horse of Achaia, slew with his own hand the Master of the victory
Horse of Elis; now, as General of the League, he slew with οὗ πο ans
his own hand the King of Sparta. Had he been a Roman, he
might have boasted of the Spolia Opima, like Romulus and
Cossus and Marcellus. The death of Lydiadas was now
avenged ; but we regret to find that the Achaians, in their day
of victory, were far from showing the same respect to a fallen
foe which Kleomenés had shown to their own hero. The
corpse of Lydiadas had received royal honours from his con-
queror; the head of Machanidas was cut from his body, and
held up as a trophy and an encouragement to the pursuers. It
was ἃ victory indeed ; four thousand Lacedzemonians lay dead ;
as many were taken prisoners ; the whole spoil remained in the
hands of the victors; and all this was purchased by the most
trifling loss on the Achaian side. In point of military glory, it
was the brightest day in the history of the League.

For a Lacedemonian army to be defeated in a pitched battle,
for Lak6énia to be ravaged at will by an invader, were now no
longer the miraculous events which they had seemed a hundred
and sixty years before. But the fight of Leuktra and the Pelo-
ponnésian campaigns of Epameinéndas were hardly more
wonderful than for a Spartan army, bred up in the school of
Kleomenés, to be defeated by a native Achaian force, com-
manded by an Achaian General, without the presence of a single
Macedonian soldier, and without the help of a single Egyptian
talent. The Achaian army, with its General at its head, now phijo-
marched as freely through Lakénia as had been done by Epa- poimén
meinéndas, by Pyrrhos, by Antigonos, or by either Philip. A Lakonia.
prouder moment in a soldier’s life can hardly be conceived than
when Philopoimén crossed the hostile border at the head of the
army of his fellow-citizens which he himself had trained to
victory.

The remaining events of the war may be hastened over. Nabis
Machanidas was suéeeeded-at—Sparta—by- ene Nabis, -a Tyrant gyre of
in every sense of the word, but who did not as yet make him-
self formidable to the League. Philip, now that the Romans
and Attalos were gone, easily drove the Attolians to a separate

2H

Peace
between
ZEtolia
and Mace-
donia,
Bc. 205.

Conference
at Phoi-
niké,

General
Peace,
B.c. 205.

466 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP

peace, a proceeding on their parts which gave deadly offence at
Rome.! It was certainly a breach of the engagements towards
Rome into which they had entered at the beginning of the war,
but the fault lay with the Romans themselves, who had wholly
neglected their Greek allies for two years.? Shortly afterwards
the Proconsul Publius Sempronius landed at Epidamnos. Unable
to perstiade the Attolians to break the peace—a rare scruple,
which shows how much they must have suffered in the war—
and unable to contend against Philip without their help, he
gladly listened to proposals of peace. They first came from
the Epeirots, who, if it be true that Philip had possessed himself of
Ambrakia,’ once the capital of their great Pyrrhos, had almost
as much reason to complain of him as of Romans or Attolians.
Conferences took place at Phoiniké in Epeiros between the Pro-
consul Sempronius, the Kings Philip and Amynander, and the
Magistrates of the Akarnanian and Epeirot Leagues. The lead
in the negociation was taken by the Epeirot General Philip,
supported by his two colleagues Dardas and Aeropos.* By the
terms of the peace Rome obtained some Illyrian districts ; Philip
obtained Atintania, hardly to the advantage of the mediating
power ; and it was probably now that he made over to King
Amynander ὅ the island of Zakynthos, his own conquest during
the Social War.° The best modern guide to these times‘
marvels, and with reason, at this last “rectification” of territory.
Amynander’s kingdom lay wholly inland, and he could not
possibly visit ‘his new dominions without the goodwill of the
possessor of Ambrakia. It was even stranger than for a Duke
of Savoy, who was at least master of Nizza, to be made King of
Sicily or Sardinia.® The other allies seem to have had no repre-
sentatives in the Conference, but they were equally included in
the treaty. Philip stipulated for his own Thessalian dependents,
for Prusias of Bithynia, whom it was needful to secure against
his neighbour Attalos, and for the Leagues of Achaia and Beotia,
as well as those of Epeiros and Akarnania. The allies on the

1 Cf. Pol. xviii. 21. Liv. xxxi. 29. 2 Liv. xxix. 12,

δ᾽ See App. Mac. ii. 1. The Atolians had taken it some time before.

* Liv. xxix. 12. See above, Ὁ. 118, note 3.

5 Liv. xxxvi. 31. It was the price of a free passage through Athamania.

6 Pol. v. 102. See above, p. 434. 7 Thirlwall, viii. 800.

8 It was as if the Prince of Montenegro should receive one of the Greek
Islands still in Turkish bondage, as compensation for the Turkish military road
through his dominions.

VIII PEACE OF EPEIROS 467

Roman side were Elis, Athens, Messéné, King Attalos, King
Pleuratos in Illyria, Nabis the Tyrant,! and Rome’s metropolis
Ilion. This last piece of mythical diplomacy rivals the claims
which Akarnania had once made for Roman support. The
4Etolians were enrdiled on neither side; Philip had granted
them peace, but not alliance; Rome looked on allies who had
made peace without her sanction as. unworthy-of her-protection
or care. Thijs was the first great lesson whie the Greeks
learned in the school of Roman diplomacy. To-become the ally
of Rome was.the first step towards becoming her subject ; it in-
volved the entire sacrifice of independent action. The peace was
confirmed by the Roman Senate and people; it was accepted,
tacitly at least, by the allies on both sides, and the land had rest
for a short space.

1 It was afterwards pretended that the treaty was concluded, not with Nabis,
but with the lawful King Pelops. Liv. xxxiv. 32.

468 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

NOTE ON THE GENERALSHIPS OF ARATOS

Ir is not easy to reconcile the number of Generalships attributed to Aratos
by Plutarch with the distinct assertion (see above, p. 237) of the same writer
that Aratos was elected General in alternate years, because the Law did not
allow the retiring General to be immediately re-elected. Droysen (ii. 438)
holds that the Law was broken in favour of Aratos, and that he served for
several consecutive years. Schorn (107) rather suspects an error in Plutarch’s
enumeration.

Aratos was first elected General in B.c. 245 ;} in 226 he was, according to
Plutarch (Ar. 35), General for the twelfth time ; in 213 he died, according to
the same authority (c. 53), in his seventeenth Generalship. Among the inter-
vening years, there are some when Aratos is mentioned as General, some when
other persons are mentioned, and some where the name is not preserved. The
statement that he died in his seventeenth Generalship would, in itself, present
no difficulty ; if he was elected in alternate years beginning with 245, then
213 would be his seventeenth year. But it is certain that his alternate re-
election, though the common rule, was not adhered to so strictly as to exclude
occasional deviations (see Plut. Ar. 38 and Pol. iv. 82 compared with iv. 37),
and the twelfth Generalship in 226 cannot possibly agree with a system of
alternate elections beginning with 245. Aratos was General in 245, 243, and
241. We then lose the succession for some years, and recover it in 284. From
that date onwards we have as follows :

234 Aratos (viii. ) 229 Lydiadas (iii. )
233 Lydiadas (i.) 228 Aratos (xi.)
232 Aratos (ix.) 227 Aristomachos.
281 Lydiadas (ii.) 226 Aratos (xii. )

230 Aratos (x.)

If 226 were Aratos’ twelfth Generalship, it follows that 234 was his eighth.
But, as 241 was his third, the six intervening years, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236,
235 do not give room for the four required Generalships (fourth, fifth, sixth,
and seventh), in alternate years. If Plutarch be right in calling 226 the
twelfth Generalship, it follows that Aratos must have held office for four out
of those six years, a clear violation of the law as stated by Plutarch himself.
Droysen (ii. 485. 8)? truly adds that in those years, only one General besides
Aratos, namely Dioitas, is mentioned.? Again, though the seventeenth

1 By the year of a General, I mean the year B.C. in which he was elected ; his
official year took in parts of two years of our reckoning. Thus the Generalship
of B.c. 284 extends into B,c. 233, and so throughout.

3 [iii, 2. 88, 2nd edition. }

3 Polyainos (ii. 36, see above, p. 315, note 1) mentions Dioitas as General, but
gives no clue to the year to which his Generalship should be referred.

VUl NOTE ON THE GENERALSHIPS OF ARATOS 469

Generalship in 213 would agree perfectly with a system of alternate re-election
throughout the whole time, yet the first three Generalships are in odd years,
245, 243, 241, while the series beginning with 234 are in even years. Aratos
must therefore, between 241 and 234, have either been in office or out of office
for two years together. Again, he was not regular General in 224, nor General
at all in 218, which, on the alternate system, he should have been. He
certainly was General in 220, 217, 213. In 221, 219, 218, 216, we find other
names. If then Plutarch be right in calling 226 his twelfth, and 218 his
seventeenth, Generalship, we must not only supply two more Generalships in
the years 222 and 215, but we must also suppose four Generalships between
241 and 234, that is, we must suppose, as Schorn says, that Aratos held the
Generalship for three years together, in manifest breach of the law.

But, by supposing two slight and easily-explained errors in Plutarch’s
reckoning, it is possible to arrange the years, so as not to imply any breach
of a Law so distinctly stated by Plutarch himself. His mention of a seven-
teenth Generalship in 213 may have been a mere careless inference from the
number of years and the common practice of alternate election. Or it may
be explained in another way. The twelfth Generalship in 226 is the great
difficulty. If for δωδέκατον, in Plut. Ar. 35, we might substitute δέκατον, we
should then have to suppose that, between 241 and 234, Aratos, instead of
being in office for three years together, remained once out of office for two
years together,! as we know that he once did at a later time. We have then
to suppose that Plutarch counted Aratos’ Extraordinary Generalship in 224-3 3
(Ar. 41) as one of his regular years, and we have, between 224 and 213, to
place Generalships in those years where it is allowable, namely in 222 and
215. This gives sixteen Generalships without any two being in consecutive
years. Now in 219 the younger Aratos was General, and Plutarch may easily,
in running his eye over a list, have mistaken his year of office for another year
of his father's, and so have made the whole number seventeen. The whole
list would then stand thus:

1 That this should be the case is not at all unlikely, when we remember (see
above, pp. 309, 310) the indignation excited by his attempt on Peiraieus during the
truce with Antigonos. That attempt must have been made either late in the
official year Β.0. 241-0 or early in B.c. 239-8. It is not an improbable conjecture
that it was made when Aratos was General in 239, and that, in consequence of
the popular feeling against him, he remained out of office during the years 238
and 237, and was elected for the fifth time in 236.

On the other hand it should be remarked that the time to which Droysen
attributes the illegal elections of Aratos, and to which, if they occurred at all,
they must be attributed, is precisely that when the power of Aratos was most
unbounded. From 241 to 234, from the acquisition of Corinth to the acquisition
of Megalopolis, Aratos was, with the exception of his temporary discredit about
Peiraieus, at the very height of his glory. Earlier, he was merely growing into
power, later, he had rivals in Lydiadas and others.

2 Aratos’ election as στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ (see above, p. 377) was in the
natural year B.c. 223, but before the expiration of the official year 224-3.

470 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP, VIII

245 Aratos (i.) 228 Aratos (ix.)

244 — 227 Aristomachos.

243 Aratos (ii.) 226 Aratos (x.)

242 — 225 Hyperbatas.

241 Aratos (iii. ) 224 Timoxenos (i.)
1240 — 224-3 Aratos (στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ) (xi.)
239 Aratos (iv.) ? 223 Timoxenos (ii. )

238 — 222 Aratos (xii.) ?

227 — 221 Timoxenos (iii. )
236 Aratos (v.) ἢ 220 Aratos (xiii.)

235 — 219 Aratos the Younger.
234 Aratos (vi.) 218 Epératos.

233 Lydiadas (i.) 217 Aratos (xiv. )

232 Aratos (vii. ) 216 Timoxenos (iv. )

281 Lydiadas (ii.) 215 Aratos (xv.) ?

230 Aratos (viii. ) 214 —

229 Lydiadas (iii.) 218 Aratos (xvi.)

The question reduces itself to this. Was Plutarch more likely to yo wrong
in a reckoning of figures or in a distinct statement of constitutional practice !
To me the former supposition certainly seems the easier of the two.

That Plutarch is by no means infallible in his chronology of the life of
Aratos is plain from his strange remark that Aratos had been, in 224, for
thirty-three years? an Achaian politician (τριάκοντα ἔτη καὶ τρία πεπολιτευμένος
ἐν τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς, Ar. 41), whereas, in 224, only twenty-seven years had elapsed
since the very beginning of his career in the deliverance of Sikyén. The only
marked period of thirty-three years in the life of Aratos is that between his
first Generalship in 245 and his death in 213 ; this is probably what Plutarch
was thinking of. A mistake in reckoning up the Presidential years is one
of exactly the same kind, and it is one, I certainly think, far more likely to
occur than a direct and often-repeated blunder on a point of constitutional
law, committed by one who had the Memoirs of Aratos before him.

1 The Generalship of Dioitas would come in one of the years 240, 238, 237 or
235, but I know of no evidence to fix it to any particular year.

2 I do not at all know what Mr. Fynes Clinton means (iii. 36) by transferring
this remark from the year 224 to 222, and adding “ The thirty-three years of
Aratos must be computed from the first praetor Marcus, B.c. 255.”" What have
the years of Markos and Aratos to do with each other.

CHAPTER IX

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE, FROM THE PEACE OF EPEIROS
TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. B.C. 205
—146

‘Wits the interference of Rome in Grecian affairs, the main Character
interest of our Federal history ceases. Hitherto we have seen °f the
Greek Federalism in the days of its glory; we have seen Greek period.
Federal commonwealths acting as perfectly independent powers,

and we have seen them acting in close union with Greek states
possessing other forms of Government. What is now left to us

is to trace Greek Federalism in its decline; a decline, indeed, in

no way peculiar to the Federal states, but one which they shared

with all powers, whether kingdoms or commonwealths, which

once came within the reach of Rome’s friendship or enmity. The

chief importance of this period for our purpose is indirect. We

have now come within the life-time of Polybios ; we shall soon

come within the range of his personal memory. His narrative

of events which he had seen himself, or had heard of from his

father, is naturally much fuller than his narrative of events which

rested on the traditions or the written records of a past genera-

tion. Unfortunately we now have his history only in fragments,

but the fragments are often of considerable length, and there are

also several narratives in Livy which are evidently translated

from Polybios to the best of Livy’s small ability. As these later
transactions were recorded by Polybios at great detail, the frag- Import-
ments of his history of these times contain a great maas of ance of the
political information, and supply many constitutional details which Feseral
we might otherwise never have known. We have several vivid History
pictures of debates in the Achaian and /Etolian Assemblies, such chiety |
as we do not get in the history of earlier times. Still, when we
read minute reports of debates in which Aristainos and Kykliadas,

or Kallikratés and Archdén, were the chief speakers, we cannot

Aggres-
sive pro-
ceedings
of Philip,
B.c. 202-
200.

B.c. 202.

His

dealings
with the
Achaian

League.

472 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

restrain a wish to exchange them for equally minute reports of
the parliamentary combats of Aratos and Lydiadas. I shall
therefore touch comparatively lightly on this last period of Greek
Federal history, leaving, as before, the details of warfare to the
general historians of Greece and Rome, and stopping only at
those points where the narrative affords us any important
constitutional information.

§ 1. From the Peace of Epetros to the Settlement of Greece
under Flamininus

B.C. 205—194

We left Greece at peace ; that she did not long remain so was
again the fault of the King of Macedonia. Philip, whose youth-
ful promise had been so bright, was gradually sinking from bad
to worse. It was open to him to play the part of Piedmont in
Greece ; he preferred, of his own choice, to play the part of
Austria. Every step that he took alienated some old friend, or
provoked some new enemy. In defiance of his treaty with
Rome, he still continued his dealings with Hannibal, and Mace-
donian soldiers are said to have fought for Carthage at Zama!
In defiance of his treaty with A‘tolia, he attacked various cities,
in Asia and elsewhere, which were allies or subjects of the
League,” and, by his cruel treatment of his conquests, he de-
graded himself, in the eyes of all Greece, almost below the level
of the Aitolians themselves.* He seems to have defrauded his
old allies of Achaia of the Peloponnésian districts which he had
professed to cede to them during the Roman war ;‘ he is even
charged with an attempt to poison Philopoimén,® as he was
believed to have poisoned Aratos. He engaged in hostilities,
which seem to have been altogether unprovoked, with the
Rhodian Republic,® with Ptolemy Epiphanés of Egypt, and with

1 Liv. xxx. 26, 33, 42. But Polybios does not mention them.

3 Lysimacheia, Kalchédén, Kios. See Pol. xv. 22; xvii. 2, 8.

3 See Pol. xvii. 3. Cf. the somewhat later siege of Abydos, Pol. xvi. 29-34.
Liv. xxxi. 16, 17.

4 See above, p. 460. That they were detained or recovered by him is clear
by nis again restoring, or pretending to restore, them at a later time. Liv.
xxxii. 5.

5 Plut. Phil. 12. Ἔπεμψεν els “Apyos κρύφα τοὺς ἀναιρήσοντας αὐτόν. This
need not imply that poison was the means to be used.

6 Philip’s war with the Rhodians produced several important sea-fights. See
the description of those of Ladé and Chios. Pol. xvi. 1-9.

1x SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 473

Attalos of Pergamos, the cherished ally of Rome. He engaged Philip’s
in a war with Athens, for which something more like an povast-
excuse could be pleaded ;! but he shocked the universal feeling attica,
of Greece by practising the same barbarous and useless kind of Β.0. 200.
devastation of which he and his Aitolian enemies had alike been
guilty during the Social War.? Athens, politically contemptible,
was already beginning to assume something of that sacred and
academic character which she enjoyed in the eyes of the later
Greeks and Romans. The destruction of Athenian temples and
works of art doubtless aroused a feeling of general indignation
even stronger than that which followed on the like sacrilege
when wrought at Dion and Thermon. It was this attack on
Athens which finally drew Rome into the strife. The justice of Justice of
the Roman declaration of war cannot be questioned. Philip had the war
clearly broken the Treaty ; he had helped the enemies of Rome Roman
and he had injured her allies. He had put himself in a position side.
which enabled the Romans to assume, and that, for a while, with
some degree of truth and sincerity, the character of the libera-
tors of Greece. It was wholly Philip’s own fault, that.a Roman,
ἃ Barbarian, was able to unite the forces of nearly all Greece
against ἃ Macedonian King, and to declare, at one of the great
Greek national festivals, that all Greeks who had been subject
to- Macedonia received their freedom from the Roman Senate
and their Proconsul. There is no need to suspect the Senate, Phil-—
still less to suspect Flamininus personally, of any insincerity in hejenie
the matter. That liberty received as a boon from a powerful of rirni-
stranger can never be lasting is indeed true. But it does not ninus and
follow that the philhellenism of Flamininus was a mere blind, a other
mere trap for Greek credulity, or that the gift of freedom was οος
deliberately designed from the beginning to be only a step
towards bondage. One might as well suppose that the servants
of the East India Company who first mingled in Indian politics
and warfare deliberately contemplated the Affghan war and the
annexation of Oude.

The second Macedonian War—the second Roman War, as we Second
may call it from our point of view—was carried on by three Mace-
successive Roman commanders, Publius Sulpicius, Publius War,

Bo. 200-
1 Two Akarnanians were put to death at Eleusis for an unwitting profanation 197.
of the mysteries. The Akarnanian League complained to their ally King Philip,
who invaded and ravaged Attica, Liv. xxxi. 14.
2 See above, pp. 419, 428.

Real good-
will of
Flami-
ninus
towards
Greece.

474 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Villius,! and Titus Quinctius Flamininus.2 Of these three,
Titus became something like a Greek national hero. Plutarch?
does not even stop to argue whether Titus or Philopoimén
deserved the larger share of Grecian thankfulness ; the merits of
the Roman allow of no dispute or comparison. Titus ‘* shone
alike as ἃ diplomatist and as a warrior; he showed him-
self as superior to Philip in the conference of Nikaia® as he did
upon the hill of Kynoskephalai. His real goodwill towards
Greece there seems no just reason to doubt. He lived at a time
peculiarly favourable to the growth of such a feeling. In earlier
times the Romans despised the Greeks with the contempt of
ignorance. In later times they despised them with the con-
tempt of conquerors, Even Titus himself lived to change from
the friend into the patron, and from the patron there are very
few steps to the master. But, just at this moment, all the pro-
ducts of Grecian intellect were, for the first time, beginning to
be opened to the inquiring minds of Rome. Greece was a land
of intellectual pilgrimage, the birthplace of the art, the poetry,
and the science, which the rising generation of Romans were
beginning to appreciate. The result was the existence for a
time of a genuine philhellenic feeling, of which the early conduct
of Titus in Greece is the most illustrious example.® Titus
Quinctius was a Roman, and we may be quite certain that he
would never have sacrificed one jot of the real interests of Rome

1T take Villius, in Greek Οὐΐλλιος, to be the name intended by the ᾽Οτίλιος
of Pausanias (vii. 7, 9). See Schorn, 240.

2 For Φλαμινῖνος, Pausanias (u.s.) and Appian (Syr. 2) have Φλαμένιος ;
Aurelius Victor (c. 51) and, after him, Orosius (lib. iv. f. iii. ed. Venice, 1483)
turn the nomen Quinctius into the prenomen Quintus, so as to change Titus
Quinctius into Quintus Flaminius. Aurelius moreover makes him the son of
Caius Flaminius who died at Trasimenus, This is not very wonderful in a late
and careless compiler, but it is wonderful to find the error repeated by a scholar
like Schorn, p. 2387.

3 Comp. Phil. et ΕἸ. 1.

4 One can hardly help, when writing from the Greek side, speaking of him by
his familiar preenomen, as he is always called by Polybios and Plutarch. It is
not every Roman who is spoken of so endearingly.

5 See Pol. xvii. 1-10.

6 Mommsen, in his Roman History, very clearly brings out this fact, but he is
very severe both on Flamininus and on his countrymen for yielding to such
foolish sentimentality. I confess that I cannot look on a generous feeling as dis-
graceful either to an individual or to a nation. But Mommsen's history of this
period, as of all periods, is well worth reading, if the reader will only reserve the
right of private judgement in his own hands.

A truer and more generous estimate of Flamininus will be found in Kortiim,
iii. 251.

IX PHILHELLENIC FEELINGS OF FLAMININUS 475

to any dream of philhellenism. But, within that limit, he was
disposed to be more liberal to Grecian allies and less harsh to
Grecian enemies than he would have been to allies or enemies of

any other nation. He would have Greece dependent on Rome ;

but he would have her dependent, not as a slave but as a free
ally ; the Greeks should be Plataians and not Helots; the con-
nexion should be one, not of constraint, but of affection and
gratitude for real favours conferred. He wished in short to make
Rome become, what Macedonia ought to have become, the chosen

head of a body of free and willing Greek confederates. For a

few years he really effected his object. Macedonia did not Union of
retain a single ally, except the brave League of Akarnania, ever Greek
faithful to its friends in their utmost peril. The two great | der
Leagues of Achaia and Aitolia did good service to the Roman Rome.
cause ; Epeiros and Beeotia, though not friendly in their hearts,

did not venture openly to oppose it. Consistently with his
whole system, Titus never pushed any Greek state to extremi-

ties. Philip received what, after such provocations as his, may

be called favourable terms. When the Attolians, like the General
Thebans after Aigospotamos, called for the utter destruction of modera-
Macedonia, Titus showed them how expedient it was that Mace- Hn οὗ
donia should remain independent and powerful, the bulwark of ninus.
Greece against barbarian inroads. Philip was deprived of his
conquests, and prevented from injuring the allies of Rome, but

the original Kingdom of Macedonia suffered no. dismemberment.

Nor do we hear of the exercise of any severities against Philip’s
gallant allies of Akarnania, a marked contrast to the later treat-

ment of the Epeirot cities after the fall of Perseus. A like
indisposition to deal harshly with any Greek state may even
account for Flamininus’ over-lenity towards the Tyrant Nabis,

the portion of his career which, at first sight, is the most difficult
either to justify or to understand.”

The way in which the several Federal States of Greece stood Relation
affected to Rome during this war throws a good deal of light on οἵ the ;
Federal politics. It will therefore be worth dwelling on a little states
more fully than the purely military history. The A‘tolians were to Rome.
the first among the Greek Leagues to embrace the Roman cause. rou.
They had good grounds for anger against Philip, because of his

1 Pol, xviii. 20. See above, p. 452.
2 Liv. xxxiv. 34, 49.

Condition
of Atolia.

B.c. 200.
Damo-
kritos
General.
Indecisive
Meeting
at Nau-
paktos,

AStolians
join the
Roman
side,

B.C. 200.

476 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP,

destruction of Kios and other of their allied or subject towns.
On the other hand, they were not allies of Rome, and they had
no special reason to be friendly to her after she had so carefully
excluded them! from the Peace of Epeiros. Adtolia was per-
haps just now a little more inclined to peace than usual. One
main element of confusion in the country, Skopas, was absent.
It was just after the Peace that he and Dorimachos received
their special commission as legislators, and their legislation seems
to have led only to internal commotions.2, Skopas was now at
Alexandria, in the service of the young Ptolemy Epiphanés,®
and we just now hear nothing of Dorimachos. The General in
office, Damokritos, seems to have been a moderate man, which
was perhaps the reason why he was suspected of being bribed by
Philip. During the first campaign of Sulpicius, an -4¢tolian
Assembly was held at Naupaktos,° under his presidency, which
listened to Macedonian, Athenian, and Roman ambassadors, but
came to no definite vote.® The policy of Damokritos was to
wait a little longer, and to see to which side success was likely
to turn. He therefore exhorted the Assembly to pass no vote
either way just yet, but to entrust the General with the power
of calling a Special Assembly, when he should think fit, to settle
the question of peace or war.’ Shortly after, when the Roman
arms seemed to have decidedly the advantage, Damokritos called
his Assembly, and procured the adhesion of the people to the
Roman cause.2 The Atolians, after this, took a prominent part
in the war, and their cavalry contributed not a little to the
victory of Kynoskephalai.

1 See above, p. 467.

2 See above, p. 263. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 302. 5. Pol. xiii. 2.

4 ΤΌ. xxxi. 32. Pecunia, ut fama est, ab Rege accepta.

5 Tb. 40. 6 Ib, 29-32.

7 Liv. xxxi. 32. Cum legibus cautum esset, ne de pace bellove, nisi in Pan-
setolico et Pylaico concilio, ageretur, decernerent extemplo, ut Pretor sine fraude,
cum de bello et pace agere velit, advocet concilium ; et quod tum referatur de-
cernaturque, ut perinde jus ratumque sit, ac si in Pansetolico aut Pylaico concilio
actum esset.

This seems to mean that, by the AXtolian constitution, only the regular Annual
Meeting could entertain questions of war and peace ; a Special Meeting, whatever
were its powers, could not do that. The Assembly now passes either a general
law for the future or a resolution for this particular case, allowing the General to
call a Special Meeting with the full powers of the regular Assembly.

On the Panetolicum and Pylaicum, see above, p. 260, note 3.

8 Livy (xxxi. 40) says proximo concilio. This cannot possibly mean the next
Annual Assembly.

ΙΧ RELATIONS BETWEEN ROME AND ATOLIA 477

In Achaia the struggle with Sparta still continued; but Ασπλια.
whether the League acted vigorously or not in any matter Import-
depended wholly on the presence of Philopoimén in office. He Phil of
was twice General between the first and second Macedonian joimén.
Wars. It seems to have been during his second Generalship! sc. 205-
that the Megarians, disgusted with the state of things in the 204!
Beeotian League, of which they then formed a part, returned to Reunion
their old connexion with Achaia.* ΑΒ for Nabis, he continued aay le
his piracies, robberies, and domestic cruelties, on a scale such as League.
Peloponnésos had never before seen. But he received several War with
defeats from the Federal arms. The Tyrant surprised Messéné, Nie.
when Lysippos was General. Lysippos, like another Aratos, p.o. 208-
would do nothing, but Philopoimén, at the head of the militia 202.
of his own city, made him retreat. Next year, being himself sice of
again General, he gathered the forces of the whole League Messéné.
together by a secret mancuvre, and then, suddenly entering 5.0. 202-
Lakénia, defeated the Tyrant in a considerable battle.‘ 201.

The policy of Philopoimén was to keep the League, as far as
might be, independent of all foreign powers. With this object
he endeavoured to procure a peace between Philip and the
Rhodians by Achaian mediation before the Romans stepped in.°
But Roman policy kept the allies of Rome from all separate
negociations ; his labours were therefore fruitless. He was General-
succeeded in the Presidency by Kykliadas, a man devoted to oD ΓΚ
Philip. Philopoimén seems then to have thought that Pelopon- 5, 901."
nésos was no longer a place for him, and, as in the days of 200.
Aratos, he went to find employment among his old friends in Philo-
Crete. As before, one may be inclined to think that he would poim®n in
have acted a more truly patriotic part by staying to defend his ἀν μον
country against Nabis, if only as a single soldier in the ranks ;
but there is at least no ground for supposing that Philopoimén
was offended because he was not allowed to hold office two
years together.’ During his absence, while Kykliadas was still

1 Plut. Phil. 11. Thirlwall, viii. 303. It was in this Generalship that he
exhibited his phalanx at the Nemean festival.

3 Pol. xx. 6. See above, Ὁ. 374.

3 Plut. Phil. 12. Τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ πολίτας ἀναλαβών. This means, I suppose, the
citizens of Megalopolis only. So Thirlwall, viii. 305.

* See the whole story in Polybios, xvi. 36.

5 Pol. xvi. 35. 5° Plut. Phil. 18. Paus. viii. 50. 6.

7 Schorn (p. 230, cf. Kortiim, iii. 237) says, ‘Ein dritter ungtinstiger Um-
stand war die Erbitterung Philopémens, welcher vergebens darnach gestrebt hatte,
die Strategie noch ein Jahr zu behalten.” This is, to say the least, a great deal to gut

Philip

at Argos ;
his vain
attempt

to gain the
League.

His pre-
tended
cession of
Triphylia
and Orcho-
menos,
B.c. 199.

478 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

in office, an Achaian Assembly was held at Argos.! This was,
seemingly, a little before the first Roman Embassy to /iétolia.
At this Meeting Philip suddenly appeared. He offered to carry
on the war with Nabis on behalf of the League, if the Achaians
would serve in his garrisons at Corinth and in Euboia. That
is, he asked them to take his part against Rome.* This the
Assembly was not ready to do; so Kykliadas, to save appear-
ances with his patron, put aside the King’s request on a point
of order. The Meeting was a Special one, summoned to con-
sider the war with Nabis; at such a Meeting nothing could
lawfully be discussed except the war with Nabis.? The present
Assembly therefore was incompetent to declare war against
Rome, or even to engage to send Achaian soldiers to Corinth
or Chalkis. With this answer Philip was obliged to be content.

The League preserved its neutrality for some time longer.
During the Consulship of Villius, Philip made another attempt
to secure the fidelity of the League‘ by ceding, or at least pre-
tending or promising to cede, those Peloponnésian districts which
he had once already professed to cede to Achaia. To the
Triphylian towns his present offer added the yet more important
cession of Orchomenos,® which had not been mentioned on the
former occasion. It would seem that the League did not, even
now, really obtain possession of them,’ but the mere hope may
have prevented the Achaians from actually joining the Roman
side. This final step did not take place till the Consulship of
Flamininus. The then President, Aristainos, was a strong

out of the words of Pausanias (u.s.), Φιλοποίμην δὲ, ὡς ἐξῆκέν οἱ στρατηγοῦντι ὁ
χρόνος, καὶ ἄρχειν ἄλλοι τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ypnvro, αὖθις és Kpyrnvy διέβη, or out of
those of Plutarch, φνγομαχῶν ἢ φιλοτιμούμενος ἀκαίρως πρὸς ἑτέρους. I do not
rely so much as I should have done at an earlier time on the unconstitutional
nature of the scheme attributed to Philopoimén, as there is one instance some-
what later—whether by a change in the law or by a breach of it—of his actually
holding office two years together.

1 Liv, xxxi. 25.

2 Liv. us. Cf. Pol. xvi. 38. Ὁ δὲ Φίλππος ὁρῶν τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς εὐλαβῶς
διακειμένους πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πόλεμον, ἐσπούδαζε κατὰ πάντα τρότον
ἐμβιβάσαι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀπέχθειαν.

8. Liv. u.s. See above, p. 215.

4 Liv, xxxii. 5. He adds, [ta enim pepigerant, quotannis juraturos in verba
Philippi. Livy has probably misunderstood the oath of adhesion to the Grand
Alliance. 5 See above, p..460.

6 This town had been a Macedonian possession since its capture by Antigonos
in B.c. 228. See above, p. 386.

7 See Livy, xxxiii. 84.

8 I know not why Kortiim (iii. 238) calls him “ Parainos.”

ΙΧ DEBATE ON THE ROMAN ALLIANCE 479

Roman partizan, and Kykliadas already had been banished, The
seemingly on account of his Macedonian politics... Of the debate ate
in the Assembly at Sikyén which finally decreed the alliance with Roman
Rome, we have a vivid description in Livy,? which is evidently Alliance,
translated from Polybios. It is a narrative of the utmost "0: 198.
importance, as being one of our best authorities for several
essential points in the Federal constitution. The General
appears, not as Speaker, but as Leader of the House ; the ten
Ministers preside and put the question ;3 and the vote is dis-
tinctly taken by States, not by heads. The Meeting lasts three

days. On the first day the Assembly listens to the rival
Ambassadors, first to those of Rome and her allies, and then to Consti-
those of Macedonia. On the second day, as no other speaker tutional
rises, Aristainos, as Leader, first tries to draw forth the opinion supplied
of the House, and then, as silence is still kept, he himself speaks by the
strongly in favour of the Roman alliance® His speech 18 ee
received with different feelings in different parts of the House, aehate.
some loudly applauding, others expressing disapprobation—in

what particular form we are not told.6 The Ministers, when

about to put the question, are found to be equally divided among
themselves on a point of order—no bad argument, it may be
thought, for the institution of a single Speaker. An unrepealed

law forbade any Magistrate to put any question contrary to the
Macedonian alliance.’ On this ground five of the Ministers
refuse to put the question of alliance with Rome.’ On the third

day, when the vote must be taken or not at 811,5 one of the pro-
testing five, Memndén of Pelléné, yields to the entreaties and
threats of his own father; a majority in the Cabinet is thus
obtained in favour of putting the question. The question is put,

and carried by a large majority, perhaps by an unanimous vote 10

1 Liv. xxxii. 19. Cycliadam, principem factionis ad Philippum trahentium
res, expulerant. Tb. 19-23. 3 ΤΌ, 22.

4 Ib. 22. Omnibus fere populis haud dubie approbantibus. Soc. 28.
Cetert populs confirmarunt.

5 Cf Pol. xvii. 18. Meréppye τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς ᾿Αρίσταινος ἀπὸ τῆς Φιλίππου
συμμαχίας πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων.

6 Liv. xxxii, 22. Murmur ortum aliorum cum assensu, aliorum inclementer
assentientes increpantium.

7 Ib. Lege cautum testabatur, ne quid, quod adversus Philippi societatem
esset, aut referre magistratibus aut decernere concilio jus esset.

8 See above, p. 215.

9 Liv. us. Tertio (die) lex jubebat decretum fieri.

10 It must be remembered that, according to the Achaian system of voting, an

by Lucius

Quinctius.

480 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

of those cities which voted at all. For the citizens ! present from
Dymé and Megalopolis, and most of those from Argos, with-
drew? from the Assembly before the vote was taken. Dymé
had been, but a few years before, rescued by Philip from con-
quest by the Romans. Megalopolis was the old ally,* Argos
was the supposed metropolis, of the Macedonian royal family.
Dymaians, Argeians, Megalopolitans, could not be expected to
vote against Philip; the other party, and the Romans them-
selves, did not expect it of them.’ The‘alliances with Attalos
and with Rhodes were at once concluded ; that with Rome was
voted provisionally, subject to the approval of the Roman
People. The Treaty seems to have contained a clause, often
violated by Rome in after days, providing that, according to the
first principles of the Federal Union, Rome should receive no
envoys from any single city of the League, but only from the
League itself.®

The League now took a considerable share in the war.
Achaian envoys appeared at the side of Titus at the conference
of Nikaia,’ and though we do not hear of Achaian warriors at
Kynoskephalai, yet they served the cause effectually elsewhere.
Now that the League was at war with Macedonia, hopes arose of
recovering Corinth. The city was besieged by the Romans
under Lucius Quinctius, the Consul’s brother, aided by the
whole Federal force. But it was vigorously and successfully
defended by the Macedonian garrison, by the Italian deserters,
and by the Corinthian citizens themselves.® This last fact
surprises the reader, as it seems to have surprised Lucius and
unanimous vote would not imply the actual consent of every man present, but
only a majority among the citizens present from every city.

1 It is strange to find such a scholar as Mommsen (Rém. Gesch. i. 528) talking
about ‘“‘Gesandten.” When Dr. Liddell (ii. 25) talks, in the same way, about
‘‘ Representatives,” one is less surprised.

2 Dr. Liddell says that they “withdrew under protest ;” but there is not ἃ
word to that effect in Livy. Kortiim’s ‘‘ stillschweigende Verwahrung ” (iii. 239)
is another matter. 3 See above, p. 458.

4 The friendship between Macedonia and Megalopolis was indeed of old stand-
ing, but Livy can go back no farther than the capture of Megalopolis by Kleo-
menés, twenty-four years before, which he thinks happened avorum memoria.

5 Liv. xxxii. 22. Neque mirante ullo nec improbante.

8 Paus. vii. 9.4. See above, p. 204.

? Aristainos and Xenophén; the banished Kykliadas accompanied Philip.
Pol. xvii. 1. Liv, xxxii. 82.

δ Liv. xxxii. 23. Uno animo omnes, et Macedones tamquam communem

patriam tuebantur, et Corinthii ducem presidii Androsthenem, haud secus quam
civem et suffragio creatum suo, imperio in se uti patiebantur.

ΙΧ NABIS AT ARGOS 481

Aristainos at the time. But the resistance of the Corinthians
does not show that they had any abstract repugnance to reunion
with the League.! To be captured by a combined host of
Romans and Achaians was a different matter from being de-
livered by Aratos without foreign interference. The Mace-
donian governor, Androsthenés, was personally popular, and the
Corinthians may have remembered the fate of those cities which
fell into the joint hands of Rome and Attolia. Anyhow, the
Macedonian Philoklés was able to reinforce the garrison, and
Lucius, by the advice of King Attalos, raised the siege.

Argos, Dymé, and Megalopolis had declined to join in voting
the Roman alliance. It does not however appear that the
citizens of Dymé or of Megalopolis thought that this justified
them in treason against the Achaian League. A Dymaian
citizen, Ainésidamos by name, commanded a Federal garrison
which had been lately placed in Argos.?_ But the Macedonian
feeling was strong at Argos ; ὅ the city was betrayed to Philoklés; Argos
Ainésidamos, after stipulating for the safe retreat of his troops, betrayed
himself stayed with a few companions and fought to the last.* rpc. 198
The Argeians soon paid the penalty of their treason. In the
course of the next 2 of the next year, Philip, in hopes of winning over Nabis and ceded

to his side, made over his ancestral city to the Tyrant.> After a vy fim to

short show of demagogic tricks,° the oppressions of Nabis soon 3c 197.
reached a pitch far beyond the worst excesses of Philip.’ Thus
both Corinth and Argos, once two of the greatest cities of the
League, were now, as in still earlier days, dangerous outposts of

1 See Schorn (243), who enlarges on the fact that Corinth, as ἃ member of the
League, had only one vote alongside of Keryneija, etc. But Corinth, as a Mace-
donian outpost, had no vote anywhere.

5 Liv. xxxii. 25. Presidium erat Acheorum nuper impositum, quingenti fere
javenes delecti omnium civitatium.

3 The way in which it was shown was curious. In the Argeian Assemblies
the Generals of the State (Pretores, Liv. u.s. See above, p. 199) pronounced
the names of Zeus, Apollo, Héraklés, and King Philip. Philip’s name was now
left out. The people demanded its restitution, which was made amid loud
cheers.

4 Liv, u.s. 5 Ib. xxxii. 40.

6 Nabis really did at Argos, what Kleomenés was in vain expected to do; he
abolished debts, divided land, etc. This marks the difference between the two
men. The innovations of Kleomenés at Sparta were held to be restorations of
the old state of things ; at Argos he did not feel called on to innovate at all.
Nabis, who merely sought a cloak for his own tyranny, carried out the most
extreme Socialist measures in both cities. See above, p. 872, and cf. Kortiim,
iii. 234.

7 Liv. xxxii. 40. Pol. xvii. 17.

21

Exploits
of the

ἘΡΕΙΒΟΒ.

Attempt
at Peace,
B.C. 198.

Charops
acts for
Rome.

482 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP,

its enemies. But the Achaian troops had so greatly improved
under the teaching of Philopoimén that, under any tolerable
generalship, they were now capable of winning a battle for them-
selves. Androsthenés, the Macedonian governor of Corinth,
ravaged all the neighbouring Achaian Cantons at the head of his
mixed host of Macedonians, Corinthians, Thessalians, Boeotians,
Akarnanians, and mercenaries of various kinds. At last Niko-
stratos, the successor of Aristainos in the Generalship, defeated
him in a battle near Kleénai, and cleared all the territory of the
League of his plundering bands.!_ This happened about the
same time as the great fight of Kynoskephalai, and lovers of
coincidences affirmed that the two victories were won on the
same day. About the same time, also, an Achaian contingent
aided in delivering the Rhodian Peraia*? from Philip’s General
Deinokratés.2 One cannot read the narratives of these successes
of the Federal arms without again and again forming the vain
wish that Philopoimén and Aratos could have changed places.

Such was the position of the Achaian League during the
second war between Philip and the Romans. Among the other
Federal states of Greece, we just now hear but little of Epeiros.
Soon after the first landing of Flamininus, while he and his army
were waiting on the banks of the Aods, an attempt was made, as
before, to bring about a peace under Epeirot mediation.‘ This
time, however, the attempt was unsuccessfil. The Epeirot
General® Pausanias, and the Master of the Horse, Alexander,
brought the King and the Consul together. But the demands
of Titus, namely the liberation of every Greek state, were such
as Philip could not bring himself to yield before Kynoskephalai.®
The League, as a League, remained neutral; but Charops, one
of the leading men of the nation, though seemingly not in office
at the time, acted as a strong partizan of Rome. It was by his

1 Liv. xxxiii. 15.

2 That is, the small Rhodian territory on the mainland, increased in 8.0. 188
(see above, p. 167) by the addition of all Lykia and the greater part of Karia
(Καρίας τὰ μέχρι rou Μαιάνδρου. Pol. xxiii. 3).

ὃ Liv. xxxiii. 18.

4 Ib. xxxii. 10. Spes data Philippo est, per Epirotarum gentem temptanda

is. Cf. above, p. 466.

5 On the number of the Epeirot Generals see above, pp. 118, 466. There were
three seven years before.

ὁ Liv. xxxii. 10. Quid victo gravius imperares, T. Quincti ?

ΙΧ AFFAIRS OF EPEIROS AND BCQOTIA 483

help, like that of Ephialtés at Thermopyle, that Titus was
enabled to turn Philip’s strong position among the mountains.!

The Bootian League, meanwhile, was strongly attached to Baorta.
the cause of Philip. It was probably confirmed in its Mace-
donian politics by the loss of Megara. It would seem however Bootia
that the Bosotarch Antiphilos was in the Roman interest ;? at constrained
all events, Titus and his troops contrived to enter Thebes, 80 1 join an
that the Federal Assembly, which was presently held there, δι B.0. 197.
could do nothing but accept the Roman alliance by the unani-
mous vote of all the cities.’ But the heart of the nation was
still Macedonian. Boeotian soldiers served under Androsthenés
at Corinth and under Philip himself at Kynoskephalai* The
treatment of Bootia by Titus after his victory hardly bears on
our subject ; it shows at once the strong anti-Roman feeling of
the people, and the sort of contemptuous magnanimity which
a Roman philhellen could, under such circumstances, afford to
display.°

Akarnania was the home of a nobler race. That gallant Axar-
people, who never betrayed a friend or evaded a treaty,° clave to "ANIA.
Philip to the last. They had seen only the brightest side of
Macedonia and the darkest side of Rome. To them Philip, the Firm
Tyrant of Greece, was the true friend who had defended them sdherence
against the AStolians and who had avenged their wrongs on 4j,,-
Athens. To them Titus, the deliverer of Greece, was but a nanians
chief of those barbarians who had carried off their citizens into ‘© Philip.
slavery, and handed over their cities to their brigand neighbours.
Shortly before Kynoskephalai, Lucius Quinctius contrived to
gain over some leading Akarnanians to the Roman interest. An β.0. 197.
Assembly was called at Leukas,’ at which a sham vote of alliance
with Rome was hurried through the House.® But the national

1 Liv. xxxii. 11. 3 Tb. xxxiii. 1...
3 See above, Ὁ. 143.
4 Liv. xxxiii. 27. 5 Ib. 27-30.

ὅ See above, p. 114. So Livy (xxxiii. 16): Due autem maxime cause eos
tenuerant in amicitia Regis; una j/ides insita gentt, altera metus odiumque
tolorum.

7 Cf. above, p. 115.

8 Liv. xxxiii. 16. Eo neque cuncti convenere Acarnanum populi: nec iis,
qui convenerant, idem placuit. Sed et principes et magistratus pervicerunt, ut
privatum decretum Romane societatis fieret. Id omnes qui abfuerant egre

The distinction between Principes and Magistratus is again to be noticed.
- The former are men of influence, whether in office or not, in this case clearly not
in office.

Sub-
mission of
Akar-

nania,
B.0. 197.

Procla-
mation of
Grecian
Freedom,
B.c. 196,

New Fede-
rations in
Thessaly
and

484 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

feeling was too strong to be cheated in this way. A real
Assembly was held, in which the Roman decree was repealed
and the alliance with Philip was re-enacted. The leaders of
the Roman party were condemned as traitors, and the General
Zeuxidas was deprived of his office, because he had put the
question of the Roman alliance to the vote! The condemned,
with a spirit worthy of their nation, refused to fly to the Roman
post at Korkyra; they appeared before the assembled People,
they pleaded their own cause, and procured the reversal of the
sentences against them. But the League still firmly adhered to
Macedonia. Leukas presently stood a siege at the hands of
Lucius, and was taken-only by the treachery of some Italian
exiles. But the result of Kynoskephalai soon made all resist-
ance hopeless; all Akarnania now submitted, and the country
seems to have been treated by Titus with his usual politic lenity.

The settlement of Greece, and the famous proclamation of
Grecian liberty at the Isthmian Games, was a work worthy of
the spirit which undoubtedly prompted Titus himself, and which
we have no right to assume was wholly absent from the minds
of all hiscountrymen. All Greece was to be free. The proclama-
tion of course enumerated those states only which had been in
bondage to Philip; it would have been an insult to independent
allies of Rome to have proclaimed the freedom of A®tolia or
Achaia. Roman garrisons remained, but only for a season, in
the three fortresses which were called the Fetters of Greece,
Akrokorinthos, Démétrias, and Chalkis.2 Under this settlement,
several new Federations arose in Thessaly and Euboia, but it is
really needless to enter into the details of commonwealths whose
independence was so nearly imaginary. Still they are important
as showing how completely Federalism was the received type of
freedom in Greece in that age. And their establishment reflects
high credit upon their founder, who may have had to contend
against some degree of local prejudice in the liberated towns
themselves, and who certainly had to overcome that national
instinct in himself and his countrymen by which every Roman
strove to make every Greek city weak-and isolated. Of this

1 Liv. us. Zeuxids Pretori, quod de ea re retulisset, imperium abrogaretur.
This seems to show that the Akarnanian General, like his Ztolian, but not un-

like his Achaian, fellow, presided in the Assembly, and put questions to the vote.
2 Pol. xviii. 28. 8 See Kortiim, iii. 250.

ΙΧ SETTLEMENT OF GREECE BY FLAMININUS 485

policy, so predominant a few years later, we see no signs in the
administration of Titus. Corinth was at once restored to the
Achaians, and the League at last received the long promised
possessions of Héraia and Triphylia.1 A joint campaign of
Romans under Titus and Achaians under Aristainos, now again
General, recovered Argos for the League? The same expedition Recovery
also separated from Sparta several of the Lakénian cities, which, of Argos,
if not absolutely incorporated with the League, were at least πο 190
placed under Achaian protection. Nabis however was allowed Nabis
to retain possession of Sparta itself.‘ This recognition of the tetains
Tyrant was seized on as a grievance by the Aitolians. They parta.
complained also that some of the Thessalian cities which Philip

had taken from them had not been restored.© Yet, as Phékis,

1 Liv. xxxiii. 84. Some words have dropped out of the text of the parallel
passage of Polybios (xviii. 30) which, as it stands, gives Corinth and Triphylia to
Eumenés. Orchomenos is not mentioned, but it was probably joined to the League
at the same time.

2 Liv. xxxiv. 40, 41. According to Livy, one Timokratés of Pelléné com-
manded for Nabis in the citadel of Argos, but was let go by the Argeians, quia
clenenter prafuerat. The presence of an Achaian citizen in such a position is
inexplicable, and one is tempted to suspect one of Livy’s usual confusions.

3 Tb. xxxv. 18. Acheis omnium maritimorum Laconum tuendorum a T.
Quinctio cura mandata erat.

This would strictly imply that these Lakénian towns stood to the Federal
Government in a relation like that of Geneva or Miihlhausen to the old Swiss
League. But as the League came to embrace all Peloponnésos, and as equal
annexation was its unvarying principle, one cannot help thinking that they must
have been admitted as States, if not now, yet afterwards, under the administration
of Philopoimén. When Pausanias (vii. 18. 8) speaks of one of these towns as
᾿Αχαιῶν ὑπήκοον, it is probably simply the ignorance of a late and careless writer.
These towns seem to be the same as those afterwards known as the Eleuthero-
lakdénic cities. (See Paus. iii. 21. 6 et seqq.) There were originally twenty-four,
but, before the time of Pausanias, six of them had been recovered by Sparta.

4 The conference between Titus, Nabis, and Aristainos (Liv. xxxiv. 31-3) is
curious. Aristainos tells Nabis of divers Tyrants, probably Jseas, Lydiadas, and
Aristomachos, who had, of their own act, descended to a private station. As if
even Aristomachos had been at all like Nabis, or as if Nabis could have borne, or
been borne in, a private station like Lydiadas.

One remark of Nabis (c. 31) is worthy of notice in an age when Consuls and
Presidents grow into Emperors. ‘‘Tum me Regem a vobis appellari memini; nunc
Tyrannum vocari video. Itaque, si ego nomen imperit mutassem, mthi mec tncon-
stantie, cum vos mutetis, vobis vestres reddenda ratio est.” |

5 Liv. xxxiii. 34, 35; xxxiv. 22, 23. Pol. xviii. 21. In the first of these
passages Livy makes one of his most curious blunders. He found in Polybios
(xviii. $1) that Cneus Cornelius went to the Ztolian Assembly at Thermon ;
ἧκον ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Θερμικῶν σύνοδον. Livy first transfers the scene to Thermopylae,
and then seemingly confounds the Xtolian Congress with the Amphiktyonic
Synod ; Cornelius Thermopylas, ubi freguens Gracie: statis diebus esse solet con-
ventus, (Pylaicum appellant) venit. See Brandstater, 438, 4.

Discontent
of the
Atolians.
With-
drawal

of the
Roman
Garrisons,
B.c. 194.

B.c. 194~
191.

Affairs
of the
Achaian
League.

Eminence
of Mega-
lopolis.
Parallel of
Virginia.

Mega-
lopolitan
Presidents.

B.c. 184.

486 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Lokris,' and Ambrakia * were recognized as parts of the Atolian
body, they hardly seem to have suffered. At last, when his
whole settlement was finished, Titus withdrew the Roman garm-
sons from the three great fortresses,® and left Greece to the
enjoyment of such peace as Nabis and the Attolians might
allow.

§ 2. From the Settlement of Greece under Flamininus
to the Death of Philopoimén

B.C. 194—183

For about three years Greece was left to herself. Of the two
great Leagues, the Attolians were brooding over their real or
supposed wrongs, and were planning how to raise up new
enemies against their late allies. The Achaians were occupied
with the war with Nabis and with some internal reforms. The
nature of our information at this time is peculiar; the fragments
of Polybios leave many deplorable gaps, but, when we have any
knowledge at all, our knowledge is very full. The fragments
are enough to give us a tolerable view of the state of parties in
the Union, and to set clearly before us the characters of several
Federal politicians. It cannot fail to strike every reader that
the City of Megalopolis held at this time the same sort of position
in the Achaian League which the State of Virginia held in the
first days of the American Union. Without any sort of legal
pre-eminence, without at all assuming the character of a capital,
Megalopolis was clearly the first city of the League, the city
which gave the nation the largest proportion of its leading states-
men. Megalopolis, like Virginia, was “the Mother of Presidents,”
and that too of Presidents of different political parties. As
Virginia produced both Washington and Jefferson, so Megalopolis,
if she produced Philopoimén and Lykortas, produced also
Aristainos and Diophanés. Megalopolitan citizens are also con-
stantly found in other posts of honour. We have already heard
of a case,* though we have not yet reached it in chronological
order, in which the Cabinet Council of the League contained at
least four Megalopolitans out of eleven. Men of the same city
seem, oftener than any other, to have represented the League as

1 Liv, xxxiii. 34. Pol. xviii. 30. 3 Pol. xxii. 9.
3 Liv. xxxiv. 49-51. 4 See above, p. 221.

Ix POLICY OF PHILOPOIMEN 487

its Ambassadors abroad, and to have acted as its subordinate
Magistrates at home. Now we must remember that all or most

of these offices were conferred by an Assembly in which Megalo-

polis had only a single vote ; we must also remember that these
Megalopolitan statesmen were constantly opposed to one another,

and therefore could not have represented any local section. We

may thus recognize at once an honourable witness to a city which Absence
contributed so many members to the national Government, and οὗ βθοετα-
a proof of the way in which the other cities rose above local parties,
prejudices, and kept the Union from the curse of geographical
parties.

Philopoimén had now returned from Crete. He soon again 8.6. 194.
became the chief man of the League, and, though he never Influence
attained the boundless influence of Aratos, yet he was felt to be οἵ Ὁ rae
the bulwark and glory of the nation. He filled the chief magis- oe
tracy eight times, and died in office at the age of seventy, retain-
ing the confidence of his countrymen to the last. He had fallen
upon days in which it was clear that the fate of Achaia, or rather
of the world, depended on the will of Rome. His policy, under
such circumstances, was at once prudent and dignified. It was
the wisdom of the weaker state to abstain from all offensive
boasts, from all needless opposition or provocation, but, at the His
same time, to keep up its position as an independent common- moverate
wealth, to give way to the unmistakable will of the Roman Senate PO, ,
and People, but not to make the laws of the League yield to Rome.
the passing caprice of every Roman officer. He saw that Greece
was doomed; but he held that a course at once modest and
dignified might stave off the evil day, and might make the blow
less heavy and less disgraceful when it did come. The Romans
themselves would not think the worse of a people who were
in form their equal allies for preserving a decent degree of
self-respect. But abject prostration before every insult would
only make insults come thicker, and would bring on the final
destruction sooner than need be.1 He thus endeavoured to
preserve for the League a respectable position both towards
Rome and towards other powers. He strove to strengthen
her at home both by constitutional reforms and by the accession His
of new members to the Union. It was this last branch of his internal
policy which revealed the weak side both of his political plans P°"™
and of his personal character.

1 Pol. xxv. 9.

Other
Federal
statesmen.
Lykortas,

Dio-
phanés,

B.c. 190.

Aristainos.

The Mace-
donian

party
extinct.
Discontent
against
Philo-
poimén

at Mega-
lopolis,
B.C. 194.

488 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CRAP.

Of the other Achaian statesmen the most important were
Lykortas, Aristainos, and Diophanés, all of them citizens of
Megalopolis. Lykortas, the father of Polybios, was, both in war
and politics, the pupil and follower of his illustrious fellow-citizen.
He pursued the same policy, possibly now and then carrying his
opposition to Rome somewhat further than his master.! Diophanés
was a military scholar of Philopoimén, a good officer,? whose head
seems to have been turned by the credit which he won when
commanding the Achaian troops in Asia. He conceived an
unworthy jealousy of a greater man than himself, and he seems
to have sometimes wantonly thwarted Philopoimén’s policy out
of mere spite. Aristainos, whom we have already seen twice in
office, was not a military man; he wasa good speaker, and skilled
in civil business ; he does not seem to have been either corrupt
or wilfully traitorous,* but he held that the interests of the
League required complete submission to the slightest hint from
Rome. His policy therefore was directly opposed to that of
Philopoimén. The Macedonian party, once headed by the
banished Kykliadas, vanishes altogether.

Philopoimén’s long absence in Crete had given great offence
in his own city. The war with Nabis had brought Megalopolis
to great straits, and it was held, not without reason, that the
best soldier of Megalopolis and of Greece ought not to have
been absent from his country at such a time. There was
a strong disposition among his fellow-citizens to deprive him
of their franchise. The Federal body however stepped in;
Aristainos was then General, and he was sent, like Aratos
on a former occasion,® to compose matters at Megalopolis.
Aristainos was, afterwards at least, a political adversary of Philo-
poimén, but it does not follow that he was a personal enemy, and
he may well have wished to save his native city from the disgrace
of disfranchising the greatest man in Greece. The mission of
Aristainos was successful, and Philopoimén remained a citizen of
Megalopolis.’ It is strange to read that it was out of revenge
for this insult that Philopoimén assisted several places which had

1 See Thirlwall, viii. 401.

2 Pol. xxiii. 10. Διοφάνης ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης, ἄνθρωπος στρατιωτικώτερος 4
WONLTLKWTE POS. ὃ Pol. xxi. 7. Liv. xxxvii. 20, 21.

4 See Schorn, p. 323.

5 (On this power of disfranchisement by a Canton, see Bluntschli, Gesch. des
schweiz. Bundesrechtes, i. 530. ]

8 See above, pp. 199, 429. ? Plut. Phil. 13.

Ix PHILOPOIMEN DIVIDES THE LARGER STATES 489

hitherto been incorporated with Megalopolis in obtaining the He raises
rank of independent members of the League. This explanation the smaller
can only come from writers who did not understand the measure. politan.
Philopoimén’s internal policy was to promote the most perfect townships

equality among the several cities of the Federation. If these nto ἐπ᾽ ι
townships were strictly subject districts, their emancipation may Qshtons,.

have been sought simply as an act of justice, like the liberation
of Vaud from the yoke of Bern. And there was another motive
which might well be present to the mind of an Arkadian politician.
It is clear that, up to this time, the Old-Achaian towns had
possessed an undue preponderance ; their ten votes might still
outweigh the interests of several of the greatest cities in Greece.
The plan which Philopoimén steadily pursued was well adapted
to counteract this evil. To erect these dependent townships into
independent Cantons was to give several more votes to the
Arkadian portion of the League, and thus to make the geo-
graphical balance more equal.? But this more remote advantage
would be much less perceptible to local politicians at Megalopolis
than the immediate loss of dominion sustained by their own city.
Even if we suppose these townships to have been, not mere subject
districts, but municipalities sharing in the Megalopolitan franchise,

1 See above, p. 200. Plutarch (Phil. 13) does not mention the names of these
townships, but numismatic evidence supplies the names of Alipheira, Asea, Dipaia,
Gortys, Pallantion, and Theisoa. There are extant coins of all these places as
independent Achaian cities. The list nearly agrees with that given by Pausanias
(viii. 27. 7) of those places among the towns united in the συνοικισμός of Megalo-
polis, which were not absolutely deserted. They remained in his time as villages
only (ἔχουσιν of Μεγαλοπολῖται κώμας), except Alipheira (and perhaps Pal-
lantion), which retained the rank of a city. Alipheira was the district which had
before been disputed between Megalopolis and Elis. See above, p. 460.

2 See Thirlwall, viii. 364. If the Eleutherolakénic towns were really all
admitted into the League, each with an independent vote (see p. 485), it would
be as necessary to strengthen the Arkadian interest against any undue influence
on their part as against that of the Old-Achaian cities.

This system of dividing large States is recognized by the American Constitu-
tion, which provides that it shall bedone only by the joint consent of Congress
and of the Legislature of the State interested (Art. iv. § 3. 1, a provision re-
enacted in the Confederate Constitution). Accordingly several new States have
been formed, at various times, within the old limits of Virginia, North Carolina,
Georgia, and Massachusetts. Just now (December, 1862) a bill is before Congress
for the unconstitutional recognition of part of Virginia as a district State—uncon-
stitutional, because the requisite consent of Virginia is not given.

It must be remembered that the territory of Megalopolis was at this time far
larger than that of any other member of the League. The other two great States
of Elis and Messéné were not yet incorporated. We here see yet another point
of likeness between Megalopolis and Virginia. Each might be called the Mother
of States as well as the Mother of Presidents.

Philo-
poimén’s
fourth
General-
ship,

Bc. 193-
192.

War with
Nabis.

Indepen-
dent
action

of the

League.

Antiochos
invited
by the
tolians,
B.C. 192.

490 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

still their separation would offend a strong vein of local patriotism,
which is to be found everywhere. The dismemberment of the
Great City would seem to many to be an evil which more than
counterbalanced the real strengthening of the Arkadian interest
in the Assembly.! We can therefore well understand that such
a proposal may have made Philopoimén for a while unpopular at
home, and may have given his enemies an opportunity of brand-
ing him as a traitor to his native town. How the proposal was
carried, we know not, but carried it evidently was. Philopoimén
steadily adhered to his policy, and it was followed both by him
and by Lykortas on other occasions.”

But if Philopoimén was just now somewhat under a cloud in
his own city, he certainly was not so in the general estimation of
the League. We have seen the Assembly and the General inter-
fering on his behalf, and the next election once more raised him
to the chief magistracy. Nabis continued to make inroads into
the Federal territory, and he was now besieging Gythion, one
of those Lakénian towns which were at least under Achaian
protection, if not actually members of the League. Philopoimén
waged war against him with great success, varied only by a
defeat at sea, where the Arkadian was out of his element. These
campaigns were waged wholly without Roman or Macedonian
help. The League acted independently in everything. An

_ Assembly at Siky6én refused to postpone the war till the Roman

fleet could arrive, even though a letter from Titus was produced
in which that course was suggested.* During the same year a
Congress of Allies was held at Tegea, in which Achaians, Epeirots,
and Akarnanians planned and carried out the campaign as freely
as could have been done in the days of Markos or Aratos.*

Meanwhile the Attolians were intriguing to bring a new foe
of Rome into Greece. Antiochos of Syria had long been threaten-
Ing war with Rome; the A‘tolians now induced him to cross at

1 It may be doubted whether the State of New York would willingly be cut up
into four or five small States, in order to obtain eight or ten Senators, or whether
Liverpool or Birmingham would choose to purchase an increase of Members at the
price of being divided into several small boroughs.

2 On the Lakénian towns see above, p. 485. The Messénian towns will be
mentioned presently. Also Pagai, the port of Megara, coins as an independent
Canton, which shows that the like policy was pursued there, either at the reunion
of Megara or at some later time.

3 Τὰν. xxxv. 25. 4 Tb. 27.

1X INTRIGUES OF THE ZTOLIANS WITH ANTIOCHOS 491

once into Europe. Titus had now returned to Greece with a
sort of general commission to look after Greek affairs, but
formally as Ambassador along with several colleagues! An
Astolian Assembly was held, to which Titus first sent Athenian
envoys to speak for Rome, and afterwards came himself.? The
majority of the Assembly was inclined to refuse him an audience,
but the counsels of age and wisdom prevailed thus far.* These
counsels however did not hinder the Assembly from passing a
vote to invite Antiochos to come and liberate Greece, nor the
General Damokritos from telling Titus, when he asked for a
copy of the decree, that he should have one dated from the
Aétolian camp on the Tiber.

This absurd vaunt in the Public Assembly was followed by a Treach--
resolution in the Senate of the Apokletes,* such as could hardly erous
have been carried, or even brought forward, in the councils of ott
any other people. In former times the A®tolian Magistrates Atolian
had often been charged with conniving at the robberies and Senate.
piracies of their countrymen. They now openly adopted the
principle on which they had so long secretly acted. It was
decreed to seize Démétrias, Chalkis, and Sparta on one day.

The attempt on Démétrias succeeded, that on Chalkis failed.
To Sparta Alexamenos of Kalydén led a body of horse and foot,
who had received orders from the Federal General implicitly to
obey their leader in everything. Nabis had asked for A‘tolian
help, and he believed that Alexamenos had brought it. For a
while the Aétolians behaved themselves as allies, but presently Murder
they murdered Nabis at a review. Tyrant as he was, they were of Nabis
not the fitting ministers of vengeance. The blow was dealt so aecliens.
suddenly that it was only the national love of plunder which
hindered them from seizing and holding Sparta, according to
their commission. As it was, they entered the city, but, while
they were scattered in search of booty, the Lacedsemonians
rallied, and slew Alexamenos and most of his followers. A few
only wandered into the Achaian territory, to be there seized
and sold as slaves. The Achaian General was not a man to

1 Liv. xxxv. 28. 2 Ib. 32, 33.

8 Ib. 33. Principam maxime seniores auctoritate obtinuere ut daretur iis
concilium.

4 Ib. 34. See above, p. 262. Schorn (p. 274) says, “In dem Rathe der
Apokleten, welcher fast unabhangig vom Volke regierte, wurde demnach der Plan
entworfen.”” Why! The tolian Assembly was clearly sovereign, but it did
not follow that it should regulate every detail of every campaign.

Philo-
poimén
unites
Sparta to
the
Achaian
League,
B.c. 192,
The union
not for-
cible, yet
contrary to
Spartan
feeling.

492 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

lose such an opportunity. He hastened to Sparta with some
troops; the city was in utter confusion ; he got together an
Assembly of some kind or other,! and procured a vote by which
Sparta was united to the Achaian League.

It does not appear that on this occasion any violence was
used, or any unjustifiable change made in the laws or constitu-
tion of the new State.2 Sparta, after her first admission to the
League, retained so much of her old discipline as had survived
the many revolutions of the last fifty years. Nor can it be said
with strict truth that Sparta was forced into the League. All
that Philopoimén did was to take advantage of an unusually
favourable moment, and we can well understand the arguments
by. which he might, at that particular moment, easily carry the
majority® of a Spartan Assembly along with him. But, even if
we did not know what followed, it would be hard to believe
that union with the League was the deliberate wish of the
Lacedemonian people. Sparta, shorn of all her rank and power,
deprived of all her subject territory, was called upon to enter a
Federation which had long been her bitterest enemy. She had
to enter it as a single town, with a single vote, as the compeer
of the petty Cantons of the old Achaia, perhaps even of the
Lakénian townships which had just been set free from her own
yoke. Such a position must have been felt by every Spartan as
irksome and degrading. For a moment, after the Tyranny and
the wars of Nabis, the change would be felt as a relief; but the
very return of peace and prosperity under the Federal Govern-
ment would bring with it aspirations after a higher national
being than the position of a single Achaian city could satisfy.
That position might do for Phlious and Sikyén, it might do
even for Argos and Corinth, but it would not do for the Sparta
of Agésilaos and Kleomenés. Little more than thirty years had
passed since a Spartan King had seen all Peloponnésos at his
feet; the wars of Machanidas, and even of Nabis, had shown
that the military spirit of the city still survived. And, beside
these feelings of special dislike to the Achaian Government, a
succession of revolutions had filled Sparta with elements of con-
fusion inconsistent with lasting quiet under any Government.

1 Liv. xxxv. 37. Evocatis principibus et oratione habita . . . societati
Achzeorum Lacedsemonios adjunxit. 2 See Schorn, p. 277.

3 Plut. Phil. 15. Tov μὲν ἀκόντων, τοὺς δὲ συμπείσας, προσηγάγετο καὶ per-
εκόσμησεν els τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς τὴν πόλιν.

1x ANNEXATION OF SPARTA TO THE LEAGUE 493

To Philopoimén and the Achaians it naturally seemed the greatest
and most glorious of all acquisitions, when the city which had
so lately threatened the whole League, was, without striking a
blow, by the mere effect of a speech from an Achaian magistrate,
changed into a peaceful member of the Federal body.! As
matters now stood, Greece needed union above all things; to
join all Peloponnésos into one body was a patriotic and a
generous project. Unhappily it proved the greater of two evils.
Sparta, as a member of the League, proved more troublesome
than she had ever been as a border foe. Her affairs as an
Achaian Canton gave a more constant handle for Roman inter-
vention, and for intervention in a worse form than they ever
could have done had she retained the position of an avowed
enemy.

The annexation of Sparta took place before Antiochos landed Antiochos

in Greece. On his coming, he was elected General—seemingly ected
General-Extraordinary *—of the Aitolian League, with thirty of General,

the Apokletes ὃ to assist him in the duties of his office. It will s.c. 192.
be remembered that Attalos had preceded him in a similar post ; 4

and that, even in Achaia, the same office had been conferred,
nominally at least, on an Egyptian Ptolemy.® He now strove

to win the other Federal states to his side. Achaia would have His rela-
nothing to say to him; his Ambassadors were heard at Aigion ; tions with
Titus himself was heard in answer to them ; the Assembly voted °
to have no friends and enemies but those of Rome, and, with

zeal perhaps a little premature, it actually preceded Rome in
declaring war against both Antiochos and the AXtolians.6 But
Boeotia openly joined the invader; he went to Thebes, he ap- Beotia,
peared in the Federal Congress, and a vote was passed receiving

him as an ally, though without formally casting aside the Roman

1 Plut. Phil. 15. Θαυμαστῶς μὲν εὐδοκίμησε παρὰ τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς προσκτὴη-
σάμενος αὐτοῖς ἀξίωμα πόλεως τηλικαύτης καὶ δύναμιν" οὐ γὰρ ἣν μικρὸν ᾿Αχαΐας
μέρος γενέσθαι τὴν Σπάρτην.

3 Liv. xxxv. 45. IJmperatoremque Regem appellandum censuerunt. (The
formula carries one on some centuries.) As Brandstiter (p. 446) says, Jmperator
probably translates στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ. Phaineas, the regular General,
would hardly be deposed.

3 Liv. u.s. Pol. xx. 1. See above, p. 262. Brandstiter (446) says, ‘‘ Es ist
wohl gewiss, dass diese dreissig mit den Apokleten dieselben sind." But Polybios
says Τριάκοντα τῶν ἀποκλήτων, showing plainly that the Apokletes were a larger
body, and that these thirty were only a Committee of them. See Tittmann, 727.

4 See above, p. 455. 5 See above, p. 302. 6 Liv. xxxv. 48-50.

Epeiros,

Akar-
nania,

and Elis,

Defeat of
Antiochos
at Ther-
mopyla,
B.C. 191.

etolian

494 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

connexion.! Epeiros, under Charops,—so lately the friend of
Rome—played a double part; the answer given to the King
was that the Epeirots would join him, Ἢ he came to their
country, otherwise they were too near Italy to expose them-
selves.2, Akarnania was divided: Antiochos bought over one
of the leading men named Mnasilochos, who won to his side the
General Klytos. By a stratagem they put Medeén into the
hands of the King, and some other cities joined him.* He also
besieged Thourion, but he raised the siege on hearing that the
Roman Consul, Manius Acilius Glabrio, had entered Thessaly.
In Peloponnésos, the Eleians openly took his side, and asked for
troops from him for their defence.‘

The hopes of Antiochos and the Atolians were shattered by
the victory of the Consul Manius at Thermopyle. Among the
resulta of that battle, the point which mainly interests us is the
submission of the AXtolians to Rome. The whole story is well
worthy of study as an illustration of Roman diplomacy, and it
is far from lacking in military interest. Avtolians, fighting on
their own soil for their national being, were enemies whom even
Rome could not afford to despise. The sieges of Hérakleia,
Naupaktos, Ambrakia, and Samé in Kephallénia gave a foretaste
of what was to be done on the same ground in our own days by
the defenders of Mesolongi. One or two constitutional points
are also well brought out in the narrative. One of the most
striking scenes in the war is when the AXtolian Ambassadors,
with the General Phaineas at their head, unwittingly handed
themselves over to the Roman Faith.5 They knew not that, in
Roman technical language, this implied an unreserved surrender
of themselves and their country. Manius was not a foe of the
school of Titus, and he presently began to exercise the rights of
conquest in their harshest form. The AXtolian General found
out his mistake, and affirmed that, though he and the Apokletes
were ready to submit, yet the National Assembly alone had

1 Pol. xx. 7. Liv. xxxv. 47; xxxvi. 6. 3 Pol. xx. 8.

3 Liv. xxxvi. 12. Aliis sua voluntate affluentibus, metu coacti etiam, qui
dissentiebant, ad Regem convenerunt. Quos placida oratione territos cum
permulsisset, ad spem vulgate clementis aliquot populi Acarnanie defecerunt.

