>> wednesday, president obama delis first state of the union address to congress laying out his vision for the future of the country and his plan to deal with issues such as unemployment, health care, and the wars in iraq and afghanistan. the state of the union address wednesday night. our coverage starts at 8 p.m. eastern on l president's address live on your iphone with the c-span radio ap. >> and now a portion of a conference focusing on the

representation of women and minorities in leadership positions. speaking at this session was cristina lopez, president of the national his panama institute. this is about 35 minutes. >> i'm very pleased to introduce our next speaker, ms. cristina lopez, who is the president of the national hispanic leadership institute. known as nhli. nhli is a nonprofit organization dedicated to developing ethical leadership in the hispanic community. the institute is the only national leadership development institute focused and committed to this mission. and in my opinion as a person who has been involved in the public sector most of my career, ethical leadership is knowing your core values and then having the courage to live them in all

aspects of your life even when it's not convenient to do that. i'm very interested in hearing ms. lopez's remarks considering the supreme court ruling yesterday. which has serious implications for all of us as public leaders and also for washington, d.c., i would suspect. please, join me in bringing her to the stage and let's show her a warm nuf welcome. [applause] >> thank you the and good afternoon. you know, it's a pleasure to be here with you and join so many talented leaders and learning so much from all of you. it's the, it's an honor to be here celebrating the 40th anniversary of the national urban fellows. in the life of a person, when you reach 40, you know, you're

at your peak, right? you can benefit from the knowledge and experience that you've gained in years, and you know that the best is yet to come, as the saying goes. and i think that's true for national urban fellows. you have graduated more than a thousand fellows who are shaping solutions and are true agents of change in their communities and nationally. you have grown one of the most extensive and engaged mentor networks in the country. and you have built a stellar leadership model, one of the premier programs in the country. so you have built a lot in the last 40 years, and you're also looking to the future. you're thinking creatively how to address the public service leadership gap and help leaders of color move from access to influence to power. you're moving forward with

innovative and exciting programs like america's leaders of change and the public service leadership diversity call to action campaign. you know, without doubt national urban fellows is and will continue to be a key player in building the leadership pipeline of people of color and the leadership pipeline of public service. national urban fellows and nhli have a lot in common. we are a younger, we've only been around 23 years, and we focus solely on latinas, hispanic women. but we share common values and a vision of leadership for a changing america. we both have the goal, i believe, of developing ethical leaders, leaders who are visionary thinkers and skilled problem solvers and results-driven agents of change. and it's not surprising that several of our own fellows are also national urban fellows like

lorraine cortez who you heard from yesterday and one of your board members back there. [applause] sylvia salazar and so many others, i could go on. and at the heart of the mission of both organizations is developing the leadership, soy and power -- voice and power of communities of color. and why is this so important? because we are the future of this country. we are shaping the country now, and we have the power to shape it even more in years to come if we're prepared and strategic and engaged. we all know the demographics, you know, people of color make up a third of the u.s. population, and we're expected to grow and exceed 50% by the year 2050 although i think it's

going to be sooner. we may have the numbers, and we have some access now, but we're still fighting to have our voices heard and our power is certainly not commensurate with our numbers. you know that the leadership picture of america doesn't reflect the demographic picture. and in the political arena we've heard figures, you know, 15% members of congress and similar number in federal and state office are people of color. in the nonprofit sector very, very low numbers as well. even in corporate america that they're always talking about the bottom line and how diversity is good for the bottom line, you know, the picture is not there. we have in corporate boards hispanics hold less than 4% of

corporation seats and latinas less than 1%. so we, you know, we have a lot of work to do. but we are a very sought-after market. not just the hispanic market, but all markets. so there's a lot to do. and progress often feels slow. and i think we were all very heartened with the election of president obama and sonia sotomayor's appointment to the supreme court, and there's no doubt that from politics to science, you know, from the arts to the economy, from los angeles to wall street, new york, people are making an impact. we're strengthening the social fabric of this country can. but despite the accomplishments of so many individuals, we still have much to do to break that leadership glass ceiling, or as a friend of mine from new mexico likes to say, the adobe ceiling.

[laughter] but the urgency of developing leaders of color is not just about demographics, it's about values. it's about advancing leaders who are value-centered. leaders who have the skills and the will to meet this country's challenges within a social justice framework. the economic calamity of the past year plus was not caused by subprime mortgages or credit defaults or even excessive greed. these were just symptoms, i think, of the real problem: failed leadership. leaders who didn't follow their true north, their internal compass of beliefs and values and principles that guide us all through life. that is why i believe it is so crucial to develop leaders of color who are rooted in community values, who have the

voice to draw attention to the challenge before us and to inspire us to common purpose, but also leaders who have the power to the deliver results. at the national hispana institute we believe there are four components of leadership development; education and training to build knowledge and skills, mentoring, community service and networking. our training component consists of four weeks over a period of nine months, a week at california, a week at harvard, a week in washington, d.c. to really give a broad experience. and this training focuses on technical management skills and building leadership competencies, and most importantly, getting to know ourselves and our strengths. mentoring is also at the core of

our model, and i think so critical to developing leadership today. our fellows gain access to role models and mentors, they're paired with a mentor, but they in turn have to commit to mentoring at least two other latinas for at least two years. so in the two-plus decades that we've been around we're so proud to say that we have mentored, our fellows have mentored more than 6,000 latinas. and we're very proud of that. [applause] the community service component is, also, very integral. providing the opportunity to put theory into action is important not only to help build confidence, but also to help find one's voice. as an effective community agent of change.

and we strongly believe that you have to give back to the community, so as part of the program the fellows have to commit to doing a leadership project. we encourage these projects to last about a year, but in our last impact study when we looked, it turns out the average life span of the project is seven years. so, you know, it's a demonstrated, i think, difference that our fellows are making in their communities and projects go from building a tenant organization to organize around affordable housing and gentrification to developing leadership programs for latina teams who are at high risk for pregnancy to developing health programs. it's quite a variety. and, in fact, we have several of our leadership projects have

evolved into national organizations today. and we're very proud of that. one of the most frequently identified preparation needs for nonprofit leadership, i think, is the need to develop networks. and nhli has built one of the most powerful latina networks in the country. we have over 600 program fellows but a broader network of about 6,000, nearly 6,000 latinas which, you know, this network is key to providing information. as you well know, a lot of the opportunities that we're able to connect to is because of these networks. so these components, these four components -- the educational piece, mentoring, community service and networking -- are p am program. call it. because we are a young

population. hispanics are a very young population, so it's important for us to start early. so our young latina program targets 17-22-year-olds, and this year we're starting a new program thanks to the american express foundation and richard brown, thank you so much. and this program is going to the target latinas 24-34 years of age who are working in the nonprofit sector because we believe it's very important to develop that leadership pipeline in the nonprofit sector. but at the national hispana leadership institute we also believe that developing leadership in communities of color must also take into consideration culture. not just the educational piece and the mentoring and the network, culture is central. as a latina organization,

culture in a gender lens is central to our model. we approach leadership development through both a female and a hispanic cultural lens. and the latina identity is genuinely validated, and our model builds on latinas' strengths. for example, latinas are nurturers by culture, and we bring this to our leadership roles. so mentoring and developing the next generation is a key element of all our programs and what we do. family and community orientation the is also central to our culture. so we bring the concept of familia to everything we do, and the nhli network functions as a big family. sometimes a dysfunctional family, but -- [laughter] and relationship building is a major focus. we spend incredible amounts of

time the just developing the relationships among our classes before going on to the educational piece and the other pieces of our program. when we function on the premise that we lead different because our community, because of our commitment to community and to the collective so that when one latina leader succeeds, her family and community succeeds. i think studies have shown that race and ethnicity affects how leaders are perceived by others, how individuals enact their leadership and how leaders addressed issues related to race and ethnicity the. so addressing race, ethnicity, culture, i think, is essential to leadership development.

when people of color bring a heritage that is rooted in community, the natural instinct of groups that have been his to historically oppressed is to come together in commune always. and the leadership tradition in communities of color is often less directive and more collective and community-focused. so i believe that expanding and transforming the leadership culture in nonprofit and public sector depends not only on building the leadership capacity of people of color who have been largely excluded from leadership decisions, but also on changing the dominant paradigm. rather than just focusing on individual leadership that tackles problems in isolated

context, i think we should see leadership as a dynamic and interconnected process that relies on many individuals. and, you know, leadership as a collective process. so we need to promote strategies that nurture and support networks and leaders in a community context. and we need to better prepare individuals to lead collectively with others whose, you know, leadership culture and practices may differ from our own. the nonprofit sector faces a great leadership vacuum in the common decades. you know, we've seen figures in the next six years, i think, the nonprofit sector's going to need to attract, like, 80,000 senior managers each year. that's about 40% more than currently required. and similarly, the need for leadership at the federal and

state and local government, you know, will be in the hundreds of thousands over the next decades. so the demand for talent coupled with the scarcity of people of color in the leadership pipeline, i think, will create significant challenges for the nonprofit and public sector. but i also think that it will create extraordinary opportunities. as the economic and social divides widen, the nonprofit and public sectors are being called to a new level of leadership. to meet these challenges, we need to expand and transform the existing leadership culture. and this requires a more culturally inclusive approach to cultivating and sustaining leadership. and what do i mean by that? i think, you know, leadership

development institutions, especially those that are targeting leaders of color like national urban fellows, like nhli, should come together to create capacity for coordinated action across networks and across organizations, and i'm so happy to see paula and i, we've been having conversations about that. [laughter] and we need to join across networks and communities to identify a shared vision and common goals to move forward. i think we also must redouble our efforts to advocate for greater diversity and inclusive ness in leadership programs and institutions across the board, even those that may not be specifically targeting leaders of color. but i think most importantly we need to the cultivate leadership, as i said before, that is rooted in community values and that also meets the

demands of the 21st century. you know, we need to prepare leaders that have vision that can inspire others, can dream, you know, i don't want to say the unimaginable because i -- but leaders who can dream boldly and can ignite confidence and passion to make these dreams reality. leaders who have a strong sense of self and purpose who stay true to their values and consistent in changing environments. leaders who lead with integrity. leaders who build bridges and inspire common purpose and shared solution. but in the process we should not confuse management with leadership. management is good, and we need to be strong managers. but it's not the same.

managers make sure that things work well. leaders create that which works better. managers focus on problems and try to fix them. leaders focus on strengths and seize opportunities. managers make sure that people put in an honest day can's work -- day's work. leaders inspire people to do more than expected. managers create efficient policies and procedures, but leaders create more effective systems. managers worry about the present, but leaders look forward to the future. we're at a historical turning point for people of color, especially latinos as we become the largest racial and ethnic group in the nation. and it's imperative that we,

people of color, we move from representation to real power. and the retirement of the baby boomers is going to create an abundance of openings for people of color in the nonprofit and business sectors. the demographic changes in the electorate will insure that more people of color get elected into government. so programs like national urban fellows, like nhli that prepare and empower people of color to grow as leaders and become more vital contributors to their community is essential to insuring the future for all americans, not just for people of color. so with that, i just wanto end and see if there are any questions. thank you so much. [applause]

>> [inaudible] quite the interesting one, and i think that cristina got to meet each other a couple of weeks ago, and i was so excited pause her call to action is our call to action, so we're together. so i would love to entertain some questions. we've got a few minutes, you're okay for a few moments? we've got a few minutes, so if i could just ask anyone who'd like to pose a question for cristina? oh, i know you have some. yes, please. carolyn. >> [inaudible] >> you spoke a lot about coming together and collaborating this organization with your organization. but within the community, the latina community and the african-american community, whether it's a perceived or reality sometimes when you try to form these collaborations, there's often conflict.

do you see any of that in the work that you're doing in trying to form these relationships? and with the -- you also made the distinction of the latina community will soon be the largest segment of people of color in this country. that also sometimes has, as we have those conversations, often there is, there is some pushback with only of this discussion -- some of this discussion. so i would just like to get your perspective on that. >> uh-huh? , yeah. that's a very good question. i don't disagree that there are conflicts in, particularly in some communities. i think it's hard when a group that has been traditionally excluded, a group that has been many -- in the minority who's beginning to feel some power to then all of a sudden say, gonna

step back and give some of that power. i think that's natural. but it must be done. i think, you know, one of the, one of the successes of the mayor in los angeles has been the way that he has been able to bring together all communities, but particularly the african-american and latino community. and he explicitly told his staff that he wanted other communities to be represented more than their proportion of the population. so, you know, it was an opportunity in which latinos were coming of age in numbers, you, you know, had an opportunity to be in some leadership positions, yet this man chose to lead in a way that

was inclusive. and i think that's the testament of a good can leader, and that's what we should do more of. you know, it doesn't happen often, but i think that little by will little when we begin tod these bridges between communities, i think we can see that we have a lot more to gain by working together than by figuring out, you know, i got more numbers, therefore, you know, i get more stuff. but i think it's hard, okay, it's hard, and conflict happens, and i don't think it's going to go away tomorrow, okay? but i think that there are enough leaders in all the communities that are willing to work that way. >> [inaudible] >> good afternoon. >>

[inaudible] first of all, i want to agree with all of your comments. i'm a graduate of class of 1974. i know some of you weren't around then, but -- [laughter] we took care of business just the same. but i'm an adjunct professor at the national hispanic university in san jose, california, and we are about doing some of the same things that you just talked about, eliminating conflict between black and brown communities, focusing on educating those communities and focusing on how we can develop leadership and educated leadership that can take on the role of making a difference in our community. one of my goals for this year is to bring national hispanic university more in touch and in tune with the goals of national urban fellows program. so i'll be in touch with you to see how we can work together. >> thank you.

