apple, hillary clinton's contention that i will testify wanonce. susan: let's talk about the irs. a sense of frustration from the chairman. stephen: boiling up for a while. i think it was interesting that he, the fact that we are going to see the inspector general's report on the e-mails and backup tapes. he does sound like he does not believe -- i believe use the words obstruction of congress. they will have a decision to make on how they pursue that and whether they asked the justice department to pursue criminal charges. the justice department turned that request down.

susan: tuesday, the opm hacking case. any indication whether or not he is inclined that other countries are involved at this point? matt: the whisper campaign, it is clear this is a massive hack of government data. from there you can extrapolate a lot of information. he's want to issue subpoenas on this. seems to be taking it seriously. susan: thanks to both of you for being on newsmakers this week. >> the new congressional directory is a handy guide to the 114th congress with color photos of every senator and house member plus contact information and twitter handles. a foldout map of capitol hill and a look at congressional committees, the president's

cabinet. order your copy today. $13.95 plus shipping and handling at c-span.org. >> director of clinical cardiology at bring up women's hospital, dr. patrick o'gara on the progress being made in the understanding of heart health. >> this is a valve that has been crimped onto this catheter that is being positioned into the diseased valve. it will be deployed with the balloon being inflated at a new valve will be inserted inside the old valve. as you can see, the delivery system is being withdrawn and the wire will he withdrawn. what we have seen in this display is replacement of a

disease aortic valve in a manner that does not require open-heart surgery. we are trying to become smarter about predicting who will get disease. smarter as to identifying the most effective means to prevent the disease and smarter about following up over a longer period of time. we are in an era where we are trying to harness the promise of the human genome research project that has been in existence for more than a decade with all of the informatics that can be driven by giants of the industry and information about sociology, geography demographics, where you live in your city, what is your likelihood to get diabetes on the basis of educational background? your likelihood of developing something like hypertension or

diabetes if you live in a certain part of the city where you have less access to the right kind of food or instructions about sodium consumption. things like that i could have -- that could have impact on health. >> dr. patrick o'gara on c-span's q and a. >> the senate homeland security and governmental affairs committee recently held a hearing on operations at the transportation security administration. a recent investigation found several security breaches at airport checkpoints. those testifying were inspector general john roth and tsa was a brother -- whistle blowers. interrupted by capital police by reports of a suspicious package.

mr. johnson: this hearing is necessary. i think it is unfortunate that some information was leaked prior to our ability to completely analyze it. we want to make sure that as we are asking questions that we do not reveal classified information. the fact of the matter is if it will solve any problems we have to recognize the reality. we have to describe it. the purpose of any hearing is that in the end, following the hearing, every member of the audience takes the first step towards solving any problems -- admit we have one. i have been thinking about the struggles of tsa since it was first established. understanding

how it has got two missions, and they are completely contradictory. on the one hand, we're looking for 100% security. all public transportation would hundred percent safe and secure. on the other hand, we are looking for complete efficiency. it is an enormous task. because of leaked information inspector general roth, i commend you for your attendance and taking a hard look at this. we are finding out that contradictory goal, we are not meeting those. with the acting tsa administrator now and tsa

nominee, i have had serious discussions and ask them to analyze the problem. start thinking outside the box. we need to look at more effective solutions and we have to start prioritizing what can -- what we can do that will most improve security. the example i would use is after 9/11, the simplest -- securing the cockpit door. we found with german wings, that is not a total solution. it creates unintended consequences. this is an enormously complex and difficult issue. we need to approach the solution soberly and honestly. i would like to ask unanimous

consent to allow my opening statement to enter the record. we had another witness, mr. jason harrington. he was unable to make it due to illness. he submitted a written testimony and i ask him his consent to enter his testimony as well. i would like to read a couple statistics that describe the difficult mission of a tsa. the tsa is comprised of 46,000 officers and 26% of that is -- and 20% are veterans. tsa screens nearly 2 million passengers each day. nearly 600 million -- nearly 60 million each year. 3 million carry on bags -- the

tsa used more than the 700 advanced image technology machines. tsa is responsible for securing 25,000 domestic flights per day. toys hundred outbound international flights per day. it also secures 4 million miles of roadways, railroad tracks bridges and tunnels, 350 maritime ports and pipeline. it is an enormous challenge. we need to recognize that reality and take a look at this problem as one that is a significant challenge and talk about it as honestly as possible. with that i will turn it over to senator carper. senator carper: thank you for your attendance, preparation and your willingness to respond to our questions.