4 Pol. xx. 3. Ol δὲ ᾿Ηλεῖοι παρεκάλουν πέμπειν τῇ πόλει βοήθειαν.

δ᾽ Liv. χχχνὶ. 27, 28. Pol. xx. 9. Οἱ δ᾽ Αἰτωλοὶ. . . ἔκριναν ἐπιτρέπειν τὰ
ὅλα Μανίῳ, δόντες αὑτοὺς εἰςτὴν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν, οὐκ εἰδότες τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει
τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ τῆς πίστεως ὀνόματι πλανηθέντες, ὡς dy διὰ τοῦτο λειοτέρου σφίσιν

ἐλέον ὑπάρξοντος. παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἰσοδυναμεῖ τό τε εἰς τὴν πίστιν αὑτὸν
ἐγχειρίσαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν δοῦναι περὶ αὑτοῦ τῷ κρατοῦντι.

Ix ANTIOCHOS IN GREECE 495

power to assent to such terms.! By the intercession of Lucius
Valerius, Phaineas was allowed a truce, in order to consult the
supreme authority of the nation. He first consulted the Apo-
kletes, and then, by their advice, summoned the Assembly.? The
people altogether scouted the notion of submission, and would

listen to no reasoning on its behalf.* The war therefore went Working
on. The three elements in the Aitolian constitution here come οἱ the
out very plainly. We see the action of the General, of the Gonsti..
Apokletes, and of the National Assembly, the Apokletes filling tution.
the place both of the Cabinet Council and of the Senate in the
Achaian system.

By the treaty, if treaty it may be called, which ended the Atolia
fétolian War, the League lost its independence for ever. It becomes
became the dependent ally of Rome. It was the first state, the D Ally.
within the proper limits of Old Greece,* which entered into that of Rome,
degrading relation. It might indeed be said that all the Greek 5.0. 189.
allies of Rome were practically dependent allies. But such was
not their formal position ; in name Achaia and Rome contracted
on equal terms. But AXtolia, though retaining its internal
independence, became subject to Rome in all external relations.

In the well-known phrase of Roman Law, the League bound
itself to reverence the Majesty of the Roman People.’ This
leadership in servitude was a fitting punishment for the Greek
state which had been the first to bring Roman fleets and armies
into Greece. The loss of dignity was accompanied by an equal
loss of territory. The League gave up all claim to the cities Dismem-
which had been taken from it during the war ; 7 Ambrakia and berment
other towns became independent commonwealths ; 8 Oiniadai of Aitolia.
1 Pol. xx. 10. See Brandstiter, p. 470, note.
7 Tb. See above, pp. 260, 262, 264.

3 Ib. Οὕτως ἀπεθηριώθη τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ᾽ οὐδ' ἀπαντᾶν οὐδεὶς ἐπεβάλετο πρὸς
τὸ διαβούλιον.

41 mean in continental Greece, south of Epeiros and Macedonia. Korkyra
and the Greek cities of Illyria were already in this, or a still closer, degree of
dependence on Rome.

5 Pol. xxii. 15. Ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν δυναστείαν τοῦ
δήμου τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀδόλως rypelrw. Liv. xxxviii.11. Jmperium majestatemque
Populi Romani gens Astolorum conservato sine dolo malo. Livy makes one of
his usual mistakes in reporting one of the terms of this treaty. The deserters
and prisoners were to be given up τῷ ἄρχοντι τῷ ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ; that is clearly to
the Roman officer in command there. Livy turns this into Corcyreorum magis-
tratibus, as if it meant the magistrates of the Korkyraian commonwealth.

6 See Thirlwall, viii. 392.

7 Pol. xxii. 15. On the date fixed see Thirlwall, u.s.

8 See Liv. xxxviii. 44. Schorn (p. 301) remarks, “Griechenland aber ward

Union of
Elis and
Messéné
with the
Achaian

496 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

and his territory was restored to the Akarnanian League ;!
Pleur6n was annexed by the Achaians, who had given consider-
able aid during the war, and it was probably now that they
acquired the still more important and more distant possession of
Hérakleia.2 As her own share of the spoil, Rome, besides her
general suzerainty over A‘tolia, took Kephallénia as part of her
immediate domain. The island was excluded from the treaty,°
and was presently conquered, after a long resistance at the hands
of the people of Samé. *

Within Peloponnésos, the Achaians had already been rewarded
for their adhesion to the Roman cause® by permission to unite
Elis and Messéné to the League. Since the annexation of Sparta,
these two were the only cities of the peninsula which still retained
their distinct existence. The relations between Messéné and the
League had commonly been friendly, and it was not very long
since Philopoimén had rescued the city from the grasp of the
Tyrant Nabis.6 Elis, on the other hand, as the ally of Atolia,
had always been hostile; some of the most famous victories of
Philopoimén had been won at the cost of Eleian enemies. Yet
Elis now seemed less unwilling to enter into the League than
Messéné. If, in the course of the various Messénian revolu-
tions, the oligarchic party had now gained the upper hand, the
apparent unwillingness of Messéné is easy to be understood.
Later events clearly show that there was in the city an Achaian
and an anti-Achaian party, and that these were respectively the
parties of democracy and of oligarchy. However this may be,
the Achaian invitation to join the League received no answer
but a declaration of war, and it was only by the interposition of
Titus himself that Messéné was at last induced, with a rather
bad grace, to enter the Achaian Union. Titus added that, if
noch mehr zerstiickelt, als es bisher war ; denn die den Aetolern abgenommenen
Orte wurden frei und bildeten fiir sich unabhingige Staaten.” This device was
of course part of the Roman policy.

1 Pol.us. Liv. xxxviii. 11.

3 See Paus. vii. 11. 3; 14. 1. Schorn (801) adds, “ Wahrscheinlich war
der erstere von den Achiern erobert worden und der andere freiwillig in die
Sympolitie getreten.”

3 Pol. xxii. 15. Περὶ δὲ KepadAnulas μὴ ἔστω ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις.

4 Liv, xxxviii, 29-30.

5 According to Plutarch (Cat. Maj. 12) there was a party in Achaia, at least
at Corinth, Patrai, and Aigion, which openly supported Antiochos. If so, the
movement was a merely local one, and was easily stifled. Schorn (pp. 279, 289)

seems to make too much of it.
6 See above, p. 477.

Ix FINAL UNION OF PELOPONNESOS 497

they ever had reason to complain of the conduct of the Federal Dealings
Government towards them, they had only to appeal to him.! οἵ Flami- h
If this was said in the character of a Roman Officer, it was a vas wat
direct. breach of the first principles of the Federal relation ; it
directly violated the article in the Treaty with Rome which
provided that Rome should receive no diplomatic agent from any
single city of the League. Titus was, it may be, by this time
awaking from his dream of philhellenism, and sinking into a
Roman’s common way of looking on the rights of other nations.
Or rather perhaps, as the personal deliverer of Greece, he would
have all Greece look to him as its personal patron and protector.
He, Titus Quinctius, not the Roman Senate and People, would
be the judge in all Grecian quarrels, and would order everything
for the good of the nation which he loved. But, in either case,
he was not disposed to allow any claims of the League to stand
in the way of direct Roman interests. The League had bought Annexa-
the island of Zakynthos of a certain Hieroklés, who had com- ἴοι οἱ hos
manded there for its sovereign Amynander, and who, on that prevented
prince’s fall, seems to have thought that he had a right to dispose by Flami-
of it for himself. 2 The morality of such a transaction seems ™0U
doubtful, and the right of the League to a possession so
acquired might well be disputed either by Amynander or by the
Zakynthian people. But it is hard to see on what ground Rome
could put in her claim to an island which she had neither
purchased nor conquered. So however it was; Titus, in that
quaint parabolic vein which he sometimes affected,’ undertook to
prove that the possession of Zakynthos was not expedient for
the League itself. The League was a tortoise, safe as long as
it kept within its shell of Peloponnésos, but in danger as soon
as it stepped beyond that limit. The same argument would
have applied with more force to the Achaian acquisition of
Pleur6n and Hérakleia a little later, to which Titus seems to
have made no objection. But Zakynthos, Korkyra, and Kephal-
lénia were all of them possessions which the Romans, like later
protectors of Greece, thought good to trust in no hands but
their own.‘

1 Liv. xxxvi 31. ϑὲ qua haberent, de quibus aut recusare aut in posterum
caveri sibi vellent, Corinthum ad se venirent. Cf. Schorn, p. 291.

2 Ib. 8. Tb. 32. Cf. xxxv. 49.

4 “The League drew in its head, and the island was given up to the Romans,”

Thirlwall, viii. 387. Cf. Liddell, History of Rome, ii. 42.
Mr. Grote has remarked that the acquisition of territory by purchase is much

2k

Relations
between
Achaia
and Rome.

198 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

The League had thus, in the days of its decline, attained the
widest measure of territorial extent to which it could ever have
reasonably looked forward in the days of its greatness. It had
fallen to the lot of Diophanés to put the finishing stroke to
the work of Markos, Aratos, Lydiadas, and Philopoimén. All
Peloponnésos, together with several places out of Peloponnésos,
was united under a single Federal Government. Unluckily this
consummation, so desirable in itself, came a hundred years too
late. Things might have run a different course, if the Achaia of
Philopoimén had sprung at once to life under the hands of
Markos of Keryneia. But the Achaia of Philopoimén had to
deal with an ally whose friendship was more deadly than the
enmity of all the Kings and Tyrants against whom Markos
and Aratos had to struggle. The bright vision of philhellenic
generosity was fast passing away from the mind of Rome,
perhaps even from the mind of Titus himself. The position of
Achaia with regard to Rome was one which it shared with
Rhodes, and practically with Macedonia, though Macedonia
had now formally sunk to the state of dependent alliance. The
League was far too weak to contend against Rome, or to
maintain a really equal alliance with Rome, but it was far too
strong to become Rome’s mere abject flatterer, like so many
contemporary Kings and commonwealths. As territory went
in those days, the territory of the League was large; most of
it lay compactly together; its inhabitants still retained their
patriotism and their self-respect ; their friendship was still eagerly
sought for by foreign powers;! they still had statesmen and
generals among them, and an army trained to victory under
one of the three great captains of the age? Such a nation
needed much heavier reverses than any that they had yet met
with to bring them down to the level of the Kings of Bithynia
and the Demagogues of Athens. Roman vanity was wounded
by the existence of a people whom it was impossible to treat
as slaves, and whom there was no excuse for treating as enemies.*
rarer in Old Greece than in medieval Europe. We have seen several approaches
to it in the course of our ‘history, as the sale of Aigina to Attalos (see above, p.
453). The contemplated acquisition of a new State by purchase finds its parallel
in the purchase of Louisiana by the United States under Jefferson in 1803.

1 See the account of the embassies from Syria, Egypt, and Pergamos in
Polybios, xxiii. 7 et seqq. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 396.

4 Philopoimén, Hannibal, Scipio. See Liv. xxxix. 50, 52.

3 (Cf. Justin, xxxiv.1. Soli adhuc ex Grecia universa Achzi nimis potentes
tunc temporis Romanis videbantur, etc. }

IX RELATIONS BETWEEN ACHAIA AND ROME — 499

The Roman Senate did not scruple to make use of every mean
and malignant art to degrade and weaken a power which,
throughout two dangerous wars, had always shown itself the
faithful ally, though never the base flatterer, of Rome. The
subtle diplomacy of the Senate soon found where the weak
point of the League lay. The Achaian, Arkadian, and the Argolic
members of the Union were now firmly welded together by
the Federal tie. Among them we hear of no dissensions, no
hankering after separation. These were doubtless those golden
days of Peloponnésian welfare and harmony upon which Polybios
grows so eloquent.! But the newly-acquired members, joined in
some degree against their own will, furnished admirable materials
for Roman intrigue? It was easy to hearken to every complaint,
to fan every flame of discontent, to seize upon every opportunity
of meddling in the internal affairs of the League, upon every
opportunity of encouraging sycophants and discouraging patriots.
Sparta, as we have seen, had been, not indeed forced, but in a
manner surprised, into the League. Among the various parties
in that divided city, none perhaps heartily loved the Achaian
connexion, and some certainly were altogether hostile to it. At
Messéné, though the mass of the people seems to have been Roman
Unionist, there was a strong oligarchic faction bent upon ee
Secession. Had the Achaian Government been left to itself, rewly.
a generation, or less, of prudent administration might have annexed
healed all these differences. But the Achaian Government had Cities.
no such chance allowed it. Possibly too the character of
Philopoimén, brave soldier and honest patriot as he was, was
less suited for so delicate a task than the irresistible diplomacy

1 Pol. ii. 37, 88. [Cf. also xxvi. 8. Thirlwall, viii. 503.]

3 I cannot help protesting against the way in which this whole period is dealt
with by Mommsen in his Roman History. He really seems unable to understand
that a small state can have any rights, or that a generous or patriotic sentiment
can find a place anywhere except in the breast of a fvol. Flamininus is called
names because, at one time at least of his life, he was really well disposed towards
Greece. Philopoimén himself is mocked at, because, being unfortunately a
citizen of a small state, he was loyally attached to that state. We are even told
(i. 568) that the base traitor Kallikratés was a wiser man than he. The manifest
fact that Rome did stir up strife in Greece, a fact plainly written in every page of
later Grecian history, is dismissed amid a torrent of hard words against those who
assert it. Such men are mere “ politisirende Philologen.” As the words “ politi-
sirende Philologen ” do not seem to be German, Greek, or any other language, it
is hard to know their exact meaning, but they are clearly used as an expression
of contempt. But whatever they may mean, an English scholar may be quite

contented to be set down as one member of the class, so long as Bishop Thirlwall
is another.

First dis-

turbances .

at Sparta
composed
by Philo-
poimén,
B.c. 191.

Spartan
attack
on Las,
B.c. 189.

500 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

of Aratos. But Aratos himself might have failed, when every
one who had a grievance was encouraged to carry it at once to
Rome or to the nearest Roman officer. Whatever decision might
be given, the mere entertaining such complaints was an insult to
the majesty of an equal ally, and a direct breach of the treaty
between Achaia and Rome. As Lykortas once ventured to tell
Appius Claudius, Rome had no more to do with the way in
which Achaia chose to deal with Sparta than Achaia had to do
with the way in which Rome chose to deal with Capua.!
Nevertheless the history of this time is to a great extent the
history of the embassies which went to and fro about the affairs
of Sparta. Of this long web of intrigue I shall attempt only a
short summary.

Disturbances began early, indeed while the fate of A‘tolia
was still undecided. A movement showed itself at Sparta; the
General Diophanés, accompanied by Titus himself, marched
thither to preserve order. This step was contrary to the advice
of Philopoimén, who held that, while the war between Rome
and Antiochos still continued, the League had better remain
quiet. As his counsel was unheeded, he himself hastened to
Sparta, composed the differences there by his personal influence,
and left no excuse for either the Roman Ambassador or the
Achaian General to enter the city.2. Two years later, when
Philopoimén himself was General for the fifth time, the Spartans,
dissatisfied with their new and narrow boundaries, attacked Las,
one of the towns separated from Sparta by Titus.2 The Federal
Government naturally interfered ; an Assembly was held, which
heard the complaints of the people of Las, and Philopoimén, as
President of the Union, required of the State Government of
Sparta that the authors of the outrage should be given up to the
Federal authority for trial. The Lacedemonian answer took
the form of the murder of thirty Spartans of Unionist principles ;
this was followed by a formal vote of Secession,‘ and by a

1 Liv. xxxix. 37.

2 Plut. Phil. 16. Τόν τε στρατηγὸν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν καὶ τὸν ὕπατον [Titus was
no such thing] τῶν Ρωμαίων ἰδιώτης ὧν ἀπέκλεισε. I follow Bishop Thirlwall
(viii. 384) in his explanation of these words.

3 Liv. xxxviii. 30.

4 ΤΌ. 31. Furentes igitur ira, triginta hominibus ex factione, cum qua con-
siliorum aliqua societas Philopcemeni atque exsulibus erat, interfectis, decreverunt
renuntiandam societatem Achzis,

IX SECESSION OF SPARTA 501

further resolution to hand over the city to the Roman Faith. The Secession
League then declared war by the unanimous vote of every city.} οἵ Sparta.
But, while winter hindered its vigorous prosecution, the Consul
Marcus Fulvius stepped in; an Assembly was held at Elis to
meet him, at which Lacedemonian deputies were heard. Fulvius
at last obtained that war should be put off till both parties could
send embassies to Rome. The Federal Ambassadors were
Lykortas and Diophanés, both of them citizens of Megalopolis,
but an ill-matched pair. Lykortas stood on the mght of the Embassy

Union to deal as it would with a seceding State, and on the to Rome,

duty of Rome to leave the rights of an allied power uninjured. 158. 189

Diophanés was ready to submit everything to the judgement of
the wisest of arbiters, the Roman Senate. They brought back
a reply which is not given at length, but which was so ambiguous
that both Unionists and Secessionists interpreted it in their own
favour.”
Philopoimén was re-elected General for the next year.’ Either November,
the old law which forbade immediate re-election had been repealed, 3.° 189.

or else the emergency was held to be ground for dispensing with μα αν
its observance.* As soon as the season allowed of military opera- two suc-
tions, he marched to Kompasion on the Lacedemonian frontier, °*!ve

where the Federal army was reinforced by multitudes of ae

1 Liv. xxxviii. 32. Omnium civitatium, que ejus concilii erant, consensu B.C. 190-
bellum Lacedmoniis indictum est. 188.

2 Ib. Ceterum responsum ita perplexum fuit, ut et Achezi sibi:de Lacedemone

rmissum acciperent et Lacedemonii non omnia concessa iis interpretarentur.

3 Ib. 33. Philopemeni continuatur magistratus. See Schorn, Ὁ. 304. Cf.
Pol: xxii. 23; xxiii. 1. This passage strongly confirms the view (see above, p.
214) that the General was now elected late in the year. Livy clearly implies
that the veris initium (of 188) was not many months after Philopoimén’s
re-election.

4 Perhaps, however, it is not absolutely necessary to adopt either alternative.
The name of the General for the years 191-0 is not recorded. It is not impossible
that it was Philopoimén himself, that the General of the year 190-89 died early
in his official year, and that he was, according to law (see pp. 219, 506), succeeded
by Philopoimén for the remainder of the year. If Philopoimén was thus only
suffect General in 189, he might be re-elected General for the year 189-8, as
Lykortas was in 183. (See p. 506.) He would thus be in office for nearly three
years together without breach of the Constitution.

The eight Generalships (see p. 505) of Philopoimén are not very easy to
arrange. According to the conjecture just hazarded, the Generalship of B.c.
189-8 might be called either his sixth or his seventh, according as we count the
suffect Generalship or not. If it is reckoned as the sixth, he may have filled a
seventh Generalship in 187-6. He could not be re-elected in 188-7, and we
know that Aristainos was General in 186-5, and Lykortas in 185-4. In 186-5
(see p. 510) Philopoimén was one of the ten δημιουργοί. We may suspect that
he commonly wes so in the years when he was not General.

502 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHA.

Lacedwemonian exiles. The General of the League repeated his
demand for the surrender of the aggressors on Las, and promised
them a fair trial. They appeared, but the violence of the
Spartan exiles could not be restrained, and seventeen of the
Execution accused fell in a tumult. The judicial sentence, by which sixty-
οἵ Spartans three more were executed next day, was probably hardly a more
pasion, regular proceeding.' But, considering the aggression on Las,
B.c. 188. the formal vote of Secession, and the murder of their own
Unionist fellow-citizens, it is not likely that they would have
found any more lenient treatment before the most solemn
tribunal that the League could have supplied. The General
now declared his will or that of the League. The walls of
Sparta were to be destroyed ; the mercenaries of the late Tyrant,
and the slaves enfranchised by him, were to leave the country by
a fixed day, on pain of being sold as slaves;? above all, the
Change Laws of Lykourgos, the laws under which Sparta had lived
οἵ the through so many ages, the laws which had reared Lednidas,
lows. Agésilaos, and Kleomenés, were to be exchanged for the
institutions of Achaia. The League also, by a fresh vote of
the Federal Assembly at Tegea, decreed the restoration of all
the Spartan exiles.

Impolicy Severity of this kind may not have been abstractedly unjust,
f Phil — δον yan]

poimén’s but nothing could be more impolitic.? It at once suggests the
treat- question—one of the most important of questions in our own

ment of time—whether a Federal Government either can retain, or ought
Sparta [ρ try to retain, unwilling members in its Union. The Achaian
Government would have failed in its duty, if it had not secured
Las against Spartan aggression, and it was hardly to be expected
that it should tolerate the establishment of a revolted Spartan
commonwealth in the midst of the cities of the League. But
the time was emphatically a time for mercy, it was no time for
hasty or irregular execution even of the most guilty traitors.
Above all, the conduct of the Achaian Government was impolitic,

1 Liv. xxxviii. 33. Sexaginta tres postero die comprehensi, a quibus Pretor
vim arcuerat, non quia salvos vellet, sed quia perire caussa indicta nolebat, objecti
multitudinit trate, cum aversis auribus pauca locuti essent, damnati omnes et
traditi sunt ad supplicium.

This trial seems to have been held before the military Assembly, held, in war-
time, to be invested with the authority of the regular Assembly of the League.
See above, p. 214, note 5.

2 It would probably be held to be against Federal Law for a single city to hire
mercenaries. See above, p. 418.

3 See the remarks of Kortiim, iii. 282.

IX PHILOPOIMEN’S TREATMENT OF SPARTA 503

as holding out a fresh handle for Roman meddling.’ And one
or two pettier matters followed, from which it would seem that
Philopoimén, while dealing with the old enemy of his city, forgot
that he was an Achaian President and only remembered that he
was ἃ Megalopolitan citizen. Many of the mercenaries, staying
beyond their time, were seized and sold; but their price was
applied, not to any national object, but to rebuild a colonnade at
Megalopolis which had been destroyed by Kleomenés. Megalo-
polis also recovered the disputed territory of Belbiné. Philo-
poimén seems to have carried the Assembly with him in all these
things, as he probably would have carried it with him in any
proposals for the humiliation of Sparta. But the whole business
was utterly unworthy of such a man. It shows how difficult it
was for any Greek to rise above petty local passions, and it may
perhaps lead us to a still greater admiration of the Achaian
statesmen, who usually rose above them in so great a degree.
We must bear in mind that Philopoimén could remember a time
when Megalopolis was an independent city, if not under a free
government, yet at least with Lydiadas for her master, and also
that he had before his eyes the work of Epameinéndas as the
great model of his imitation.

_ From this time onwards, the connexion of the League with
Sparta was the standing difficulty of Achaian politics. Ceaseless
disputes arose ; Spartan factions complained at Rome against one Continued
another and against the Federal Government ; the very exiles disputes
whom Philopoimén had restored shared the old Spartan spirit, ** Pe".
and could not endure that the city which had once been mistress
of Greece should be cast down to the rank of a single Achaian
Canton.2 At one time, four different sets of Spartan envoys

1 See Thirlwall, viii. 396.

2 See Pol. xxiii. 4,12; xxiv. 2. Liv. xxxix. 88. Some expressions of Poly-
bios (xxiii. 12) are remarkable. The Spartan envoys complain that the city has
lost its security and independence—émiogarh καὶ ἀπαρρησίαστον καταλείπεσθαι
τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐπισφαλῇ μὲν ὀλίγοις οὖσι, καὶ τούτοις τῶν τειχῶν περιῃρημένων,
ἀπαρρησίαστον δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ μόνον τοῖς κοινοῖς δόγμασι τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν πειθαρχεῖν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ὑπηρετεῖν τοῖς ἀεὶ καθισταμένοις ἄρχουσι. These words need
not imply any unconstitutional acts on the part either of the Federal Government
or of individual magistrates. The Federal constitution vested larger powers in
the chiefs of the League than Sparta had ever vested in her own Kings, and
among those chiefs, we may be sure, no Spartan at this time ever found a place.
Without supposing any real oppression, the humiliation of receiving orders from
Megalopolis was enough. Compare the praise bestowed by Plutarch on Aratos
(Ar. 11) for his loyal obedience to the Federal magistrates, even when citizens of
insignificant townships.

B.C. 184.

Policy

of the
Moderate
party at
Sparta.

B.0. 183.

Roman
intrigues
for the
Dissolu-
tion of the
League.
Formal
Reunion
of Sparta,
Β.σ. 182.

504 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

appeared at once before the Roman Senate.! It should however
be remarked that none of them asked for complete separation
from the League; their complaints were against one another, or
against particular acts of the Federal body. A moderate Spartan
politician would probably see the vanity of attempting to main-
tain the existence of Sparta as a wholly independent common-
wealth. But every Spartan would naturally revolt at the violent
change in his ancestral institutions and at the destruction of the
walls of his city. A position of equality with Messéné and
Megalopolis, to say nothing of Las and Gythion, was irksome,
but it might be borne. But the special changes of Philopoimén
reduced Sparta below the level of other Achaian cities ; they
violated that internal independence which the Federal Constitu-
tion promised to every member of the League. It was natural
therefore that every Spartan should wish to obtain the repeal of
these insulting ordinances ; but it was equally natural that every
wise Spartan should wish to preserve the connexion of his city
with the rest of Peloponnésos. When the Spartans themselves
did not speak of Secession, Rome could not decently suggest it.
But a little later, during the Messénian troubles, the Senate tried
the trick of an affected neutrality. One of its rescripts ran that
the affairs of the League were no affairs of the Roman People ;
if Sparta or Corinth or Argos thought good to secede, Rome
would not feel herself called on to interfere? The meaning of
this was plain enough ; Rome would be well pleased to see the
Peloponnésian Confederation fall asunder.? Corinth and Argos
however knew what was good for them far too well to be led
away by the insidious hint ; and even Sparta soon afterwards—
Philopoimén was then no more—definitively renewed her con-
nexion with the League, and set up her pillar like the other
Achaian cities.‘

Of the other two Peloponnésian cities lately annexed, Elis

1 Pol. xxiv. 4. Liv. xxxix. 48. Thirlwall, viii. 402.

2 Pol, xxiv. 10. ᾿Απεκρίθησαν δὲ διότι οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὁ Λακεδαιμονίων ἣ Κορινθίων
ἢ ᾿Αργείων ἀφίστηται δῆμος, οὐ δεήσει τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς θαυμάζειν ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς αὑτοὺς
ἡγῶνται. Is it possible that the use of the word δῆμος instead of πόλις was
itself an insidious hint to the assumption of increased independence by the several
cities ?

3 Ib. Ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐκθέμενοι κηρύγματος ἔχουσαν διάθεσιν τοῖς
βουλομένοις ἕνεκεν Ρωμαίων ἀφίστασθαι τῆς τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν πολιτείας.

4 ΤῸ, xxv. 2, Μετὰ ταῦτα στήλης προγραφείσης συνεπολιτεύετο μετὰ τῶν
Axa h Σπάρτη.

Ix SECESSION OF MESSENE B05

seems to have been the scene of no disturbances, but to have Quiet in-
settled quietly down into its place as an Achaian Canton. There Hor of
is no sign that the Eleians distrusted the Federal Government, mis

or were distrusted by it. We have seen a Federal Assembly

held in their city, and the Ambassador sent by Philopoimén to

Rome to excuse his doings at Kompasion was an Eleian named
Nikodémos.2 At Messéné the question of Union or Secession State of
had become identical with the question of Democracy or Oli- parties in
garchy in the State Government. When Messéné was admitted ὉΠ"
to the Union, some changes in the State constitution were made

by the influence of Philopoimén,® which, we cannot doubt, were
changes in a democratical direction. But there was a strong
oligarchic party, which hoped to recover its power by Roman

help. Its leader was one Deinokratés, who is described to us as

a good soldier, but as, in other respects, a man of profligate and
frivolous, though showy, character.* This man visited Rome as

an envoy,° seemingly not from the Messénian Government, but
merely from his own party. He received no open encourage-

ment, yet he contrived to obtain a certain degree of countenance

from Titus himself. He returned to Greece in his company, and Revolt of
presently he caused a revolution at Messéné and proclaimed Messéné
Secession from the League. Philopoimén, in his seventieth meer
year, after forty years of political life, was now General of the kratés,
Achaians for the eighth time.’ He was then lying sick at Argos, 8.0. 188.
but he roused himself at the news. He at once sent Lykortas

to reduce the rebels. He himself hastened to Megalopolis, and

there collected the cavalry of his native city, the sons of the men

who had fought beside Lydiadas at Ladokeia and had followed
himself to victory at Sellasia. But it was the last campaign

of the old hero. His immediate object was to relieve a loyal
Messénian town—either Koréné or Kolénides*®—lying to the

south of the revolted capital. In a skirmish with Deinokratés, Capture
he was at first successful, but afterwards, surrounded by numbers, 84 exe-

. . . ti f
the Achaian General was thrown from his horse, and was carried Puro.
POIMEN at
1 Liv. xxxviii. 82. See above, p. 501. 2 Pol. xxiii. 1. Messéné,
3 ΤΌ, 10. Τὸ τοῦ Τίτον διάγραμμα καὶ τὴν τοῦ Φιλοποίμενος διόρθωσιν. Β.0. 183.

4 ΤΌ. xxiv. 5.

6 Ib. Παραγενόμενος εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην πρεσβευτής. On the vague use of the
word πρεσβευτής, see above, p. 417.

6 Plut. Phil. 18. 7 Pol. xxiv. 8, 9. Plut. Phil. 18.

§ Plot. Phil. 18. Κώμην τὴν καλουμένην Κολωνίδα. Liv. xxxix. 49. Ad
preoccupandum Curonen. See Thirlwall, viii. 405.

November,
B.c. 183.

Read-
mission

of Messéné
to the
League,
B.c. 182,

506 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

ST en ..... -.ς-.-ἢςος-..-.- --Ἡ .-.----.-ο. --..

a prisoner to Messéné. But it soon became evident that popular
feeling was wholly in his favour ; Deinokratés and his Senate
therefore hastened to remove their noble captive to a surer
keeping. Philopoimén drank the cup of hemlock! in a sub-
terranean dungeon—the last hero of Achaia, the last hero of
Greece, the last whom Plutarch has thought worthy of a place
on the beadroll of the worthies of his country.

According to the Achaian constitution, Lykortas, who had
been General of the year before, succeeded Philopoimén in office
for the remainder of his term. This seems to have been near
the end of the official year, and he was re-elected at the next
regular Meeting of the Kesembly, which was shortly afterwards
held at Megalopolis.2 It was soon evident that the revolt of
Messéné and the death of Philopoimén were the work of a mere
faction, and that the guilt was in no way shared by the mass of
the Messénian people.* In the course of the next year, popular
feeling compelled Deinokratés to sue for peace.* It was granted,
as was just, on favourable terms. lLykortas, by the advice of
his Cabinet,> required the surrender of the guilty persons, the
reception of a Federal garrison into the citadel of Messéné, and
the unreserved submission of all questions to the Federal
Assembly. The persons surrendered died, at Lykortas’ order,
by their own hands, and the Assembly ® decreed the readmission

1 Plut. Phil. 206. Liv. xxxix. 50. Plutarch adds that some of the Messénians
proposed to torture him to death, and that they were afterwards stoned to death
at his tomb (c. 21). There is no authority for either statement in Polybios or
Livy [cf. Pol. xxvi. 2.] It reminds one of the crimes which Quintus Curtius and
writers of that kind have impartially heaped alike upon Alexander and upon his
enemies.

3 This seems to me the only way to reconcile the statement of Plutarch that
Lykortas was elected General (ἑλόμενοι στρατηγὸν Auxdpray, Phil. 21) soon after
Philopoimén’s death, with what we know, from the direct witness of Polybios
(xl. 2, see above, p. 219), to have been the constitutional practice of the League.
By the death of Philopoimén, Lykortas, as General of the year B.c. 185-4 (see
Livy, xxxix. 35, 86), became at once, without election, General for the remainder
of the year B.c. 184-3. But, if the death of Philopoimén took place very shortly
before the November Meeting of Bc. 188, Lykortas would need an almost
immediate re-election to continue him in office during the year B.c. 183-2. See
Schorn, 318, 21.

3 Liv. xxxix. 49, 50. Plut. Phil. 19, 20. Pol. xxiv. 12.

+ Pol. xxiv. 12.

5. Ib. Ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν παραλαβὼν τοὺς συνάρχοντας.

5. Tb. Ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες συνέβαινε τότε πάλιν συνάγεσθαι τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς εἰς
Μεγάλην πόλιν ἐπὶ τὴν δευτέραν σύνοδον. This I take to be the regular
Spring Meeting of B.c. 182. Now that the official year began in November, the
May Meeting would be the δευτέρα σύνοδος.

ΙΧ DEATH OF PHILOPOIMEN 507

of Messéné to the League. In consideration of the damage done 8.0. 182.
to ite territory by the war, the restored State was, seemingly at
«a later Assembly, exempted from all Federal taxes for three
years.! But, in accordance with the policy which Philopoimén Three
had followed even with his native city,? three of the smaller Messénian
Messénian towns, Abia, Thouria, and Pharai, were detached from ja nitted
the capital, and were admitted to the Union as independent as inde-
States, each setting up its own pillar like Argos or Megalopolis.® Pendent
These towns all lie between Messéné and the Lakénian frontier,‘ ,, ma
a district which it was specially important to occupy with
members attached to the Union both by gratitude and interest.

It was during this eventful Presidency of Lykortas that
Sparta was, at a Meeting at Sikyén, finally reunited to the
League. The news was announced at Rome both by a Federal
and by a Lacedemonian Ambassador, the latter, one Chairén,
being probably sent by consent of the League.® It must have Schemes
been in a later year that this same Chairén entered on a series οἵ φμρῖτῦν
of demagogic measures at Sparta with an evident view to the 5.1807
Tyranny. When the State Government instituted an inquiry
into his conduct, he procured the murder of the chief commis-
sioner.’ The Federal power now interposed. The General,
probably Lykortas, went, -by order of the Assembly, to Sparta,
and procured the condemnation of Chairén, seemingly by a
Spartan tribunal.

Our direct information during the period between the war Consti-
with Antiochos and the death of Philopoimén chiefly relates to ‘tional

notices,

those external affairs of the League of which I have just attempted , ¢ 19)-
ἃ summary. But many important constitutional points are 188.
brought out incidentally in our narratives. The detail at which

1 Pol. xxv. 8, Συνέθεντο τὴν πρὸς rods Μεσσηνίους στήλην, συγχωρήσαντες
αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλανθρώποιξ καὶ τριῶν ἐτῶν ἀτέλειαν.

2 See above, p. 489.

3 Pol. xxv. 1. ᾿Ιδίαν δὲ θέμεναι στήλην ἑκάστη μετεῖχε τῆς κοινῆς συμπο-
λιτείας. Schorn (p. 321) says with truth, “Diese Anordnung kann als ein
Fortschritt in der Ausbildung der Bundesverfassung betrachtet werden.”

4 They form the district which Augustus afterwards took from Messéné and
added to Lakénia. Pausanias, iv. 80. 2.

5 See above, p. 504.

6 Pol. xxv. 2. Cf. above, p. 204. This Chairén had once appeared at Rome
(Pol. xxiv. 4) as the representative of one of the discontented parties. His
Federal colleague was Bippos, an Argeian.

7 Pol. xxv. 8. Τὸν ἐπιφανέστατον τῶν δοκιμαστήρων ᾿Απολλωνίδην.

Yearly
Meetings
removed
from
Aigion,
B.C. 189.

Consti-
tution
of the
Senate.

Rejec-
tion of
Eumenés’
offer to
pay its
members,
B.c. 185.

508 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Polybios now writes gives us a minute account of everything of
which we have any account at all, and we constantly see the
working of the Federal system far more clearly displayed than
in earlier times. One important change was introduced by
Philopoimén, when President for the fifth time, in the year of
the Secession of Sparta. Hitherto, though Special Meetings had
been called wherever the Government thought fit, the two regular
yearly Assemblies had always been held at Aigion. It was now
that Philopoimén carried his law by which these Meetings were
to be held in each city of the League in turn.! Aigion, a natural
centre enough for the old Achaia, was a most unnatural centre
for all Peloponnésos; and Philopoimén understood Federal
principles too well to give the League the curse of a capital any-
where else. The change too, as tending to equalize all the
members of the Union, quite fell in with his policy. It was part
of the same plan which led him to sacrifice somewhat of the
apparent greatness of his own city by raising her dependent
towns to the rank of equal members of the League.?

It is from an incidental notice during this period that we
learn the constitution of the Achaian Senate. The Kings of
Egypt and Asia still continued to seek the friendship of the
League. Many costly gifts were offered by them, which were
refused by the Assembly whenever they were thought deroga-
tory to the national honour and independence. One offer from
Eumenés of Pergamos, made during the second Presidency of
Aristainos, was of a very strange kind. He offered to give the
League one hundred and twenty talents, which sum was to be
put out to interest, and the proceeds applied to pay wages to the
Federal Senators at the times of Assembly.* The proposal must
be taken in connexion with the fact that the Senators so often
really formed the Assembly, so that the offer was very like a
scheme for taking the whole Achaian League into pay. The

1 See above, p. 216.

2 Liv. xxxviii. 80. Philopoimén summons an Assembly—seemingly a Special
Assembly—at Argos, to entertain this question. The Ministers summon another
at Aigion. All the world goes ta Argos; the Roman Consul Marcus Fuivius,
whom the people of Aigion had called in to stop the change, goes theretoo. The
national will is so plain that Fulvius ventures on no opposition, and Philo-
poimén’s bill is passed. The Roman, as usual, is found hostile to any measure
tending to increase the strength and harmony of the League.

3 Pol. xxiii. 7. Μισθοδοτεῖσθαι τὴν βουλὴν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς
συνόδοις [and Diod. xxix. 17 (Exc. de Leg. 18, p. 319) ὀψωνιάζεσθαι τὴν τῶν
᾿Αχαιῶν σύνοδον]. 4 See above, p. 240.

eee
a > Ce eee .. .-- 20 ee eee 3

ΙΧ YEARLY MEETINGS REMOVED FROM AIGION £09

offer was rejected ; the League had no mind to see its Senators
pensioners of Eumenés; the law forbade either magistrates or
private persons to accept such presents; how then could it be
borne that the whole Senate should be bribed ina body?! These
arguments were forcibly pressed by an orator named Apollénidés

of Sikyon ; the feelings of the Assembly were also strongly stirred

up against the King by one Kassander of Aigina,? who set forth how

his native island, once a free Canton of the League, was now in
bondage to the very prince who offered them this tempting bribe.®

We have already seen that the Achaian laws required that a Legal

Special Assembly should be summoned only to discuss some resistance
definite business, and that it could entertain no proposition alien to Ronen
to that business.‘ This law was more than once appealed to by ments,
Philopoimén in order to escape from the unauthorized interfer-

ence of Roman officers. When a duly commissioned Roman
Ambassador came with any definite communication from the
Senate, an Assembly was summoned, as a matter of course, to

hear what he had to say. His communication of itself formed
business to be laid before the Assembly according tothe law. But

both Flamininus and others of his countrymen seem to have
thought that it was the duty of the Achaian Government to
summon an Assembly whenever any Roman of distinction took

a fancy to address the Achaian People, whether he were the
bearer of any real communication from the Senate or not. The

law just mentioned afforded a good means of refusing such

1 Pol. xxiii. 8. Tir γὰρ νόμων κωλυόντων μηθένα μήτε ἰδιωτῶν μήτε τῶν
ἀρχόντων παρὰ βασιλέως δῶρα λαμβάνειν κατὰ μηδ᾽ ὁποίαν πρόφασιν, πάντας
ἅμα δωροδοκεῖσθαι προφανῶς, προσδεξαμένους τὰ χρήματα, πάντων εἶναι wapa-
νομώτατον, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αἴσχιστον ὁμολογουμένως. τὸ γὰρ ὀψωνιάζεσθαι
τὴν βονλὴν ὑπ᾽ Εὐμένους καθ᾽ ἕκαστον Eros, καὶ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν κοινῶν
καταπεπωκότας οἱονεὶ δέλεαρ, πρόδηλον ἔχειν τὴν αἰσχύνην καὶ τὴν βλάβην.

It will be seen how completely equivalent bribing the Senate is held to be to
bribing the whole Assembly.

2 Ib. Did the Aiginétans, though their city was enslaved, retain their Federal
franchise, or had Kassander been admitted to the franchise of some other Achaian
city? This speech of an ἄπολις ἀνήρ (see Herod. viii. 61) reminds us of Kanarés
and Garibaldi in our own times.

3 It was probably now that the decree was passel to abolish all illegal and
unseemly honours (τὰς ἀπρεπεῖς τιμὰς καὶ rds παρανόμουξ) which had been voted
to Eumenés. Two Rhodians, Sésigenés and Diopeithés, who held some judicial
office which it is not easy to explain (δικαστὰς ὑπάρχοντας κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν),
were set to carry out this decree. A private grudge against Eumenés led them
to exceed their commission, and to abolish all honours whatsoever which had been
granted to the King. Pol. xxviii. 7. See Schorn, 339.

4 See above, pp. 215, 478.

B.c. 185.

The de-
mand of
Quintus
Cecilius
for an
Assembly
refused.

Discussion
thereon
at Rome.

510 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

requests. In the same second Presidency of Aristainos, just after
the Assembly which declined the gift of Eumenés had dispersed,
came Quintus Cecilius, who had been sent as Ambassador into
Macedonia, requiring that an Assembly should be called together
to hear what he had to say about the affairs of Sparta’ He seems
to have been ordered to go into Peloponnésos on his return from
Macedonia,” but he clearly brought no definite instructions with
him. Aristainos, as President, summoned a Cabinet Counceil®
at Argos, in which we incidentally learn that three citizens of
Megalopolis were present beside himself.‘ Cecilius spoke,
strongly blaming the conduct of the Federal body towards
Sparta. Aristainos was silent, showing, as Polybios says, by his
very silence that his sentiments were on the side of Cecilius.*
Diophanés openly took the Roman side; Philopoimén, Archén,
and Lykortas—all the speakers mentioned, except Archén, are
Megalopolitans—stood up for their country. The demand of
Cecilius for an Assembly® was at last met by a request to know
what were his instructions from the Senate; if he had any to
produce, an Assembly should be held to discuss them, otherwise
the law did not allow one to be summoned. Cecilius had no
instructions to show, and he departed without his Assembly.
He afterwards complained so bitterly at Rome of the supposed
insult which he had received, that it was thought prudent to
send Philopoimén and Lykortas to defend the conduct of the
Achaian Government before the Senate. They were told that,
as the Roman Senate were always summoned to hear the Ambas-
sadors of Achaia, so a hearing before the Achaian Assembly
ought never to be refused to an Ambassador of Rome.’ The
sophism is obvious ; it was one thing to assemble the Senators
of the Roman City; it was another to get together all the
citizens, or even all the Senators of Achaia, scattered, as they
were, over the whole face of Peloponnésos. And, after all, the

1 Pol, xxiii. 10. Liv. xxxix. 88. (Cf. Paus. vii. 9.]

2 Liv. u.s. Peloponnesum quoque adire jussi.

3 Pol. us. Συναγαγόντος ᾿Αρισταίνον τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ras ἀρχὰς els τὴν τῶν
᾿Αργείων πόλιν. This is clearly a Meeting of the Ministers only, not of the whole
Senate (Rath) as Schorn (p. 310) makes it.

4 See abgqve, p. 221.

5 Pol. u.s. Δῆλος ὧν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σιωπᾶν ὅτι δυσαρεστεῖται τοῖς ὠκονομημένοις
καὶ συνευδοκεῖ τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Καικιλίου λεγομένοιξ.

6 Pol. u.s. Ὁ δὲ Καικίλιος, ὁρῶν τὴν τούτων προαίρεσιν, ἠξίου τοὺς πολλοὺς
αὑτῷ συνάγειν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν.

7 Pol. xxiii, 12. Liv. xxxix, 33.

ΙΧ THE LEAGUE AFTER PHILOPOIMEN 511

a ... -- « --- -- —

Roman Senate and the Achaian Assembly did not answer to one

another. Great as were the powers of the Roman Senate, it was

not, like the Achaian Assembly, the body which actually de-

clared war and peace. That last attribute of sovereignty belonged

to the Roman People in their Tribes, and they were certainly

never assembled to hear the communications of an Achaian envoy.
Similarly, when Titus himself, on his way to a mission in

Asia, took the Messénian Deinokratés back with him as far as An As-

Naupaktos, he wrote thence to the Achaian Government, requir- sem

ing an Assembly to be summoned. Philopoimén was now 1m ¢o Flami-

the last year of his office and his life. The answer sent was ninus,

the same as that given to Cecilius; the Assembly should be ®° 188.

summoned if Titus would, according to law, state the business

which he had to lay before it. Titus had no statement to make, .

and the Assembly was not held.!

§ 3. From the Death of Philopoimén to the Conquest of Macedonia
and Epeiros

B.C. 183—167

With Philopoimén died out the old race of Achaian
statesmen, the race which had seen the League in the days
of its glory, and indeed of its growth. Philopoimén was
born about the time of the deliverance of Sikyén and the sc. 253.
first great extension of the League. He was born when
Megalopolis was still a detached unit, the subject of some
of the earlier and baser Tyrants who preceded Lydiadas.
He was a grown man when his native city joined the sic. 234.
League; his youth was contemporary with the last days of
Markos and with the full prime both of Lydiadas and Aratos.
And he had lived to see a state of things which might have
made him wish that either Kleomenés or Antigonos could come
back again as lord over Peloponnésos. But he was taken away
before the worst evils came on the land he loved ; he had gone
through the allotted span of man’s life; it was well for him
that he was not reserved for the sad old age of Isokratés. And

1 Pol. xxiv. 5. ᾿Επεὶ. . ἔγραψε τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς τῶν
᾿Αχαιῶν, κελεύων συνάγειν τοὺς 'Axaods εἰς ἐκκλησίαν, ἀντέγραψαν αὐτῷ
διότι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν γράψῃ περὶ τίνων βούλεται διαλεχθῆναι τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς" τοὺς
yap νόμους ταῦτα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἑπιτάττειν᾽ τοῦ δὲ μὴ τολμῶντος γράφειν,
κι τ᾿ λ.

Condition
of the
League
at the
death of
Philo-
poimén.

League ;
the elder
Roman
party not
wilfully
unpa-
triotic.
Growth
of the
extreme
Roman
party
under
Kalli-
kratés.

512 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

he left the League, if not what it had once been, yet as flourish-
ing and as independent as any state could hope to be in those
evil times. Achaia was still the first of existing republics, the
compeer of any existing kingdom. The League was still spared
the worst forms of Roman interference; some respect was still paid
to the constitution and laws of an equal ally ; and the internal
administration was less meddled with by Rome than it had been
by Philip. Philopoimén too left his country to the care of
statesmen formed in his own school, who had imbibed his
prudent maxims of avoiding at once indiscreet defiance and
still more indiscreet servility. Lykortas of Megalopolis had the
state as it were bequeathed to him by his great fellow-citizen,
and Lykortas’ son Polybios, to whom we owe our best know-
ledge of these times, carried the urn of the hero at his funeral
pomp. Thus three men’s lives embrace the whole history of
Federal Greece. Polybios sat at the feet of Philopoimén, and
Philopoimén may have sat at the feet of Markos of Keryneia.}
The exact age of Lykortas is not known; he must have been
much younger than Philopoimén, but still quite old enough to
remember when the Achaian League was a really independent
power. The statesmen of his generation differed, as we have
seen, among themselves ; the policy of Aristainos and Diophanés
was less dignified, and really less prudent, than the policy of
Philopoimén and Lykortas ; still Aristainos and Diophanés were
certainly not wilful traitors. But, under the debasing influence
of Rome, a brood of men was growing up throughout Greece who
knew nothing of republican or patriotic feelings, and whose only
thought was to advance their own selfish interests by the basest
subserviency to the dominant power. Such, among the Achaians,
was Kallikratés of Leontion, such, in Epeiros, was the younger
Charops. These were men of essentially the same stamp as
those whom, a century before, the Macedonian Kings had set up
as Tyrants in the Peloponnésian cities. Rome was a Republic ;
she therefore could hardly establish her slaves as Tyrants, and
probably they served her better by exercising a practical Tyranny
under republican forms. Charops, it is clear, was the author of

1 Polybios was contemporary with Philopoimén, and Philopoimén contem-
porary with Markos, as grown men. This alone is really fit to be called
contemporary existence. If a child born just before Chairéneia is reckoned as
contemporary with Isokratés, three men’s lives might be spread over a much wider
space,

ΙΧ SERVILITY OF THE ROMAN PARTY 518

cruelties hardly inferior to those of Nabis himself ;! but Law
reigned in Achaia down to the moment of her fall; Kallikratés

could not rob or banish or murder ; he could only act as a vile

cross between Tyrant and Demagogue, the opponent of every
patriot, the supporter of every measure which could exalt his

own power at the cost of the national degradation. We first

hear of this wretch under the Presidency of Hyperbatos,? him- Presidency
self seemingly a man of the same stamp, or perhaps only of the es Eyper-
school of Aristainos. At any rate, he agreed with Kallikratés 2. 780.
in openly avowing the doctrine that no constitutional impedi- 179.
ment ought to stand in the way of implicit obedience to the Slavieh
Roman Senate.? This doctrine, of course, had to be maintained ον ‘Hyper.
in the teeth of a strong opposition on the part of Lykortas and batos and
the patriotic party. The immediate occasion on which Kalli- ΚΑῚ
kratés is first introduced to us is one of the interminable dis- Opposi-
putes about the Lacedwmonian exiles. The Senate required tion of
their restitution, which Lykortas opposed as unconstitutional. ae
It was determined to send an embassy to Rome to lay the objec- ~~ 179.
tions of Lykortas before the Senate. By what chance it
happened that Kallikratés himself was nominated one of the
envoys does not appear. Perhaps he had not yet displayed
himself in his full colours, and it may have been thought desir-

able that the embassy should not wholly consist of avowed
partizans of Lykortas. Of his colleagues we know only that

they bore the most glorious names in the history of the League ;

they were Lydiadas of Megalopolis and Aratos of Sikyén.5
Kallikratés of course betrayed his trust; he invited the Senate Embassy
to exercise a more direct authority in Achaia and the other οἱ Ball

Grecian states; there were in every city men who were ready 4, Rome.

1 Pol. xxx. 14; xxxii. 21.

3 Ib. xxvi. 1. Hyperbatos is probably a grandson of the person of the same
name who was General in B.c. 224. See above, p. 353. Plutarch however writes
the name ‘TxepSaras and Polybios Ὑπέρβατος.

3 Ib. Ol δὲ περὶ τὸν Ὑπέρβατον καὶ Καλλικράτην πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς γὙραφο-
μένοις παρήνουν, καὶ μήτε νόμον μήτε στήλην μήτ᾽ ἄλλο μηδὲν τούτον νομίζειν
ἀναγκαιότερον.

4 Schorn (p. 8328) says, “ Anstatt aber den rechtschaffenen Lykortas, welcher
den Rath gegeben hatte, an die Spitze der Gesandtschaft zu stellen, erwahlte die
Regierung, wie von einem Damon verblendet, zu diesem Posten den Kallikrates.”
Why “die Regierung’”! Surely Ambassadors were elected by the Assembly.
See Pol. xxix. 10.

5 Aratos was certainly (see Pol. xxv. 7) grandson of the great Aratos, and son
of the younger General of that name. And analogy makes it almost certain that
Lydiadas was grandson of the illustrious Tyrant.

21,

Rescript
of the
Roman
Senate.

Kalli-
kratés
elected
General,
B.C. 179-
178.
Effects of
the war
with
Perseus
on the
Federal
states,
Bc. 172-
168.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP-

514

to do its work ; these men ought to be encouraged, and the men
who talked about oaths and laws and pillars should in like
manner be made to feel the displeasure of Rome.1 The Senate
hardly needed such counsel ;? yet it is clear that from this
moment there begins another marked change in the way in
which Rome treated the Grecian commonwealths. While Philip
and Antiochos were formidable, Achaia was treated as an equal
ally ; with their fall she sank to the position of a dependent.
ally ; now she had to feel what it was to be, in all but name, a
subject dependency. From this time forth, Kallikratés and his
fellows received their orders from Rome, and communicated them
to the Assemblies of the several states. Kallikratés himself
came back with a rescript from the Senate, ordering the restora-

_ tion of the exiles, and recommending himself as the model for

all Greek statesmen. The Senate wrote also to the four other
Leagues— Aitolia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Beeotia,—and to
Rome’s humble slaves at Athens, bidding them all co-operate in
restoring the exiles, that is, bidding them all to pick a quarrel
with the Achaians if they could. The patriots were awed, and
Kallikratés brought with him a new means of influence, of which
we have as yet heard nothing in the history of Greek Federalism.
At the next election the traitor was raised to the Presidency,
and the historian directly attributes his success partly to decep-
tion and partly to bribery. As soon as he entered upon his
office, he at once restored the exiles both at Sparta and at Messéné.

Our next business is to trace the way in which the Federal
states of Greece were affected by the war between the Romans
and King Perseus, the Third Macedonian War of Roman history.
In the course of that war, three of the Greek Leagues were
wiped out of the list of independent states, and Achaia received
a blow from which she never recovered. By this time Greece
had learned what Roman friendship and alliance really meant.
The philhellenic dreams of Flamininus on the one side, the
feeling of gratitude for recovered freedom on the other, had

1 Pol. xxvi. 2. 2 Thirlwall, viii. 414.

3 Pol, xxvi. 3. ἹΙερὶ δὲ τοῦ Καλλικράτους αὐτοῦ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν, παρασιωπήσασα
τοὺς συμπρεσβευτὰς, κατέταξεν εἰς τὴν ἀπόκρισω διότι δεῖ τοιούτους ὑπάρχειν
ἐν τοῖς πολιτεύμασιν ἄνδρας οἷός ἐστι Καλλικράτης. We may infer from this that
Lydiadas and Aratos had acted somewhat more worthily of their illustrious names.

4 Ib. Καταπληξάμενος καὶ συντρίψας τοὺς ὄχλους διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἰδέναι τῶν
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν εἰρημένων ἐν τῇ σνγκλήτῳ τοὺς πολλοὺς, πρῶτον μὲν
ἠρέθη στρατηγὸς, πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις κακοῖς καὶ δωροδοκηθείς.

ΙΧ WAR BETWEEN ROME AND PERSEUS 515

now utterly passed away. Things had so changed since the
famous Isthmian Games that Rome was now felt to be the

enemy of Greece, and Macedonia to be her natural bulwark.
Macedonian and Roman lordship had both been tried, and the

yoke of Macedon had been found to be the lighter of the two.

And indeed, with Rome standing by the side of both, Mace- Greek
donian headship over Greece was not now likely to be oppressive. Patriotic
If not Perseus personally, yet at least the gallant nation which jow oy
he so unworthily ruled, was felt to be the champion and the Mace-
bulwark of republican Greece. Some states openly espoused domian
his cause ; in others it is clear that every patriotic heart wished ©”
well to him.' Perseus, though free from most of his father’s Character
vices, had vices of his own, which, though they left him a °f Perseus.
better man, yet made him, at such a moment, decidedly a worse

King. He is described as temperate in his life, and just in his
government, and, till he lost his wits among his misfortunes,

we hear nothing of any personal cruelty. He was sagacious

in laying plans beforehand both in politics and war, but when

the moment for action of either kind came, his heart always

failed him. Philip, with all his crimes, retained some hold

on men’s regard, on account of his gallant and kingly spirit,

always rising highest in time of danger. Perseus was about

as fit to command in a pitched battle as Aratos; and he had

not, like Aratos, the art either of improving a victory or of
making up for a defeat. Above all, he was basely and even
treacherously covetous, descending to the lowest tricks to gain

or to save money. Upon such a prince, the recovered resources

of Macedonia, and the general goodwill of Greece, were utterly

thrown away.

As in all the Roman wars of this period, two or three
incompetent commanders waged two or three unsuccessful or
indecisive campaigns, till the right man came and restored
to Rome that superiority which was inherent in her arms when- Character
ever they were rightly directed. The war was spread over of the
the Consulships of Publius Licinius, Aulus Hostilius, Quintus war with
Marcius, and Lucius A‘milius Paullus. The part played by sc. 171-
Titus Quinctius in the war with Philip was played by Lucius 168.

1 On the popularity of Perseus in Greece, see Pol. xxvi. 5; xxvii. 7; Liv. xlii.

63; and especially Appian, Mac. ix. 1, 4. He is accused at Rome, ὅτι πρὸς
πολλῶν ὀξέως ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἀγαπῷτο καὶ éwawotro, and again ὅτι πολλοῖς ἔθνεσι

κεχαρισμένος, καὶ φιλέλλην, καὶ σωφρόνως ἀντὶ μέθης καὶ τρυφῆς ἄρχει. This is
certainly rather hard measure,

Character
of L.
AEmilius
Paullus.

Depen-

dent con-
dition of
ARTOLIA,

Civil dis-
sensions,
B.c. 178.

516 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE (ΑΔΓ.

fémilius in the war with Perseus. Aimilius seems to have
been quite as well disposed towards Greece as Titus, but his
personal goodwill had no longer the same influence, and he
was often made the unwilling instrument of cruelties which he
abhorred. As before, I will not enter upon the military
details of the war, but only trace its events so far as they bear
upon the politics of the Federal states of Greece.}

We have seen that Attolia was as yet the only com-
monwealth of continental Greece which had entered into any
formal relations of dependence upon Rome. Achaia, Beotia,
Epeiros, Athens, were all, in name, equal allies of Rome; but
Aitolia had agreed to reverence the Majesty of the Reman
People, and to have no friends and enemies but theirs.”
A&tolia, then, was now a Roman dependency, free in its internal
administration, but, in all its foreign relations, bound to follow
the lead of Rome without inquiry. This state of things had
at least the advantage of hindering the AXtolians from practising
their old piracies upon other Greek states; but, according to
our Achaian and Roman informants, it had at home only the
effect of turning their arms against one another. The forms
of the constitution were trampled under foot,‘ and the strife

1 After the fall of Perseus Macedonia was divided into four Republics. The
size of each district, and some expressions of Polybios and Livy, may lead us to
believe that the internal constitution of each had something of a Federal form.
Polybios speaks of their δημοκρατικὴ καὶ συνεδριακὴ πολιτεία, xxxi. 12, cf. xxxv.
4; xxxvii. 4. (This συνεδριακὴ πολιτεία must be distinguished from the
βασιλέως συνέδριον, or Μακεδόνων συνέδριον, in iv. 23 and xxvii. 8, which is
merely the King’s Privy Council.) Livy (xlv. 18, 29) speaks of the Concilium
of each commonwealth, a word which he commonly applies to the Assemblies of
Federal states. He afterwards (xlv. 82) speaks of Synedri as the Senators of
the several commonwealths. On the whole then it is most probable that each
of the four new Republics had some shadow of an internal Federal constitution.
But I doubt the theory of Brandstater (490) that the four together formed a
Federation of four Cantons. This probably comes from the words commune
Concilium gentis in c. 18, and Macedonia concilium in c. 32; but the former
must be explained, or perhaps held to be cancelled, by the more detailed
description in c, 29, and in the latter the concilium is the βασιλέως συνέδριον
mentioned above. There was no connubium or commercium between the Mace-
donian districts (Liv. xlv. 29), and it suited the general policy of Rome to isolate
them from one another. Cf. Kortiim, iii. 811. Probably Livy had no very
clear idea of the matter himself.

2 See above, p. 495.

ὃ Pol. xxx. 14. Liv. xli. 25 or 30; xlii. 2.

4 Pol. us. Ἑτοῖμοι πρὸς πᾶν ἦσαν, ἀποτεθηριωμένοι τὰς ψυχὰς, ὥστε μηδὲ
βουλὴν διδόναι τοῖς προεστῶσιν. It is not easy to see exactly what this means.

Ix AFFAIRS OF ZTOLIA 517

of factions led to mutual bloodshed. It does not appear that

these contending parties exactly coincided with the respective
favourers of Rome and of Macedonia; debt is mentioned as one

cause of dissension ;! it is hinted that both parties appealed to
Perseus as an arbiter;? it is certain that, when the Roman

envoy Marcellus contrived to appease their differences, he took
hostages of both parties alike.3 There were however in AXtolia Roman
the same parties as elsewhere. The place of Kallikratés and and Mace-
Charops was filled there by one Lykiskos, who was elected parties.
General through Roman influence. Hippolochos, Nikander, Lykiskos
and Lochagos seem to have answered, as nearly as AXtolians ener
could, to Kephalos and Lykortas. Aitolian troops served = —~
against Perseus under the Roman Consul Licinius, but, when ®-° 171.
he was defeated by the Macedonian cavalry, the A‘tolians

made convenient scape-goats ; the blame of the defeat was laid

on Hippolochos and his friends, and they, with two other Aitolian
officers, were, at Lykiskos’ suggestion, sent off to Rome.® After

this, Caius Popillius and Cneus Octavius visited both Aftolia

and other Grecian states, with a decree of the Senate, forbidding 5.6. 169.
supplies to be furnished to any Roman officers without its
authority. In the Assembly held at Thermon to receive them,

they asked for hostages, which they did not obtain. At this
Meeting, Lykiskos and Thoas raised insinuations against the
patriotic party, and were guilty of gross flattery towards the
Romans, A tumult arose; Thoas was pelted; and Popillius

had the pleasure of rebuking the Attolians for the breach of
order. Soon afterwards Perseus himself entered A®tolia. Perseus
The calumnies of Lykiskos had driven a leading citizen named ‘F, γ..
Archidamos openly to take the Macedonian side. He offered 5 Ὁ. 166,
to admit the King into Stratos, but the other chief men of that

city shrank from so bold a step; they called in Popillius from
Ambrakia, and Perseus came before the town only to find it in

the hands of his enemies. Deinarchos, the A<tolian Master of ἡ

the Horse, had also been on the point of joining Perseus, but

he soon found it expedient to change sides, and to join the

One is tempted to guess that some Magistrates had tried to procure, either for
themselves or for some other accused persons, a legal trial before the Apokletes,
but that popular fury prevented them by a massacre. -

1 Liv. xlii. 5. 2 In the speech of Enmenés, ib. 12.

3 Tb. 5. 4 Tb. 38.

5 Pol, xxvii. 13. Liv. xlii. 60. App. Mac. 10.

6 Pol. xxviii. 3,4. Liv. xliii. 17.

Part
of the
country

joins him.

Massacre
by A.
Bebius,
B.C. 167.

Dissolu-
tion

of the
League,
B.C. 167 ?
Death of
Lykiskos,
B.C. 157.
Affairs
of AKAR-
NANIA.
B.c. 171.
B.c. 169.

518 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Roman army which he had come to oppose.’ But, though
Stratos was lost, and occupied by Popillius, the whole district
of Aperantia, where Archidamos had great influence, openly
joined Perseus, and Archidamos himself appears among those
who clave to the Macedonian King to the last.2 In the rest
of Attolia, Lykiskos, with a comrade named Tisippos, continued
his career. After the battle of Pydna, A‘tmilius was met in
Thessaly by a crowd of suppliant A‘tolians, who told him how
Aulus Bebius, a Roman officer, had, at the instigation of
Lykiskos, massacred five hundred and fifty Senators or leading
men in the council-house,? how he had driven others into exile,
and seemingly divided the property of both classes among the
chiefs of the Roman party. The Roman Commissioners—the
hands of Aimilius are clear from such iniquity—sat at Amphi-
polis, confirmed both the banishment and the murders, and
merely punished Bebius for employing Roman soldiers on such
a business. Other A‘tolians, suspected of patriotism, were
summoned to Rome to take their trial there, and a leading
man named Andronikos was beheaded on the spot for having
borne arms on the Macedonian side. It has been supposed
that the A‘tolian League was now formally dissolved ;® at all
events the country sank into utter insignificance ; we only hear
that civil strife continued till the death of Lykiskos; when the
land was rid of him, it enjoyed a time of at least comparative
prosperity.”

Of Akarnania we hear but little. That gallant and faithful
ally of Macedonia was warned at the beginning of the war ® that
she had now an opportunity of wiping out her old errors by
loyal adherence to Rome. Two years later we find the Roman
Commissioners, Popillius and Octavius, meeting an Akarnanian
Assembly at Thourion,® which was divided between two parties

1 Liv. xliii. 22. 2 Th. xliv. 43. 3 Ib. xlv. 28.

4 Ib. 31. Cf. Pol. xxx. 10.
5 Liv. ib. Duo securi percussi viri insignes; Andronicus Andronici filins

ZEtolus, quod, patrem secutus, arma contra populum Romanum tulisset, et Neo
Thebanus.

One is strongly tempted to read Archidami for Andronici, as we have heard
nothing of any Ztolian Andronikos. The persons of that name in Liv. xxxvii.
13 and xliv. 10 seem to be native Macedonians.

6 Brandstiiter (493) and Kortiim (iii. 315) quote, from Justin (Prol. xxxiii. ),
the words £tolice ciritates ab unitate corporis deducte. In every edition that
I know of they stand simply, tol: oppresst.

7 Pol. xxxii. 20, 21. 8 Liv. xlii., 38.

9 Pol. xxviii. 5. Liv. xliii. 17 or 19.

ΙΧ AFFAIRS OF AKARNANIA AND EPEIROS 519

answering to those of Lykortas and Kallikratés in Achaia.

The Roman party, led by one Chremés, went further even than Debate
their Achaian counterparts, as they asked for Roman garrisons ™ the
in the Akarnanian towns. The patriots, led by Diogenés, aren
pleaded that Akarnania was the friend and ally of Rome, and sembly.
that none of her cities needed to be dealt with like conquered
enemies. The Roman hesitated for the present, but, after the

defeat of Perseus, when the Roman Commissioners at Amphi-

polis sat in judgement on all the states of Greece, Akarnanian

as well as Attolian victims were sent off to Rome. But no Leukas
change was made in the constitution of the League, except separated
that its capital Leukas was taken from it! Chremés after-janin
wards played in Akarnania the same part as Lykiskos in no. 167.
étolia, and his country was delivered from him about the no. 157.
same time.” ;

Epeiros and Beootia suffered yet more severely during and State of
after the war with Perseus. In Epeiros we find the same parties #P2!Ros.
as elsewhere, namely the three described by Livy,? devoted
partizans of Rome and of Macedonia, and the moderate men
who simply wished to retain as much dignity and independence
for their country as such evil times allowed. The Lykortas of Parties in
Epeiros was Kephalos: .its Kallikratés was one Charops, a grand- Ἐροΐτοβ,
son of the elder Charops,4 whom Polybios describes as the vilest 7;
of his vile class.5 Of Kephalos as a politician we hear the best Charops.
possible character. He was an old friend of the house of
Macedon, but he knew that Epeiros was the ally of Rome; he
prayed that peace might endure between the two powers; if
war did come, he was ready to discharge towards Rome the
duties of an honourable ally, but not to degrade his country by
any base subserviency.® Theodotos, Antinods, and Philostratos
represented the more decided Macedonian party.’ At first,

1 Liv. xlv. 31, 34. 2 Pol. xxxii. 21.

8 Liv. xlv. 31. Tria genera principum in civitatibus erant; duo, que
adulando aut Romanorum imperium, aut amicitiam Regum, sibi privatim opes
oppreasis faciebant civitatibus ; medium unum, utrique generi adversum, libertatem
et leges tuebatur.

This is candid for a Roman, but the adherents of Rome and of Macedonia
must not be put on a level.

4 See above, p. 482.

5 Pol. xxx. 14. Ἔφ᾽ ὅσον γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων [ἐν Help] μετριώ-
τεροι τὴν κατὰ τὴν Αἰτωλίαν ἧσαν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὁ προεστὼς αὐτῶν ἀσεβέστερος
καὶ παρανομώτερος ὑπῆρχε τῶν ἄλλων. δοκώ γὰρ μὴ γεγονέναι μηδ᾽ ἔσεσθαι

θηριωδέστερον ἄνθρωπον μηδὲ σκαιότερον Χάροπος.
6 Ib. xxvii. 13. 7 ΤΌ, 14, Cf. Liv. xlv. 26.

B.c. 170.

Geogra-
phical
parties

in Epeiros,
B.C. 169.

520 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Epeiros was true to Rome ;! that she did not remain so was the

fault of the ultra-Roman party. The constant calumnies of
Charops, the fate which they saw fall upon their fellow-patriots
in Aitolia, at last drove Kephalos and his adherents openly to
take the Macedonian side. Some of the more zealous partizans
of Macedonia went so far as to make an attempt, in which they
nearly succeeded, to seize the Roman Consul Aulus Hostilius
and deliver him up to Perseus.2 During the war, the different
districts of the League seem to have been divided. While
Phanoté in Chaonia stood a siege in the Macedonian interest,
Thesprétian auxiliaries served in the Roman army against it.®

- But, on the whole, Epeiros decidedly took the Macedonian side.

Conquest
and
desola-
tion of
Epeiros,
B.0. 167.

Tyranny
of Charops,
B.c. 167-
157.

Molossis had to be conquered as a hostile country by the Preetor
Lucius Anicius. Theodotos and Antinoés died in defence of the
old capital Passar6n, and Kephalos himself in defence of the
Molossian town of Tekmén.* The vengeance of Rome was
terrible, and it was marked by equal baseness and cruelty.
Lucius A¢milius, a man whose heart abhorred the vile business
on which he was sent,5 was the unwilling instrument of the
wicked will of the Senate. By the foulest treachery all sus-
picion was lulled to sleep, and, in one day, seventy towns,
mostly in Molossis, were destroyed, and one hundred and fifty
thousand persons sold into slavery.6 An Assembly was then
held, representing what was left of the Epeirot League ; some
selected victims were carried to Rome, and Charops was left to
tyrannize over the rest. What constitutional forms were pre-
served for him to abuse, we know not ;’ practically life and pro-
perty were at the mercy of an oppressor who, whatever may
have been the title he bore, was essentially of the same class as
Nabis and Apollodéros.®

The fate of Boeotia was the most remarkable of all. It moet

1 Liv. xlii. 38 ; xliii. 5.

3 Pol. xxvii. 14. 3 Liv. xliii. 21 or 28.

4 Ib. xlv. 26. To judge from Livy’s account, the heroism of the chiefs would
seem not to have been shared by the people. But one would like to have an
Epeirot historian.

5 Plut. Alm. 30. Αἰμίλιος τοῦτο πράξας μάλιστα παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν
ἐπιεικῇ καὶ χρηστὴν οὖσαν.

6 Pol. xxx. 15. Liv. xlv. 84. Plut. Aim. 29.

7 In Pol. xxxii. 22, οἱ πολλοὲ τῶν ἐν τῇ Φοινίκῃ condemn certain men as enemies
of Rome. Does this action on the part of a single city imply the formal dissolu-
tion of the League ?

8 See the details of his cruelties in Pol. xxxii. 21, 22.

IX CONDITION OF BQOTIA 521

clearly illustrates the detestable Roman policy of sowing dissen- Condition
sion among the Grecian cities, and it shows how much the forms οἵ B0T!4.
of the Greek Federal constitutions stood in the way of such
intrigues. The Beotian Confederation was not a threatening Beotian
or a powerful state; but it was a little stronger and a little sliance
more independent than any or all of its cities could have been persons,
separately. Roman policy therefore seized with delight on any 8.0. 173.
prospect of dissolving the League of Bootia, as it would have

seized with still greater delight on any prospect of dissolving

the more powerful League of Achaia. The Beotian League

alone, among all the Greek states, had ventured to contract a

formal alliance with Perseus.!_ This was before the war between

Rome and Macedonia broke out; but of course the act was

looked on at Rome as an act of hostility. On the first mission

of Marcius and Atilius, they were met in Thessaly by Beeotian

envoys, who were doubtless chosen from among the partizans of

Rome. When they were rebuked for the dealings of the League Intrigues
with Macedonia, they had the indiscretion not only to lay the οἱ ὦ ἀκα
blame on Isménias, the chief of the other party, but to add that 5. ¢ 173,
the decree of alliance with Perseus had passed the Federal As-

sembly against the will of several of the cities? The Roman

caught eagerly at this opening; he would give every city of

Bootia an opportunity of speaking for itself; he would thus

know which cities had really opposed the Macedonian alliance.®

Some of the discontented cities at once sent separate embassies

to Marcius.‘ What little Boeotian patriotism was left spent

iteelf, after much tumult, in the election of Isménias to the post

of Federal General, and in an effort, under his management, to

procure the Roman acceptance of a formal surrender of the
League as a whole.” It was hoped that, by this step, the utter

Δ According to the speech of Eumenés, Liv. xlii. 12.

2 ΤΌ. 38. Cum culpam in Ismeniam, principem alterius partis, conferrent,
et quasdam civitates dissentientes in caussam deductas.

This of course only means that the votes of those cities were given against the
Macedonian treaty. Such a minority would be in the position of the New
England States during Madison’s war with England.

