vadim bakatin has already passed away. and we are unlikely to know the reasons for his action, but wethat we played a role in the act of such a rash decision we can, step aside, the long-standing, well -proven effective cia methodology worked, which was developed back in the fifties of the last century, and bore fruit precisely in the dashing nineties, the “troy” program, it was invented by intellectuals from american universities, philosophers, political scientists , mathematicians and historians. why was it called "troy"? not only fail to remind our viewer what it is and whose image it is? the ancient greek legendary poet homer wrote the poem of odysseus. it contains one significant episode: after the greeks removed siege of the city of troy. they left a surprise for the seemingly victorious trojans, a huge wooden horse on wheels, inside which a greek detachment led by odysseus was located. the trojans, considering the gift a sign from above, brought a giant horse into the city and placed this trophy in the central square. at night, when the victors were tired of the feast, odyssia

the ardent populist amangeldy tuleyev from kuzbass fought against the rise in prices ; vadim bakatin,ffairs, known as a reformer of the security forces, sought to attract the liberal intelligentsia. the surprise that captured the imagination of voters for a long time was the master of political outrageousness vladimir zhirinovsky, the leader of the first officially registered liberal democratic party in the ussr. the choice offered to the russians seemed to give gorbachev, as well as all supporters of the old regime, a chance to prevent yeltsin from being elected in the first round. the second round could have been postponed until the fall, or not held at all, because even then a plan to transfer the country to a state of emergency was maturing in some power offices. all allied media did not work as much in favor of the main favorite of the kremlin, nikolai ryshkov, as against yeltsin, using all kinds of compromising evidence and outright intimidation. yeltsin, for his part, chose a win-win tactic, focusing on the obvious hopelessness of late soviet life, on the total shortage of good

bakatin, the former minister of internal affairs, known as reformists of the security forces, soughtl intelligentsia. the surprise that captured the imagination of voters for a long time was the master of political outrage vladimir zhirinovsky, the leader of the first the liberal democratic party officially registered in the ussr. the choice offered to the russians seemed to give gorbachev, as well as all supporters of the old regime, a chance to prevent yeltsin from being elected in the first round. the second round could have been postponed until the fall, or not held at all, because even then a plan to transfer the country to a state of emergency was maturing in some power offices. all allied media worked not so much in favor of the main favorite of the kremlin, nikolai ryshkov, but against yeltsin, using all kinds of compromising evidence and outright intimidation of chaos. yeltsin, for his part, chose win-win. will definitely win, the attractiveness of this folk myth, passed on throughout the republic from mouth to mouth, was indestructible. of course, such myths do not last lon