few federal agencies interact with the american people on a daily basis than does the tsa. the men and women who work there have a difficult, but extremely important job. last month i spoke on the senate floor about two women who have dedicated their lives to keeping our aviation system and its users secure by working for the tsa. one of these two women was shot in the line of duty. she showed up for work the very next day. every day, these women and their colleagues, thousands of them around the country work in a , challenging environment to keep our aviation systems safe and for those that use it safe and secure. we don't do enough to acknowledge that and to thank them for when they do their jobs well. that is almost all the time. i believe it is important for us to recognize exemplary performance when it is done.

this committee also has an obligation to exercise our oversight responsibilities when performance falls short of that standard. thank you to our witnesses, we have been alerted to a number of instances where performance by tsa appears to have been disappointing and even troubling . yesterday for example, we learned from the hs inspector general that 73 individuals had -- with possible links to terrorism and have been given credentials to access secure areas of airports. last week we learned of significant vulnerabilities at passenger screening checkpoints, uncovered by the inspector general. reported failure to -- fourfor detecting prohibited items are more than troubling, they are unacceptable.

i look forward to reviewing the department of homeland security's full report later this month. that said, i am encouraged by the swift action taken by the secretary of homeland security to address the inspector general's findings. since 2011, transit agency security administration has transitioned from a one-size-fits-all screening philosophy to one more risk-based. that approach is designed to allow tsa to deploy limited resources to the areas where we face the greatest threat. however as the inspector general has identified, such a swift transition may have created vulnerabilities to this system. i thank the chairman and staff for working so quickly and cooperating with my staff so that we can move the nomination . with that, we look forward to the testimony, think the

-- thank the witnesses for appearing and grateful to the current front-line employees that have joined us today. i will close with one last personal thought. my father used to drive my sister and i crazy growing up. he said the same things over and over again. one of these things he said is if a job is worth doing, it is worth doing well. he said that maybe a thousands of times. out of that i took this lesson we should be focused on perfection. we'll never get there, that should be the goal. it isn't perfect, we need to make it better. clearly, some things are going on at the tsa that are far from perfection. our job is to help them get closer to that goal. thank you so much. >> thank you. i would only add, in a request for protection -- request for

perfection is through continuous improvement. it is the tradition of this committee to swear and witnesses. so if you all stand and raise your right hand. do you swear the testimony you will give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you god. thank you and be seated. our first witness is mr. roth. he is the inspector general for the department of homeland security. prior to serving as inspector general, he served in the office of criminal investigations of the food and drug administration. inspector general roth. mr. roth: thank you for inviting me here today to discuss tsa's programs. before discussing tsa's challenges, i would like to acknowledge the whistleblowers i join on the panel today. we are grateful when employees are willing to step forward to identify problems within the agency. whistleblower

disclosures have saved lives as well as taxpayer dollars. whistleblowers play a crucial role in keeping our department efficient and accountable. we review over 16,000 complaints per year, more than 300 per week, to better understand and respond to potential waste fraud, and abuse in the department's programs. with regard to tsa, we face a classic asymmetric threat in attempting to secure our transportation systems. tsa cannot afford to miss a single, genuine threat without potential catastrophic consequences. yet a terrorist only needs to get it right once. tsa's thousands of officers conduct tedious tasks that require constant vigilance. complacency can be a huge detriment to tsa's mission. ensuring consistency across