5 Liv. u.s. Apparituram id esse, Marcius respondit, singulis enim civitatibus
de se ipsis consulendi potestatem facturos.

4 Tb. 43.

5 See Pol. xxvii. 1, 2 for an account of the whole dissension and tumult.

The Thespian envoys come with a separate surrender, Isménias comes with a
surrender in the name of the whole League, which was just what Marcius wished

to avoid ; κατὰ κοινὸν πάσας τὰς ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις διδοὺς els τὴν τῶν πρεσβευτῶν
πίστιν. ἣν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐναντιώτατον τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάρκιον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ πόλιν

Dissolu-
tion

of the
League,
B.c. 171.

ACHAIA
during
the war
with
Perseus.

Decree

of non-
intercourse
between
Achaia
and Mace-
donia.

Debate
on its
proposed
repeal,
B.c. 174.

522 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

dissolution of the Union would be avoided, at the expense of its
becoming, like AXtolia, an acknowledged Roman dependency.
This was exactly opposite to the wishes of Marcius, who con-
trived to obtain separate surrenders from all the cities, except
Koréneia and Haliartos, which clave desperately to the cause of
Perseus, and suffered the extremities of Roman cruelty in his
behalf. The Boeotian League, as a body with the least shadow
of political independence, thus passes away for ever.”

Thus four out of the five Greek Federations vanish from the
field of history. It remains to trace the fate of the Achaian
League from the beginning of the war with Perseus to the
extinction of Greek independence. Achaia was far more power-
ful, and enjoyed far more consideration, than any other state in
Greece. All Peloponnésos was united under a single free con-
stitution; and, allowing for Spartan and Messénian dissatisfaction,
it was still moved by a single will. Such a power was not
altogether to be despised, least of all on the brink of a war with
Macefonia. It might even have been thought that something
like real goodwill and gratitude was due to faithful allies, who
had served Rome well against Philip and Antiochos, and who
were now so far from taking the side of Perseus that they had
—on what special ground we know not—passed a decree for-
bidding any sort of intercourse between Achaia and Macedonia.*
The result was that Achaian slaves ran away into Macedonia,
and that there was no means of getting them back. Perseus,
anxious to win the favour of the League, collected as many of
the runaways as he could, and sent them back with a letter to
the Achaian people, hinting that there was a way by which such
losses could be hindered for the future. The President of the
League was Xenarchos, whom Livy describes as a private
partizan of Philip,* but, as he was the brother of Archén, we
may probably set him down as a statesman of the school of
Lykortas. The greater part of the Assembly wished to repeal
the decree ; some were favourable to Macedonia; others wanted
their slaves back again. Kallikratés of course opposed the

διελεῖν τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς οἰκειότατον. So below, Marcius’ object is said to be
διαλῦσαι τῶν Βοιωτῶν τὸ ἔθνος καὶ λυμήνασθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν εὔνοιαν πρὸς τὴν
Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν. So Liv. ΧΙ. 44. Jd quod marime volebant, discusso Beotico
concilio.

! Liv. xlii. 635 ΧΙ, 4. * See above, p. 144.

3 Livy, xli. 23.

+ Ib. Qui private gratia aditum apud Regem querebat.

IX ROMAN INTRIGUES IN ACHAIA §28

repeal; Archén supported it. Achaia was the ally of Rome,
ready, if war broke out, to assist Rome against Macedonia.

But that was no reason why Macedonia should be thus politically
excommunicated, why the same international courtesy should

not take place between Achaia and Macedonia as between Achaia

and any other power. The repeal however was deferred ;
Perseus was thought to have treated the League disrespectfully

by merely sending a short letter and not an Embassy.! Pre-
sently he did send an Embassy to the next Federal Congress at
Megalopolis, but the Roman party prevailed so far that his
envoys were not allowed to address the Assembly. The next Mission
year Marcellus summoned an Achaian Assembly, and praised ὁ ᾿ Mar:
the League*—it had sunk to that point—for its refusal to yc. 173.
repeal the anti-Macedonian decree.

Two years later, while Marcius and Atilius visited the Mission
Northern states, two Lentuli, Publius and Servius, went through °° of me
the cities of Peloponnésos, praising them for their con- = ἫΝ
stancy to Rome in the wars with Philip and Antiochos, and
hoping that they would continue to follow the same path in the
coming war with Perseus.> This diplomatic intercourse between Roman
a foreign power and particular cities was a manifest breach of dealings
the first principles of the League. It was worse even than the dividual
reception of envoys from discontented cities ; it was a direct, cities.
attempt to stir up discontent where no discontent, existed. To
exhort this or that city, and not the League as a whole, to
retain its fidelity towards Rome was to recognize in each city a
capacity for separate political action which the Federal Constitu-
tion forbade. One cannot doubt that the Lentuli would have
been as well pleased to see the Achaian cities fall away from
their Federal Union as their colleagues Marcius and Atilius
were to see the like disruption take place in Beotia. We may
suspect that it had been arranged between them thus to labour
for the same end in different parts of Greece. The cases indeed
were different ; Boeotia had concluded a treaty with the enemy ;
Achaia was so firm a friend of Rome as to refuse to Macedonia
even common international courtesy. But a natural instinct led
every Roman of the vulgar stamp to do all he could to weaken
Greek Federalism, as being the source of all Greek independence
and power. But, in this case, the insidious attempt wholly

1 Liv. xli. 24 or 29. * Ib. xlii. 6. Collaudata gente.

5 Ib. 37.

Demands
of Atilius
and Mar-
cius.

524 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

failed ; no Achaian city was tempted to fall away; the mission
of the Lentuli excited only indignation mixed with contempt.
For, in going through the several cities of the League, they
addressed their praises of past fidelity to several commonwealths
where they were wholly out of place. Elis and Messéné, which
had fought for Antiochos against Rome, and, we may suppose,
Sparta also, came in for the same praises as the elder cities of
the League.

Shortly afterwards, Atilius and Marcius themselves came into
Peloponnésos. They had an interview with the Achaian General
Archon and his Ministry,” and demanded a body of a thousand
Achaians to act as the garrison of Chalkis till the Roman army
landed. To this Archén consented. Considering the alliance
between Achaia and Rome and the large powers of the Achaian
General, this course was perhaps not absolutely illegal ; Archén
was one of the sounder Achaian statesmen, and he was not
likely to yield to any requests which directly contradicted the
Federal Constitution. But it was a dangerous precedent for the
Government thus to act upon its own responsibility, at the

. bidding of a foreign power. This again, like the mission of the

|

Mission of
Popillius
and Oc-
tavius,
B.c. 170.

Lentuli to the separate cities, may be looked at as another blow
struck at the unity, and thereby at the independence, of the
Achaian body.

Next came the mission of Popillius and Octavius,? which was
ostensibly designed to stop such requisitions for the future.
Such an order was in its place when addressed to Attolia, which
had become a Roman dependency, but it was a monstrous insult
when it was addressed to an equal ally like the Achaian League.

1 This is the meaning which I get out of Livy’s words (xlii.37), A cheats indignan-
tibus eodem se loco esse . . . quo Messenii atque Elei, etc. Livy, as usual, does
not understand Federal politics. The Achaians could not complain that two of
their own cities were put on a level with themselves ; but the whole body might
complain that particular cities were dealt with at all, and the other cities might
complain that such inappropriate praise was addressed to Elis and Messéné.
Livy does not fully realize that Elis and Messéné were now Achaian cities, much
as he once before (p. 458) fancied Elis to be an Achaian city before it became one.
Cf. Schorn, p. 342.

2 Pol, xxvii. 2. ᾿Εχρημάτισαν ταῖς συναρχίαις ταῖς τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν καὶ
παρεκάλεσαν “Apywra τὸν στρατηγόν, x.7.A. This language clearly implies that
it was an act of the General and his Cabinet (the δημιουργοί) only. Livy indeed
says, Argis prebitum est iis concilium, ubi nihil aliud a gente Achworum petierunt,
etc. (xlii. 44). He probably misunderstood the term συναρχίαι, which is
equivalent to συνάρχοντες, and that to δημιουργοί. See above, pp. 220, 506.

8. See above, p. 518.

Ix CONVENTION OF THE MODERATE PARTY 525

The decree forbade any city to grant military help to any Roman
officer, except by order of the Senate. This clearly implied
that it was the duty of every Greek state to obey every order

which really had the Senate’s authority. Again, in defiance of Further

all Federal rights, the Roman envoys went through the several
cities, publishing the decree, enlarging on the virtues of the
Senate, and threatening all who were not avowed supporters
of Rome? It was not till after this that they condescended
to attend the Federal Assembly at Aigion. It was currently
believed that they came with the design of accusing Lykortas,
Polybios, and even Archén, before the assembled People, as
enemies of Rome. But they did not venture upon an accusa-
tion for which they found that there was absolutely no pretence.
They therefore did not appear before the Assembly, but contented
themselves with addressing a few words of compliment and
exhortation to the Senate.§

The intentions of Rome towards the League were now made Conven-

manifest. Every Achaian statesman who was not Rome’s abject
slave might feel himself threatened by the behaviour of the

inroads on

Federal

rights.

tion of the
Moderate

Party,

Roman envoys both in Achaia and in other Greek states. The Autumn,
leading men of the moderate party now held a Convention, to 5.0: 170.

settle their general course of action, and, among other things, to
determine what candidates they would propose at the next
Federal elections.‘ Lykortas exhorted to strict neutrality ;
it was not advisable to help either Rome or Macedonia in a
struggle in which it was certain that the conqueror, whichever
he might be, would prove a dangerous foe to Grecian freedom.
On the other hand, to oppose Rome would be too great a risk ;
he at least would not venture on it; he had already too often
opposed the most distinguished Romans and with too little
success. Apollénidés of Sikyén and Stratios of Tritaia took a

1 Liv. xliii, 17. Senatus-consultum . . . per omnes Peloponnesi urbes
circumtulerunt, Ne quis ullam rem in bellum magistratibus Romanis conferret,
preterquam quod Senatus censuisset. ᾿

3 Pol. xxviii. 3.

+ This seems on the whole to be the most likely meaning of the narrative in
Polybios, where there certainly seems a marked opposition between συναχθείσης
τῆς τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἐκκλησίας and συναχθείσης αὐτοῖς τῆς βουλῆς. But it is
possible that it might be one of the cases (see above, p. 239) where the members
of the βουλή practically discharged the functions of an ἐκκλησία, so that the

body assembled might be called by either name. Livy (xliii. 17) is amusingly
brief.

4 Pol. xxviii. 6. This is the passage which I have already mentioned (p. 222)
as having been so strangely misunderstood.

Archén
General,
B.c. 170-
169.

Embassy
- from
Attalos,

May, 169.

Debate
on the
restora-
tion of
Eumenés’
honours,

526 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

— ———- —— ee eee a τΤΤΤ΄΄“ἷ“ἷἝἷἝ!ὯἝἷ΄΄΄Ἕςς.ς.
-----.-- -- — - + --

bolder line; they would not oppose Rome, but they would
openly and vigorously oppose those among their own citizens
who served Rome for their own private advantage. Archén, on
the other hand, argued that they must yield to the times, and
give their enemies no occasion for calumny, lest they should
share the fate of the Attolian Nikander and his companions.
The majority of the meeting, including Polybios himself, agreed
in this view, and it was determined to support Archén as a
candidate for the Generalship, and Polybios for the office of
Master of the Horse. This description of a private debate
among the chief men of an Achaian party! is one of the most
precious glimpses into Federal politics which the fragments of
Polybios afford us. What would one not give for similar details
of the political life of the League in earlier days ?

Archén then was elected General, with Polybios as his second
in command, and the policy of the League was to be strict
adherence to the Roman alliance, without any slavish subserviency
to Roman dictation. Presently there came a communication
from Attalos, brother of King Eumenés of Pergamos, asking
for the restoration of his brother’s honours.” As the President
was favourable to the request,? the Ambassadors were introduced
to the Assembly at the Spring Meeting.* The attendance was
large ; the multitude ® was divided ; many speeches were made ;
the restoration of the honours was opposed by a large party on
both public and private grounds. Then followed loud calls
for Archén, who, as Head of the Government, was held to be
bound to speak on such a subject.6 He spoke, and that favour-
ably to the proposal, but he spoke briefly; he had spent large sums
on his costly office,’ and he feared lest any strong support should be
attributed to hopes of private advantage from a grateful monarch.
Polybios then spoke himself; he showed that the decree under
which the honours of Eumenés had been taken away had
been misconceived, and carried out in a way not intended by

1 The names mentioned by Polybios are, Lykortas, Polybios, Arkesilaos, and
Aristén from Megalopolis ; Archén from Aigeira ; Stratios from Tritaia ; Xendén
fron Patrai; Apolldnidés from Sikyén; and Polyainos, perhaps from the
Triphylian Kyparissia (see Pol. xi. 18). Others of course may have been present.

2 Pol. xxviii. 7. See above, p. 508.

8 Ib. ΙΙροθύμως αὐτῷ κατανεύσαντες [ol περὶ τὸν “Apxwva] ὑπέσχοντο συμ-
πράξειν ὑπὲρ τῶν παρακαλουμένων. See above, p. 224.

4 Ih, Εἰς τὴν πρώτην ἀγοράν. But see p. 506, note 6.

5 Ib. Ὁ μὲν ὄχλος ἄδηλος ἣν ἐπὶ τίνος ὑπάρχει γνώμης.
6 See above, p. 228. 7 See above, p. 229.

ΙΧ EMBASSY FROM ATTALOS 527

its original authors.- It had never been intended to abolish
all the honours voted to the King of Pergamos, but only such
us were either formally illegal or else in some way disparaging
to the dignity of the Achaian nation. A vote was accordingly
passed to that effect, and the honours of Eumenés, with the
necessary exceptions, were restored to him.! The account of
this debate also, though its immediate subject is not very
important, is one of the most valuable fragments of our history.
The mode of conducting diplomatic business, the constitution of
the Assembly, the position of the General, the costliness, and
therefore the unpaid nature, of his office, are all clearly set forth
in the incidental language of a historian who is now describing
his own actions.

But much more important business was done in the same Negocia-
Assembly. Quintus Marcius was now in Thessaly. A decree tions with
was accordingly passed, on the motion of the General himself,” 5 ¢ 169.
to help the Romans with the whole force of the League. This
being carried, a series of more detailed resolutions were passed.
It was voted that the General should collect the army, and make
all preparations ; that Polybios and some others should go as
envoys to Marcius, offering the services of the League ; that, if
he accepted them, the other envoys should return with his
message, but that Polybios should remain to undertake the
commissariat department, and to provide supplies in all the
towns through which the troops would have to pass. Marcius
was found in the act of crossing over Mount Olympos into
Pieria, when fresh troops were not what he most wanted. The
Achaian envoys shared the difficulties of his passage,® and had
a final interview with him when he had safely reached the
Macedonian Hérakleion. The other ambassadors now returned,
but Polybios stayed with the Roman army. Presently Marcius
heard that Appius Claudius, who had been lately defeated in
Illyria, was asking the Achaians for five thousand men.* Marcius
bade Polybios go and take care that the request of Appius
should be refused—whether out of care for the Achaians or
out of spite against Appius, Polybios does not venture to

1 Pol. xxviii. 7, 10. Envoys were sent at the same time to the coronation
(ἀνακλητήρια) of the young Ptolemy Philométér, renewing the old friendly
relations between his dynasty and the League.

2 Ib. 10. Elotweyxay οὖν [ol περὶ rdv"Apxwva) els τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς δόγμα.

2 See Liv. xliv. 2 et seqq. 4 Pol. xxviii. 11.

Polybios
opposes
Appius
Claudius.

Embassy
from the
Ptolemies,
B.c. 169-
168.

528 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

determine.! Polybios returned to Peloponnésos ; an Assembly
at Sikyén discussed the request of Appius. What was he to
do? He could not venture to disobey the secret injunctions of
the Consul, neither could he venture to reveal them. He had
to oppose a Roman demand, without having any manifestly
unanswerable reason to bring forward. At last he took the
line that the request of Appius was contrary to the decree of
the Senate brought by Octavius and Popillius. It was voted to
refer the matter to Marcius, that is, to refuse the request of
Appius. The Senate and the Consul were thus obeyed, but
Polybios felt that his enemies had gained an excellent handle
for calumniating him to Appius Claudius.

The League had, as we have seen, just renewed its alliance
with Egypt. In the course of the winter, envoys came from the
two young Ptolemies, Philométér and Euergetés, who were now
reigning as joint Kings, asking for help against Antiochos Epi-
phanés of Syria. They asked for one thousand foot and two
hundred horse, for Lykortas as commander of the whole force,
and for his son Polybios as commander of the cavalry.* This
sort of request plainly shows that, as compared with any power
except Rome, the League still held a high place among nations.
This embassy at once caused an open division between the two
Achaian parties. Kallikratés, supported by Diophanés and
Hyperbatos, were for refusing the required help; Lykortas,
Archén, and Polybios were for granting it. The matter was
discussed in an Assembly at Corinth, at which few except
Senators seem to have been present. Kallikratés pleaded the
general necessity of keeping quiet,‘ especially while the war
between Rome and Macedon was still undecided. Lykortas and
his son pleaded the Egyptian alliance, the benefits received from

1 Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 464) adds, “ But it might not be an improbable or
unjust surmise, that he also wished to entrap the Acheans into a refusal which
might afterwards be used as a ground of accusation against them.”

2 Pol. xxix. 8.

8 See above, p. 240. From the context this would seem to have been an
ordinary and not aspecial Meeting. If so, we have to choose between the Autumn
Meeting of p.c. 169 and the Spring Meeting of p.c. 168. The words οΐντου
τοῦ Φιλίππου [Quintus Marcius Philippus] τὴν παραχειμασίαν ἐν Maxedovle
ποιουμένου, look like the earlier date, and the reference to the embassy of Polybios
to Marcius as having taken place the year before (rp πρότερον ἔτει, c. 9) looks
like the later. But τῷ πρότερον ἔτει may mean in the last oficial year, and on
the other hand the παραχειμασία of Marcius seems to have practically lasted till

the arrival of A¢milius.
4 Pol. xxix. 8. Φάσκοντες δεῖν καθόλου μὲν μὴ πραγματοκοκεῖν.

IX EMBASSIES FROM THE PTOLEMIES 529

the Egyptian Kings, and the fact that the Roman Consul had
declined the offer of Achaian reinforcements. When the feeling

of the Assembly seemed decidedly on the side of Lykortas,
Kallikratés appealed to the presiding Ministers not to put the
question, alleging some formal ground which hindered the present
Assembly from entertaining it.! But, after a while, a Special
Meeting was held at Sikyén which was very largely attended.”

Here the subject was fully discussed. Polybios set forth his case.

The Romans did not need tbeir help; the Consul Marcius had Debate at
declined it; even if they needed it, twelve hundred men sent Sikyén
to help an old ally from whom they had received many benefits, Teyptian
would not hinder a state which could bring thirty or forty question,
thousand soldiers into the field? from still helping Rome effectu- ®-¢- 168.
ally. On the second day the formal proposals had to be made.
Lykortas moved that the proposed auxiliary force be sent to
Egypt. Kallikratés moved an amendment that, instead of troops,
Ambassadors be sent to reconcile the Ptolemies with Antiochos.
According to the forms of the Achaian Assembly, the decisive

vote would not be taken till the next day,‘ but it was clear that

the feeling of the House was strongly with Lykortas.’ Kalli-
kratés and his party now sought to compass their end in another

way. A messenger, whose coming was probably preconcerted,
entered the theatre with a letter from Marcius, requesting the
Achaians, at the wish of the Senate, to send Ambassadors to
reconcile the Kings. Polybios and his friends, not choosing
directly to oppose a letter from a Roman Consul, withdrew their
motion. The amendment of Kallikratés was carried; three
Ambassadors, Archén of Aigeira, Arkesilaos and Aristén of

1 Pol. xxix.9. Ol περὶ τὸν Καλλικράτην ἐξέβαλον τὸ διαβούλιον, διασείσαντες
τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἐξουσίας κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐν ἀγορᾷ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ
βοηθείας. I do not profess to know what the impediment was. Tittmann (684)
supposes it to refer to some religious objection to the ἀγορά as a place of Meeting.
The next Assembly (c. 10) was held in the theatre. Considering what follows,
one might think that the objection was to the smallness of the attendance, but
it is not easy to see why a thinly-attended Meeting, or one attended only by
Senators, should be called ἀγορά.

2 Ib. Mera δέ τινα χρόνον συγκλήτου συναχθείσης els τὴν τῶν Σικνωνίων
πόλιν, ἐν ἣ συνέβαινε μὴ μόνον συμπορεύεσθαι τὴν βουλὴν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τοὺς
ἀπὸ τριάκοντα ἑτῶν. See above, pp. 205, note 3, 240, note 4.

3 Ib. Καλῶς γὰρ ποιοῦντας αὐτοὺς καὶ τρεῖς ἄγειν καὶ τέτταρας μυριάδας
ἀνδρῶν μαχίμων 4 See above, p. 215, note 8.

Tb. Πάλιν δὲ τῶν διαβουλίων προτεθέντων ἀγὼν ἐγίγνετο 'νεανικὸς, πολύ γε
μὴν ὑπερεῖχον οἱ περὶ τὸν Λυκόρταν.

6 ΤΌ. 10. ᾿Ανεχώρησαν ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων.

2M

Depor-
tation

of the
Thousand
Achaians,
B.c. 167.

Embassies
on behalf
of the
exiles,
B.c. 164—
161.

Insidious
reply

of the
Senate.

582 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Perseus; I am ready to be tried on sucha charge by the
Assembly of the Achaians or even by the Romans themselves.”
The conscious innocence of Xenén had carried him too far.! The
Roman caught at the imprudent challenge; he demanded that
all whom Kallikratés named should be sent for trial to Rome.
Sent to Rome they were, above a thousand of the best men of
Achaia ; whether they were carried off by sheer force, or whether
the Assembly was so cowed as to pass the required vote, does
not clearly appear. Most probably some sort of vote was passed ;
for the Senate had the mean hypocrisy to reply to one—perhaps
the first—of the many Achaian embassies sent on their behalf,
that they wondered at the Achaians applying in favour of men
whom they had themselves condemned.2, Now the Achaian
Assembly had most certainly not condemned these men ; it had
at most sent them to Rome for trial, though indeed to send them
to Rome for trial might be looked on as much the same thing
as condemning them. Still such an answer seems to imply an
Achaian vote of some kind; even the diplomatic impudence of
the Roman Senate could hardly have ventured on such an
assertion, if the victims had been carried off by mere Roman
violence. It is clear that the Achaians were simple enough to
believe that their countrymen would receive some sort of trial ;
nay, as there was really nothing whatever to compromise them,
they seem to have gone so far as to hope that a trial would prove
their innocence, and that they would be restored to their country.
Instead of this they were quartered—under what degree of
restraint does not appear—in various Etruscan towns, in a dull
provincial solitude, out of the reach of either Greek or Roman
political life. Several embassies applied in vain for their release.
One, which is described by Polybios, pleaded, in rejoinder to the
Senate, that the exiles had never been condemned, and directly
begged that the Senate would either bring them to trial itself, or
allow the Achaians to try them. Nothing could less suit the
Senate’s purpose. A fair trial, whether at Rome or in Achaia,
could only lead to an acquittal ; and a release of the victims,
whether after trial or without, was held to be dangerous to the
interests alike of Rome herself and of the Roman party in Achaia.
The Senate, thus driven to unmask itself, distinctly declared that
their release was inexpedient both for Rome and for Achaia.

1 Paus. vii. 10. 10. Ὁ μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ συνειδότος ἑπαρρησιάζετο ἀγαθοῦ.
2 Pol, χχχὶ, 8.

1x POSITION OF POLYBIOS 538

But, in the very form of its answer, it took care to strike another
blow at that Federal unity which it so deeply hated and dreaded.
The legal description of the Union was carefully avoided, and
a form of words! was employed which could only be meant as
another insidious attempt to stir up division. At this answer the
people everywhere mourned, not only in Achaia but throughout
all Greece.? But Kallikratés, Charops, and their fellows rejoiced,
and ruled everywhere still more undisturbed, while the flower of
the Greek nation languished in their Etruscan prisons.

One only among these victims of Roman treachery seems to Position
have been less harshly dealt with than his fellows. Polybios, οἱ nts
through the friendship of A=milius and his son the younger’
Scipio, found a shelter in that great patrician house,’ and there,
by familiar intercourse with the greatest men of Rome, he had
those wide views of politics and history thrown open to him of
which we reap the fruit in his immortal work. But by thus
becoming a citizen of the world, his patriotism as a citizen of
Achaia was somewhat dulled. He still loved his country ; he
lived to do her important services ; but, from this time onwards,
his tone becomes Roman rather than Achaian. He looks at
Greek affairs rather with the eye of a Roman philhellen, a
Flamininus or an A‘milius, than with the national patriotism of
Philopoimén or Lykortas or himself in his earlier days. The
Senate refused his release and that of Stratios,* when they were
the only men of importance surviving. Yet it was at last
through his influence® that, in the seventeenth year of their
bondage, after many fruitless embassies,® such of the exiles as Release
still survived, now less than three hundred in number, were οἷ ihe
allowed to return to their homes.’ Bc. Isl.

The treatment of these kidnapped Achaians was probably the
most brutal and treacherous piece of tyranny of which a civilized
state was ever guilty towards an equal ally which had faithfully

1 Pol. xxxi. 8. "Εγραψαν ἀπόκρισιν τοιαύτην, ὅτι' ἡμεῖς οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνομεν
συμφέρειν [οὔτε ἡμῖν) οὔτε τοῖς ὑμετέροις δήμοις τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπανελθεῖν
εἰς οἶκον. Now οἱ ὑμέτεροι δῆμοι can only mean the several cities separately. But
the interest of the several Achaian cities was no affair of the Roman Senate. It
was only with the ἔθνος or κοινὸν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν that they could have any lawful
dealings.

3 Pol. us. Κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα διαγγελθείσης τῆς ἀποκρίσεως τῆς τοῖς
᾿Αχαιοῖς δεδομένης ὑπὲρ τῶν καταιτιαθέντων, τὰ μὲν πλήθη συνετρίβη ταῖς
διανοίαις, x.T.X.

3 ΤΌ, xxxii. 9. 4 Ib. 7. 5 Plut. Cat. Maj. 9.

® Paus. vii. 10. 11. Pol. xxxiii. 1, 2, 13. 7 Paus. vii. 10, 12.

Dealings
of Rome
with
foreign
nations.

Fresh
intrigues
of Rome.

Dispute
between
Sparta
and Mega-
lopolis.

584 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE OHAP.

discharged all the duties of alliance! Rome, in her dealings
with foreign nations, knew neither mercy nor justice. It is in
this unfavourable light that the City and most of her citizens
appear to a student of Grecian history ; but it must not be for-
gotten that Roman vices and Roman virtues sprang from the
same source, and that the men who sacrificed the rights of other
nations to the interests of Rome were often equally ready to
sacrifice themselves and all that they had in the same cause.
The man who, in dealing with strangers, appeared only as a
brutal conqueror or a base intriguer, often retained every old
Roman virtue at the hearth of his own house and in the forum
of his own city. It had long been held to be the duty of every
Roman to use every means to break the power of any state
which still retained strength or independence inconsistent with
Rome’s claim to universal dominion. The deportation of the
Achaian patriots was only one act, though the basest, in a long
series of treacherous attempts against the union and freedom of
the League. It is even possible that it was only with a sinister
purpose that the Senate at last consented to their release. Their
advocate Cato obtained their enlargement by an appeal to the
contemptuous pity of his hearers rather than to any nobler
feeling.? It may be that the Senate foresaw what would come,
and set free its victims mainly in order to secure fresh oppor-
tunities for intrigue and for final conquest.

Even while the flower of the nation was thus detained in
Italy, Rome did not cease from her intrigues against the integrity
of the Achaian Union. It is impossible to conceive a greater
tribute to the importance and benefit of the Federal tie than
these constant attempts to dissolve it on the part of the enemy
of all Grecian freedom. The discontent of Sparta, never perhaps
fully appeased, once more furnished the occasion. There was a
dispute about frontiers between the Cantons of Sparta and
Megalopolis,® perhaps the old dispute which Philopoimén had

1 Mommsen, who cannot understand that a weak state can have any rights
against a strong one, does not forsake his friends even in this extremity. The
deportation of the Achaians is recorded by him (i. 596) without a word of dis-
approval ; indeed he seems to think it all right and proper ; the object was ‘‘die
kindische Opposition [is that German 7] der Hellenen mundtodt zu machen.”

3 Plut. Cat. Maj. 9.

8 Pol. xxxi. 9. Pausanias (vii. 11. 1) makes it a dispute between Sparta and
Argos. See Schorn, 877. Considering that the maritime towns of Lakénia were

Ix CHARACTER OF ROMAN FOREIGN POLICY 585

somewhat arbitrarily decided in favour of his own city. Caius Mission

Sulpicius Gallus, one of the most distinguished Romans of his οἵ Ci

time, was going into Asia to collect accusations against King Gallus,

Eumenés ;* for friendly Kings, when they had served their turn, s.c. 166-

fared no better at the hands of Rome than friendly commor- 159"

wealths. He was ordered to stop and settle this little matter

on his way, and also, if report says truly, to detach as many

cities as he could from the Achaian League.* Sulpicius thought

10 beneath him personally to decide a matter which, as Pausanias

remarks,* the great Philip had not thought beneath him ; he

bade Kallikratés judge between the two contending Cantons.

The other part of his commission almost wholly failed. All the

cities of Peloponnésos—Sparta, it would seem, included—knew

their interest too well to listen to any intrigues against an Union

to which they owed whatever amount of freedom and prosperity

they still retained. The Aitolian Pleur6én alone, an outlying Separa-

Canton unnaturally attached to the Peloponnésian Confederacy, Dre oan

asked for licence to secede. Sulpicius bade his envoys go and from the

ask leave of the Senate, which of course gladly granted it.5 League.
Yet even now the League retained a degree of power which

made its alliance or enmity of importance to foreign states. And

in truth the union of all Peloponnésos formed a power which

could have held its own against any kingdom or commonwealth

then existing, except Rome itself. There was now a war between

Rhodes and Crete. Each party asked for Achaian help; the Debate

Ambassadors were heard ;® the Assembly was strongly disposed on tne

to assist Rhodes ; but Kallikratés said that the League ought not aniance,

to make war or alliance with any one without the consent of 8.6. 152.

Rome. No such engagement had ever been entered into: Achaia

was not a dependency like A‘Qtolia, but an equal ally ; and nothing

in the treaty with Rome forbade the League to take any part it

chose in such a quarrel. But the voice of Kallikratés was cer-

now independent of Sparta, it may be doubted whether the Cantons of Sparta
and Argos were conterminous.

1 See above, p. 508. 2 Pol. xxxi. 10.

3 Paus. vii. 11. 8. Προσεπεστάλη δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς τῷ Γάλλῳ πόλεις ὁπόσας
ἐστὶν οἷός τε ὡς πλείστας ἀφεῖναι συλλόγου τοῦ ᾿Αχαιῶν.

4 ΤΌ. 11. 2.

5 Ib. 11. 8. ᾿Επετράπη δὲ ὑπὸ 'Ρωμαίων συνεδρίου τοῦ ᾿Αχαιῶν ἀποστῆναι.

6 Pol. xxxiii. 15. We here get a glimpse of the mode of transacting business
of this kind. The Ambassadors of both sides are heard; then they retire, and
the citizens debate the question among themselves. The Cretan envoy Antiphatas

Return of
Stratios
and
Polybios,
B.C. 161.

Causes
of the
final war
with
Rome,
Disputes
between
Athens
and
Orépos,
B.c. 156-
150.

536 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

tainly the voice of prudence; hated as he was—for men shrank
from the commonest social intercourse with him 1—the Assembly
listened on such occasions to the man who spoke the will of the
Roman Senate.”

At last the exiles returned ; it might have been better for
Greece if they had died in their bondage. Except Polybios and
Stratios, no man of any eminence or experience survived among
them. The rest had learned nothing and forgotten nothing, and
they came back full of a deadly hatred towards Rome, which a
sojourn among her Italian allies was perhaps not likely to
diminish. Stratios returned, to play, almost alone in the last
days of Achaia, the part of a prudent and honest statesman.
Polybios returned also, but only for a season. Probably he
found that he could do his country more real service by acting as
her advocate with his powerful Roman friends than by mingling
personally in the affairs of a commonwealth between whose
leaders and himself there could now be little sympathy.* From
this moment the violent anti-Roman party had the upper hand
in the councils of the League. We have now reached the
beginning of the series of events which brought about the final
overthrow of the last remains of Grecian independence.

As Athens was the immediate cause of the war between the
Romans and Philip,* so Athens was the immediate cause of the
war between the Romans and the League. The strange relations
now existing between Athens and Orépos do not concern our
purpose except in two points. The independent action of Orépos
throughout the story bears witness to the utter extinction of the
Beeotian League, and we may see another attempt of Rome to
reduce the League of Achaia to the same level, when the Senate
thought proper to nominate the single city of Sikyén as arbiter
of the dispute. Here, as in the mission of Gallus, and indeed
in every other act of the Roman Government, we see the same
insidious endeavour to tempt the Achaian cities to separate

was, by the favour of the General, allowed to return and make a second speech ;
but the proceeding was clearly irregular.

1 See the curious details in Pol. xxx. 20. The boys in the streets hooted after
Kallikratés and Andrénidas as traitors ; men would not bathe in the same water
with them.

2 See Thirlwall, viii. 472.

3 See Ib. 476.

4 See above, p. 473.
> Paus, vii. 11. 4. .

ΙΧ CAUSES OF FINAL WAR WITH ROME 537

political action, contrary to the constitution of the League.
At a later stage in the dispute, the injured Orépians brought
their wrongs directly before the Federal Assembly.! The
Assembly had no wish for a needless war with Athens, and
declined to interfere in the matter. But the League had now
fallen so low that its Chief Magistrate was open to a bribe.
The present General was a Spartan named Menalkidas, a fact A Spartan
which shows that there was at least no open dispute at this time ceneral
between Sparta and the Federal power. The Ordpians promised League.
this man ten talents, as the price of his bringing an Achaian
army to their help; Menalkidas prudently promised half his Achaian
gains to Kallikratés ; and, by the joint influence of the two, a interfer-
decree was passed for assisting Orépos against Athens. Menal- 5.3. "08
kidas however, Spartan as he was, proved a General of the school 2. Be. 150.
of Aratos rather than of that of Kleomenés. Like Aratos in
Boootia,? Menalkidas came too late ; the Athenians had pillaged
Or6pos before he got there. Then Menalkidas and Kallikratés
wished to invade Attica, but the troops, especially the Lacede-
monian contingent, refused to serve for such a purpose. They
might well plead that a defensive alliance with Ordédpos, which
was probably all that the Assembly had decreed, did not justify
offensive operations against Athens. The army thus returned
without doing anything; but Menalkidas took care to exact his
ten talents from the Orépians, and took equal care not to pay
the five which he had promised to Kallikratés.‘ As soon as
Menalkidas’ official year was over, Kallikratés impeached him
before the Assembly on a charge of treason.’ He had, so his Novem-
accuser said, gone as an Ambassador to Rome—doubtless a per ᾿
private Ambassador from Sparta—and had there acted against ~
the interests of the League, by trying to separate Sparta from

1 Paus. vii. 11. 7. 2 See above, p. 293.

3 Compare the relations between Athens, Korkyra, and Corinth. Thue. i. 44.

4 I tell the story as I find it in our only authority (Paus. vii. 11. 7—12. 3).
But narratives of secret corruption, though probable enough in the main, are
always suspicious in their details, and are likely to contain as much of gossip as

of real history. It is especially hard to understand how Menalkidas could have
exacted the money from the Ordpians against their will—duws ὑπὸ Mevarxida τὰ
χρήματα ἐξεπράχθησαν.

5 Paus. vii. 12. 2. Παυσάμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς Μεναλκίδαν ἐδίωκεν ἐν τοῖς
᾿Αχαιοῖς θανάτου δίκην. It is dangerous to draw political inferences from the
language of Pausanias in the way that we do from that of Polybios. Do the
words παυσάμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς imply something like an Attic εὐθύνη at the end of the
Presidential year, or are we to infer that the President could not be impeached
while he remained in office ?

c. 150.

588 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

it. Now, as Menalkidas could hardly have done this during his
term of office, it would have been more seemly to have brought
these charges a year sooner, as reasons against electing him to
the Generalship. Diaios of Megalopolis succeeded Menalkidas
as General ; his predecessor now gave him three of his talents to
get him off the charge. This the new General did, and incurred
much unpopularity by so doing.

The impeachment of Menalkidas seems to have stirred up
once more the old Spartan dislike to the Achaian connexion.
We now hear of yet another Lacedemonian embassy to Rome
about the disputed frontier. The real rescript of the Senate is
said to have ordered Sparta to submit to the judgement of the
Federal Assembly on all matters not touching life and death.’
This answer must have been pleaded on the Spartan side at a
meeting of the Assembly. JDiaios then affirmed that the excep-
tion was not genuine ; he maintained that the lives of the Lacedex-
monians present were at the mercy of the Assembly, and he
seems to have called upon them at once to stand their trial ona
charge of treason.2 The Spartans proposed to appeal to the
Roman Senate; the President quoted that great and primary
article of the Federal Constitution, engraved no doubt on every
pular in every city, which forbade any single State to hold
diplomatic intercourse with foreign powers. War now broke
out between the League and its troublesome member, though
Diaios took care to affirm that he made war, not on Sparta, but
on the disturbers of her peace.* The Spartans, unable to resist
the whole force of the Union, sent private embassies to the
General and to the several cities. They got the same answer
everywhere ; no city could refuse its contingent to an expedition
lawfully ordered by the Federal General.® Diaios now advanced
on Sparta. By this time any real Unionist sentiment which
existed there must have been pretty well stifled; the State

1 Paus. vii. 12. 4. Καταφεύγουσι δὲ αὐτοῖς προεῖπεν ἡ βουλὴ δικάζεσθαι τὰ
ἄλλα πλὴν ψυχῆς ἐν συνεδρίῳ τῷ ᾿Αχαιῶν.
Ib. 5. Οἱ μὲν δὴ δικάζειν Ν κακεδαιμονίοις ἠξίουν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἑκάστου

ψυχῆς

δ ΤΌ. ᾿Αχαιοὶ δὲ ἀντελαμβάνοντο αὖθις ἄλλου λόγου, πόλεις ὅσαι τελοῦσιν
ἐς ᾿Αχαιοὺς μηδεμίαν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς καθεστηκέναι κυρίαν ἄνεν τοῦ κοινοῦ τοῦ ᾿Αχαιῶν
παρὰ Ῥωμαίους ἰδίᾳ πρεσβείαν ἀποστέλλειν. See above, p. 204.

4 ΤΌ. 6. "Εφασκεν οὐ τῇ Σπάρτῃ τοῖς δὲ ταράσσουσιν αὐτὴν πολεμήσων

ἀφίξεσθαι.

“8 Ib. Αἱ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ αἱ πόλεις ἐποιοῦντο τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, οὔ σφισιν
ἔξοδον ἐπαγγέλλοντος στρατηγοῦ παρακούειν εἶναι νόμον.

ΙΧ WAR WITH SPARTA 539

Government! however did not venture on open resistance.

They asked the General to name the guilty persons; he named Diaios
twenty-four of the chief citizens of Sparta. One Agasisthenés, before
a leading Spartan, then suggested an ingenious way of at least Parts
staving off the danger. Let the twenty-four at once fly to Rome,

where they would undoubtedly find means of restoration. When

they are gone, let the Spartan Government condemn them to

death, and so save appearances with the League. So they did;

and Diaios and Kallikratés were sent to Rome after them by the
Federal Government. Kallikratés died on the road; Pausanias Death of
doubts whether his death at such a moment was a gain or a loss Kalli-
to his country.? It is at least possible that he might have pre- , . 149.
vented some of the evils which followed. Diaios and Menalkidas
disputed before the Senate, and carried off a rescript, which either

must have been singularly ambiguous, or else one party or the

other must have lied even beyond the usual measure of diplo-
matists. According to Pausanias, the real answer was simply

that the Senate would send Ambassadors to settle all differences

on the spot. But Diaios affirmed in the Federal Assembly that

the Lacedemonians were ordered to submit to the Federal power

parations for war with Sparta. ®
Rome was just now engaged in a fourth Macedonian War. Fourth
The four Republics, as might be expected, did not answer ;* a wate

onian

claimant of the crown, a real or pretended Philip, arose, and ran way,
through a brief alternation of victory and defeat, much like those 8.0. 149-
of the other Philip and of Perseus. The war ended in the 138:

Δ Pausanias (vii. 12. 7) calls them οἱ γέροντες. If one could feel sure that he
found this word in Polybios, one would infer that the old Spartan constitution
had been partially restored since the innovations of Philopoimén.

2 ΤΌ. 8. Οὐδὲ οἶδα ef ἀφικόμενος és Ῥώμην ὠφέλησεν ἄν re’ Axaods ἣ κακῶν
σφίσιν ἐγένετο μειζόνων ἀρχή. Dr. Elder (Dict. Biog. art. Callicrates) some-
what oddly translates this, “‘ His death being, for aught I know, a clear gain to
his country.”

3 Ib. 9. Tods μὲν δὴ [᾿Αχαιοὺς}] παρῆγεν ὁ Δίαιος ws τὰ πάντα ἕπεσθαι
Λακεδαιμόνιοί σφισιν ὑπὸ τῆς Ρωμαίων βουλῆς εἰσὶν ἐγνωσμένοι' Λακεδαιμονίους
δὲ ὁ Μεναλκίδας ἡπάτα παντελῶς τοῦ συνεδρεύειν ἐς τὸ ᾿Αχαϊκὸν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων
αὐτοὺς ἀπηλλάχθαι.

4 Pol. xxxi. 12, Συνέβαινε γὰρ τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἀήθεις ὄντας δημοκρατικῆς καὶ
συνεδριακῆς πολιτείας στασιάζειν πρὸς αὑτούς. See above, p. 516, note 1.

Mediation

of Q.
Cacilius
Metellus.

Victory
and
banish-
ment of
Damo-
kritos,
Bc. 148.
Second
General-
ship of
Diaios,
B.c. 148-
147.

540 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

reduction of Macedonia to a Roman Province. Just at this
moment, the Preetor Quintus Cecilius Metellus, who fills in this
war the place of Flamininus and Aumilius in the former wars,
entered Macedonia. Metellus was a man of much the same
stamp as his two great predecessors, ἃ brave and skilful soldier,
a faithful servant of Rome, but evidently disposed to deal as
gently with Grecian enemies as he could. As some Roman
Ambassadors were passing by on their road to Asia, they turned
aside, at his request, and asked the Achaian Government! to
suspend hostilities till the Commissioners should come from
Rome to settle the differences between Sparta and the League.
Damokritos would not hearken, and by this time the old Spartan
spirit was aroused. A pitched battle took place; the Spartans,
far inferior in numbers, were utterly routed ; Damokritos, it was
thought, might have taken the city if he had chosen. He was
tried as a traitor, perhaps when his year of office had expired,”
and was condemned to a fine of fifty talents. He went into
exile, and Diaios succeeded him as General. Metellus now sent
another embassy, again asking the new General to refrain from
any further action against Sparta till the Roman Commissioners
should come. He promised to obey, and he did obey so far as
not to carry on any open hostilities ; but he left Federal garrisons
in those Lak6nian towns which were now independent members
of the League, and which were doubtless the bitterest enemies
of Sparta to be found in the whole compass of the Union. We
may well believe that neither the citizens of these towns nor the
Federal garrisons placed in them were very strict in observing
the armistice. Menalkidas was now General of the seceding
State ; he took and plundered Iasos, one of these free Lakénian
towns, and thus was guilty of a more direct breach of the truce

1 Paus. vii. 13. 2. Τοῖς ἡγεμόσι τοῖς ᾿Αχαιῶν ἐς λόγους ἐλθεῖν. If this
were in Polybios, I should take this to mean that a message was delivered to the
Achaian Cabinet without summoning the Assembly ; but it is dangerous to make
inferences from Pausanias. On the word ἡγεμών cf. p. 234, note 1.

23 See Ib. 5. Thirlwall, viii. 486.

3 This must be the meaning of the words of Pausanias (vii. 13. 6), τὰ ἐν
κύκλῳ τῆς Σπάρτης πολίσματα és τὴν ᾿Αχαιῶν ὑπηγάγετο εὔνοιαν, ἐσήγαγε δὲ és
αὐτὰ καὶ φρουρὰς, ὁρμητήρια ἐπὶ τὴν Σπάρτην ᾿Αχαιοῖς εἶναι. Pausanias pre-
sently speaks of Iasos as subject to the Achaians— Αχαιῶν ἐν τῷ τότε ὑπήκοον.
See above, p. 485, note 3. Of this Iasos I can find no mention elsewhere.
Probably it was one of the six Eleutherolakénic towns which were reannexed by
Sparta, and which therefore do not appear in the list given by Pausanias.

Ix EMBASSY OF AURELIUS 541

than Diaios himself.1 Popular indignation was aroused against Suicide of

him at Sparta, and he put himself out of the way by
poison.

B.c. 147.

At last the Roman ministers arrived. By this time the Embassy

Macedonian War was ended, and its successful conclusion, just οὗ 1.

like those of the wars with Antiochos and Perseus, enabled the

Romans to take a higher tone than ever with their Greek allies. p.c. 147.

Hitherto the Senate had clearly temporized, and had used
designedly ambiguous language. It now spoke out plainly
enough. The Ambassadors— judges? they are called by
Pausanias—came to Corinth, the head of the legation being
Lucius Aurelius Orestes. They began, if the words of our
informant are to be taken literally, by a more daring breach of
all Federal right than any on which they had yet ventured.
Instead of communicating their errand, first to the Federal
Government, and then to the Federal Assembly, they summoned
an utterly unconstitutional meeting of the magistrates of the
several cities,> who had no sort of authority to receive com-

munications from foreign powers. The message with which Extra-
demands

they were charged was the most daring attack on the integrity
of the Union that had yet been made. The Roman Senate

thought it good that neither Lacedemon nor Corinth nor Argos Romans.

nor Hérakleia nor Orchomenos should any longer form part of
the League. None of them were really Achaian cities ; all were

1 Pausanias (vii. 18. 8) thus sums up his character; Μεναλκίδᾳ μὲν τέλος
τοιοῦτον ἐγένετο, ἄρξαντι ἐν τῷ [ἑαντοῦ νῷ] τότε μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ws ay ὁ
ἀμαθέστατος στρατηγὸς, πρότερον δὲ ἔτι τοῦ ᾿Αχαιῶν ἔθνους ὡς ἂν ἀνθρώπων ὁ
ἀδικώτατος.

There was not however much to choose between the Secessionist and the
Federal commander. It must have been shortly before this time that Diaios
caused one Philinos of Corinth and his young sons to be tortured till they died,
on a charge of dealing with Menalkidas. (Pol. xl. 5.) These horrors are quite
unknown in the better days of the League, unless in the single doubtful case of
Aristomachos. See above, p. 384, note 3.

2 Paus. vii. 14.1. Ol ἀποσταλέντες ἐκ Ῥώμης Λακεδαιμονίοις δικασταὶ καὶ
᾿Αχαιοῖς γενέσθαι.

Tb. Τούς τε ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἔχοντας τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ Δίαιον
ἐκάλει wap’ αὐτόν. Justin, xxxiv. 1. Omnium civitatium principibus Corinthum
evocatis.

It is hard to see who can be meant by this description, except the local magis-
trates. Of course to address them, instead of the Federal Cabinet, would be quite
in the spirit of the Roman policy. It was doubtless hoped, by the compliment thus
paid to State, at the expense of Federal, authority, to awaken any lurking Seces-
sionist tendencies which might exist among the cities. The proceeding itself,
in point of constitutional right, was as if a foreign power, in transacting business
with the United States, should address itself to the several State Governors.

542 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

late additions to the Confederation! The cause for the selec-
tion of these particular cities is not quite obvious. If we count
the accession of Corinth and Argos from their recovery in the
days of Flamininus,? all these cities were late acquisitions, and,
in a certain sense, they were all Roman gifts. But so, in the
same sense, were Elis, Messéné, and the Triphylian and Lakénian
towns, none of which are mentioned. It may be that the Senate
counted on a lurking feeling of disloyalty in Elis and Messéné,
while to cut away Argos and Corinth was to cut away the very
vitals of the League. At Argos and Corinth any tendency to
Secession had yet to be awakened ; the Corinthians especially,
though their fathers had fought valiantly against forcible reunion,°
were now equally strenuous against forcible separation. The
irregular Assembly which the Romans had got together knew
not how to act or how to answer; they could hardly bear to
hear the insolent barbarian to the end of his speech. They then
rushed into the streets, and gathered together what they called
Tumult at an Assembly of the Achaian People, but which was really an
Corinth. Assembly only of the Corinthian mob.‘ Its fury spent itself in
acts of violence against all Spartans who chanced to be present
in Corinth, and seemingly against some persons who were falsely
taken for Spartans. The Roman envoys themselves were not
actually hurt, but they were at any rate frightened, and the
sanctity of their domicile was violated, Spartans or supposed
Spartans being dragged from the house where Aurelius lodged.
These breaches of International Law formed an admirable handle
for the Romans, and Aurelius did not fail to warn and protest.
When the people came a little to their senses, the real Lacedx-
monians were put in prison, while the strangers who had merely
the ill luck to wear Lacedzemonian shoes® were let go free.
Presently an embassy, headed by Thearidas, was sent to Rome ;

1 Paus. vii. 14. 2. Schorn (389) observes that all these cities had been under
the power of Philip, which is hardly true of Sparta.

2 See above, Ὁ. 485. 3 See above, p. 480.

4 Paus. vii. 14. 2. Ταῦτα 'Opécrou λέγοντος, οἱ ἄρχοντες τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν, οὐδὲ
τὸν πάντα ὑπομείναντες ἀκοῦσαι λόγον, ἔθεον ἐς τὸ ἐκτὸς τῆς οἰκίας καὶ ἐκάλουν
τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς ἐς ἐκκλησίαν. Of course such an Assembly was utterly illegal, 2s
no notice had been sent to the several cities. But it may be observed that, if
the magistrates of each city were really present, there was something like a repre-
sentation of the several members of the League.

5 Ib. Συνήρπαζον δὲ πάντα τινά, καὶ by Λακεδαιμόνιον σαφῶς ὄντα ἡπτίσ-
ταντο, καὶ ὅτῳ κουρᾶς ἢ ὑποδημάτων εἵνεκεν ἢ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐσθῆτι ἣ κατ᾽ ὄνομα προῦ-
γένοιτο ὑπόνοια.

Ix TUMULT AT CORINTH 548

—possibly a lawful Assembly had been got together in the
meanwhile. The Achaian envoys met yet another Roman
embassy on the road.! Aurelius had taken care to represent
the insults which he had received, not as the sudden act of an
excited mob, but as a deliberate and preconceived affront to the
majesty of Rome.” Sextus Julius Cesar® now came, with in- Embassy
structions to use very mild words. The last Punic War was οἱ Sextus

still dangerous,* and it was desirable that an Achaian War should Caan
at least be put off till that was finished. B.C. 147.

Thearidas and his colleagues returned to Peloponnésos with Kritolaos
Sextus. The Roman envoys were introduced to an Assembly at elected

τς : : _ dened
Aigion, perhaps that in which Diaios was succeeded in the sitims,

Generalship by Kritolaos, a still more bitter and unreflecting 5.0. 147.
enemy of Rome.® Sextus used very conciliatory language, which

had more effect upon his hearers than suited the schemes of
Diaios and Kritolaos.6 They then hit upon a strange stratagem.

It was agreed that a Conference of some kind or other should be

held at Tegea, at which representatives of Rome, Achaia, and
Sparta should meet and decide matters. The language of Poly-
bios—for we have now happily for a little time recovered his
guidance—does not distinctly imply who were to appear on the
Achaian side, but it seems most probably to have been the
Council of Ministers. It was determined by Kritolaos and his Sham
party, seemingly in a session of that Council,” that nobody should ©o™fr-

ence at

go to Tegea except Kritolaos himself. Thus the President Tegea,
appeared at the Conference as the sole representative of the 8.6. 147.

1 Pol. xxxviii. 2. Paus. vii. 14. 3. 3 Pol. xxxviii. 1.

3 He and Orestes had been Consuls together, Β.0. 157.

4 It is clear from Polybios (xxxviii. 1, 2) that the general belief in Achaia
attributed the apparent lenity of the Romans to this cause, though he himself
holds it to have been genuine. But, in all these later fragments, Polybios seems
mainly to speak the language of his Roman friends. And of course it is quite
possible that men of more generous minds, such as his friends were, might now
and then be able to carry through the Senate a vote less brutal and treacherous
than usual. But that the abiding policy of Rome was to break up the League by
every sort of intrigue, however base, is too plain a fact to be evaded. Men like
Scipio, Aimilius, and Metellus could at most only stop the torrent for a moment.
See Thirlwall, viii. 488.

5 Paus. vii. 14. 4. Todrow δριμὺς καὶ σὺν οὐδενὶ λογισμῷ πολεμεῖν πρὸς
Ῥωμαίους ἔρως ἔσχε.

6 Pol. xxxviii. 2. (The whole chapter.)

7 Ib. 8. Συνεδρεύσαντες ol περὶ τὸν Kpird\aoy ἔκριναν, x.r.r. This seems
to be the most probable meaning. See p. 548. The word σύνεδρος and its
cognates are constantly used by Plutarch and Pausanias to express the Assembly,
but not by Polybios. See above, pp. 205, note 1, 220, note 1.

Uncon-
stitutional
proceed-
ings of
Kritolaos,
B.C. 147—
146.

Tamul-
tuous
Meeting

at Corinth,

May,
B.c. 146.

544 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

League, and told Sextus that he had no power to act without the
Assembly, and that he would refer matters to the next Meeting
to be held six months hence.! This was mere mockery, and the
Romans naturally departed in great indignation. Kritolaos
himself spent the winter in proceedings almost as unconstitutional
as anything that the Romans themselves had done. He went
through the several cities of the League ;? he held local Assem-
blies in each, nominally to announce what had been done at
Tegea, but really to excite the people everywhere against Rome.
He even went so far as to order the local magistrates * to stop
all proceedings against debtors till the war was over. No wonder
the President and his war policy were highly popular.

At this stage of the proceedings it is almost as hard to
sympathize with the Achaians as with their enemies. It is one
of those cases in which a nation or a party, whose cause is
essentially just, contrives, by particular foolish and criminal
actions, to forfeit the respect to which it is otherwise entitled.
Now, in its last moments, the Federal Government of Achaia
had, for the first time, fallen into the hands of a mere mob, led
by a President who showed himself a demagogue in the worst
sense of the word. The class of men who had hitherto directed
the affairs of the League, the old liberal aristocracy, leaders and
not enemies of the people, men who had both character and
property to lose, were no longer listened to. They were
naturally averse to a war in which success was hopeless, and it
was therefore easy for Kritolaos to hold them up to popular
hatred as traitors. At the next Spring Meeting, held at Corinth,
an Assembly was gathered together such as had never before
been seen. It was attended by a multitude of low handicrafts-
men, both from Corinth and other cities, such as seldom

1 Pol. xxxviii. 3. See above, Ὁ. 214. Pausanias (vii. 14. 4, δ) makes this
answer of Kritolaos be preceded by a request of Sextus that a regular Assembly
might be summoned at once. This Kritolaos pretends to do, but, together with
his formal summons, he sends secret instructions, in conformity with which
nobody came. This is not easy to believe, and it reads like a misconception of
Polybios’ account, as if Pausanias had been led astray by the ambiguous word
συνεδρεύσαντες. It would be easier to believe, though still very unlikely, that
the Meeting at Tegea was to be a full Meeting of the Assembly, and that Kritolaos
prevented it in this way. Polybios clearly makes the sham summons—to what-
ever kind of meeting—take place before Kritolaos reached Tegea, while Pausanias
places it afterwards.

2 Pol. u.s, ᾿Επιπορευόμενος κατὰ τὸν χειμῶνα rds πόλεις, ἐκκλησίας συνῆγε.

ΤΌ, Παρήγγειλε τοῖς ἄρχουσι. This must mean the local magistrates.

ΙΧ EMBASSY OF SEXTUS CHSAR 545

appeared in the Federal Congress! At this Meeting Metellus Efforts of
made yet one more effort. Cnsus Papirius and three other wee ;
Roman envoys” appeared at Corinth, and addressed the peace.
Assembly in the same conciliatory tone as had been employed

by Sextus. Hitherto the Achaian Assemblies seem to have

been fairly decorous parliamentary bodies, but such a multitude

as had now come together was not disposed to listen to any

one but its own leaders. The place of meeting made matters

worse, a8 the Corinthian people were the fiercest of all,® doubt-

less through indignation at the proposal to separate them from

the League. The Roman Ambassadors were received with a

storm of derision, and left the Assembly amid the shouts and

insults of the multitude.4 The Achaian People then went on in

due order to discuss the proposals of the envoys to which they

had not listened. A few only took their side. Kritolaos made

a fierce speech against the Romans, which might not have been

out of place in the mouth of Kykliadas fifty years sooner.

Could we believe in their personal purity, we might have some
sympathy for the last champions of Greece, even when such
championship had become madness.® But we have seen that Violence
Diaios was not above a bribe, and now Kritolaos went on in a οἱ Κτὶ-
strain very unworthy of the successor of Markos and Philopoimén. τὸ the
One or two sentences indeed of his speech might have been Assembly.
in place in the mouth of either of those great men.’ But he

went on to attack the moderate party, to attack the presiding

1 Pol. xxxviii. 4. See above, p. 205. This is the Meeting spoken of by
Pausanias, vii. 14. 5. He leaves out the account of Kritolaos’ doings during
the winter.

3 Aulus Gabinius, Caius Fannius, and a third whose name appears in the
text of Polybios in the corrupt form τὸν νεώτερον ἀλίωνα μαῖνον. This suggests
some such name as Aulus Menius.

3 Pol. us. Πᾶσαι μὲν ἐκορύζων al πόλεις, πανδημεὶ δὲ καὶ μάλιστά πως ἢ
τῶν Κορωθίων. ᾿

4 Ib. Χλευάξοντες δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις μετὰ θορύβον καὶ κρανγῆς ἐξέβαλλον.
Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 490) refers to the somewhat confused account in Strabo
(lib. viii. cap. 6, vol. ii. 215), which seems to apply to this time. According to
him, the Romans were pelted with mud.

5 Pol. xxxviii. 4. Ὀλίγοις δέ τισι καὶ λίαν ἤρεσκε τὰ λεγόμενα διὰ τῶν
πρεσβευτῶν.

6 Pans. vii. 14. 6. Td μὲν δὴ ἄνδρα βασιλέα καὶ πόλιν ἀνελέσθαι πόλεμον
καὶ μὴ εὐτυχῆσαι συνέβη φθόνῳ μᾶλλον Ex του δαιμόνων ἢ τοῖς πολεμήσασι ποιεῖ
τὸ ἔγκλημα " θρασύτης δὲ ἡ μετὰ ἀσθενείας μανία μᾶλλον ἢ ἀτυχία καλοῖτο.

7 Pol. us. Φάσκων βούλεσθαι μὲν Ῥωμαίων φίλος ὑπάρχειν, δεσπότας δ᾽ οὐκ
ἂν εὐδοκῆσαι κτησάμενος" καθόλου δὲ παρήνει, λέγων ὡς, ἐὰν μὲν ἄνδρες ὥσιν, οὐκ
ἀπορήσουσι συμμάχων, ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀνδρόγυνοι,͵ κυρίων.

ΩΝ

Beginning
of War
with
Rome,
B.c, 146.

Further
efforts of
Metellua,

546 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

Ministers,' and, when called to order by them,” he appealed to
his soldiers * to stand by him, and dared any man, magistrate or
not, to touch the hem of his garment. He ended by accusing
two of the presiding Ministers, Evagoras of Aigion and the
honest old patriot Stratios of Tritaia, of revealing the secrets of
the Cabinet to Papirius.* Stratios in vain denied the charge.
At last Kritolaos carried two resolutions through the Assembly ;
one declaring war against Sparta, that is, as Polybios truly says,
against Rome; the other investing the General for the time
being with absolute power, that is, as the same writer adds,
making himself Monarch of the League.®

War now broke out. The report of Sextus and his
colleagues, and the letter of Metellus, determined the Senate to
send the newly-chosen Consul Lucius Mummius with a land- and
sea-force against the League. Rome had now got, in the insults
offered to her successive ministers, that which she had doubtless
long aimed at getting—a good technical ground for war. But
the long-suffering of Metellus made yet one more effort. His
real goodwill to Greece was now sharpened by a personal
consideration. Mummius was coming; Metellus would fain
finish the struggle, either by war or by diplomacy, before his
arrival. He neither wished Mummius to rob him of the credit
of subduing Achaia as well as Macedonia, nor yet to see a nation
which he was anxious to spare as far as he could handed over
to one who was disposed to deal with itfar more harshly. Once

1 Pol. xxxviii. 4. Κατανίστατο μὲν τῶν ἀρχόντων, διέσυρε δὲ τοὺς ἀντι-
πολιτευομένους.

3 Ib. 5. Τῶν δὲ τῆς γερουσίας βουλομένων ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, κιτ.λ. See
above, p. 231, note 4.

8 Ib. Περισπασάμενος τοὺς στρατιώτας xaravloraro, κελεύων προσελθεῖν.
Were these soldiers citizens or mercenaries? In regular times one cannot fancy
mercenaries being present in the Assembly at all, nor citizen soldiers in any
military dress or character. But in these days of violence any breach of order
may have bappened.

* ΤΌ, "Edy γὰρ. .. πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα δι᾽ ἀπορρήτων ἐν ταῖς curap-
χίαις διασαφεῖν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Γναῖον.

δ᾽ Ib. Προσεμέτρησεν ἕτερον ψήφισμα παράνομον, ὥστε κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀν θρώ-
πους οὖς ἂν ἐπὶ στρατοπεδείᾳ αἱρήσονται᾽" δι᾽ ἃ τρόπον τινὰ μοναρχικὴν ἀνέλαβεν
ἐξουσίαν. See above, p. 377, for the appointment of Aratos, as στρατηγὸς
αὐτοκράτωρ.

One might almost infer from Pausanias (vii. 14. 6) that the Theban Boeotarch
Pytheas was present in this Assembly. But his words do not absolutely imply
it, and Polybios could hardly have failed to mention it. He merely makes
Kritolaos tell the Achaians that several Kings and commonwealths are ready te
help them.

IX WAR WITH ROME 547

a SS

more, seemingly on his own responsibility, he pledged himself

for the safety of the Achaians, if they would give up the cities

which Aurelius had required to be separated from the League.}
Ignominious as these terms were, they would have left the
League in possession of a larger territory than it held during

the Social War. But Kritolaos would listen to no terms, and

the mass of the people shared his passions. War had been
declared against Sparta, but it was begun in another quarter.
Among the cities which the League was called on to surrender,

no disaffection is spoken of, nor is any likely to have existed, at

Argos or at Orchomenos ; the Corinthians, as we have seen, were

the fiercest Unionists in all Peloponnésos ; one city only, besides

Sparta, hearkened to the Roman call to Secession. This was Secession
Hérakleia, a distant and outlying Canton, which it was foolish ane
to have ever annexed to the League at all. Against these new xieia.
Secessionists Kritolaos now led his army.? On his march he

was joined by the whole force of Thebes under the Bceotarch
Pytheas.* The Thebans had been sentenced by Metellus to pay
damages to Phékis, Euboia, and Amphissa for various wrongs

done to those several states.* They were therefore ready for

any risk. The combined Achaian and Theban force sat down

before Hérakleia, but, on hearing of the approach of Metellus,

they raised the siege. A battle took place at Skarpheia near Battle of
Thermopyle, in which the Greek army was utterly routed. A oer.
chosen reinforcement from Arkadia was overtaken by the a efent
Romans at Chairéneia; all, a thousand in number, perished. and
Kritolaos himself, after the defeat at Skarpheia, disappeared ; ace
Pausanias is inclined to think that he drowned himself; accord-
ing to Livy, he took poison.” At any rate, no more was seen Diaios
of him, and Diaios, as the General of the year before, assumed succeeds
his command, according to Law.® He seems to have ventured othe
on many arbitrary measures, such as exacting benevolences, and ship.
requiring the emancipation and military equipment of twelve

1 Paus. vii. 15. 2. That is, Lacedemon, Corinth, Argos, Orchomenos, and
Hérakleia. See Schorn, 396, and Thirlwall, viii. 492.

2 Paus. vii. 15. 2. Ἡράκλειαν δὲ προσεκάθηντο πολιορκοῦντες οὐ βουλομένους
ἐς τὸ ᾿Αχαϊκὸν συντελεῖν.

3 Cf. Paus. vii. 14. 6 with 15. 9. Polybios (xl. 1) gives Pytheas a bad
character. 4 Paus. vii. 14. 7.

5 Ib. vii. 15. 4. Livy, Epit. lii.

® Pol. xl. 2. See above, pp. 219, 506. Livy (u.s.) says, less accurately,
ab Acheis ἀκα [why not Pretor 1] creatus.

Nego-
ciation
between
Sdsikratés
and Me-
tellus.

548 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

thousand slaves! He summoned the whole force of the League
to assemble at Corinth. But the whole land was in a wretched

9

state; Elis and Messéné refused their contingents ;* we may
suppose that their Achaian loyalty had never been very fervent,
but they had for years at least acquiesced in their position in
the League; they were not however prepared, like the Corin-
thians, to die for it. Patrai and its dependent towns? had
suffered so severely at Skarpheia that they had no contingent to
furnish. Diaios however raised four thousand men, whom
‘he sent, under Alkamenés, to garrison Megara and to check the
further advance of the Romans.4 Meanwhile the Vice-General
Sésikratés had entered into negociations of some sort with
Metellus.© One Andrénidas had gone as envoy; he now
returned with Philén, a Thessalian, still bearing kind words
and promises from the Roman General. Meanwhile Metelius
advanced ; Alkamenés and his garrison escaped to Corinth,® and
the Megarians, deprived of all Federal aid, surrendered their
city to the Romans. Diaios held an Assembly at Corinth ; he
was confirmed in his office,’ and the returning envoys, Andrénidas
and Lagios, were dragged to prison with every sort of insult.
Phil6n was indeed allowed to speak, but the aged Stratios in
vain implored Diaios to hearken. The President then held a
meeting of his Cabinet 8 among whom were the former President

1 Tittmann (677, 8, and 686) relies too much on this clearly illegal act as
proving a habit, if not a right, of occasional arbitrary interference on the part of
the Federal power.

2 Pol. xl. 3. ᾿Ηλεῖοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ Μεσσήνιοι κατὰ χώραν ἔμειναν, προσδοκ-
ὥντες τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου κίνδυνον.

3 ΤῸ. Πατρεῖς καὶ τὸ μετὰ τούτων συντελικόν. See above, p. 198.

4 Paus. vii. 15. 8.

5 Pol. xl. 4. Paus. vii. 15. 11. We know this mission ‘only in its results.
The words ὅτι προστατήσαι τοῦ διαβουλίον (Pol. xl. δ), which imply the putting
of a question to an Assembly, show that Andrdnidas was sent by the authority
of some deliberative body or other, under the presidency of Sésikratés. Possibly
Sésikratés may have collected the Senate, or have done his best, however un-
successfully, to summon a regular Assembly. 6 Paus, vii. 15. 10, 11.

7 Pol, x). 4. Καθεσταμένου στρατηγοῦ διὰ τών πολλῶν. After Polybios’
clear exposition of the law in c. 2 this seems a needless ceremony, and it is
impossible to suppose that we have reached the Autumn Meeting of B.c. 146,
and this was a regular election to the Generalship of 5.c. 146-5. This supposi-
tion would drive all the remaining events of the war far too late in the year.
(See Clinton, in an.) Considering the whole story, the suggestion presents
itself whether Sdsikratés had not been set up by his party as Provisional
General in opposition to Diaios, so that a formal confirmation would be
desirable.

8 Pol. xl. 4. Συνεδρεύσαντες. See above, p. 543. These Ministers were

ΙΧ CRUELTIES OF DIAIOS 549

Damokritos, and Alkamenés—the real traitor, if any one. The
result of their deliberations was to drag the Vice-General before
some High Court of Justice or other.1 He was accused of Cruelty
treason, and condemned to death, and he died under the tortures 224 cor-
which were inflicted upon him to extort a confession. This rt Dintos
spectacle roused the indignation of the people; their patriotism Death
was unreflecting and unruly, but they were not prepared for οἵ Sosi-
such monstrous cruelty and injustice. Andrénidas and the other rates.
intended victims were spared on payment of bribes to Diaios.

By this time the Achaians had no longer to deal with Metellus,
but with a very different foe. Mummius was now at their gates. Mummius
He was far from being a Roman of the school of Flamininus and οἱ phe
Aémilius. He was a plebeian, a man of no hereditary distinction, athmus.
with a character marked by many of the virtues and vices of the
old plebeian character. He was rough and ignorant, but devoid
neither of native eloquence nor of a certain practical skill in
administration; ferocious in war, while war lasted, but not
inclined to needless oppression when conquest was once secure.
Mummius now came to the Isthmus with the Roman army, and
with some Pergamenian auxiliaries, led against the Achaian
League by an officer who, strangely enough, bore the name of
Philopoimén.? He was, it is said, joined by the inhabitants of
the Corinthian territory of Tenea,® apparently a subject district
glad to throw off the yoke of the capital. A slight advantage Battle
puffed up Diaios and his troops ; ὁ he marched forth to a pitched Lemke
battle at Leukopetra ;5 the cavalry fled without a blow;® the ack of
infantry fought bravely, but in vain. Diaios fled to his own Corinth,
city of Megalopolis, killed his wife, perhaps set fire to his house, Sep:

and lastly poisoned himself.’ Of the rest of the army many ert

perhaps elected at the violent Spring Meeting at Corinth, which accounts for
their being mere creatures of Diaios, while their predecessors (see above, p. 546)
did what they could to restrain Kritolaos. The time of election of the Ministers
need not have been changed with that of the General.

1 Pol. xl. 5. Καθίσαντες δικαστὰς τοῦ μὲν Σωσικράτους κατεδίκασαν θάνατον.

3 Paus. vii. 16. 1.

3 Strabo, viii. 6. 22. See above, p. 200, note 3. This district must have
somehow escaped the liberalizing reforms of Philopoimén and Lykortas.

4 Paus. vii. 16. 2. Yet it is impossible to believe the tales of their excessive
presumption in Justin, xxxiv. 2, See Thirlwall, viii. 496.

5 Aurelius Victor, c. Ix.

δ They were, as Bishop Thirlwall says (viii. 496), “all belonging to that
class which was opposed to the measures of Dieus.’’ Yet it is an inglorious
ending for a service which had shone so under Lydiadas and Philopoimén.

7 Paus. vii. 16. 4-6. Aur. Vict. u.s. See Thirlwall, u.s. note.

Achaia
not yet
formally
reduced
toa
Province.

Settle-
ment

of the
country,
B.c. 146-
145.

550 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

—$$——— ςἐ-οὄ.. = τ .α-Ἐ.-.. ς-Ξ-.-. - — ----ἔ - =

took refuge in Corinth, and thence escaped in the night along
with a large portion of the Corinthians themselves. The city,
though it offered no resistance, was sacked and burned ; of the
few people who were left in it, the men were slaughtered, the
women and children were sold. The history of the Achaian
League, as an independent power, was over.

It is commonly said that Achaia was now reduced to the
form of a Rogan Province. It would seem that this assertion
is not strictly accurate.| No Roman Preetor was sent into Greece
till a much later time ;? but the Governor of Macedonia continued
to exercise the same sort of protectorate over the country which
we have seen Metellus exercising for some years past. In fact
it was not the policy of Rome to reduce any conquered state to
the form of a province at the conclusion of the first war against
it. This we may see by the history of Carthage, Macedonia,
and Aitolia. But Achaia was reduced to a state of dependence
which differed only in form from the provincial condition, and
which makes it quite needless for me to continue my history
any further. Achaia now surrendered herself to the will of
Rome,’ as AXitolia had done forty years before. And the arm
of the conqueror fell more heavily upon Achaia than it had done
upon Aitolia. That Achaia, like AXstolia, sank to the level of
acknowledged dependency is involved in the nature of the
case ; and the Roman interference with internal institutions was
incomparably greater than it had been in the case of Attolia.
Mummius of his own authority, before the usual Board of
Commissioners arrived from Rome, imposed a fine upon the
League for the benefit of Sparta,‘ and destroyed the walls of all

1 See Dr. Smith, Dict. Geog. art. Achaia. Mommsen, i ii. 46. Kortiim, i iii, 338.

3 Plutarch (Cim. 2) says, of the time of Lucullus, ἡ κρίσις ἣν ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ
τῆς Μακεδονίας, οὕπω γὰρ εἰς τὴν ᾿Ελλάδα Ῥωμαῖοι στρατηγοὺς διεπέμποντο.
Compare also the language put by Appian (Mithrid. 58) into the mouth of Snuila
towards Mithridatés: Μακεδονίαν re ἡμετέραν οὖσαν éwérpexes, καὶ τοὺς
Ἕλληνας τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀφήρου" οὐ πρίν τε ἤρξω μετανοεῖν, οὐδ᾽ ᾿Αρχέλαος
ὑπέρ σου παρακαλεῖν, ἢ Μακεδονίαν μέν με ἀνασώσασθαι, τὴν δὲ Ἑλλάδα τῆς
σῆς ἐκλῦσαι βίας. Here is a marked distinction drawn between the position of
Macedonia and that of Greece, one which a late and careless writer like Appiau
would hardly have introduced, if he had not found it in his authorities. But
see Thirlwall, viii. 503.