[applause] >> good afternoon. i'm class of 2009, and you made the distinction between managers and leaders. managers see the present, leaders see the future. what do you see as the future of latina leadership in the u.s.? >> wow. well, as a la latina i'd like to say that we are the future of latino leadership. [applause] i see there are quite a few latinas there. sorry, alfred, i know you're a latino. >> [inaudible] [laughter] >> you know, in the community, in the latino community i think women are really central. you know, there's this image of ma cheese mow and that the man is the one, you know -- that might be the image, but you and i know that the women exert a lot of power in the household,

in the family, in the community. and i think latinas bring a lot of that strength that our culture gives us. and we -- the appointment of sonia sotomayor was a tremendous inspiration to latinas because, you know, the old saying of, si, se puede and you can do it if you work really hard became tangible for the first time. we have linda solis in labor, so i think that right now latina leaders we're very inspired, we're working hard, and we are playing leadership roles in our community. for example, la tees that -- latinas are starting their own businesses at six times the rate of the, you know, average population. now, that says a little

something like why? starting their businesses because they can't go any further, they can't go up any further, so they leave wherever they're at whether it's the nonprofit sector or business or whatever to form their own thing. but we're seeing examples every day of how latinas are leading in the hispanic community. so the future looks good. >> i wanted to just say something that cristina and i talked about and was also mentioned by david birdsall and that's the need to seek out board opportunities and the need for all of us in this room to make our presence known through local boards and nonprofits. it's amazingly a small percentage of our alumni have been involved in those boards, and that's one of the things we want to work on because it's one of those great ways to get the leadership more exposed.

i wanted to mention that. .. not only in our community but to latinas. we lead, i think, in a more collective way. and we need opportunities that allow us to fulfill ourselves within the family context as well.

you know, i speak to a lot of women and especially of the little more seasoned -- i don't want to call them older but more seasoned women. and they talk about how family sometimes was a barrier to developing their leadership opportunities because they gave up opportunities because of family situations. because of family responsibilities. in many cases, you know, where you went to school had -- 'cause your family -- your mom and dad didn't let you go away to college. hey, i'm 52-year-olds. so my undergraduate, it was close to home. i couldn't go to the college i wanted because mom and dad felt, you're not going to go away. you know, you have to be close here. close by the family. and, you know, back then it wasn't like, you know, i'm going to do what i want. okay, mom.

so all that is changing. but the family -- i think it's a very important component to our leadership development. and again when i was saying the whole context of community. the context of giving back to the community. i think it's very important for us as well. >> good afternoon. my name is jacque and i'm class of 2006. i thank you so much for sharing. i work very closely -- one of my colleagues whom i work closely with is a latina and i see her leadership style which is a little different than mine. and it's really humbling. so thank you for sharing your perspective. what i would like to say is that now today there are many groups who are coming together.

i know in the christian community, there are groups who are talking about looking at different business models, different ways of managing where family does come first. where it's not just about the job, but it's about other values. in the african-american community, not only has the church been strong but also the principles of kwanza have also permeated some groups. and so i just want to just encourage you and just embrace your efforts to reach out to other groups as you continue on and find the common purposes. thank you. >> thank you. [applause] >> it has been a delight, christina. it's only the beginning of a new partnership and friendship. so welcome to our family. >> thank you. >> thank you so much. [applause]

>> so i was thinking about my venezuelan grandmother during the course of the day and i wanted to use a phrase i learned last year that she had her own way of saying. but i first had to say and tell you what she used to call me. so for those of you who wonder if your grandmother always inspires you, she did. but she also used in her own way, and that's one of the things we heard last year from our fellows that, you know, when you have the will, you can make it happen. so as we take a short break, i want to will you back with a lot of energy. we have a great closing panel, which is going to talk about leadership in the media. and that in itself will be of interest. and then harvey johnson, mayor harvey johnson will give us a closing. i'll give you 10 minutes to freshen up and get something a little cold to drink and we'll

be back in 15. thank you. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> and as we look at the u.s. capitol here where the u.s. senate galveston for business starting at 2:00 pm today, lawmakers will continue working on raising the federal debt limit. and later they'll consider a judicial nomination. live u.s. senate coverage right here on c-span2. off the floor there's a lot of focuses on the nomination of ben bernanke to serve as chair of the federal reserve. harry reid has yet to take the procedural steps. mr. bernanke bank of america's term ends this thursday. several democratic senators have noted their opposition to his nomination.

>> geoff hoon served as the former defense secretary under british prime minister tony blair from 1999 to 2005. last week he testified before the british iraq committee, a five-member committee examining the british in the iraq war. questions focused on mr. hoon's relationship with then defense secretary donald rumsfeld and the assessment of the military be this is over 2 1/2 hours. >> well, good morning, ladies and gentlemen. today we begin hearing from members of the government who were involved in the buildup and the decision to commit force to action in iraq in 2003.

this session are to examine the right honorable geoff hoon the former secretary of state for defense the key discussions and decisions taken on iraq. and their implementation within the ministry of defense and the government. during his period of secretary of defense. it will cover from summer 2001 to may of 2005. i should say at this point that a number of issues and specific incidents which occurred in iraq during mr. hoon's time as secretary of state are currently subject to a range of judicial proceedings. including, for example, the use of snatch land rovers. in fairness to all parties to those proceedings, therefore, the committee will not focus on these in detail during this session. now, we that witnesses are giving evidence based on their recollection of their efforts and we, of course, can cross-check what we hear against

the papers to which we have access. some of which are still have come in. i remind every witness that he will be later to sign a transcript of the evidence to the effect of the evidence given, if it's truthful and fair. and i'll ask sir martin gilbert to ask the questions. >> can you tell us what was the division of responsibilities between you as secretary of state and the chief of defense staff? >> the first chief of defense staff, charles guthrie once described the ministry of defense like a three-legged stool. there were the politicians, the civil servants and the military. and in a sense what he was driving at was that it was important that all three elements of the stool work together; otherwise, we had problems. so i always remembered that in the almost six years that i was

there. it was important for me to enjoy the confidence of the military. but at the same time ensure that those responsible for developing policy on the civil service side were -- were comfortable with where we were going. having said that, i think sometimes there's a myth about the extent to which the policymakers act upon the military. i think one of the great successes of the military of the defense is to the extent it is genuinely joined up. that there are real integration between the civil servants and the military to the extent that sometimes it wasn't always possible when people were wearing civilian clothes to determine who was from the military and who was a civil servant. there were civil servants who were determined to demonstrate that they were every bit as robust as the military and there were military people determined to demonstrate their considerable grasp on policy. >> and specifically your

relationship with the chief of the defense staff? >> there were a number of chiefs in my time in the m.o.d. i hope that they would say that we had an excellent relationship. the door was always opened. we had very regular -- bole formal and informal meetings. and obviously in the course of campaigns like iraq, they were on a daily or more than daily basis. >> if i could turn to your own experience of the united states, and i wondered what contrast you saw in your role and in its execution and that of donald rumsfeld of the department of state. and how you would characterize your relationship with rumsfeld? >> well, first of all, i first worked with bill cohen, who is don rumsfeld's previous successor. inevitably individuals bring their own style to bear.

i would say that probably initially donald was somewhat -- to use the right word suspicious perhaps of a labour government. he was a republican politician. he had been a congressman many years before. he had previously been secretary of defense. i don't think he was whole persuaded a labour government where he could be comfortable. but he had a admiration with the prime minister and we were able to do business. >> how were you able to allay his suspicions during that period? >> i think by being consistent. i think he was -- i think he was anxious to ensure that people did what they said that they were going to do. >> and did you feel you had a good line of communication with him? that you were getting a good picture he have what was in his mind?>01

>> as i say there was this -- suspicion is possibly a too strong a word but perhaps that we came from different places. yes, as it went on, we had no difficulty in frankly discussing the issues that had to be resolved. >> i wonder, mr. hoon, could you say just a little between the difference between the setup in terms of giving direction to the armed forces in the united states and here because the president is the head of the -- and -- and you have a in modern times a simplify setup with various commands working after the president unlike our system? >> well, i think certainly in the course of the events that you are inquiring into, it was clear that the chiefs of staff in washington weren't always in

the direct line of communication to the pentagon in a sense that donald would deal more directly with general franks and with people in the commands out of the united states. where our system -- it is clear that whatever information was coming through the military chain came through the cds and the other military heads. so to that extent, that structure was in business terms flatter. the secretary for defense was able to go direct to centcom and to tommy franks. >> thank you. >> i'd like to turn now to the question of sanctions. to ask how concerned you were about the humanitarian aspects and the much publicized suffering of the iraqi people and in particular the m.o.d.'s report of our policy, for the

u.k. policy being undermined as a result of widespread public concern about the suffering of the iraqi people? >> i became a foreign office minister responsible for the middle east in may, 1999. and from then on i was a fairly regular visitor to the middle east. and there was little doubt that notwithstanding the meetings that we might have had with the leaders of those countries who were always in private expressing concern about iraq and indeed about iran to be fair, once we went out -- and if we did, say, a press conference, it was completely different. journalists, people in those meetings would be actually very angry about their allegations arising out of the sanctions. they blamed us for, they said, starving the iraqi people, or depriving them of medical supplies. so to that extent sanctions were

failing in that they were not delivering the benefit that we anticipated politically. moreover, worse than that, we were getting the blame for things that actually were saddam's responsibility. >> and was there something that the m.o.d. was able to do in terms of public perception? >> i think we could try. i remember certainly in the middle east a whole series of extremely uncomfortable press conferences where arab journalists would blame us for sanctions. blame us for the suffering of the iraqi people. i'm sure other ministers did their level best as i did to try and set the record straight. i have to say i didn't feel we had much success. >> to return to united states and the department of defense, we understand that in the spring of 2001, the pentagon wanted any new iraq policy, which was then

under discussion to include a threat of military action. what caveats -- what conditions did you and the m.o.d. suggest, particularly, with regard to the legal base and also international preparations? and were these discussed in cabinet? was this as issue that the cabinet discussed at that time? >> your dates puzzle me a little. do you mean the spring of 2002? >> 2001. >> before 11? >> right. -- before 9/11? >> right. >> i'm not particularly aware of any detailed conversations about iraq prior to 9/11. >> we'll come on to that sequence in a moment. another issue which has been raised by a number our witnesses relates to the discussion with

regard to a more active campaign it off influence the arab stream, the arab public opinion in terms of the problems what were perceived in the arab world was somehow our dual standards with regard to the arab-israel conflict on the one land and the iraq policy on the other. may i ask what was your input to this debate? and whether you felt enough was being done. >> well, again, i mean, going on from the press conference, i can't say that i had regular contact with the arab street but i think the press conferences that i was describing earlier was probably a fair reflection in the sense i think many arab journalists were influencing opinion in the arab street who were avid newspaper-readers at the time. so clearly we judged -- i don't just mean me.

the government judged that, what was required was real progress on the -- on the palestinian track. on improving relations between palestinians and israel. as a foreign officer ministers in may, june and july, 1999, i've been involved in achieving some of the final status issues that were then being negotiated. so we absolutely saw that as being the way forward. because that really was the underlying problem with the arab street. that we have not pushed as hard as we could have. that was the sentiments in the middle east. >> was this discussed in cabinet in debate -- >> obviously, my own involvement in 1999 was only for a few months. but i went to faz. -- compassesa.

-- gaza and i met yasser arafat. and we discussed issues relating to borders, water, location to the capital city and in a sense that all went wrong. we were well aware that this was a fundamental issue as far as the arab street and the arab world in general was concerned. in fact, i would say in the period since then, the street has been absolutely consistent in its views on the issues. and it probably changed to the extent arab leaders and arab governments have regarded this as being more important. i was always a little surprised in the late 1990s the extent to which the leadership of arab nations -- some arab nations at any rate did not see this as a particular issue for them. >> thank you. i'd like to turn now to the no-fly zones.

after the february strikes in 2001, there was considerable concern in the united states to keep the action low key. how did you see the role of the no-fly zones in terms of our containment policy? and what advice were you giving with regard to what our position should be? >> but again, if anything back to your point earlier about sanctions. one of the further issues that was consistently raised with us was the fact that we were perceived in the arab street to be attacking iraqis. that when we took action against radars and missile sites under the no-fly zones, we were accused by the street of attacking iraq. and again, try as i might it was extremely difficult to persuade people what we were doing it was for the protection of people under the no-fly zone. that was how and why they were established and why we continued to patrol them.

the difficulty -- and i think this is what your question is referring to, is that unless we had pretty regular patrols over the no-fly zones, i'm most familiar with the southern one, then it was much harder for the pilots to retain a picture of where mobile missile launches were located. the iraqis were becoming more sophisticated in the later stages of the zones at both locating radar equipment out of the zones, even though they could then direct missiles from inside the zone. but also having mobile launchers that were hidden in -- sometimes in residential districts, in center of towns, in places where they knew that an attack would be very difficult for us because of the risk of civilian casualties. and they became very adept at

what i think the americans called scoot and shoot, which was to move these things around on a very regular basis. so if you were flying from kuwait and you were over a zone, then -- unless you had a pretty clear picture as to where these things might be and you got that from experience, then it was quite hard to be sure that our pilots would not come at risk. so i think -- the specific answer to your question is that i became increasingly concerned that unless we patrolled regularly, there were -- there were growing risks to our pilots. >> i'd like to ask about the question of advice and what advice you were getting about iraq and particularly about the sustainability of containment. and about potential alternative policies, both from your own officials and also from other government officials.