tsa's largest workforce which -- across dhs's largest workforce which challenge even the best organizations. unfortunately although nearly 14 years have passed since tsa's inception, we remain deeply concerned about its ability to execute its important mission. since 2004 we have published more than 115 audit inspection operations. we have issued recommendations and attempts to improve effectiveness. we have conducted a series of covert penetration tests. essentially testing tsa's ability. we identified vulnerabilities caused by human and technology-based failures trade . i am aware of the media reports regarding our most recent testing. although the details of those tests are classified, and i will not be able to speak the specifics of them today, i

welcome the opportunity to brief members of this committee and staff in a close setting. we have also reported on the acquisitions. our audit results show that tsa faces significant challenges in contracting for goods and services are despite spending billions on aviation security technology, our testing has yielded no results of improvement. we have examined the approach to risk-based screening. while we at applaud the concept, our inspections have uncovered significant vulnerabilities. we have concerns regarding the manner in which tsa manages this risk. this includes managing inclusion and the administration of the project program itself. we have also examined the performance of tsa's workforce. our audits have found that human error, often a simple farrier --

a simple failure to follow protocol every time poses significant vulnerabilities. we have also looked at how tsa buys equipment and have found challenges. these weaknesses have a real and negative impact on transportation security as well. tsa has taken some steps to implement our recommendations and address security on our vulnerabilities. some problems persist. sound planning and strategies for efficiently using an screening -- using and maintaining screening equipment would go a long way. tsa needs to have a better understanding of the limitations of its technology, and develop strategies to counter those limitations. better training and better management of tso's would help mitigate the effects of human error, although it never eliminated, could be reduced.

tsa's focus on management practices, and oversight of the workforce would help enhance security as well as customer service for air passengers. mr. chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. i am happy to take questions you or other members of the committee may have. senator johnson: our next witness is rebecca roering. during her 25 years of government service, ms. roering has also served the federal aviation administration as a federal air marshal. ms. roering. ms. roering: thank you for inviting me here today to discuss important security concerns related to the tsa. the mission of tsa is to ensure the freedom of movement for people and commerce. it is also the mission to protect the traveling public

against terrorist attacks read . the ability of tsa to execute its mission has been called into question by many oversight group s. my testimony today will focus on a number of the security concerns that result in vulnerabilities and morale issues across the workforce. tsa has hired into leadership positions, a number of former airline executives and others who place more emphasis on customer service than security. any wait time deemed by excessive requires reporting analysis, and action. conversely, the local monthly testing of officers to determine ability to detect vulnerabilities and weapons is not associated with the same metric. there is a basic remedial training before the office may return to duty. a tsa officer may never be

subjected to a current -- to a covert test based on current volume of the test each month, resources, and the volume. it is not until recently, the detection rates of iuds has become a topic of discussion. this is a result of covert testing at numerous airports identifying detection rates. leadership recognized that poor detection rates are part -- are in part related to the poor more morale that exist across the workforce spread the 2014 federal employee viewpoint survey resulted in them getting the lowest ratings in a government agency and tsa receiving more than their share of low marks. a great deal of pressure and scrutiny.

a culture of fear and distrust has been created in the agency, impacting morale. this is documented in the results of the survey. equally troubling are the security gaps associated with the tsa pre-check program. while a risk-based approach is essential, tsa has expanded pre-check to large populations of passengers who have not enrolled in, or paid for the program. in the fall of 2013, expressed my concerns to my leadership as well as the tsa office of inspections. i later reported this to be -- to the office of special investigations. my allegations were substantiated by the inspector general in a report. tsa is handing out pre-check status like halloween candy in an effort to expedite passengers as quickly as possible.