3 Liv. Epit. 11, Omni Achaia in deditionem accepta.

4 Either now, or in the arrangements of the next year, the Lakénian towns
(see above, p. 485) must have been reunited to Sparta. They remained subject
to Sparta till the reign of Augustus ; they therefore had no share in the nominal!

ΙΧ LEGISLATION OF POLYBIOS 551

the cities which had taken a share in the war !—that is, of all
except Elis, Messéné, and perhaps Patraii When the Com- Disso-
missioners came, they entirely abolished the Federal Constitution, ion
with its Assemblies and Magistracies, and, in each particular city League
the constitution was changed from Democracy to what the
Greeks called Timocracy, that is, that species of Oligarchy in and aboli-
which wealth, and not birth, is the qualification.2 Everywhere “2 οὗ
else throughout Greece, whatever vestiges of Federal Union still cracy in
survived were swept away in like manner.® Greece was to the Cities.
contain only separate cities, each of them a dependent and
tributary ally of Rome, Each city was to be wholly isolated -

from its neighbours; no common Assemblies were to bring

men of different cities together, nor could the citizen of one city

any longer hold land in the territory of another. But, when

they had thus rooted up the dangerous elements of Federalism

and Democracy, when every city was condemned to weakness

and isolation, when each was reconstructed with a form of,
government which was sure to make it the humble slave of
Rome, neither Mummius nor his golleagues seem to have been
disposed to push the rights of conquest to any specially tyrannical
extreme. They called in Polybios as the law-giver of the new Polybios
commonwealths ;5 no man could have been better suited for the regisiates
office. He alone was equally familiar with Achaian and with Achaian
Roman politics; he alone, in his'calm and capacious intellect, Cities,
combined a sincere wish to benefit his country with an utter ἢ δ᾽
absence of all merely sentimental patriotism. He did not shrink

from making the best of a bad bargain, nor refuse to serve his
country because she had fallen from the position which she had

held in his youth. During the crisis itself, he was better away ;

he could not have hindered the war, and he might have been
tortured to death like Sésikratés and Philinos. But now, in his
peculiar position, the friend alike of the living Scipio and of the

dead Philopoimén, he could mediate, as no other man could, between

the conquerors and the conquered. Freedom, greatness, glory

he could not restore to his country ; but it was something to

revival of the League. Augustus separated twenty-four towns, but six of them
had been recovered by Sparta before the visit of Pausanias.

1 Paus. vii. 16. 9.

2 Ib, Anpoxparias μὲν xaréwave, καθίστα δὲ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων τὰς ἀρχάς.

3 Ib. See above, p. 144.

4 Ib. See above, p. 201.

5 Pol. xl. 10. Paus. viii. 30. 9.

Nominal
revival
of the
League.

Devotion
of the
Pelo-
ponnésian

people.

Later
parallels.

B.c. 146.
aD. 1454.

552 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

give to her cities such laws as secured to them internal peace
and as high a degree of well-being as their condition allowed.
And we may well believe that it was owing to his influence that,
after a while, both the Achaians and the other Greeks were
allowed to resume something like the forms of their old Federal
institutions.|_ The Romans, perhaps the Greeks too, called it
a restoration of liberty, when the Achaian League once more
arose, with its Federal General, its Federal Cabinet, and as near
an approach to its Federal Assembly® as the new oligarchic
State-constitutions allowed. But its existence was now purely
municipal, or rather it was something less than municipal
Town-Autonomy and Federalism, Aristocracy and Democracy,
were now, all alike, shadows and pageants. The League lingered
on in this shape for some centuries; the exact moment of its
final dissolution it would be hard to fix, and it would be useless
for my purpose to inquire. It is enough that the history of the
Achaian League, as a contribution of the slightest value to
political knowledge, ends with the last and most unhappy
Presidency of Kritolaos and Diaios.

Achaia fell ingloriously ; in her last years there is nothing to
admire, except the determined, even if misdirected, patriotism of
the mass of the people. They may well be pardoned if Krito-
laos and Diaios seemed to them as Lydiadas and Philopoimén.
They listened to constitutional leaders who had at least the
formulz of patriotism on their lips, and they fought to the
death against the invader, when the aristocrats of the cavalry
fled without striking a blow. Thrice in the world’s history
have the gallant people of Peloponnésos risen like a nation of
heroes, and found no leaders worthy of them. They faced the
Roman beneath the headland of Leukopetra ; they died sword in
hand upon their mountains when Byzantine priests and nobles
cringed before the conquering Ottoman ; and, in our own day,

1 Paus. vii. 16. 10. See above, p. 144, note 3. The expression of Polybios
(xl. 10) that he gave the cities τοὺς περὶ τῆς κοινῆς δικαιοδοσίας νόμου: seems to imply
that some part of his legislation took place after the restoration of Federal forms.

2 See Boeckh, C. 1, i. 712. Thirlwall, viii. 502.

δ The title of the oligarchic Assembly of the revived League seems to have
been συνέδριον. This accounts for the constant use of that word and its cognates
by Plutarch and Pausanias to express the Democratic Assembly of the old League.
In Polybios, as we have seen (see p. 220, note 1), they are applied to meetings,
not of the Assembly, but of the Cabinet Council.

1x GENERAL RESULTS OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE 558

they have wrested their independence from the same enemy, in a.p. 1821-
spite of, rather than by the help of, the native rulers and 1827.
captains of their land. And, at the very moment that I am ap. 1862.
thus summing up the long history of Greece, a new Revolution,

as pure and glorious as any that expelled Macedonian or Otto-

man from her soil, has again made Greece the centre of the
admiring gaze of Europe. Let us hope that, this time at least,
Greece may find leaders worthy of her people, and that her
fourth struggle for freedom and good government may be
crowned with a more lasting success than any that has gone
before it. It at least augurs well for Greece that her Revolu-

tion has not been the work of the mob of a capital, but is, if

ever revolution was, the deliberate expression of the will of a

whole people. And a historian of Federal Greece may be
allowed to rejoice when he hears the revived voice of Grecian
freedom first sounding from the lands of his old love. The
homes where Greek freedom lingered longest have been those
where it has been the first to rise again; Achaia, Akarnania,
/tolia, have been foremost in the good work, and the name of
Roufos of Patrai bids fair to win a place alongside of that of
Markos of Keryneia. Through the days of Bavarian corruption,

just as through those of Roman conquest and of Turkish
tyranny, the heart of the Achaian people has still been sound.

And, in all cases alike, the most blameworthy points in the
character of the oppressed have been mainly the work of the
oppressor. That the Achaian League fell, in its last days, from Errors
its ancient dignity—that the place of some of the noblest of men ° the
was filled by some of the most contemptible—that the seal which mainly the
had been borne by Markos and Lykortas had passed into the result of
hands of the traitor Menalkidas and the coward Damokritos—all Roman
this was mainly the fruit of Rome’s own insidious policy. Her δ
arts had tried, and tried in vain, to divide a people which had so

well learned the benefits of union. When those arts failed, she

shut up the best life of the nation in her Etruscan prisons, and

so cut off that stream of uninterrupted political tradition which

alone can be trusted permanently to maintain the needful succes-

sion of statesmen and of captains. If Achaia died ill, it was
mainly the fault of her murderer; and, if she died ill, she had

at least lived well. For a hundred and forty years—no short 8.0. 281-
space in any nation’s life, and a very long space among the few 146.
centuries which we call Ancient History—the League had given

General
results
of the
Achaian

League.

Roman
opposition
a witness
to its
value.

The
Achaian
League the
natural
model for
liberated
Greece.

554 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP.

a a .

to a larger portion of Greece than any previous age had seen, a

. measure of freedom, unity, and general good government, which

may well atone for the lack of the dazzling glory of the old
Athenian Democracy. It was no slight achievement to weld
together so many cities into an Union which strengthened them
against foreign Kings and Senates, and which yet preserved to
them that internal independence which was so dear to the
Hellenic mind. It was no slight achievement to keep so many
cities for so long a time free alike from foreign garrisons, from
domestic mobs, domestic Tyrants, and domestic oligarchs. How
practically efficient the Federal principle was in maintaining the
strength and freedom of the nation is best shown by the bitter
hatred which it aroused, first in the Macedonian Kings and then in
the Roman Senate. It was no contemptible political system against
which so many Kings and Consuls successively conspired ; it was
no weak bond which the subtlest of all diplomatic Senates ex-
pended so many intrigues and stratagems to unloose.! And, if
the League fell ingloriously, it at least fell less ingloriously than
the kingdoms and commonwealths around it. Better was it to
be conquered in open battle, even with a Diaios as its leader,
than to drag on the contemptible life of the last Kings of
Bithynia and Pergamos or of the beggar Democracy of Athens.
The League did its work in its own age by giving Peloponnésos

-well nigh a century and a half of freedom ; it does its work still

by living in the pages of its own great historian as the first
attempt on a large scale to reconcile local independence with
national strength. Ages must pass away before the course of
our history will show us another so perfect and illustrious an
example of a true Federal Constitution. And never, up to our
own day, has Federalism, the offspring of Greece, appeared again
in its native land. Yet, when we look at the map of Greece,
and sec each valley and peninsula and island marked out by the
hand of nature for an independent being—when we think of the
varied origin and condition of the present inhabitants of its
several provinces—when we think of the local institutions,
democratic here, aristocratic there, which preserved the life of

1 A remarkable passage of Justin (xxxiv. 1) gives a clear and forcible summary
of the whole Roman policy towards the League: ‘‘ Achzi nimis potentes Romanis
videbantur, non propter singularum civitatium nimias opes, sed propter conspirati-
onem universarum. Namque Achai, licet per civitates, veluti per membra, divisi

sint, unum tamen corpus et unum imperium habent, singularumque urbium peri-
cula mutuis viribus, propulsant.”’

IX FUTURE OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE 555

the nation through ages of Turkish bondage—we may well ask
whether ancient Achaia or modern Switzerland may not be the

true model for regenerate Greece, rather than a blind imitation

of the stereotyped forms of European royalty. It may be that

the favourable moment has passed for ever ; it may be that it is

now too late to dream of a Federal Republic in a land where
thirty years of Bavarian corruption have swept away those relics

of ancient freedom which the very Ottoman had spared. How-

ever this may be now, there can be little doubt that, a genera-

‘tion back, the blood of Botzarés and the life of Kanarés would

have been better given to found a free Hellenic Federation than

to establish the throne of any stranger King. And let us pass Future of
beyond the bounds of Greece herself, to look at that whole group soul
of nations of which Greece is only one among many, although in Eprope.
some respects the foremost. We may be sure that a day will

come when the rod of the oppressor shall be broken’; we need

no prophet to tell us that wrong and robbery shall not always

be abiding, that all the arts of Western diplomatists cannot for

ever maintain the Barbarian on the throne of the Ceesars and the
Infidel in the most glorious of Christian temples. A day will

come when the Turkish horde shall be driven back to its native
deserts, or else die out, the victim of its own vices, upon the soil
which it has too long defiled. Then will Greek and Serb and
Albanian and Rouman and Bulgarian enter upon the full and

free possession of the land which is their own. Already does
Greece, free and extending her borders, Servia and Wallachia held

in only nominal vassalage, Montenegro, if crushed for ἃ moment,

yet unsubdued in heart, all point to the full accomplishment of

the glorious dream. And, when the full day has dawned, are

those lands to remain utterly separate and isolated, or are they,

so many peoples, nations, and languages, to be fettered down by

some centralizing Monarchy which would merely substitute a
Christian for an Infidel master? Here would be the grandest Monarchic
field that the world has ever seen for trying the great experi- Federalism
ment of Monarchic Federalism. The nations of the Byzantine probably
peninsula, differing in origin, language, and feeling, are united solvent.
by common wrongs, by a common religion, and by the common
reverence of ages for the Imperial City of the Basils and the
Constantines. For nations in such a position, the Federal tie,
rather than either more complete separation or more close con-
nexion, seems the natural relation to each other. But the tradi-

556 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP. IX

tions of Servia and Bulgaria are not Republican ; the mere size
of the several provinces may seem, in the Old World at least, to
surpass the limits which nature has in all ages marked out for
European commonwealths. One set of circumstances points to
Federal Union, another set of circumstances points to princely
government. A Monarchic Federation on such a scale has never
yet existed, but it is not in itself at all contradictory to the
Federal ideal. When the day of vengeance and of freedom shall
have come, it will be for the people of those noble and injured
lands—not for Western mediators or Western protectors—to
solve the mighty problem for themselves.

CHAPTER X

OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY

IN the foregoing pages I have traced the history of the Federal Recapitu-
system of Government, alike in its rudest forms and in its most /ation.
perfect developement, both in Greece itself and in those countries

whose political institutions were evidently formed after Grecian

models. In the Achaian League we saw one of the four great
Confederations of history stand forth as the restorer of freedom

in the Grecian world; we beheld its work alike in the deliver-

ance of Peloponnésos from foreign Kings and local Tyrants and

in the establishment of the most formidable obstacle which the
encroaching power of Rome ever encountered. In Lykia we

beheld a Federal state to which circumstances denied the same
prominence as that of Achaia, but which, like Achaia, long pre-

served an oasis of freedom in the midst of surrounding bondage,

and which possessed a constitution still more perfect, forestalling

some of the subtlest inventions of modern political science. In
carrying the history of Achaia and Lykia down to their absorp-

tion into the dominion of Rome, we finished for ever, as far as

the past is concerned, the History of Federal Government in the

land east of the Hadriatic. The Hellenic and Hellenized states

formed a world of their own, and their political life has had

but little direct effect upon the later history of mankind. The Indirect
indirect influence of Grecian politics, as of Grecian literature and iaence
art, it is indeed impossible to overrate. But no direct chain of direct in.’
cause and effect connects with Greece in the way in which all fluence of
medizval and modern history is connected, as an uninterrupted Rome.
continuation, with the history of the Republic and Empire of

Rome.! There is no reason to believe that the constitution of

1 I have to thank the writings of Sir Francis Palgrave for first opening my
eyes to this all-important truth, without which all medisval history is an in-
soluble puzzle. Notwithstanding the constant eccentricity and frequent one-

δῆ OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

any state of Western Europe was ever directly derived either
from the Athenian Democracy or from the Achaian Confeder-
ation. It is this very lack of direct connexion which gives to
their later reproductions a value which could never have attached
either to worn-out traditions or to conscious imitations. In
closing the history of Greek Federalism we draw a wider line
than will separate any other two portions of our subject.
Switzerland, Holland, the United States, the lesser Feder-
ations which 1 shall have to group around them, all belong to
one world, to one political system, to that system which arose
out of the fusion between the Roman Empire and its Teutonic
conquerors. Before, then, we enter upon the history of any
of these later commonwealths, we must look back to the
common source of all European history, the Roman Empire and
Connexion the Roman Republic. Rome indeed never formed a Federal
of Italian state, but many of her institutions approached the borders of
no | the Federal idea, and there can be little doubt that to these
subject of guast-Federal elements Rome owed no small share of her great-
Federal- ness. And in the slight glimpses which Roman history gives us
ism of the’ older Italian states, we can see that the rude germs of
Federalism were no less widely spread in Italy than in Northern
Greece, and that, in some cases at least, these rude germs grew
up in something coming very near to a true Federal common-
wealth. Again, in the medizval history of Italy there is at
least one moment when a Federal Union would have been the
true remedy for the evils of the time, when a large portion of
Italian _[taly seemed on the very brink of forming such an Union, though,
historya like the projected Unions of Ionia and Chalkidiké,! the scheme,
paneon if it ever amounted to a scheme, never took effect. And, lastly,
the Greek In our own day, the plan of an Italian Confederation has been,
and the with different objects and with different meanings, proposed
medieval alike by friends and by enemies of Italy as the proper mode of
ism. uniting the different portions of that so long divided land. Thus,
though no true Federal Government has ever existed in Italy
in strictly historical times, still a Chapter on the history of
. Federalism in that country forms a natural branch of my
general subject, and it will act as a sort of transition from the
purely Hellenic to the purely medieval portions of the work.

sidedness of his writings, Sir F. Palgrave deserves the gratitude of every student
for having done more than any other man to demonstrate the true unity of
history. 1 See above, pp. 145, 147.

x CAUSES OF FEDERATION IN ANCIENT ITALY 559

δ. 1. Of the Federations of Ancient Italy

The same causes which made Federal Government, or some Prevalence
approach to it, common in the ruder parts of Greece, seem to of Federal-
have had the same effect in many parts of the Italian peninsula.! cme
A number of small neighbouring communities, politically im- Italy.
dependent, but closely allied in blood, language, and religion, Its causes.
retained, among whatever amount of local differences, some
general sense of national unity; the feeling of brotherhood was
kept up by common sacrifices in a common temple, by occasional
common deliberations on matters of common interest, and by
occasional help given to one another when threatened by foreign
enemies. Such a group of kindred towns or districts naturally
forms a religious Amphiktyony; the religious Amphiktyony
easily grows into a lax political League, and the lax political
League may, if fortune favours, easily grow into a regular
Fedegg] Government. Indeed we have no reason to suppose
that operation of these causes was at all confined to Greece These
and Italy ; they are causes of universal application in every land ΟΟΛδῸ ΝΑ]

. . . . ws genera
which is cut up into small independent communities. And the applica.
further the people are removed from the perfection of city life, tion.
the stronger is the inducement towards national union, and the ᾽
slighter the repugnance towards the necessary sacrifice of full
local independence. It was easier for the rural cantons of
Aétolia and Samnium to enter into a Federal bond than it was
for the great cities of Athens and Milétos or Rome and Capua.

It therefore almost necessarily follows that, in the less civilized
countries of Europe, where the approaches to city life were in-
comparably feebler than in the rudest parts of Greece or Italy,

the Federal principle, in some of its laxer forms, is likely to have Instances
made considerable advances in very early times. Wherever we οἵ Confede-
find several towns or districts acting together as a single people, beyond
especially when, as among many peoples of Spain and Gaul, the Greece and

1 Canti, Histoire des Italiens, i. 82 [Storia degli Italiani, i. 118, ed. 1874}. Maly.
‘Les ¢tats gouvernés par un seul ou plusieurs . . . continuent entre eux les
luttes commencees entre les tribus ; les plus forts envahissent les plus faibles ; les .
montagnards se précipitent sur les habitants des plaines, et Jes uns pour se dé-
fendre, les autres pour attaquer, forment des confédérations, Cette forme, tres
ancienne en Italie, est naturelle dans un pays divisé par des montagnes et des
tleuves ; aussi n'y trouve-t-on pas les conditions propres aux vastes empires qui

furent pour |’Asie une cause de servitude, ni l’unité nationale qui a rendu puis-
sants quelques peuples modernes.”

Greater
importance
of the
Italian

Leagues.

Uncer-
tainty of
the
ethnology
of Ancient
Italy.

560 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

government clearly was republican, it is impossible not to suspect
the presence of some sort of an approach to Federal union.? In
this way we may get glimpses of rude Confederations in many
parts of the ancient world, any special examination of which the
political historian may be content to leave to the minuter
researches of the antiquaries of the several countries. We have
no evidence for any constitutional details, and the common-
wealths themselves are of no direct importance in history. It is
enough for my purpose barely to record their existence, as illus-
trations of the working of a general law. But the Federations
of Ancient Italy stand on a different footing. It is indeed
almost as impossible to recover any political details as in the
obscure commonwealths of Gaul and Spain ; still the fame, even
if partly mythical, of Etruria, Latium, and Samnium, and their
intimate connexion with the history of Rome, and thereby with
the history of the world, make some slight mention of those
Leagues, at once so famous and so obscure, an appropriate
portion of a general survey of the progress of Federal
ideas.

I must, once for all, decline all inquiries into the ethnology
of the early Italian nations. On no subject have more daring
and more unprofitable speculations been hazarded ; on no subject
have they more fully met with their due reward. Ingenious
men have striven to reconstruct a lost history from their own
power of divination, and to reconstruct a lost language from a
single unintelligible inscription. But their crude theories have
been scattered to the winds by the wit and wisdom of the same
hand which has since dashed in pieces the still frailer fabric of

1 Thus the Adui in Gaul had a Republic under a yearly President with large
powers, called a Vergobret (Czsar, Bell. Gall. i. 16), and Mr. Merivale (i. 302)
does not hesitate to apply the name of Confederation both to their commonwealth
and to that of the Arverni. Cesar also speaks of a Concilium Gallia (vi. 3) and
even fotius Gallia (i. 30). Here we have the familiar Federal formula. Doubt-
less, as Mr. Merivale says, the word éotius is not to be construed very strictly,
but the expression at least points to some sort of union, however lax, among
several Gaulish states. The Druidical religion seems also to have united a con-
siderable portion of Gaul in a religious Amphiktyony (Ces. vi. 13), which might
easily form the germ of a political League.

Of course when I apply the words “ Federal” and “Union ” to these obscure
commonwealths, I do so in the laxest sense of the words, not as implying the
existence of regular constitutions, like those of Achaia and Lykia. It is here
important to mark any approaches, however distant, to the Federal system, just
as when treating of the Delphic Amphiktyony, it was important to distinguish
between such mere approaches and a perfect Federation.

x EARLY FEDERATIONS IN ITALY 561

ES ...-.

Egyptian and Babylonish delusion. It is but lost labour to
dispute, and it is profoundly indifferent to my subject if ascer-

tained, whether the Etruscans were Lydians, Rhetians, or
Armenians”; whether the Tyrrhénians were the same people as

the Rasena or a subject Pelasgian race. All that concerns me is

that, in the course of Roman history, we find glimpses which Early
are quite enough to convince us that a near approach to Federal Or Fede.
ideas was made, at an early time, by more than one Italian rations
people. We see clear indications of the existence of Leagues of in Italy.
some kind among the Etruscans, Samnites, Hernicans,® and Vol-
scians,* while we can hardly doubt that the Thirty Cities of
Latium were united by a tie which came nearer still to our con-
ception of a true Federal Government. Our evidence indeed Nature
comes immediately from the suspicious records of half-mythical οἵ the
times, records which it is impossible to trust for details, and evidence.
whose testimony must at once be cast aside whenever it bears

the stamp of falsification in the interests of national or family

pride. But incidental testimonies to the constitution of foreign

states are far less suspicious; such accounts are more open to
unconscious error, but much less so to wilful misrepresentation.

And we must not forget that these early constitutions did, in Late pre-
some sort, survive far down into strictly historical times. The servation
Italian states were not incorporated with Rome; they remained jaan
distinct, though dependent, commonwealths as late as the wars Constitu-
of Marius and Sulla. They were in much the same position as tiovs.
the dependent commonwealths of Greece, and retained much the *“ o1-82,
same sort of shadow of their ancient freedom. Etruria, till her
conquest by Sulla, retained her internal constitution and her

native literature. Samnium, in the very last stage of the war, 8.0. 82.
brought Rome nearer to destruction than she had been brought

1 Sir G. C. Lewis, Credibility of the Early Roman History, 1855. Historical
Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients, 1862.

3 The Armenian Origin of the Etruscans, by Robert Ellis, B.D., London,
1861.

5 Of the Hernicans Livy uses exactly the same formulas which he applies
to the Federal states of Greece. Concilium populorum omninm huabentibus
Anagninis in circo quem Maritimum vocant, preter Aletrinatem, Ferentina-
temque, et Verulanum, omnes Hernici nominis populo Romano bellum indixe-
runt. Liv. ix. 42. Cf. the Beotian dissensions, xlii. 38 (above, p. 521).

4 Dionysios (viii. 4) describes a Federal Congress of the Volscians, from which
Niebuhr, Roman History (ii. 28, Eng. Tr.), endeavours to extract some details as
to the Volscian constitution. In this I cannot follgw him; but that Dionysios
looked on the Volscians as a Federal state is clear beyond doubt.

20

League of
ETRURIA.

Ν The
Twelve
Cities.

562 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

---...-....----ὕὄ.-...............- .--..-.ο..-ἥ -- eee —_— —

by Hannibal himself. Even the Latin commonwealths in the
later sense, Roman colonies and dependencies as they were, still
kept up a faint shadow of the famous Latin League of earlier
days. The historians who serve as our authorities had therefore
in their hands better materials than might at first sight appear
for a knowledge of the constitutional antiquities of the old
Italian states. Livy indeed was too careless, and Dionysios too
wedded to preconceived theories, ever thoroughly to understand
what they saw or what they read; still Livy and Dionysios
wrote with earlier and better informed writers before them,
writers who had themselves seen Etruria and Samnium in the
condition of separate, although dependent commonwealths. We
may therefore fairly look in their writings for occasional hints
which may give us some general notion of the constitution of
these ancient republics. Minute details it would of course be
hopeless to expect.

I pass by the traditions of Etruscan settlements, and indeed
of Etruscan Confederations, in Campania and in Cisalpine Gaul.!
These traditions are indeed highly probable in themselves, but
they belong to an age before the faintest approaches to authentic
history. I confine myself wholly to the well-known Etruria on
the banks of the Tiber and the Arnus. Here we find a picture,
the general outlines of which are surely trustworthy, of twelve
cities, each forming an independent commonwealth, but all

‘united by a lax Federal bond. The number twelve is so con-

stantly given? that there can be no doubt of its accuracy ; “ the
Twelve Cities” was evidently a familiar formula, and it is con-
firmed by the existence of twelve as a political number in the
most remote parts of the world. And it derives confirmation
from the fact that the number twelve is one not easy to recon-
cile with the lists of the Etruscan towns as handed down to us.

1 Liv. v. 88. Polyb. ii. 16, 17. See K. O. Miller, Etrusker, i. 131, 136,
345. Niebuhr, i. 88, 95.

3 Liv. u.s. So iv. 28, where duodecim popili is used as equivalent to the
Etruscan State. See also Dionys. Hal. vi. 75; cf. ix. 18 and Niebuhr, i. 94
sqq. The Federal style of populi remained in use in the Hannibalian War both
in Etruria and Umbria. Liv. xxviii. 45. It remained even in Imperial times,
when we meet with Helrurie quindecim populi (see Miiller, i. 358), an increase
reminding one of the Augustan Reform of the Amphiktyonic Council. See above,
p. 105.

3 As in Palestine, Egypt, Achaia, Ionia, We might add the “Twelve Peers"
of medieval or romantic France.

x LEAGUE OF ETRURIA 563

More than twelve towns are spoken of in our narratives ; either
then the number must, as in some other Federations, have
fluctuated from time to time, or the twelve sovereign members
of the League could not in every case have consisted of a single Constitu-
city only.! Either the several States may have themselves con- eon οὗ the
sisted of smaller Confederations, or the great cities may have
had smaller towns attached to them, whether as subjects, as
dependent allies, or as municipalities sharing in the franchise
of the capital. Our Greek experience has supplied us with
examples of all these various relations? The States, however
constituted, seem to have preserved strict Federal equality
among themselves ; except in the mythical days of Lars Porsena,
we hear nothing of any predominant capital. Indeed the
Federal Meetings, like those of Phékis and of Akarnania in
early times,® seem not to have been held in a town at all, but
within the precincts of a venerated national sanctuary. The Amphi-
Etruscan League has every appearance of being one of those ktyonic .
political Unions which grew out of an earlier religious Amphi- 44,
ktyony.* The religious centre of Etruria was the temple of League.
Voltumna,° a place whose site is uncertain, and there the poli-
tical assemblies of the nation were held also. The religious
synod was doubtless held at stated times; whether every
religious synod involved also a political Congress, or whether
secular affairs were dealt with only from time to time as occasion
served, is a question which it would be dangerous to determine
either way. But it seems that a power was vested somewhere
to summon special] meetings, as we find them held both at the
request of particular cities® and at that of foreign allies.’ Of
the constitution of the Federal Assembly we can say nothing, Constitu-
except that it doubtless was, like the constitutions of the several Hon οἵ the
1 This is suggested by Miiller, i. 852, 360. Assembly.
2 See above, pp. 126, 200, 489. 3 See above, pp. 118, 114.
4+ Mommaen (i. 86) calls Volsinii the “ Metropole” of Etruria, but he explains
it to be so only in a religious sense, “namentlich fiir den Gotterdienst,” and he
strongly asserts the independent position of the States.
5 Liv. iv. 28, 25; vi. 2. He regularly uses Concilium for the Federal As-
sembly and populi for the States, just as he does when speaking of Achaia.
6 ΤΌ, iv. 23. Cum dus civitates, legatis circa duodecim popules missis,
impetrassent ut ad Voltumnz fanum indiceretur omni Etrurie concilium.
7 Ib. x. 16. (Samnites) Etruriam pulsi petierunt; et quod legationibus
nequicquam δῶρο tentaverant, id se tanto agmine armatorum, mixtis terrore
precibus, acturos efficacius rati, postulaverunt principyum Etrurie concilium.

The Assembly is held, the Samnites address it, and we read presently after
(c.418), Tusci fere omnes consciverant bellum.

Traces of
Federal
Kingship.

B.c. 400?

Laxity
of the
Federal
tie.

Power
of war
' and peace
in the

League,

564 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

—e . .-- ---.... -.Ψ---.. . - a4 — ----— -- — ----.-

cities, strictly aristocratic.! In mythical times we hear of Kings
in the several cities, and of a sort of a Federal King, at least in
war time, attended by a lictor from each of the Confederate
towns.?. This is a state of things which is by no means im-
probable in itself, though it would be dangerous to set it down
as a piece of authentic history. We may feel sure that, in
Etruria, as well as in other parts of Italy and Greece, kingly
government existed before Aristocracy ; the further change from
Aristocracy to Democracy seems in Etruria never to have been
made. ‘There is a remarkable story in Livy that the Veientines,
weary of the excitement of annual elections, fell back upon
Kingship, and thereby offended the other cities. The rest of
the League at once disliked royalty and had personal objections
to the particular King chosen.’ This is a sort of story which
neither Livy nor any other Roman annalist was likely to insert ;
we doubtless have here, however much spoiled in the telling, a
genuine bit of internal Etruscan history. The Federal tie
between the several States seems to have been lax. If we may
venture so far into detail, it would seem that the relations
among the Etruscan cities with regard to peace and war were
nearly the same as those among the members of the Lacedsemo-
nian Confederacy. They were however modified by the absence
of any city possessing the presidential and pre-considering powers
of Sparta. War might apparently be decreed by the Federal
body, in which case every city would doubtless be bound to
send its contingent.6 In such a case it seems to have been held
to be a breach of Federal Law for any city to conclude a separate

1 See Miiller, i. 356, 362. Livy constantly uses the word Princeps, with
which we have been 80 familiar in the history of Federal Greece, to designate the
members of the Etruscan Assemblies. Dionysios (iii. 5) speaks of an ἐκκλησία
at Tarquinii in mythical times, and it has been thought, by a very doubtful
refinement, that this ἐκκλησία is opposed, like the Roman Plebs, to the γένη or
Patrician houses. See Niebuhr, i. 99. Miiller, i. 362. But nothing can be
plainer than that Dionysios, as Niebuhr himself suggests, merely transferred
Roman language to Tarquinii.

2 Dion. iii. 61. Τυρρηνὸν γὰρ ἔθος ἐδόκει, ἑκάστου τῶν κατὰ πόλιν βασιλέων
ἕνα προηγεῖσθαι ῥαβδοφόρον, ἅμα τῇ δέσμῃ τῶν ῥάβδων πέλεκυν φέροντα εἰ δὲ
κοινὴ γίνοιτο τῶν δώδεκα πόλεων στρατεία, τοὺς δώδεκα πελέκεις ἑνὶ παραδίδοσθαι
τῷ λαβόντι τὴν αὐτοκράτορα ἀρχήν.

5. Liv. v. 1. Veientes contra tedio annuz ambitionis, que interdum dis-
cordiarum causa erat, Regem creavere. Offendit ea res populorum Etrurie
animos, non majore odio regni, quam ipsius Regis.

4 See above, p. 357.

5 Dion. iii. 57. Ψήφισμα ποιοῦνται πάσας Τυρρηνῶν πόλεις κοινῇ τὸν κατὰ

“Ῥωμαίων πόλεμον ἐκφέρειν" τὴν δὲ μὴ μετέχουσαν τῆς στρατείας ἔκσπονδον εἶναι.

x LAXITY OF FEDERAL TIE IN ETRURIA 565

peace with the enemy.! But it is clear that the several cities
retained, under all other circumstances, the right of separate
diplomatic and military action. If the Federal body neglected
to take up the quarrel of any particular city, that city might, and also
alone or with such cities as chose to join it, carry on war on its = the

᾿ States.
own account. One narrative, if we may trust it, describes the
Federal body as, on one occasion, refusing to declare war in the B.c. 4791
name of the League, but expressly authorizing the service of
volunteers from any Confederate city, seemingly whether such city
itself declared war or not. Altogether, the picture which Diony-
sios and Livy give us of the state of things in Etruria must be The
taken at what it may be worth, according to the amount of aecounts
authentic materials which we may hold to be preserved in their authorities
writings. They are of course not to be received as containing a how far
trustworthy narrative of events which are placed before the worthy
beginning of authentic history. The question is, How far did
the annalists whom they followed carry back into these times
the real constitution of Etruria in later times? The general
picture which they draw is quite consistent with what we know
of other states in a similar position, and does not need to be
pieced out by any random conjectures or attempts at divination
It sets before us the perfectly probable spectacle of twelve cities,| Probable
united by a strong religious and national feeling, fully accus4*c"em®
tomed to common political action, but among which the Federal! League.
tie was not strong enough to extinguish the separate action of
the States or to weld Etruria together into a perfect Federal
commonwealth like Achaia. The Etruscan Union, as described
to us, was laxer even than that of the United States under their.
first Confederation ; but it may well have been as strong as that
which unites the members of the existing Confederation of
Germany, or even as strong as the union of the Swiss Cantons
in some of its earlier and laxer forms.

Of the Samnites, the worthiest foes whom Rome ever met

1 Dion. ix. 18. Τυρρηνῶν al μὴ μετασχοῦσαι τῆς εἰρήνης ἕνδεκα πόλεις, ἀγορὰν
ποιησάμενοι κοινὴν, κατηγόρουν τοῦ Οὐϊετανῶν ἔθνον:, ὅτι τὸν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους
πόλεμον οὐ μετὰ κοινῆς γνώμης κατελύσαντο.

2 This seems clear from several of the passages already quoted from Livy, and
indeed from the whole history of the wars between Rome and Veii.

3 Dion. ix. 1. Συνήχθη els κοινὴν ἐκκλησίαν» τὸ COvos' καὶ πολλὰ Οὐΐετανῶν
δεηθέντων συναίρεσθαι σφίσι τοῦ κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πολέμου, τέλος ἐξήνεγκαν ἐξεῖναι
τοῖς βουλομένοις Τυρρηνῶν μετέχειν τῆς στρατείας.

League of

” SAMNIUM,

Absence
of details.

The
Samnite
Cantons.

566 ‘OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

within her own peninsula, we know even less than we know of
the Etruscans. There can be little doubt that they possessed a
Federal Constitution, but of its details we can say absolutely
nothing. There was, in war-time at least, a military head of the
League, with the title of Embratur or Imperator ;' but we know
not whether he was merely a Commander-in-Chief appointed for
the occasion, or whether Samnium, unlike Atolia and Achaia,
possessed a permanent Federal President. That the Samnite
Government was Federal we might almost infer from the mere
extent of the country without any further evidence. The Sam-

-nite nation constantly acts as a whole; but a consolidated

republic on such a scale would be without parallel among the
ancient commonwealths, and it is still clearer that Samnium was
not a case of a single city ruling over a subject or dependent
territory. The names of two Cantons, the Caudini and the
Pentri,? are distinctly mentioned by Livy ; the Hirpini,* Cara-
ceni,* and Frentani® are added by modern writers with more or
less of probability. But the great city of Capua,® though a portion
of its inhabitants were of Samnite blood, seems at no time to have
been a member of the Samnite League. This was a most important
fact in Samnite history. It debarred the Confederation from

1 Liv. ix. 1. Samnites eo anno Imperatorem C. Pontium, Herennii flium,
habuerunt, Myr. Bunbury (Dict. of Geog. Art. Samnium) infers from Livy, ix. 3,
viii. 39, the absence of a Federal Diet, which Niebuhr (iii. 108) assumes without
hesitation. It is hard to see how Mr. Bunbury’s references bear upon the point.
In Liv. ix. 8 Caius Pontius consults his father ou a military question, which was
surely within the competence of the Imperator ; in viii. 39, I should rather have
found a distinct proof of the existence both of Federal and local Assemblies.
The words omnia concilia may well imply the latter, while the Federal Assembly
seems implied in De 60 coacti referre Preetores decretum fecerunt. A Senate too
seems implied in the phrase, οἱ πρόβουλοι τῶν Σαυνιτῶν, Dion. Fr. ii. (Exc. de
leg. p. 789 c). See Niebuhr, ii. 25.

2 Liv. xxiii. 41. Agrum Hirpinum et Samnites Caudinos. xxiv. 20. Cau-
dinus Samnis gravius devastatus, cf. ix. 1, et seqq. Soix. 31, Bovianus ...
caput Pentrorum Samnitium. xxii. 61, Samnites preter Pentros.

3 See Mr. Bunbury’s Article ‘‘ Hirpini” in the Dictionary of Geography. The
Hirpini are never distinctly mentioned during the days of Samnite independence,
but throughout the Hannibalian War they appear as a distinct people. Doubt-
less Rome had practised the same system of dismemberment in Samnium of which
we have seen so much in the Greek Federal States.

* See Dict. of Geog. in voc.

5 Dict. of Geog. in voc. Niebuhr, iii. 107. The Frentani appear in history
only as a non-Samnite people. _

δ᾽ Livy describes the Samnite occupation of Capua in iv. 37. In vii. 38 the
people of Capua pray for relief against Samnite incursions. The original
filibusters must therefore have quite separated themselves from the Samnite
League.

x LEAGUE OF SAMNIUM 567

both the good and the evil which might have sprung from the Effect
presence of one of the great cities of Italy within its borders. of the +
It freed Samnium from all fear of a predominant or tyrant city, of Capua.
such as Thebes became in Boeotia ; on the other hand it must
have cut off the Samnite people from many of the civilizing
influences to which other parts of Italy were open. Samnium
remained an isolated mountain district, without a sea-board ! and
without any city of importance.? Its position resembled that of Analogy
the original AXtolia and of the original Switzerland. Civic life, with |
that is, among the ancient commonwealths, the only fully civilized a“
life, must, in such a country, have lagged far behind its develope- switzer.
ments, not only in the Greek cities of Italy, but in Rome, lacd.
Etruria, or Latium. The long struggle of the Samnites with struele
Rome, never flinching, never yielding while hope of success against
lasted, sinking only before irresistible force, and rising again Rome.
whenever the least glimmer of hope or help appeared—the war s.c. 340-
which lasted, we may say, from the days of Valerius Corvus to 82:
the days of Sulla, is worthy of tha men of Morgarten or the men
of Mesolongi. Their resistance to the conqueror ceased, as we
shall see, only with the devastation of their land and the exter-
mination of their race. The Pontius who led Rome’s army and 5.0, 319.
whom Rome led in chains and beheaded,’ and the Pontius who, 5.0. 82.
generations after, fell in the last struggle by the Colline Gate,‘
remind us of the Reding who first taught the Austrian despot what a.p. 1816.
freemen could do and suffer, and the Reding who struck the last a.n. 1798.
blow for the true Democracy of the mountains against the sham
Democracy of the bloody city. The internal history of such a
people, could we recover it, would be a contribution of the
highest value both to the general history of the world and to the:
general history of Federalism. It would of course be vain to
dream of perfection in Samnium any more than elsewhere. We
must never let the external heroism of a nation delude us into
the hope that we should find its internal history free from those
dissensions and crimes which disfigure every history. What we
know of the Samnite League sets its people before us in a far'
fairer light than the kindred League of Attolia; still we cannot

1 Unless possibly the district afterwards known as that of the Picentes. See
Niebuhr, iii. 543-4.

3 Bovianum is called by Livy (ix. 31) longe ditissimum et opulentissimum armis
virisque. But could Boviannm have been compared to Rome and Capua or the

great Etruscan cities ?
3 See above, pp. 45, 46. 4 See below, § 2.

ἃ

568 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

Lessons of suppose that it was wholly free from those errors which are

Samnite common to all political communities, kingly and republican,

ustory- Federal and Consolidated. But, just as in the case of A‘tolia,
the long endurance of Samnium, the abiding energy displayed by
its people, the absence of any sign of wavering on the part of
any section of the people—all show that the Samnite League
formed a really united people, acting with a common national
will against a common enemy. Thus the history of Samnium
supplies another of the many answers with which our history
abounds to shallow declamations about the inherent weakness of
Federal states. The utter lack of all detailed history of such a
Federation—a Federation too, like that of A‘tolia, mainly rural
and not urban—is one of those losses which the student of
ancient history will ever lament, but which, if he is wise, he will
not attempt to supply by arbitrary conjectures or divinations of
his own.

League of Of all the principal Italian powers, that which, as far as our
LaTIUM. scanty information goes, has the best claim to be looked on as a
real Federal Government is the League of the Thirty Cities of
Latium. Our position with regard to the Latins is exactly
Abundance opposite to our position with regard to the Samnites. We have
of untrust- abundance of details, if we could only bring ourselves to look upon
ΜΌΓΙΣ any of those details as trustworthy. Dignysios, if we choose to
believe him, is ready to give us an account of the Latin League
almost as minute as Polybios could give us of the Achaian League.
He knows the name and date of its founder, the objects of its
foundation, and the earlier models which the founder had before
his eyes. Servius Tullius founded the Latin League in imitation
of the Amphiktyonies of Greece,! and he accompanied his founda-
tion by an Inaugural Address, full of political precepts which
might have fallen from the lips of Markos or of Hamilton.? Into
this mythical abyss I must decline to plunge; nor yet can 1
undertake to correct the ever-fluctuating lists of the Confederate
Cities, even with the help of the divining-rod of Niebuhr. Such
minute descriptions of unhistoric times are worth incomparably

1 Dion. iv, 25. See above, p. 96.

3 Ib, 26. Λόγον διεξῆλθε παρακλητικὸν ὁμονοίας, διδάσκων ὡς καλὸν μὲν
χρῆμα, πολλαὶ πόλεις la “χρώμεναι γνώμῃ! αἰσχρὸν δὲ, ὄψις συγγενῶν ἀλλήλοις
διαφερομένων, αἴτιόν τε ἰσχύος μὲν τοῖς ἀσθένεσιν ἀποφαίνων ὁμοφροσύνην,
ταπεινότητος δὲ καὶ ἀσθενείας καὶ τοῖς loxvpordras ἀλληλοφθονίαν.

x LEAGUE OF LATIUM 569

-- ec

less than those genuine bits of information which are ever and anon

to be extracted from the unconscious witness either of chroniclers

or of poets. About Latium indeed we have one piece of real -
direct evidence in the form of the treaty concluded between Rome rreaty
and Carthage in the first year of the Republic, a document which petween a
serves to refute so much of what has commonly passed for Roman Carthage,
history. This treaty, whose genuineness there is no reason to B.c. 508.
doubt, was read by Polybios in its own obsolete Latin, and is
preserved by him in a Greek translation.!_ But unluckily it tells

us nothing as to Latin Federal history ; the Latin cities which

it speaks of are described, not as Confederates, but as subjects

of Rome.? Still the Thirty Cities of Latium, like the Twelve Nature
Cities of Etruria, are mentioned far too often, and in far too veape
regular and formal a manner,® to leave any reasonable doubt that

there really was a group of thirty Latin towns, united together -

by a Federal tie. That tie, there is every reason to believe, was

-tauch closer than that which united the Twelve Cities of Etruria.

And, as the Latin towns, though most of them were small, seem

to have occupied the country far more thoroughly than the few

and scattered towns of Samnium, we may well believe that the

Latin Confederation presented much more likeness to a real

League of Greek cities than anything to be found either in-
Samnium or in Etruria. The Latin League clearly had common
religious and political meetings,‘ and, in war-time at least, a
common chief with the title of Dictator. The number of Thirty

—

1 Pol. iii. 22.

2 Τρ, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ μὴ ἀδικείτωσαν δῆμον ᾿Αρδεατῶν, ᾿Αντιατῶν, Aaupev-
τίνων, Κιρκαιιτῶν, Ταρρακινιτῶν, μηδ᾽ ἄλλον μηδένα Λατίνων, ὅσοι ἂν ὑπήκοοι"
ἐὰν δέ τινες μὴ ὦσιν ὑπήκοοι, κιτιλ. The heading of the treaty indeed speaks
of Rome and her σύμμαχοι, but σύμμαχοι is a flexible word, which must be
explained by the more definite ὑπήκοος. That word implies something more
than the mere προστασία of a League spoken of in Dionysios.

8 Dion. iii. 34; vi. 63, 74, 75. See Niebuhr, ii. 18.

4 The Feria Latine survived, as a well-known Roman Festival, till very late
times. See Dion. iv. 49; viii. 87, The political meetings come out in iii. 34,
al δὲ τῶν Λατίνων πόλεις ἐδίᾳ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίναντο πρὸς τοὺς πρέσβεις, κοινῇ δὲ
τοῦ ἔθνους ἀγορὰν ἐν Φερεντίνῳ ποιησάμενοι, ψηφίζονται μὴ παραχωρεῖν Ῥωμαίοις
τῆς ἀρχῆς, v. 61 συναχθείσης ἀγορᾶς ἐν Φερεντίνῳ ὅσοι τοῦ Λατίνων μετεῖχον γένους
κοινῇ τὸν κατὰ τῶν Ρωμαίων ἀναιροῦνται πόλεμον. So in Liv. vii. 25 we hear of
the Concilia populorum Latinorum, and in viii. 8 of the decem principes. In
Dion. (v. 61) we also read of a κοινὸν Λατίνων δικαστήριον.

5 The Alban or Latin origin of the Dictatorship was asserted by Licinius, quoted
by Dionysios, v. 74, and the Dictator thus spoken of could hardly fail to have
been a Federal Magistrate. There were also local Dictators in particular towns
(like the local στρατηγοί of Achaian towns, see above, p. 199, note 4) down to very

The
Thirty
Cities.

570 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

Cities seems confirmed by the prevalence of the same number in
so many Roman institutions, the thirty Tribes, the thirty Curia,
the thirty Latin Colonies of a later time. That the list fluctuated
from time to time we may well believe! Etruscan and Volscian
wars may have often caused the frontier to vary, so that the
same town may have been Latin at one time and Volscian at
another. And the position of Rome itself must have had even

Relations smore influence upon the condition of the League. For Rome,

of Rome
to the

League.

B.c. 334.

whatever Etruscan or Samnite elements may have mingled with
its religious or political life, was undoubtedly, primarily and
essentially, a Latin city which had outgrown all its fellows.? If
so, we can well believe the picture which represents Rome, at
different times, in an endless variety of relations to the Latin
League. Sometimes, as in our most authentic piece of evidence,*
she appears as an absolute mistress, sometimes as a Federal head,
sometimes as the equal ally or the equal enemy of the League as
a whole, sometimes as incorporating various Latin towns within
the borders of her own citizenship. We can well believe that
the League was more than once dissolved, and more than once
restored before its final dissolution after the great war with
Rome. But we must remember that Rome, though essentially
a Latin city, speaking the same language, using the same names
of men and of offices, employing the same political numbers, and
subjecting its armies to the same discipline, still never appears
as the mere capital of the Latin League. As far as the faintest
glimmerings of history go back, Rome holds a position towards
Latium far more lordly than even that of Thebes towards Bootia.
She must have so soon outstripped all other Latin cities, that she
appears, at the very beginning of her history, as something more
than the first of Latin cities, as a power able to make war and
peace with the Latin League on equal terms, sometimes to hold
' particular cities, if not the League itself, in a state of absolute
subjection. Rome, according to a highly probable conjecture, 4

late times ; Milo, the friend of Cicero, had been Dictator of Lanuvium (Cic. pro M.
10). But in Dion, iii. 34 we read of twaorp rye, and in Livy viii. 8 of two
Pretors as the chief magistrates of the League: “In the various fluctuations of the
League their number and titles may well have varied. There can be no doubt
that the oldest Roman offices, Prator and Dictator, were of Latin origin. The name
Consul is much more recent.

1 See other lists of thirty in Dion. v. 61, and Pliny, Nat. Hist. iii. 9. See
Niebuhr, ii. 23.

1. See Mommsen, cap. iv. Die Anfiinge Roms.

3 As in the treaty quoted aboye from Polybios. + Mommaen, i. 32.

x LATIUM AND ROME | 571

was originally an outpost of Latium on the Etruscan frontier, Probable
in old German political language, a Mark against Etruria. Her Rone of
extraordinary developement has its parallels in the case of similar
frontier states elséwhere. Brandenburg, the Mark of Germany
against the Slave, and Austria, her Mark against the Hungarian,

have gradually grown into the dominant German powers to the
exclusion of older and more glorious names. So Paris, once

the Mark of Gaul against the Northman, has grown into the
capital, or rather the tyrant, of the whole land.‘ It is no wonder

that a League of small towns could not permanently bear up
against a single great city 2 of their own race, whose strength
equalled their united strength, and which was more liberal of

its franchise than any other city-commonwealth ever was. The

last time that Rome and Latium negociated together, the Latin Latin
proposal was that the League should be merged in the City, that proposals
the name of Latins should be sunk in that of Romans, but that With Rome,
the chief magistrates of the united nation should be chosen in ac, 337.
equal proportion from the single City of Rome and from the|
Thirty Cities of Latium.’ Such a proposal shows how slight

must have been the national distinction between Romans and

Latins ;* it shows also how close must have been the union Close
among the Latin cities themselves; it shows that the Latin union of
League was a case in which a long-standing Federal connexion pe Latin
had prepared its members for a more intimate union.© Had the inustrated
Latin offer been accepted, the Thirty Cities could no longer have by this
kept their place aa sovereign members of a Federal body ; they P'°P*!
must have sunk into Roman tribes, possessing indeed their
distinct votes in the Roman Assembly, but retaining no local
independence except of a purely municipal kind. All that was
stipulated was that the new citizens should have an equal share

with the old in the honours of their common country, a stipula-

tion which the struggle, so lately decided, between the Patrician

and Plebeian orders, showed to be absolutely necessary, if the

Latin citizens were to receive common justice. And these were

not terms offered at the end of a war, when Latium was dis-

1 See Edin. Rev. July 1860. Nat. Rev. Oct. 1860. Megalopolis might have
been added, as it certainly was designed as a Mark against Sparta (see above,
p. 159), had it not been also designed as a capital from the beginning.

2 See Arnold’s Rome, ii. 187, 245, and cf. above, p. 410.

3 Liv. viii. 3-5. Arnold, ii. 189,

* Liv. viii. 8. Nihil apud Latinos dissonum ab Romana re preter animos
erat. See Arnold, ii. 136. 5 See above, p. 88.

Dissolu-

tion of the

League,
B.C. 334.

Rome
not a
Federal
state ;

but con-
tainin
quast-
Federal
elements.

Gradual

incorpora-

tion of
other
states
with
Rome.

‘heartened by repeated defeats; they were the Latin wtimatum

572 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

before war began, when the League was still in a position to
treat or to fight on equal terms. They therefore clearly show
what sort of union was looked on as just and desirable in the
eyes of Latin patriots. Rome of course despised any such terms,
and, when her arms proved victorious, she followed exactly the
same line of policy which she afterwards followed in Greece.’ It
was the Federal Union which had made Latium strong; the
League was therefore dissolved, and its several cities, as isolated
units, were admitted, one by one, to various degrees of citizen-
ship, dependence, or subjection.”

§ 2. The Roman Commonwealth and the Italian Allies

That the Roman Commonwealth had not, at any period of its
authentic history, a real Federal Constitution is a fact so obvious
that I need not dwell upon it. Rome was essentially a city-

‘commonwealth ; it was the greatest of all city-commonwealths ;

as a Latin city independent of the Latin League, it may even
have owed its origin and its greatness to secession from a Federal
Union. Yet the constitution of Rome is an object of some
importance in a History of Federalism. Though Rome was a
city-commonwealth, yet it differed in many points from the city-
commonwealths of Greece, and all the points in which it differed
are approaches to the Federal type. The Roman state contained
quasi-Federal elements, and to these quasi-Federal elements she
largely owed her greatness and permanence. From the first
moment of her history to the last, Rome is ever incorporating
‘new bodies of citizens, who have gradually less and less to do
with the local city.2 We see this in her authentic history,
we see it in the border-land between history and legend, we see
it equally in the mythical narratives of her earliest days. With
so consistent a picture before us, we cannot doubt that it dis-
plays a real tendency which distinguished Rome from her very
birth. The mythical tales themselves, worthless as they are for
facts and dates and persons, may fairly be cited as cumulative
evidence of the tendency which they illustrate in common with
authentic history. In the very first days of the City we hear
of Romulus and Titus Tatius reigning, side by side, over two

1 See above, pp. 144, 551.

2? Liv. viii. 14. Arnold, ii. 195 et seqq.
3 See above, p. 23.

x ROME NOT A FEDERAL STATE 578

peoples united by a Federal tie. The-States are presently con-
solidated, and the two peoples sink into two Tribes of a single
people. A third Tribe is added, formed, doubtless, out of the
inhabitants of some allied or conquered city; it is admitted at

first with a certain inferiority of position; it gradually raises

itself to an equality with the elder Tribes. Then comes in a
whole mass of new citizens, a new people in truth, the famous

Plebs or Commons, who long formed in many respects a distinct
commonwealth from the elder citizens, and whose long and
successful strivings after equality with them form the internal
history of Rome for several ages. We then find Rome forming
alliances on equal terms with various neighbouring states, as the
Latins and Hernicans, alliances so intimate as to occupy a sort

of border-ground between Confederations and mere Confederacies.

In process of time, the members of those alliances, by various

steps and various events of war and peace, were admitted to
Roman citizenship. When we reach the time of perfectly
authentic history, we find, in the Italy which was invaded by
Pyrrhos and Hannibal, a body of which Rome is the acknow-
ledged head. The inhabitants of the peninsula fall into three Three great
great classes. There were Romans, men possessing the full Roman cneses 0
franchise, not the mere inhabitants of the Roman City, but all Romane,
the free inhabitants of a large territory, which had once con-
tained independent commonwealths and whole Federal Unions.

There were Latins,! imperfect citizens, not sharing in the full Latins,
franchise, but capable of being raised to it by an easy process,

by removing to Rome under certain conditions, or by serving
certain magistracies in their own towns. Finally, there were and
the Italians, the allied states, retaining their internal independ- '##"*.
ence, but united to Rome by the terms, more or less burthen-

some, of dependent alliance. Their actual position answered

1 I need hardly say that the Latin Colonies of the later Roman history do not
represent the old Latin League, either in blood or in geographical position. A
city enjoying the Latin franchise might be anywhere, and its citizens might be of
any race. They might be real Latins; they might not be real Latins; they
might be Romans who by migration had sunk to the Latin level; they might be
Italians or Provincials who had been raised to it. Still the origin of the Jus Latii
or Latinitas undoubtedly was that these cities were admitted to that position to
which the rea] Latins had been admitted ; they were artificial Latins, just as many
Romans were artificial Romans. The number of thirty colonies, too, inthe Hanni-
balian War must surely have come from the tradition of the thirty cities of the
old League.

.27 On the general relation of dependent alliance, see above, p. 18 et seqq.

The
nature
of the
struggle
between
Patrician
and
Plebeian.

574 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

very closely to that of the dependent allies of Athens; but the
Marsian or the Samnite had one great advantage over the Chian
or the Rhodian. The Athenian allies had hardly more chance
of being raised to citizenship than the Helots of Sparta ; but the
gradual advance from Italian to Latin, and from Latin to Roman
rank, was the regular reward of merit, whether in individuals or
in communities. At last the Roman citizenship was spread over
the whole peninsula, and finally over all the Provinces of the
Roman Empire. The Quirites, the Commons, the Latins, the
Italians, the Provincials, all gradually merged themselves in the
common name of Romans. And all these incorporations, all
these struggles, were strictly geographical; the strife between
Patrician and Plebeian was a strife of communities rather than
of classes ; it had far more in common with the strife between
Romans and Latins than with the strife between the Senate and
the populace in later times. The true Plebeians, as distinguished
from the mob of the Forum, were the inhabitants, gentle and
simple, of conquered or allied states, which had received the then
imperfect franchise of the Roman Commons, just as, a few
generations later, they might have received the imperfect fran-
chise of a Latin Colony. The Patrician stood to the Plebeian,
not in the relation of Eorl to Ceorl or of Gentilhomme to Roturier,
but in the relation of a Swiss citizen of a ruling Canton, whether
aristocratic or democratic, to the inhabitant of a subject district.
When the strife of classes really came, in the days of Marius and
Sulla, of Pompeius and Cesar, it put on a very different form.
Patricians of heroic and divine descent, a Catilina, a Clodius, a
Cesar, appeared as conspirators, demagogues, and Tyrants, while

‘ the defence of the aristocracy—when aristocracy had become

synonymous with freedom—was left to Plebeian Catuli, and
Metelli, to the Latin Cato and the Volscian Cicero. It is at
once clear that this history of the City of Rome is something
altogether different from the history of the City of Athens.
The system of incorporation which Athens practised only in her
earliest day was continued by Rome during her whole historic
lifetime. Now, in all this, there is no real Federalism; the
relation of the Tribes to each other was not a Federal relation,
because all the Tribes were members of the one ruling common-

On the allies of Rome, see Arnold, Late Roman Commonwealth, i, 164. Merivale,
Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 78.

x QUASI-FEDERAL ELEMENTS IN ROME 575

wealth, and did not form sovereign commonwealths themselves.

Nor is the relation between Italians, Latins, and Romans a
Federal relation ; because in those pointsjwhich would have been
delegated to the common Federal power the Romans decided for

the Latins and Italians as well as for themselves.’ Still the
existence of these marked geographical divisions among the
various classes within the Roman dominions, the local independ-

ence retained by each, the fair hope which each class had of
being raised to the class above it, all form a broad contrast
between Rome and other city-commonwealths, and every differ-

ence is a difference in a Federal direction. The Tribes were not Quasi-
members of a Federal Union, because they were mere munici- Federal
palities retaining no separate State-sovereignty. But they were of the
not mere artificial divisions. Tull they were corrupted by the Roman
enfranchisement of slaves and strangers, they remained strictly T>e-
local ;2 the Tribe was often ἃ Latin or Volscian district, which

by its incorporation lost all independent sovereignty, but which
acquired a distinct vote in the Roman Assembly, and retained a

large measure of municipal independence at home. Cicero had

two countries, Rome and Arpinum ;* Milo, a Roman playing a
prominent part at Rome, was Dictator of his native Latin town

of Lanuvium.* And when the Tribes actually met in the Comitia,

their position was exactly the same as that of the Achaian
Cities ;5 each Tribe had its independent vote, exactly as if it

had been a sovereign Canton ; its non-Federal and non-sovereign
position is to be found in the absence of any independent
Government at home. Thus the guasi-Federal position of the
Tribes is to be looked for in the way in which they shared in the
supreme power ; the quasi-Federal position of the Allies is to

be found in the retention of their separate local governments.

In the Roman policy, each of these privileges was held to exclude Near
the other ; had the two been allowed to co-exist, a real Federal approach
system would have been the result. Had the Samnite and ° the

Roman

1 See above, p. 20. system to

2 At Athens, the real local division, round which local patriotism centred, Federalisin
was the δῆμος ; but the δῆμος was not a political body. The Tribe, the political and to
body, consisted of certain δῆμοι, but those δῆμοι were not continuous, as if Represen-
expressly to hinder strictly local action in public affairs. tation.

3 See Cicero, De Legg. ii. 2, where the dua patria are discussed at length,
and the analogy of the Attic συνοικισμός appropriately quoted. On this use of
patria or πατρίς, see above, p. 15, Cicero's patria was Rome, or Arpinum, or both,
but in no case Italy.

4 See above, p. 570. 5 See above, p. 211, Niebuhr, ii. 29.

The
greatness
of Rome
inainly due
to her
quast-
Federal
elements,

The
SOCIAL

War,

B.c. 90-89.
Its
historical
import-
ance,

576 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

ne ee eee

Etruscan cities, in addition to their local independence, possessed
votes in the Roman Assembly; had the Latin and Volscian
towns, in addition to their votes in the Roman Assembly, pos-
sessed the same local independence as Etruria and Samnium,
then Roman Italy could have formed as true a Federal Govern-
ment as Lykia or Achaia. As it was, the Roman Constitution
was neither Representative nor Federal, but it trembled on the
verge of being both. And surely it was by thus extending the
Roman franchise so far beyond the local Roman City, by con-
stantly calling up allies to the rank of citizens, and subjects to
the rank of allies, by thus continually strengthening the common-
wealth by the infusion of new and vigorous blood, that Rome
maintained her independence and her power so incomparably
longer than almost any other commonwealth on record.! And
the elements which were thus the main cause of Rome’s great-
ness are precisely those which | have ventured to call her quasi-
Federal elements. They are precisely those which at oncé
distinguish Rome from those commonwealths which knew no
distinctions except those of citizens of the local city and the
inhabitants of lower standing to it in the relation of subjects or
dependent allies.

Of the many struggles among these different component
elements of the Roman world, there is one which fairly claims
some comment at my hands, for, if the defeated side had proved
victorious, the establishment of a Federal Government over a
large part of Italy must have followed. I mean the great
struggle between Rome and her Italians in the early years of
the first century before Christ. This, like a widely different
struggle in Grecian history, is generally known as the Social
War. This struggle and its results are really among the most
important events in the history of the world. They have affected
the condition of Italy, and thereby of the rest of Europe, ever
since. The Social War was the last time that Rome had to fight
for her dominion, and even for her existence, and never, between

1 No state in Greece or in ancient Italy can be at all compared to Rome in
the long retention not of mere being but of real greatness. The Athenian
commonwealth may have existed as many years as the Roman, but for several
centuries it existed and no more. The commonwealths most truly rivalling Rome
are Carthage, Venice, and Bern. In the case of Carthage we must allow some-
thing for Semitic tenacity, and in the other two cases for the slower march of
events in modern times. .

x THE SOCIAL WAR 577

the days of Brennus and the days of Alaric, was she brought so 8.0. 387.
near to the brink of destruction. That Rome remained the head “>: 410.

of Italy and the world, that her influence has extended over
every succeeding page of history, that the dominion of her
Caesars and her Pontiffs, of her laws and of her language, has
lived on, in one form or another, through every later age—all
this is due, before all other men and all other causes, to the
unbending and ruthless energy of her preserver Sulla.’ It is

impossible for us to judge what would have been the result, had Probable
the one ruling City of Rome made way for a free Confederation results of

of all Italy. Many an immediate wrong would have been

righted, many a victim of oppression would have blessed the day Italian
of deliverance, many a subject land would have regained the side.

freedom which Rome had wrested from her—a King might
again have sat on the throne of Alexander, and a free Assembly
have again been gathered within the theatre of Megalopolis—
but all those wise ends which the dominion of Rome has accom-
plished in the general history of mankind must have remained
for ever unfulfilled. An Italian Confederation could never have
maintained the supremacy which Rome had held over the Pro-
vinces; it is indeed one of the merits of Federal States that
they are less capable than other States of holding their neigh-
bours in bondage. Federal Italy would have been far freer and
happier than Italy in subjection to a single City, but then
Federal Italy never could have been, like that single City, the
mistress of the world throughout all time. The Social War is
therefore one of the turning-points of history ; that it stands out
less conspicuously than its importance deserves is owing to the
misfortune that no worthy history of it has been preserved, even

if any ever existed. We are driven to patch up our accounts of Nature

it from late compilers and biographers, writing of course from

1 See National Review, January 1862, p. 66.

2 Our materials for this period are: the regular narrative of Appian, a late
and often careless writer, but who is more valuable now than in earlier times ;
the summaries of Velleius Paterculus and Florus; some considerable and
important fragments of Diodéros and some smaller ones of Didn Cassius ; Plu-
tarch’s Lives of Marius, Sulla, Sertorius, and others; finally, a few incidental
allusions in Cicero, Pliny, and other writers. Of these Cicero, who does not tell
us much, is the only contemporary ; he, as a young man, served his first and
only campaign in the war. Of the regular historians Diodéros comes nearest to
the time, and might have conversed with contemporaries. Plutarch seems to
have mainly followed the Autobiography of Sulla, so that what he says must
be received with caution. The best writers—for Cicero hardly comes into the

2P

Authorities

Character
of the
Roman
dominion.

Condition
of the
Italian
Allies.

578 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

Roman materials; on the side of the conquered we have no
evidence except that of a few coins. Still we have materials
enough to form a general notion of the nature and objects of
the struggle, although we sigh at every step for the guidance of
a Thucydides, a Polybios, or a Tacitus, |

Rome, it must be remembered, vast as her empire had now
become, still remained essentially a city-commonwealth.! The
defence and administration of a large part of three continents
were still entrusted to the municipal magistrates of a single town,
elected by that town’s hereditary burghers. Rome had indeed
liberally extended her franchise, but the only franchise which
she could offer was one purely municipal, a vote in the local
Assembly of the Roman People, and the chance of being chosen
to the high offices of the Roman City. That City, as we have
seen, ruled over a world of dependent communities, Latin,
Italian, and Provincial. The Italian allies retained their local
constitutions as separate city-commonwealths, but, in all external
matters, they were the passive slaves of Rome. And, beside
this condition of formal dependence, they had often to endure
much irregular insolence and oppression at the hands of Roman
magistrates and even of private men.* Each city too was isolated
from its fellows ; no league, no alliance, no inter-communion of
franchise was allowed ; and the cities thus isolated and weakened
were watched by Roman and Latin colonies placed in all the
most important points, and which, under a less invidious name,
discharged the duties of Roman garrisons. Still the Roman
dominion brought some advantages with it. Italy was at least
free from the scourge of internal war, and, since the days of
Hannibal, it had been equally free from the scourge of foreign
invasion. And, if the Italians were bound to shed their blood
in the endless foreign wars of Rome, if, in those wars, their
officers never rose above very subordinate commands, if they
comparison—are Velleius, the descendant of an Italian who remained faithful to
Rome, and Dién, who, though the latest of all in date, understood Roman affairs
better than any Greek writer since Polybios. But Velleius is unluckily very
brief, and the fragments οὗ Dién for this period are but few.

1 We must however remember that the Empire was still far from having
reached its full extent. The European conquests of Cesar, the Asiatic conquests
of Lucullus and Pompeius, were yet to be won. The Roman dominions did not
as yet surround the whole Mediterranean.

2 Aulus Gellius (x. 8) has collected some of the worst instances from a speech
of Caius Gracchus. Cf. Mommeen, ii, 211.

x CONDITION OF THE ITALIAN ALLIES 579

reaped none of the direct fruits of victory, still they were by no
means left without some indirect profits. If no Italian com-
munity, as such, shared in the glories of Scipio or Aimilius, still
many individual Italians reaped both booty in their wars, and
the reward of Roman citizenship was never beyond the hopes of
a deserving soldier. The whole Roman Empire too was open to
Italian mercantile enterprise ; the Italians, subject as they might
be at home, were a favoured, and almost a ruling, race as com-
pared with the Provincials, and they were included in the hatred
which Provincials and foreigners bore towards the citizens of the
ruling commonwealth.! Subjects who were so nearly on a level
with their masters, who had had so great a share in raising their
masters to their present greatness, naturally aspired to perfect
equality with them. What form was the equality which justice
undoubtedly demanded, to take between the Roman and the
Italian ally 1

The most obvious form, and that which the demand commonly Claim of
took, was that of admission to the full franchise of the vome
Roman citizen, with all its political rights and personal im- forthe
munities. This was the form most in accordance with earlier Allies.
precedent, and with the general political notions of antiquity. It
was also the only form in which the allies could make the demand
without infringing, or threatening to infringe, the sovereignty
of Rome. A demand for admission to Roman citizenship was
therefore the form which the claims of the allies always took
both in their own mouths and in those of their Roman advocates.
But we can hardly doubt that many of the Italians saw that Advantages
there were two sides to the question, and that admission to δ: dis-
Roman citizenship would not be an unmixed gain. Rome had, ao vantages
as it was, extended her franchise too far for good government admission.
on the municipal type. Her popular Assemblies, attended by
thousands of citizens, had become scenes of riot, bloodshed, and
open battle. In one point of view the admission of the Allies
would have been the greatest possible gain for the Romans
themselves. The enfranchisement of the stout yeomen of the
Samnite mountains, of the refined nobles of the Etruscan cities,
of the burghers of the smaller towns throughout all Italy, would
refresh the degenerate Roman People by the infusion of some

1 Mithridatés ordered the massacre throughout all Asia, not only of the Roman
citizens, but of all Italians—8co: γένους ᾿Ιταλικοῦ. See Appian, Bell. Mith., 22,
23. Cf. Sallust, Bell.fJug., 26.

580 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

new and vigorous elements. But, unless the Roman Assembly
had changed its constitution in some way for which there was
as yet no precedent in political history, every fresh infusion of
citizens would only make that ungovernable body more un-
governable than before. A dweller at the other end of Italy
might not be greatly attracted by admission to a vote in such
an Assembly, combined with the shadowy possibility of the
fasces and the curule chair for some remote descendant. And .
by admission to Roman citizenship, an Italian town lost its local",
independence ; it sank into a purely municipal existence ; it fell
from the functions of a Colonial Parliament to the functions
οὗ an English Town-Council. The leading men would lose the
influence of the local magistracies with but little chance of
sharing in the magistracies of Rome. The citizens at large
would lose the power of managing their local affairs as a separate
commonwealth, and receive in exchange a place in the Roman
Assembly which was sure to be almost illusory. It is no wonder
then that the feeling on the subject differed widely in different
Difference parts of Italy. The states nearest Rome, differing little from
of feeling ~Rome in blood or language, simply wished for admission to that
the Roman franchise which had been already conferred on so many
Italians. of their neighbours. They had no wish to destroy Rome or to
weaken her power; they only wished to share her greatness by
Rome; becoming Romans themselves.'' But Samnites and Lucanians
among the looked at matters with different eyes. To them, at their distance,
Samnites with their foreign speech and foreign feelings, the offer of the
Lucanians ; Roman franchise was little better than a mockery. In them the
old spirit of national independence and national hatred to Rome
had never died out. They might accept Roman citizenship as
a last resource, if there was no alternative but citizenship or
dependence; but what they really wished for was not Roman
citizenship but Samnite and Lucanian freedom ; they were ready
at any moment to fight against Rome; they were ready, if need
were, to wipe out her name from among the nations. On the
among the other hand some parts of Italy, or at least the ruling classes
Btenscans in them, seem really to have preferred the position of depend-
Umbriane, ©Dcies to either independence or citizenship. When the struggle
came, Etruria and Umbria took hardly any share in it. And

1 Οἷς. Phil. xii. 11. Non enim ut ertperent nobdis civitatem, sed μὲ in cam
reciperentur, petebat, This is said specially of the Marsians. Dr. Liddell (ii. 282)
makes the Marsian a Samnite, and puts his speech into the mouth of a Roman.

x THE CLAIM OF THE ALLIES 581

the reason is easy to be understood. The Roman dominion pre-
served at once the internal and the external tranquillity of the
Etruscan oligarchies. Etruria, under the shield of Rome, was

safe against Gaulish inroads, while the policy of Rome retained

the proud and luxurious nobles of the Etruscan cities in their

full domination over the rest of their countrymen. It might
prove a dear bargain, were they to exchange this local dominion

‘for a mere plebeian franchise at Rome, where they would be
massed in some Tribe along with their own dependents, where

they would cease to .be Etruscan Lucumos, and would have
small chance of becoming Roman Pretors and Consuls! These
differences of opinion doubtless existed all along, though they

did not make themselves prominently seen till the war actually

broke out. Of course till war did break out, the only cry that

could be raised was the claim of Roman citizenship for the
Italian allies. That claim was successively urged by various

men and various parties in Rome. Undoubtedly the true Federal
course would have been, not to admit the Allies to the mere or Repre-
municipal franchise of Rome, but to unite Rome and all Italy institutions
by Federal or Representative institutions. But such a change the true
would have been contrary to every Roman feeling and tradition ; ™™°4Y-
it 1s no matter for blame or for wonder that no Roman was
found sharp-sighted enough to dream of it or daring enough to
propose it. And, failing this more sweeping reform, the demand

of citizenship for the Allies was the demand of perfect justice.*

If their cause was taken up as a tool by some factious dema- The claim
gogues, it was also taken up, as the cause of justice, by some one
of the best men both of the Senatorial and the Popular party.