>> m.o.d. was much more concerned about the issue we were just discussing about no-fly zones. i think my sense for the reasons that i've given to the inquiry already was that politically this was failing. that we could not go on indefinitely being blamed for starvation of the iraqi people. not getting medical supplies. us appearing to attack iraq when all those policies were designed for the benefit and protection for the iraqis. there was a complete mismatch to what we were intending to do and the effect politically that it was creating in the arab street. >> this leads us to the crawford period which is obviously one of tremendous importance for us. what was your view before crawford of how the united kingdom should respond to any american request in support of their policy of regime change?

what should our attitude be? >> there's quite a number of separate issues in that question if i can try and separate them out. i think our first reaction in the ministry of defense was to think about precisely what the president was getting at in relation to his axis of evil speech. and, therefore, having identified potential threats to the united states and to the west than we did think about what that might mean as far as the m.o.d. was concerned. and indeed i think i wrote -- a wrote a note to the prime minister at some stage saying that, you know, iraq was of concern. but actually probably the longer term threat to the united kingdom was from iran. i don't think that was a particularly remarkable thing to say. but nevertheless it did indicate we were thinking solely about iraq but we were thinking more widely about potential threats.

and i think that reflected what had happened in the united states after 9/11. i was never really persuaded. i have family -- and i've lived in america. i have many friends there. i didn't think the united kingdom ever quite grasp the extent of the shock that 9/11 caused to the united states, both to the political system but also to ordinary people. i think the americans became very anxious to avoid being taken by surprise again and look hard at the kinds of risks that there were around. iraq was one of them. but i would say in the pre-crawford period as far as the ministry of defense was concerned, it was only one of them. >> what did you suggest from the m.o.d. perspective the prime minister should be asking the president to crawford. >> i think what we were looking at in that sense of what were the consequences of this speech?

what was the president aiming at in terms of making this pretty powerful speech about the axis of evil. what did it mean in terms of american likely responses? and where would we be as a country and as a ministry of defense if we were called upon to take action. we all know the americans -- the world was taken by surprise by the events of 9/11. my sense of the united states it was pretty determined not to be taken by surprise again. >> and did you feel the president could give us some access to united states military planning? this was the time when we should really know what the americans had in mind? >> in the preparation for crawford, i know that we suggested that the prime minister should raise with the president precisely that question. that we should ask for access to

u.s. planning so that we were aware of what they had in mind. i'm reasonably confident that he asked for that. i have to say that it didn't happen particularly quickly after crawford. >> we hadn't started with centcom for afghanistan planning, was it? >> that was kept quite separate. i was not aware that there was any overlap. i think i learned later that the iraq planning side was kept very, very separate from afghanistan. so our people -- i mean, they might have had a general sense that something was happening. but they didn't have any specific information about precisely what that was. >> right. >> when you asked for planning, access to planning, was that on the assumption that there would be by necessity -- if the americans were going to get involved in an operation of this

scale, some interest, expectation requirement for military contribution? >> i'm not sure necessarily expectation. but i think certainly there was a sense that we wanted to know what was happening so that perhaps we could influence it. perhaps we could share in what was at that stage an essentially political process. at that stage as far as i was concerned, what we were trying to do was to disarm saddam hussein and that the ems was on a peaceful process through the united nations. but ultimately the threat of force, which is something that i think was consistent throughout. >> you were assuming that the british might wish to make a military contribution if this process ended in large scale military action? >> i think that in the military mind and in the ministry of defense was a sense that this was a possibility. i will put it no higher than that.

certainly not an expectation. to be inside the process, both to influence it but equally to understand what was happening so that if later on there was such a request, we knew the nature of that request and why it had been made. >> but your focus pre-crawford was that we had to maintain our position in terms of being able to both influence and participate in some future military operation? >> yes. that we need to understand where the americans were going, both in the political process but equally if necessary militarily. >> thank you. >> after crawford, did you set out for the m.o.d. your perspective and the government's perspective on what our policy on iraq was at that time? >> i think we were clear -- i think i'd probably just done it, actually. that this was essentially a

conditional, political process where if necessary and in the event of those conditions being satisfied, then military action might be necessary. but i think we were a long way off taking any of those kinds of decisions. >> what point then did you ask for an assessment of the potential military options? >> well, i think that had been part of the work that was being done even prior to crawford. i think there were some people in the ministry of defense involved in that. the actual paper that the prime minister talked to crawford -- it was a slight curious thing. it was a cabinet office paper. it had involved m.o.d. people but it didn't come through the m.o.d. i think it was sent to me in parallel, which is a process that sometimes would occur where a number of departments were involved. so my assumption is that other departments would have as well contributed to that paper. presumably most obviously the

foreign office. >> you were, i believe, part of the immediate pre-crawford discussions? >> actually i wasn't. and i wasn't establish precisely why. i must have been overseas. sir kevin about it. >> did you get information from sir kevin? >> yes i knew there were some quite detailed discussions about what was going to happen at crawford. >> to go back to the options, when you received the options, what was your own assessment of what the united states might prefer? >> i think if you go through the three options -- i mean, the united states would have been probably understandably very disappointed if we had not been able to provide basing in places like diego garcia which we would

have to agree to. it was the minimal option i think was self-evident. it would be highly unlikely for our closest ally we would refuse access to our bases. >> option 2 is an air force maritime package. it was relatively straightforward. a number of those assets were not too far from the air and, therefore, could be deployed relatively straightforward. i think early on we thought that option 3, which is a full armored division -- i have to say that these things change slightly over time. i'm kind of summarizing the picture to some extent because there were -- there were some overlap between 2 and 3. some of the elements of 3 changed over time. but nevertheless, the land option is how i might characterize 3, was something that i probably thought at that

stage was quite a big ask given extensive involvement in afghanistan at the time. >> previous witnesses have spoken about the importance with regard to the options of our potential influence with united states. did you have a particular view on that? >> i think it's undoubtedly the case that we would be taken more seriously if we were making a substantial contribution. i think it goes without saying in a military alliance, if that was what it was going to become, that if you are involved to a significant extent that means that your voice is necessarily louder in the discussions that take place. if we had a minimalist involvement, you know, our views would be much less significant. >> and that would affect also our views with regard to the actual policy? >> i don't quite understand that? >> with the actual policy to

iraq as opposed to the way in which a military operation would be conducted, were it to be? >> yes. sorry, i see what you mean. there is no doubt that that influence then extends to the shaping of the policy. that if we are seeming to be willing to participate to a significant extent militarily, that allows us is greater say in the nonmilitary aspects of the policy. is that what you mean? >> yes, yes. i'd like to end my whole section of questions with the meeting with the prime minister which you did attend on the 23rd of july. which has been called a key meeting on iraq. did you recognize at the time it was a key meeting? and what was the -- from the m.o.d. perspective, what was the outcome of it? >> i don't recall that as being a key meeting and such. i don't think there was a sudden change in the atmosphere or in the pace of preparations. i would say that this was part

of what i would describe as an iterative process. we were working out both what the americans were planning, what contributions we could make. they were necessarily constrained by the political process, by the conditions that the prime minister had imposed on our participation. and moreover, by real world judgments as to what we could do. all of those meetings are key at some extent. i wouldn't say suddenly something changed as a result of that meeting. >> and your contribution to it? >> i'm afraid there were many such meetings. i don't have a specific recollection of my contribution at the time. >> just to be clear of the sequence in the summer of 2002. there was thinking about about military options against the political context and the

constraints from early may but it was a very small number of people. and general reese told us he didn't submit a paper on options with a planning base behind it until, i think, september. is this part of the evolution, july somewhere in the middle of that? >> yes, there was. i mean, one of the issues that i know that we were very -- i need to go back a little. i learned later that the americans on a shelf in the pentagon had a plan for iraq. and i know -- and he learned later that donald rumsfeld was not at all happy with that plan. it was a very heavy plan. it involved large numbers of troops. i think up to half a million. and he had asked centcom to think again basically to take down that plan and look at it in quite a different way, which is what they were engaged upon. when the general went to tampa,

june, 2002 -- i mean, i have a recollection that he persuaded the americans about the so-called northern option. certainly we had had -- >> we've heard that evidence too. >> we had had that discussion i know in the ministry of defense before he went. he was a very -- he was a very thoughtful, a very creative soldier. and he set out the kinds of options for an attack on iraq that, you know, any military man would consider. i think he went to tampa -- as i say my recollection was i have no specific knowledge of this. that he persuaded the americans that it was sensible to have a two-pronged attack. to divide the republican guard to keep from guessing as to where the attack was actually coming from. >> looking to the political context to the states this

summer of 2002, i mean, were you getting a sense either from military sources or from general awareness or from donald rumsfeld that the u.s. administration was getting closer to the point of contemplating regime change if necessary by military action? rather than simply running through a range of broad strategic policy options? >> i think it was getting pretty real by then, yes. i think that there was -- there was a real sense of the americans thinking through in a very practical way the consequences of the axis of evil speech and focusing on iraq. we had no doubt of that stage in the summer that they meant business. >> thank you. >> i think you're looking in my direction, john? >> i am. i lost you. >> i'd like to get a bit more

into detail of the military planning in a minute. but i just wonder before i do that, i can come back to the question of sanctions and containment that you were talking to sir martin about earlier. from 1991 onwards we had a policy of containment which, of course, had gone beyond sanctions. trade sanctions were indeed part of that which you were talking earlier. another part of it was the u.n. embargo on the export of defense material to iraq. the no-fly zones is another part. the naval embargo, another part and indeed the stationing of kurdish forces including some british forces in neighboring countries. it was all part of this policy of containment. by 2001, what had that achieved? had that contained saddam hussein? >> it had, yes. i mean, i think it had certainly

stopped him from, for example, acquiring fissile material. he had an ambition earlier to develop a nuclear weapon. i think we were pretty confident that his ambitions had been constrained, if not -- they certainly weren't eliminated. i mean, there were many aspects of things that he was engaged upon that were contrary to the sanctions. he was -- he was trying to extend the range of one of his existing missiles. i think it was called an al-samod but i would have to check. he would trying to develop longer range missiles. i think inspectors had found casings and engines that were larger than was allowed under the rules. there was no doubt that his agents were trying to acquire a fissile material. so he was constantly pushing out

and indeed breaching the rules. so it wasn't completely successful but equally i think in the spirit of your question, it wasn't completely a failure either. he was able to get around the rules. but for those -- but for that policy he would have done a lot more and become a lot more dangerous more quickly. >> but for the policy he would have been more dangerous. as you say he still had ambitions to break out from it and was trying to. >> it was more than ambition. >> yes. >> the issues i described in relation -- >> he was making efforts. >> he was doing it? >> yes. yeah. but was it the case in 2001 that he wasn't actually a serious threat to the region, to the countries around him?

>> he was a potential threat. and that is what i think changed particularly in the united ststststster a/11. instead of simply dealing with a threat today, i think the americans became much more sensitive about potential risks because they had not seen 9/11 coming. we knew very little about afghanistan. we had very little information about afghanistan. and out of apparently nowhere, an attack on the most powerful country in the world. i think straight-away the american administration under -- i think as well some pressure from some of the politicians i met in congress, you know, they just were not prepared to tolerate a similar set of events occurring again. whether that was from iraq or iran or libya or from north korea. >> many other witnesses have talked, as you have done, about the shock effect of 9/11 and the way that this changed american

tolerance of risk. but the question i'm asking is about the actuality of the risk. whether in actuality he had been contained in a way that he wasn't able to seriously threaten his neighbors at this time? >> well, the intelligence evidence was that he retained stocks of chemical and indeed biological weapons. and clearly had been prepared to use them both against iran and against his own people. so there was little doubt that having gotten to that capability, he was capable of using it. >> but his nuclear programmed been frozen? >> his nuclear programmed been frozen because of the absence of fisill material. -- fissile material. but there was a sense that his efforts to develop larger and

longer-range missiles were part of an ambition to deliver a nuclear weapon if he could secure the fissile material. >> leaving the americans on one side, we've heard -- we heard from jonathan powell yesterday, indeed, that there were differing views in the british government about the extent to which containment was a sustainable policy could be continued particularly if the sanctions were made more targeted in a way that dealt with the political problem, the political downside you talked about earlier. they focused more on military weapons and indeed if firmer action was taken for evasion of actions and smuggling. where did you lie in this debate? >> i'm not sure that i was particularly engaged in it. i mean, i can recall discussions about smarter sanctions i think

was the expression that was used. but as far as i was concerned, my -- i mean, i think i put it in answer to previous questions, it seemed to me that politically we were not -- we were not succeeding with our policy. i was concerned -- increasingly concerned about the risk of our area of pilots of patrolling the no-fly zones because we were not -- we were not always able to respond in a way that was necessary to make those patrols as safe as they needed to be. and my sense was that this -- this policy was breaking down. the containment was not delivering the political results as you say that were required. but that it was simply not something that could go on indefinitely. >> even if it was reinforced? >> well, as i say, i was not much involved in the -- in those discussions.