the tsa pre-check enrollment program did not meet the expectations in terms of volume, therefore pre-check rules keep expanding is a matter of efficiency, even though the agency is well aware of the risks. as documented in recent reports, insider threat continues to present a security concern for our nation's airports. although some screening is conducted on checked baggage is and passengers, there are other employees who have access to sterile areas of the airport who are subjected to only criminal history checks and security threat assessments. this group has unimpeded access to aircraft. it was discovered that some of these employees later traveled to syria to fight for isis. tsa has increased the use of playbook teams with the focus on insider threat. in my experience, the director

federal security director is reluctant to initiate enforcement action against carriers. a conflicts of interest exists when the fst relies on certain services, and on the other hand has responsibility for the regulatory program. additionally, transportation and security inspectors are being used by the fst to provide a wide range of duties not related to the core functions. such duties include moving bends bins and conducting audits of universal enrollment facilities to determine such items as whether it or not there is so open the restrooms or of the -- or if the staff is friendly. these audits should be done by a contracting officer rather than regulatory inspectors. dhs should reconsider the reporting structure to eliminate any potential conflicts. tsa uses prohibited personnel practices to pressure employees to resign.

when allegations of misconduct occur by employees in certain positions, the fst must offer refer the allegations to the office of inspection. if they do investigate, they send criminal investigators to conduct an investigation of even minor matters. it is a waste of taxpayer dollars to use criminal investigators to conduct routine administrative investigations. in conclusion, the culture that exists at tsa is one of fear and distrust. while they cannot control all the risks with aviation security, leadership of the agency is in a position to impact change. better training and management of the workforce would result an improvement to morale and detection rates. tsa should eliminate security gaps created by risk assessment rolls of pre-check and dhs

should reconsider the reporting structure for inspectors. mr. chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. i welcome any questions from you or any members of the committee. chairman: thank you. our next witness is robert mclean. he blew the whistle about potential safety concerns regarding the tsa plan to alter schedules. he was fired by tsa after disclosing's information. he was eventually reinstated. he is currently a federal air marshal based in los angeles. mr. mclean: thank you. it is a great honor to be here. due to my 12 year case that finished before the supreme court four years ago, and my role as a national whistleblower liaison for the federal law enforcement officers association

dozens of tsa federal air , marshals come to me with their concerns about aviation security threats. this is a huge responsibility. being a voice for those tasked with stopping terrorism. the public wants to continue and join the great privilege and miracle of flying on jetliners. they are tired of complaints and want their tax money spent wisely. the 9/11 attacks should have proved how volatile it is inside a crowded, rasterized, then to -- a crowded pressurized, thin tube traveling 500 miles an hour, 40,000 feet up in the sky. air marshals most common concern, improvised explosive devices, bombs. bonds won't just pass through checkpoints -- delivery drivers

the inmate of items consumed by passengers in the boarding areas. that cargo includes food, drink, condiments, cooking oil, cleaning products, and all of the packaging that goes with it. you also have all of the dense stacks of newspapers, magazines, and books, this mountain is nowhere near getting the screening of passengers are getting at checkpoints. a bomb smuggler will hide a needle in a hay wagon. before sneaking a state passed a pack of wolves -- a snake -- steak passed a pack of wolves. get exhausted air marshals get out of airline shares, and deploy them in the bowels of airports to do traditional foot patrol. when i flew missions, i desperately tried to find that terrorist. instead i disrupted three illegal alien smuggling operations, purely because of my experience learning the mundane routines of the traveling public

building rapport with the , airport workers and authorities, knowing the area, and reading faces. tsa pre-check, with improvements should be expanded. it should be free of charge. more people in pre-check frees up resources to focus on attackers. i would like to see tso's roaming airports with mobile pre-check application kits and soliciting passengers during their delays. we need to have more faith in human intelligence gathering and the intuition of bold officers. you need to completely secure the flight deck or cockpit where the pilots are in control of the jet. every flight deck should have a modified shotgun with an emergency lock switch. shotgun pellets are ideal since the primary concern is to stop an attacker trying to force the door open.

shotgun pellets will not harm passengers or the aircraft. the group of pilots would use their own funds to travel to new mexico used once again, this is highly unlikely. but it's possible. arm pilots are not allowed to carry on flights. the shotgun meant to stop one or two hijackers from one foot away and risk another 9/11 style attack. there is a cheap and perfect solution to this.