The proposal ran counter to the worst prejudices of both sides.

The vulgar oligarch feared that his path to the Consulship would opposed
be made more doubtful if he were exposed to the additional Y
competition of the nobles of the allied states, of the Lucumos of
Etruria and the Imperators of Samnium. The vulgar democrat
feared that his vote would lose half alike of its political im-
portance and of its market value, if the number of citizens who

1 See Cantu, i. 407.

2 Florus, iii. 18. Quum jus civitatis, quam viribus auxerant, socii justissime
postularent. Velleius, ii. 15. Quorum, ut fortuna atrox, ita caussa fuit justis-
sima. Petebant enim eam civitatem, cujus imperium armis tuebantur : per omnes
annos atque omnia bella, duplici numero se militum equitumque fungi, neque in
ejus civitatis jus recipi, que per eos in id ipsum pervenisset fastigium, per quod
homines ejusdem et gentis et sanguinis, nt externos alienosque, fastidire posset.

582 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

shared his rights were at once to be doubled. And the proposal

also offended a vein of dull conservatism in both parties, that

blind clinging to things as they are, under pretence of reverence

for antiquity, when to make a change would be simply to imitate

the best precedents of that antiquity for which reverence 15

and professed. But there were men of both parties who rose above
es aes such narrowness and blindness. The Gracchi, the purest of
best men Popular leaders, favoured the cause of the Allies as the cause of
ofboth justice. The younger Scipio, the purest of aristocrats, stood up
parties at for the brave soldiers who had shared his toils and victories, in
"defiance of the howls of the mongrel populace of the Forum.?
Caius Marius, as yet the Third Founder and not the destroyer

of his country, himself a Volscian yeoman whose grandfather had

not been a free citizen, naturally felt far more sympathy for the

cause of Italy at large than for the arrogant pretensions of the

local Rome. On the whole, the Italian cause gained a good deal

of favour among the better class of the Senators and among the

more uncorrupted portions of the people ;? but it was bitterly

opposed by the high aristocrats, by the low populace, and by

the most selfish class of all, the money-making order of Knights.

Tribune- Its last champion before the war began was that most perplexing
ae οἱ of statesmen, the second Marcus Livius Drusus. In the lack of con-
Livius temporary and impartial evidence, his character and schemes must
Drusus, for ever remain mysterious ; still we are attracted towards a man
B.0. 91. whose plans embraced portions of the policy of both contending
parties, and who accordingly won for himself the unextinguishable

hatred of the vulgar mass on both sides. Perhaps, had not the

assassin’s knife prematurely cut him off, he might not have

shrunk from actual violence any more than Caius Gracchus or

than his enemies. As it was, he put himself at the head of a
wide-spread conspiracy which it was impossible that any Govern-

ment should tolerate. He was not satisfied with pressing the

Italian claims, lawfully and honourably, in the Roman Senate

1 App. Bell. Civ. £ 19. Val. Max. vi. 2.3. Aurel. Vict. de Vir. IIL Ilviii. 8.
Taceant quibus Italia noverca est, non mater are the famous words said to have
been uttered by him. They plainly imply that he looked on the turba forensis
as a mere mob of freedmen and enfranchised strangers, far less worthy of the
Roman name than allies of Italian blood. The facility with which citizenship
was granted to freedmen in preference to themselves was alone enough bitterly
to incense the Italians. Cf. the story of the Cretan mercenary in Diodéros, Exc.
Vat. lib. xxxvii. 18.

3 See Arnold, Later Roman Commonwealth, i. 179, note.

x TRIBUNATE OF LIVIUS DRUSUS 583

and Assembly; he bound his partizans throughout Italy by a
personal oath to himself which we can hardly look upon as
consistent with the character of a Roman citizen and magistrate.!
This oath shows how widely spread the disaffection was through-
out Italy, even while disaffection sheltered itself under the legal
demand for the Roman citizenship. Another story shows that,
even during the lifetime of Drusus, the Allies were ready to
fall back upon force, if lawful means failed them. A body of
the Italians formed a plan, which they did not scruple to
communicate to their Roman champion, for murdering the
hostile Consul Philippus among the solemnities of the Alban
Mount.? Drusus might perhaps not have shrunk from civil war,
but he had no mind to be an accomplice in an assassination, and
his warning saved his rival from the threatened danger. At
last, when Drusus was killed,’ and when several eminent Romans
were prosecuted, and some of them condemned, for favouring
the Italian claims,* the Allies saw that they had no hope except
in their own swords. A plot which must have been widely
spread through the peninsula was prematurely discovered ;°
the unwise threats of the Proconsul Servilius at Asculum ὅ raised
a popular commotion, and every Roman in the town was slain.
The sword was now drawn, and it was time to fling away the
scabbard.

All unenfranchised Italy, save Etruria and Umbria, now took Beginning
up arms. One final embassy was sent to Rome, and, when οὗ the
its demands were contemptuously rejected, the Seceding States war,

1 Diod. Exc. Vat. (xxxvii. 11]. “Ομγνυμι τὸν Δία x.t.d. τὸν αὐτὸν φίλον B.C. 90.
Kal πολέμιον ἡγήσεσθαι Δρούσῳ, kal μήτε βίου μήτε τέκνων καὶ γονέων μηδεμιᾶς
φείσασθαι ψυχῆς, ἐὰν μὴ συμφέρῃ Δρούσῳ τε καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον ὁμόσασιν. ἐὰν
δὲ γένωμαι πολίτης τῷ Δρούσου νόμῳ, πατρίδα ἡγήσομαι τὴν Ρώμην καὶ μεγίστην
εὐεργέτην Δροῦσον.

2 Aur. Vict. de Vir. Ill. Ixvi. 12. Florus, iii. 18. 8.

3 He seems (App. Bell, Civ. i. 36) to have in some degree lost the affections
of the Italians. They thought themselves threatened by his law for founding
colonies,.which they feared might be endowed at their own expense. Drusus, in fact,
offended all parties in turn—one of the best proofs of his honesty, though perhaps
not of his worldly wisdom.

“ App. Bell. Civ, i. 37. Aur. Vict. de Vir. IIL Ixxii. 11.

5 The immediate discovery (see App. u.s. 38) was caused by the sending of a
hostage from Asculum in Picenum to another town. This was of course a direct
attack on the Roman system of isolating the several cities. Livy (Ep. lxxi) seems
to have given a full account of the internal movements in the Italian states—
Korum coitus conjurationesque et orationes in conciltis principum,

5 Liv. Ep. Ixxii, App. Bell Civ. i. 38.

Analogy
between
the Italian
Allies

and the
American
Colonies.

584 - OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

proceeded to organize a Government for themselves. Their
position was, in everything but its geographical aspect, singularly
like the position of the North American Colonies in 1775.!
What the colonists demanded was, not separation from the
mother-country, but an acknowledgement of their claim to all
the natural rights of Englishmen. What the Italians demanded
was, not separation from Rome, but admission to the full
privileges of Romans. Of course the form of the demand
was not the same in the two cases. The Italians asked for
closer incorporation, the Americans asked for fuller acknowledge-
ment of local liberties. This difference was the natural con-
sequence of the geographical difference. The Italians demanded
Roman citizenship; the analogous demand on the part of the
Americans would have been a claim for representation in the
British Parliament. Had England and America formed one
peninsula, they probably would have demanded it; but, with
the Atlantic between the Colonies and the mother-country,
American patriotism necessarily took another shape. But, in
other respects, the relations between the ruling country and its
dependencies were closely analogous in the two cases. In both
cases, the dependent commonwealths possessed a large share of
internal independence, while their external affairs were ordered
for them by a power over which they had no control. In both
cases they were kept isolated from one another, with no common
bond save that of common dependence on the dominant power.
Even the complaints as to the position of the Italian allies in
the Roman armies find a parallel in the complaints made by
the Provincial officers in America as to the superiority over them
claimed, even on their own soil, by officers of the same rank who
bore British commissions. In both cases no doubt there were
men who foresaw and desired separation from the first; in
America indeed such foresight and desire were confined to a
few individuals, while in Italy they clearly extended to whole
commonwealths: still separation was neither openly sought for,
nor probably generally desired, till all constitutional means had
failed, till separation was forced upon the discontented depend-
encies by the conduct of the ruling state. The Americans, as
being not conquered enemies but British colonies, clave longer
than the Italians did to the names of loyalty and union. Still,

1 See Mommsen, ii. 216.
2 See Marshall’s Life of Washington, ii. 36.

x ANALOGY BETWEEN ITALY AND AMERICA 585

when Congress had once raised troops, when the Allies had once
set up their counter-Government, the ruling state in each case
had no choice but to yield every point at issue, to acknowledge
the independence of the seceders, or to reconquer them by force.
As the policy of Rome and England differed, so the event of the
war differed ; but between the origin and the earliest stages of
the two there is a close likeness.

The Constitution which the seceding Allies now established Federal
was beyond doubt intended to be a Federal one. This is taken Οομείϊια"
for granted by most modern writers,' and it seems involved in seceding me
the nature of the case. The various nations which joined in the States.
revolt might indeed stoop to acknowledge the suprethacy of
Rome or to merge themselves in the Roman Commonwealth, but
they were not likely either to acknowledge the supremacy of
any other state or to merge their national differences in an
Italian Republic one and indivisible. They chose a particular
city as the seat of the Federal Government; but there is no
evidence that it was intended to be anything more than the seat
of the Federal Government.? Their new capital was Corfinium,
in the Pelignian territory, a position admirably central for the
whole of Italy, and probably chosen in the hope that the northern
states which as yet stood aloof would before long join the League.

As the Federal capital, Corfinium exchanged its old name for Italicum
that of Italicum.? The League took for the present the form of the

a Confederation of eight * States, each doubtless retaining its full capital
internal sovereignty, and some of them probably assuming a League.
Federal form in their internal constitutions. In the details of Constitu-
the central Government they closely followed the Roman pattern, tion one
a pattern in truth in no way inconsistent with Federal institu- govern.

tions. For, had each of the Roman Tribes possessed the internal ment

1 See Merivale, Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 84. Canta, Hist. des It. borrowed
i, 408. Cf. Mommeen, ii. 216-17, 220-21. Diodoros (Exc. Phot. 1. xxxvii.) uses of Rome.
the Federal word σύνεδροι.

2 Mommeen (ii. 221) seems to think that every citizen of the League received
the citizenship of Italicum. I see no proof of this.

3 ᾿Ιχαλική, Strabo, v. 4. IJtalicwm, Vell. ii. 16.

4 The number eight seems to rest on good numismatic evidence. The lists
vary in different authors. Livy’s list is Picentes, Vestini, Marsi, Peligni,
Marrucini, Samnites, Incani. Add the Hirpini, who appear as a distinct
people from the Samnites (App. i. § 1; see above, p. 566, note 3), and we have
the eight states needed.

5 The several states of Samnium and Lucania, isolated by the Roman policy,
could hardly fail to return to the old Federal connexion, and the Samnites and
Lucanians act throughout as wholes. On Leagues within Leagues, see above, p. 126.

Federation.

586 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

sovereignty which belonged to each Achaian City, the power of
the Consuls, the Senate, and the Assembly would have been a
good deal curtailed, but all three would have been just as neces-
sary as they were under the actual system. At the head of the
League stood two Consuls and twelve Preetors, and the affairs of
the Confederation were administered by a Federal Senate of five
hundred.! This was the nearest approach to a Federal union of
the whole peninsula which Italy has ever beheld.

It might be a matter for curious speculation what would have
been the result if the Italians had finally conquered, as at one
stage of the war they seemed likely to do. Rome, so far greater
in every way than any other Italian city, would perhaps have
been found to be an insuperable obstacle in the way of any
lasting Federation of all Italy. Had the Roman armies been
finally overthrown, had Rome, instead of admitting the allies
to citizenship, been driven to seek admittance into the Italian
League, she could never have sat down as an equal and con-
tented member of a Federal body. It would have been as
when Sparta, in the later days of the Achaian League, was
required to sit down as an equal confederate alongside of her
own revolted subjects of Messéné and the Eleutherolakénic towns.*
The Samnite Pontius gave utterance to a real, though terrible,
truth when he said that, if the Italians would be free, they must
root up the wood which sheltered the wolves which so long had
ravaged Italy.2 He, we may be sure, had looked to separation
from the first, and had held the rejection of the Italian claims
by the Roman Senate to be matter for nothing but rejoicing.
As it was, it is hard to say whether Rome conquered or was
conquered ; but it is certain that, so far as she can be looked
upon as successful, her victory was due far more to her diplo-
macy than to her arms. As usual, I must decline entering into
military details. It is enough for my purpose to say that Rome
drew on all her resources both in Italy and in the Provinces.
As the British Government strove to reconquer America by the
help of German mercenaries and of Indian savages, so Rome
called to her help the fierce warriors of Numidia and Maure-
tania. As the revolted colonists sought for aid from France, so

1 Diod. Exc. Phot. 1. xxxvii. 2.

* See above, pp. 485, 492.

3 Vell. ii. 27. 2. Telesinus dictitans adesse Romanis ultimum diem, vocifera-

batur eruendam delendamque urbem ; adjiciens numquam defuturos raptores
Italics libertatis lupos nisi silva, in quam refugere solerent, esset excisa.

x ROME THE OBSTACLE TO ITALIAN FEDERATION 587

the revolted Italians sought for aid from Mithridatés. But, in

the case of Italy, these extraneous aids had less influence on the
struggle than they had in the case of America. The Numidians

were rendered lukewarm in the Roman cause by an ingenious
stratagem,! and Mithridatés, less wise than the counsellors of

Lewis the Sixteenth, gave the Italians no effectual support.”

The Roman and Italian armies, thus left to themselves, were, on

the whole, equally matched ; and the victories and defeats on Successes
the two sides were nearly equally balanced. Indeed, as long as one
the League retained its full proportion, the Italians had clearly
the advantage. Their successes emboldened the Etruscans and Movements
Umbrians; that is, most probably, the mass of the people in ™ Etruria
those states, whose interests lay in separation, showed that they Umbria.
would no longer be kept down by the local aristocracies, whose
interests bound them to the Roman connexion. At all events,
Secession began to be threatened among the Etruscan and
Umbrian commonwealths.2 The Senate now yielded ; citizenship The

was offered to the Latins, to the Allies who had remained faithful, Senate
finally to all the seceders who should lay down their arms.‘ yields the

demands

That is to say, Rome was really defeated, but she contrived to of the
preserve the appearance of victory. The Allies had in truth Allies.
extorted from her at the point of the sword all that any of them
had openly demanded, all that many of them had actually wished

1 App. Bell. Civ. i. 42.

3 Diod. Exc. Phot. L xxxvii. 2, Ὁ δὲ Μιθριδάτης ἀπόκρισιν δίδωσιν ἄξειν τὰς
δυνάμεις εἰς τὴν ᾿Ιταλίαν, ἐπειδὰν αὑτῷ καταστήσῃ τὴν ᾿Ασίαν" τοῦτο γὰρ
ἔπραττε. Out of this Dr. Liddell (ii, 282) makes the following: “He bade the
Samnites hold out firmly ; he was, he said, at present engaged in expelling the
Romans from Asia; when that work was done, he would cross the sea, and
assist them in crushing the she-wolf of Asia.”” The wolves of Pontius Telesinus
speak for themselves ; those of Dr. Liddell are wholly inexplicable.

It should be observed that this application to Mithridatés was only made in
the last stage of the war, by the Samnites and other real enemies of Rome.
Probably those states which sincerely sought for Roman citizenship would not
have consented to such a negociation. .

3 App. Bell. Civ. i. 49.

4 ΤΌ Δείσασα οὖν ἡ βουλὴ... Ἰταλιωτῶν τοὺς ἔτι ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ
παραμένοντας ἐψηφίσατο εἶναι πολίτας. This must be the Lex Julia. See Cic.
pro Balbo, 8. Merivale, p. 92. The words of Appian do not distinctly mention
any offer of citizenship to those who should lay down their arms; but it seems
implied in the fact that those who did so did receive it (see Arnold, i. 174), and
perhaps in the words of Velleius (ii. 16), Paullatim deinde recipiendo in
civitatem, qui arma aut non ceperant, aut deposuerant maturius, vires refecte
sunt. Probably promises to that effect were made, of which the later Lex
Plautia- Papiria (see Cic. pro Archia, 8. Merivale, p. 94) was the formal
confirmation.

The other
States
accept
citizenship,

but
Samnium
and
Lucania
still hold
out,

B.c. 89.

588 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

for. But that policy which never failed the Roman Senate was
able to put another face upon the matter. Rome no doubt
well knew the real diversity of objects which lurked under the
apparent unanimity of the seceders. The commonwealths nearer
Rome, to which she was an object of envy rather than of hatred,
had now all that they had wished for freely offered to them—
offered to them, it might well be said, as the reward of their
own prowess in arms. Citizenship was what they had all along
striven for; they had been driven into revolt and the establish-
ment of a rival Government only by the pertinacious refusal
of the wished-for gift. When citizenship was really to be had,
there was no need to prolong the struggle for their own sakes,
and the Italian Confederation was hardly old enough for them
to wish to prolong it for the sake of the Union. It would have
been an excess of self-sacrifice beyond all parallel, if Marsians
and Pelignians, when their own point was gained, had gone on
fighting purely for the sake of Samnites and Lucanians. With
the exception of those two gallant nations, all the revolted states
gradually returned to their allegiance, and received the full
citizenship of Rome. And, received as they were, one by one,
often after some success of the Roman arms, Rome was even now
able formally to maintain her own principle of yielding nothing
to those who resisted and negociating only with the conquered.
But the Samnites and Lucanians still held out; when they had
once taken up arms, when they had once again won victories
and suffered defeats, their old enmity towards Rome was not 80
easily quenched. The Confederation was now reduced to two
members, but those two members still resisted ; Italicum sank
again into Corfinium, but the Samnite town of A‘sernia succeeded
to the rank of the Federal capital. Sulla himself, notwithstand-
ing several victories, failed wholly to subdue them; they still
prolonged a guerrilla warfare, hoping that, among the factions of
the Roman state, some favourable opportunity might still turn
up, or that the great King of Pontos might at last land in Italy,
and summon them to his banners, as Pyrrhos and Hannibal had
summoned their fathers.

And for a while they were not wholly disappointed. The
Social War had now dwindled into such small proportions
that it might be left to a subordinate commander, while the

1 Diod. Exc. Phot. 1. xxxvii. 2. But App. c. 51 calls Bovianum the κοινοβούλιον
τῶν ἀποστάντων.

x ILLUSORY NATURE OF THE ROMAN FRANCHISE 589 -

threatening aspect of Mithridatés demanded all the attention of
the Republic and its chiefs. Metellus Pius was left to deal with
the remnants of war! which still lingered in Samnium and
Lucania, while the great prize of the Eastern command was
disputed between Marius and Sulla. It fell to Sulla; he was
chosen Consul, and bidden to recover Rome’s Eastern dominions
from her terrible enemy. But just then arose the disputes and Legislation

tumults which attended the legislation of Publius Sulpicius. out, "
The Allies had been admitted to the Roman franchise; but they Ὁ οἱ sa.”

had been admitted to it in a shape which made its political
rights wholly illusory. The new citizens were equal in number Illusory

to the old; but they were all massed together, in eight Tribes ee
only, so that, according to the Roman manner of voting, they garchise

could, at the outside, command eight votes only out of thirty- granted
five, perhaps only out of forty-three.* Considering their numbers oie
and weight, they were fully entitled to command twice as many.”

They were naturally discontented with their position, and their Their
discontent.

1 App. Bell. Civ. 68 τὰ λείψανα τοῦ συμμαχικοῦ πολέμον. Cf. capp. 58, 91.

* It is by no means clear whether the new citizens were all placed in eight of
the existing Tribes, or whether eight new Tribes were created to receive them,
making the whole number forty-three. The latter course would have been in
harmony with the ancient custom by which so many allied or conquered states
had been converted into Roman Tribes. The words of Appian (i. 49) are,
Ρωμαῖοι μὲν Sh τούσδε τοὺς veowoNlras, οὐκ és ras πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα φυλὰς, at
πότε ἦσαν αὐτοῖς, κατέλεξαν᾽ ἵνα μὴ τῶν ἀρχαίων πλέονες ὄντες, ἐν ταῖς
χειροτονίαις ἐπικρατοῖεν. ἀλλὰ δεκατεύοντες ἀπέφηναν ἑτέρας, ἐν αἷς
ἐχειροτόνουν ἔσχατοι. This can only mean the creation of ten new Tribes,
though δεκατεύω is a very odd word to express it. Velleius (ii. 20. 2) says,
‘‘Cum ita civitas Italim data esset, ut ἐπ oclo tribus contribuerentur novi cives ;
ne potentia eorum et multitudo veterum civium dignitatem frangeret.” This
would most naturally be understood of distributing the new citizens among
eight of the existing Tribes, but it might perhaps be taken the other way, and
the eight Tribes of Velleius coincide most temptingly with the eight States of the
Italian League. Mr. Merivale (p. 96) takes for granted that the Tribes, whether
eight or ten, were additional. Dr. Liddell (ii. 289) thinks Appian's statement
‘clear and consistent,” and explains the diversity by supposing that “several
plans were afoot, but that none was actually carried into effect.” Now nothing ~
can be plainer than that the plan, whatever it was, was carried into effect, and
that the Italians were dissatisfied with the result. (See Merivale, p. 104.)
Appian (u.s.) goes on to say, πολλάκις αὐτῶν ἡ ψῆφος ἀχρεῖος Fy, ἅτε τῶν πέντε
καὶ τριάκοντα προτέρων τε καλουμένων, καὶ οὐσῶν ὑπὲρ ἥμισυν. It may be worth
a thought whether their special exasperation was not caused by the election of
Sulla and Pompeius to the Consulship for B.c. 88—doubtless in the teeth of
every Italian voter.

8 Some slight preference to the old citizens conld not be helped. In our own
Reform Bill old boroughs were allowed to retain their one or two members by
the possession of a much smaller population than was required for new boroughs
to claim them.

Their
cause
embraced
by Marius

and
Sulpicius.

The

Civil War,

B.c. 88-2.
B.C. 87.

The
Samnite
War still
continues.

B.c. 87.

590 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

just cause found a vehement advocate in the great Caius Marius.
The Volscian yeoman had always taken their side; his heart had
always been Italian rather than Roman; when constrained to
fight against them in the Social War, he had gone forth with
only half a heart, and he had waged war in a very different way
from that in which he had waged it against the Numidian and
the Teuton.! Marius, we have no reason to doubt, honestly em-
braced the cause of men whose friend he had been through life ;
but he was an ambitious, and now a disappointed man, and he
of course looked for the grateful support of the new citizens in
any future struggles with his rival Their cause was also taken
up by Sulpicius, then a Tribune of the Commons, a celebrated
orator, a man hitherto of aristocratic politics, and whose character
is certainly not to be estimated by the unfavourable reports of
it which have been handed down to us by the Sullan party.*
A law was proposed to distribute the new citizens among all the
Tribes ; when the Consuls threw vexatious obstacles in the way
of its passing, Sulpicius, by a bolder stroke still, proposed another
law, transferring the Mithridatic command from Sulla to Marius.
The Civil War now began ; Sulla entered Rome as a conqueror ;
Sulpicius was killed and Marius fled for his life; and Sulla at
last departed for the East, leaving the Marian Cinna in posses-
sion of the Consulship, and Samnium and Lucania still unsubdued.
The details of the Civil War do not concern me; it is enough
for my purpose that the new citizens, Marsians and Etruscans
alike, stedfastly clave to the Marian cause,* and that Samnium
and Lucania still continued their anti-Roman warfare. Attempts
were made to conciliate both the avowed foes and the discon-
tented citizens. The Italians who had accepted the franchise
were at last distributed among the thirty-five Tribes,‘ and so
gained their proper position in the commonwealth. Their part
in the struggle is no longer that of enemies of Rome, but merely
of partizans of one of the two Roman factions. But in Samnium
matters were very different. An attempt was made by Metellus
to bring the rebels to terms; citizenship was offered ; the Sam-

1 See Merivale, p. 90. National Review, Jan. 1862, p. 68.

2 Plut. Mar. 85. Sulla, 8. Lau (Lucius Cornelius Sulla, p. 193) has thrown
much light on the real character of Sulpicius and his designs. They have been
much misunderstood, through trusting too implicitly to reports which, it is clear,
represent only the Sullan version of the story. See National Review, January
1862, p. 64.

3 App. oc. 64, 86. 4 See Merivale, p. 120.

x THE SAMNITES BEFORE ROME 591

nites professed to accept it, but they clogged their acceptance with
conditions to which Rome, even in her distracted state, could

not yield without dishonour,! and the negociation came to
nothing. Probably it was only in mockery that the Samnites

had professed to listen, hoping to prolong the struggle till some

more favourable time. At last the moment came; Rome was Last stage
utterly divided against herself; Sulla and the younger Marius οἵ the
were at the head of hostile armies, waging a war in which no jy ἢ
mercy was shown on either side. Pontius the Samnite and Samnites
Lamponius the Lucanian now marched on Rome, with the tome
avowed purpose of destroying the tyrant city or of perishing in 5 o, 39.
the attempt.2. They were received as allies by the Marian army

—an act of treason against their country which almost drives

our sympathies to the side of Sulla. But, viewed from the
Samnite side and with the memories of old Samnite glories in

our minds, this march of the last Pontius is the one heroic scene
which redeems the black annals of the Civil War. Rome had

now at last to struggle for her existence at her own gates;
Pontius and Lamponius brought her nearer to her overthrow

than Hannibal or Pyrrhos. And the brave Samnites might
boast that, in this last hour of their national being, victory was

in some sort theirs. In the battle before the Colline Gate, Battle
Pontius drove Sulla himself before him; had fortune been at the
equally favourable to his Roman allies, he might have avenged qate,
the wrongs of his forefather, and have entered Atsernia with

the proudest of the Cornelii led in chains before his car of
triumph. But it was not in the Fates that Rome should fall in

this the hour of her deepest danger. The star of Sulla the
Fortunate was dimmed but for a moment; the whole Samnite

host died on the field, or were slaughtered after the battle

by the merciless conqueror.? In a word, Sulla had delivered

1 App. c. 68. Didn, fr. 166.

2 Vell. (ii. 27. 1) introduces them with more sympathy than a Roman
writer often shows toa noble enemy. At Pontius Telesinus, dux Samnitium,
vir domi bellique fortissimus, penitusque Romano nomini infestissimus, con-
tractis circiter quadraginta millibus fortissime pertinacissimeque in retinendis
armis juventutis, Carbone et Mario Coss, abhinc annos cxi. Kal. Novembribus
ita ad portam Collinam cum Sulla dimicavit ut ad summum discrimen et eum et
rempublicam perduceret. See also Florus, iii. 21. 22, App. c. 90-93. Liv.
Ep. Ixxxviii. Plut. Sul. 29. Arnold, i. 221-7, and a singularly fine passage
of Merivale, pp. 129, 3

3 App. c. 94, cf. ἮΝ " Vell. ii. 27. Didn, fr. 185, 6. Arnold, i. 226.

592 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

Rome, and had thereby fixed the future history of the world for
ever.
Permanent The conqueror had now only to gather in the spoil. Heavy
dovastation indeed was the hand that fell alike upon Samnium and upon
nium b by Etruria. Sulla had saved Rome, and all Italy was henceforth
Sulla, to be Roman. The Samnite people were, as far as might be,
exterminated, and their cities reduced to desolation.! Rome
had never again to fear an Italian enemy; but the effects of
Sulla’s devastation of Southern Italy remain to our own day.
The rooting out of that noble people of brave soldiers and hardy
yeomen has been the main cause of that difference which, in
every later age, has been visible between the Southern and
Northern parts of the peninsula. The policy of Sulla was well
nigh the same as that by which, in our own times, another lord
of Rome has doomed the same lands to anarchy and brigandage.
But, if Sulla wasted Samnium, he at least did it in the cause of
Rome’s dominion ; it was reserved for another Saviour of Society,
the Eldest Son of the Church, the patron of the Holy Father, to
renew the same evil work in the cause of Rome’s subjection to a
- foreign enemy.

§ 3. Of the Lombard League

Our history has now to take a leap of more than twelve

Gradual hundred years. The victory of Sulla established the permanent
re tai dominion of Rome over Italy, and over all the Mediterranean
Provinces Nations. Or rather, what was finally accomplished was not so
with Rome. much the dominion of Rome, as the incorporation of Italy and
the Provinces with Rome. Under the Republic indeed, and

under the early Cesars, the local Rome still kept her place.

But gradually all mankind, from Egypt to Britain, became

equally entitled to the name of Romans, and to whatever pre-
eminence that once proud name still implied. As classes

were gradually mingled together within the Roman dominions,

as new nations gradually arose, capable of fighting and negocia-

ting with Rome on equal terms, the pre-eminence attached to the

Roman name ceased to be the pre-eminence of a particular order

within the Empire, but the supposed pre-eminence of all the

subjects of the Empire over all the nations beyond its borders.

1 Strabo, νυ. 4, 11. Οὐκ ἐπαύσατο πρὶν ἢ πάντας rods ἐν ὀνόματι Σαυνιτῶν
διέφθειρεν ἣ ἐκ τῆς ᾿Ιταλίας ἐξέβαλε.

x THE KINGDOM OF ITALY 598

The Roman was now opposed not to the Italian or the Provincial,
but to the Persian and the Goth. The Emperors, commonly Rome
Provincials by birth, learned to care less for the City and more forsaken
for the Empire; and, as barbarian enemies began to threaten, Emperors.
the presence of Cesar was needed almost anywhere rather than
in the ancient capital. Province after province was lopped away,
but no province of the West seems ever to have willingly seceded
from the Empire till the Empire had ceased to be Roman in
more than name. Strangers established themselves within the
Empire: barbarian dynasties reigned in Britain, in Gaul, in
Spain, in Africa, in Italy itself. The style and title of Augustus
was handed on from one stranger to another ; it was assumed The ~
by a Frank and disputed by a Greek or a Slave; yet Rome was Imperial
never without a Cesar; there was always some Prince whom siways
she acknowledged as the lawful bearer of the Imperial title, main-
whose claim was never denied in theory, however carefully his *=e4-
authority might be evaded in practice. Rome had her Cmsar,
but, from the fourth century onwards, he dwelt anywhere rather
than in Rome itself; at Milan, at Ravenna, or at Pavia; at
Nikomédeia or at Byzantium; at Aachen, at Goslar, at Geln-
hausen, or at Palermo. This absence of the Emperors was one '
main cause of the difference between the history of the Old
Rome and of the New; the presence of the Eastern Emperors
at Constantinople preserved the Imperial authority both in
Church and State; the absence of the Western Emperors from The
Rome left room for the growth of those sacerdotal and republican Singiom
powers whose developement forms the history of medizval Italy. ὦ. Ὁ. ἜΘΗ.
From the days of the Lombard invasion there was also an 1250.
acknowledged Kingdom of Italy, whose sovereign, from the days 774.
of Charles the Great, was commonly either a vassal of the
Emperor or the Emperor himself. But the royal authority was
never extended over the whole peninsula ; the Eastern Emperors
still retained a considerable province in the South, and here and
there a Lombard Duke or a Saracen freebooter contrived to
maintain himself in independence of all kings and Emperors
whatsoever. The King of Italy commonly dwelt, as at this
day, in a remote corner of his Kingdom! ; when, under the great

1 The perplexing history of the Italian Kings between 888 and 961 may be
studied in that most amusing book, Liudprand’s Antapodosis (printed both by
Pertz and by Muratori), and in several chronicles in Muratori’s second volume. Some

of them bore the title of Emperor (see, for instance, the Chronicle of Farfa, col.
416 of Guido, and 460 of Berenger), but their history is mainly confined to Northern

2 Q

authority,
1039-
1056.

The
Normans
in Apulia
and Sicily,
1021-
1194,

Condition
of Rome.

Northern
Italy in
the twelfth
century.
Predomi-
nance of
the Cities.

Their
practical
indepen-
dence.

594 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

Otto, the crown of Italy was definitely annexed to that of
Germany, the King of Italy became at once a stranger, a plura-
list, and a non-resident. The consequence was that the royal
authority was weaker in Italy than anywhere else, and that it
required an unusually vigorous King, an Otto or a Henry the
Third, to maintain any authority at all. Italy thus changed,
far sooner than Germany, far more permanently than France,
into a system of independent principalities and cities, owning
little more than a nominal allegiance to their King and Emperor.
By the middle of the twelfth century the notion of a Kingdom

. of Italy had become almost nominal. The southern part of the

peninsula had been converted into an independent monarchy,
whose Norman Counts and Kings did not scruple to acknow-
ledge themselves as the vassals of the Pope, but rejected all
claims to even a formal supremacy on the part either of the
Eastern or of the Western Cesar. In other parts of the
peninsula smaller princes reigned, nominal vassals, no doubt, of
the absent Emperor, but practically no less independent than
the Sicilian King. Rome was in an anomalous state, sometimes
a republic, sometimes almost a Papal possession, anything rather
than a loyal city of the Cesar and Augustus, who, once in his
reign, fought his way to a coronation within its walls. Northern
Italy had split up into a multitude of practically independent
states ; some of them were feudal principalities, but the dominant
element in the country was the Cities! It is their greatness,
their rivalries, and their fall, which make the history of
medieval Italy the most living reproduction in later times of
the history of ancient Greece.” During the constant absence
of the Emperors from Italy, the Lombard cities had become
practically sovereign. They not only chose their own magistrates
and administered their internal affairs without royal interference,
but they exercised all the rights of independent commonwealths ;
they levied war and they made peace, they sent and received
ambassadors, they entered into treaties and alliances, without
any reference whatever to the will of the distant prince whom
they still acknowledged as their lawful Emperor and King.®
Italy. The most exceptional is King Hugh's unlucky expedition to Rome.
Liudprand, iii. 44-5.

1 On the greatness of the Cities, and the way in which they had absorbed
nearly all the feudal nobility, see the description of Otto of Freising, ii. 12, 14.

2 See above, p. 24.
3 I do not enter into any question as to the Roman or the Teutonic origin of

See

x IMPERIALIST REACTION 595

The amount of authority retained by the Emperors in Italy
fluctuated infinitely according to the character and position of
the reigning prince. Henry the Third, nearly absolute in
Germany, was hardly less so in Italy, but Kings like the Saxon
Lothar and the Frankish Conrad retained hardly any authority Reigns of
at all By the middle of the twelfth century, the Imperial Lothar II.
power in Italy had sunk to the lowest ebb. But about that eine
time several circumstances combined to bring about a reaction in 1137-52.
its favour. The study of the Civil Law was reviving, and with
it there revived a certain feeling of reverence for the power Imperialist
which. possessed the titles, and claimed the prerogatives, of reaction.
Theodosius and Justinian. The independent princes looked
with jealousy on the advances of civic freedom, and hoped that
the authority of a king would be exercised in favour of feudal
chiefs rather than in favour of revolted commonwealths. The
cities again, divided against each other, did not always refuse a
common master as an arbiter of their quarrels; small common-
wealths oppressed by great ones eagerly invoked Ceesar as their
protector against the other tyrants ; several cities, above all, the
old Lombard capital of Pavia, were bound to the Imperial cause -
by an attachment as loyal and enthusiastic as any that bound
their rivals to the cause of the Church or to the cause of freedom.
And, above all, Milan, Cremona, and Tortona themselves still
acknowledged the Roman Emperor and King of Italy as their
lawful sovereign. They might be anxious to limit his royal
rights to the smallest possible amount, but that they had a King
in Cesar, and that Cesar had some rights over them, the stoutest
Guelf in Lombardy never dreamed of denying. When therefore Election of
the choice of the German and Italian! electors had filled the Frederick,
throne of Charles and Otto with a prince really worthy to walk ~~
Italian municipal freedom, or whether any civic constitutions can trace their
being as far back as Otto the Great. It is enough for my purpose that the cities
were practically independent at the accession of Frederick Barbarossa.

1 Otto of Freising (ii. 1) distinctly says that Frederick’s election was made
non sine quibusdam ex Italia baronibus. We know not who they were, or by
what commission they came, but it is important to mark that the election was
not exclusively the work of Germans. So at the election of Frederick’s uncle,
the late King Conrad, in 1137, the consent of Italy was given through the mouth
of a Papal Legate. See Otto Fris. Chron. vii. 22, ‘‘ Presente Theodwino Episcopo
Cardinali, ac sancte Romane Ecclesie Legato, summi Pontificis, ac tottus Romans
Populi, Urbiumque Italie assensum promittente.” It should also be remembered
that this same Conrad had already been actually chosen and crowned King of

Italy at Milan in 1128, in opposition to Lothar, who was then reigning in
Germany. See Otto Fris. Chron. vii. 17, ‘‘Conradus a fratre ac quibuedam

596 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

in their steps, the revival of the Imperial dominion in Italy
seemed to follow as a matter of course. Frederick of Hohen-
staufen, famous by his Italian nickname of Barbarossa, was the
greatest and noblest sovereign of his age. He rose as high in

aliis Rex creatus, ... a Mediolanensibus ... honorifice suscipitur, et ab
eorum Archiepiscopo Anselmo Modoyci sede, Italici Regni in Regem ungitur.”
Of course Conrad intended to become King and Emperor of the whole Empire, if
he could, and not merely to reign as a local King of Italy, but the fact is worth
notice as showing not only that the right of Italy to a voice in the choice of its
sovereign was not denied, but also that the Milanese did not look upon a German
King as being necessarily a foreign oppressor.

This election of Conrad was just after the Milanese conquest of Como.

1 The authorities for the reign of Frederick are numerous, but unluckily
some of the best fail us long before the end of his reign. By far the best
historian of that time is Otto, Bishop of Freising, Frederick’s uncle, whose
history of Frederick (a distinct work from his Chronicle) unluckily reaches only
to the year 1156, and the continuation of Radevic, a Canon of his church, only
to 1159. They therefore give us no direct help for the history of the Lombard
League. Prefixed to Otto’s history is a letter from Frederick himself to his
uncle, describing his first campaign. Otto and Radevic are printed in the sixth
volume of Muratori’s Rerum Italicaruam Scriptores. There is also a fine old edition
printed at Strassburg in 1515, at the end of which (in my copy) is added the
poetical account of Frederick’s campaigns by Gunther, otherwise Ligurinus.
There is also a contemporary Chronicle by Otto of St. Blaise, printed in the
same volume of Muratori. The contemporary poems contained in the collection
called Gedichte auf Konig Friedrich, published by Jacob Grimm (Berlin, 1844),
are very curious. Of Italian writers, we have, on the Imperialist side, the very
valuable Chronicle of Otto Morena of Lodi, carried on by his son Acerbus and by
a nameless continuator down to 1168. The shorter Chronicle of Sire Raul or
Ralph of Milan is of course strong on the other side; it takes in Frederick's
whole reign. These are also in Muratori’s sixth volume. In his seventh volume
we have the contemporary Chronicle of Romuald, Archbishop of Salerno, primarily
devoted to Sicilian history, but which deals at length with several stages of the
struggle between Frederick and the cities. A few things may also be gleaned
from the Pantheon of Godfrey of Viterbo, and the Chronicle of Sicard of Cremona
in the same volume. All these are contemporary. To the next century belongs
the Chronicle of Conrad, Abbot of Ursperg, printed at Strassburg, 1537, edited
by Philip Melanchthon. The life of Pope Alexander the Third by Nicolas,
Cardinal of Aragon, in Muratori’s third volume, though not compiled till the
fourteenth century, is very important, as giving the strictly Papal, as distinguished
from the Imperialist, the Lombard, or the Sicilian view, of the history. The
abundance of our materials for these times makes us the more sigh over the sad
deficiency of them during a large part of the time dealt with in this volume.
If all medieval writers were like Lambert of Herzfeld and Otto of Freising, we
should not have also to lament the inferiority of our store as well as to rejoice at
their abundance.

Between original authorities and modern writers may come the work of
Sigonius, an Italian scholar of the sixteenth century, De Regno Italiz. As he
professes to have searched diligently the archives of various cities, he probably
had materials before him which are not now available, and may therefore be
looked on as occupying a place somewhat like that of Plutarch, Pausanias, and
Appian in our earlier history. Of modern writers there is of course the second

x CHARACTER OF FREDERICK BARBAROSSA 597

every moral quality above Henry of Anjou and Philip of Paris,

as he perhaps fell below them in some purely intellectual gifts.! Charac-
Firmly believing in his righta, supported in that helief by all ‘ero τ
Germany and by a large part of Italy, he devoted every energy το
of his soul, every resource of his kingdoms, to the assertion of

the claims which he had inherited from the Kings and Emperors

before him. Stern and merciless while opposition lasted, but
faithful to his word? and generous in the hour of victory,
Frederick stands forth in honourable contrast to most conquerors

of his own or of any other age. He was a King contending His
against Republics ; therefore all our noblest sympathies lie with position
his enemies ; but we must never allow ourselves to look on the ποῦ (0 ated
Italian history of the twelfth century in a light reflected only with that
from the passions of the nineteenth. Never must we confound or modern
the claims of the Saxon, Frankish, and Swabian Cesars with the ον
imposture of yesterday, which ventures to assume their title and

to deck itself with their Imperial ensign. Frederick was indeed

a stranger in Italy, but he was not more a stranger than

Henry of Anjou was a stranger in England, than Lewis of Paris

was a stranger In Aquitaine. His royal title was acknowledged

by all; his royal rights were zealously asserted by many ; his
personal qualities won the enthusiastic love of multitudes of

Italian as well as German partizans.3 His position, as lawful
Emperor of the Romans, lawful King of Germany, Italy, and

volume of the great work of Sismondi, and Raumer’s Geschichte der Hohenstaufen,

the second volume for the narrative, and the fifth for the political antiquities.

A good deal may also be learned from the fifth volume of Cantu’s Histoire des

Italiens. The Histoire des Révolutions d'Italie, byJFerrari (Paris, 1858), is, I

must confess, beyond my understanding. I will only say that the author through-

out uses the word “ Federal” in a sense quite different from its usual meaning,

and one which I have been quite unable to catch.
1 On the character of Frederick, see National Review, Jan. 1861, p. 61 et

seqq.

4 The only breach of faith—in a very faithless age—with which Frederick
stands distinctly charged is his attack on Alexandria during a truce in 1174.
But there is no reason to believe that this was an act of deliberate treachery, as
might be inferred from the words of Romuald (imaginaria treuga, etc. col. 2138)
and the Life of Alexander (inzidiator, perversa proditio, etc. p. 464), Ralph of
Milan, a hostile witness, distinctly attributes the Emperor's breach of faith to
the impatience of his Italian allies (accensus ira et dolore Longobardorum, col.
1192), ever foremost in acts of cruelty against their neighbours. See above, pp. 42,
43. It is hard tosee how Frederick was guilty of any breach of faith, however
much he may be open to the charge of harshness or cruelty in the destruction of
Milan in 1162. Yet the charge seems to be brought by Romuald, col. 208. Cf
Ralph of Milan, col. 1187.

* See the character of Frederick as he seemed to a German admirer in Radevic,

The War

not strictly

a national

struggle,

but a
struggle
betwee

598 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

Burgundy, had no one point of likeness to the position of the
Austrian or Lotharingian Archduke who insults Germany and
Italy by his usurpation of the Imperial title, and who acts the
practical wrong of detaining by brute force an Italian province
in which his sway is hateful to every native. The struggle
between Frederick and his Italian subjects was hardly a national
struggle at all; it undoubtedly called forth a bitter and lasting
hatred between German and Italian, but that hatred was the
effect of Frederick’s warfare rather than its cause. The notion
of nationality was still very vague; many of the Italian nobles
had not yet forgotten their German origin; any hatred between
Italian and German as such was as nothing compared with the
bitterness which raged between neighbouring and rival cities!
The war between the Emperor and the Lombard commonwealths
was such ἃ war as would have taken place in every kingdom in

royalty and Europe, had the cities everywhere been able to develope them-

municipal
freedom

selves to the same degree as the Italian cities did. That age
and the age which followed it, beheld a vast movement in favour
of municipal independence everywhere. In most countries the
cities were so weak, and their claims so modest, that the Kings
rather favoured them as a useful counterpoise to the more
dangerous power of the feudal nobles. But wherever, as in
Provence* and Flanders, the cities threatened to grow into
independent Republics, a struggle took place between the common-
wealths and the local sovereign differing only in scale from the
great warfare which tore Italy in pieces. Most of the feudal
lords of Italy stood by the side of the Emperor against their
common enemies ; in the next age Frederick’s own grandson and
namesake showed as little love for civic independence in Germany
as himself or his grandfather showed in Italy.2 To look on
Frederick Barbarossa as a mere foreign intruder in Italy, or as
affording the slightest parallel to Italy’s modern French and
Austrian oppressors, is to catch at one of the most superficial of
lib. iv. c. 80, and for his portrait by a no less zealous Italian adherent, see
Acerbus Morena, col. 1115.

1 One of the most striking passages on this head is in Acerbus Morena, col.
1141. ‘ Bene sciebat [Landenses] Mediolanenses nullam pietatem de ipsis habere,
quam de rabiosis canibus haberent, et si manus aliorum inimicorum effugerent,
ipsorum tamen Mediolanensium manus nequaquam evadere valerent.”

* On the Provencal Republics, see Sismondi, Histoire des Frangais, part iv.
ce. 410 (vol. iv. p. 281), William de Nangis in An. 1257 (Pithou, Hist. Fr. Scriptt.

Vet. ed. 1596, p. 446), 996, ed. Bruxelles.
3 See Kington’ 8 History of Frederick the Second.

x FREDERICK AND THE LOMBARD CITIES 599

resemblances and to forget the essential unlikeness which lies
below. -

Frederick then, already elected at Frankfort and crowned Frederick
King of Germany at Aachen, entered Italy, not as an external ier,
invader, but to assume, in the regular order of things, the crown yee
of the Italian Kingdom at Monza or Milan,! and the crown of the
Roman Empire at Rome. He came too to settle the affairs of a
Kingdom long deserted by its Kings, and specially to redress the
wrongs of certain injured commonwealths which cried to him for
help against their oppressors.” His alleged royal rights came Collision
into collision with the alleged rights of various Italian cities, but οἵ οἰαΐτιε
neither party denied the existence of some rights in the other. sh. Em.
The difference seems to have been mainly this — Frederick, peror and
though willing to allow to the cities a large amount of municipal the Cities.
independence, understood his royal rights as implying a direct
and immediate sovereignty over them. Milan and _ her
confederates, on the other hand, were willing to acknowledge
the external suzerainty of the Emperor, but claimed to them-
selves all the essential powers of sovereign commonwealths.

They excepted his royal rights in their manifestoes, they re-
cognized his royal title, they were ready to pay him a royal
tribute,’ and to show him all royal honour,‘ but they would both

be sovereign within their own walls and capable of making war

and peace with their neighbours. Frederick’s policy, on the

other hand, strictly forbade all private war and all private
alliances® between any communities within his realm. In his Early
first campaigns he was successful, as much through the zealous)
help of his Italian partizans as through the forces which he Frederick,

1154-62,

1 Such was the regular course of things. In point of fact Frederick was
crowned King of Italy not at Milan, but in the loyal city of Pavia. Otto Fris.
ii. 20.

2 Compare the contrasted descriptions of Otto Morena and of Ralph of Milan
at the opening of their respective chronicles.

* The Imperial claim of Fodrum (see Ducange in voc. and Otto Fris. ii. 12)
amounted to a tribute for the time being, though it was only required when the
King went to Rome to receive the crown of the Empire.

4 Rom. Sal. c. 221. Nos gratanter Imperatoris pacem, salvo Italie honore,
recipimus, et ejus gratiam, libertate nostra integra remanente, preoptamus. Quod
ei de antiquo debet Italia, libenter exsolvimus, et veteres illi justitias non negamus;
libertatem autem nostram, quam a patribus nostris, avis, et proavis hereditario
jure contraximus, nequaquam relinquemus.

5 Sigon. de Reg. It. 584. Volumus etiam ut cum nulla civitate conjurati-
onem injussu nostro ineatis [Cremonenses].

600 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

brought from the other side of the Alps. Pavia triumphed over
her rival ; the despiser of Czsar and his rights! was, like Thebes,
levelled to the ground by her exulting neighbours, and her
Destruction inhabitants, like those of Mantineia, were distributed among
of auen, four unwalled villages? Lodi rose again, like Messéné under
the hands of Epameinéndas,? and the royal power was as fully
acknowledged in Lombardy as in any kingdom in Europe. What
Oppression called forth that spirit of resistance which triumphed in the end
od ck's 798 the oppression exercised in Frederick’s absence by many
of his German lieutenants, which the Emperor himself, on his
return to Italy, failed to chastise as his royal duty required.‘
Four And now came one of those moments which have offered
oppor themselves at long intervals in the history of the world for the
Union of Yealization of the great vision of our own times, the formation of a
Italy ; free and united Italy. Twice has the opportunity offered itself
in the form of a national Monarchy, twice in that of a Federal
in the Republic. We have seen the attempt made to establish an
Social Italian Confederation in the days of Sulla and Pontius Telesinus;
, we can hardly say that the attempt was again made, but most
under the certainly the opportunity was again offered, in the days of
League's Frederick Barbarossa and Alexander the Third. In the next
"age the chance came from the opposite side. It would have
deprived Florence and Genoa of some ages of splendour, but it
would have saved Italy, as a whole, from many more ages of
oppression, if all Italy had been, in the thirteenth century,
under united under the sceptre of Frederick’s descendant Manfred.
Manfred; Τῃ all these cases Rome, Republican, Imperial, or Papal, has been
under the greatest difficulty in the way. So we see it in our own day,
er net, When a fourth opportunity has offered itself, when, as far as
' Italy is concerned, that opportunity has been vigorously seized
upon, and when the delay in the full victory of right is owing

1 Gedichte auf Konig Friedrich, p. 65:

De tributo Cesaris nemo cogitabat,

Omnes erant Cesares, nemo censum dabat ;
Civitas Ambrosii velut Troja staba

Deos parum, homines minus, formidabat.

3 Rom. Sal. col. 299. Otto St. Bl. col. 875. Divisis in quatuor partes
civibus, regione inculta ipsis ad inhabitandum concessa, quatuor eos oppida
eedificare jussit, ipsosque, ut dictum est, per partes divisos ea incolere fecit. Cf.
above, pp. 154, 155.

3 Rad. Fris. iii. 27, Otto Mor. col. 1011, 1087. Cf. above, p. 140.

4 See Vit. Alex. iii. 456. Acerbus Mor. col. 1127, 1131. Cf. Conrad Ursp.
p. 309. Acerbus gives large details, and the witness of so warm an Imperialist
proves a great deal.

x FOUR OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNION OF ITALY 601

wholly to the selfishness of avowed foreign enemies and to the

baser hypocrisy of pretended foreign friends. Among the four

cases, the second was, in some respects, the least favourable,
because the union of the whole peninsula would have been, in

the twelfth century, an idea utterly chimerical. At any one of

the other three periods, an united Italy would have included, as

we have seen it include in our own times, southern Italy, as well

as northern. In the twelfth century, the idea of Italy as a Distinc-
national whole, including Apulia and Calabria no leas than Lom- tion of
bardy and Tuscany, did not enter the mind of any party. nd
Southern Italy formed no part of the Italian Kingdom. Held southern
by the Eastern Emperors, by independent Dukes, and now by ‘aly.
the powerful Norman Kings of Sicily, the modern Kingdom of

Naples had very little share in the revolutions of the northern

part of the peninsula. It was indeed in Campania that the first The
Italian Republics arose. But Naples, Gaeta, and Amalfi, like rempaee
Venice in another part of Italy, were really Byzantine depen- 550. 1158᾽
dencies, whose allegiance, distant and isolated as they became,

was best retained by allowing to them a large amount of prac-

tical freedom. Their freedom was like that of Cherson at the

other end of the Empire, or like that of Bourdeaux and Bayonne

in the fifteenth century, when they found in loyalty to the distant

King of England their surest safeguard against the despotism of

the Valois. The Republics of Campania had no connexion with

those of Lombardy, and, in the days of Frederick, they had sunk

into mere municipalities of the Sicilian Kingdom. During the

war with Frederick, both the Eastern Emperor and the Sicilian The cities
King were zealous in the cause of the Lombard commonwealths ; supported
but this was simply because they were both the enemies of Pope, the
the Western Emperor. William! and Manuel had no more Eastern
natural love for Lombard freedom than they had natural friend- Emperor,
ship for one another. They settled their own differences King of
in the face of the growing power of Frederick, and, under Sicily.
this strange combination of circumstances, the Lombard Re- 1166.
publics found three powerful protectors against their own
sovereign. ‘The Pope, the Eastern Cesar, and the Sicilian King

were all zealous in their cause; yet we can hardly doubt that

any one of the three would have been more ready to swallow

1 William the Bad and his son William the Good, different as they appear in
the internal history of Sicily, can hardly be distinguished in their relation to
northern Italy. :

movements

in the

Beginning
of the
LOMBARD
LEAGUE,
1164.

Relations
of Venice
and the
Lombard
Cities,

Action
of the
Emperor
Manuel.

602 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

them up than Frederick himself, if a common dread of his
power had not for a moment united their interests with those
of freedom.

As in the liberation of the Belgian provinces from Spain, 80
in the struggle of the Lombard cities against Frederick, the
movement did not begin in the quarter in which it was most
vigorously carried on to the end. The revolt against Philip
the Second did not begin with Holland and those other provinces
which, in the end, won and maintained their freedom. During
the earlier stages of the war, the main centre of interest lies in
those southern provinces which at last fell back under the
Spanish yoke. So the first movements against Frederick now
began in a corner of Italy which, both before and after, played
quite a secondary part. Verona had indeed, nine years earlier,
acted vigorously against the Emperor,? but both Verona and the
neighbouring cities have called for but little of our attention
compared with Milan, Cremona, and Tortona. It was probably
because the north-eastern cities had suffered so much less than
the others in the first part of the war that they are found the
foremost in beginning the second. The first group of cities
which leagued together for the recovery of their liberties con-
sisted of Verona, Padua, Vicenza, and the great island common-
wealth of Venice.* This last city, it should be remembered, was
no part of the Kingdom of Italy. Venice had never admitted
the claim of the German Kings to the style of Roman Emperors ;
she had found her account in cleaving to the nominal supremacy
of the Cesars of Byzantium till she became, as she now was,
strong enough to dispense with any acknowledgement of vassalage
to either of the Lords of the World. She must therefore be
looked on throughout as an external ally, almost on the same
footing with William and Manuel. According to the Byzantine
version, the movement was first suggested by the Eastern
Emperor, who sent his Ambassador Niképhoros Chalouphés to
Venice, and other agents to the smaller Italian cities, in order to

1 This peace was concluded soon after the accession of William the Good.
Rom. Sal. col. 1166.

2 Otto Fris. ii. 27. Rad. Fris. iii. 45. Otto Mor. col. 991.

3 Acerbus Mor. col. 1128. Tisdem temporibus Veronenses et Paduani et
Vicentini, certique [ceterique] de illa Marchia, preter paucos Imperatoris, fieri
contra Imperatorem rebelles exstiterunt, partim propter pecuniam Venetis accep-
tam, qu jam ante Imperatori resistant [resistebat] Rad. Mil. 1189. Eadem
quoque hyeme Veronenses cum omnibus de Marchia illa juraverunt cum Veneti-

bus, et facti sunt Imperatori rebelles. Cf. Vit. Alex. iii. 456. Sicard, 600.

x DESIGNS OF THE EMPEROR MANUEL 603

unite them against the rival Cesar.' There is nothing im-
probable in the story ; Byzantine troops and Byzantine gold play

an important part throughout the narrative, and Manuel was an

ally of far more moment than might seem to those who are
accustomed only to vulgar commonplaces about “Greeks of the

Lower Empire.” The Byzantine power was indeed no longer Condition
what it had been under the great Macedonian Emperors, but the of the
vigorous rule of the Komnénian princes had recovered a large Terie
portion of Asia from the Turk,? and in Eastern Europe, the
Cesar of Constantinople, after his Servian and Hungarian
victories, no longer met with a rival on equal terms. Manuel

was no statesman, and he was perhaps more of a knight-errant

than a general; his Empire was weakened by his very victories ;

still, under him, the Eastern Empire presented a splendid and
formidable appearance in the eyes of Europe. He aspired to Manuel

reunite the rival Churches and the rival Empires; he, the true aspires to
Emperor of the Romans, aspired to reign once more in the the

capital of his predecessors instead of the northern Barbarian Empires.
who presumptuously usurped the titles of Roman sovereignty.®

1 Joan. Kinnamos, Hist. lib. iv. (Pp. 298, ed. 1652). “Ober καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔθνη
τὰ τῇδε καὶ κόλπου ἐντὸς ἵδρυται τοῦ "Iovlov, τῶν ἀσημοτέρων τινὰς ἀφανῶς
ἐκπέμπων, τῆς Φρεδερίκου τε αὐτὰ ὑπομιμνήσκειν ἐκέλευεν ἀπληστίας, καὶ πρὸς
ἀντίστασιν ἤγειρεν. εἰς δὲ τὸ Οὐεννέτων ἔθνος Νικηφόρον σὺν χρήμασι τὸν
Σαλούφην ἔπεμπε, πειρασόμενόνἿ τε εἰς αὐτὸν τοῦ ἔθνους εὐνοίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ
Ῥωμαίοις συμφέροντι τὰ τῇδε διοικησόμενον.

31 mean, of course, the Seljouk Turks of Ikonion ; the Ottomans had not yet
appeared.

8 The language of the Byzantine and Papal writers on this head is very
curious. The schismatic Greek now becomes Magnus et excelsus Constantinopolis
Imperator (Vit. Alex. iii. 458, 60). Manuel sends his Ambassador Jordan ;
“ Nihilominus quoque petebat ut, quia occasio justa, et tempus opportunum at-
que acceptabile se obtulerat, Romani corona Imperii a sede Apostolica sibi redde-
retur, quoniam non ad Frederici Alamanni, sed ut suum jus asseruit pertinere”
(458). And again, “rogat et postulat, quatenus predictem Ecelesis adversario
Imperii Romani corona privato, eam δἰ δὶ, prout ratio et justitia exigit, restituatis”’
(460). Cf. Godfrey of St. Pantaleon (Freher, Rer. Germ. Scriptt. vol. i.) in A.
1172. ‘Imperator . . . conquestus de Italicis et illis qui partibus favebant
Rulandi, quod coronam Romani Imperii Greco imponere vellent.” (This was
just after the special alliance between Pisa and Constantinople. See Sismondi, ii.
190.) In Kinnamos (lib. iv. pp. 247, 8) we see the same side from the home point
of view. Φρεδερίκῳ τῴ ῥηγὶ ᾿Αλαμανῶν ἐπὶ μέγα ἑκάστοτε τὰ τῆς δυνάμεως
ἐχώρει καὶ ηὔξανεν. .. Φρεδερίκος Ρώμης ἤδη περιγεγονὼς, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ
ἐνεωτέρισε, καὶ δὴ καὶ ᾿Αλέξανδρον τὸν τῇδε ἀρχιερέα τοῦ θῤόνον κατασπάσας,
᾿θκταβιανὸν ἀντεισῆξεν ἐντεῦθεν οἶμαι τοῦ Ῥωμαίων αὐτοκράτορος προσ-
αρμόσειν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀξίωμα οἱηθείς .. .. Φρεδερίκος τῇ αὐτοκράτορος
πάλιν ἐποφθαλμίζων ἀρχῇ, κιτ.λ.

B.C. 394.

Founda-
tion of
Alexan-
dria, 1168.

604 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

More than one embassy was sent from Manuel to Alexander
demanding a Roman Coronation, and though this request was,
as might be expected, always evaded, still the Eastern Emperor
continued, throughout the war, to give important help to every
enemy of his Teutonic rival. That Manuel then was actually
the first mover in the formation of the Lombard League isa
statement which we may readily accept. But if it were so, his
promptings were merely the occasion and not the cause; his
embassies and his gold did but enable the discontented cities to
do a little sooner and a little more effectively what they would
assuredly have done sometime without his help. Manuel caused
the formation of the Lombard League only in the sense in which
the Persian King caused the Corinthian War;! the Italians
received his gold as Aratos received the gold of Ptolemy, as
Algernon Sidney received the gold of Lewis, merely as the con-
tribution of an ally towards a purpose which suited the objects
of both. Anyhow the League,” such as it was, was formed, and
grew, till it included most of the Lombard cities. Pavia indeed
stood firm in her loyalty; but Cremona,’ lately almost as
zealously Imperialist, was not long in embracing the cause of
freedom ; Lodi, small, weak, and isolated, clave to the cause of
her Imperial founder, but, when her existence was perilled, she
unwillingly became a member of the Confederacy. Milan,
destroyed like Mantineia, rose again, like Mantineia, from her
ruins ;° and, as if to repeat every detail of the Arkadian parallel,
the combined powers of the League founded what might seem to
be meant as a Federal city, a second Megalopolis.6 The new
city received the name of Alexandria, in honour of the Pontiff
whose cause was incidentally linked with that of Lombard free-
dom. But Alexandria resembled Megalopolis only in its strategic
position ; it stood as an outpost against Pavia, as Megalopolis
stood as an outpost against Sparta, but it never was meant to
become a Federal capital or a member of a true Federal body in
any shape.

1 Xen. Hell. iii. 5. 1.9. See Grote ix. 400.

2 The Confederacy is at first Veronensis Societas (Vit. Alex. iii. 456), after-
wards Societas Lombardi or Lombardorum, Lombardorun Communitas or Confede-
ratio (ib. 461, 4, 7), Societas Lombardia εἰ Marchie et Verona et Venetia.
(Conventus Venetus ap. Pertz, iv. 151.)

3 Vit. Alex. iii. 456. Acerbus Morena, 1183.

4 See the details in Acerbus Morena, 1135--48.

5 Acerbus Morena, 1135. Otto St. Bl. c. 20, 22. Cf. Ursperg, p. 809.
6 See above, p. 159.

x LOMBARD LEAGUE OF INDIRECT FEDERAL IMPORTANCE 605

For in fact the importance of the Lombard League in Federal Indirect

history is of exactly the same kind as the importance of the importance

Amphiktyonic Council. It is important aimply because it never Lombard
became a Federal Government. Yet its beginnings closely League in

resembled the beginnings of two of the great Federations of Federal
history. The Lombard League was analogous to the union of Aualocy

the Belgic Provinces or the American Colonies before their with

respective Declarations of Independence. The oaths of the rie

Confederate cities may be paralleled with the early acts of the y.tner.
American Congress, with the early engagements among the lands.
Provinces of the Netherlands, such as the separate alliance of
Holland and Zealand,! or the general agreement of all at the 1576.
Pacification of Ghent? ΑἹ] agree in being unions of revolted 1576.
subjects against Princes whose authority, within its lawful bounds,
there was no avowed, and probably no real, intention of shaking

off. All alike are they distinguished from the struggle of the
Peloponnésian towns against Macedonia, where of course no sort

of legal right was acknowledged in the oppressor. The Lombards
indeed guarded the rights of the Prince against whom they were
contending, even more scrupulously than the Americans or the
Netherlanders. The cities agree to maintain strict alliance with

each other, to wage war against the Emperor with their united
forces, to make no peace or truce with him except by common
consent, but all is done with the most careful reservation of their
faith and allegiance to the Empire itself.* The Lombard League,

1 Recueil des Traites, iii. 397.

2 Th. iii. 8366. Motley’s Rise of the Dutch Republic, iii. 85 (ed. 2).

3 This feeling appears strongly in the first beginnings of the League, but it
seems gradually to have been weakened, though the event shows that the idea of
perfect independence of the Empire could never have been reached. The rights
of the Empire are formally reserved on the accession of Cremona and Lodi to the
League. According to Sigonius (1. 14, p. 595) the Confederates describe themselves
to the Cremonese as non Friderico adversaturi, sed communem libertatem adversus
tmmanem prefectorum ejus impotentiam tutaturi, and the agreement with Lodi is
made salva fide Friderico Cesari data (Ib. p. 596). This last fact at least rests
on the sure authority of Acerbus Morena (1143): Fadus . . . salva Imperatoris
fidelitate, sicut palam tunc dicebatur, inierunt. In the oath of the cities in 1167,
given in Moratori’s Antiquitates Italicss (Diss. 48, vol. iv. p. 262), the formal
reservation is not made, but the rights of the Empire are implicitly reserved.
They agree to resist any addition to their obligations as they stood at the accession
of Frederick contra quod velit nos plus fucere quam fecimus a tempore Henrict
Regis usque ad introitum Imperatoris Friderict. This language clearly implies
that some obligations towards the Empire were recognized. Alsoin this oath they
do not bind themselves to make war on the Emperor by name, but only on any
one who may violate their rights, contra omnem hominem quicumque nobiscum
Sacere voluerint guerram aut molum, But in the later oaths they engage to make

Congress
of the

League.

The
League
not a true
Federa-
tion.

606 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

in short, was not a Federal union, even of the laxest kind, it was
a mere temporary agreement of certain cities to employ their
united forces to accomplish a common object. While the war
lasted, the League had its Congress ;! the Rectors? of the Con-
federate cities met, as, in the nature of things, some one must
have met, to arrange the measures to be taken by the Confederacy.
Now and then they seem to have interfered in disputes between
two Confederate cities, to defend the weaker against the stronger.®
But there was no Federal Government, no formation of an united
state, nothing, in short, but an alliance of an unusually close
kind.4 Why then should such an ephemeral union claim any
place in a history of Federalism ? Because, I would answer, it
is instructive to mark the contrast, and the causes of the contrast,
between the subsequent fate of the Lombard, the Belgian, and
the American Confederacies. The early stages of all three were
remarkably alike. But, in the two later cases, a lasting Federal
Government rose out of what was, in its beginning, a mere Con-
federacy fora temporary purpose. At first sight the circumstances
of Italy might seem just as favourable for the formation of such
a Government as the circumstances of America or the Netherlands.
Why then did not a real Federal State grow up out of the
promising elements of the Lombard League such as grew up
out of the elements—at one time not more promising—which
developed into the Belgian and American Confederations ?
Several causes at once present themselves ; one of them indeed

war on him by name, and to make no peace or truce with him, his sons, or his
wife, without the common consent. See Sigonius, pp. 606, 607, 613. Muratori,
Ant. iv. 266,271. I transcribe Muratori’s comment (279): ‘“‘Ceterum antea
Societas Lombardorum propriam tantummodo tutelam in suis foederibus preeferebat,
volebatque illesam fidelitatem Imperatoris. At hic sine ulla tergiversatione ab
eo discedit, atque ipsum ejurat, hostemque decernit. Eum nempe uti depositum
et anathemate perculsum ab Alexandro III. Papa jam tandem omnes exsecra-
antur.” ,

1 Vit. Alex. III. 461. Pontifex . . . ad Lombardos literas et nuntios
festinanter direxit, et eorum dubia et nutantia corda firmavit, ut ex singulis
civitatibus wram discretam et idoneam personam, que vicem generalitatis haberet,
ad ejus presentiam destinarent . ... . Unde factum est quod quidam fideles et
sapientes viri a Lombardorum communitate sunt electi, ete.

2 Ib. 466. Rectores civitatum Lombardie.

3 Cantu (Histoire des Italiens, iv. 558) quotes a case in which the Congress of
the League annulled a sentence of the Consuls of Bellagio to the prejudice of the
people of Civenna and Lamonta. Would they have ventured on such an act of
justice, had the offender been Milan or Verona? This whole chapter of Canta
should be read, especially the remarks on subject districts in p. 563 et seqq.

4 See Sismondi, ii. 184-9. Canta, iv. 531.

x LOMBARD LEAGUE NOT A TRUE FEDERATION 607

lies quite on the surface. Frederick Barbarossa was more under Personal
the dominion of reason than either Philip the Second or George character of
the Third. When Frederick saw that the maintenance of his
claims in their full extent was hopeless, he had the wisdom to
surrender a part in order to save the rest. The Belgian and

the American insurgents had to do with princes who would yield
nothing till they were obliged to yield everything. Thus the
original demand for just and legal government gradually changed

into a demand for total separation. The prudence of Frederick He yields
prevented matters from reaching this stage. But this personal ' time.
difference by no means touches the root of the matter. The Second
Lombard League was renewed against Frederick the Second, by rombard
which time one might have thought that the need of union would j998, ’
have been more strongly felt; but the second League was, if
anything, still furthereremoved from a true Fefleral Government

than the first. It is indeed possible that, had the struggle with
Frederick Barbarossa gone on much longer, the cities might have

been tempted to throw off their allegiance to the Empire altogether.

In that case an united Government of some sort, whether a

League or a national Kingdom, could hardly fail to have taken

its place. As it was, the Imperial power in Italy died out No definite
gradually, without any definite act either of revolt or of abdica- moment
tion at any particular moment. There was therefore no particular tion in
moment when it was clearly imperative to substitute any other Italy.
Government for it. There was therefore no such distinct
opportunity or rather necessity for the formation of a real
Federation in Italy as there was in America and in the Nether-

lands. And, what was of still greater moment, there was not No such
in Italy the same predisposition towards union of any kind which pendency
there was in the other cases. The Lombard cities were in truth ;, Italy
in a position far too: closely resembling that of the old Greek as there
cities to feel the need of union. Their feelings and their patriot- δας i= the
ism were more strictly local than in the Netherlands or in the yrds
American colonies. In Italy we have to do with cities ; in the and in
other two cases with provinces. The Dutch cities indeed retained America.
a most extraordinary amount of independence, still the immediate
component members of the Confederation were not cities but
provinces. Again, the Lombard cities, in the practical abeyance The

of the royal power, had actually exercised all the rights of Lombard
independent sovereignty ; probably no wrong seemed to them really

so great as when the Emperor required them to give up their sovereign ;

the

Dutch and
American
provinces
not 80.

1429-383.

608 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

darling privilege of private war. But the American Colonies had
never possessed any sovereignty at all; and the separate sove-
reignty of the Belgian Counties and Duchies—sovereign at any
time only with the reservation of the rights of the Empire ᾿---
had been altogether lost since their union under the House of
Burgundy. There may have been local jealousies in either case,
but there was nothing like the bitter hatred which reigned
between Milan and Lodi. The American and the Dutch States
had infinitely more to gain than to lose by union; the Italian
cities, like those of old Greece, would have lost by any effective
union all that was dearest to them. In days when the names
of Rome, and Cesar, and Augustus had not yet lost their magic
influence, we can almost believe that a more complete subjection
to the Empire would have been felt as less irksome than the
establishment of a Federal Government stfong enough to deliver
Lombardy from the curse of local warfare. To have preached
Federalism to the Italians of the twelfth century would have
been like preaching it to the Greeks before the days of Alexander.
Indeed it would have been a vainer attempt still, for experience
did at least teach a large portion of Greece the necessity of union,
while Italy never learned the lesson till our own times.

The Lombard League then was a mere Confederacy, a mere
close alliance to obtain a common object ; a Confederacy so close
that it might easily have been developed into a real Confedera-
tion, but which, in point of fact, never was so developed. Asa
Confederacy, it claims our deep admiration for the unity and
vigour with which so many independent cities acted together
during so long a struggle, for the constancy with which they
refused all offers of separate terms, all temptations to break the
ties which bound them to their external allies, the Pope, the
King of Sicily, and the Emperor of the East. It was only when
the war was over, when they had seen Cesar himself fly before
them, that any of the true Lombard cities began to fall away.

1 Of the Crown of France in Flanders ; of the Empire everywhere else.

2 See Vit. Alex. iii. 965, 6, told with much papal partiality. It was however
forbidden for any particular city to make any private agreement with the Eastern
Emperor. See the oaths in Cantu (iv. 516). Ht ego nullam concordiam fect vel
faciam cum imperatore Constantinopolitano. The League might negociate with
Manuel as an external power ; for 8 single city to negociate with him could hardly
fail to involve an admission of his sovereignty, which would be at once
dangerous for the other cities, and inconsistent with the rights which they still
acknowledged in the Western Eniperor.

x POLICY OF VENICE 609

Venice indeed seems to have put a laxer interpretation on her Peculiar
engagements ; but then Venice stood in quite a different position, Policy of
and was actuated by quite a different spirit, from the cities of *°"™
the mainland. Venice did not scruple to aid Frederick the Siege of
enemy of the League against Manuel its ally, when Frederick Ancona,
attacked, and Manuel defended, her commercial rival Ancona.}
Perhaps, as Ancona was not a member of the League, the island

city did not actually violate the letter of any engagement ; still

her conduct at least displayed something like sharp practice on

the part of her merchant princes.