i think they were discussions probably more taking place in the foreign office. >> your department was responsible for an awful lot of the containment. shouldn't you have been involved in discussions? >> well, i have no -- i don't know what the dates were for that. but i certainly don't -- i can recall that there were discussions about improving sanctions and about making them smarter and more targeted. i don't recall any -- any conclusions from those discussions. >> i mean, you talked earlier about the ongoing series of meetings with the prime minister about iraq. and presumably in those meetings he was one of the minister's most closely involved in iraq policy. it must have been taking a position on the strategy on whether we should look to sustain containment? and we were still pursuing containment at the united nations.

or whether we needed to go in a completely different direction? >> i think i've set out for you already that my concerns -- i visited the base in kuwait. i can't quite remember its name. but i've been there. i talked to the pilots. i'd been briefed in detail on the kinds of operation that is they were conducting. there was considerable concern about the risk to that operation. so i was just much less persuaded than perhaps i had been prior to that. this policy could continue, not least because the real downside was that every time we attacked a missile in iraq, we were accused of attacking iraq and causing civilian casualties. >> what did the prime minister tell you about his discussion

with president bush at crawford? >> i don't think he told me anything directly. i saw a record of the meeting. i think one of the -- inevitably inquiring into iraq but one of the sort of -- it creates an artificial sense of what was happening. much of our preoccupation at the time, was about what was happening in afghanistan. the foreign office i know were very concerned about the middle east peace process for the reasons i mentioned earlier, i took a continuing interest in that. the sense that this was all about iraq, in my recollection was wrong. it was part of a kind of process. >> this inquiry is about iraq but obviously we have to understand the wider context. to what extent more generally -- i mean, jonathan powell told us there were different records of crawford.

there's one that has now been declassified which is one paragraph that was sent out to the guidance of diplomatic missions overseas which is not exactly very informative and indeed we heard from others that distribution of the prime minister's records is traditional. it's on a very differential basis. to what extent do you as defense secretary privy to the prime minister's exchanges with president bush orally and in writing in the course of 2002 about iraq? >> it's almost an impossible question to answer. i saw the changes that you had with alistar campbell. i think there were probably but i'm reconstructing to some extent. i think there were probably two sorts of letters. there was -- what i might describe as a round robin letter where the prime minister would set out a number of concerns from different departments, the foreign office, the m.o.d., and

possibly other issues that i would certainly have seen. and was used to seeing. that letter would be in a sense a statement of british government's position on a range of issues including some effect on the ministry of defense that would go to the white house. my impression with your exchanges with alistar was that there were probably rather more private communications that may have taken place. i'm reconstructing 'cause i don't know 'cause i did fought see those more private communications. the prime minister was a great note-writer. it would not surprise me at all that there were private notes that he would send to the president. moreover, that he would have had private conversations that i would not be privy to.

>> if he was writing notes to recipients as committing britain to military action, wouldn't you have expected his defense secretary to have been consulted? >> i would have been and that is why i don't believe he was ever unconditionally committing us to anything. i think that -- right up until the vote in the house of commons, our attitude towards the use of military force was always conditional. it was always conditional on either securing a u.n. security council resolution eventually in november. in fact, the prime minister had set out almost at the outset a whole set of conditions about the middle east peace process, about communicating our concern about iraq and a range of other conditions. so i never -- i never assumed that we were in a position of

unconditionally resorting to military action. actually, right up until the vote in the house of commons. it was only at that point. as you're probably aware i had a conversation with donald rumsfeld that day indicating to him that if the vote went the wrong way, we would not take action. and we could not take action. so even at that late stage in my own mind, we had not unconditionally committed ourselves to using military force. >> yes, i mean, you've seen alastair campbell talked about the evidence, we share the analysis, we share the concern and we're absolutely with you in making sure that saddam hussein has faced up to his obligations and that iraq is disarmed. if that can't be done

diplomatically and it has to be done militarily, britain will be there. that's alastair's summation of what the correspondence was saying. were you aware that this was the general tenure of the way that the prime minister was putting opposition to president bush? >> that's wholly consistent with what i've just said. facing saddam up to his obligations is conditional. >> yes. >> and the conditions were his obligations to the united nations and to the various security council resolutions that had been passed. >> so you were aware that this was the nature of the exchange at the very top level? >> i wasn't aware of that specific exchange. what i was aware of -- i think your questions are a fair one, of the general tenor of our opposition. our opposition was that we wanted to go through a political, a diplomatic process to disarm saddam hussein.

and the iraqi regime that he led. if ultimately that required the use of force, we were prepared to contemplate that. but it was very much conditional upon going through those processes first. >> would it be fair to say that these conditions, excepting we wouldn't -- couldn't move unless and until they were satisfied, nonetheless were the british view for the coalition of what it would take to execute a successful strategy towards iraq? >> yes, i think that's right. yes. that we couldn't simply go to a military response without the kind of discussion that the prime minister had described in relation to the middle east peace process, which i've mentioned already was a very important issue for the arab street. without developing an understanding of why we were taking action in the united kingdom and indeed in other western countries.

so those conditions were a necessary part of the process. but, you know, again i emphasize that we wanted those nonmilitary processes to be successful. >> if i can now turn to the question of the military planning and the influence that we gained through it, which you were also talking about earlier with sir martin. we heard from among others that word got to washington in fairly early 2002, i think in may, that the british were offering a land contribution, a division, the big package. and that was -- that was the impression that had lodged itself in the heart of the american administration. now, this was long before you and the prime minister had taken

any such decision. were you aware that this had happened? >> i don't think so, no. i mean, my recollection of those events is that there was -- there was a sense in which we were a little disappointed after crawford that we hadn't immediately received a request from the united states to send someone to tampa. and i don't quite know how that eventually was resolved. it wasn't until i think the end of june -- >> july. >> july, that actually we sent the general and his team there. there was quite a long period -- kind of of what was going on and wondering why we weren't being involved. >> if the americans were effectively assuming that we were going to come in, in a big way, that we were going to be by

their side, would that have undermined to a degree your ability to exercise influence over the process in the way that you wanted to do? >> well, had that been the case, then, i suppose, it logically follows yes. that was not my understanding. and indeed i think i answered the point in a different way. i wasn't persuaded at that stage that it was possible for us to offer that armored division in the time scale that was required. indeed, even later in the process, perhaps we would come on to it, at one point i think in october we pretty much assumed that the americans had discounted the prospect of precisely that contribution and were planning without our involvement simply because we had not taken the decisions that were required in the time scale that was at that stage required.

>> we had general john reese at the end of last week that he had a close relationship with general john franks and that throughout this general franks was assuming we were going to be there. sir john said he, meaning tommy franks, couldn't conceive that america's close ally wouldn't go into iraq if they went. he described how he had to put opposition in a caveated way. i couldn't say to him, it's all right, my friend, i'm with you. we will be there. throughout this process i was saying to tommy franks, this is what we could do. but i can't guarantee we are. if you're tommy franks and he's saying this, one can see that tommy franks would pretty well come to the assumption from that, this is what they're going to do, which may be what had happened? >> well, i can't speak for general franks.

but what i can say is that when general pigott was sent to tampa sent with very clear instructions that whatever he said or did, whatever discussions took place, were always subject to a very clear political caveat that we had made no decision whatsoever about our involvement. and that was absolutely clear. in a sense your quotation from general reith rather confirmed that. that the -- those engaged knew full well that this was planning. it was preparation. it was what might have to happen if a certain set of conditions follow. but those conditions were paramount. and the absolute paramount instruction to general pigott that we had not taken any political decision, whatsoever, to be involved. >> we had another in september 2002 and there was a big conference of the military at tampa and we were represented at it.

and we had meetings beforehand and at that point you and the prime minister -- your instructions were that we could offer the second package, the maritime and air package. but not the third package. but then word came back that we had also discussed in some caveated terms at that conference the land option. and i think that came back through number 10 to your office. and can you remember your reactions when you heard that your instructions appeared to have been perhaps interpreted in a rather liberal way? >> i don't think those instructions were interpreted in a liberal way. i don't think it's particularly surprising that military people would talk about what the united kingdom could conceivably do. by the end of the summer, there was a further complication that there was a likely fire strike.

and we were required to make available a significant number of members of the armed forces to deal with that. so that was another complication in terms of not what we could do but whether -- given what we could do, we could actually translate that into any kind of reality. i wouldn't be at all surprised that military people would be able to reflect upon the possibilities. but that does not mean that those possibilities are translated into reality. i don't think any -- i have no sense that in all my conversations with the united states, with donald rumsfeld, tommy franks and others that they ever assumed automatically that we would be there. indeed, as i say, in october there was some -- there was -- there was a report that the americans were continuing their planning on the assumption that we wouldn't do the third option. and, of course, i referred already to the conversation i had with donald rumsfeld on the day of the debate in the house of commons.

he went from that conversation to a press conference in which he said that -- that the british might not be there and if they weren't there, the u.s. could handle it. so i'm not sure that i agree with this idea that there was some sort of inherent assumption all the way through that we would take military action. >> i think we're in a difficulty, mr. hoon, because hearing other evidence quite correctly in terms of the policies as you and others have described it -- we will go through the planning but we're not committed until we're committed. he then goes on to say that the u.s. don't believe it. >> and i'm not in any way contradicting what his experience was of dealing with the american military. but both in the united states and the united kingdom ultimately these decisions are taken by political leaders, by the president, by the prime minister and in the case of the united kingdom in this particular case, by the decision of the house of commons. >> yes.

can i just ask -- 'cause you're in close touch from time to time with your exact opposite, donald rumsfeld, who was as it were the forward edge. did he understand our political constraints and conventions and the needs? >> very much so. and donald is a keen student of british politics and of the house of commons. and would from time to time surprise me by the fact that he had been watching events in the house of commons sometimes more assiduously than i have been and would make reference to what had been said and the debates that were taking place. so he was in no doubt of the -- of the constraints that we were under politically.

>> by this stage, how good was the relationship? we're talking to them frequently? did you feel you really had some good straightforward relationship with them? >> i always felt i had a good straightforward relationship, because he's a very straightforward man.

very clear about what he wants and what he is going to do. certainly spoke on the telephone whenever we needed to. i wouldn't say that it was on -- survey was on a daily or possibly weekly basis. but it was regular. we met frequently. he was not a man to have idle conversations. he didn't sort of sit around chatting about politics or the world, or even what was happening in the pentagon. the conversations, the meetings, were extremely businesslike. they were very focused. he did what he had to do, and moved on. for example, i was well aware that jack straw had a different kind of relationship where they talked about things on a formal regular basis, far detail, and they were friends in a very, in

a way that met their relationship would probably be quite different from mine with donald. >> you in the course of putting some of your biggest military tips onto donald rumsfeld's table. did you feel that this made it possible for you to exercise some influence over the way he was approaching the iraq conflict because yes, i think we had some -- this was a two-way process. there were a number of occasions on which i set out very clearly the position of the united kingdom government, and we had some quite, we have some fairly lively exchanges on occasion. >> there's a lot of argument in favor of arc big contribution this would give his influence with the americans. we've heard this this from many witnesses. can you point to areas in which you recall at did give us influence in which we were able to change things in the wake we wanted to change? >> i can give one example

already, although it didn't happen in the end. i'm pretty confident that we persuaded them about the northern option, about going through turkey. i'm fairly confident that in a number of areas, the detailed planning that like general pigott were excellent influential in shaping the nature of the campaign. we were very clear about the requirement for improving the aftermath planning. so there were a number -- >> about the aftermath planning, the aftermath planning turned out to be a disaster, didn't? >> i don't think it turned out to be a disaster. it did not, it did not go as well as we wanted it to do. but you asked me for examples of where we had influence. i took a paper to the pentagon, i think in favor of 2003, setting out our concerns about

what might happen after the invasion. and i was given assurances that that was to be acted upon. and certainly, to great extent it was. >> it was described as witnesses, described in the paper which was the pentagon's first attempted aftermath, execution as a shambles. so had to pay any attention to our concerns about this quest other witnesses have suggested not. >> i think there's a distinction to be drawn between our role in back in in the north and what was happening in the south. as i understand, the attitude that you've been given so far, it was mainly focus on what they were doing and around baghdad which i example is the center of gravity for iraq and the key city that had to be resolved. in the south the picture was significantly different, not

least because of the predominant shia population. >> i think we'll probably come back to that later on. perhaps i can just ask you one or two other questions about the way the decision to actually take the package to the largest of the options, was taken. i mean, that decision which is we've established had been taken in september, but after that in october you recommended to the prime minister that we should go for the option three, the big package. what for you for the critical factors in making that recommendation? >> well, if i could just that back a little. actually, what happened i alluded to it already, was that there was growing concern, i think my boys shared this concern, that given that given the timescale for american action was essentially january of this point, that we really had to make a decision because

we would not have had time to prepare that third option. the problem was that the foreign office, downing street, were heavily engaged in negotiating a u.n. security council resolution, and they did not want any overt military preparation that would affect their diplomatic efforts. so in the sense, by october, and i think i mentioned it already, i was really saying to the prime minister, look, if you're going to do this, and we had this discussion on several occasions by then, you've really got to decide that because at the moment, my understanding by the middle of october was the americans were assuming we wouldn't be there, that we sort of wouldn't be there with a third option, that we wouldn't be there on the land. and that their planning was moving ahead on that basis. and as the weeks went by, meeting in january timescale was