can horizontal cables attached to a vertical hole, a flight attendant can stretch across the galley and lock in place. this buys plenty of time to get the pilot back into the flight deck and lock the door. in order to control unruly passengers who could be suicidal attackers sending up a ruse for the law enforcement officers, every cabin should be equipped with restraint systems and nonlethal tools to restrain unruly passengers. flight crews and law enforcement officers need the legal authority to deputize and indemnify able-bodied passengers to protect themselves and the jet from destruction. we can do this during our pre-check. there is no reason why a military member can walk deep into the cabin to restrain somebody area we can ask passengers to volunteer to be these deputy air marshals during critical events and qualify them

at training centers. passengers may do nothing because of the potential civil liability, and because they are expecting air marshals to respond. an air marshal taken away from the flight deck endangers the jet. the pilots may not be able to safely land a jet for hours while attackers are going on a murders re-. the pilots need the ability to disorient the attackers. when that doesn't stop the mayhem, pilots can don oxygen masks and the pet -- and d pressurize the cabin. do all this and give flight attendants and regular passengers the right to save their lives. you can assign air marshals and airports to find terrorists before they go up to the sky.

it should have only been a temporary detail and not a career. not many young and ambitious people you're in for a career in airlines. the air marshals told me half the job would be flying and the rest would be time to recover train, and investigate. no one can sustain five days of flying per week. we should train federal and local law enforcement officers to quickly deploy reserve air marshals to respond to specific threats. all federal reap -- all federal employees are reluctant to report money wasted and dangerous security lapses because they do not want to gamble with their careers. the tiny underfunded -- underfunded agency. cabin safety inspector kimberly blew the whistle on faa 12 years

ago and she had a hearing 18 months ago and still the judge has not made a hearing, or made a decision. if i had a jury i would have won six years ago. federal employees are the only people who do not have access to jury trials. a restaurant cook has more due process then an airport marshal security lapses that could cripple the aviation industry. the list goes on. i have availed myself all week to meet with members of congress and my fellow tsa force. many may think my proposals are risky or even crazy. benefits can outweigh the risk.

i hope we don't need another 9/11 to prove we were accurate. i am excited to surf with the new leader of the tsa. i really hope he is confirmed. i apologize for going over time. i appreciate your testimony. our next witness is jennifer grover. she is the director of transportation security in coast guard issues for the government accountability office. her work includes assessing vulnerabilities throughout the tsa screening process. >> thank you. morning members and staff. last week renewed concerns arose about tsa screening systems and whether they are sufficient to identify prohibited items. gal supports tsa's move toward risk-based screening.

tsa must do two things. first take more rigorous steps to ensure that each layer of security works as intended. second put systems in place to continuously monitor their effectiveness. over many years gao has reported weaknesses in tsa's oversight of its screening systems raising questions about whether tsa is falling short in its ability to ensure aviation security. tsa has taken steps to improve oversight of the systems. the secure flight program matches information against federal government watch lists to identify those who should not fly or receive enhanced screening. second, the a i.t. systems, the full body -- full body scanners used to screen for items at

prohibited checkpoints. the management screening process, which t assay uses to provide expedited screening to passengers not previously identified as low risk. first of all regarding secure flight, we founded september 2014 that tsa did not have timely or reliable information about the extent or causes of system matching errors, which occur when secure flight fails to identify passengers who were actual matches to the watch list. in response to our recommendations, tsa has developed a mechanism to keep track of errors. second, regarding the ait body scanners we found that tsa did not include information about screener performance when evaluating effectiveness.

the assessment was limited to the laboratory. after a machine identifies a potential threat for screening officer has to do a targeted pat down. the consistency with which the screener's conduct the pat down's properly and identify all threat items is key to ensuring the effectiveness of the ait systems in the airport operating environment. we recommend that tsa assess ait effectiveness as a function of technology and the screening officers that operated. tsa recently sent updated information about their efforts to address it, which are under review. in december 2014 we found tsa had not tested the security effectiveness of the inclusion process as it functions as a whole. as part of managed inclusion tsa uses multiple layers of security