The details of the war are matter of Italian history. At one Course of
time, before the decisive stroke which ended the war, there ‘?¢ ΤΑΣ.
seemed a fair hope of settling matters by peaceful negociation. Siege of
Frederick had failed—the only failure in his life which can be ajexan-
called disgraceful—before the mud walls of Alexandria. A dria,
pitched battle seemed impending between the Imperial army and !174-5-
the forces of the League. But, gallantly as they had resisted him
when he appeared as an aggressor beneath their walls, the
Italians still shrank from meeting their King and Emperor as an
enemy on the open field. Negociations were opened ; each side
was ready, saving its own rights, to entrust its cause to the nooocia-
decision of chosen commissioners.? " The question to be debated tions be-
would of course have been as to the extent of the Imperial rights, tween the
as no one denied the Emperor's possession of some rights. ΑΒ andthe
far then as Frederick and the cities were concerned there seems Cities
no reason why the disputed points might not have been settled (1175)
then as well as nine years later. That they were not so settled
seems to have been no fault either of the Emperor or of the
Republics. Possibly indeed Frederick was not yet humbled
enough to make such concessions as he afterwards made. But
it was neither by King nor Commonwealth that the negociations broken off
were actually broken off; the cities might have made terms with by the
Cesar, but the Church was unwilling to make terms with the Legates,
schismatic.2 The war was renewed; the next year saw the

1 Kinnamos, p. 314. Otto St. B. c. 20. Sismondi (ii. 195) seems to me to
attach far too much value to the account of the siege by Buoncampagno (in
Muratori’s sixth volume), a rhetorical critic of the next century, to whose rhetoric
he now and then adds a touch of his own.

2 Vit. Alex. iii. 465. See the text of the Concordia Imperatoris et Societatis
Lombardia in Pertz, iv. 145. .

3 Alex. iii. 466. Cf. Rad. Mil. 1192. Romuald, 216.

28

Battle of
LEGNANO,
defeat of
Frederick,
1176.

Change in
Frederick's
policy,
Negocia-
tions for
Peace,
1176-7.

Frederick
reconciled

610 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP,

famous fight of Legnano, where, for perhaps the only time since
the days of old Roman conquest, the Italian overcame the
German in the open field. Not sheltered by ramparts, not
strengthened by auxiliaries, the forces of some half-dozen
Lombard cities, gathered round the carroccio of Milan, put to
flight the armies of the Roman Empire.! Cesar himself was left
to skulk, unattended, and, like Aratos,? already mourned as dead,
to the shelter of his still faithful Pavia. Frederick now knew
that he was vanquished ; the plans of more than twenty years
were utterly shattered; from that day he no more drew his
sword against Italian freedom; he confined his exertions to
securing by diplomatic skill as large a portion as he could of his
disputed rights. Then followed long negociations which we have
the advantage of having narrated in detail by an eye-witness
and principal actor.2 A year earlier the cities had seemed
less inflexible than the Church; now that Frederick was pre
pared to renounce his schism, Alexander did not escape the
charge of forsaking the cause of the cities. In that famous and
much misrepresented interview at Venice, Frederick received
absolution from Alexander and came to terms with his temporal
enemies. He concluded a separate peace with Venice,® as an
independent power, and the Republic thereby incurred some ill-
will on the part of the Lombards for what was held to be a
desertion of her allies.’ He also concluded a truce for fifteen
years with the King of Sicily, and entered into negociations
with the Lombard League.® The cities set forth their claims ;
they were ready to acknowledge in the Emperor all such rights
as had been held by his predecessor Henry the Fifth. These

1 Vit. Alex. iii, 467. Rad. Mil. 1192. Otto St. B.c. 23. The Ursperg
Chronicle (p. 310) has a curious euphemism. Imperator rursus impugnare

, cepit Lombardos, commissumque est preelium inter eos prid. kal. Julii. De

quo tamen sine victoria recessum est,

2 See above, p. 310.

3 Rom. Sal. 217-240. This Prelate was the Ambassador from the King of
Sicily at the Congress.

ὁ Rad. Mil. 1193. Deserendo fidem quam Longobardis promiserat.

5 The strange Venetian fables about this interview are refuted by Sismondi
(ii. 227) and Raumer (ii. 218). They are accepted by Daru (Hist. de Venise,
lib. iii. c. 18), and revived by Cantu (iv. 552).

6 See the text of Pax cum Venetis in Pertz, iv. 151.

7 Rom. Sal. 222. Lombardi autem e diverso suspectos habebant Venetos,
asserentes illos pacis cum iis initee foedera violasse, et sepe Imperatoris nuncios
contra hoc quod statutum inter eos fuerat recepisse. This of course includes
earlier breaches of the engagement, as in the case of Ancona. See above, p. 609.

8 See Pertz, iv. 151-7.

x TRUCE BETWEEN FREDERICK AND THE LEAGUE 611

rights they seem to have limited to the personal services and
personal gifts which were usual when the King of Germany
came to claim the Italian crown at Milan and the Imperial
crown at Rome.! They claim, on the other hand, to retain their
League with one another, and to retain the fortifications of their
cities ; the right to choose their own consuls they do not claim
—they seem to have so completely taken it for granted. This
was asking more than Frederick was at once prepared to yield ;
peace was not made, but a truce for six years was agreed on Truce for

between the Lombard League on one side, and the Emperor and we years
the princes and cities of his party on the other.2 And, now 4. kn.

that the war was over, the Emperor regained his advantage ; the peror and
magic of the Imperial name, the attraction of Frederick's personal the renee,
character, began again to do their work. More than one city of

the League forsook the common cause, and made private terms Various

with its now gracious and placable sovereign. Cremona had cities join
turned to its Imperialist loyal before the C f Cremona
returned to its Imperialist loyalty even before the Uongress Of Cremona,

Venice. And, in the interval between the truce and the final 1176.
peace, Tortona, which Frederick had destroyed, and which had Tortona,
been rebuilt in defiance of his power ;* Alexandria, whose very
existence was a standing record of enmity to his cause, were

both admitted to Imperial favour. Alexandria, the city of the 1o"Tigs,
patriotic Pontiff, submitted to be formally refounded, and to

receive from her Imperial parent the name of Cesarea.® At

1 See Rom. Sal. 221 et seqq. and the Petitio Societatis in Pertz, iv. 169. On
the Royal rights see Raumer, v. 78, and Cant, iv. 509. Frederick’s agents
demanded the rights as they stood under Henry the Fourth (Third of Italy), but
the Italians insisted on the standard of Henry the Fifth, Henricus posterior,
postremus (Pertz, 151, 169), a description which evades the difference between
Italian and German reckoning. They rejected Henry the Fourth as a tyrant and
schismatic. — Item Imperator Henricus (salva auctoritate Imperit) non debet
Dominus sed Tyrannus vocart, etc. Rom. Sal. 223.

2. See the Treuga cum Lombardis, Pertz, iv. 155.

3 Vit. Alex. iii. 469. In diebus illis Cremona respiciens retro absque grava-
mine turpiter dejerando a confcederatione aliarum civitatum impudenter recessit,
et ad Imperatorem non sine magna infamia se convertit ; unde indignationem
Ecclesiae et aliorum Lombardorum odium et inimicitiam juste incurrit. The
Reconciliatio Cremone in 1186 (Pertz, iv. 183) must not be confounded with
this. It belongs to much later events, which will be found in Sicard’s Chronicle,
603, and Sismondi, ij. 620.

4 See the Reconciliatio Terdone, Pertz, iv. 165. The Cardinal of Aragon
(Vit. Alex. iii. u.s.) goes on to say, ‘‘Terdona quoque non post multum temporis
id ipsum reprehensibiliter fecit, et eadem infamia contumeliose se involvit.” It
is clear, however, that an interval of seven years, including the whole negocia-
tions at Venice, came between the reconciliation of Cremona and that of Tortona.

5 Sigonius (p. 632) places the reconciliation of Alexandria in 1184 after the

Peace of
Constanz,
1183.

The treaty
takes the
form of a
pardon,

612 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

last, terms of peace were agreed on in a negociation at Placentia,)
which led -to the final conclusion of the Peace of Constanz, that
famous Charter which closes the great volume of the Civil Law.?
It shows how great was the abiding influence of the Imperial
name that this treaty, concluded by a prince with rebellious
subjects, by whom he had been defeated in battle, and to whom
he yielded all their most important demands, was at last drawn
up in the form of a pardon. The merciful Emperor extends his
grace to certain cities which had offended him, and he grants
them certain rights and privileges of his Imperial favour. But

Peace of Constanz, and the same date is given in Pertz, iv. 181. But as Cesarea
is reckoned among the allies of the Emperor at the Peace (see Pertz, iv. 180 and
note), Sismondi (ii. 242) is doubtless right in placing it in 1183.

The change of name from Alexandria to Cesarea may be likened to the
changes from Mantineia to Antigoneia, from Sikydn to Démétrias, and from
Thebes to Philippopolis. See above, pp. 279, 386, 430, 464, note 1. None of
these changes seems to have been permanent. New Amsterdam, however, has
kept its name of New York.

1 See Pertz, iv. 167-175.

2 It is to be found at the end of the Corpus Juris Civilis, Amsted. 1668 ; also
in Pertz, iv. 175. Cf. Sigonius, 629.

5. The Charter begins thus: Imperialis clementis mansueta serenitas’ eam
semper in subditis suis dispensationem favoris et gratie habere consuevit, ut
quamvis districta severitate excessuum delicta debeat et possit corrigere, magis
tamen studeat propitia tranquillitate pacis et piis affectibus misericordie Romanum
Imperium regere et rebellium insolentiam ad debitam fidem et debite devotionis
obsequium revocare. Ea propter cognoscat universitas fidelium Imperii tam
presentis statis quam successure posteritatis, quod nos solita benignitatis nostre
gratia ad fidem et devotionem Lombardorum qui aliquando nos et Imperium
nostrum offenderant, viscera innate nobis pietatis aperientes, eos et Societatem
eorum et fautores in plenitudinem gratiz nostre recepimus, offensas omnes et
culpas quibus nos ad indignationem provocaverant clementer eis remittentes, eos-
que propter fidlelia devotionis suz servitia que nos ab eis credimus certissime
recepturos, in numero dilectorum fidelium nostrorum computandos censemus.
Pacem itaque nostram quam eis clementer indultam concessimus, presenti pagina
jussimus subterscribi, et auctoritatis nostre sigillo communiri.

It is almost more amusing to mark the high Imperialist tone of the Swiss
writer Tschudi in the sixteenth century. A Landamman of Glarus might have
been expected to sympathize with the Confederates, but the Swabian blood and
speech were too strong in him. He tells the tale thus :

‘Anno Domini 1183 hielt Keiser Fridrich Barbarossa ein grossen Richstag
sambt sinem Sun Kiinig Heinrichen dem Sechsten zu Costenz in der fiirnam-
bisten Statt Alamanniw und beschreib daselbshin alle Fiirsten, und namhafftisten
in ganzem Lamparten, ouch aller desselben Lands-Stetten fiirnimiste vollmiichtige
Gewalthaber und Rats-Botten, dass Si allda Im und sinem Sun buldetind von des
Richs wegen. Also warend Si gehorsam, erscheinend alle zu ingehndem Christ-
monat December genant, und schwurind Inen nachfolgenden Eidt, wie Si von
Recht und alter Gewonheit zu tun schuldig warend den Rémischen Keisern und
Kiinigen.” Tschudi, Chron. Helveticum, i. 90. (Basel, 1734.)

The Abbot of Ursperg, nearer the time, lets out a little more. ‘‘Eo tempore

x THE PEACE OF CONSTANZ 618

these rights and privileges extended to an entire abolition of all but
direct sovereignty on the part of the Emperor. From this *mounted
moment the King of Italy became a mere external suzerainty to -naer
his Lombard subjects, and, in the course of less than a hundred of all

years, his very suzerainty died away. Frederick recognized the direct
complete internal independence of the Lombard commonwealths ; ! reignty.

they were to choose their own Consuls; the Consuls, however,
and all the citizens, were to swear allegiance to the Emperor,”
and in the more important civil causes there was to be an appeal
from the magistrates of the cities to the Emperor or the Judge
whom he should appoint. Further than this, the royal rights
were limited to the ancient services due on the Imperial progress
to Rome. On the other hand, the cities retained the right of
fortification, and the Lombard League was to be retained and
renewed 5 as often as its members thought good. The League is
distinctly recognized as a contracting power—somewhat more
distinctly in the oath of allegiance‘ than in the lofty language
of the Charter itself. Still every magistrate and every citizen
recognizes Frederick and his successors as Emperors and Kings ;
they will bear them true allegiance ; they will reveal all plots

jam bellis nimis fatigatus Imperator, Lombardis omnibus condixit curiam apud
Constantiam ubi Principes et potestates eorum se representaverunt, et pacta
quedam de faciendo servitio Imperatori de singulis civitatibus Lombardie ibidem
statuta sunt, que adhuc dicunt se tenere in scriptis nec ad serviendum ultra hec
compelli volunt. Sicque pax reformata est’’ (p. 311).

1 This is clearly the effect of the first two clauses of the Charter. 1. ‘‘ Con-
cedimus vobis, civitatibus, locis, et personis Societatis, regalia et consuetudines
vestras tam in civitate quam extra civitatem, . . . videlicet ut in ipsa civitate
omnia habeatis sicut hactenus habuistis vel habetis. 2. Extra vero omnes con-
suetudines sine contradictione nostra exerceatis, quas ab antiquo exercuistis vel
exercetis. 3. Scilicet... in exercitu, in munitionibus civitatum, in jurisdictione
tam in criminalibus caussis quam in pecuniariis, intus et extra, et in ceteris que
ad commoditatem spectant civitatum.”

2 This oath might easily sink into a mere form, or, at most, would only
exclude violent and avowed enemies of the Empire. The essential power of
choice remained to the cities. Frederick’s own claim, in the days of his power,
had been much wider. Ab omnibus judicatum et recognitum est in singulis
civitatibus Potestates, Consules, ceterosque magistratus assensu populi per ipsum
{[Imperatorem] creari debere. Rad. Fris. 111, 6. But even this allowed the
citizens some share, though it is not clear what, in the choice of their magistrates.

3 Clause 20, 28. Sigonius (p. 637) describes the renewal of the oaths“%wo
years later.

4 Pertz, iv. 180. Pacem Domini Friderici Imperatoris et filii ejus Regis
Heinrici et sue partis factam cum Soctetate Lombardorum, et civitatibus ejua
Societatis. This makes the League, as a League, far more prominent than it is
in the passages already quoted. A body so spoken of was surely on the high road
to becoming a real Federation if the need of union had been felt in the least.

The
Second
Lombard

League
1228,

The First
League
primarily
political.

1159.

614 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

against them; they will preserve to them the crown of the
Empire and of the Kingdom ;! if they should lose either, they
will help them to recover it. But all these obligations were, as
the terms of the Charter itself show, consistent with practical
independence on all those points on which independence was
prized most dearly. By the Peace of Constanz the kingdom of
Italy, in the old sense, was reduced to a mere name, and no
wa Republic, no national monarchy, was substituted for it.

As the importance of the Lombard League in Federal history
is so purely negative, it is hardly necessary to follow out its
career, when it was revived in the next century against Eredar
thamGecord.? I have dwelt on its first period at some length,
because it seemed important to show how a real Federal system
might arise, or might fail to arise, out of circumstances very
closely analogous. The Peace of Constanz took away all excuse
for the formation of any central Government; each city gained
the acknowledgement of that full local sovereignty which it
prized far more dearly, without giving up its formal allegiance
to the Prince whose lofty titles Italy still reverenced. A true
Federal Government therefore never arose in Italy. In the next
century we again find a Lombard League fighting against an
Emperor and on the side of a Pope. But the circumstances of
all three are greatly altered. The struggle of the twelfth century
was primarily a struggle for freedom ; the ecclesiastical question
came in only as something quite accessory. Though the League
itself was not formed so soon, yet the war began before Frederick
had any dissensions with the Church at all. That, in a disputed
election to the Popedom, the Emperor took one side, and the
cities another, was the natural result of their several positions,
but the quarrel had in no sort an ecclesiastical origin. In short,
Frederick Barbarossa was an enemy of the Roman Church only

1 Pertz, iv. 180. ‘ Honorem corona,” Coronam Imperit vel Regni. The still
more distinct phrase, Regnum Italie et homorem corone, which occurs in the
separate oath of Tortona (Pertz, iv. 166), does not occur in the general oath
imposed by the Charter.

2 It is worth notice however that, in the reconciliation between Frederick and
the Lombard cities (Pertz, iv. 258), while the Lombards themselves set forth the
League strongly as a whole (Reclores Societatis Lombardia, Marchie, Romaniole
totaque ipsa Societas), the Emperor seems to recognize them only as separate
cities— Quidam de civitatibus, locis, et personis de Lombardia, Marchia ¢
Romaniola. This is quite in harmony with Frederick’s policy in his German
Kingdom, which I shall have to speak of hereafter.

x FIRST AND SECOND LOMBARD LEAGUES COMPARED 615

in so far as he attached himself to the Pontiff, who in the end

failed to be successful. But the strife between Frederick the

Second and the successive Popes, Gregory the Ninth and Inno- The Second
cent the Fourth, was primarily an ecclesiastical strife. The Pontiffs League
did not ally themselves with cities which had already revolted ; Scctesiag.
they rather stirred the cities up to revolt for their own purposes.! tical.

In fact while, in the twelfth century, Italian unity, or an approach

to it, would have been best found in a Confederation of Republics,

in the thirteenth century the fairest hope for Italy seemed to lie

in union under the sceptre of Frederick or of his son. This Union of
union was hindered by Papal ambition ; the result was a period [aly under
of unrivalled glory for three or four fortunate Republics, com- o, Manfred
bined with the handing over of Southern Italy to a foreign hindered
invader and of Northern Italy to domestic tyrants. Venice, Py the
Florence, Genoa, Pisa were far greater, far more glorious, as Good and
independent Commonwealths, than they ever could have been as evil which
cities of an Italian Kingdom or even of an Italian League. But el union
the worst cemented Italian League, the worst governed Italian have
Kingdom, would at least have relieved Milan and Naples and prevented.
countless smaller cities from the far worse oppression of the

Visconti, the Angevin, and the Spaniard. The truth is that the Italian —
idea of Italian nationality is an idea of purely modern growth ; tionality
it is an idea which has arisen only through the experience of
long ages of foreign oppression and internal discord. The cause idea.

of Italian union is one to which every lover of freedom must

wish Godspeed in our own times, but we shall read history

wrong if we carry back the conception, or any inferences derived

from it, into the days of the Hohenstaufen. Italian patriotism,

like old Greek patriotism, was felt only for a city and not for a

nation. The days of Macedonian dominion taught Greece the

need of Union ; the longer ages of French, Spanish, and Austrian
oppression have at last taught the same lesson to the Italy of

our own day. But, long after Greece was comparatively united,

the Macedonian still held the Fetters of Greece,? and they were
wrested from his grasp only to be handed over to the stronger

hand of Rome. And, now that one realm stretches from the

Alps to the Libyan Sea, a baser oppressor than Antigonos or 1849-63.
Philip still holds the Fetters of Italy. Let us hope that the day

may yet come when Italy shall recover her own, not by the gift

1 See Sismondi, ii. 474-7, iii. 1 et seqq. 2 See above, p. 484.

Question
of Italian
Confedera-
tion or
Consolida-
tion.

Italian
Federation
discredited

Argu-
ments on
behalf of
Federalism
in Italy.

616 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP.

of another Flamininus, but by the might of a strong arm and a
righteous cause.

One word more before I take leave of Italian history. From
my point of view, the question can hardly fail to present itself
whether a Federal Union, instead of a consolidated Kingdom,
would not have been the proper form for the regenerate Italy of
our own times. For the practical statesmen it is enough to
answer that the Italians, who alone have the right to decide the
question, have already decided it otherwise. But this answer
is hardly enough for the political historian. That the name of
Federalism has a bad odour in Italy no one can wonder ; for the
word has passed through the lips of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte.
When Italy was striving to be united, her bitterest enemy, like
Kallias of old, preached up a sham Federation as a means of
perpetuating weakness and disunion. And, repulsed as he was
at the time, the Tyrant seems never to have quite given up this
darling scheme of mischief ; his pamphleteers have ever and anon
brought it forward again as what, in their detestable jargon, is
called “the Solution of the Italian Question.” Of course, from
the day when the betrayer of Italy proposed an Italian Con-
federation, with the Pope at its head, and the Austrian for one
of its members, the very name of Federalism has been utterly
discredited in Italy. But all who have ever spoken or dreamed
of an Italian Confederation must not be involved jn his con-
demnation. Long before Magenta and Solferino, long before the
freedom of Milan and Florence had been purchased by the
bondage of Savoy, while all Italy, save the little realm of Pied-
mont, groaned under foreign or domestic tyrants, an Italian Con-
federation was the cherished hope of some of Italy’s warmest
friends. The historic greatness of her cities, the wide diversities

. among her several provinces, the difference in feelings, manners,

Arguments
against it.

and even language, between Sicily, Rome, Tuscany, Venice, and
Piedmont, all pointed to a Federal Union as the natural form
for Italian freedom to assume. It seemed, on every ground, to
be the form of unity under which Italy might look for the
highest amoynt of internal prosperity and contentment. On
the other hand stood the question, whether the greater strength
of a consolidated Government might not be needed to resist the
brute force of Austria and the hypocritical friendship of France.
1 See Oxford Essays.

x ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST FEDERALISM IN ITALY 617

Between these two opposing arguments, the Italians, who alone

had the right to choose, have made their choice, and those who

once hoped for a Federal Union of Italy have no right to com- The
plain. It may be indeed that, when they see the difficulty with qestion
which the several provinces are welded together, when they see by the
the jealousies aroused among the great Italian cities as to the will of the
choice of a capital among them, they may be tempted to think Italians.
that, after all, something was to be said on behalf of a scheme

by which these difficulties at least would have been altogether
avoided. But it is too late to recommend an Italian Federation

now ; Italy has chosen to be a consolidated State, and she must
improve and develope herself as such. The rule with which I set Federalism
out! here applies. Federalism is in its place whenever it appears 9° longer
in the form of more perfect union ; it is out of place whenever (PoP
it appears in the form of separation of what is already more Italy ;
closely united. But it is not too late to say that the true policy

of the Italian Kingdom will be to approach as near to the
Federal type as a Consolidated state can approach. It should but Local
keep as far as possible from the deadening system of French j10ePer-
centralization ; it should give every province, every city, évery sti its
district, the greatest amount of local independence consistent true
with the common national action of the whole realm. Naples Policy.
and Florence and Milan must not be allowed for a moment to

feel themselves in bondage to an upstart rival like Turin. It is

only by establishing perfect equality, and therefore perfect local
independence, through every corner of his realm that the King

of Piedmont can grow into a true King of Italy, or can make

good his claim to a yet more glorious title. For we must hope

that the Tyrant of the West may one day pass away along with Future
his Barbarian fellow, and that the Old and the New Rome may rest Oration
alike open their gates to the chosen Princes of free peoples. Then Empire.
will the title which has been too long degraded by the impostors

of Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Elba, Mexico, Brazil, and Hayti

pass of right to the true successor of Charles, of Berenger, and

of Frederick. And none will be more ready than those who

once looked forward to a Confederate Italy, once more to wish

Life and Victory to an Augustus crowned by God, a King of

Italy and Emperor of the Romans.

1 See above, pp. 83-85.
2 See National Review, January 1861, p. 68.

Influence
of the
Empire on
Germany.

The three
Imperial
Kingdoms.

FRAGMENT
OF THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY

A CONSIDERATION of those imperfect approaches to Federal
Union, which are all that the later history of Italy contains, has
involved some mention of the great central point of all mediseval
history, the continued existence of the Roman Empire.! And
the great Imperial idea, without a full understanding of which
all medieval history is nothing but an insoluble puzzle, has had
an effect on the destinies of Germany even more important and
more permanent than the effect which it has had on the destinies
of Italy. The German Kingdom and the Roman Empire were
indeed at all times distinguishable in idea. But, from the days
of Charles the Great onwards, the history of the two institutions
cannot be separated, and, long before the final dissolution of
both, the Empire and the Kingdom had come to be two inappro-
priate names for something which had become quite different from
either. In the full-grown conception of the medieval Empire,
three Kingdoms were inseparably attached to the Imperial
Crown. The Emperor of the Romans was of necessity King of
Germany, of Italy, and of Burgundy. Four separate corona-
tions? were needed to put the chosen King and Cesar in full

1 Since my last chapter was written, the whole subject of the Joly Roman
Empire has been treated with wonderful power and clearness in Mr. Bryce’s
volume bearing that name, a volume which originally grew out of an Oxford
Prize Essay. To that volume, as the best—indeed the only—English exposition
of the whole matter, I refer once for all. I had myself, before Mr. Bryce’s book
appeared, dealt with several portions of the subject in various articles in the
(now defunct) National Review, to some of which I have referred in earlier
chapters. I would also venture to refer to a review of Mr. Bryce’s book in the
North British Review for February 1865. I had once dreamed of attempting the
History of the Western Empire as a distinct work, but I am glad to leave so
great a subject in younger hands.

2 At Aachen for Germany, at Monza for Italy, at Arles for Burgundy, at Rome

for the Empire. The Burgundian coronation however was commonly omitted.
Frederick Barbarossa however was crowned at Arles in 1178 (Vit. Alex. III. ap.

FRAGMENT THE THREE IMPERIAL KINGDOMS 619

possession of all his realms. But the constitutional relations of

the three Kingdoms to the Empire differed from one another,

and the historical destinies of the three Kingdoms differed more

widely still. Germany was the hearth and home of the Empire. Germany

The German King, elected by German Princes only, claimed the

crowns of the Empire and of the two other Kingdoms by virtue

of that sole election. Italy was a distinct, in some sort a de- Italy,

pendent Kingdom ;! the King of Germany, as such, assumed

the Crown of Italy as his right, and, as King of Italy, presided

in Italian Diets wholly distinct from those of his native King-

dom. In Italy therefore the Imperial power gradually died out,

without any formal separation of the Kingdom from the Empire.

Emperors who were strangers to the soil of Italy, and who never

permanently resided within her borders, gradually ceased to

exercise any effective authority over their Italian Kingdom.

The Kingdom of Italy thus split asunder, and in its stead there

arose a system of independent principalities and commonwealths,

not united by the bond of any common Assembly, nor owning

any common head or centre, whether Federal or monarchic.

The Kingdom of Burgundy,* whose connexion with Germany and

was in theory far closer than that of Italy, split asunder also, Burgundy.

but in a somewhat different way. Most of its provinces gradually

fell away from the Empire by annexation, formal or practical, to

some other power—the Kings of Paris taking the lion’s share.

But those Burgundian States which still remained attached to Closest

the Empire were in some measure incorporated with the German Uru

Kingdom. No Burgundian Prince indeed held the rank of Germany

Elector, but those who retained their allegiance to the Empire and i
urgundy,.

Murat. tom. iii. p. 447), and so, strange to say, was Charles the Fourth (1365).
The four seats of Empire are well described by Godfrey of Viterbo (Murat.
vii. 418) : .

ἐς Scribere vera volens, quot sint loca prima corone,
Quatuor Imperii sedes video ratione,
Nomina proponam, sicut et acta sonant.
Primus Aquisgrani locus est, post hee Arelati,
Inde Modoétiz regali sede locari,
Post solet Italie: summa corona dari.
Cesar Romano cum vult,diademate fungi,
Debet Apostolicis manibus reverenter inungi."

1 The different positions of Italy and Burgundy are well explained by Piitter.
2 See above, p. 24. For the various uses of the word Burgundy, see Mr.
Bryce’s Appendix.

Counexion
between
Germany
and the
Empire
growing
into
identity.

620 THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY Frac-

retained with it their seats and votes! in that Assembly which
might now be looked upon indifferently as representing either
the Roman Empire or the German Kingdom. But ‘the third
Imperial realm, the German Kingdom itself, the Regnum Teutons-
cum, the Kingdom of the East-Franks, underwent a very
different fate. Its connexion with the Empire was, from the
beginning, closer than that of either of the other Kingdoms, and
this close connexion gradually grew into identity. As Burgundy
and Italy fell away, the Roman Empire of the West became
identified with the German speech and the German nation, just
as, by the loss of Egypt, Syria, Africa, and Latin Italy, the
Roman Empire of the East became identified with the Greek
speech and the Greek nation. After the great Interregnum of
the thirteenth century, the Emperor of the Romans remained
simply a German King, who, once in his reign, travelled out of
his realm to receive a ceremonial exaltation which added not a
jot to his real power. He might even omit the journey and the
ceremony altogether, and the only consequence was that he
remained only King of the Romans, and did not venture to
assume the title of Emperor. From the sixteenth century on-
wards journey and ceremony were permanently disused, and the
King of Germany, by virtue of his German election and German
coronation, received the formal title of Emperor-Elect,? the
popular title of Emperor without any qualification at all. The
Empire, thus become conterminous with the German Kingdom,
was driven to express the anomaly of its twofold position,
practical and formal, by that most paradoxical and yet most
accurate description—“ The Holy Roman Empire of the German
Nation.”

With the Holy Roman Empire, distinctly as an Empire,
the historian of Federal Government has no concern. But,

1 Thus, for instance, the County of Burgundy, the inheritance of the Empress
Beatrice, remained formally an Imperial fief till its final annexation by France in
1679. But, held as it was successively by the Kings of France, the Dukes of
Burgundy, and the Kings of Spain, its connexion with the Empire was very
slight for several centuries. Savoy again always remained an Imperial fief, but
its connexion in various ways with Italy, France, and Switzerland was much
more important than its allegiance to the Empire. Of that large part of the
Burgundian Kingdom which was gradually incorporated with the Swiss Con-
federation I shall speak elsewhere. But even Allies of the Confederation, such
as the Bishop of Basel, retained their position as members of the Empire down to
the wars of the French Revolution.

3 ‘* Hrwihlter Rimischer Kaiser,” ‘‘ Romanorum Imperator electus.””

MENT THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION 621

indirectly, the position of the Empire has had no small share in
producing a state of things which the Federal historian cannot
leave unnoticed. Germany, at the present hour, calls itself a The
Confederation ; its Princes and Commonwealths profess to be German
united by a Federal tie. That tie is, even in theory, a very lax Liontedera-
one ; what it has become in practice Germany and the world .
know too well. At the very best, the German Confederation
is no Bundesstaat—the German language alone can express the
distinction! in a single word—but only a Staatenbund of the a lax
laxest kind. Still a Staatenbund it does profess to be; it has
Federal Laws, administered by a Federal Diet, to whose authority, ὅπ τ;
within its own competence, every member of the League is, in
theory, bound to yield obedience. That the mass of the German
States are practically dependent on two of their own number, its theory
does not affect the Federal theory ; every interference of Austria 924 us
or Brandenburg with the lawful authority of the German Diet ee
is, in Federal theory, as undoubted rebellion? as the secession of
Messéné or the secession of South Carolina. Small as is the
competence of the Federal power in Germany, within that com-
petence it is as much entitled to the loyal obedience of every
member of the League as the Federal powers of Achaia, America,
or Switzerland. Germany then, in its present state, is a
phznomenon which an historian of Federalism cannot pass by.
It forms an essential, though a secondary, part of his subject, if
only to point out the difference between its awkwardly con-
stituted arrangements and the better ordered Federal systems of Peculiari-
other lands. And here two important differences present them- ties of the
selves between the German Confederation and any other Con- oe
federation on record. First, the mass of its members are not tion.
Commonwealths but Principalities. Secondly, it arose, not, like First, —
other Confederations, through States which had once been more TO! ἴα
widely separated seeking a closer union, but through States are princi-
which had once been more closely connected gradually falling palities.
apart. In both these respects, but especially in the latter, the “cnt:
present condition of the modern German Confederation has been from the
largely influenced by the history of the defunct Holy Roman eae
Empire.

These two peculiarities are closely connected with each other ; united
indeed the first may be looked on as, in some sort, a result of State.

1 See above pp. 8, 9. 2 See above, p. 89,

Process of
disunion
in Ger-
many.

622 THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY Frac-

the second. A Confederation, as I have already remarked,!
stands at an intermediate point between a system of wholly
independent States, and a consolidated Kingdom or Common-
wealth—in German political language, an Einhettsstaat. In theory,
it is clear that this middle point may be approached alike
from either extreme; but while, in all other cases, the middle
point of Confederation has been reached by detached units
making advances towards closer union, Germany has reached it
by the opposite process of members of an once more united body
detaching themselves partially, but not wholly, from the central
power.” All other Confederations have been formed by the
union of previously independent States ;* the German Con-
federation alone has been formed by the dissolution of the

- German Kingdom. Long before that Kingdom was formally

dissolved, the relation between its several members had become

Y much more truly a Federal one than anything else, and this fact

Germany
really a
Federation
from the
Peace of
West-
phalia,
A.D. 1648-
1806. ᾿

was ever and anon revealed to the world, either by the indus-
trious researches of a native jurist,‘ or by the insolent plainness
of speech of a foreign conqueror.5 From the Peace of West-
phalia onwards the Kingdom of Germany was in truth no King-
dom, but a Confederation, and that a very lax Confederation.
The princes and commonwealths which composed it possessed
and exercised independent powers at least as extensive as those

1 See above, pp. 69, 79.

2 Of course, at the actual moment when the present Federal compact was
drawn up, the powers which united to form it were, in theory, absolutely inde-
pendent. At that particular moment no common tie, Imperial or Federal, held
them together. But the beginnings of the German Confederation must be looked
for, as we shall soon see, in much earlier times. The years between 1806 and
1814 must be looked on as an anomalous period, like the Athenian ἀναρχία,
interposed between two periods of regular order. The final establishment of the
Confederation in 1814 was the natural sequence of the dissolution of the Empire
in 1806, and, in point of fact, the dissolution of the Empire was actually followed
(or, more accurately, preceded and caused) by the establishment of a professed
Federal system in the shape of the elder Buonaparte’s Rheinbund.

3 The States of the American Union were, in theory, absolutely independent
during the ideal interval between their rejection of British authority and their
union in a Federal body. The States of Achaia and Switzerland had of course
been historically, as well as theoretically, independent. And the Federal Union
did historically bring the American States into a much closer union than existed
in the Colonial period when they had no tie but that of a common dependence.

4 See the very remarkable chapter in Piitter’s Teutsche Staatsverfassung,
vol. iii. p. 156, especially pp. 159, 161.

5 See Buonaparte's Supplement to the Act of Formation of the Rheinbund :
“Ye lien fédératif (between the States of the Empire) n’offrit plus de garantie a
personne,” etc., etc.

MENT ORIGIN OF THE GERMAN KINGDOM 623

possessed by a Dutch Province or a Swiss Canton.! The only
difference was that the German Confederation still continued to
give to ita elective President the sounding titles of King and
Emperor, Cesar and Augustus, titles which, while they gave
him the first place among the princes of the earth, clothed him v
with less real power than was held by a Dutch Stadtholder.
The Acts of 1806 and of 1814 were in truth only the formal
acknowledgements of a state of things which had practically
existed ever since 1648, and the germs of which may be seen
centuries earlier.

In truth the disunion of Germany has lasted so long, the The
authority of its central power, Imperial or Federal, has so long Kingdom
been hardly more than nominal, that men in general find a diffi- οἱ Gere
culty in understanding that these severed states, feebly united
by a feudal or Federal tie, are merely the scattered members of
an once united Kingdom. It is hard to make men believe that
_ there was a time when the Kingdom of Germany was as united Compari-
as contemporary England, far more united than contemporary 59} with
France. The three countries, in short, started from nearly the England
same point, and have diverged in three different directions. France,
The Kingdom of England was formed by the gradual welding
together of various independent, though kindred principalities.

The King of the West-Saxons obtained a certain external supre- 800-886.
macy over his neighbours: a dependent King of Mercia or
Northumberland succeeded an independent one. In the next 878-954.
stage the dependent King gave way to an Earl, possessing vast

local authority, but still a subject, though often a turbulent sub-

ject, of the one King of the English. The Kingdom of the Origin
Franks, the Empire of Charles the Great, was formed by nearly of the
the same process. Dukes of Saxony and Bavaria, of Burgundy Kingdom,
and Aquitaine, succeeded to the ancient Kings; or, if the royal 483-888.
dignity was allowed to survive, it was confined to princes of the

royal house, who held their dependent Kingdoms as appanages

with the head of the family and the Empire.? Eastern and

1 The Confederations of Switzerland, America, and the United Provinces, are
the analogies specially chosen by Piitter to illustrate the constitution of the
Empire. Switzerland and America were then (1786) under their older and laxer
Federal system.

2 Thus Charles the Great made his sons Kings over Aquitaine (Einhard,
Annales, sub A.D. 781, Pertz, i. 161) and Italy, and towards the end of the Caro-
lingian period we find a whole crowd of these regi. So in England Kent for
some generations was held by a King of the royal house of Wessex.

Different
history of
England,
800-1087,

France,
888-1202,

aud
Germany,
936-973,
1039-
1056.

Circum-
stances
which
strength-
ened the
royal
authority
in Ger-
many.

624 THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY Frac-

Western Francia—Germany and modern France—fell asunder ; ἢ
after the partition of 888 no King ever reigned over both
together. But much the same state of things existed in both
Kingdoms. In both the King was only the first among several
Princes, who held their Duchies and Counties of him as of their
feudal superior. But the later history of England, France, and
Germany differed widely. In England the tendency to union,
which had been at work ever since the days of Ecgberht, was
powerfully strengthened by the Norman Conquest. The King-
doms shrank into Earldoms, and the Earldoms shrank into
territorial administrative divisions. The Earldom of Chester
and the Bishoprick of Durham alone retained some faint shadow
of the independence of continental Dukes and Prelates. In
France the great vassals became, for every practical purpose,
independent sovereigns ;? the utmost amount of submission
obtained by the nominal King was to have the years of his
reign used as a date. Normandy was in a constant state of
war with France; France and Aquitaine seem for long periods
to have forgotten one another's existence. With the thirteenth
century a change began; the forfeiture of Normandy was the
first of a long serics of annexations, which, by conquest, by
inheritance, by marriage, by escheat, by every conceivable
means, fair or foul, gradually 3 reunited the great Duchies and
Counties to the Royal Domain. In Germany the case differed
from either. In the tenth century, under Otto the Great, and
in the eleventh, under Henry the Third, the Teutonic Kingdom
was undoubtedly the most united realm of the three. A Duke
of Saxony or Bavaria, like an Earl of the Mercians or the North-
umbrians, might be a very powerful and a very troublesome
subject; but he was still a subject liable to be called to
account, to be judged and punished, by his Sovereign and
the assembled Estates of the Realm. But it would be
an abuse of language to call the lords of Rouen and

1 A German poet uses (with perfect truth) a stronger word, which has since
become technical :
“ Et simul a nostro secessit Gallia regno, ἡ

Nos priscum regni mnorem servamus.”
Ligurinus de Gest. Frid. lib. i.

2 On this whole period see Edinburgh Review, July 1860.

3 The favourite French phrase of réunton is perfectly admissible when applied
to provinces which had ever been, even in name, fiefs of the Parisian Crown ;
it is objectionable only when applied to provinces pilfered from Germany or
Burgundy. <A réunion of Barcelona would have been one degree less intoler-
able than a réunion of Savoy.

MENT ROYAL AUTHORITY IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 625

—_— -....

Bourdeaux the subjects, though they might be the nominal Retention
vassals, of the King of Laon or of Paris. Germany, like Eng- of National
land, always retained her national Assemblies. The }} ilenagemot j, Ger.
and the Afarzfeld gradually developed, without any sudden many and
change, into the British Parliament and the Imperial Diet. pngland,
But in West-France, after the great partition, a national as- prance "
sembly was something unheard of! till Philip the Fair devised 888-1302.
the States General as an invention wholly new, not a develope-

ment out of something old. The German Kings again long The
retained a domain which was scattered through various parts of Roya
the Kingdom; the French Kings retained nothing but their
own Duchy of Paris and some districts conterminous with it.

Again the system of Imperial Cities, holding immediately of the The Free
King, and acknowledging no inferior lord, made the German Cities.
King at once at home in all the chief towns of his dominions.

Again the great ecclesiastical Princes, naturally more loyal or The |
more subservient than the lay Princes, all held in Germany Eee
immediately of the King. In France the Archbishops of Rouen princes,
and Bourdeaux and the Cities of Rouen and Bourdeaux stood in

no relation whatever to the King; whatever powers and posses-

sions either Prelates or citizens might enjoy, were held of their
immediate lord, the Duke of Normandy or of Aquitaine.
Through all these means the authority of the German King and

the unity of the German Kingdom were kept up, while the King

of the French retained no authority beyond Paris and Orleans,

and the Kingdom itself seemed fast hastening towards utter dis-
memberment. There can be no greater contrast than between Contrast
a German King,” ever in motion, ever visiting every corner of ree Gen
the land, holding a national Assembly in one City, keeping an man and
ecclesiastical festival in another, appointing this Bishop and me French

e gs.
1 This expression may perhaps sound too strong for the period between 888

and 987, when Assemblies of some kind were certainly held, for instauce that
which elected Hugh of Paris in 987. (See Richer, iv. 12.) But that they were
really national assemblies, like those of England or Germany, seems very
doubtful. Hugh was made King over “Gauls, Bretons, Danes, Aquitanians,
Goths, Spaniards, and Gascons,’’ but the counties south of the Loire seem to
have had no hand in the matter. After the accession of the Parisian dynasty
there seems to have been no pretence at anything like a national Assembly.

2 The amazing activity of the German Kings is familiar to every one who has
read the national chronicles, Take for instance one year of Henry the Fourth as
recorded by Lambert of Herzfeld. He kept the Christmas of 1073—4 at Worms,
thence he went to Herzfeld, held an Assembly at Goslar, kept Lent at Worms
and Easter at Bamberg, met Papal Legates at Niirnberg, set out on an expedition
into Hungary, but turned back at Regensburg for fear of “‘ Willehelmus cogno-

28

626 THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY FRrac-

deposing that Duke, and a King of the French, retaining a
dominion smaller than that of many of his vassals, never stirring
beyond the three or four cities of that immediate domain, never
presiding in any national Assembly, with no Free Cities, no
immediate Prelates, no detached royal possessions, nothing to
make the existence of the King practically felt in the furthest
corners of his Kingdom. But the great point of difference of
all is that Germany retained her National Assemblies, while

Contrast_/France lost hers. From this cause, more than from any other,

between
the later
history

of the
Kingdoms.

though the royal authority in Germany sank to a mere name,
yet the national unity never utterly perished. The Kingdom
changed into a Confederation, the King changed into a President ;
but the Confederation and its President still remained, and formed
a bond of union which hindered utter separation. The France
of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, where no National As-
sembly ever brought King, Nobles, and People together, did not
even stop at the half-way house of Federation; the practical
separation was total. France indeed was reunited, and, when
once reunited, France became far more closely united than
Germany. But this closer union was in truth rendered possible
only by her former disunion. The King of the French con-
quered or inherited a Duchy, and that Duchy was at once
incorporated with the royal dominions. It might retain some
local rights and customs, but it retained no means of communica-
tion with those Duchies which remained independent. Step by
step did the Royal Domain and the Kingdom become coex-
tensive ; but national unity was purchased at the cost of both
national and local freedom. In France, in short, the Princes
fell into complete isolation, and the Crown swallowed them
up one by one.! In Germany the Princes reduced the royal
authority to a shadow; but they never threw aside either their
formal allegiance to the Crown or their formal brotherhood
towards one another.

Thus, in a word, the early disunion of France led to her later

mento Bostar (sic) Rex Auglorum,” kept Pentecost at Mainz, went on divers
affairs to Andernach, Aachen, and Worms again, then invaded Hungary, returned
to Worms, thence to Regensburg, and spent the rest of the time till Christmas in
going through the cities of Bavaria and Swabia.

1 It was doubtless a great advantage to the French Kings that some of their
annexations took the form of national wars. Thus the Duke of Aquitaine was
also King of England, and Aquitaine was won for France in a national war
against England. -

MENT CAUSES OF DISUNION OF GERMANY 627

centralization ; the early union of Germany hindered Germany

from ever becoming centralized. So far from her Principalities

being absorbed into the Royal Dominion, they gradually changed

from fiefs of a Kingdom into members of a Federal body. No

other Kingdom on record has gone through the like process.

And why was Germany destined to a fate which placed it, in Causes '
point of national strength, below all other Kingdoms? Mainly, which led
I believe, because Germany was the first and noblest of King- iO the ae
doms, because her crown was inseparably united with the crown Germany.
of the Roman Empire. One obvious cause greatly contributed

to the diminution of the royal power in Germany ; the crown of The
Germany was elective, while the crown of France was hereditary. crown of
That is to say, of the two elements which were united in the elective!
idea of the ancient Teutonic Kingship, one triumphed in Ger-

many and the other triumphed in France. The old Teutonic
kingship was hereditary so far as that, under all ordinary circum-
stances, the King must needs be the descendant of Kings ; it was
elective so far as that there was no distinct law of succession,

but the will of the people or of his chiefs selected the worthiest
member of the royal house. Of these two principles, Germany
developed one till no hereditary claim was acknowledged, France
developed the other till the idea of election was wholly for-
gotten. Several causes combined to strengthen the elective through
element in Germany and to strengthen the hereditary element in several
France. The son of the last King had everywhere a marked“. ”
preference over every other candidate,! and every King of the
French, like every King of Judah, left, for three hundred years,

a son of his loins to sit on his throne. In Germany, on the

other hand, one royal house after another became extinct, or was
continued only in illegitimate or female representatives. This

cause doubtless had its weight in determining the elective
character of the German Kingdom ; but this cause was by no chiefly
means all ; of all the combining circumstances none 80 decisively because
influenced the course of events as the fact that the King of Connexion
Germany was, or had an exclusive right to become, Emperor of with the
the Romans. Now the Empire was elective in its very nature. Empire.
It had been elective both in the Old and in the New Rome, and

1 In England the eldest son of the late King seems to have been regularly
chosen, unless there was some manifest reason to the contrary. For instance,
an adult brother was always preferred toa minor son. The succession of William
Rufus and Heury the First is perhaps the only case of a younger son being pre-
ferred to an elder.

The
Empire
essentially
elective,

Ways in
which the
Imperial

and|
elective
character
of the
German
Crown
diminished
the royal
authority.

628 THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY Frac-

it remained equally elective at Aachen and at Frankfurt. In the
fully developed conception of the medieval Empire an hereditary
Emperor would have seemed as great an absurdity as an heredi-
tary Pope. The Lord of the World, the temporal chief of
Christendom, held a place which could never be left to the
accidents of hereditary succession ; it must be, like the office of
his spiritual colleague, held forth as a prize for the worthiest of
the faithful, an object of possible, however remote ambition, for
every baptized freeman. In this case, as in the whole history
of the Empire, the very grandeur of the theory was the immediate
cause of utter weakness and failure in practice. Because the
King of Germany was also Roman Emperor, Cesar, Augustus,
Lord of the World, he came to have less authority in his own King-
dom than any other King. He was in fact too great to act with
effect as the local King of a particular Kingdom. His functions as
Roman Emperor and King of Italy led to constant absences from
Germany, to constant defeats and humiliations in his Italian pro-
gresses, which could not fail greatly to lessen the weight of the
royal authority in Germany itself. And, as the Empire was
essentially elective, the Emperor King saw his authority exposed
to diminution from another cause. When a Kingdom is elective,
the electors will soon learn to make terms with the candidate as
the price of his election, and the royal power will be diminished
with every vacancy. This will be especially the case when, as
in Germany, the election is vested in a small oligarchy, each
member of which is strong enough to make his personal influence
distinctly felt. Again, when estates fall into the Crown by
escheat or forfeiture, it is the manifest interest of an hereditary
King to incorporate them with the royal domain. The utmost
that he will do in the way of alienation will be to use them as
mere appanages for the younger members of the royal house.
But, when an escheated or forfeited fief falls into the Crown in
an elective monarchy, the King, uncertain of his son’s succession,
is tempted to employ the vacant benefice, not to enrich the
Crown, which may pass to a stranger, but to provide his son
with something to fall back upon in case he fails of a Kingdom.
From these, and from many other causes, the royal power in
Germany dwindled away. The Kingdom changed into a Con-
federation, and its change into a Confederation was owing to no
cause so much as to the fact that the Kingdom aspired to be an
Empire.

MENT GERMAN CONFEDERATION A UNION OF PRINCES 629

The other point of peculiarity in the German Confederation, The other
as distinguished from all others, is, as was before said, that the point of
great majority of its members are, and always have been, not arity ᾿
commonwealths, but principalities. A few Free Cities still exist, the Ger-
and a far larger number once existed ; still, even in the most Par Con-

oa. . ς ederation

flourishing days of the Hanseatic League, princely government mainly a
was the rule, and the republics were the exception. This Confedera-
peculiarity of character is, as was before said, closely connected Hon of
with the other peculiarity of origin. It may be doubted whether connexion
a group of perfectly independent Princes would ever have joined between
themselves together in a Federal Union; but it was not un- thie char
natural that Princes who became sovereign only by the gradual wud the
weakening of a central monarchy should stop at the point of other.
Federalism, and shrink from asserting their absolute independ-
ence. Setting aside the Free Cities, whose course runs parallel Origin
with that of the Princes, the division of the German Kingdom οἱ '"° |
took place through the acquisition, first of an hereditary right pringi-
of succession, then of all the practical rights of sovereignty, by Palities.
officers who, in their origin, were merely magistrates appointed
by the King and liable to be removed by him. Counts, Dukes, Royal
Palsgraves, each class designed as a check on the encroachments of officers
the other, all followed the same law. Counts, Dukes, Palsgraves, sovereigns
all gradually grew into sovereign Princes. The Count! was
originally a royal officer, and the Duke a royal officer with
authority superior to that of the Count. But the Duke gradually
grew into an immediate hereditary vassal of the Crown, and the
Count gradually grew into an hereditary under-vassal of the
Duke. The Duchies, in most cases, became extinct, and the
Counts became immediate vassals of the Crown. But by that
time the relation of immediate dependence on the Crown had
become a relation of practical independence. Thus each princi-
pality, great and small, gradually acquired the practical rights of The
sovereignty ; the only common tie was the common Diet of the pet al
nation, still presided over by the common Imperial head of all. Congress
But when that Diet came to consist mainly of sovereign, though rather
nominally vassal, Princes, it became something far more like a ee onal
Federal Congress than a National Parliament. Then, by the Parjia-
very fact of its origin, the German Diet was essentially a Con- ment.
gress of Governments only. Except so far as the Free Cities

1 Graf is the same as the Old English gerefa, grieve, reeve, a magistrate or
officer of any sort, great or small.

Govern-
ments
only, not
peoples,
repre-
sented in
the Diet.

The Diet
sinks into
a diplo-
matic
Congress.

Other
peculiari-
ties of the
German
Confedera-
tion.

Loss

of the
ancient
divisions.

Compari-
son with
England,

630 THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY Fkrac-

formed a partial exception, the German Diet in no way repre-
sented the German people. The modern Diet of the Confedera-
tion represents them as little as the old Diet of the Empire did.
In like manner the Old Swiss Diet of the Thirteen Cantons, the
first American Congress of the Thirteen States, immediately re-
presented the Governments, and not the people, of the States
which composed the Confederations. But then those were
Governments on which the people, or, as in the oligarchic
Cantons, a certain class of the people had more or less of in-
fluence. A German Prince represented only himself;! the
people were not represented directly or indirectly, unless the
personal wisdom and patriotism of this or that Prince made him
practically the representative of his subjects. Gradually both
the Emperor and the Princes left off personal attendance, and
the Imperial Diet became, what the Confederate Diet still
remains, a mere Congress of Ambassadors. The one body which
professes to speak in the name of Germany still represents
nothing but the policy of German sovereigns; the voice of the
German people has no constitutional means of utterance.

One or two other general peculiarities in the nature of the
German Confederation may here be mentioned. Every observer
must be struck with the great number, even after many re-
ductions, of the independent States of Germany and at their
striking disproportion in extent and power. Every careful ob-
server will also remark the way in which ancient landmarks have
been wiped out through the greater part of Germany. The
States which make up the present German Confederation, the
States which made up the German Kingdom at the time of its
dissolution, in no way answer to those great national divisions
which existed before the formation of the Kingdom, and which
remained as the chief provincial divisions long after its forma-
tion. In no country have the old historical divisions more
utterly perished than in Germany. In England several of the
old Kingdoms still survive as Counties, with their old names and
pretty nearly with their old boundaries. Others have been
divided into several Counties. But those Counties, in a large
part of England, represent ancient Principalities subordinate to

1 Some of the votes given in the Diet, those of the Benches of Prelates for
instance, were representative of the class, but not in any way representative of
the people or of any part of it. There is something analogous in our own Parlia-
ment, in the position of the Scotch and Irish representative Peers.

MENT HISTORICAL DIVISIONS BLOTTED OUT IN GERMANY 631

the ancient Kingdoms. Even where the Counties are of later
origin the Kingdoms have been, for the most part, simply sub-
Givided ; the ancient and the modern divisions do not often cross

one another ; it seldom happens that a modern English County

runs into two ancient English Kingdoms.! So in France, as the and
Crown annexed one great fief after another, those fiefs remained as France.
local divisions, Provinces, or Governments, retaining, in some cases,

very extensive local liberties. It was only the revolution of

1789 which wiped the ancient names from the map, and even

then, as in England, the ancient divisions were, for the most

part, only subdivided and not confused. But in Germany,
though most of the old names remain on the map, they have lost

their meanings, and, in many cases, they have changed their
places. The modern Kingdom of Saxony has not a rood of
ground in common with the Saxony which was subdued by
Charles the Great. Modern and ancient Bavaria do indeed con-

tain a large territory in common; still the modern Kingdom

takes in a great deal which was not part of the ancient Duchy

and leaves out a great deal which was part of it. Lotharingia

has vanished ; Swabia, Franconia, Westphalia, survive only as
new-fangled provincial divisions of upstart monarchies. The
modern German Confederation is not a Confederation of the
ancient national Duchies ; it is not a Confederation of the old
Electorates ; it is not a Confederation of the Circles of Maxi-
Milian. All these successive divisions have vanished. The
modern Confederation is an union of States, great and small,

which have been formed by endless partitions and endless
annexations, but all of which have assumed their present shape

in very recent times. In short, not only the Kingdom, but the Splitting
Duchies which formed the primary divisions of the Kingdom, ἃν οἵ the
have been split up into fragments, and those fragments have Duchies.
often been conjoined with fragments of other Duchies. The
German law of succession allowed of endless partitions of territory,

endless treaties and family arrangements, through which, in this

case, one State has been divided into several, in the other case
several States have been united into one. Changes of this sort Constant
took place regularly and peaceably according to the Laws of the Partitions
Empire. But to these we have to add the high-handed doings δι 8™e=-

ations.
1 Several of the Western Counties of Mercia had a portion of Welsh territory

added to them when the Principality and its Marches were finally settled under

Henry the Eighth.

. 632 THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY Frac-

1814-5.

1801.

Different
position
of the
arriére
vassals in
France
and in
Germany.

of the present century. This principality has been mediatized 1
altogether ; that, rather too large for such a process, has been
compelled to surrender half its territory to the greed of a more
powerful neighbour ; princes who had been compelled to yield
their own dominions to the common enemy have indemnified
themselves at the expense of their own weaker brethren.
Bishopricks have been secularized; Free Cities have been
deprived of their freedom ; and every change, just or unjust,
expedient or inexpedient, has involved the removal of some
ancient landmark, the wiping out of some ancient memory.
Thus were formed States like Prussia, Hannover, and Baden,
answering to no ancient divisions, suggesting no ancient associa-
tions, and which would seem as strange in the eyes of a Saxon or
Frankish Emperor as to see one portion of Swabia forming part
of an independent republic and another incorporated with a
hostile monarchy. But though so much of this geographical
confusion is owing to very modern arrangements, the change had
largely taken place long before the dissolution of the Kingdom.
This striking peculiarity in German historical geography, as
compared with that of France, has its origin in that gradual
splitting of the Kingdom and its great divisions which had been
going on for ages.

In England then the process of dissolution never took place ;
in France a temporary total dissolution was followed by the
closest of reunions ; in Germany dissolution stopped at a certain
point. It is an important difference between Germany and
France that in France the Crown was able to annex the great
fiefs as wholes, before the mediate vassals had found time and
opportunity to make themselves independent of their immediate
lords. In Germany the vassals of the Dukes became immediate
vassals of the Crown at a time when immediate vassalage was
fast becoming synonymous with sovereignty. The smallest
tenant-in-chief acquired, or at least strove after, independence ;
and his independence has been at all times much more liable to
be endangered at the hands of some more powerful neighbour
than at the hands of the common suzerain. Again, each of these

1 The German phrase of mediatizetion is as delicate an euphemism as the
French phrase of réunion. To the student of constitutional law there is some-
thing singularly grotesque in the use of the word after the dissolution of the
Empire, when no such distinction as “ mediate” and “immediate” any longer
existed.

MENT DISPROPORTION IN SIZE OF GERMAN STATES 633

small principalities was liable either to be subdivided or to be

united with any other. Hence follows the vast number of the Vast
German States and the diminutive size of so many of them. nember
Even now that so many of them have been swallowed up by larger german
States, the mention of some of them almost raises a smile; and, States.
before the dissolution of the Kingdom, they were incomparably

more numerous and some of them incomparably smaller. Hence

again follows the wiping out of ancient landmarks, and the Their
singular disproportion in extent and powers between the different singwiar
members of the former Kingdom and now Confederation. The dispropor-
ancient Duchies of Saxony, Swabia, and Bavaria fairly balanced size.

one another; but there is no proportion between Prussia and
Lippe-Detmold. Here, as we shall see, lies the great vice of the

existing Confederation. Most of the existing States are purely
artificial ; they answer to no national, geographical, or historical
divisions, Again their disproportion in size is so great that

even the secondary States cannot hope to maintain their inde-
pendence by their own strength ; their only hope—a faint hope Position of
indeed—lies in the mutual jealousy of the two dominant powers. © Austria
A great disproportion indeed has often existed between the Prussia.
several members of Federal bodies, between Megalopolis and

Tritaia, between Bern and Zug, between Virginia and Rhode

Island. But nowhere has disproportion been carried to so great

a pitch as in modern Germany. And the Federal and brotherly

feeling which has tempered the disproportion in republican Con-
federations is hardly to be looked for in the sovereigns of either

great or small German States. The only parallel is to be looked Parallel
for in the worst arranged and most unfortunate of the Greek δι
Confederations. Germany, tossed to and fro between Austria
and Brandenburg, is like the Boeotian League in the days when
Thebes had not yet definitely got the better of Orchomenos.

APPENDIX I

1. NOTE ON THE CITIES OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE!

(See Head, Historia Numorum, p. 350 sgq, and Leicester
Warren, Greek Federal Coinage)

In the following list of the cities of the Achaian League, those are marked
with an asterisk for which numismatic evidence exists ; those whose existence
as members of the League is known only from the evidence of coins are
put in Italics. It may be stated here that on the obverse of the Federal silver
coins the head of Zeus Homagyrios was represented; on the reverse the
Achaian monogram X, and around it ‘‘various letters, monograms, local
symbols, names of magistrates or of cities, usually abbreviated,” all surrounded
by a wreath of bay. The bronze coins have the name of each city in full,
preceded by the name of the Achaians (e.g. AXAION ATMAION). On the
obverse is a ‘‘ full length figure of Zeus Homagyrios holding Nike and leaning
on sceptre”’ ; on the reverse ‘‘ Demeter Panachaia (Π) seated, holding wreath
and resting on sceptre.”

NAME OF CITY. DATE. OF ACCESSION. PAGE.
B.C.
*Patrai.. . . . 280 . . . . 191.
*Dymé , . . . 280 . . . . 191.
Τυ δῖα. . . . 6. 279 . . . . 191.
Pharai_. . . . 6. 279 . . . . 191.
Aigion . . . . 275 . . . . 192.
Boura. . . . 275 . . . . 192.

* Keryneia . . . . 275 . . . . 192,
Leontion . . . . -- . . . . 192.
Aigeira . . . . 274(%) . . . . 192.
Pelléné . . . . 274(%) . . . 192.
Sikyén . . . . 251 . . . . 285.
Corinth . . . . 243—-223. 196—146? . 294, 484.
Megara . . . . 243—223. 204—1467 . 294, 477.

1 This note, with the list of cities, appeared in an Appendix to the original
edition, but has been recast by the Editor. The other notes in this Appendix
are added by the Editor.

2 Corinth was out of the League from 223 to 196, and Megara from 223 to
204. (Freeman.)

es -—. se ee

636 APPENDIX I

NAME OF CITY. DATE OF ACCESSION. - PAGE.
B.C. -

Troizén . . . . 243 . . . . 295.
Epidauros . . . 243 . . . . 298.
Héraia_.. . . Between 240—235. 208? . . 814, 460.
Kynaitha . . . . -- 814. Ν
Stymphalos.. . . -- 814.
Kleitér.. . . . -- 814.
Pheneos . . . . 234 . . . . 314.
Alea . . . . — «854,
Telphousah . .. - 314. .
Mantineia before 222 . -- 315.

Mantineia or Antigoneia . 222 . . . . 315.
*Megalopolis . . . 284 . . . . 315.
Aigina . . . . 233 (?)—210 . . . 331, 453.
* Hermioné . . . 229 . . . . 331.
*Klednai . . . . 229 . . . . 812.
"Argos. . . . 228 . . . . 333.
*Phliious . . . . 228 . . . . 333.
* Kaphyai . . . . 227 . . . . 944.
*Tegea . . . 222 . . . . 886.
Ῥβδρηΐβ. . . . 219 . . . . 419.
*Pagat . . . . 20813 , . . . 489.
* Phigaleia’ . . . 208 or 196 .
Lepreon ‘ , . . . 208 or 196 . . . 460, 478, 484.
Orchomenos. . . 199 or 196 . . . 478, 484.

* Alipheira oe. . 194 . . . .

* Asea . . . . 194 \ 488,
*Dipaia . . . . 194 . . . .

* Elisphasioi . . . 194 . . . . “
*Gortys . . . . 194 . . . . 488. ᾿

* Kallista . . . . 194 (7) .
* Pallantion . . . 194 . . . . 488.

* Theisoa . . . . 194 . . . . 488.

* Sparta . . . . 192 . . . . 492.

* Elis . . . . . 191 . . . . 496.

* Messiné , . . . 191 . . . . 496.

" Koréné . . . . 184 . . . . δ06.
Hypana . . . . Ἷ

*Lusot . . . ?

*Methydrion . . . ?

1 Spelt Thelpusa on coins, . -

3 Pagai most probably became a distinct State on the second incorporation of
Megara. (Freeman. )

3 Phigaleia was probably annexed along with Triphylia. (Freeman.)

* T insert the name of Lepreon as the only city in Triphylia. (Freeman.)

APPENDIX I 637

NAME OF CITY. DATE OF ACCESSION, PAGE
B.C.

* Teuthis . . . .
Abia . . . . . . .
Thowris | . . . 182 . . . . 507.
Pharai . .
Gythion !. . . .
Teuthréné ἢ . Ὶ
* Asiné (in Messenia) 1 .
Pyrrhichos ?
Kainépolis ?
Oitylos? .
Leuktra ?.
Thalamai !
Alagonia? . .
Geréniat. ©...) $195 » 2 «+ . 485, 540.
Asépos? . .
Akriai
Boiai ?
Zarax ! .
Epidauros Liméra ἢ ?
Brasiai? .
Geronthrai ?
Marios? .
Tasos ? ?

2. NOTE ON THE CITIES OF THE LYKIAN LEAGUE

(See Head, Historia Numorum, p. 576 sqq)

STRABO states that twenty-three cities belonged to the Lykian League. This
statement corresponds exactly to the numismatic evidence. We have Federal
coins issued by twenty-three cities, viz. Antiphellos, Apollénia, Apulai,
Araxa (ἢ), Arykanda, Bubon, Gagai, Kragos, Kyané, Kydna (ἢ), Limyra,
Masikytos, Myra, Olympos, Patara, Phellos, Pinara (autonomous coins of
Federal type), Podalia, Rhodiopolis, Tlés, Trebenna, Tymena, Xanthos.
Strabo states that Phasélis was not a member of the second Lykian League ;
and this ‘‘is not contradicted by numismatic evidence” (Head). We have
also Federal coins of Trabula and Telméssos, but only in conjunction with
Kragos. This shows the existence of monetary leagues or Sonderbunds of
separate pairs of towns which are supposed to be meant by the words
συμπολιτευόμενοι δῆμοι which occur in Lykian inscriptions (Le Bas - Waddington,
As. Min., 1290-92).

638 APPENDIX I

3. THE FEDERAL COINAGE OF AKARNANIA

(See Head, Historia Numorum, p. 278 sqq)

In the fifth century, after the formation of the Akarnanian Confederacy, the
coast towns issued Corinthian staters (obverse, Head of Pallas; reverse,
Pégasos). The towns of the interior, including Stratos, the chief city of the
Confederacy, issued small silver coins with their own types. In the end of
the third century we find a regular Federal coinage (obverse, Head of the
river god Acheldos ; reverse, the Actian Apollo) instead of the Corinthian
staters. Leukas was probably the place where these coins were struck, as
(about 300 8.0.) it had taken the place of Stratos as the most important
Akarnanian town. In 167 3.c. Leukas was separated from Akarnania, and
issued her own coins. Thyrrheion continued for some time the type of Federal
coinage, though not in the name of the Confederacy, but on her own account.

4. THE FEDERAL COINAGE OF ZXTOLIA

(See Head, Historia Numorun, p. 283 sqq)

THE Federal coinage of Atolia began soon after the invasion of that country
by the Gauls. None of the Atolian towns issued coins of their own.

APPENDIX II

ADDITIONAL NOTES BY THE EDITOR

P. 35. ‘THERE was nothing at Athens at all analogous to what we call
* Office’ and ‘ Opposition.’ ”

On the δήμου προστάτης at Athens and Syracuse, see Mr. Freeman’s History
of Sicily, vol. iii. p. 116, where he says: ‘‘ The δήμου προστάτης comes nearest
to the Leader of Opposition, but with this difference, that the Leader of
Opposition, though not at the time in office, is sure to belong to the official
class.”

P. 53. As a fourth ‘exception to the representative system in modern
Europe and America” we may count the Referendum in Switzerland.

P. 56. ‘‘ Election of the American President.” Mr. Bryce has described
(4A merican Commonwealth, i. 52) how it has happened that ‘‘ the presidential
electors have become a mere cogwheel in the machine.” Their voting is
now a mere matter of form.

Ib., note 1. South Carolina is no longer an exception since 1868.

P. 74. Since Mr. Freeman wrote, a Federal monarchy has come into
existence, namely, the German Empire. Sec remarks in Editor’s Preface.

P. 104, line 6 from foot. Insert ‘‘as” between ‘‘such” and ‘‘ merely.”

P. 105. W. Vischer, in a valuable review of the History of Federal
Government, published in the Neues Schweizerisches Musewm (iv. pp. 281-328),
and reprinted in the reviewer's Kleine Schriften, i. 534-587 (to which reference
is here made), pointed out that light is thrown on the condition of the
Delphic Amphiktyony, before its reform by Augustus, by an inscription
found at Delphi by C. Wescher. At the time of this document there were
twenty-four votes (as in the time of Aischinés) among seventeen peoples,
distributed in such a way that ten peoples had one vote each, and the
remaining seven two votes cach. The possessors of two votes were the
Delphians, Thessalians, Phékians, Bwotians, Phthiétic Achaians, Magnéctes,
Ainiancs ; while those with one vote were the Dorians of Parnassus, Dorians
of Peloponnésos, Athenians, Euboians, Malians, Oitaians, Dolopians,
Perrhaibians, Epiknémidian Lokrians, Western Lokrians. Thus the Dorians,
the Ionians (Athenians and Enboians), and Lokrians, who were originally
classed as one people and gave one vote, had been severally divided into two.

640 APPENDIX II

At an earlier period, about the beginning of the third century, Mtolian
influence was predominant at Delphi. See below p. 651, note on p. 257.

P. 112. See Vischer, in the review mentioned in last note, p. 553-4. He
refers to the inscription, found in the Troad and now in Cambridge, which
was published by Εἰ. Curtius in Gerhard’s Archacol. Zeitung, 1855, p. 38 δοῃ.,
where κοινά of the Oitaian Dorians, the Ainianes, the Athamanes, the
Oitaians, the Eastern Lokrians, are mentioned. For the Phékian League
too there is now new epigraphic material available, in the Delphic inscrip-
tions, published by Wescher and Foucart.

P. 118. Vischer criticizes Mr. Freeman for denying that there was any
real Federalism in Thessaly (p. 554). Cf. his account of a ‘‘ Bundes-
organismus ” in Thessaly, in an essay ‘‘ Ueber die Bildung von Staaten und
Biinden” (Kleine Schriften, i. p. 335 sqq). But after reading Vischer’s
strictures, Mr. Freeman thought that the difference between his own view
and that of Vischer was mainly one of words.

P. 125. The remarks in the text on the use of “Theban” and “ Beeotian”’
should be modified, as Vischer (p. 558) pointed out. ‘‘ Was den Namen des
Gesammtstaates betrifft, so scheint er officiell als der thebanische bezeichnet
worden zu sein, οἱ Θηβαῖοι. So wenigstens steht in der bekannten Steinur-
kunde jener Zeit iiber den unter Archon Nausinikos geschlossenen grossen
athenischen Bund, der einzigen mir bekannten, wo eine officielle Unterschrift
sich findet. [See Rangabé, Antig. Hell. ἢ. 381 and 381 b.] Damit stimmt
auch wohl iiberein, dass, wihrend bei Thukydides, also in den Zeiten des
peloponnesischen Kricges, Boiotien als Staat immer mit Βοιωτοί bezeichnet
wird, und bei Xenophon bis zur Zeit des antalkidischen Friedens der Gebrauch
zwischen Βοιωτοί und Θηβαῖοι schwankt, seit der Befreiung vom spartanischen
Joch bei diesem Θηβαῖοι das regelmissige ist, und ebenso bei den Rednern
immer Θηβαῖοι vorkommt.” He explains Xen. Hell, vi. 8. 19 in the same
way as Mr. Freeman, but from his own different standpoint ; and deprecates
stress being laid on the expressions of Diodorus (κοινὴ σύνοδος τῶν Βοιωτῶν,
xv. 80, and κοινὸν τῶν Βοιωτῶν, xvi. 85), who was not always accurate in his
terms.

P. 134. Vischer (p. 557 844.) plausibly argues against the view of Grote
that in 378 the Thebans ‘‘revived the Bootian Confederacy,”—a view
which Mr. Freeman accepted as the theoretical, but not as the practical,
aspect of what happened. ‘Vischer holds that the Thebans tried to introduce
in Beotia the same state of things which had prevailed in Athens since
Theseus. As all the inhabitants of Attica were Athenians, so all the inhabi-
tants of Bootia were to be Thebans ; and he quotes the passage in Isokratés
Plat. ὃ 8 (quoted p. 136, note 2) in support of his theory. But Vischer’s
observations, while they considerably affect Grote’s statement of the case,
affect Mr. Freeman's account but little.

P. 148. For the constitution of the Beotian League in the Third period,
see the investigations of M. Holleaux in the Bulletin de Correspondance

APPENDIX II 641

hellénique, xiii., 1 sqq., and 225 sgqg. The President of the League was called
ἄρχων. There were functionaries called ἀφεδριατεύοντες, apparently seven in
number, and delegated by the cities. No city could send more than one;
but the right of sending them seems to have been confined to a certain
number of the cities. Orchomenos, Thebes, Plataia, Tanagra, Thespiai, were
always represented. Bceckh identifies these officials with the Bootarchs of
Polybios and Livy ; but there is not yet sufficient evidence to decide this
point.

P. 145-6. Stein, one of the best interpreters of Herodotus, takes a some-
what different view of the passage, i.170, ‘‘ Thales schlug fiir den ionischen
Stadtebund eine Buudesverfassung vor, nach der sich die einzelnen Stadte
ihrer politischen Selbstindigkeit begeben und einem Bundestage (βουλευτήριον)
sich unterordnen, daneben aber nach wie vor als gesonderte Stadtgemeinde
bestehen bleiben (olxeouévas) und in ihrem Verhiltniss zur Bundesstadt so
-angesehen werden sollten (νομίζεσθαι) wie anderswo (z.B.) in Attika die
Landgemeinden (δῆμοι od. κῶμαι) zur Stadtgemeinde (πόλις). Kurz er wollte an
die Stelle des bisherigen Stidtebundes eine Bundesstadt (und zwar Teos)setzen.”
Stein evidently thinks that the proposal of Thales involved a much greater
loss of independence for the cities of the Federation than is assumed by Mr.
Freeman. It is not clear that in using the word δῆμοι Herodotus was
necessarily thinking of the demes of Attica.