increasingly impossible. so essentially, once we got, what i was saying to the prime minister, you have got to decide, you've got to decide where we're going to offer this third option, this package of an armored division on the land. and eventually, i think probably as late as the very end of october, that decision was then taken. the reasons for it essentially were to -- clearly we discussed already the question, the influence of providers to a big role in the south. there was an assumption that would provide us with a coherent area in the south, that we would operate right across southern provinces. i think one of the factors i recall in some of the conversations, perhaps with a far office, but certainly in the m.o.d. as well, was that had we had not gone in that stage as

part of the military invasion of iraq, we would nevertheless have been expected to be involved afterwards. so let's assume we didn't do option three. nevertheless, quite soon afterwards the assumption was that there would be a further u.n. security council resolution. that would require or encourage the member states to send troops to iraq, peacekeeping. and there is an opponent member of the secret accounts, we would be expected to play our part. so there was a sense, and i recall this from some of the military that it was better to be there at the beginning to establish ourselves, to know what the land was like, rather than going in later for a peacekeeping operation without having that prior experience in information. >> so that was one of the

arguments, but actually turned out we ended up doing both, campaign and stay on. >> yes, but not in the numbers that we might otherwise have had to send her to a part of the consideration. we drew down a significantly from the 46000 that we sent as part of the invasion, i think initially around 15 or 16. and actually down to about 10. so there was a pretty rapid reduction in our numbers. and again, was part of the consideration that we might have had to send more later if there had been involved in a purely peacekeeping role. >> what about other arguments? if i don't misquote you, i think jonathan was telling us yesterday, was a strong item it being made in terms of the army wanting to do this, its self-respect and not using his exact words are, was that an argument was being put to you

and through you to the prime minister. >> i don't recall the argument being put in those terms. i think anybody who had spent, although i spent in the m.o.d., was well aware the tremendous quality of our armed forces and their desire to be used and then to participate. so there was a sense, particularly amongst the army that they did not want to be left out. but i don't think that was -- i don't regard that as being a substantial argument, something that you put on the table and say, was a major factor in the decision-making. >> but there was quite a strong push from the army? >> they knew that, and that's probably been true in the more recent conflicts, particularly in afghanistan. they knew the kind of capabilities that we had in the royal air force and the royal navy were relatively easily

available. and certainly there was a sense they want to play the part. i don't regard that as being a major factor in the actual decision-making. it made it easy. they weren't saying we can't do this, under no circumstances will we go. they are saying, if necessary, we can play our part in this particular way. >> was there any sense that the thing, the americans needed it the thing was going to be done really well, but there were things we could provide to this operation, that perhaps we thought we were better at doing than the americans? >> i recall one stage, this was never a sort of, this was never a fixed package. they were always changes. at one stage i think the americans were planning in the south a substitute, a relatively heavy brigade with a rather light on her. i think we had some reservations

about the extent to which that was sufficiently capable of doing their job in the south. so sending an armored division, some of our very best people, certainly meant that we felt confident of the job would be done and be done well. but bear in mind, we were, what speaks russian, relief in place. the task of the armored division was to follow in behind american forces who were pushing rapidly ahead towards baghdad. that particular responsibility, wasn't as if we were the ones pushing on to baghdad. >> one last question on this subject, and then i think we're going to take a short break. were the people in your department or in all arguing against the idea of sending the

big package, suggesting that if we send package to, that would be a pretty significant contribution with a lot of chips, a lot of aircrafts, special forces perhaps? >> i think was recognized ultimately, a political judgment for the prime minister in terms of the wider picture of the kind of things we have been discussing, and to influence. i think the big concerns that i faced, particularly by the time the summer had passed, was whether we could manage. we got people in afghanistan. we got a potentially big commitment to operation fresco to deal with a fire strike, and whether sending this number of troops to iraq, and then being able to replace them, thereafter. that we could actually cope with it. so there was some proper

reservations expressed about whether the minister of defense could manage all that simultaneously. >> so those questions whether we were overstretched or not, and in the was a judgment to be made as to whether package to was a respectable contribution we really needed package three with a landau, and that was a political decision for the prime minister. on the basis of military advice as to whether or not it was doable, prime minister would only take that decision, as i would have taken a corresponding decision on the basis of whether it was practical. not only for us to deliver i think a point to emphasize, not only for us to deliver the number of troops required in the early stages and however long the fighting stages would last, but also to recognize that once we were there, there was going to be a continuing obligation, although qualified by the point

i made to you just now. that that continuing obligation would likely to arise in any event as a result of whatever u.n. resolution was passed in the aftermath. >> thank you. >> let's take a break now and come back in just a bit before half past. thank you. >> one other thing i can prefer to without being putting my finger on the day was a letter in october. on the 29th of october, that in a sense my office wrote to david manning saying that u.s. military planning is continuing and increasingly assumed that there would be no u.k. land contribution. >> let's resume where we left

off. surfboards? >> banks. -- sir laurence? >> banks. just following on the. we talked about these options and effectively the two in play, with the number two and number three. >> number one was assumed. >> number one was assumed that we would actually go out of our way to make it hard for them to come down operations and number two was a significant maritime, and number three was a division. and you've given us some indications of the pressures, considerations that argued for a division. how were the different options evaluated? because when he also indicated they had different political implications as well as military applications but what was the actual process by which you've assess which of these we would like to go for? >> well, i think in terms of what actually was achievable.

i think it was assumed that we would want to be helpful to the united states in this situation. and therefore, how would they go about offering as much as was consistent with all of the other pressures that we faced. >> was there a paper at any point which went through the political, military, financial, whatever, advantages optioned? >> the letter i just refer to on the 29th of october does indicate some of those points. not least, written by my private secretary, a letter from my office to the prime minister. >> just out of interest, you by and large, your letters came

from office to office, rather than from you writing directly to the prime minister. >> it seems -- i never quite understood why sometimes it was done in different ways. i'm sure there is some civil-service convention for this, but i think it tended to be the case that i would write my own personal views directly to the prime minister if i was writing on behalf of the department. it was more likely to come through my private office. >> so basically, the different options being sent out, as late as october 29. which is quite well on, but actually this had all been settled by the start of september. it clearly wasn't settled. >> again, in response to a question from sir roderic earlier about sort of aftermath, there's a sense here, it is also

worth noting that while package is significant and more expensive than package to making it available could significantly reduce our vulnerability to u.s. requests -- >> sorry. >> my apologies. it is also worth noting that while package that is significant more expensive in itself than package to, making it available could significantly reduce our vulnerability to u.s. requests to provide a substantial and costly contribution to post-conflict stabilization operation. so that was clearly in my mind as part of the decision-making process. >> again, just to clarify on this point, because you seem to be suggesting before the break that, what that implied was not that we would be involved in post-conflict stabilization, but that our forces would be better prepared. because the terrain, people, there would be kleiman cites.

what you just said, it implies that, the way these are often discussed we would rather be there and making the meal than dealing with the washing up. our forces wanted to be part of the main action than a post-conflict as seen as something rather secondary. is that fair? >> i think is also an assumption, which i would share, that british forces are pretty good at making the adjustment from war fighting to stabilization, and to peacekeeping and nationbuilding. a three block war, i think we're pretty good at and there was a sense in which we were confident that we would do a very good job, that if we made that kind of transition. that it would be more difficult,

but it was a job. if they simply came in for the peacekeeping part. >> so just to clarify this point, you're not assuming these were alternatives. that you either did, my analogy, the cooking, or you did the washing up. you're saying do both. >> we could do both. i think implicit was the assumption that if we, if we did the washing, that we would have to do that on a larger scale than had we had been involved in the war fighting stage. >> that that would require presumption that the other countries prepared to contribute to what could be a really challenging task. so there could be no guarantees? >> no. >> on the way these options reviewed, what was the position of number 10 on these

alternatives between two and 30? >> my sense was that generally speaking, the prime minister wanted us to be involved to the maximum extent that was possible, but he would accept the advice from the military and from me as to what was practically achievable. the prime minister was a generally speaking, anxious to do what the united kingdom could to help. >> but as you describe, september and into october, there had been concerns about the competing demands for operation fresco, fire strike. and also the americans might just go before there was any way that we could be ready. so was it the case that the prime minister was prepared to

describe to the americans optioned to as a significant contribution. that didn't in fact he did this at camp david? >> i think he would have -- he would have accepted, had been the case because the american times scale, or because of other factors affecting our forces, that we could not do option tree. he would have accepted that that he wasn't that i was under huge pressure from downing street to offer option three. my assumption was that's what they wanted. if it could be done. >> so again, it's quite an important point in just establishing what the options were. it was perfectly reasonable to imagine the u.k. being quite involved in the american operation. but not to the extent that was eventually the case, not with a division and that would have been politically satisfactory. >> and that is precisely the import of the letter that we

have just been discussing. the letter says the americans are moving ahead. they're doing their planning, they are assuming we're not going to be involved on the land. >> but it's also the case that even after this letter there still wasn't a final decision taken on the decision was taking around the 31st. so it was quite soon after. . .

>> you may see some rights. but they were pretty uncomfortable with us. we may come on to this in a second. but there is a particular history. >> we're going back to the dog now. >> well, it -- no, no. sort of the post world war settlement. because i went to turkey at the beginning of january. i had a very rapid history lesson as a result. but -- so we knew that this was going to be a problem. i mean there were other, i've always, i've been to turkey quite a lot. the new there, there were issues about the extent to which the

new government was as influenced by the military as previous governments were. and they instruct -- struck me, and i saw a lot of them during the period being much more democratic like us in the way that they responded to issues. and therefore, the prospect of large numbers of soldiers in their country i could see was going to cause some problems. towards the end of the year, we were beginning to think this might be a problem. and we were preparing contingency plans if we could not go in through the north. but equally, i don't think the decision was taken after my visit to turkey after the beginning of january. when i came back from turkey, i thought that this wasn't going to happen. >> i think all of the chronology maybe just before you went. it was about the third of january. >> well, i was --

>> i think it was the question of the world would still need to work with the tourist. >> i don't see evidence of this so far. i don't agree with it. >> okay. >> we were aware of the difficulties, colin powell, with the attitude towards the british being in turkey. i went specifically to determine that, to decide whether or not we would get those transit rights. and turkey never actually said no. i mean they never actually said we could not go through turkey. but i came back partly because of the newspaper there, i did a tv interview with the turkish government or something like that. a long interview where all they were talking about was what happened in the 1920s. and that britain could not

entirely be trusted. and i formed the view when i came home that we would never get an agreement from turkey. that was the point on which we took the decision to then go into the south. and we organizize our effort. i mean it's interesting that the united states didn't take that view for quite a long time in the fourth division, for infantry division. they stayed in the eastern mediterranean until after the initial invasion for that reason. because the americans assumed that some stage that turkey would agree and never did. >> i think what we would want to check the timing about. however, you look at this, it's quite late in the day to be shifting from one flank to another. all of our planning up to this point goes on one basis. and then all of the sudden you

are now looking at having to explain to other members of the government that we're looking at completely different. >> as i said earlier, there were already because of the information that we previously received. we were beginning to think about what might be in the south. i think we actually discussed with the americans that as an alternative. so it wasn't all of the sudden. but the actual decision didn't come until i came back from turkey. >> and one of his heard from jonathan powell was if we had gone through the north, but we might have gone as far as to take the responsibility for that part of the raft. was that your understanding? >> i'm not sure we quite got into sort of the aftermath planning as far as the north was concerned. i remember seeing from general piggot prior to to him going to tampa and certainly thereafter.

the idea as i mentioned earlier was that essentially to deflight whatever force iraq had between the north and the south. because part of the practical problem, i like in the first gulf war, the kuwaiti border was relatively short with with iraq. it meant that a lot of soldiers were being funneled through a relatively narrow area. one the concerns was it made us highly vulnerable to wepons of mass destruction to chemical weapons and biological weapons. there was a lot of concern about the focus of a source going through a relatively narrow area.

the advantage of the like is it gave us more space to operate. >> yes, i accepted of course. the anticipation of the level of security was inadequate. >> we're talk about that later. just fine on this, we were major logistical issues about going to the south. which had really only be resolved with american help. is that fair? >> yes, i mean it was always assumed that if we did go in through the south that we would be dependent on significant logistical help from the u.s. but the change in the south did not have -- clearly it meant the things had to move slightly more quickly. but actually, i don't recall that anyone had actually set

off. i came back from about the 9th of january. i don't think -- i mean art royal didn't sail until the 16th of january. it began the 23rd of january in the air. so in a sense, they didn't -- they weren't hanging around. there wasn't a delay. i can't even imagine the journey was longer. they were having to make a long land transit across the birdie. >> the operation that they were going to be all quite different sorts of missions. >> yes. but certainly, they were impressed. but again, i don't recall any particular anxiety on the part of the military that this could not be done. partly because the planning was already under way before my visit to turkey. partly because they are pretty good at making those kinds of

adjustments. >> okay. thank you. we'd like to ask some questions now. noting that you yourself are a professional lawyer by background and indeed a constitutional lawyer. >> not an international lawyer. >> can we start in self-contained thing. in march 2004 your interview with jonathan dimbebee to be use fort without the united states legal resolution. this is in 2002. and we understand and we now have permission to be classify the extent of correspondent. the attorney general expressed concern in his difference in that view. i wonder if you would like to take us through that exchange. and to ask initially, were you relying on your own view of the

war in what you said to jonathan dimbleby or was there any legal add a vice behind it? >> this is a very wide ranging interview to the best of my recollection. it was one of the last programs that still had long interviews with politicians rather than five or ten minute interviews. he was able to ask me a lot of questions. of course the legality. to the best of my recollection, i haven't read the transcript in the documentation of the transcript, i read the transcript since writing the letter, i should say. i was trying quite hard -- put it this way, i was trying quite hard not to answer any question. that's quite difficult when there are only two of you having a conversation. and as i recall, and in the

documentation support this is, essentially, i gave an example of self-defense as justification that would not require a rut u.n. resolution. what i was saying is if iraq attacked british forces we would be in legally to respond. i'm not sure i went any further than that. i certainly don't recall giving any kind of detail. now the reason why peter goldsmith required -- i think it was not -- i don't think of any -- more recently reread the letter that he sent. i don't think he was particularly concerned about the nature of our legal observations. i think he was more concerned that i might be in effect boxing him in when he came to write his own opinion on the subject. what he wanted to avoid was a sense that out there i had already prejudged this matter legally. but my examples, i think i say

in my letter, was really about self-defense. self-defense wasn't a justification, ultimately. and therefore, i don't think i particularly trespassed on his area of legal opportunity. >> so it should be understand that your dimbleby moment was without address to the situation as it is in march 2002 in the real world? >> i was trying pretty hard not to answer his questions in truth. >> okay. well, let's draw a line for a moment under that and move on a whole year. in 2003, it'll be the invasion on participation. and in it is now imitant, i think it is the 7th of march of that the attorney general gives advice to among others, yourself. the key people at top of the government.