to mitigate the inherent risk that is associated with screening randomly selected passengers in a system that was designed for low risk passengers. however if these security leaders -- security layers are not working as intended they may not be screening passengers effectively. they have reported them to be effective but gao reached concer tsa is planning to complete testing of the system by mid 2016. finally, regarding tsa's involvement in airport worker vetting, we found that tsa and airports were conducting background checks based on limited information specifically tsa's level of access to fbi criminal history records were excluding many state records. in response to the recommendation, tsa and fbi confirms there was a risk of incomplete information and the

fbi has since reported expanding the criminal records they provide for the security threat assessments. in conclusion, tsa has made progress improving the screening oversight such as taking steps to address the vulnerabilities in the security flight program and by working with the fbi to obtain more access to criminal background information. more work remains to make sure security flight, ait and inclusion management is working as intended. this concludes my statement and i look forward to your questions. >> i want to start you have, inspector right inspector roth you can you have can you -- can you speak to the level of sophistication of people on the red team in trying to assess the effectiveness of the system? >> that is going to be a

difficult question to answer in this environment. i will say the testers we used a are auditors and members of the oig workforce and don't have background or training of the work. to go into more detail that will be problematic. >> i am an accountant as well. >> no one spoke to accountants. >> can you speak to differences between airports? did we see, you know, some airports perform better than others and see what works and doesn't work? >> again, i can't get into the specifics of the actually results of the testing. you ask know we did field work in the area but no report yet. we do field work, analyze the work, and do the kinds of comparison you are talking about and report them out. i will say the results were consistent across airports. >> i will not go any further than that. i would like to talk about just the number of standard operating

procedures and number of protocols. maybe ms. roaring or whoever else wants to speak to that -- how many are there? i have seen briefings and acronyms and i am trying to show how difficult they are for the standard tso's. >> there are a number of standard operating procedures. offhand i don't know the specific numbers but there is a checkpoint, a check baggage sop, sop for the ticket documenter checker position, known crew member, bda, a passenger screening canine and those are the ones i can think of off the top of my head. >> how detailed are the sop's? >> very detailed.

>> we are just humans. it is hard to have the training involved of someone following every one of the sop's with the volume, the throughput we are trying to achieve is a real problem, isn't it? >> there are a number of very specific procedures in the sop. during the training process, the sop's are separated out so when you are being trained in that function, you would be referring to the sop that applies. some of them don't apply to all of the officers across the workforce. for example, the sop wouldn't need to be normal tso wouldn't need to know the normal sop and the inclusion and passenger screening screening. you don't have to be proficient in all of the sop's. >> i want to get into the pre-check program and my concern, and what i think is a really good idea, and most agree, but only if followed and if we only do complete

background checks, so whoever is best able to answer in terms of how many people have been cleared for pre-check? i have information for about 100,000 but i am not sure it is accurate and how many went through a thorough vetting we would expect verses under pressure to again accomplish the throughput objective, how many have been approved in a very watered down process? ms. grover? >> i believe there are about a million people who have applied for pre-check now. but there are about 7.2 million people who have routinely get pre-check on their bording pass because of their affilation with concern groups. people in the trusted program or dod active military.

and then of course, in addition to that, as was discussed earlier there is people who can get repre-check through the auto mated risk assessments or at the airport through random selection from management inclusion. >> talk about automated risk assessment. >> automated risk assessment. so the first thing tsa does is check to see if a passenger is on one of the terrorist watch list. if they are not, then tsa checks to see if the person is already a known traveler. signed up with pre-check and have a known traveler number. if not, then all of the rest of the passengers are screened against a set of risk rules that tsa has designed based on

intelligence and based on certain characteristics of the traveler including information about the specific flight they are looking at, then the individual can receive pre-check on their boarding pass on a one-time base. >> anybody else want to comment on the watering down of thet vetting process? >> tsa increased the use of pre-check over the last several years. it has gone from really a test case into a situation where between 40-50 percent of the traveling public gets an expedited screening whether it is inclusion, part of a trusted traveler program or ms. grover talked about the risk rules. >> as pre-check was conceived with a full vetting process, how many people received the full vetting process to 50-60 percent of the public qualifying for pre-check? >> the tsa celebrated a million