P. 156. Arkadia seems to have tried Federal Government before any other
part of Greece. There are Federal coins which seem to date from the sixth
century (see Essay on Federal Coinage by the Hon. Leicester Warren, now
Lord de Tabley, p. 11; where it is also pointed out how the foundation of
Megalopolis gave a great impulse to coinage in the Peloponnésos). It is
significant that of Federal coins dating from the period of the Achaian
League, twenty-three were struck in Arkadian towns, twenty-eight in the
rest of Peloponnésos. M. Dubois (Les ligues dlolienne et achéenne, p. 53)
notices that the Arkadians were those who were most zealous to join the
second Achaian League (see Pausanias, Arcadica, 6. 1), and concludes that
‘it is impossible to give too much weight to the Federal antecedents of the
Arkadian people.”

P. 187, notes, line 7. ‘‘Can we trust a writer who seems to think that
Dymé needed deliverance from Achaian oppression ?”’

M. Dubois (p. 20) replies that at this period Achaia was divided and
governed by local oligarchies which Epameindndas permitted to continue
in order to keep the Peloponnésos disunited (the Arkadian union being the
sole exception). This consideration may explain the odd phrase of Diod6ros.

P. 188. M. Dubois writes (p. 57): ‘‘M. Freeman s'étonne qu’Alexandre
ait traité si rigoureusement les Achéens de Pelléne; il suffit peut-étre de
rappeler que la ligue des villes d’Achaie avait combattu contre son pére
Philippe ἃ Chéronée.” A reader would naturally infer from this that Mr.
Freeman had ignored or forgotten the action of the Achaian League in 888
B.c. But if M. Dubois had read on to the next sentence he would have seen

2T

642 APPENDIX II

that Mr. Freeman mentions the fact, and considers it to be an insufficient
explanation.

P. 192. M. Dubois complains that Mr. Freeman (as well as other
historians of the period), in discussing the origin and significance of the
Achaian League, has not given sufficient weight to the Peloponnésian history of
the previous century. He regards the union of 281 B.o. as the final result
of a series of struggles of the lesser Peloponnésian peoples to throw off the
yoke of Sparta. ‘‘De l’ensemble de ces luttes sortira l’union fédérale qui
sera le triomphe d’une vieille tradition de haine contre Lacédémone” (p. 55).
If this statement goes a little too far, we may still be ready to believe that
the ‘‘ tradition constante d’indépendance et de groupement” in Peloponnésos,
on which M. Dubois justly insists, was a condition in the absence of which
the second Achaian League could hardly have come into being. It is con-
jectured by Mr. Mahaffy (Greek Life and Thought, p. 8) that the sudden rise
of the Achaians and Aitolians into prominence in Greek politics is to be
accounted for by an infiux of wealth acquired by them in mercenary service in
the wars of Alexander.

P. 194, note 1. It is now generally believed that Margos, not Markos,
is the right form of the name of the Founder of the League, and Mdpyos
appears in modern texts of Polybios. As, however, Mr. Freeman had
evidently given the matter his consideration, I have not ventured to change
‘‘ Markos” in his text, though I have no doubt that Margos is correct.

P. 197. On the constitution of the Achaian League there are two special
treatises, Merleker’s Achaicorum libri tres (1837) and Wahner’s De Achaworum
federis origine atque institutis (1857). Mr. Freeman does not refer to
them, and probably made no direct use of them, but they are still worth
consulting. The most recent exposition of the Achaian constitution is in
the work of M. Dubois already quoted.

P.198. ‘The greater cities . . . were admitted into a body the relations
and duties of whose members were already fixed and well understood.”

But it must be remembered that each town which joined the Leagne had
to sign a special Federal treaty, and it is highly probable that in lesser
details the conditions of membership were sometimes modified. (See Dubois,
p. 92.) For an example of a Federal treaty, see below, p. 647.

P. 202. ‘*No independent diplomatic action in the several cities.” While
Mr. Freeman thinks that the rule was that no state could of itself send
ambassadors to foreign powers, but that the Federal Government might
sometimes dispense from this rule, M. Dubois (p. 181, 182) holds the rule
to have been that each city had perfect liberty to commission ambassadors,
but that the League could restrain this liberty in special cases. (Cf. p. 183,
‘‘En matiére de relations extérieures, l’autonomie de chaque Etat restait
intacte, pourvu que l’union ne fit pas compromise.”) Pausanias, vii. 9. 4, is
not decisive, as it may be interpreted to suit both opinions (see above, p. 204,
note 5). M. Dubois supports his view by the circumstance that the Spartan
embassy to Rome in which the restored exiles Areos and Alkibiadés took

APPENDIX II: 643

part, is not censured by Polybios as illegal, but solely on the ground of
ingratitude to the League and Philopoimén (Pol. xxiii. 11. 7, 8). There
does not seem to be sufficient evidence for deciding the question definitely.

In this connexion it is interesting to observe that each city might have
its own proxenoi, independently of the League. See Bulletin de Corre-
spondance hellénique iv. p. 98.

{ P. 205. ‘‘The Assembly of the League.”

P, 239. ‘‘ The Senate.”

M. Dubois takes a very different view of the Assembly and Senate, and
their relation to one another. He has not expounded his view very clearly,
but as far as I understand him he holds that

(1) The Assembly or Congress (σύνοδος) was composed of four classes: (a)
the Βουλή ; (Ὁ) the Γερουσία, another ‘‘senate,” of which we hear and know
very little ; (6) the people, of πολλοί ; (4) the Federal magistrates.

(2) The influence of these four bodies varied at different periods in the
history of the League ; but the importance of the Βουλή was the most abiding.
In the early years of the League the presence of the Βουλή was what con-
stituted a Congress. Other citizens, not members of the Βουλή, could come
if they chose, but as a rule they did not attend, and the Congress practically
meant the Βουλή acting in conjunction with the magistrates. So far, the view
of M. Dubois is not opposed to that of Mr. Freeman.

(3) The Βουλή was not a body chosen at the Federal Assemblies (consist-
ing, as Merleker held, of magistrates, ex-magistrates, and prominent citizens),
but was a regular Chamber of Representatives, chosen from time to time by
each state in its local Assembly. The evidence on which M. Dubois chiefly
relies for this is apparently Livy xxxiv. 48, where we read of omnium
civitatium legationes in concionis modum circumfusas at the Congress of Corinth
in 194 8.6. (cf. xxxii. 22), combined with the fact that a regular Congress
sometimes seems to have consisted altogether of the BovAx}—the presumption
being that this could not have happened unless every city was represented in
the Βουλή.

(4) Each city sent more than one Representative—how many, or of how
many the whole Senate consisted, is unknown. These Representatives were
like our Members of Parliament. Although they were chosen by the cities
because they were practically pledged to certain lines of policy, they were per-
mitted to exercise their private judgment. They were not mere mouthpieces
of the assemblies which appointed them. See Livy xxxii. 22, where the Argive
Representatives are divided in opinion (Dymei ac Megalopolitani et quidam
Argivorum, priusquam decretum fieret, consurrexerunt ac reliqueruntconcilium),

(5) I do not feel quite sure whether M. Dubois holds that the Βουλή had
functions outside the Assembly or not; whether it was like the Βουλή at
Athens, a body which prepared measures for the Assembly to consider, or
whether this was exclusively the business of the Demiurges. He states that
the βουλευτήριον was the place where the Assembly deliberated, not (as some
suppose) a special council chamber of the βουλευταί (see above p. 239).

646 APPENDIX II

P. 205, note 1. ‘‘The formal title of the body, as usual, is τὸ κοινὸν τῶν
᾿Αχαιῶν."

This statement was criticized by Mr. H. J. Smith in his notice of Federal
Government in the Edinburgh Review. Bishop Thirlwall wrote as follows in
reply to a question of Mr. Freeman: ‘‘It seems to me that there are not suff-
cient data to determine whether ἀγορά or τὸ κοινόν or some other word was the
proper ‘formal’ or ‘constitutional ’ title of the Achaean General Assembly, or
perhaps even whether there was any such title; but I agree with Mr. Smith
that ἀγορά would be—if not the—a proper name for the thing, whereas τὸ
κοινόν would be properly the commonwealth, and could only have been
applied to the Assembly in a secondary sense as the commonwealth by
representation. For of course, though the Assembly was primary, as not
elective, it could only represent the whole body of the nation.”

It may be observed that in Polybios the terms σύγκλητος, ἐκκλησία and
ἀγορά generally designate the Congress (though not always, as ¢.g. ἀγορά
xxix. 9. 5). The precise term for a regular annual Congress was καθήκουσα
σύνοδος.

P. 211. For the cases when the election of a President devolves upon the
House of Representatives, see Mr. Bryce, American Commonwealth, i. 58.

Pp. 212, 218. ‘‘The admission of new towns.”

The act by which the city of Orchomenos was annexed to the Achaian
League (for date see below, note to p. 886) came to light since Mr. Freeman
wrote, and was published by M. Foucart in the Hevue Archéologique (new
series, xxxii. p. 96) in 1876. The inscription is mutilated, but most of it can
be restored satisfactorily. The importance of the document is so great for
the constitutional history of the Achaian League that I subjoin the text (after
Hoffmann, in Collitz’s Sammlung, ii. 2, 148). The beginning, in which the
Orchomenians were admitted as Achaian citizens, and doubtless empowered
to confer Achaian citizenship on individuals, and bound to keep the laws of
the League, has unluckily been lost. The first clause of the extant part pro-
vides that if any one propose anything dangerous to the union, or if any
magistrate summon the people to vote on such a proposal, he shall pay a fine
of thirty talents, which shall be consecrated to the Hamarian Zeus, the
special god of the League. An oath was taken on both sides, Orchomenos
being represented by its local magistrates, and the League by the General,
the Hipparch, the Navarch, and, if M. Foucart’s supplement be right, ‘‘the
σύνεδροι of the Achaians,” which is supposed to mean all the Representa-
tives or members of the Βουλή. If this be so, it is highly interesting ; but
I cannot regard the restoration as ‘‘ perfectly certain,” with M. Dubois. - One
would like to think that Representatives of all the cities solemnly assembled
to receive the new member into their federation.

In order to secure the fidelity of Orchomenos, a number of Achaian
Kléruchoi were settled there, and had houses and lands assigned to them.
This policy seems to have been often adopted where the entry of a new city
into the League was compulsory rather than voluntary. It was adopted
by Aratos after his first occupation of Mantineia.

APPENDIX II 647

The text of the act (as restored by Hoffmann) is as follows :—

pay
» « . . μὸν πέμπ[η]ι εἴτε Apywly . . ..

~ + . « ἐέοι εἴτε [Πδιώτας ψαφοφορέοι. . ..
ὀφλέτω] rpidxorr[a τάϊλαντα ἱερὰ τοῦ Διὸϊς τοῦ ᾿Αμαρίου καὶ ἐξέστω τῶι Bov-
λομένωι αὖ-
τῶι δίκαν θ]ανάτου εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τ[ῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν
ὀμνυόντων τὸν
ὅρκον τὸν αὐτὸν οἱ ᾿Ορχομένιοι καὶ οἱ ᾿Αχαιοί, ἐμ μ[ὲν Αὐγίωι οἱ σύνεδροι τῶν ᾽Αχαι
ὧν καὶ ὁ orparjayds καὶ ἵππαρχος καὶ ναύαρχος ἐν δὲ ᾿Ορχομένωι οἱ ἄρχοντες
τῶν Ὀρ-
χομενίων.)] ὀϊΐμ]νύω Δία ᾿Αμάριον, ᾿Αθάναν ᾿Αμαρίαν͵ ᾿Αφ[ροδ]ταν καὶ rov]s θ[εοὺς
πάντας
ἦμαν ἐμ) πᾶσιν ἐμμε[ν]εῖν ἐν ri στάλαι καὶ ra ὁμολογίαι καὶ τῶι ψαφίσματί[ι
τῶι γενο
μένωι τῶι κοι) [ω) τῶι τῶ)» ᾿Αχαιῶν καὶ εἴ τίς κα μὴ ἐμμένῃ Ἰούκ ἐπιτρέψω els
δύναμ[ιν
καὶ εὐορκέ]οντι μέν μοι εἴη τἀγαθὰ ἐπιορκέοντι δὲ τἀναντία. τῶν δὲ λαβόντων ἐν
᾽Ὄρ[χο
μενίοις ἢ] κλᾶρ[ο]ν ἣ οἰκίαν ἀφ᾽ οὗ ᾿Αχαιοὶ ἐγένοντο μὴ ἐξέστω μηθενὶ ἀπαλλοτριῶ
σαι ἐντὸς ἐτ)έων εἴ[κ]οσι. El δέ τι ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθε χρόνων ἣ οἱ ᾿Ορχομένιοι ᾿Αχαιοὶ
ἐγέ-
vovro.... ] Νε[ά]ρίχωι) ἔγκλημα γέγονεν ἣ τοῖς υἱοῖς, ὑπότομα εἶμεν πάντα καὶ μ
ἡ δικαζέσ)θω μή[τε] Νεάρχωι μηθεὶς περὶ τῶμ πρότερον ἐγκλημάτων ἣ οἱ 'Ορχομένιοι
᾿Αχαιοὶ ἐγ
évovro καὶ] Oori]s δικάζοιτο ὀφλέτω χιλίας δράχμας καὶ ἁ δίκα ἀτέλης ἔστω. Περ
i δὲ τᾶς τραπέζα])ς τᾶς χρυσέ[α])ς τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὁπλοσμίου ΔΎ καταθέντες ἐνέχυρα
ol Μεθυ
δριεῖς οἱ μεταστή]σαντες εῆς ᾿᾽Ορχόμενον διείλοντο τὸ ἀργύριον καί τινες αὐτῶν ἀπέ
φασαν ἀποδιδόναι ἐΐαμ μὴ ἀποδίδωντι τὸ ἀργυριον τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις καθὼς ε
ixds ποτὶ τὰμ πό]λιν τὰν ᾿Ορχομενίων ὑποδίκους εἶμεν τοὺς μὴ ποιοῦντας τὰ δίκαια.

Some other decrees of the Achaian League and its cities have been dis-
covered (unfortunately all in a fragmentary state), and published by J. Martha
in the Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique, vol. ii. (1878). They will be
found in Collitz, Sammlung der gr. Dial.-Inschriften, ii. 2, Die Inschriften
Achaia’s, edited by O. Hoffmann. In one of these the Achaian citizenship
is granted on certain conditions. In another sentence of death is pronounced
by an Achaian town. From these decrees we derive the names of various
local magistrates: θεόκολος, προστάτας, βούλαρχος, γὙραμματιστάς͵ δαμοσιοφύ-
λακες. The existence of polemarchs we already knew from Polybios, at least
for Kynaitha (iv. 18), and of stratégot from Plutarch, for Argos (Arat. 44).

An inscription in Megarian dialect found at Epidauros (Collitz, Sammlung,
etc. iii. 1, Die Megarischen Inschr., edited by Bechtel, p. 16, No. 3025)
records a decision of the Megarians, who were asked by the League to mediate
in a territorial dispute between two of its States, Epidauros and Corinth. As

648 APPENDIX II

Corinth belonged to the League between 243 and 228 B.c., the date of the
document is limited to twenty years. The General in office is named: ἐπὶ
στραταγοῦ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν Αἰγιαλεῦς (1. 1). We hear nowhere else of Aigialeés,
but as we know who the Generals were from 284 to 223 (although the exact
distribution over these years is not quite certain ; see Ὁ. 468 sqq.), the date is
limited further to the eight years, 243-235. Of these 243 and 241 are ex-
cluded, as Aratos was General in these years.

P.214. ‘‘The Assembly met of right twice yearly, in Spring and Autumn.”

The time of the Spring Assembly was the rising of the Pleiades, and it has
been shown that this was 11th May. Thus we get 11th November, or there-
abouts, for the Autumn Assembly. These dates permitted the Achaian
farmers to discharge their political duties without sacrificing their private
interests. The May Assembly was just before the beginning of harvest ; the
November Congress followed the autumn sowing.

P. 214 and p. 281 (cf. p. 426). In Polybios, v. 1, the ἄρχοντες, whom Philip
got to summon the Ekklésia, are not the dauopyol alone, but rather the
δαμιοργοί and the Ministers; cf. Pol. xxiii. 5, where Flamininus writes
τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν, bidding them call an Assembly.
(See Vischer, p. 572, and cf. Mr. Strachan-Davidson’s Prolegomena to his Selec-
tions from Polybius, Ὁ. 48.)

P. 218. ‘‘In America the Ministers of the President are strictly excluded
from seats in Congress.” That is, they cannot vote in Congress; but they
have the right of attending and speaking in both Houses. Mr. Bryce points
out that the exclusion of the Ministers tends to weaken the legislative
efficiency of Congress. The American Ministers, it must be observed, are not
really a government, but rather ‘‘a group of heads of departments ” (Bryce,
i, 123).

P. 219. ‘‘Under-General.” M. Dubois supposes that there was not a
single ‘Troorpdryyos but a number of ὑποστράτηγοι, who were appointed by
the League to organize the military contingents of the several cities—possibly
the same as the οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόνες mentioned by Polybios. I cannot see
the evidence.

Besides the officers mentioned on p. 219 there were also ᾿Αποτέλειοι
(mentioned once by Polybios, x. 23. 9), who assisted in the military organiza-
tion ; and there was the zavarch or admiral of the fleet—a permanent office.

P. 219, note 2, line 13. Erratum.—Read a Magistrate of Patrai (for a
Magistrate at Pharai).

Ib. (cf. p. 429, note 6). Bishop Thirlwall, writing to Mr. Freeman in refer-
ence to this difficult expression, will only commit himself so far as to state his
opinion that there must have been something special in the case, and that the
συντέλεια, of which Lykos was ὑποστράτηγος, was ‘‘some partial union.”

It may be remarked that Mr. Freeman’s conjecture of a proper adjective
would require Πατραικῆς (and so Vischer).

M. Dubois (p. 166) observes that if the text is correct the words διὰ τὸ
might possibly be explained by supposing that there was some strange law,

APPENDIX II 649

that if the stratégos were obliged to leave the army he should consign the
command to the hypostratégos, on whose territory he happened to be. This
passage seems to be the sole prop of his theory of a number of ὑποστράτηγοι.

P. 220. There is no doubt that, as Mr. Freeman has shown, in opposition
to Thirlwall and Schorn (and Merleker), all Achaian citizens, to whatever
city they belonged, were eligible as Ministers, although the number of the
Ministers was a survival from the time when the League consisted of the
Ten Achaian towns. But it is very tantalizing that there is absolutely no
evidence, direct or indirect, bearing on the mode in which the Ministers were
elected. It is impossible to suppose that they were nominated by the
stratégos, and it is difficult to imagine how they could be elected by the
Assembly without causing jealousies among the cities. In Polybios, xxiii. 10,
three of the Ministers are Megalopolitans.

P. 220, note 1. ol προεστῶτες is used in different senses in Polybios. In
iv. 9. 3 it means the Damiorgoi, in ii. 46. 4 the βουλευταί. This is natural
enough, for both Magistrates and Senators belonged to the same class of
leading men, and προεστῶτες was not an official term.

P. 221, note 1. Damiurgis civilatium, qui summus est magistratus (Livy
xxXviii. 30). This looks like local Magistrates. But Livy is certainly re-
ferring to Federal Magistrates, and M. Dubois has acutely proposed to
punctuate Damiurgis, civitatium qui summus est magistratus. This gives the
sense required : civitatium being the cities collectively, that is, the League.

There were, however, also local damiurgi, cf. p. 220, note 1. We find
them in Arkadian towns, for example at Tegea. See Bull. de Corr. hell. vii.
492 and xiii. 287.

P. 229. ‘‘ There is distinct evidence that some important public officers
were not paid.” I cannot think that the passages (notes 2 and 8) in which
Mr. Freeman finds this evidence are decisive. Archon may have spent a large
sum from his private means in addition to the pay of his office. Modern
instances could be cited. Pol. xxiii. 7 certainly does not prove that the
Senators were not paid. (Cf. Dubois, p. 149.)

P. 230. ‘*No property qualification.” It is conceivable, however, that
only those who possessed property, however small, received the Achaian
(Federal) citizenship. This is the opinion of Wahner, but it cannot be
proved. Polybios, v. 93. 6, does not help us.

P. 231. It is hard to feel quite certain that ‘‘ the forma] presidency of the
Assembly” was vested in the ministers, as Mr. Freeman thinks. M. Dubois
has no hesitation in ruling that the General presided at the debates (pp. 153,
154).

P. 231, note 4. οἱ τῆς γερουσίας, Pol. xxxviii. 5. This is the only distinct
mention of the Tepovola. Drumann identified it with the Βουλή. Merleker
and Wabner supposed it to be a distinct administrative council, somewhat
like the Ztolian Apoklétoi. If so, it is strange indeed that we do not hear of
it again, except perhaps in Pausanias vii. 12. 7, where the γέροντες ask Diaios

650 APPENDIX II

a question. The truth is, we have not sufficient data to justify us in
identifying the Gerusia either with the Magistrates or with any other
known body.

P. 240. The passage of Polybios (xxiii. 7. 8), which Mr. Freeman adduces
to prove that the Senate ‘‘consisted of one hundred and twenty unpaid
members,” does not prove so much (as was pointed out by Vischer, p. 573. 4).
It is there related (see p. 508) that Eumenés offered the Achaians a hundred
and twenty talents to pay the Senators at the times of Assembly, but it is
not stated that each Senator was to receive a talent; so no deduction as to
the number of Senators can be made. Nor, strictly speaking, can it be
inferred that the Senators were unpaid. Vischer, however, agrees with Mr.
Freeman in thinking so, as against Hermann and Schomann.

P, 241. ““ Financial policy of the League.”

Two interesting points have come out through inscriptions published since
the original edition of Federal Government appeared. (1) The Central
Government could exercise a control over the finances of the Cities, in
order to secure its own interests. This appears in the act admitting Orcho-
menos as a member, where it is expressly provided that Orchomenos shall
pay a sum of money for the Methydrians, whose cause they had supported.
Another case of interference in a financial affair will be found in Polybios
xxv. 8. (2) The League could impose a fine on any of its members. A fine
was imposed on the Lacedmemonians for offences against the Megalopolitans.
See inscription published in the Archacologische Zeitung, 1879, p. 127, περὶ
τᾶς faulas ἄι ἐζαμί[ωσαν ol ᾽Αχαιοὶ τὸν δᾶμον τὸν Λακε]δαιμονίων. From the
same document it appears that when disputes between Achaian towns were
decided by outsiders, the arbitration was invited not by the towns concerned,
but by the League.

Ῥ, 245, note 2. See the contrast drawn by Mr. Bryce (American Com-
monwealth, ii. 149) between the President and State Governor.

P. 254. In 426 3.c. the Atolians were not hindered by Démosthenés
from seizing Molykria, although he saved Naupaktos. The occupation of
Molykria, situated at the narrowest point of the Gulf of Corinth, was im-
portant because it gave them a vantage-point for plundering Peloponnésos.

P, 256. Itis clear that Mr. Freeman regarded the Ztolian League as exist-
ing before the death of Alexander, and probably even at the beginning of his
reign. He did not accept as certain the inference of Schorn from the passage
of Arrian quoted in note 1. It is very strange to find M. Dubois ascribing
to him exactly the opposite opinion. ‘‘Schorn et M. Freeman ont vu dans
le texte d’Arrien une preuve établissant que 1’Etolie était encore, ἃ cette
époque, un groupe de peuples indépendants les uns des autres." M. Dubois
himself holds, and I think rightly, that the old League had not ceased to
exist.

P, 257. ‘‘Share of the Atolians in the Gaulish War.”
Interesting testimony to the part played by the Aitolians on this occasion

APPENDIX II 651

is furnished by recently discovered decrees, in which other Greek states
express their gratitude to the Preservers of Delphi. The Atolians founded
a feast, called Sétéria, at Delphi in commemoration of the deliverance, and
asked the Greek States to recognize it. We have the favourable replies of
Athens and Chios. The Athenian decree will be found in the Corpus Inscr.
Att. ti. 323, that of Chios in the Bull. de Correspondance hellénique, v. p.
305 80.

The influence won by the Atolians at Delphi is amply attested by the
inscriptions found there, and appreciated in M. Foucart’s monograph,
Mémoire sur les ruines et (histoire de Delphes. See above, note to Ὁ. 112.

The Atolians often deposited at Delphi copies of their decrees,

P. 260, note 8. ‘‘Seemingly even at Naupaktos.” M. Dubois interprets
the statement of Livy, on which this is founded, as follows: ‘‘ Apres les dés-
astres de la guerre contre Macédoine et le sac de l’ancienne capitale, le siége
de l’assemblée annuelle semble avoir été transporté pour quelque temps ἃ
Naupacte.” Extraordinary assemblies were held at such places as Lamia,
Hérakleia, and Hypata.

P. 261. ‘‘Powers of the Assembly.” We possess in an incomplete
form a decree of the Aitolian Assembly, in reply to a letter of Vaxos in
Crete. The Vaxians wrote in favour of a citizen of their own who was
residing at Amphissa, asking the Assembly to make him an tolian citizen.
(The inscription was published in 1882 in the Bulletin de Correspondance
hellénique, vol. vi.) The Vaxian letter begins :

'᾽'Οαξίων ol κόσμοι καὶ a πόλις Αἰτωλῶν ouvdspos] καὶ τῶι στραταγῶι Kal τῶι
ἱππάρχαι χαίρειν.

It is interesting to observe that the Captain of Horse is specially named in

the greeting.

P. 262. ‘The body called the Apoklétoi seem to have been the Senate.”
The ‘‘council” of the Apoklétoi must, I think, be distinguished from the
Senate. The Apoklétoi were the Federal executive, and the General was the
president of this body, which fulfilled somewhat the same functions as the
Achaian Démiourgoi. The difference is that there were only ten Démiourgoi,
but over thirty Apoklétoi. Mr. Freeman is certainly right in the view that
the Synedroi did not correspond to the Démiourgoi. M. Dubois puts forward
the view that they were the Bouleutai, and that the magistrates (that is, the
Apoklétoi) were designated as προστάται τοῦ συνεδρίου.

The Assembly then would have consisted of (1) the Senators, sometimes
called σύνεδροι, (2) the Ztolian citizens, who chose to attend, (3) the executive
council composed of the General, the Hipparch, the Secretary (γραμματεύ:),
and the Apoklétoi.

We can say definitely in the case of the Atolian League what could only
be put forward tentatively in the case of the Achaian, that the Senate con-
sisted of Representatives chosen by the States. The evidence for this is
found in an inscription which was unknown to Mr. Freeman: a decree of

652 APPENDIX II

the Ztolians ordaining that two towns, Melitaia (now ᾿Αβαρίτζα) and Pérea,
which had previously formed one State, should be separated and form two
States. The representation in the Senate is provided for as follows: (1 17)
el δέ κα ἀποπολιτεύωντι TIinpets ἀπὸ Με[λι)ταέων περὶ μὲν ras χώρας Spas χρήσθων
τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ ἔχοντες ἀποπορευνέσθων βουλευτὰν ἕνα καὶ τὰ δάνεια συν-
αποτινόντω ὅσα κα ἁ πόλις ὀφείλῃ, κατὰ τὸ ἐπίβαλλον μέρος [τ]οῦ βουλευτᾶ, καὶ
ἐμφερόντω τὰ ἐν τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς γινόμενα κατὰ τὸν βουλευτάν. (I take the text
from Fick's edition of the Atolian Inscriptions in vol. ii. part i. of Collitz,
Sammlung der gr. Dialekt-Inschriften, p. 22.) The inscription belongs to
the end of the third century. We learn from it that the Secretary was the
eponymous officer of the Assembly. The witnesses of the act are (1. 34) τὸ
συνέδριον Α[ἰτωλ]ῶν τὸ ἐπὶ γραμματέος Λύκου καὶ ol προσστάται τοῦ συνεδρίου
K.T.X.

P. 263, note 3. The improved reading of the sentence quoted from the
Keian decree is as follows (Fick, op. cit. p. 18):

el δέ rls xa ἄγει τοὺς xelovs τὸν orparaydy ἀεὶ τὸν ἐνάρχοντα τὰ ἐν Αἰτωλίαν
καταγόμενα [ἀναπράσσἼ]οντα κύριον εἶμεν κ.τ.λ.

In the Téian decree Fick reads (Ὁ. 19): τὰ μὲν ἐμφανῆ ἀναπράσσειν τὸν
o[rp]ara[ydr] καὶ rods συνέδρους ἀεὶ τοὺς évdpyous.

Ib. note 4. Omit ἁ before ἀνιέρωσις and ἀσυλία, and read ἐν τοὺς νόμους.

P. 264. A. Mommsen has shown (Philologus xxiv) by a careful examina-
tion of Delphic inscriptions that the strategic year of the Aitolians began—
that is, the General came into office—in the Delphic month Boathoos, which
the Atolians therefore called προκύκλιος, the month beginning the cycle of
office. It corresponds partly to our September.

P. 268, line 10. ‘‘ Delphi must have been seized in some way or other.”
See above, note to p. 257. An Atolian decree found at Delphi (published in
1881 in the Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique, vol. v.) enacts that none
of the Delphians shall be exempt from the money requisition unless such
immunity be granted by the city of Delphi. See Dittenberger, Sylloge 325,
and Fick in Collitz, Sammlung der gr. Dial.-Inschr. ii. 1. 18.

orparayéovros Τιμαίου ἔδοξε rots Αἰτωλοῖς μηθένα τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς συνοίκων
ἀτελέα εἶμεν, εἴ κα μὴ δοθῆι παρὰ ras πόλιος τῶν Δελφῶν ἀτέλεια x.7.X.

If this Timaios be the same as he who is mentioned in a Messénian
inscription (see below, note to p. 342), the date of this decree would be
roughly determined between 240 and 220 B.c.

P. 268, line 20, “Teds” ; line 31, Teds; and p. 270, line 5, “The Téian ally.”
It is doubtful whether Teés was ever really a member of the Atolian League,
with right of voting in the Assembly at Thermon. The inscription (C. J. G.
3046) on which Mr. Freeman relies (cp. p. 263) only proves that Teds had a
special treaty with the Htolians, securing to her immunity from depredation
by pirates (dovAla) and compensation in case of such depredation.

P. 290. ‘‘The habit of looking to Ptolemy.” M. Dubois (p. 60) urges
in defence of Aratos that the Achaians had really no other resource, and
reminds us that the Egyptian navy was very powerful in the Agean at

APPENDIX II 653

this time. Cp. Homolle in the Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique vi.
161.

P. 292. ‘‘It was more likely at this time (245-244 3.c.] than at any
other that the Atolian League made its famous agreement with Antigonos
for the partition of the Achaian territory.”

This agreement seems to have also included a partition of the Ionian
possessions of the Ptolemies. We learn of the activity of the Atolians in
those regions from chance notices of Polyenus and Frontinus. The Greek
writer mentions that the Atolian Timarchus disembarked in a populous part
of Asia, and burned his ships to make his soldiers fight ; he was completely
successful (Strat. v. 25). In Bk. iii. (2) of the Strategemata of Frontinus,
the stratagem by which Timarchus obtained possession of Samos is related.
These distant enterprises, as M. Dubois remarks (p. 32), showed that Atolians

a considerable marine power. He thinks that the extant treaties
with Keos and Teds must be placed between 240 and 220 8.0, and suggests
that Lysimacheia and Chalkédén were annexed about 240.

P. 318. Among the effects of the acquisition of Megalopolis must also be
reckoned the decided adoption by the League of the Megalopolitan tradition
of hostility to Sparta. See Dubois, p. 63: ‘‘dans la politique d’Aratus et de
ses successeurs Philopcemen, Lycortas, Polybe, l’antagonisme contre la Laconie
devint un fait constant.” This new policy was started through the influence
of Lydiadas (above, p. 319). M. Dubois tries to show that as a consequence
of this the policy of the League becomes exclusively Peloponnésian, and
the Achaians cease to dispute with the Atolians the Gulf of Corinth.

P. 334. “Το League was now the greatest power of Greece.” M.
Dubois, who has taken the Atolians under his special protection, demurs to
this, and suggests that the northern League was stronger. He seems also to
think that the Achaians were not stronger now than Macedonia or Sparta.
It seems to me that at this time the four powers were pretty equally
balanced.

P, 842. In illustration of the influence possessed by the Atolians at this
time in the Peloponnésos, I may refer to a decree of the Messénians accepting
the terms of an agreement proposed by the /Etolians to regulate the frontiers
of Messéné and Phigaleia, and other relations between the two cities. The
inscription will be found in Le Bas et Foucart, Inscriptions du Peloponnése
No. 3288, :

P. 359 (line 4 from foot “Τὸ Plutarch ;” cp. p. 361, note1). M. Dubois
(p. 65) warns us against trusting too much to Plutarch, who would have us
believe that the revolution of Kleomenés was merely a return to the laws of
Lycurgus and ‘‘ancient virtue ;” and would explain the policy of Aratos
by the disgust which the Lacedemonian cloak and black bread inspired in
a wealthy citizen of Sikyén. ‘‘C’est 14 un pur roman philosophique.” We
must certainly always remember that the narrative of Plutarch is strongly
biassed by the influence of Phylarchos (although he used Aratos’ Memoirs as
well).

654 APPENDIX II

As for Phylarchos, a decree of the Arkadian League has been discovered
in honour ‘‘of Phylarchos, son of Lysikratés the Athenian,” enacting that
he shall be ‘‘ the proxenos and benefactor of all the Arkadians.” M. Foucart
(who published it in the Mémoires of the Académie des inscriptions εἰ belles-
lettres, vol. viii.) supposes the Phylarchos of this decree to be identical with
Phylarchos the historian and enemy of Aratos. He thinks that there was a
strong Lakénian party in Arkadia, and that this decree was a manifesto
against Aratos and in favour of Kleomenés. M. Dubois has shown the
uncertainty of the combination (p. 65). The inscription will be found in
Collitz, Sammlung etc., i. p. 339, No. 1181, or Dittenberger, Sylloge, No.
167.

P. 372. ‘‘Kleomenés wins the Argolic cities.”

A very mutilated inscription of Troizén, in which τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν is
mentioned, is supposed to date from shortly before this event. Bull. de
Corr. hell. (1886) p. 186 80.

P. 385. The statement that the Argives received Mantineia from Antigonos
and founded the colony Antigoneia depends on the reading in Plutarch's
Aratos, 45 (cited in the note), τῶν γὰρ ᾿Αργείων. But E. Curtius reads
᾿Αχαιῶν, which is adopted in the text of Sintenis.

P. 386, line 10. ‘‘It [Orchomenos] had never belonged to the League.”

It seems to me (cp. Dittenberger in Hermes xviii. 178 sqq.) that the words
of Polybios, iv. 6. 5 [ὁ βασιλεὺς ’Avriyorvos] ᾿Ορχομενὸν κατὰ κράτος ἑλὼν
οὐκ ἀποκατέστησε τοῖς ᾿Αχαιοῖς ἀλλὰ σφετερισάμενος κατεῖχε imply that
Orchomenos did belong to the Achsian League before ; and this is confirmed
by the expression of Livy when he tells how in 199 B.c. Philip sent envoys
gui redderent Acheis Orchomenon (xxxil. 5).

If so, Orchomenos was twice admitted into the Achaian League: (1)
before 222 Bc. and (2) in or after 199 B.c.; see above, p. 478. The
question arises, to which occasion are we to refer the act of union, of which
I have printed the text in note to p. 212. Dittenberger decides for the first,
and suggests the year 234-233 B.c. as the date. Foucart, who first published
the inscription, had only taken into account the second possibility.

P. 398. M. Dubois defends Philopoimén’s withdrawal to Crete. ‘‘ Les
guerres qu'il fit en Créte ἃ la téte d’une troupe de mercenaires ne furent sans
doute pas si inutiles ἃ sa patrie qu’on |’a dit souvent. Nous verrons plus
tard que les tyrans de Sparte recrutérent souvent des soldats et des marins
dans cette ile: Philopceemen servait peut-étre trés efficacement les intéréts
de la ligue en lui gagnant des partisans crétois.” For connexion of Crete
and continental Greece, cp. Polybios, iv. 55.

P. 395. For. Phigaleia and the Atolian League, cp. above, p. 653, my
note to p. 342.

P, 443, note 1. But ‘‘ bellumque cum quibus regi placeret’” (that is, the
enemies of King Philip were to be the enemies of the League) is the right
reading, which now appears in all good texts. The text must be modified

APPENDIX II 655

accordingly. The words ‘‘to wage war with what kings they pleased”
should be ‘‘ to wage war with whatsoever states Philip pleased.”

P. 446, note 3. Bishop Thirlwall, in a letter already referred to, says a
word for Livy. ‘‘I think it possible that, though he had known and
remembered all about the two Aratuses, he might still, in order to enhance
the enormity of Philip’s conduct, have indulged in the slight rhetorical
exaggeration of calling the injured husband ‘the foremost man of all the
Achaeans’ (princeps, as you well remark in your note, p. 336 [262], having
nothing to do with official dignity); and in a matter which concerned the

honour of the family, the father and the son might be not very improperly
treated as one.”

P. 458, note 2. In the letter already quoted Bishop Thirlwall suggests
that what looks in this passage of Livy like a blunder ‘‘may be nothing
more than looseness of expression in a case which did not call for greater
exactness.” Although ‘‘one could not even compare Livy's expression to
that of one who should say that the Danes were angry with the Holsteiners
because they would not make common cause with the rest of Denmark,”
yet ‘‘considering the time αὐ and for which Livy wrote, I should not think
it very unnatural, if, although aware of the real state of the case, he here
used Achais in the sense in which it was most familiar to his readers, as
equivalent to Peloponnesus.”

P. 470. ‘The question reduces itself to this. Was Plutarch more likely
to go wrong, etc. δ

But it must be remembered that Mr. Freeman’s conjectural solution
assumes not only that Plutarch went wrong in mistaking an official year of
the younger Aratos for a year of his father’s (which he might easily have
done), but also that a mistake has crept into Plutarch’s text, δωδέκατον
having taken the place of δέκατον in Aratvs 35. Remembering Mr. Freeman’s
strong protest against ‘‘text-tinkering” in the preface to vol. iii. of his
History of Sicily, 1 doubt whether he would have, in later years, considered
his solution an admissible one.

P. 484. ‘*New Federations.” On the Federation of the Magnétes much
light has been recently thrown by inscriptions. (See P. Monceaux in the
Revue archéologique (1888) xii. 301; P. Wolters in Mittheilungen des deutschen
Inst. in Athen (1889) xiv. 51 and (1890) xv. 283 ; G. Fougéres in Bulletin de
corr. hell. xiii. 271.)

The President was the στρατηγός (=princeps magistratuum, Livy xxxv. 81).
He was assisted by a συναρχία of Ten, also termed στρατηγοί, who were
elected annually. There were also a Hipparch and a Navarch ; a ταμίας
(Secretary of Finance) ; and a board of civil magistrates, νομοφύλακες. The
legislative council, who have a special secretary (γραμματεύς), are always
called οἱ σύνεδροι ; and the decrees which they propose are afterwards put
to the Assembly in which the legislative power resides. Thus the decrees
always describe the proceedings in the meeting of the Synedroi, and conclude

656 APPENDIX I

with the formula ἔδοξεν καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ. Démétrias was the seat of the
Federal Government, and Zeus Akraios the chief divinity of the League.

P. 495. ‘‘The League gave up all claim to the cities which had been
taken from it during the war.”

Not only those which had been taken, but also those which voluntarily
entered into friendship with Rome (φιλίαν ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, Poly bios,
xxii, 18. 4 and 15. 13). Which were these? M. Dubois thinks they were
‘les cités comprises dans la proclamation de liberté de Corinthe et plus par-
ticuli¢rement les cités thessaliennes reformant un κοινόν auquel on avait ajouté
l’Achaie Phthiotide” (p. 43). ᾿

P. 539. Ὠ δῖοδβ, as Mr. Strachan-Davidson remarks, can hardly have gone
on the embassy until his term of Presidency had expired (in August).

P. 541. Mr. Freeman’s view that this meeting in 147 B.c., on the occasion
of the embassy of Aurelius, was not a Federal Assembly, is questioned by
Mr. Strachan-Davidson (Proleg. to Select. from Polybius, Ὁ. 48). “41 think
that the words of Pausanias (vii. 14. 1 τούς re ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν
ἔχοντας τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ Δίαιον ἐκάλει παρ᾽ αὑτόν) cannot be pressed so far, and
what he says in the next section—raira Ὀρέστου λέγοντος οἱ ἄρχοντες τῶν
᾿Αχαιῶν οὐδὲ τὸν πάντα ὑπομείναντες ἀκοῦσαι λόγον ἔθεον és τὸ ἐκτὸς τῆς οἰκίας
καὶ ἐκάλουν ᾿Αχαιοὺς ἐς éxxAnolay—seems to point rather to one of the regular
half-yearly meetings of the Senate and Assembly of the League. The local
magistrates in the various cities may very likely have been ex officio members
of the Senate (Bovd4).”

P, 548. Mr. Freeman is hardly right in supposing that this was an
extraordinary Assembly. It must have been the regular Autumn Assembly
at which Diaios was regularly elected President ; and what it proves is that
the Autumn Assembly was not as late as November. Diaios held office after
the death of Kritolaos for the remainder of Kritolaos’ year of Presidency, but
was also elected on his own account for the following year. See Mr. Strachan-
Davidson, Proleg. to Selections from Polybius, p. 42, who points out that
‘everything falls into order if we assume that a new arrangement came
into force after the war with Perseus, so that the assemblies were now held
in February and in August, and the elections (followed immediately by entry
on office) at the August Meeting.”

That the President was always elected at a stated Meeting seems almost
certain.

P. 552. As to the date of the nominal restoration of the League by the
Romans, see Hertzberg, Gesch. Griechenlands unter der Herrschaft der Rimer,
i. 301 (note 218).

P. 568. It is to be observed that the technical phrase for the Latin group
of peoples was nomen Latinum ; whereas populus was always used of the
single town. Cf. C. J. L., x. 797, sacra principia p. R. Quirit. nominisque
Latini quai apud Laurentis coluntur. See Mommsen, Staaésreché, iii. 609.

P. 569, note 4. For the Feria Latine see also Diénysios, vi. 95.—For
political meetings—the concilium—cf. also Didnysios, v. 50, Livy, i. 50.

APPENDIX IT 657

P. 568, note 5. The Dictator was the Alban king, and existed until the
fall of Alba, after which the presidency of the League was vested in the two
preetors, mentioned in this note. Cp. also Diénysios, v. 61.

P. 571, note 1. These articles were afterwards published in Historical
Essays, first series.

P. 572. Dissolution of the Latin League. Cf. also Cincius quoted by
Festus, 8.0. praetor.

P. 578. We must distinguish between two different kinds of Latin
citizenship ; the better kind which was possessed by the prisci Latini, that
is, by all Latin towns before 268 B.c., and the inferior kind which was
granted to the Twelve Colonies, of which the first, Ariminum, was ‘‘ deduced "’
in that year. The former kind, never bestowed after 268 B.c., may be dis-
tinguished as that of the prisci Latini; the latter, as that of the Latini
coloniarit (cf. Gaius, 1. 22) or the Jus of Ariminum. The exact difference
between these two forms of Jus Latinum has not been recorded. The first
form vanished for ever after the Social War, as all the communities which
possessed it received full Roman citizenship. Under the Empire there are
no Latin communities except in the provinces, and the Jus Latinum conferred
on provincial towns, whether in Republican or Imperial times, is always the
Jus of Ariminum.

P. 577, note 1. This article was afterwards published in Historical Essays,
second series. Cf. p. 590, notes 1 and 2.

P. 593, note 1. The phrases in the Chronicle of Farfa (Muratori, S.2.J.
ii. b.) are, col. 416, Guido Imperator constituitur; col. 460, Berengarius
Imperator Augustus.

P. 594, line 4 from foot, for ‘levied " read ‘‘ waged.”

P. 595, note 1, ‘‘at Milan” should be strictly ‘‘at Monza and at Milan.”
Conrad was crowned and anointed at Monza by the Milanese and then
crowned again at Milan.

P. 613, line 3 from top, for ‘‘suzerainty ” read ‘‘ suzerain.”

P. 617, note 2, Afterwards published in Historical Essays, first series.

P. 618, note 2. Mr. Freeman's MS. has ‘‘at Milan for Italy.” I believe
that this was a mere slip, and have ventured to substitute Monza for Milan.
Coronations sometimes took place at Milan, but usually at Monza; and in
the lines which he quotes from Godfrey there is no mention of Mediolanum,
only of Modoetia. So too on p. 599 (1. 6 from top) I have inserted the name
of Monza. In earlier times Pavia was the place of coronation for Italy.
See Bryce, Holy Roman Empire (ed. 7) p. 198.

P. 624, note 2. See note to p. 571, note 1.

P. 625, line 4 from top, for ‘‘ Marzfeld” read ‘‘ Mirzfeld.”

P. 626, notes, line 8 from foot. ‘‘ Willehelmus cognomento Bostar Rex
Anglorum.” Bostar of course means the Bastard ; it is a curious corruption.
The passage of Lambert will be found in Pertz, v. p. 216.

2UuU

INDEX

AACHEN, seat of Imperial Government,
593

crowning place of the Kings of Ger-
many, 618 note
Abantidas, his Tyranny at Sikydn, 280
assassinated, 281
Abia, independent member of Achaian
League, 507
Acerbus Morena, 596 note, 598 note
Achaian Assembly, its democratic con-
stitution, 205, 209, 210
contrast with the Athenian, 206
aristocratic elements in, 206, 207,
209
not oligarchic, 209
voting in, 211
evils of the system, 212
short and unfrequent meetings of,
214
restriction of its power, 215
places of meeting, 1.
its relations with the Government,
217
as to power of summoning, 232
military contingents ordered by, 242
passes vote of censure on Aratos,
352
Megalopolitan embassy to, 363
account of debate at Sikydn, 479
yearly meetings moved from Aigion,
508
Achaian General, answers to Presi-
dent, 219, 223
his relations to the Ministers, 221,
231
number reduced to one, 228, 245,
277
his powers, 224, 226, 228, 231, 304
compared with a Prime Minister,
224, 226, 227
with the American President, 227,
246
his unrestrained power in war, 233

Achaian General, as to the union of

military and civil powers in, 238-
235

his badge of office, 234

incapable of immediate re-election,
237

no kingly powers, 245

Achaian League. See also Achaian

Assembly, General, Magistrates,
Senate, 508

a great example of Federal Govern-
ment, 4

Federal taxation in, 11, 241

a League of Cities, 77

Primary Assemblies in, 77, 80

aims of, opposel to those of Mace-
donia, 179

its generous aims, 183

-its effect on Greece, 184

history of the Old League, 185-191

beginning of the revived League,
179, 191

joined by all the Achaian Cities,
190 note

extended to all Achaia, 192

effect of Gaulish invasion on, 193

Constitution of, 197

its democratic nature, 198, 205

compared with that of Athens, 199,
206, 216

tendency to assimilation in, 200

a National Government, 202

no independent diplomatic action
in the Cities, 202-205 segg. See
also Achaian Assembly

admission of new Cities into, 212,
646

as to the arrangement of voting, 1.

power of the Magistrates, 216

Federal offices in, 219, 229. See
also Achaian General

its financial and military policy, 241

mercenaries employed by, 242

660

Achaian League,

compared with
United States Constitution, 243

8€qq.
as described in the “‘Federalist’”’ and
by Mably, 249

"compared with that of Actolia, 251,

&

- 258, 264 seggq.
continuity of its territory, 267
its biographical character, 278
results of the annexation of Sikyon,
278, 286
its war with Atolia, 292
its alliance with Alexander of
Corinth, 1.
extension of its territory, 295
suit of Aristippos against, 302
its alliance with Ptolemy Philadel-
phos, Ὁ.
-powers of the General, 304, 809
its alliance with Sparta, 305
truce concluded with Antigonos,
308

‘its alliance with Atolia, 1.

its international morality, 310

effect of the accession of Kleénai, 313

extension in Arkadia, 314

accession of Megalopolis, 315

and its effects, 318

joins ZXtolia on behalf of Korkyra,
325

failure of naval operations, 7.

Roman embassy to, 327

alliance of with Athens, 329-331

further extension of, 331, 333

union of Argos with, 331-333

its commanding position, 334

causes of the war with Sparta, 338,
342

declaration of war, 344

union of Kaphyai, 2.

Mantineian embassy to, 349 note

schemes of Kleomenés fatal to, 357

Spartan negociations with, 361

Megalopolitan embassy to, 363

grants leave to appeal to Macedonia,
364

letter from Antigonos read to, 366

negociates with Kleomenés, 367

Kleomenés declares war against, 369

secessions from, 372-376 \

votes absolute power to Aratos, 377

invites the help of Antigonos, 379

its position henceforth, 12.

recovers seceded cities, 384

Tegea united to, 386

INDEX

Achaian League, its relation to Mace-

donia, 389-391

its embassy on behalf of Messéné,
399, 401

ratifies decree for Social War, 408

contribution to refused by Western
States, 417

Pséphis annexed to, 419

its relations with Philip, 420

Macedonian feeling against, 422

combines Federal sovereignty with
State rights, 429

effects of the Treaty with Hannibal
on, 444

attacked by Rome and her allies, 453

asks help of Philip, 22.

military system reformed by Philo-
poimén, 454, 462

defeats Ztolians and Eleians, 459

cessions to, by Philip, 460

dealings of Philip with, 472

his attempt to win over, 478

joins Roman alliance, 479, 480

its share in Macedonian War, 1d.

policy of Flamininus towards, 485

its independent action against
Nabis, 490

Sparta annexed to, 492

declares war against Antiochos, 493

Elis and Messéné united to, 496

alleged party of Antiochos in, 2.
note

buys Zakynthos, 497

its right to, disputed by Flami-
ninus, 4.

extended over all Peloponnésos, 498

its relation with Rome, 1d.

Roman intrigues against, 499, 504

declares war against Sparta, 501

treatment of Sparta, 502

Messéné revolts agrinst, 505

readmits Messéné, 506

yearly meetings of, removed from
Aigion, 508

refuses the offer of Eumenés of Per-
gamos, 1.

resists Roman encroachments, 509-
§11

its condition at the death of Philo-
poimeén, 512

Roman party in, ἐδ.

its action towards Lacedemonian
exiles, 513, 514

change in the treatment of, by
Rome, 514

INDEX 661

Achaian League, decrees non -inter-

course with Macedonia, 522

letter and embassy of Perseus to,
522, 523

Roman dealings with individual
cities, 523

forther inroads on Federal rights,
524, 525

restores Eumenés his honours, 526,
527

its negociation with Marcius, 527

refuses the request of Appius, 528

appealed to by Egypt for help, ἰδ.

debate on the question, 528-530

Roman policy towards, 530

demands of the Roman embassy,
531

Achaians sent to Rome for trial, 532

fresh Roman intrigues against, 534,
536

its debate on the Cretan alliance,
535

its wars with Sparta, 538, 540

Roman embassies to, 541, 548

dismemberment of, demanded by
Rome, 541

its war with Rome, 546-550

becomes a dependency of Rome, 550

dissolution of, 551

nominal revival of, 552

its errors due to Roman intrigues,
553

general results of, 554

the natural model for liberated
Greece, 1.

list of the cities, 635-637

coinage of, 635

decrees of, 647

Achaian Magistrates, their power

greater than the Athenian, 216
form a ‘‘ Government,” 217, 219
their relation with the Assembly, 20.
Ministerial offices, 219
their number and election, 220
their relation to the General, 22],

232 .
necessarily wealthy, 229
no property qualification for, 230
act as Speakers of the Assembly, 231
compared with American Cabinet,

248

Achaian Senate, its functions, 239-241

compared with Norwegian Lagthing,
247 ; its constitution, 241, 643

Adeimantos of Sparta murdered, 405

dui, confederation of, 560 note
Aeropos and Dardas, 466 and ante
Aeropos of Epeiros, 466 ante
ZEschinés, pleads before the Ten
Thousand, 161
Esernia, Federal capital of Italy, 588
ZEtolia, its early history, 254 seqq.
Z£tolian League, compared with that
of Achaia, 252, 258, 264 seqq.
a union of districts, 254, 259, 271
early history of, 256-258
its democratic character, 260
meeting of the Assembly, 260 note,
261
the Senate, 262, 651
Magistrates, 263
and General, ἐδ.
powers of the General, 232 note,
264
its foreign policy, 265
hostages given to Rome by, 265
note

its treason towards Greece, 266,
292

re nature of its territory,
26

variety of relations in, 268 segg., 278

compared with those of British de- -
pendencies, 270

compared with Swiss Confederation,
271 seqg.

its war with Achaia, 292, 305 δέρῃ.

its agreement with Antigonos, +.

its alliance with Achaia, 308

its acquisitions in Arkadia, 314

its war with Akarnania, 321-323

sends help to Epeiros, 324
and to Korkyra, 325

Roman embassy to, 327

its relations with Sparta and Achaia,
340

acquisitions of, in Thessaly, 341

acknowledges Spartan acquisitions
in Arkadia, 342

Aratos asks help from, 378

extensive invasions by, 396

strange decree passed by, 399-401

its relation with Messéné, 400

its ravages in Peloponnésos, 402

its diplomatic insincerity, 7d.

sacks Kynaitha, 44 note, 403

war declared against, at Corinth,
407

Philip’s letter to, ἐδ.

shifts of, in answer 407, 408

662

Atolian League,
strength, 409
sends embassies to Peloponnésos,
411
ravages of, in Achaia, 416
invaded by Philip, 427
defeated by Lykos, 429
Chian and Rhodian embassy to, 430
its action at the Congress of Nau-

tos, 435
elects Agelaos General, 438

effect of the Treaty with Hannibal

on, 444
/ on ally of Rome, 448, 449

invades Akarnania, 449

sends an embassy to Sparta, 451

chooses King Attalos General, 455

demands of, at Aigion, 456

makes peace with Philip, 466

treatment of, by Rome, 467

Joins Rome against Philip, 475,
476

submits to Rome, 484

invites the help of Antiochos, 490

answer of, to Titus, 491

treacherous resolution of the Senate,

its comparative

elects Antiochos General, 493

defeated at Thermopyle, 494

its action towards Antiochos, 4d.

submits to the Roman ‘“ Faith,”
ἐδ.

becomes a dependent ally of Rome,
495, 516

its dismemberment, 1d. '

bidden by Rome to restore Lace-
deemonian exiles, 514

civil dissensions in, 516

oo and Macedonian parties in,
51

Perseus in, 1d.

dissolution of, 518

Roman dealings with, 519

its analogy with that of Samnium,
568

coinage of, 638

Agasisthenés of Sparta, 539
Agelaos of Naupaktos, his ravages in

Peloponnésos, 402

his speech at Congress of Naupak-
tos, 435

his policy compared with that of
Isokratés, 437

elected Atolian General, 269 note,
438

INDEX

Agelaos of Naupaktos, his Peace com-
pared with that of Nikias, 439
Agésilaos, King of Sparta, resists the
claims of Thebes, 182, 138
finds Eutaia deserted, 157
Agésipolis chosen King of Sparta, 413
exiled, 451
Agis, King of Sparta, his action
against Macedonia, 188
confounded with the later Agis,
305 note
Agia II., King of Sparta, his character,
305
his alleged Arkadian campaign,
305 note
compared with Aratos, 306
withdraws with his army, 307
his reforms and death, 337
Agron, King of Illyria, relieves Me-
dedn, 323
invades Peloponnésos, 324
Aigeira, loss and recovery of, 418
Aigina, treatment of inhabitants by
Rome, 269
joins Achaian League, 331
sold to King Attalos, 453
Aigion, seat of Achaian Assembly,
121, 190, 207, 215
in the original Achaian League,
190
drives out Macedonian garrison,
189, 192
joins the Union, 192
Assembly held at, 352, 379
conference at, 456
alleged party of Antiochos in, 496
note
yearly meetings removed from, 508
Ainésidamos of Dymé, 481
Akanthos seeks help from Sparta, 150
rejects Olynthian terms, 150-153
Akarnanian League, notices of, 114,
115
its constitution, 116
its coinage, 116, 638
the General acts as President, 282
note
partial incorporation with A£tolia,
256
applies to Rome for help against
ZEtolia, 321
fresh Atolian inroad, 322
helped by Démétrios and the Ilyri-
ans, 323
its alliance with Illyrians, 324

INDEX

Akarnanian League, promises to join
in Social War, 408
plots for the reunion of, 449
heroism of, 450
sends embassy to Sparta, 451
seeks help against Athens from
Philip, 473 note
adheres to Philip, 475, 483, 484
Akrokorinthos, Federal garrison at,
242
.demanded by Antigonos Désdn, 368
besieged by Kleomenés, 373
Kleomenés, proposals as to, 378
ceded to Antigonos, 379
surrendered to him, 385
Roman garrison in, 484
Aktion, inscription found at, 116
Alexamenos of Kalydén, his attack on
Nabis, 491

slain, 12. .

Alexander III. Pope, Frederick Bar-
barossa reconciled to, 610

Alexander the Great, as to his alleged
election by the Amphiktyons,
100 note

destroys Thebes, 141

effects of his conquests, 175

his policy towards Greece, 179

tyraany established at Pelléné by,
188

as to Ztolian embassies to, 256

his threatened vengeance on Ztolia,
1b.

Alexander, son of Pyrrhos, King of
Epeiroa, his attempt against the
Akarnanian League, 115, 266

his Aa with Antigonos Gonatas,
276

Alexander, son of Krateros, Tyrant of

Corinth, 276
his alliance with Achaia, 292
position of Corinth under, 294
his death, τό.

Alexander, guardian of Philip II. of
o_o plots against him,
42

Alexander of Ztolia, 419

Alexander of Epeiros, 482

Alexander of Pherai, 119

Alexandria, effects of its foundation,
175

Alexandria (Alessandria), foundation
of, 604

siege of, 609
joins Frederick Barbarossa, 611

Alexandria( Alessandria), name changed
to Cesarea, 1b.

Alipheira, restored to Megalopolis,
460

an independent member of the
League, 489 note
Alkamenés sent to garrison Megara,
548
Amaiokritos of Bcoeotia, 293
Ambrakia, an independent common-
wealth, 495 ~
America, United States of. See United
States
other confederations in, 6
America, North, demands of the
colonists compared with those
of Italian allies of Rome, 584
Amphidamos, General of Elis, acts as
an agent of Philip, 425
witnesses on behalf of Aratos, 426
Amphiktyonic Council not 8 true
Federal Government, 95-97
a religious not a political body, 97
only one of many in Greece, 98
its incidental political functions,
tb

instances of its action, and crusades,

no inherent force in its decrees,
100

its importance in the history of
Federalism, 101, 147

its close approach to a Federal
system, ἰδ.

ecclesiastical but not clerical, 102

8 union of tribes, not of cities,
103

compared with the unreformed
British Parliament, 104

feeling of reverence towards, 1.

its championship of Philip, 105

reforms in, under Augustus, 105-
108

approach to Representative forms
in, 108

in no sense a Government, 20.

its political nullity, 109-111

as a literary body, 110 note

its authority over Delphi, 407

Amphiktyonies, among Asiatic Greeks,

145

in Etruria, 563
Amphiktyony of Arkadia, 155
Amphiktyony of Beotia, its places of
meeting, 124, and note

664 INDEX

Amphipolis, Roman Commission at,
518, 519, 531

Amphissa, damages paid to, by Thebes,
547

Amsterdam, predominance of, 121
Amynander, King of Athamania,
mediates on behalf of tolia,
455
at the Conference of Phoiniké, 466
Zakynthos ceded to, 2.
Ancona besieged by Frederick Bar-
609

barossa, 60
Andrénidas, popular hatred of, 536
note

his embassy to Metellus, 548
treatment of by Diaios, 548, 549
Andronikos of tolia beheaded at

Rome, 518
Androsthenés, Governor of Corinth,
481
ravages Achaia, 482
Anicius, L., conquers Molossis, 520
Antalkidas, Peace of, 131
Antigoneia, name of Mantineia
changed to, 386
Antigonids in Macedonia, 178, 180
their aim and position, 179 seqq.
their rule compared with that of
Austria in Italy, 181 seqgq.
Antigonos Désén, King of Macedonia,
sends Prytanis to Megalopolis,
199 note
his protectorate and reign, 829
Aratos seeks help from, 359 segq.,
363
Megalopolitan embassy to, 364
answer laid before Federal Assem-
bly, 365
mission of young Aratos to, 367
demands Akrokorinthos, 368
his terms agreed to, 379
his character, 183, 380, 387
honours paid to, 383
his war with Kleomenés, 383 δέῃ.
recovers Akrokorinthos, 385
keeps Orchomenos, 386
his victory at Sellasia, 387
his treatment of Sparta, 2.
his death, 2.
his offers to Philopoimén, 393
Antigonos Gonatas, King of Mace-
donia, supports local Tyrannies,
181

his action towards the Achaian
League, 189

Antigonos Gonatas, King of Mace-
donia, his war with Epeiros and
Athens, 276

fails to help Aratos, 282

his relations towards him, 283, 288

his alliance with Atolia, 292

takes Corinth, 294

his truce with Achaian League, 308

hia death, ὦ.

his alleged conspiracy against Ara-
tos, 311

Antikyra taken by Rome, 449

Antinoos of Epeiros, supports Mace-
donia, 519

his death, 520

Antiochos the Great, King of Syria,

called Senex by Livy, 446 note
invited to liberate Greece, 490
elected Xtolian General, 493
action of other Federal states to, 3d.
his defeat at Thermopyle, 494

Antiochos Epiphanés, King of Syria,
his war with Egypt, 528

Antiphatas, Cretan envoy to Achaia,
535 note

Antiphilos of Boeotia, supports Rome,
483

Apellés plots against Achaia, 421

ill-treats the soldiers, 422

restrained by Philip, 2.

plots against Aratos, 422, 424

accuses him of treason, 424-426

plots against Philip, 427
Apollénia, rejects Olynthian terms, 151

threatened by Illyria, 324

her alliance with Rome, 326

besieged by Philip, 447

Apollénidés of Sikyén, inveighs against
the offer of Eumenés, 509

his action towards Rome, 525

Appian, his version of the Treaty be-

tween Philip and Hannibal, 443
an authority for the Social War, 577

Apulia, Normans in, 594

Aratos, the elder, his property at
Corinth, 201 note

his position compared with that of
Periklés, 225

and of Kledn, 226

his military career a failure, 235

as to his re-election as President,
237

his special position, 238

legend of his miraculous origin, 280
note

INDEX . 665

Aratos, the elder, escapes from

Siky6én, 280

brought up at Argos, 281

his early schemes, 282

delivers Sikyén, 1d.

his internal measure of pacification,
284, 287

annexes Sikyén to Achaian League,
278, 285

his relation to Antigonos and
Ptolemy, 284, 288

elected General of the League, 288

his character, civil and military,
289-292

his action against Ztolia, 298

delivers Corinth, 294

invades Attica, 295

his lenity to his prisoners, 2d.

encourages conspiracies in Argos,
297, 300

his vain attempt at deliverance, 301

condemned for breach of inter-
national right, 302

his pension from Ptolemy Phila-
delphos, 289 note, 302

contrasted with Agis, 306

his action in the campaign against
tolia, 306-308

his attempt on Peiraieus, 309

feeling towards, at Athens, 310

his attempt on Argos, 311

his rivalry with Lydiadas, 318

brings about the deliverance of
Athens, 329-331

his negociations with Aristomachos
of Argos, 331 ,

his action in the matter of the
union of Argos, 333

his feelings towards Sparta, 338

his conduct as regards the declara-
tion of war, 343, 344

annexes Kaphyai, 344

indignation against, for withdraw-
ing from Pallantion, 346

his campaign in Elis, 347

his treatment of Mantineia, 348

his conduct at Ladokeia, 351

vote of censure on, 352

contemplates resignation, 353

his position after the battle of
Hekatombaion, 355, 356

begins to look to Macedonia, 359, 363

declines the Generalship, 362

his dealings with Megalopolis, 363
seqq.

Aratos, the elder, his speech on the

letter from Antigonos, 366

sends his son to Antigonos, 367

his policy towards Kleomenés, 368,
369 note

his doings at Sikyén, 373

driven out of Corinth, 1.

invested with absolute power, 377

refuses the offers of Kleomenés, 378

asks help of Atolia and Athens, 1.

estimate of his conduct, 379

compared with Cavour, 380, 381

elected General of the State of
Argos, 199, 201 note, 384

surrenders Akrokorinthos, 385

re-names Mantineia, 3.

his undiminished influence, $391

his relations to Macedonian Kings,
392, 406, 415, 420

compared with Philopoimén, 393

elected General 220 B.c., 397

takes office before legal time, 398

his defeat at Kaphyai, 1.

accused before the Assembly, 399

his liberal views of international
right, 406

schemes of Apellés against, 421,
422

obtains redress against Apellés, 422

Apellés accuses him of treason, 424,
426

restored to Philip’s favour 426

his mediation at Megalopolis, 199
note, 429

sent by Philip to Congress of Nau-
paktos, 434

influences Philip on behalf of Mes-
séné, 445

reproaches him for his misdeeds,
446

his death, 2.

his latter years, 446, 447

compared with Philopoimén, 447

as to his Generalships, 468-470

Aratos, the younger, his mission to

Antigonos, 367
his Generalship, 415, 416
protest against Philip’s conduct at
Messéné, 445
Philip carries off his wife, 446
driven mad, ἐδ.

Aratos of Sikyén, son of above, his

embassy to Rome, 513

Archenoos recovers Amphiktyonic

rights for Argos, 107 note

666

Archidamos, King of Sparta, as to his
murder, 350 nole
Archidamos of tolia, 419
supports Perseus, 517, 518
Archén of Achaia withstands the de-
mand of Cacilius, 510
his policy towards Rome, 526
elected general, ἐδ.
his speech as to the restoration of
Eumenés’ honours, ἰδ.
supports the cause of the Ptolemies,
528
Archén of Aigeira, his embassy to
Egypt, 529
Archons at Athens, election of, 116
Federal and Local in Beotia, 128
Areus, King of Sparta, his crusade
against Aitolia, 99 noée
Argolis, secessions from to Sparta, 372
cities of, recovered by the League,
385
invaded by Lykourgos of Sparta, 414
Argos and Philip, 481 note
Argos, amphiktyonic rights recovered
for, by Archenoos, 107 note
Tyranny of Aristomachos, 296 δέχῃ.
as to the succession of ‘'yrants at,
297 note
special feeling of Aratos for, 300
attempts of Aratos on, 301, 311
claims right to celebrate Nemean
Games, 313, 433 note
competitors seized by Achaians, 313
joins Achaian League, 331-333
won by Kleomenés, 373
returns to the League, 384
re-peoples Mantineia, 385
special decree as to its troops, 429
honours paid to Philip by, 456
Achaian Assembly at, 478
supports Philip, 480
betrayed to Philip, 481
ceded to Nabis, ἐδ.
recovered by Achaia, 485
Aristainos, Achaian General supports
Rome, 478, 479
recovers Argos, 485
his conference with Nabis, 485 note
his policy opposed to Philopoimén,
488

his mission to Megalopolis, ἐδ.
a Council to consider the demands
of Cecilius, 207 note, 510
Aristippos I., Tyrant of Argos, 297
note 2

INDEX

Aristippos 11., 297 note 2
becomes tyrant, 301
brings a suit against Achaian League,
302
his warfare with Aratos, 311
his death, 312
Aristocracy in Greek Commonwealths,
1

Aristodémos, General of Antigonos,
189
Aristomachos I., his Tyranny at Argos,
296 seqq.
conspiracies against, 297, 300
his death, 301
Aristomachos II., his Tyranny at
Argos, 312
as to his alleged massacre, 312
note
negociations of Aratos with, 331
pleads before the Achaian Assembly,
332
his proposals rejected, 333
elected general of the League, 333,
334
his campaign against Sparta, 346
submits to Kleomenés, 373
his execution, 384
Aristomachos, Sikyénian exile, helps
to deliver Sikydn, 282
Aristéu, General of tolia, 395
Aristén of Megalopolis, his embassy
to Egypt, 529
Aristotelés of Argos, 384
Aristotelés of Siky&n assassinates
Kleinias, 281
Arkadia, policy of Epameindndas to-
wards, 143
Federal union of, 154 δέῃ.
Amphiktyonic union of, 155
Constitution of the League, 157
decline of the League, 160
Ztolian acquisitions in, 314, 342
extension of Achaian League in, 314,
331
Spartan acquisitions in, 342
secession from, to Sparta, 372
cities recovered by the League, 385
Arkesilaos, his embassy to Egypt, 529
Arles, crowning-place of Kings of Bur-
gundy, 618 note
Arthmios of Zeleia, proscribed by
Athens, 99
Arverni, Confederation of, 560 note
Asea, an independent member of the
League, 484 note

INDEX

Assemblies, primary and representa-
tive, 77, 78, 247, 248
Astakos, city of, 115
Athamania, mediates on behalf of
Z2tolia, 455
Athénaion fortified by Kleomenés, 344
seized by Lykourgos of Sparta, 416
Athenian Assembly, compared with
er House of Commons, 31 δέφᾳ.,
6
with the Florentine Parliament, 31
its direct ruling and diplomatic
powers, 35, 36
their effect on individual citizens, 36
compared with that of Achaia, 206

δέῃ.
influence of men without office in,

Athens, relations of her allied cities

to, 19-21

incorporates the old Attic cities, 22

aristocratic position of the citizens,
29

position of slaves in, 30 note

connexion of her history with
Federalism, 32

citizen of, compared with an English
member, 82 seqq.

highest type of a city-common-
wealth, 37, 47

intensity of patriotism at, 39

her degradation in later days, 40

her enmity towards neighbouring
cities, 43

bribery at, 65

a model of democratic government,
68

relations of, to Amphiktyonic body,
103

her repugnance to Thebes, 187

helps to restore Thebes, 142

averse to Federalism, 148

her importance in Early Greek his-
tory, 172

her nullity in the Federal period,
ἐδ

Democracy at, compared with that
of Achaia, 198, 206

power of the Magistrates compared
with those of Achaia, 216

union and separation of military
and civil powers in, 234, 235

mercenaries employed by, 235

results of Lamian War on, 257

capture of, by Macedonia, 276

667

Athens, treatment of her prisoners by
Aratos, 295
keeps aloof from Achaian League,
296

report of death of Aratos at, 310
his threatened attack on, 311]
Roman embassy to, 327
delivered by Aratos, 329-331
Aratos asks help from, 378
offers mediation to Philip, 455
devastated by Philip, 473
bidden by Rome to restore Lace-
dzmonian exiles, 514
her disputes with Ordpos, 536
Atintania, its cessions demanded by
AStolia, 457
ceded to Philip, 466
Attalos, King of Pergamos, Aigina
sold to, 453
chosen General of Atolia, 455
defeated near Lamia, td.
warned off from Euboia, 456
confers with Atolia at Heérakleia,
459
his war with Philip, 478
concludes alliance with Achaian
League, 480
Attalos, brother of King Eumenés,
his embassy on his brother's
behalf, 526
Attica, towns of, their relation to
Athens, 22 note, 123
extent of, compared with Achaia,
207 note
invaded by Aratos, 295, 310
Austria, Emperor of, use of the title,
75 note, 182 note
her analogy with Macedonia, 180
the Mark of Germany, 571
analogy with Thebes, 633
Augustus Cesar, reforms the Am-
phiktyonic Council, 105
restores Patrai, 192 note

BADEN, State of, 632

Bebius, A., 618

Ballot, vote by, 66

Barbarians, Greek feeling towards, 174

Basel, Bishops of, their connexion
with the Empire, 620 note

Bavaria, kingdom of, how far iden-
tical with the Duchy, 631

Belbiné, 508

Belgium, its separation from Holland,
72

668

Bern, seat of government at, 121
influence of, on Swiss League, 272
compared with Rome, 576 note

Besancon, 24 note

Bippos of Argos, 507 note

Beotarcha, how apportioned, 125, 126
their office, 126
their diplomatic action, 128
in the revived League, 134, 135

note, 143
Beotia joins Achaia against Atolia,
142
intimate relations with Atolia, 268
joins Atolian Alliance, 343
“ Beotian,”’ use of, by Thacydidés and
Xenophén, 125
Bootian League, evils of a preponder-
ating capital in, 121, 123
three periods in, 124 seggq.
both religious and political, 124
its Constitution, 125-126
supreme power in the Four Senates,

the Archén the nominal chief, 128
secessions from, 129, 131
dissolution of, 132
nominal revival of, 134
subjection of, to Thebes, 22 note,
135 seqq.
reconstitution of, 142
insignificance of, in later Greece, 7d.
its constitution, 143
compelled to support Rome, 1 43, 483
dissolved by Quintus Marcus, 144
defeated at Chairéneia, 293
joins Atolian League, 1d.
its alliance with Macedonia, 308
joins Antiochos, 493
ordered to restore Lacedemonian
exiles, 514
its alliance with Perseus, 521
Roman intrigues against, ἐδ.
dissolution of, 522
Borough, English, democratic nature
of, 59 note
Boroughs Contributory, a later form
in the Amphiktyonic Council, 103
note, 106
Bousa, garrison expelled by Démeé-
trios, 189
in the original Achaian League, 190
liberation of, 192, 198
Brachyllas, the Theban, 387 note
Brandenburg, a Mark of Germany,
571

INDEX

Bretwaldas, 96
Bribery, different forms of, 65
Bryce, J., his Holy Roman Empire,
618 note
Buonaparte, L. N., his election as
emperor, 55
his scheme for a Confederation of
Italian princes, 75
compared with Antigonos Désén,
880, 381
undesignedly discredits Italian
Federation, 616
Burgundy, county of, 620 note
Burgundy, kingdom of, defined, 24
note

its close connexion with Germany,
619

Bute and Caithness, sent members

alternately to Parliament, 107
note

Byzantium, seat of Imperial Govern-
ment, 593

CaBINET GOVERNMENT. Sce Ministry
Cecilius, Q., his demand for an Achaian
Assembly refused, 510
Cesar, Sextus Julius, his embassy to
Achaian League, 543
Cesarea. See Alexandria
Caithness and Bute, sent members
alternately to Parliament, 107
note
Campanian Republics, 25, 601
Cannz, battle of, 440
Cantons, Swiss, Confederation of. Se
Swiss Confederation ~-
Capital, the, its position and influence
in a large State, 50-51
dangers arising from, 120-122
Capua, 566
Caraceni, the, 2.
Carolina, South, 56, note, and 639
appoints Governor Rutledge dic-
tator, 377 note
Carthage, Treaty of, with Philip and
his allies, 439, 441
Treaty of, with Rome, 569
compared with Rome, 576 note
Cathedral Chapters, attendance at,
240 note
Cato, his reply to Aulus Postumius,
110 note
obtains release of Achaian exiles,
534
‘* Caucus,” Achaian, 222

INDEX 669

Caudini, the, 566
Cavour, compared with Aratos, 380-
382

Chairén, Tyrant of Pelléné, 188
Chairén of Sparta, 1d.
Chairéneia, Bootian defeat at, 293
Chalkidiké, Greeks of, reject Olynthian
terms, 151
Spartan intervention in, 149 seqq.
Chalkis, Roman garrison in, 484
Stolian attempt on, 491
Chalouphés Niképhoros, 602
Chambers, two, impossible in Primary
Assemblies, 247
Chancellor, Lord, his position in the
House of Lords, 232
Channe!} Islands, their relation to Great
Britain, 271
Chaonians, the, 116
Charés, battle of the, 311
Charles the Great, his execution of
Saxon prisoners, 46 note
Charles IV., Emperor, crowned at
Arles, 619 note
Charops, of Epeiros, supports Rome,
482, 494
Charops the Younger, of Epeiros, his
Tyranny, 512, 519, 520
Cheilén of Sparta, 450
Cherson, Republic of, 25, 169
Chios, nature of its alliance with
Athens, 19, 27 note
position of slaves in, 30 note
mediates in the Social War, 430-
432
offers mediation to Philip, 455
Chlaineas of AXtolia, his embassy to
Sparta, 154, 181 note, 451
Chremés of Akarnania, 519
Chreménidean War, 276
Christianity, Alexander the Great, the
pioneer of, 175
Chur, its privileged position in the
Gotteshausbund, 126 note
Cities, dependent, condition of, in
Greece, 18
compared with Federal common-
wealths, 19
with English colonies, 20
Cities, Free. See City-commonwealths
Cities, Free, of the Empire, 625
City - commonwealths, characteristics
of, 15-18
full developement of, in Greece, 16,
4

City-commonwealths in Italy, 23
in medigva] Europe, 24
general view of the system, 26 δέρῃ.
varieties in internal constitution,
26
in external relations, 27
varying relations with surrounding
territory, 28
position of the individual citizens
in, 29, 36, 38
system of, a political education, 37,
48, 64, 80
highest type of, at Athens, 37, 47
intensity of patriotism in, 38
bad side of the system, 39
in the Middle Ages, 42
constant warfare among, 1.
results of the system in war, 43
bitterness of political enmities in,
48
the Amphiktyonic Council a wit-
ness for, 101
strong feeling for, among Ionian
Greeks, 146
and among great Greek cities, 148,
151
union among, compared with that
of districts, 259
Clackmannan and_ Kinross, _ sent
members alternately to Parlia-
ment, 107 note
Claudius, Emperor, Lykian League
destroyed by, 169
Claudius, Appius, Lykortas’ answer to,
500

demands help from Achaia, 527
refused by the League, 528
Claudius, C., 531
Clergy and Laity, no such distinction
in ancient times, 102
Coalitions, as to the strength of, 410
note
Colonies, English, compared with
Greek dependent cities, 20
relations to the United Kingdom,
59 note
Columbia, district of, 273 note
Commons, House of, compared with
the other Assemblies, 209, 210,
217 seqq.
Commonwealths, See City and Federal
commonwealths, 4
Confederation, Swiss. See Swiss Con-
federation. German. Sce Germany
Confederations, examples of, 4-6

760

Confederacy, a, as distinguished from
a Confederation, 8
Congress, its relation to the President,
218, 227 note, 244
compared with Achaian Assembly,
243 seq.
Conrad III., Emperor, his position in
Italy, 595
as to his election, 595 nole
Conrad of Ursperg, 596
Constanz, Peace of, 612
Constitution, British, gradual growth
of, 197
Corfinium. See Italicum
Corinth, subject districts of, 200
position of under Alexander, 276,
294
taken by Antigonoa, 294
delivered by Aratos, ἐδ.
joins Achaian League, ἐδ.
Roman embassy to, 208, 327
grants Rome admission to Isthmian
Games, 1.
drives out Aratos, 373
calls in Kleomenés, ἐδ.
effect of its secession, 376
Congress at, summoned by Philip,
404, 406
besieged by Lucius Quinctius, 480
restored to Achaia, 485
alleged party of Antiochos in, 496
note
Roman ambassadors at, 541
tumults at, 542, 544
sacked by Mummius, 550
County, English, aristocratic nature of,
59 note
Cremona, attitude of Emperor, 595
joins Lombard League, 604
joins Frederick Barbarossa, 611
Cretans, use of the name, 351 note
Crete, Philopoimén withdraws to, 393,
477
asks help against Rhodes from
Achaia, 535
Cromarty and Nairn, sent members
alternately to Parliament, 107

DaMOKRITOS, Atolian General, his
policy towards Rome, 476
his answer to Titus, 491
Damokritos, elected Achaian General,
539
defeats the Spartans, 540
banished, 12.