>> yup. >> and it's a finally balanced review of the arguments. it indicates the risk. it touches incident tally, very important, i guess on the risk of profession of service personallal. >> and politicians on that. >> and indeed politicians. did that advice lead you to be more concerned about the various areas anyway about the troops? or was it something that you at least as a lawyer and senior politician would expect in terms of advice in that situation? >> well, i read at the time his -- what has become the long legal advice. and it is a very complex quite dense, it raised a number of quite difficult issues. i was clear on the conclusion

that there was a legal justification for military action for reviving the previous revolution 6, 7, 8, he says so categoryically. i accept the reasonable case can be made is capable in principal of reviving the authorization in 6, 7, 8 without the further resolution. that was his conclusion. >> i'd like to ask you about difficulty or what is needed about the finally argumented on an all-balanced conclusion which the attorney general gave on the 7th of march for the advice and the military need for the voice that we hear the signal even in january. that he would need a one-line final certificate. >> we all did. it was no different.

we would have been in precisely a legal position as the legal position. as the military, we had taken unlawful action. >> and so after the attorney's advice on the 7th, there's a meeting on the 11th of march where lord boyce tells us we would need to have a short paragraph to the armed forces. i think they would say the same regarding civil servants. he received that assurance in a letter from the attorney's office in the m.o.d. the 14th of march. and can i ask, did you and he have any discussions to whether -- >> who's the he? >> the he is chief of head staff, lord boyce. did you and he feel the need or did you sit down together and say is this good enough? is this it? or was that already water over

the dam? >> mike, quite rightly, had been pressing for some time for precisely this very clear legal judgment. and as have we all. so there's no doubt that this peter goldsmith said this is unlawful, this is not a basis on which military action can be taken, there would have been no military action. in the seasons, you refer to my legal background, although it's very many years ago, i was perfectly used to seeing legal advice that argued the case but came to a conclusion. indeed, i recall being told off pretty roundly by my people master when i was a people barrasser that my opinion was too academic and they argued the case too much. i've been an academic lawyer before. he said the client wants an answer. and in a sense, this was the answer. this was peter goldsmith's

conclusion. the fact that it was, as you say finally argued, didn't come as a great surprise. you wouldn't need lawyer unless there were arguments. he came to a view and it was that view that lord boyce, kevin tebbit, and i were looking for. >> thank you. one other mention to this. you can see the long attorney general's advice, you yourself for a lawyer by training profession, as some other cabinet colleagues, and indeed the prime minister. but many of your cabinet colleagues have not seen -- didn't see it. and the discussion in cabinet was based on something much shorter. it was a draft of parliamentary answer. did you think now, or did you think at time that cabinet colleagues would have wished to

be led into the detailed considerations in the attorney's full advice? >> i'm not sure that it would be appropriate forker -- for cabinet to have that kind of discussion. because in the end what you would be inviting people to do is to speculate on the legal judgment that the attorney judgment had reached. it's not the same about the political discussion about options or poll -- policies. this is someone who's decision that was awful. i don't see how cabinet can look be hind that and have the discussion -- that was not policy advice. on one hand or the other hand. what he was saying was this was lawful in his judgment. i can't see how we could have had a sensible discussion going behind that. >> one member of the cabinet,

did say she would like to have a full discussion of legal arguments. which was not granted. and it didn't take -- >> well, i hope for the reason that i just announced. i'm not -- i don't see how you can have that kind of discussion. whether the legal advice is accepted or not? it doesn't lead anywhere. i can see that you -- as we did, have a discussion about whether it is sensible in policy terms to commit british forces to take the action that we were taking. that's a different matter. but having a debate about a legal opinion doesn't strike me as being very sensible. >> i just wanted to mention before -- i'd like to move on to other legal issues in a moment. it is a policy of operational risk which is implicit of the legal advice. in fact, it's not a proper question for the cabinet to judge. would they, therefore, have been aware that the there were risk

lurking behind the legal advice? >> well, i can see further on. i saw this at the time that in order to justify the conclusion that the attorney general came to, it was negative for there to be -- he describe it is as strong factual crowns. there needs to be a necessary underpinning to support that. and we have -- >> which you saw from the prime minister. >> sorry? >> which he sought from the prime minister right at the last moment. >> well -- certainly we had those kinds of discussions. that's the factual background support the action that we're taking? is there sufficient cooperation by saddam hussein and his regime in iraq. are they cooperating? what are the fews of the inspectors? and so on. so that kind of discussion was taking place. >> thank you. that was as it were the big legal question. but there is a great deal of

legal surround to operational and military battles. i'd like just to ask a few questions. first about the no-fly zones. you have given us evidence earlier today about the continuance of the no-fly zones as part of containment. what about the legal justification of their continuance? it seems clear it was felt by initially the spring session. this was precarious, increasely precarious legal base. because it had initially rested on humanity doubts. >> and that remained the case. i mean that was not desire, as far as i'm aware of specific. u.n. security council resolution . that was based on the requirement to prevent overwhelming humanity disaster.

and nevertheless, it did have an june pinning on the series of u.n. security council resolutions. i mentioned one already, 6, 7, 8. i think there were others. >> one question that flows from the concerns of attorney general about the precarious legal base as the time went on in the operations in the no-fly zones -- >> i hate to quibble. but i imagine the legal base changed as it went on. the factual preparation of the zones changed. the legal justification remained. >> understood. that's unequivalent. but one effect that it was, the success of the attorneys general had to pay or wish to pay closer and tighter attention to the targeting decisions. and so attention inevitablely existed because the military and

operation and execution on the one hand and careful legal scrutiny of things like impact on civilians, et cetera. now, can i ask, did you regard that as a stable situation through the operations of the no-fly zone? >> i think we probably touched a little on this. the answer, the iraqi were becoming much more sophisticated . they -- they were developing radar that could operate from outside of the no-fly zone. but direct from their misarmed inside the no-fly zone. so there were -- i follow your argument that there were legal issues that were making it more difficult to justify the action that we were taking. were we entitled to the matter of war. i think that we were. we accepted the hard judgment to

make to attack radar facilities based outside the no-fly zone, even though we judge that you were controlling inside the zone. equally, what if the iraqi did quite a lot of this. they had the mobile launches that slipped into the zone and slipped out again. how were we to determine whether they were literally the targets or not? >> sergeant, i mean -- i imagine that you were looking at a lot of this stuff. very hard to possession collateral damage. >> there were -- not quite that fast. i think five miles an hour is the kind of speed that we were talking about. but they were mobile. and rightly. on to the right point. which is that they were often located in centers of population, that there were serious questions about the potential for civilian casualties.

and i suspect that there were civilian casualties. but nevertheless, that was the judgment for the raf and uaf personnel. >> thank you. what i'd like to move on to is the last segment of the legal surrounds to the whole business. is looking ahead initially to the campaign, in march 2003, before it starts, we understand that you briefed the attorney general on the military objectives. and there are inevitably concerned about the british government as well as military. as we are going in coalition, to countries, some different rules of engagement, somewhat different tolerance levels. >> and a different legal basis. >> yes. did you and the attorney

identify particular concerns that you felt immediately addressed? >> well, the reason i mention the legal basis. our legal basis was always predicated on the fact that we were disarming iraq on the wepons of mass destruction. and that meant that our actions had to be consistent with that legal base. now that developed once iraq had not taken the opportunity of cooperating with the united states. once it was clear that we were entitled as a matter of law to remove the regime in order to disarm iraq. that had to follow. so they did the legal decisions. what were consistent with that in terms of targeting it and the meeting i had with the attorney general will be very much about how we went about the process of deciding appropriate targets.

and that again was slightly different from some of the targets that i've done, for example, in relation to afghanistan. the american campaign was different. >> yes. >> very much about creating an effect on the ground. and making clear to the iraqi people that our target was saddam hussein and his regime rather than like a more conventional military attack on the country as a whole. i know where that is clear. but many of the targets were -- the justification was that the targets were targeted associated with saddam hussein and his regime. >> and shock and awe at least on that fact. we at least shared the coalition partner, the agree of responsibility for whatever the americans did as well as what we did for targets and we'd decide to do on our own. how much interchange would there be either political or military

level with -- between ourselves and the united states forces and government? on the matter of targeting, limits, constraints criteria? >> this was a pretty integrated process. once we got to the air campaign and such, it was not because of the modern sophisticated weaponed, it was not always known been before a plane took off necessarily what it's target was going to be. and that has changed -- i mean it has changed dramatically from conventional bombings. we had a list of targets. and i went -- again, the difference probably legally that i went through them. very often one by one. there wasn't dedication ultimately. but in the early days, i saw pretty much every target that was going to be attacked. i didn't always know whether we

were going to do the actual attack. >> in the event, and this is speculation, in the event of some disastrous missed target, it would be in the british system a trail for our authority, legal and political through military if necessary by delegation to the actual event. but we couldn't control the united states' system? >> right. >> was that a concern? >> i mean that was always going to be a concern. i mean there were some suggestion of course by the campaign that i think the go astray and hit a market. there are always those kinds of risks. the advice that i received in my job was to minimize those risk as much as possible. as though saddam hussein made that as difficult as he could by, for example, co-locating civilian facilities alongside military ones. >> thank you.

you mention delegation. and in the course of the actual invasion, you were delegated to a mar marble, a commander on the ground. a degree of delegated authority for targeting decisions. inevitable for the campaign? >> yes. inevitable for the kind of technology that i was describing. it was possible to have planes in the sky who are then subsequently given targets. so i think that the practicality of modern technology means that is a requirement, yes. >> reminding ourself, this is a lesson to learn. of course, after the invasion phase, our lessons learn approach to the actual targeting, and to the actual damage as a review process. did that go on? :

>> it was possible to hit parts of building without causing damage to the other parts. i think the lessons we learned more about how much more

accurate modern weapons are than their predecessors. >> very accurate targeting. the chinese embassy targeted for quite different. >> i don't want to, that ms. i'll bomb, i don't recall which it was. that was involved at the time. >> it went to where it was directed. the point to be made is that the intelligence and factual information becomes at least as important as technology. >> that is absolutely right. >> the advantage we had in relationship to iraq in comparative to the operations the conducted in afghanistan, iraq was probably one of the most photographed countries in the world. so the long history of operations in and around iraq meant that we had a huge amount of information about what it was that we were targeting.

in stark contrast to what was a very limited campaign in afghanistan because we simply did not have the same kind of information. >> thank you very much. we will turn to baroness. >> thank you. i want to move to better planning. what time would like to hear is what was the time skill that you plan for the u.k.'s involvement with troops on on the ground? >> the timescale that you plan for the u.k.'s involvement forces on the ground in terms of what was the planning. >> the initial assumption was that what they have deployed they could remain there until roughly the end of the summer. it was around six months. so the full divisional ability capable of remaining in place

until, i have the phrase the late summer in my head. you can assume around six months from initial deployment. >> on what basis was that function based? >> on the basis of the strategic defense review assumptions about the length of time that we could maintain a large scale deployment. >> and did you have any concerns about this planning which you have seen or heard from washington at the time? >> well, i began have mentioned already. we were concerned that the planning for the aftermath was not as detailed and as comprehensive as we would have liked. indeed, in a visit to the pentagon sometime in february, i think relatively early in february i talked about a list of things that we helped the

united states would take account of. >> and what were they? >> they were a wide range of things. the question of security, the question of how we would deal with the immediate aftermath. above all else at the time we were very anxious about the extent to which the iraqi people had been dependent on the program. have a recollection telling me more than once that 60% of the iraqi people depended for their food on the united nations. there was a very clear anxiety that the moment we went in the u.n. operation would stop. i never spent a pent a lot of te preparing for the prospect of humanitarian catastrophe.

so that meant one of the reasons why we were keen to open the port. we got the ship in very quickly. why we built a pipeline carrying water from kuwait toward basra. i remember of the kuwaiti defense minister commenting that one of the driest country in the world was supplying water to a nearby country that had rivers. he could not quite understand my water was coming in the other direction. these were all about making sure that we did not face this kind of humanitarian disaster as a direct consequence of going into iraq. >> but you said that you went with a list. what sort of response did you get from them? obviously you expect your concerns. what response did you get? >> at the time a very positive one. i think, you know, the view was that since the pentagon was

given responsibility in the united states for dealing with this phase they welcomed the suggestion that we were making. i accept that the whole of those items on my list were followed up and followed up in the time scale that we expected. one of the issues, the issue that went on for some time was the requirement for a further u.n. security council resolution to give legal, to give a further legal basis for our presence there. we were very focused on that. >> this was the resolution 1483? >> yes. forgive me. i don't remember the number. the legal problem otherwise is that a report recently governed by this convention. that limited of what we could do, but equally and the key consideration, it limited the ability of a number of other countries to come in and tell.

they required a further legal justification for their presence in southern iraq in order to be a will to deploy their people, soldiers and others, to assist in the aftermath. so even in february, we need a u.n. mandate to legitimize international law to sort out sanctions. we were very focused on that. >> but what were your expectations about the level of u.n. involvement in this complex? focusing on the resolutions. >> our expectations were that although there might be an initial this rupture caused by the invasion in a sense that the u.n. might then not assist in the delivery of food, quite quickly we would have expected to get security council resolution. and that would then allow the u.n., in a sense, producing p

retty seamlessly to carry on. and of course until the attack on the u.n. building that seemed to be happening. it was the bombing attack on the united nations that stopped all of that. up until then that seemed to be a reasonable assumption. >> but our understanding is the u.s. was not so keen on the u.n. involvement. >> no, that is right. >> were you anticipating any conditions from the u.s. or u.n. because we do know that president bush used the word vital after some pressure. did you anticipate any restrictions from the u.s. on the u.n. involvement? >> you are right that there was some significant hesitation on the part of the pentagon and other parts of the system. i should have thought of. a rather curious question where the prime minister did persuade the importance of this particular course of action.

eventually there was such a resolution. from my point of view i was anxious that we should get a resolution because i knew how many european countries in particular could not legally into their systems and trips to doubt that justification. for the reasons we discussed we were looking in the aftermath to be able to drive down our forces. we could not do that without other countries coming in. if they could not come in and without pay for the u.n. security council resolution we had a problem. so the for the resolution was important in practice as well as legally. >> appointed some time in a sub meeting with a conflict resolution. what instruction, if any, did you give him?

>> i know that i saw him in the course of that meeting. at think he was actually present at the meeting with donald rumsfeld. he was involved in that. it is important when you say instructions i gave him. he was our representative. at that stage a big hitters the office of post conflict planning. >> it must have been sent there for a reason. >> he was sent there to help with the process. he was a man i knew pretty well. he was an absolutely brilliant logistician. i met him in his previous position where he ran part of the logistics operation. but in terms of -- his job was to be part of -- when you say instructions. i wasn't actually in day-to-day contact with them. he was our representative.

we judged that he had the right abilities and experience to make, to help make. >> he told as he was supplying information back. was that getting to you? >> we knew there was a problem. >> if you knew there was a problem what steps did you take or did you weathered the prime minister because it is quite important. you yourself have admitted sense that fatal errors in planning were made. if you had been elected did you inform the prime minister? did you take any step? >> i think the prime minister didn't need separate alerting by me. i accept there was a mismatch in our system, the lead on civilian reconstruction and development will always be with the far office and the department for international development. that is why to some extent there was a mixed match between what

was happening in baghdad and what was happening in the south in the sense that the natural counterparts in our system whereas they were being run out of the pentagon. general cross' responses would be as much aimed at the far office as the board. his line of communication wasn't directly through the m.o.d. is what i am saying. he was behind it on behalf of the government inside the office of reconstruction. >> it is fair from ken cross' evidence to this committee. he was really astonished. he said is that all there is? >> and that message came back and very clearly is the paper and the meeting and the determination to try and

improve. >> i want to move on to dealings and communication within the u.k. government. before that can i just start the question about expectations about what advice or briefing you were receiving on what you u.k. says might find in the the south when they got there? >> well, i have mentioned already the overriding consideration initially was food, water, quite quickly the question of power, electricity supplies. security in the south, at any rate, was a slightly later concern. i don't mean to minimize that. the initial situation on the ground was pretty good. i went to iraq in april after the invasion, and i walked

around with british soldiers. i walked along the side of the arab waterway. i talked with people. there were children following the soldiers around. they were not following me. they were fascinated by british soldiers. british soldiers were not wearing helmets. they were wearing berets. it was a very relaxed environment initially. that changed. but in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, as i say, i went to different parts of basra. met people. talk to the local population. it was -- there was a very positive feeling initially. >> i want to pick up ken cross was there as a representative of the government. where was the lead for the aftermath planning within the

u.k. government? >> well, as i say, traditionally it would have been with the foreign office, and with coordination. sir john asked me right at the outset about the differences between the u.s. system and our system, and one of the key differences other end of the time is the u.s. departmental arrangements were much more self-contained. there were much more of the classic silos. there were not the kind of exchanges that occur routinely between different departments in the british government. they did not appear to me to have the kind of cabinet committee structure that we are used to where typically ministers from different departments and civil service from different departments would meet together. and that was a practical problem because, you know, i knew

probably from jack straw there was real frustration in the state department who had much of this expertise. there were not given much access to that. as far as the u.k. was concerned, it may well be. i saw the evidence that we lacked a single focal point on someone willing to do that. the consequence for ministry of defense, and i can't speak on behalf of other departments. we became very heavily involved in the reconstruction, frankly, to an extent that eventually i thought just was not appropriate. we were expecting that soldiers would be replaced. we had been promised that would happen. i got to the point where i think i actually wrote letters saying

we cannot allow reservists, because by then we have reservists in. one of the thing that was happening is we had reservist carrying out, put it this way, their civilian role in the basra and southern iraq. there was someone trying to develop a new currency. there was a teacher who was trying to organize the ministry of education. i did get quite frustrated that these people who were there for military reasons and had volunteered to serve as reservists for military reasons were actually being asked to carry out there, essentially, civilian role. they quite enjoyed it, but that was not why they were there. i was increasingly frustrated at the failure of the government departments to supply the people

who were supposed to come and take over those possibilities. >> but you can't rightly say that the united states had the overall responsibility. but in our system there was no ministry of cabinet committee before the conflict. would that help if it had a cabinet committee which had lived at both the invasion and the aftermath? >> there was one set up pretty quickly afterwards. i can't recall when it was established. the prime minister was pretty quickly on to the points that general cross was making. we had regular meetings on the cabinet committee that drew in the different departments chaired by jack straw mostly. occasionally by clare short. and later by baroness. >> they didn't appear to be a single person in the cabinet responsible for coordinating our approach to the aftermath.

>> i have seen that criticism. that is probably a fair observation. i am not retreating from that. all i am saying is that i was expecting, for all the reasons we discussed, that their forces would take responsibility for the south. they were good at that transition on the war fighting to peacekeeping, that we put in place quite a number of projects. eventually we got some money. they could not provide enough people. a think we called them quick-impact projects. there is probably another name for them. british soldiers who very frustrated by this, very concerned they weren't, in a sense, doing the job of winning hearts and minds. they wanted to do something.

they build bridges. they repaired on the sewage system. they were constantly trying to ensure the electricity supply was being delivered. so quite a lot of that in the first place was being done by british troops. my concern is interest going on for rather longer than anticipated it should. i was expecting for there to be more help from other departments. you have to ask other colleagues what the difficulties were. >> but the point is you yourself express frustrations. how would you characterize the relationship between the m.o.d. and dfid? what was the relationship between the two departments? >> i recall that there were seven letters between clare short and myself offering cooperation and to work together making sure that we thought some

of these issues there. she did not believe that soldiers should deliver humanitarian assistance. a little less, i worked very closely with her. she was very, very committed to by ensuring that there was no humanitarian catastrophe in iraq. that is why i recall emphasis on the the 60 percent figure because that is a figure i got from her. she was very, very focused on ensuring that the iraqi people were helped and supported in that early period. >> but exchanging letters, working cooperatively at this level is fine. we heard from the lord boyce it was particularly uncooperative and he expressed his concern to you. >> we're going back over what i just said. what i did then was to write and

to discuss specifically why it was that we were not getting the people, the civilians that we had been promised by a certain date to come in and helped deliver the administration of seven iraq because that was at s the next stage that had to be developed. in a sense it had collapsed with the ending of the regime. many of the people, i suspect, had disappeared because much of that administration would have been hands off technocrats. it probably wasn't a comfortable place for them to be at the time. >> were you aware that your department was involved. were you aware that your department was reluctant in detailed planning because of

concerns about their security clearance? you were not aware of that? >> i wrote to clare, i think -- let me have a look. yeah, i wrote to her on the 16th january sort of emphasizing that there was an invitation dfid to be represented at the weekly iraq stock meetings. so essentially we would come to a military planning meetings in order to get the perspective of dfid on the aftermath of planning. indeed the letter goes on to say we would like to attend any equivalent meetings held in your department. what we're doing is making sure that both departments were operating together in that planning for the aftermath. >> so you would agree that the aftermath planning, particularly

at the government level, was not as well coordinated as it could have been? >> in the event of the problems that we had to deal with i would agree with you. but the issue is did we anticipate the kinds of problems that we ultimately face? if there is any criticism we did down sufficiently to anticipate the difficulties eventually of security. that was something that developed. actually in the first place we probably did anticipate the kinds of problems of the humanitarian kind, electricity. what i think we did not get right was the extent of those difficulties. electricity is a good example in the sense that the electricity supply presumably to southern iraq under saddam hussein had always been intermittent and poor. when we took over they expected everything to suddenly get better and it didn't because we

were dealing with a power station that i understand at the time had been patched and repaired and kept going. we had people doing that. the local population quite quickly, perhaps understandably, blamed us for the problems that they had suffered for a long time under saddam. it's not unreasonable. i can see why. they thought that we were there to help, and we weren't making their lives any better as quickly as they expected. >> accepted, but he did say earlier that ken cross was a representative of government. so there was nobody taking charge of that. was it my problem? it is tim cross'. government to be saying these of the issues. there is like a planning. any to take charge of this.

>> again i keep making the point that by then ken cross in baghdad is dealing with an american system. i'm not avoiding a responsibility for it, but essentially focus on m.o.d. was in the south. we had a huge job in the south. many of the things that orha was supposed to be doing, the security situation in baghdad deteriorated much more quickly and much more dramatically. the problems were security problems. >> i have one question which arises out of something interesting you mentioned earlier in the context of targeting. iraq was probably the most photographed country in the world in terms of overhead imagery. ken cross, when he gets to baghdad, is astonished tomato thus, by the infrastructure. that private coalition or damage, just absolutely shattered. we heard that condition of basic

infrastructure, patches and mends and things tied up with shoelaces. photographic imagery does not disclose that kind of quality condition of an infrastructure system. is that right? >> well, i think the point you are making i agree with. we did not anticipate the extent of the kind of practical difficulties that we were going to face. >> that is where i was heading and wondering. it is that system on the grounds intelligence. that picture and supplies it was put together a picture of what we would find turned out to the not what we actually encountered. there was a mismatck. >> if anything we were all is well aware that they did particularly badly in the distribution of whatever finance the regime had.

you could always assume that the south would do a lot worse. the levels of poverty and malnutrition and so on were always much higher than they were in the center of the country. >> right. we are going to come up to a lunch break fairly soon. we just need to cover a few more questions before we get there. >> i would just like to make sure that we are clear about what it was we did anticipate and what we didn't anticipate. when did we actually realize that we were going to be in charge in the south in the post-conflict phase? >> well from when we decided, even before we decided that we

would do the third option. the third option carried with it the recognition that we would be responsible for the south. that was part of the plan. . >> the southern blocks of four provinces. that is clear. so that is autumn of the 2003. >> if you like, in terms of the planning process that was part of the assumption, running through all of the preparations. but the decision, yes, in toward the end. >> and did we realize at that stage that we were going to be the occupying power in the south and, indeed, the co-occupying power for the whole of iraq? >> well, that was certainly, that was the reason why we were so keen to see a further u.n. security council resolution because the legal responsibilities and constraints upon occupying power and general international law were more restrictive than we would expect

to enjoy under

>> our policy had been based ever since 1441 had been adopted on the assumption we wouldn't get that resolution. that resolution would provide u.n. authority for the action, and the united nations could come in straightaway after the campaign. and take charge of the country. so we were not assuming at this stage that we were going to be the occupying power. in this planning cycle. >> no, unless and until we got that support. but i don't think i disagree with you in the sense that part of what i was talking about in the middle of february was a requirement to ensure that we did not -- we were not the occupying power for too long. whatever the gap was between going in and assuming the responsibilities, we wanted to keep out as short as possible.