INDEX

Damophantos, slain by Philopoiméa,
458
Dardanians, 328
Dardas of Epeiros, 466
Davos, its position compared with
that of Thebes, 126 note
Déidameia of Epeiros, resigns her
power, 320
murdered, 321
Deinias, 281
Deinarchos of A‘tolia, 517
Deinokratés defeated at Peraia, 482
Deinokratés of Messéné procures the
secession of Messéné, 505
puts Philopoimén to death, 2.
sues for peace, 506
Delphi, Amphiktyony, 98
Delphi and tolia, ante and 268
Demagogue, use of the word, 229
note
Démaratos, 139 note
Démétrias, name of Sikyén changed
to, 279
Démétrias, Roman garrison in, 484
seized by Atolia, 491
Démétrios, Kiug of Macedonia, his
policy towards Greece, 180, 189
frees Sikyén, 279
his war with Achaia and tolia, 308
sends a ship for Aratos, 310
grants subsidies in Peloponnésos,
320
subsidizes Illyria to keep Mededn,
323
his death, 328
Démétrios of Pharos, surrenders
Korkyra to Rome, 326
Illyrian lands granted to, id.
ravages Peloponnésos, 402
and 2tolia, 403
advises Philip, 438, 444, 445
his death, 445
Democracy, absolute and constitu-
tional, 12
at Athens, 29, 32, 37,
206 seqg., 231
weak point of, in Greece, 30 note
in Achaia, 80, 198, 205 segq., 231
in Switzerland, 80
in Achaian cities, at the dissolution
of League, 551
Démophanés, 282
Démodokos, 429
Démosthenés reconciles Athens and
Thebes, 137

47, 198,

INDEX 671

Démosthenés on the Olynthian League,
152
pleads before the Ten Thousand,
161
and on behalf of Megalopolis, id.
Despot, use of the word, 195 note
Diaios, elec n General, 538
makes war on Sparta, ἰδ.
embassy to Rome, 539
embassy of Metellus to, 540
tortures Philinos of Corinth, 541 note
his arbitrary measures, 547
his cruelty and corruption, 549
his defeat and death, 7.

_ es, origin of the office, 369 note
Didgenés, Macedonian commander in

Peiraieus, 310
restores it, Salamis, etc., to the
Athenians, 330
Diogenés of Akarnania, 519
Dioitas, Achaian General, 315 note,
468
Dion, Ztolian sacrilege at, 419
Diophanés of Megalopolis, his jealousy
of Philopoimén, 488
extent of the League under, 498
marches against Sparta, 500
his embassy to Rome, 501
supports the demand of Cecilius,
510

opposes Egyptian appeal for help,
528

Diopeithés of Rhodes, 509 note
Dipaia, 489 note
Déddéna, destroyed by Dorimachos, 419
Domitius, Cn., 531
Dorians, Amphiktyonic votes as-
signed to by Augustus, 106
Dorimachos, Ztolian General, plun-
ders Messéné, 395
further incursions of, 396
his invasion of Achaia, 402
sacks Kynaitha, 403
attacks Aigeira, 418
destroys Dodéna, 419
Levinus negociates with, 448
attempts to relieve Echinos, 453
his special legislature, 263, 476
Droysen, his history of Hellenism, and
his Macedonian sympathies, 178
Drusna, M. Livius, his Tribuneship, 582
his death, 583
Dymé, 424, 479, 480,
expulsion of Macedonian garrison,
189

Dymé, ravaged by Atolia, 416
Sonderbund formed by, 417
supports Philip, 480

EcHINos, siege of, 453
Egypt, offers mediation to Philip, 455
sends embassy to Achaia, 528-530
Ekdémos of Megalopolis, 282
Electors, ignorance and corruption
among, 64-67
Elis, pays indemnity to Megalopolia,
189
its connexion with AStolia, 271,
314
its action with regard to Nemean
Games, 313
campaign of Aratos in, 347
declares war against Achaia, 411
ravaged by Philip, 424
rejects Macedonian offers, 425
ravaged by Lykos, 429
joins Rome and Atolia, 450
receives the AStolians, 458
supports Antiochos, 494
united to Achaian League, 496, 505
refuses contingent against Rome,
548
Emperor, synonymous with τύραννος,
17 note

Emperors, Roman, their relations with
city-commonwealths, 25
forsake Rome, 593
succession of, always maintained, #2.
amount of authority retained by,
595
Empire, Eastern, influence of Alex-
ander’s conquests on, 175
its identity with Greece, 620
Empire, Western, right of, recognised
by Lombard League, 605 note
its influence on Germany, 618
three kingdoms attached to, 618,
619
its identity with Germany, 620
Free Cities of, 625
and Germany, 627-628
essentially elective, 628
England, civil wars in, 47 and note
her relations towards Wales and
Scotland, 59 note
union with Scotland, 76
compared with Germany, 623 seqq.,
630-632
retention of National Assemblies in,
625

672 INDEX

England, as to royal succession in, 627
te

no
survival of Kingdoms in Counties,
630
Epameinéndas, his career, 134
his claim on behalf of Thebes, 139
his policy towards Arkadia, 143
the true founder of Megalopolis, 160
and note
Epeiros, early form of constitutional
monarchy in, 16, 116
Epeirot League, formation of, 117, 320
coinage of, 117
Achaian Embassy, 401
its double dealing towards Philip
and Atolia, 408
joins the alliance, 414
proposes peace to Philip, 466
attempts to mediate between Rome
and Philip, 482
answer of, to Antiochos, 494
bidden restore Lacedsemonian exiles,
514
_ Macedonian and Roman parties in,
519, 520
conquest and desolation of, by Rome,
520
Epératos of Pharai chosen General of
Achaian League, 418, 423, 424
his election a mistake, 426
his incompetence, 226 note, 239
note, 428
Ephialtés, 99
Epidamnos repulses the Illyrians, 325
her alliance with Rome, 326
Epidauros joins Achaian League, 295
secedes to Sparta, 373
Erginos, 309
Etruria, League of, its position under
Rome, 561, 580
its constitution, 562-564
threatens secession from Rome, 587
Euboia, scheme of Federal Union in,
162
new in Federation, 484
damages paid to, by Thebes, 547
Eukleidas, King of Sparta, 413
Eukleidés of Athens, 379
Eumenés, King of Pergamos, his offer
to the Achaian League, 508
honours granted to, abolished, 509
note
as to the restoration of his honours,
526
Roman intrigues against, 535

Euphrén, Tyrant of Sikyén, 194 note,
279

Euripidas of 4étolia, his ravages in
Achaia, 416

Eutaia, 157

Evagoras of Aigion, 546

Fasu, the, Consuls chosen from, 117
Fannius, C., 545 note
Federal and National, dispute as to
the terms, 10 note
Federal Commonwealths, examples of,
4-6
relations of the members, 7
two classes of, 8-12
classification of government in, 12
Federal Government. See Federalism
Federalism, a compromise, 1, 13, 14,
69, 78
definition of, 2
examples of, 3-6
conditions of true Federalism, 8,
11
early approaches to, in Greece, 16,
112 segg., 145
its connexion with Athenian his-
tory, 32
approach to, in English relations
with Scotland, 59 note
advantages of, 69
only suited to certain conditions, 70
popular prejudice against, ἰδ.
American civil war no proof against,
71, 72
ony of the Southern States to,
2

whether possible in monarchies, 74
ale as an intermediate system,
7-79

as a political educator, 80, 83

favourable to local Self -Govern-
ment, 82

desirable in certain circumstances,
83

inappropriate in others, 84

results of, in the United States, 85

its alleged weakness, 87 seqq.

facilities for secession, 89

example of the system in Switzer-
land, 92

close approach of the Amphiktyonic
Council to, 101, 147

dangers of an overwhelming capital
to, 120-122

Thalés’ advice in favour of, 145-148

LL ,.... Ὁ “ὦ “πἄἀσ-πῆ-- ὀΛἍἜῳΨ “ἘΝ

INDEX 673

Federalism, evidence of the growth of,

-in Greece, 162

history of, in Greece neglected in
England, 171

German writers on, 7.

revival of, in later Greece, 177

early establishment of, in Greece not
desirable, 183

ἃ reaction against Macedonia, 185

fullest and purest shape of, in
Achaia, 199

unwilling members a source of weak-
ness, 205

argument as to, deduced from
break-up of Achaian League, 374-
376

importance of the Treaty between
Philip and Hannibal, 444

in Greece, swept away by Rome,
551

monarchic, the true solvent for the
Byzantine peninsula, 555
germs of, in ancient Italy, 558-559
in Spain and Gaul, 559
in Italy, agreements for and against,
616
in Germany, 621, 622
‘< Federalist,” the, on the Amphikty-
onic Council, 110 note
treatment of Achaian history in, 249
Feudalism, approach to kingly Fede-
ralism in, 74
Flamininus, T. Quinctius, his legisla-
tion in Greece, 120
his philhellenism, 478, 474
his moderation, 475
his terms refused by Philip, 482
proclaims the freedom of Greece, 484
his settlement of Grecian matters,
484-486
withdraws his garrisons, 486
his letter to Achaian Assembly, 490
his embassy to Greece, 491
his dealings with Messéné, 496
‘with Zakynthos, 497
marches against Sparta, 500
his demand for an Achaian Assem-
bly refused, 511
Flanders, a fief of the Crown of France,
25 note
the common battle-ground of France
and Austria, 63
Florence, dependencies of, 23
Parliament of, 81, 53 note
powers of the magistrates, 246

Foscari, Francesco, 168
France, civil wars in, 47 and note
frequent changes of government in,
86

local divisions represent ancient
fiefs, 601
Kingdom of, compared with that of
Germany, 623 seqq., 680-682
as to National Assemblies in, 625
process of re-union in, 626
Kingship hereditary in, 627
Franconia, 631
Francis IL, Emperor, calls himself
‘* Emperor of Austria,” 75 note
Frankfort, German confederation
meets at, 122
Frederick Barbarossa, Emperor, as to
his election, 595 note
authorities for his reign, 596 note
his character, 597, 607
his position not to be confounded
with that of modern Austria, 597
his alleged breach of faith, 597
note
his war with the Lombard Cities,
598, 599
besieges Ancona, 609
defeated before Alexandria, ἐδ.
negociates with the League, 609, 610
his defeat at Legnano, 610
reconciled to Venice and the
Church, 1.
his truce with the King of Sicily, ἰδ.
with the League, 611
joined by various Cities, ἐδ.
concludes the Peace of Constanz, 612
crowned at Arles, 618 note
Frederick II., Emperor, his strifes
with the Popes, 614
Frentani, the, 566
Fulvius, Cn., delivers Korkyra, 326
Fulvius, M., intervenes between the
League and Sparta, 501
at the Special Assembly of Argos,
508 note

Gapsinius, A., 545 note
Gallus, C. Sulpicius, 535
Gardiner, Capt. Thomas, his plea to
Charles II. ‘‘ for relief,” 299 note
Gauls, rude approach to Federalism
among, in Asia, 165 note
invade Ztolia, 178, 192
and Macedonia and Greece, 178, 257
Confederations in, 559, 560 note

2x

674

Gelnhausen, seat of Imperial Govern-
meut, 593
Generals, Greek, powers of, 223
Genoa, dependencies of, 23
Germany, influence of the Empire on,
618, 621
its close connexion with Burgundy,
619
its ieentity with the Empire, 620,
62

Confederation of, 5, 10, 75, 122,
621, 622

process of disunion in, 74, 622,
627, 6380-632

compared with England and France,
623 seqq.

origin of the Kingdom, 623

power of the royal authority in, 624

retention of National Assemblies
in, 625, 626

a Confederation mainly of princes,
629

Diet of, 2.

loss of its ancient divisions, 630

its arriére vassals compared with
those in France, 632

vast number of its states, 633

paralleled with Beotia, 2%.

Gessler, Tell’s slaughter of, 300 note
niin its relation to Great Britain,

270

Glabrio, M. Acilius, his campaign
against Antiochos, 494
his treatment of Actolia, τ.
Godfrey of Viterbo, 596 note
Gortys, 489 note
Goslar, seat of Imperial Government,
593
‘*Government ” the, use of the name
in England, 34 note
Gracchi, the, supports the cause of the
allies, 582
Graf, original meaning of, 629 note
Grand Alliance under Macedonian
headship, 389
Messéné asks for admission to,
398, 399, 401
holds a Congress at Corinth, 406
its strength compared with that of
ZEtolia, 409
Congress of, at Panormos, 434
Philip’s Treaty with Hannibal as
head of, 442
Great Britain, its union with Ireland,
76

INDEX

Great Britain, dependencies of, com-
pared with those of Attolia, 270
Greece, small Federal States in, 5

city-commonwealths in, 13, 15-18,
24, 101

early forms of Constitutional Mon-
archy and Federalism in, 16, 112,
145

Civic Tyrannies in, 17

condition of independent cities in,
18

warfare in, compared with that of
mediseval times, 44

republics of, a model for mankind,
67

position of the
Council in, 98, 99

indisposed towards Federalism,
101, 102

results of Theban supremacy for,
184

results of dissolution of Olynthian
League, 149

earlier and later history of, 172,

Amphiktyonic

seqq.

change in the language of, 173

wide spread of her culture, 174

effects of Alexander's conquests on,
175

Gaulish invasion of, 178, 257

under Philip and Alexander, 179

under the successors, 180

and under the Antigonids, 180-
182

early Federalism in, undesirable,
183

effects of the Achaian League on,
184

Illyrian invasion of, 324

state of, after fall of Kleomenés,
389

alliance in, under Macedonian head-
ship, Ὁ.

becomes gradually dependent on
Rome, 432, 433, 439

Roman goodwill towards, 473, 474

freedom of, proclaimed by Flami-
ninus, 484

acquisition of territory in, by pur-
chase, 497 note

Federalism in, swept away by Rome,
551

Revolution of 1862, 5538

the Achaian League, the natural
model for, 554

INDEX

675

Greeks, no desire for real Federalism
among, 147 (see ante)
Gregory IX., Pope, his strife with
Frederick II., 615
Grote on autonomous city-communi-
ties, 15
on the Olynthian League, 150
his depreciation of the ‘‘ Greece of
Polybios,” 177 note
Guernsey, its relation to Great
Britain, 271
Gunther, his account of Frederick’s
campaigns, 596 note°
Gythion, besieged by Nabis, 490

Hacuk, the, meetings of United Pro-
vinces at, 121
Haliartos, 522
Hannibal, his campaign against Rome,
433
his alliance with Macedonia, 439,
441 seqq.
called senex by Livy, 446 note
Hanover, State of, 632
Hanse Towns, League of, 6
Hekatombaion, battle of, 354
Heliké, 190
Hellas, wide signification of, 174 note
Henry III., Emperor, 595
Henry IV., Emperor, regarded as an
old man, 446 note
his activity, 625 note
Héraia joins Achaian League, 314, 315
note

taken by Kleomenés, 354
ceded to Achaia, 460
joined to Achaia, 485
Hérakleia, Trachinian, annexed by
Ztolians, 257
relation of, with the League, 260,
268
tolian Assembly at, 260 note
acquired by Achaia, 496
secedes from Achaian League, 547
besieged by Kritolaos, ἐδ
Hermioné joins Achaian League, 881
secedes to Sparta, 372
Hernicans, traces of a League among,
561
Hierokles of Zakynthos, 497
Hieromnémones, the, 102, 104 note,
108
‘Highness,’ attempt to confer the
title on Washington, 166 note
Hippolochos of Atolia, 517

Hirpini, the, 566 -.

History, “ancient” and “modern,”
as to the evil result of distinction
between, 175, 274

Hostilius, A., 520

Hugh Capet, his election, 625 note

Hypata, 269 note

Hyperbatas, Achaian General, 353

Achaian General, his policy towards
Rome, 513

opposes Egyptian appeal for help,
52

Tasos, plundered by Menalkidas, 540
Illyrians relieve Medeén, 828
their ravages in Peloponnésos, 324
occupy Korkyra, 326
kingdom of, dismembered by Rome,

Innovent IV., Pope, 615
Ionian Telands, their relation to Great
Britain, 27 0
Ionians, advice of Thalés to, 145, 146
Amphiktyonic relation of their
colonies, 12.
feeling of town-autonomy among,
146
their request to Heliké, 191 note
Ireland, quasi-Federalism not to be
desired for, 70
its union with Great Britain, 76
Iseas of Keryneia abdicates the
Tyranny, 192, 194, 196 and
note

Isménias of Boeotia, 521
Isokratés, his policy compared with
that of Agelaos, 437
Isthmian games, administration of,
not Federal, 203 note
Romans admitted to, 327
Italians, ancient, their relations to
Rome, 578, 578
claim Roman citizenship, 579 seqq.
their war with Rome, 576, 587-590
difference of feeling among, 580
their claims supported at Rome, 582
compared with the American colon-
ists, 584
League formed by, 585
receive citizenship of Rome, 588
nature of the franchise, 589, 590
Malina capital of Italian League,
58
becomes Corfinium again, 588
Italy, Federalism in, 5, 558-561, 585

676

INDEX

Italy, city commonwealths in, 15-18,
23, 24

designs of Philip V. of Macedonia
on, 482, 434

uncertainty of its ethnology, 561

three great classes in, 573

Rome the great obstacle to perma-
nent Federation in, 586

kingdom of, 598

union of with Germany under Otto
the Great, 594

four opportunities for the union of,

no tendency to union in, 607

as to a union under Frederick II.
or Manfred, 615

Italian nationality a modern idea, ἰδ.

as to a Federal union in, 616

local independence the true policy
fot, 617

its connexion with the Empire,
618, 619

Jas6n of Pherai, 119, 151
Jersey, its relations to Great Britain,
271

John, Duke of Burgundy, his murder
of Lewis, Duke of Orleans, 299 note

John of Salisbury, his defence of
Tyrannicide, 299 note

Jus Latii, origin of, 573 note, 657

KapMos, Tyrant of Kés, 196 note
Kalaureia, Amphiktyony of, 98
Kallias, Tyrant of Chalkis, 162
Kallikratés of Leontion, growth of
Roman party under, 512

his embassy to Rome, 513

his election as General, 514

opposes Egyptian appeal for help,

8, 529

’
at the Assembly of Amphipolis, 530
supports the demands of Rome,
581
opposes an alliance with Crete and
Rhodes, 585
popular hatred of, 586 note
supports the appeal of Orépos, 537
impeaches Menalkidas, 1d.
sent to Rome, 589
his death, ἐδ.
Kalydén occupied by Achaia, 186, 255
Kaphyai joins Achaian League, 314,
344
secedes to Sparta, 372

Kaphyai, Aratos defeated at, 398
Karia subject to Rhodes, 167
set free, 168
Kassander, King of Macedonia, re-
stores Thebes, 141
garrisons Achaian cities, 189
Kassander of Aigina inveighs against
the offer of Eumenés, 509
Keians, their dealings with Xtolian
Assembly, 263 note, 652
Kenchreia, 294
Keds, 267, 268
Kept its relations with Atolia,
270

with Great Britain, 12.
attacked by Philip, 427
taken by Rome, 496
Kephalos of Epeiros, his policy to-
wards Rome, 519
joins Macedonia, 520
his death, 12.
Kerkidas, his embassy to Macedonia,
363 seqg.
Keryneia, in the original Achaian
League, 190
joins in the revival, 192, 196
Kibyra, 165 note
Kimén, his military powers pre-
eminent, 234
Kinnamos, on Western and Eastern
Emperors, 603 note
Kingship elective, tends to weaken
royal authority, 628
Kinross and Clackmannan, sent mem-
bers alternately to Parliament,
107 note >
Kiog,, Atolian dealings with, 267,
2
Kirrha, plain of, Spartan Crusade
about, 99 note
Klarion, 396
Kleigenés of Akanthos, 150
Kleinias of Sikydn, 280 vA
Kleisthenés of Siky6n, 279
Kleitér joins Achaian League, 314
cleaves to it, 372 note
withstands Dorimachos, 403
Kleomenés, King of Sparta, his revolu-
tion, 337, 353
position as regards Achaia, 340
fortifies Athénaion, 344
invades Argolis, 345
his victory at Mount Lykaion, 347
his alleged murder of Archidamos,
350 note

INDEX

Kleomenés, King of Sparta, attacks
Megalopolis, 350
his victory at Ladokeia, 12.
his treatment of the body of Lydi-
adas, 352
his successes in Arkadia, 354
his victory at Hekatombaion, ἐδ.
his popularity in Greece, 355
his policy and schemes, 356-358,
371
his negociations with Achaian
League, 361, 367
his illness, 367
breaks off negociations, 369
wins Arkadian and Argolic cities,
372
joined by Argos and Corinth, 873
his offers to Aratos, 378
the champion of Greece, 882
his war with Antigonos, 384 δέος.
takes Megalopolis, 386
his defeat and exile, 387, 404
effect of his death, 411, 413
Kleomenés, guardian of King Agési-
polis, 418, 451
Kleén, his position in the Athenian
Assembly, 225, 235
Kleén of Sikyén slain, 280
Klednai joins Achaian League, 312
claims presidency of Nemean Games,
313
secedes to Sparta, 372
battle of, 482
Kleonikos of Naupaktos, 269 note
exempted from slavery, 45 note, 434
note
at Congress of Naupaktos, 484
his embassy to Sparta, 451
Kleédnymos, Tyrant of Phlious, 333
Klytos, Akarnanian General, 494
Kompasion, 501
Kerkyra, among the worst of Greek
commonwealths, 47
besieged by Illyrians, 324
surrenders, 326
alliance of, with Rome, ἐδ.
Kordneia, meeting of Boeotian Am-
phiktyony near, 124
destroyed, 136
restored, 140
religious centre of Beotia, 190 note
supports Perseus, 522
Krateros, Tyrant of Corinth, 276
Kratésikleia, 349 note
Kratésipolis of Sikydn, 279

677

Kritolaos elected Achaian General,
543
his action at the Conference of
Tegea, 544
his unconstitutional proceedings, ἰδ.
his violence in the Assembly at
Corinth, 545
besieges Hérakleia, 547
his defeat and death, 4.
Kykliadas, Achaian General, joins
Philip against AXtolia, 458
supports Philip, 477, 478
banished, 479
Kynaitha, Polemarcha of, 199, 408
Federal garrison at, 242
joins Achaian League, $14
retarn of the exiles, 403
sacked by the Atolians, 44 note,
403
Kynoskephalai, battle of, 476

LaDOKEIA, battle of, 306 note, 850
Levinus, M. Valerius, repulses Philip,
. 447
at the Atolian Federal Congress,
448
Lagthing, Norwegian, 247
Laity and Clergy, no such distinction
in ancient times, 102
Lakénia, towns of, their relations to
Sparta, 22 note
mentioned in Herodotos, 139 nofle
Atolian inroad into, 306 note
ravaged by Philopoimén, 465
towns of, granted to Achaia by
Flamininus, 485
Lamia, victory of Philip near, 455
Lamian War, 257
Lamponius of Lucania, 591
Larisos, battle of, 458
Las, Spartan attack on, 500
Latin Colonies do not represent Latin
League, 518 note
Latins, the, their relation to Rome,
5738
Latium, League of, 5, 95 note, 568-
572
Lechaion, 294
Legnano, battle of, 610
Lentuli, Publius and Servius, their
mission to Peloponnésos, 523
Leontion, 190, 192
Leontios of Macedon, his crimes, 384
note
plots against Philip, 427

678 INDEX

Lerna, 362 note
Leukas, Akarnanian Assembly held
at, 115, 483
besieged by Lucius, 484
separated from AXtolia, 519, 638
Leukopetra, battle of, 549
Leuktra, battle of, 137
Lewis, Duke of Orleans, his murder,
299 note
Licinius, P., his campaign against
Perseus, 515, 517
Limoges, massacre at, 46 nole
Lincoln, Abraham, 246 note
Liudprand, his Antapodosis, 593
Livy, his version of the Treaty between
Philip and Hannibal, 443
Lochagos of Ztolia, 517
Lodi, 604
Lokrians, the Amphiktyonic votes
assigned to by Augustus, 106
tom Cities, predominance of, 594,
60
at war with Frederick Barbarossa,
598 seqq. .
League formed by, 602
their internal independence recog-
nized by Frederick Barbarossa,
613. See also Lombard League
Lombard League, beginning of, 602
growth of, 604
its indirect importance in Federal
History, 605 .
analogy of with America and Nether-
lands, 1.
obligations towards the Empire
recognized by, 605 note, 610
its congress, 606
not a true Federation, 1.
renewed against Frederick II., 607
a mere Confederacy, 608
sovereignty of Manuel not admitted
by, 608 note
negociates with Frederick, 609, 610
victory of, at Legnano, 610
truce made with Frederick, 611
recognition of by Peace of Con-
stanz, 613
revived under Frederick II., 614
first League primarily political, +d.
second primarily ecclesiastical, 615
Lombardy, the battle-ground of France
and Austria, 63
Lords, House of, its analogy to the
Achaian Assembly, 232
Lot, appointment by, 129 note

Lothar II., Emperor, 595

Louisiana, its purchase by the United
States, 498 note

Lucanians, their feelings towards
Rome, 580

hold out against her, 588, 590
Luzern, influence of on Swiss League,
2

27
Lydiadas of Megalopolis, his character,
315

gives up his Tyranny, 317
chosen General of Achaian League,

a.
his rivalry with Aratos, 318, 331,
345
his enmity to Sparta, 319
sends help to Korkyra, 325
his action with regard to the union
of Argos, 332
declaims against Aratos, 346
aero against him for Generalship,
34
his death at Ladokeia, 351
treatment of his body by Kleomenés,
352
Lydiadas of Megalopolis, grandson of
above, his embassy to Rome, 513
Lykaion Mount, battle of, 347
Lykian League, 6, 162-169
list of the cities, 163, 637
merits of-the Constitution, 164-166
origin and history, 167, 168
destroyed by Claudius, 169
method of voting, 165, 212, 218
Lykians, their relation to the Greeks,
167

of Homer, 169 note
last teachers of old Greek philosophy,

ab.
Lykiarch, President of Lykian League,
166

Lykiskos of Akarnania, 451
Lykiskos, Atolian General, 517
instigates the massacre of Bebius,
518
his death, ἰδ.
Lykomédés of Mantineia, 155 segq.
Lykomédés of Tegea, 155 note
Lykortas of Megalopolis supports
Philopoimén’s policy, 488, 490
his answer to Appius Claudius,
500
his embassy to Rome, 501
sent against Messéné, 505
his treatment of the rebels, 506

΄ INDEX 679

e
Lykortas of Megalopolis withstands | Macedonia, divided into four Repub-

the demand of Cascilius, 510
his embassies to Rome, 510, 513
exhorts to strict neutrality, 525
supports Egyptian appeal for help,
528, 529
Lykos of Pharai, his office, 219 nole
defeats Atolians, 219
and ravages Elis, 429
Lykourgos chosen King of Sparta, 413
invades Argolis, 414
seizes Athénaion, 415
his banishment and return, 451
Lysippos, Achaian General, 477
Lyons, a free city of the Empire, 24
nole

MaBLY on the Achaian League, 229
Macedonia, early form of constitu-
tional monarchy in, 16
represented in the Amphiktyonic
Council, 106
her supremacy over Thessaly, 119
her dealings with Olynthos, 150

seqq.
alliance of Megalopolis with, 161
Gaulish invasion of, 178
under the Antigonids, 178, 180, 189
aims of, opposed to those of Achaia,
179

her power in Greece compared with
Austria in Italy, 181 segg., 196

Federal reaction against, 185

result of Achaian annexation of
Sikydn, 286

the Démétrian War, 308

inaction of, 328

bought out of Attica by Aratos, 330

Megalopolitan Embassy to, 204, 366
8eqq.

Achaian Embassy to, 401

feelings of, towards Achaian League,
421

relation of the army to the kings,
428

becomes gradually dependent on
Rome, 433, 439

union under, desirable for Greece,
437

allied with Carthage, 439

first war with Rome, 447 seqq.

second war with Rome, 473 seyq.

policy of Flamininus towards, 475

third war with Rome, 514 seqq.

Greek feeling on behalf of, 515 seqq.

lics, 516 note
intercourse with,
Achaia, 522
fourth war with Rome, 539
becomes a Roman province, 540
Machanidas, king of Sparta, 451
attacks Achaia, 453
his defeat and death at Mantineia,
464, 465
Machatas wins Elis over to Z#tolia,
411
his embassy to Sparta, 411-413
success of his second mission, 414
Malta, its relation to Great Britain,
270
Man, x relation to Great Britain,
271

forbidden by

Mantineia, destroyed by Sparta, 154

its restoration, 155

hostile to Tegea, 155, 161

ally of Sparta, 161

Federal garrison at, 242

joins the Aitolian League, 268

suit at, betweeu Argos and the
Achaian League, 302

revolutions of, 315

joins Sparta, 342

taken by Aratos, 347

readmitted to League, 348

as to the μέτοικοι at, 348 note

aud the embassy to Achaian Assem-
bly, 349 note

revolts to Kleomenés, 354

taken by Aratos, 385

his treatment and renaming of,

battles of, 464
Manuel Komnénos, Eastern Emperor,
his action towards the Lombard
Cities, 602
aspires to reunite the Empires,
603
his sovereignty not admitted by
Lombard League, 608 note
defends Ancona, 609
Marcellus, Roman envoy, 517, 523
Achaian negociations with, 527
his letter to the League on the
Egyptian question, 529
Marcius, Q., dissolves the Bootian
League, 144, 521
Marius, C., supports the cause of the
allies, 582, 590
his war with Sulla, 590

680

Markos of Keryneia, chosen General

of Achaian League, 198, 223, 277
his death, 325

Marks, instances of the growth of,
671

Marseilles, a free city of the Empire,
24 note

Medeén, Atolian attack on, 268

note
" besieged by tolia, 322
relieved by Illyria, 323
decree of the Assembly, ἐδ.
betrayed to Antiochos, 494
Mediatization, use of the phrase, 632
note
Megaleas of Macedonia, plots against
Philip, 427
Megalopolis, city of, no separate in-
ternational existence, 7, 78
helps to restore Thebes, 142
foundation of, 152 note, 156, 159
Θερσίλιον at, 159 note
advantageous position of, 160
later history of, 161
indemnity paid to, by Achaia and
Elis, 189
subject districts of, 200
joins Achaian League, 315, 317
her disputes with Sparta, 339, 344,
534
attacked by Kleomenés, 350
death of Lydiadas at, 351
commissioners from, to Federal
Assembly, 363
her embassy to Antigonos, 204, 364
envoys’ report to Assembly, 365
cleaves to the League, 372, 376
taken by Kleomenés, 386
military assembly at, 398
rpecial decree as to its troops, 429
mission of Aratos to, 199 note, 429
Alipheira ceded to, 460
supports Philip, 480
discontent in, towards Philopoimén,
488
his dismemberment of the town-
ships, 489
her pre-eminence in the League,
486, 489 note -
designed as a Mark ayainst Sparta,
160, 571 note
Megara, Athenian enmity towards,
43
joins Achaian League, 294
joins Beotian League, 874

INDEX

Megara, later secessions of, 374 sole
rejoins Achaian League, 477
surrenders to Metellus, 548

Megistonous, 350 note

Mélos, massacre of, 46

Memnién of Pelléné, 479

Menalkidas, Achaian General bribed,

537
impeached by Kallikratés, ἐδ.
plunders Iasos, 540
commits suicide, 1d.
Mercenaries, employment of, 235, 242
Merséné, helps to restore Thebes,
142
foundation of, 140, 152 note
plundered by Dorimachos, 395
her relations with Atolia, 399
asks for union with Grand Alliance,
390 note, 398, 401 note
action as regards Social War, 409,
414
disturbances in, caused by Philip,
444, 445
joins Rome and Atolia, 450
delivered by Philopoimén, 477
united to Achaian League, 496
secedes from the League, 505
execution of Philopoimén at, 1.
readmitted to the League, 506
her exiles restored, 514
refuses to wage war with Rome,
548
Metellus, Q. Cecilius, mediates be-
tween Achaia and Sparta, 640
again attempts to preserve peace,
545
his efforts on behalf of Achaian
League, 546
his sentence on the Thebans, 547
his negociations with Sdsikratés,
548

Metellus Pius, his war with Samnium,
589, 590
Methydrion, taken by Kleomenés, 345
μέτοικοι, as to, at Mantineia, 348
note
Mikién, persuades Athenians not to
help Aratos, 379
Mikkos of Dymé, 416
Milan, destruction of, 48, 600
seat of Imperial government, 593
joins Lombard League, 604
crowning-place of kings of Italy,
611, 657
Ministry, English, its position, 33

INDEX

Mithridatés, gives citizenship to μέ-
τοικοι in Asia, 348 note
suppers Italians against Rome,
58
Mityléné, nature of its alliance with
Athens, 19, 27 note
massacre of, 46
Mnasilochos, 494
Melos constitutional monarchy in,
11
conquered by the Romans, 520
Mommeen, on the philhellenism of
Flamininus, 474 note, 499 note
Monarchies, secessions in the case of,
(2
Monarchy, Federal, scheme of, 75
approaches to, 74, 75
Monza, crowning-place of Italian
kings, 596 note, 618 note, 599,
657
Morena, Otto, 596
Mounyehion restored to Athens, 330
Miihlhausen, 273 note
Mummius, L., sent against Achaian
League, 546
his victory at Leukopetra, 549
sacks Corinth, 550
fine imposed on League by, ἐδ.
Mure, Colonel, on the Amphiktyons,
97 note
Mykaléssos, massacre at, 44 note
Mys6n of Siky6én, 279

NaBIs, Tyrant of Sparta, 465
defeated by Philopoimén, 477
Argos ceded to, 481
his socialist measures, 481 note
allowed to retain Sparta, 485
his conference with Titus and

Aristainos, 485 note
besieges Gythion, 490
murdered, 491
Nairn and Cromarty, sent members
alternately to Parliament, 107

National and Federal dispute as to

the terms, 10 note

National Assemblies, retention of, in

Germany and England, 625, 626

Naupaktos, held by Achaia, 186

acquired by AXtolia, 255, 268, 269
note

relations of, with the League, 260

congress of, 434

peace of, 438

Etolian Assembly at, 476

Nikoklés,

681

Nemean Games, rival claims to cele-
bration of, 318
restored to Argos, 488 note
Nésos, taken by Rome, 449
Netherlands, United Provinces of. See
United Provinces
New York, state of, no separate inter-
national existence, 7
its position compared with that of
Megalopolis, 78
not the seat of government of
United States, 121
Niebuhr, sets forth the importance
of Greek Federalism, 171
Nikaia, widow of Alexander of Corinth,
277, 294
Nikander of Ztolia, 517
Nikias, peace of, compared with that
of Agelaos, 439
Nikodemos of Elis, his embassy to
Rome, 505
Tyrant of Sikyén, his
dread of Aratos, 281, 282
escapes from Sikyén, 283
Nikomédeia, seat of Imperial govern-
ment, 593
Nikophanés, his embassy to Mace-
donia, 353 seqq.
Nikopolis, 106
Nikostratos, Achaian general, his vic-
tory at Kleonai, 482
Nizza, cession of, compared to that of
Akrokorinthos, 380
Normans in Apulia and Sicily, 594
Norway, its position compared with
greater states, 40
its union with Sweden, 76
Numidians, support Rome against the
Italians, 586

Octavius, Cn., sent as Commissioner
to Atolia, 517, 518
to Akarnania, 518
Offices, unpaid, effect of, 230
Oiniadai, hostile to Athens, 115
joined to AStolian League, 256
taken by Rome, 449
restored to Akarnania, 495
Olenos, 190
Oligarchy, definition of, 231 note
Oligarchy and democracy, 138, 134
Olpai, seat of the Akarnanian Council,
115
Olympian Games, rival claims to cele-
bration of, 313

682 INDEX

Olynthos attempts to form a League,
149-151
its dissolution fatal to Greece, ἐδ.
views of Mr. Grote on, 150
her relations with Macedonia and
Thrace, 151 note
real nature of her “ League,” 152
Onchéstos, 124 note
Orchomenos (Boeotian), secedes from
Beotian League, 131
destruction of, 136
restoration of, 140
Orchomenos (Arkadian), compelled to
join Arkadian League, 157
joins Ztolia, 314
joins Sparta, 342
attempt of Aratos on, 343, 353
kept by Antigonos, 386
pretended cession of, by Philip, 478
Roman demand concerning, 541
Orestes, L., his embassy to Achaian
League, 541
protests against a breach of Inter-
national Law, 542
Orikon taken by Philip, 447
Orépos, disputes of, with Athens, 536
appeals to Achaian Assembly, 537
help decreed to, 4d.
Orthagoras of Sikyén, 279
Otto the Great, Emperor, union of
Italy and Germany under, 594
Otto of Freising, 596
Otto Morena, 1.
Oxford University, meeting of con-
gregation and convocation, 240
note, 241 note

Papva joins Lombard League, 602
Pagai, 490 note
Palermo, seat of Imperial government,
593
Pallantion, 346, 489
Panormos, congress at, 484
Pantaledn of Ztolia, 308
Papirius, Cn., his embassy to Achaian
League, 545
Paris, kings of, extent of their power,
74
the Mark of Gaul, 571
Parliament, British, members of, com-
pared with the Athenian citizen,
32, 88, 34
its analogy toAmphiktyonic Council,
1

04
Paseas of Sikyén, 281

Passarén, 117
Patrai, an ally of Athens, 187
expulsion of Macedonian garrison,
189
in the early Achaian League, 190
joins Dymé in reviving the League,
' 191

helps AStolia against Gauls, 192,
197

restored by Augustus, 192 ποίεε
alleged party of Antiochos in, 496
note
Patricians, their strife with the
Plebeians, 574
Patriotism, confined to the city in
ancient Greece and Italy, 15
its intensity in small states, 38
Paulus, L. Xmilius, his character, 516
AEtolian appeal to, 518
sent to devastate Epeiros, 520
his friendship towards Polybios,
533

Pausanias on the
Council, 105
mentions the Phékian League, 113
Pausanias of Epeiros, 482
Pavia, seat of Imperial government,
593
Peace, internal, secured by large
states, 61
Peiraieus, attempt of Aratos on, 309
retired to Athens, 330
Pelopidas, career of, 134
Peloponnésian War, neutrality of
Achaia, 187
Peloponnésos, 202, 552
extension of the League in, 498
Pelops, king of Sparta, 451
Pelléné, an ally of Sparta, 187, 197
of Thebes, 187 note
tyranny of Chairén at, 188
in original Achaian League, 190
recovered by League, 192
supposed capture of by Agis, 305
n

Amphiktyonic

ote
taken by Ztolia, 307
recovered by Aratos, ἰδ.
occupied by Kleomenés, 372
Pentri, the, 566
Peraia, Rhodian, 482
Periklés, his position compared with
that of Aratos, 225
his civil powers pre-eminent, 234
Periklés, the younger, his dialogue
with Sékratés, 180 note

INDEX 683

Perseus, King of Macedonia, effect of

his war with Rome on Federal
Greece, 514 seqq.

his character, 515

ZEtolians said to have appealed to,
517

enters Aitolia, ἐδ.

Bootian alliance with, 521

his letter to the Achaian League,
522

Petit, John, his defence of Tyrannicide,

299 note

Phaineas, Ztolian General, 494
Phanoté, siege of, 520
Pharai, member of the Achaian League,
190
ravaged by Aftolia, 416 .
Sonderbund formed by, 417
an independent member of the
League, 507
Pheneos, joins Achaian League, 314
secedes to Sparta, 377
Phigaleia, its relations with tolia,
270
joins Atolia, 314
heid by Aitolia, 395
surrenders to Philip, 419
Philinos of Corinth, tortured by
Diaios, 541 note
Philip of Macedon, enforces Amphi-
ktyonic decrees in Phékis, 100, 105
his embassy to the new Beotian
League, 134 note
founder of the modern Greek nation,
175
his policy towards Greece, 179
Philip, son of Déemétrios of Macedon,
329
succeeds Antigonos, 394
his treatment of the Phthidtic
Thebes, 269 note, and above
summons a congress at Corinth,
404, 406
deals with Spartan affairs at Tegea,
404-406
his letter to the Ztolians, 407
speaks at the Achaian Assembly,
408
his military skill, 414, 416
and paramount importance, 415
restores Teichos to Dymé, 418, 424
his Peloponnésian campaign, 419
annexes Psédphis to Achaian League,
ib

his relations with the League, 420

Philip, son of Démétrios of Macedonia,

his relations with Aratos, 7.

redress obtained from, by Aratos,
422

influence of Apellés on, ἐδ.

interferes in Achaian election, 423

Apellés accuses Aratos to, 425

his action in the matter, 426

Apellés plots against, 427

attacks Kephallénia, and destroys
Thermon, 1.

his success in Norther? Greece, 430

embassy from Chios and Rhodes to,
430, 431

his designs on Italy, 432

hears of Hannibal’s successes, 433

advice of Démétrios to, 1d.

gathers a Congress at Panormos,
434

his negociations with Atolia, 435

regards himself as a Greek, 437

concludes peace, 438

his alliance with Hannibal, 439 δέχῃ.

his impolitic conduct, 440

position discussed by, in the Treaty,
442

disturbance at Messéné caused by,
444

his second attempt on Messéné, 445

charges brought against, 446

regarded as older than he was, 446
note

attacks Illyria, 447

besieges Echinos, 453

his victory near Lamia, 455

embassies of mediation to, 2.

honours paid to, at Argos, 456

at the Aigion Conference, 7d.

breaks off negociations, 457

repulses the Romans, 458

defeats the Atolians, 1d.

his attempt on Hérakleia, 459

his cessions to Achaian League, 460

makes peace with Atolia, 466

at the Conference of Phoiniké, 22.

his aggressive proceedings, 472

his dealings with Achaian League,

1.
devastates Attica, 473
his war with Rome, 473-475
attempts to gain over Achaia, 478
Philip, General of Epeiros, at the
Conference of Phoiniké, 466
Philippopolis, name of Phthidtic
Thebes changed to, 480

684 INDEX

Philoklés of Macedonia, 481
Philomélos of Phokis, 114
Phildn of Thessaly, envoy of Metellus,
548
Philophrén of Rhodes, 167
Philopoimén, 212
and Assemblies, 216
his military reforms, 248, 454,
462
first mention of, 386
his ὍΝ in the victory of Sellasia,
38
his character and policy, 392, 393
refuses the offers of Antigonos,
393
withdraws to Crete, id.
compared with Aratos, 447
chosen general of Achaian cavalry,
453
his exploits against the Atolians,
458, 459
chosen General of the League, 461
his victory at Mantineia, 464
slays Machanidas, 465
ravages Lakdnia, 2.
Philip's alleged attempt to poison,
472
exhibits his phalanx at Nemea, 477
note
drives back Nabis, 477
delivers Messéné, ἐδ.
retires to Crete, 2b.
his policy towards Rome, 487
feelings against at Megalopolis,
488
his policy of equality among the
townships, 489
his war with Nabis, 490
unites Sparta to the League, 492
as to his Generalship, 501 note
withstands the deinand of Cercilius,
510
his embassy to Rome, 1d.
refuses Titus’ demand for an
Assembly, 511
Philostratos of Epeiros, 519
Phlious joins Achaian League, 333
secedes to Sparta, 373
Phoibidas, his seizure of the Kadmeia,
100, 183
Phoiniké, Illyrian capture of, 324
restored to Aftolia, 2.
Conference at, 466
Phékian League,
Pausanias, 113

described by

Phékian League, probably revival of
an older League, 1d.
Phikians, 431 note
Phéki6én, his position in the Athenian
Assembly, 225
Phékis, Amphiktyonic decrees enforced
by Philip, 100, 105
votes restored to, by Augustus, 106
damages paid to, by Thebes, 547
Photos Tzabellas, 117 note
Pindar, his use of βασιλεύς, 27 note
Pisa claims presidency of Olympian
Games, 313
Placentia, negociations of peace at,
612
Plataia secedes from the Beotian
League, 129
subsequent fate of, 131
her restoration, 133
destroyed by Thebes, 136
restored by Macedonia, 140
Plebeians, their strife with the Patri-
cians, 514
Pleurén annexed by Achaia, 496
secedes from Achaian League, 535
Plutarch, his account of the Theban
Archon, 129
Poland, election of kings of, 53, 54,
55 note

nature of the nobility, 54

institution of hereditary monarchy,
55

Polybios, his mention of the Amphi-

ktyonic Council, 110 and note

his account of Beeotia, 142

neglect of, in English Universities,
171

character of the age of, 175

compared with Thucydidés, 176

as to date of his birth, 16—

his Macedonian bias, 179

his sketch of the Achaian Constitu-
tion, 198

on unity of Peloponnésos, 202

his account of an Achaian Cabinet
Council, 221

of a Caucus, 222

of the Treaty between Philip and
Hannibal, 441

at the funeral of Philopoimén, 512

his speech as to the restoration of
Eumenés’ honours, 526

chosen Master of the Achaian Horse,
ab

his embassy to Marcius, 527

INDEX

Polybios opposes Appius Claudius,
528

supports Egyptian appeal for help,
528, 529
sent for trial to Rome, 533
effect of sojourn at Rome on, ἰδ.
his return, 536
legislates for Achaian cities under
Rome, 551
Polydamas of Pharsalos, 151
Polykrateia carried off by Philip,
446
Polyphrén of Pherai, 119
Polysperchén, his policy towards
Greece, 180
Pontius of Samnium,
against Rome, 591
Popillius, C., sent as Commissioner to
ZEtolia, 517, 518
to Akarnania, 518
Postumius, his excuse as to writing in
Greek, 110 note
hie embassies to the two Leagues,
26 -
Pretor, Latin origin of the office, 570
note
Presidency, easily developed
Empire, 135
President, agreement against a single
President, 228 note
President of the United States, method
of his election, 56
his relations to Congress, 218, 227
note
compared with Achaian General,
227, 244 δέῃ.
evil of the interregnum after his
legal election, 236
question as to his re-election, id.
longer term of office in the
Southern Confederation, 237 note

his march

into

Congress, 244
his kingly powers, 7.
Prime Minister compared with

Achaian General, 224, 227
his position compared with that of
American President, 245 note
Principalities, small, on the incorpora-
tion of, 178 note
Prisoners of war sold as slaves, 45
Privy Council, attendance at, 241
note
Proklos, a Megarian Amphiktyon,
107 note
Proklos, Caius Curtius, 374 note

685

Property, intercommunion of, in the
Achaian League, 201 note
Property qualification, 209
non-existent in Achaian League,
230
Provence, 25 note
Prussia, formation of, 682
Prytanis of Megalopolis, 199 note
Pséphis, its incorporation with Elis,
416 note
annexed to Achaian League, 419
Ptolemies, Philométér and Euergetés,
appeal to Achaian League for
help, 528
embassy sent to, 529
Ptolemy, garrisons Sikyén, 279
Ptolemy Epiphanés, King of Egypt,
his war with Philip, 472
Ptolemy Philopatér, fails to keep
Aratos, 282
his gifts of money, 284, 302
suspicions with regard to, 288
gives Aratos a pension, 289 note,
302
his alliance with Achaian League,
302

supports Kleomenés, 378 note
mediates, 430-442
Pylagoroi, the, 102, 104 note, 108
Pylos, its cession demanded by Atolia,
457
Pyrrhos of Epeiros, 178
his wars with Antigonos Gonatas,
276
Pytheas, Theban Bootarch, 546 note

Quixcotivs, L. (brother of Titus Flami-
ninus) besieges Corinth, 480
wins over some Akarnanians, 483

Quinctius, T. See Flamininnus

RaDEVIC, continuer of Otto of Freising,
596 note

Ralph of Milan, 596 note, 597 note

Ravenna, seat of Imperial government,
593

Representative Government, approach
to, in the Amphiktyonic Council,
108

Representative system, necessary in
large free states, 52
exceptions to, in Europe and
America, 53
Republics, usually confined to small
states, 13

686 INDEX

Repubtics not necessarily Federations,
3

small, on the incorporation of,
178 note
Requisitions, inadequacy of the
system, 10
system of, in the Achaian League, 11
common under despotisms, 11 note
system of, in Achaian League, 241

$¢9q.
Reunion, use of the phrase, 624 note
Rhodes, subjection of lLykia and
Karia to, 167
deprived of this power, 168
mediates, 430-442
offers mediation to Philip, 455
its war with Philip, 472
concludes alliance with Achaian
League, 480
asks help against Crete from Achaia,
535

Rhion, proposed conference at, 407,
430

Rome, effects of incorporation at, 23

power of the Assembly compared
with that of Athens, 37

bribery at, 65
voting of the Tribes, 164
embassy of, to Corinth, 208
embassies to, of Achaian cities, 204
ambassadors from, at Aigion, 214

note
change of Consuls, 236
as to re-election of Consuls, 238
Etolian hostages to, 265 note
tolian agreement with, 266
Akarnania applies for help against
ZEtolia, 321
mandate of, to ZXtolia, 322
declares war against Illyria, 326
Greek alliances made by, <2.
dismembers Illyria, 4d.
sends embassies to Greece, 327
honours granted to by Corinth, ἐδ.
result of her interference in Greece,
328
history interwoven with that of
Greece, 433
beginning of her influence in Greece,
439

effect of the Treaty between Philip
and Hannibal, 444

her policy of alliance, 447

her connexion with Atolia, 448

he: alliance with Ztolia, 449

Rome, her conquests in Greece, 449,

453, 456

repulsed by Philip, 455, 458

ceasions at Peace of Epeirus
(Phoiniké), 466

her treatment of the Xtolians, 467

declares war against Philip, 473

philhellenic feeling at, 473, 474

union of Greek States under, 475
seqq.

campaign of, against Antiochos, 494

treatment of Atolia, 494-496

her Treaty with Xtolia, 495

retains Kephallénia, 496

her intrigues against the Achaian
League, 499, 564

Achaian and Spartan embassies to,
501

her encroachments resisted by the
Achaian League, 509-511

requires the restitution of the
Lacedemonian exiles, 518, 514

war of, with Perseus, 514 segg.

action of, towards tolia, 518

towards Akarnania, 519

conquers and devastates Epeiros,
520

intrigues of, in Boeotia, 521

dealings of, with Achaian cities, 523

her further inroads on Federal rights,
525

her policy towards Achaia, 530

demands the condemnation of the
chief Achaians, 531

her treatment of the exiles, 532,
533

her dealings with foreign nations,
534

her intrigues against Eumenés and
the League, 535

her 4th Macedonian War, 531 δος.

sends an embassy to Corinth, 541

demands dismemberment of the
League ἐδ.

treatment of, by Kritolaos, 543

her war with Achaian League, 546-
550

reduces Achaia to a dependency,
550

treatment of the country, 550-552,

quasi-Federal elements of, 558, 572
575

intrigues, ante, 553

treaty of, with Carthage, 508 B.c.,
569

INDEX

Rome, her relations of the Latin
League, 570
probable origin of, 571
Latin proposals for union with, ἰδ.
dissolves the League, 572
her gradual incorporation of other
states, 572, 592
importance of the Social War, 576
character of her dominion, 578
as to the claim of citizenship with,
579 seqq.
analogy of this claim with that of
American Colonies, 584
the great obstacle to a permanent
Italian Federation, 586
vies? to the demands of the allies,
58
wars of, with Samnium, 588, 590-
592
provincial policy, 592
forsaken by the Emperors, 593
Roman “ Faith,” 494
Romuald of Salerno, 596 note
Rotation, appointment by, 129 nofe
Roufos of Patrai, 553
Rutledge, Governor, absolute power
granted to, 377 note

Sante Croix on the Amphiktyonic
League, 97
Salamis in Cyprus, kingdom of, 27 note
restored to Athens, 330
Salynthios, King of the Agraians, 255
Samnites, their feelings towards Rome,
580
hold out against her, 588 , 590
their defeat by Sulla, 591
devastation of their country, 592
Samnium, League of, its position
under Rome, 561
League of, 565-568
Savoy, cession of, compared to that
of Akrokorinthos, 380-382
a fief of the Empire, 620 note
Saxony, Kingdom of, not identical
with ancient Saxony, 631
Scipio supports the cause of the
allies, 582
Scotch Universities, voting of the
Nations in, 164
Scotland, her relations with England
slightly Federal, 59 note
quasi-Federalism not to be desired
for, 70
its union with England, 76

687

Seal, badge of office in Achaia, 234
badge of office in Outer Appenzell,
234 note
Self-Government, local, in Federal
states, 82
Sellasia, battle of, 387
Sempronius, Publius, lands at Epi-
damnos, 466
makes peace with Philip, 1.
Senate of Achaian League. See
Achaian League
Senators in the United States, 19

note
Sforza, Lewis, betrayed by his Swiss
Guards, 273
Sicard of Cremona, 596 note
Sicily, Tyrannies in, 18
Normans in, 594
Sigonius, de regno Italie, 596 note
Sikyén joins Achaian League, 278,
285-287
sketch of its history, 279 segg.
admitted on equal terms, 286
traitors at, killed by Aratos, 373
cleaves to the League, 376
Federal Assembly at, 377
alliance with Rome, decreed at, 479
debate at, on the Egyptian question,
529
nominated to arbitrate between
Athens and Ordpos, 536
Skarpheia, battle of, 547
Skerdilaidos of Illyria, 402, 435 note
Skidné, massacre of, 46
Skopas, 263
of Ztolia, 315
his ravages in Peloponnésos, 402
destroys Dion, 419
elected general, 408
Leevinus negociates with, 448
legislation of, 476
at Alexandria, ἐδ.
Slavery, a necessary condition of pure
Democracy, 30 note
Slaves, prisoners sold as, 45
Social War, causes of, 394
decreed at Corinth, 407
beginning of 414
between Rome and Italians, 576,
583-587
Sdkratés, his dialogue with Perikles
the younger, 131 note
Soldiers, citizen and professional,
compared, 44-46
Solén, sacred war under, 99

688

Sésigenés of Rhodes, 509 note
Sésikratés, ‘his negociations
Metellus, 548
tortured to death by Diaios, 549
Sdsitheos of Magnésia, envoy of Philip,
442 note
§és6, shelters Aratos, 280
Sounion, restored to Athens, 330
Spain, absorption of the various king-
doms in, 76
Confederations in, 559
Sparta, position of the Lakénian towns
under, 22 note
her relations to her Peloponnésian
allies, 27 note
position of slaves in, 80 nole
her rivalry with Athens, 43
disregards the Amphiktyonic fine,
100
as such, not a member of the
Amphiktyony, 103
her policy at the Peace of Antal-
kidas, 132
her garrisons in the Boeotian cities,

with

133

Thebes puts herself on a level with,
139

humiliation of, by Epameindndas,
140

averse to Federalism, 148, 149

dissolves the Olynthian League,
149

destroys Mantineia, 154

and Megalopolis, 204

repulses Pyrrhos, 277

its alliance with Achaian League,
805

her independence, 335

causes of war with Achaian League,
338 seq.

acquires Atolian towns in Arkadia,
342

Achaians declare war against, 344

effect of loss of Mantineia on, 349

its supremacy sought for by Kleo-
menés, 357

treatment of, by Antigonos, 387

joined to the Confederacy, 389

political parties in, 404, 411

disturbances at, 405

Philip’s judgment with regard to,
405, 406

vouchsafes no answer to Corinthian
Congress 409

ZEtolian embassy to, 411, 412

INDEX

Sparta, state of the Government, 412

refuses Atolian alliance, 413
revolution in, ἐδ.

joins Atolia against Achaia, 414

ZEtolian and Akarnanian embassies
to, 451

joins Ztolia, 458

retained by Nabis, 485

AXtolian attempt on, 491

annexed to Achaian League, 492

Philopoimén settles differences at,
500

attacks Las, Ὁ.

secedes from the League, %.

treatment of by Philopoimén, 502

continued disputes at, 508

formal reunion with League, 504

exiles from, restored, 514

her dispute with Megalopolis, 534

sends an embassy to Rome, 538

at war with the League, 638

seq.
Roman interference in the matter,
war declared against by Kritolacs,
546
Lakénian towns reunited to, 550
Spear, badge of office of Theban
Archon, 129, 234
Special Correspondents, 463
Spence, Mr., on the American Union,
111 note
State Composite, the, 9
States, large and small, system of, 13
definition of, 14
small and large, definition of, 14,
49 seqq.
large, definition of, 14, 50
intensity of patriotism in, 38
comuon fallacy as to small ones,

results of the system of, 50-53
influence of the capital in, 51
general view of the system, 57
local diversity in, 58
advantages of, 61-64
disadvantages of, 64-67
balance in favour of, 67
large not necessarily monarchical,
large division of, 489 note
States Confederated, system of, 8, 9
Storthing, Norwegian, 247
Strabo, his account of the Lykian
League, 163

eH

—___

“τς

INDEX | 689

Stratios of Tritaia, 525
sent for trial to Rome, 533
released, 536
accused of treason, 546
Stratos, seat of the Akarnanian League,
115
Stymphalos joins Achaian League,
312
Stymphalos, 377 note
Successors, wars of, 180, 257
Achaia under, 189
Suffrage, Universal Napoleonic, 55
Sulla, L. Cornelius, his war with
Samnium, 588
with Mithridatés, 589, 590
with Marius, 590, 591
overthrows the Samnites, 591
and devastates Samnium, 592
Sulpicius, Publius, his naval warfare
in Greece, 453
repulsed by Philip, 458
Commander in Second Macedonian
War, 473
his legislation, 589
supports the cause of the allies,
590
killed, (2.
Swabia, 631
Sweden, its union with Norway, 76
Swiss Confederation, 4, 5, 6
action of, as regards external
matters, 10
its action as regards Napoleonic
aggressions, 41 note
as to its seat of government, 121
sketch of its history, 271-274
compared with Attolian League,
271 δέῃ.
its diet not representative of the
people, 680
Swiss Cantons, dependencies of, 23
Switzerland, its position compared
with greater states, 40
both primary and representative
Assemblies in, 77 note, 80
problem as to its government solved
by Federalism, 92
League, its analogy with that of
Samnium, 567
‘‘Switzerland, French” a misnomer,
273 note
Synods, Christian, compared with the
Amphiktyonic Council, 98, 99,
102
early representative forms in, 109
3

TARENTINES, use of the name, 351
note, 463 note
Tarquinil, Consuls chosen from, 117
Taurién, Macedonian commander, 396.
403
plots against Philip, 427
sent to negociate with Aratos, 484
his share in the poisoning of Aratos,

446 .
Taxation, Federal system of in
Achaia, 242

Taxes. See Requisitions
Tegea, its relations with Mantineia,
155, 161
joins the Arkadian League, 156
ally of Thebes, 161
joins Astolia, 314
joins Sparta, 342
attempt of Aratos on, 348 |
united to Achaian League, 386
Philip at, 404, 405
Congress of, 490
sham Conference at, 643
Téians, their dealings with Astolian
Assembly, 263 note
Teichos, occupied by A&tolia, 416
restored to Dymé, 418, 424
Tell, William, his slaughter of Gessler,
300 note
Telphousa joins Achaian Jeague,
314

Tenea joins Metellus, 549
Teds, suggested by Thalés as a seat
of government, 145 note, 148
its connexion with tolia, 268,
270, 325, 652
Teuta, Queen of Illyria, invades Pelo-
ponnésos, 824
treatment of, by Rome, 326
Thalés, his advice to the Ionians,
145, 148
Theaitétos of Rhodes, 167
Thearidas, his embassy to Rome, 542
“Theban,” use of, by Thucydidés and
Xenophén, 125
Thebes, her greatness, 16
her position in the Boeotian League,
22 note, 122, 129
her enmity towards Athens, 43
destruction of, 1.
seizure of the Kadmeia, 100
effects of her position on Greek
history, 123
her superiority represented by two
Beotarchs, 126 note

Y

Thebes, Archon of, a mere pageant,

129

her treatment of Thespiai and
Plataia, 130, 18]

her claims at the Peace of Antal-
kidas, 131

oligarchic government in, 133

becomes the centre of Democracy,
134, 135

results of her supremacy, 134

destruction of smaller towns by,
136

general Greek hatred of, 137

claims the headship of Beotia, 137,

138

puts herself on a level with Sparta,
139

claims exclude true Federalism,
140

Macedonian garrison in, 2.
destroyed by Alexander, 141
restored by Kassander, τ.
her modified headship, 142
supports Macedonia against Rome,
143
Federal Assembly meets at, ἐδ.
her policy towards Achaian cities,
188
Thebes, Phthidtic, treatment of by
Philip, 269 note, 480
name changed to Philippopolis,
430
Theisoa, 489 note
Theodotos of Epeiros, supports Mace-
donia, 519
his death, 520
Thermon, public monuments at, 255
ZEtolian Assembly at, 260 note, 517
destroyed by Philip, 427
Thermopylae, Roman victory at, 494
Thespiai destroyed by Thebes, 130, 136
restored, 140
Thesprotis, constitution of, 116 note
early republican development in,
ib

Thessaly, contributory boroughs to,

in the Amphiktyonic Council,
106

no real Federalism in, 118

Tagos of, 118, 119

a dependency of Macedonia, 119,
181, 421, 442 note

legislation of Flamininus, 120

AEtolian conquest in, 341

new Federations in, 484

INDEX

Thirlwall, his History of Greece, 171
Thirty Years’ War, character of, 64
Thoas of Atolia, 517
Thouria admitted to Achaian League,
- 507
Thourion, meetings of Akarnanian
League at, 115
besieged by Antiochos, 494
Roman Commission at, 518

- Thrace, her relations with Olynthas,

150 note
Thucydidés, his use of ‘“ Bootian”’
and ‘‘ Theban,’’ 125
compared with Polybios, 176
Thyrrheiom, her coinage, 638
Ticino, Swiss annexation of, 273
Timocracy, definition of, 64 note
Timokleidas of Sikyén, 280
Timokrates of Pelléné, 485 note
an Argeian Amphiktyon, 107 not.
Timoleén, as to his slaying his brother,
298
Timophanés, Tyrant of Corinth, 194
note
Timoxenos, General of Achaian League,
236, 362
re-elected General, 377 note, 396
his unwillingness to proceed against
the £tolians, 397
Aratos makes him resign office, 398
his unsuccessful candidature, 423,
424
Tisippos of Atolia, 518
Tittmann on _ the
League, 97
Titus Flamininus. See Flamininus
Tocqueville, de, on the Greek republics,
32 note
on the Amphiktyonic Council, 110
note
Tortona, attitude to the Emperor, 595
joins Frederick Barbarossa, 611
Town-autonomy. See City-common-
wealths
Tribunes, power of, 244 note
Triphylia, conquered by Philip, 419
pretended cession of, by Philip, 460,
478
joined to Achaia, 485
Tritaia, in the original Achaian League,
190
joins in the revival, 191
ravaged by AStolia, 416
Sonderbund formed by, 417
Tritymallos of Messéné, 378 note

Amphiktyonic

INDEX 691

Troizén, joins Achaian League, 295
secedes to Sparta, 372
Twelve, its existence as a political
number, 562
Tyrannicide, Greek view as to, 27,
297, 298
French and English defence of, 299
note
Tyrant, Tyranny, meaning of the
word, 17 and note, 195
“to plant,” use of the term, 181
note
nature of, in Greece, 194, 297
earlier and later compared, 194
voluntary abdication by, 196 and
note

ὌΜΒΕΙΑΝΒ, their relations towards
Rome, 580
threaten secession’ from Rome, 587
United Provinces, their union, 4, 5
meetings of, at the Hague, 121
compared with Lombard League,
602, 605, 607
United States, their union, 4, 5
their action as regards external
matters, 9, 10
method of electing the President,
56
civil war in, no proof against
Federalism, 71
nor against the Union, 72
a league of countries, 77
representative Assemblies in, 7.
scale of the States compared with
those in Europe, 78
results of the Union, 85
the Union compared with govern-
ment in France, 86
evils hindered by the Union, 2.
war between North and South, 91
seat of government at Washington,
121
tendency to assimilation in, 200
difference of franchise in, 201
diplomatic action compared with
that of Achaia, 202 seqq.
relation of Congress and the Presi-
dent, 217, 218
election and deposition of the Presi-
dent, 218 note
general comparison of, with Achaian
League, 243-251
as to the Senators’ votes, 247 nole
democratic feeling in, 248

United States, not an imitation of

Achaian League, 249

as to Presidential interregnum, 396
note

its provision as to dividing large
States, 489 node

first Congress (of thirteen States)
not representative of the people,
630

VaLERIvs, L., 494
Veientines, their resort to Kingship,
564
Venice, dependencies of, 23
her relations to the Eastern Empire,
25
her degradation in later days, 40
Great Council of, 58 note
new relations with the Lombard
cities, 602
her policy towards the two Empires,
609
concludes peace with Frederick
Barbarossa, 610
Verona, march of movement in, against
Frederick Barharossa, 602
Vicenza joins Lombard League, 602
Villius, P., 474
Virginia, appointment of a Dictator
contemplated, 317 note
analogy of, with Megalopolis, 486,
489 note
Volscians, traces of a League among,
561 and nofe .
Voltumna, the religious centre of
Etruria, 563
Votes, apportionment of, to members,
105, 164, 211, 212

Wark, constant state of, among City-
commonwealths, 42
severity of the Laws of, 45
evils of, lessened in large States, 62
Washington, George, his attempt to
-YTaise a volunteer cavalry, 454
note
Washington, seat of government of
United States, 121, 216
Westphalia, 631
Peace of, 622
William, the Bad, 601 note.
William, the Good, 601 note

XANTHOS, embassies sent by, 168
destruction of, 169

692 INDEX

Xenarchos, Achaian General, 522 Zakynthos, invaded by Rome, 449
Xenon of Hermioné gives up histyranny, ceded to Amynander, 466
331 dealings of Titus with, 497
Xenén of Patrai, challenges the Roman | Zama, battle of, 472
envoys, 531 Zeuxidas, Akarnanian General, 484
Xenophdn, his use of “ Beotian” and | Zénaras, his version of the Treaty
“‘Theban,” 125 between Philip and Hannibal.
bare mention of Arkadian League 443
in, 157 Zug, canton of, 165 note
Xerxes, his dialogue with Démaratos, City of, compared with Thebes, 126
139 note note
Ziirich, Canton of, no separate Inter -
ZAKYNTHOS taken by Philip, 434 national existence, 7 > )-
Φ
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