>> and you say we assume we're going to take charge of this southern region from the stage that we decided to put in the land contribution, but it was only in february that we really started seriously to focus on the aftermath. you made a trip to washington with tim cross. >> he was already there. >> but he was with you at the meeting. and it was only mid-february the foreign officer set up the iraq planning unit to actually coordinate planning on the aftermath. so why were we so late in focusing on this question if it had been apparent for so long? >> well, i think the reasons i've already tried to set out, that british forces i think are pretty good, this kind of transition. so in the first place in the assumption has always been that we would transit very quickly on

war fighting to peacekeeping and two was called off in nationbuilding. and indeed, that was happening from the moment that -- the port was taken specifically to make sure that we had access for shipping to bring in food supplies. so from the moment that was taken, the railhead, that was absolutely. >> i don't think you is particularly a military significant target. it was important for our thinking about the aftermath to make sure that we had access for deepwater ships. i think some work was done on clearing the harbor very, very quickly to get a ship in. and i think my recollection was sir callahan, but i maybe wrong. got in really quite quickly with supplies. >> obviously our military is extremely well in what they did

in coping with the transition. and as you said this is something they are very good at. we heard from the general who commanded the first troops across the border, the moment you take 1 yard of territory, you can become responsible for post-conflict. so straightaway, they were in to having administer areas of iraq, as you said, you didn't want them to be doing that for too long. >> but i did want to be doing it in the sense, the answer to question is, we recognize they would be engaged in this task. and indeed, you're right. i mean, the moment they arrived in a bizarre there were these soldiers already engaged in the second for the phase of operations. some were still fighting. and that process was a process until we have taken those for promises and control of the. >> but the picture that's certainly been built on by

succession, and i don't think contradicted by anything you've said today, is effectively we have to make this up as we went along. our military found themselves in charge of the simple administration of the southeast of iraq, for which they have not been prepared. which they did obvious extremely well in. no criticism of them. but it wasn't what they were therefore. it had been planned for, the british government collectively, really hadn't anticipated that this was going to happen. and we had nothing planned to step in to the place. >> i disagree with in the sense we had had something planned. the reason for my writing letters say, you know, where are these people, was, to the best of my recollection, there was a date i had been given an assurance that people would be available. those dates were passed and those people were not in iraq doing the job that i have been told they were doing. so there was planning for

whatever reason, we did not, either we did not satisfy those targets, those ambitions. we did not have the kinds of people, civilians, on the ground doing the jobs that were being carried out by soldiers, by reservists i enlarge. >> so such planning is they didn't produce the results of. >> didn't deliver. >> could that be because the planning started very late? >> well, i think that's probably fair. i don't exactly know the specific problems were, i do know from other conflicts, particular problem for example in kosovo, we have similar difficulties in afghanistan. that is quite hard to find the right people with the right skills to go in to what a very recently has been a war zone. so it may be that we did not provide sufficient timelines for identifying those people and getting them in to southern

iraq. >> very much corresponds with what others have said to his. now, you've reflected the back to your concerned a long time about the aftermath, other ministers likewise. why at cabinet level did we not take more vigorous action to ensure the aftermath planning was done properly, as you say it's very complicated, and insufficient time? >> to the best of my recollection, we did. i think a lot of work went into, i'm going to repeat myself, but into the humanitarian part, into looking at how we dealt with the infrastructure. i think there was a lot of thought. we had people, for example, that we were going to deploy very quickly who were experts in oil

pumping and delivery. because part of that was concerned that the iraqi regime might iraqi regime avatars for the oil wells, as they had in the first gulf war. we also knew that it was going to be vitally, important iraq's future that it was able to pump oil and earn money as quickly as possible. so we actually had quite a number of experts in that area who were deployed and were available to do those sorts of things. i think when things -- things went badly wrong once the security situation started to deteriorate. and we worked able to get, it may well be this was a problem. that we were able to get people to go there because of the increasing worries about security. >> we probably need to take pause at this point, and resume after lunch.

because i think we're just at the point where planning turns into execution through the invasion happening. and the military action being, catastrophically successful. i think the chairman would like us to resume that after lunch. >> yes, he would. servlets would like to ask a very short question and then we will break. >> hopefully a short answer. >> in the south in this discussion the security in iraq was always going to depend much more on most happening in baghdad. is that their? >> i think that is absolutely right. >> and it's going to be much more of an american responsibility. >> we had so people there, but a very small number of highly specialist people, shall i say. >> lots of evidence, about the

concerns about how well the americans were preparing for this and how seriously they took it. was there ever a point where you thought or where you discuss with colleagues the possibility that the problems that may well result make, whatever the quality of the case, on weapons of mass destruction and so forth, made that of the occupation of iraq would represent just an unacceptable level of risk? >> i don't think case was quite like that, but clearly, i referred earlier i think to a note i wrote to the prime minister. i think it was in march of 2002. i reference the problem with iran. and i think in the same letter, i pointed out that we had never successfully identified at that stage someone who might replace saddam hussein, there was real

concern about what iraq might look like in the aftermath of his regime being removed. and that debate was very live debate. and a lot of discussion about the structure of iraq, perhaps something will come onto women talk about the disbandment of the iraqi army. simply in the m.o.d. there was a strong sense that the iraqi army was a forced stability. saddam had not allow the republic guard into baghdad, for example. and it was assumed that was because he didn't wholly trust mostly professional soldiers, and indeed, in the later phase of the war fighting, we deliberately did not target republican guard units. because we wanted them to be that force for stability in the aftermath. but then there was a debate -- i

can recall, about we're likely to swap one dictator for another dictator. i mean, that was clearly a risk. >> as we went into war, there was a debate still going on about what it would lead to? >> know. because i think by then it was clear that the ambition, particularly in the american ambition we shared was to have a democratic iraq. that you asked me about prior to that, and certainly there was a lot of discussion. i can recall people suggesting that iraq would fall apart. the three elements would divide. that we would end up with three states rather than one state. so those a great deal of speculations as to what this might lead to. but by the time the war fighting began it was clear that we saw a

democratic country as being the outcome. >> thank you. >> we will b thank you all very much. thank you. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> no look at the u.s. capitol here where the u.s. senate is expected to gavel in for business at 2 p.m. eastern. lawmakers continue to work on

raising the federal debt limit that they will later consider a judicial nomination. live u.s. senate coverage right here on c-span2. off the floor there is a lot of focus on the nomination of ben bernanke to serve a second term as chairman of the federal reserve board. majority leader harry reid has yet to take the procedural steps to bring the matter to a vote. mr. bernanke's term ends this coming sunday, january 31. several democratic senators are signaling their opposition to his nomination. >> and taking a look

>> and more now with geoff hoon, former defense secretary under british by mr. tony blair. this is the second part of his testimony on the iraq war investigation. it's about two hours and 20 minutes. >> let's resume the questioning, and sir roderick? >> i just like to talk very briefly about the military campaign itself before i think sir lawrence wants to get into the more specialized assets of that aspect. basically, the campaign went extraordinarily well. was over much quicker than anticipated. is that right the? >> i think so, yes. i mean, i think extraordinary combination of very high technology and basic successful soldiery. >> was part of the reason it went so fast was the other side put up less of a fight that had been expected? >> i think the planning for what

was described by the americans was in effect based warfare was very successful. they were able to target with astonishing precision the enemy to the extent that quite quickly large number some iraqi soldiers in various places simply went home. had the coalition's military intelligence about the enemy turned out to be accurate? >> not entirely, because i was certainly led to believe that the republican guard in particular was relatively sophisticated and effective military unit. but i think what it demonstrated, perhaps in contrast with the first gulf war, was the advances in technology and precision bombing in particular was something that more conventional forces like iraqi forces would be a much bigger size, simply could not

resist. >> so by the first of may we get to a situation where it is declared the mission is being accomplished. the war fighting face. >> yes. what was your reaction at that point? did you think the main task was over or still a heavy? >> i don't think i would put the emphasis on one side or the other. you know, as you say, a lot has been achieved very successfully in a shorter period of time that we anticipated. i think we were always aware in any conflict, the post-conflict period is always going to be longer and more difficult. >> one of the things it did allow, as you were telling us this morning, for us to plan to draw down quite significant numbers of the troops that we deployed in a campaign. what governed that decision?

how quickly did it, and at what point you to down? >> i think if we go back to the discussion we had before lunch about the size of the force that we could deploy. one of the consequences of deployed force on any operation is that they then have to -- they have to have a period of recuperation, of recovery. they have to get back into the training. so i believe something -- i didn't frankly entirely understand why first got to the ministry of defense. we were discussing earlier the no-fly zones that i assume before i went to kuwait to talk to the people involved that flying missions over southern iraq was pretty good training. of course, it was only part of their training. and admit they could not get back to the more encompassing training that was required, similarly with forces who engage in war fighting that they have got to get back and get back into their normal routine of

training and deployment when the time came. so the sooner we got them back from their war fighting role, the sooner they could resume their normal activities. >> down in the southeast as we discussed this morning, we found ourselves in charge of four provinces. and we discussed a bit the way in which this was a fully anticipated. had we actually in the original military plan anticipated the british forces would be taking basha? or was it going to be our role to screen it or the american advance? >> we had anticipated that we would be taken responsibly. i think the point i was making was we, i so had expected that others would come in to assist more quickly than they did so it wasn't purely a military responsibility as it proved to be for rather longer than i had expected. certainly we were likely to always have been responsible for

taking basra, because the essential american plan was to move as quickly as possible to baghdad. and if necessary, although it proved not to be, but if necessary to bypass some of the cities on the way. because they regarded baghdad as a key center, psychologically and practically of the regime. >> looking back finally on the successful campaign, what was the reflection of preferred to do differently? >> in the war fighting part? >> yes, on the war fighting part. >> i'm not sure that there was a huge difference. that i would have made. the fighting part was remarkably successfully. we sustain some casualties, but by and large it was a success.

i suspect, i think sir john made reference to an observation jeremy greenstock. one of the difficulties of advancing at that speed in contrast with a more conventional campaign was that the resistance that was left in the wake of the frontline was able to attack not the frontline, not the hard and combat forces, but some of the people who were so much in the rear, but who were at the sides. some of the attacks by, we called, some of those loyal to saddam hussein, they took some american prisoners who were mechanics. i think the chef was taken prisoner. they were able to sort of come in to the side of the advance, and perhaps those people were not as well protected as might

have been the case. because in a conventional campaign, essentially the frontline would've taken all of the resistance with it. i think that may have -- i mean, that may have been -- i think though the real issue was those who were ultimately loyal to saddam hussein were not necessarily wearing uniforms. they were not capable of being dealt with in a conventional military way. >> but no big lessons to be learned from the war fighting part of the campaign? >> no. i think i mentioned some of the. the big lessons by large were surveyed for the ministry of defense were a very positive one. and they were to do with the benefits of very sophisticated technology, precision bombing, precision attacks. the way in which modern warfare can be conducted for war fighting, park with a relatively smaller number of soldiers, as against the kind of force that

was originally anticipated in the original american plan for invading iraq. >> all right. >> yes, i'm going to ask you a few questions on intelligence weapons of mass destruction .ca, and then on to the much larger questions, and some equipment issues. if we start with weapons of mass destruction, and the intelligence, now in the ministry of defense, defense intelligence staff, which is bound to be a major input into the gac process, did you get separate briefings from the defense intelligence staff on iraqi issues and the issues of weapons of mass destruction? >> gas. >> and how regularly?

>> i'm not sure i can put a figure on it. pretty often. they were regular papers produced by dis, looking at issues like weapons of mass destruction, but in range of other issues to do with, for example, military capability. i think i did ask whether i could be given information about to fall on sir roderic previous questions, the resilience of the iraqis, we'll can get bill is did they have, were they likely to fight and what was their likely effectiveness? involve not send any intelligence, pure intelligence part, but more in the assessment of military capability. >> exactly. what were your impressions that you have gained from this, the vision we had a look at gic about the iraqi wmd. >> i was in no doubt at all from the merit of amateur i read

those capabilities they had. both chemical and biological capabilities. and the nuclear question with some distance? >> there was a note really to the effect going back to our early discussions this morning, that the containment had prevented them from securing fissile material. but they pursued to quite an extent the technology required to do everything else, so that they were working hard on missiles, on those capabilities for delivery. they lack access to fissile material, but the point was made. i think i repeated this morning, that if they could figure fissile material, then they would be able to move relatively quickly towards securing a nuclear weapon. >> that's a very a trend -- a

very big if. >> and when the question of the dossier or came up, were you aware of this process is did you take much interest in a? >> i was certainly aware that there was going to be a dossier, and i was always aware, i was also aware that dis would be consulted in the preparation of that dossier, yes. >> were you aware there were to some concerns within dis about some of the language that was used? >> i wasn't aware of the detailed points until, i think, the butler inquiry. i wasn't aware of the detailed drafting, when they were made. i did at the time of butler see the point and i understood the points that were being made at the time the.

>> this didn't percolate up to? >> what i did see was a letter from the policy director on the 20th of september in 2002. he said, cdi staff has been closely associated with the preparation of the detail of the dossier. i understand their content from a professional dis point of view with the judgments it contains. so i was given specific advice that dis was content with the dossier. >> and as we know from butler that was the level at which these issues was deciding dis not to take it further. so you weren't aware. when the document was published, obviously one of the issues was this 45 minutes question. were you aware that is rather

misleading question had, this was related not just to munitions, for battlefield use, but for longer range missile? >> first of all, when i saw the draft, the only thing in the draft that surprised is to start with, but the only thing i had not seen in a row before with my familiarity was this 45 minute claim. put it this way. my experience with dealing with intelligence over many years was that if you saw something new and different, you would ask about it. and i asked about what that meant. and i think, i haven't been able to find it in any record, but almost certain because of the way it happened.