people who have applied for pre-check through the vetting program as ms. grover said. there are other trusted travelers programs that is very similar to pre-check, some more extensive and they get grandfathered in. members of congress and other trusted populations get grandfathered in. but you are talking about 1.8 million people per day traveling. so you are talking about a significant portion of the flying public that is unknown to tsa and goes to register. >> i am out of time. senator carper. >> thanks so much for joining us and for your testimony and your work. before we talk about the things tsa needs to do better. let's talk about this. give us one thing they are doing

well. john, lead us off. >> certainly. and that is the hazard that i have in this occupation i only focus on the negative instead of the positive. >> we never do that in our jobs. >> certainly the two people sitting two my left with people are courage to see something gone wrong and try to fix it. and i suspect within the tsa population there are people every day, thousands of people who get up and put on that uniform and go to work and try to do their best every single day. and again, when you only focus on the negatives, you forget about the majority of the population that really wants to do the right thing and cares about their job. >> i try to travel on planes but i have taken over the years

when someone from tsa is doing a good job, polite, courtesy and thankful i thank them. they have no idea who mean. they think i am ron johnson. day to day it is probably mixed. we had a study about why people are leaving and one of the things is that as hard as they work they never get thanked. let me let the others pick up. >> i think risk based security is a good procedure. as long as there is no risk associated associated. 99.9 of the public want to get from point a to b safely and we need to focus on that and target the tiny segment of the population. >> once again, i like the pre-check program. it blows hay from the hay stack to get down to that one needle. and the other program i love is the viper teams. the visibility intermodal

prevention and response teams. >> i would like to say risk based security at tsa has the opportunity to offer tremendous efficiency and i would encourage them to go ahead and work on that. >> most important element i have

seen is leadership. if you have great leadership you have a chance to be successful. if not you are doomed. the president seemed to nominate and i think that is a great choice. if you had the opportunity to say this would be a top priority for you what would the top priority be? >> i would go back and echo the remarks chairman johnson made at the beginning pointing out tsa's primary mission to insure aviation security and another mission is to insure the free flow of commerce and passengers. at this time when questions are raise about whether or not the

fundamentals are working properly it is important to have a strong leader in place to guide the organization to figure out how to balance those two elements. >> thank you. >> one piece of advice if the admiral is concerned. >> more emphasis on protecting the cock deck or cockpit. >> i think the leadership of the agency is one that focus on wait times and we need to focus less

on wait times and be more concerned about detection rates and giving our officers the time they need to process passengers and bags in a manner they feel is comfortable the bag doesn't contain a weapon or prohibited item. >> thank you. >> i had the good fortune of meeting with the admiral prior to one of his hearings and i think the biggest thing he needs to understand and i think he does, that this is a huge challenge. i think he is committed to understanding the problem and fixing it. >> my last question is give us good advice. come back and pick up one point you mentioned for us. give us one great to do-list.

give us one really good one. >> understand the risk you are attempting to manage. understand the risk behind the technology, behind your management processes and manage against those risks. you have don't understand those risks, you will not be able to manage against it. >> thank you. >> i will take one out of my statement and that has to do with the fact we have no body in the field overseeing the numerous contracts tsa engaged in. no way of measuring if the performance is acceptable. having contracted the representatives in the field would let us manage the contracts better so we are not wasting taxpayer dollars.

>> i would pass a law giving flight attendants more training and authorities to have passengers save their lives. >> all right. thank you. >> gao's a data driven organization so i would like to see the tsa's top leaders accountability by asking for data on the top measure. >> what you can't measure you cannot manage. >> i have to give a shoutout to my tsas in my gate area c. i travel light but i attended a boy scout event and rushed to the airport and they put this package in my brief case and it was a boy scout knife and they caught it. again, there are, i think, the vast majority of tso and tsa employees that are trying to stay alert in a difficult task and check the public. that is my own experience. i got caught. senator ernst. >> thank you mr. chair and thank you ranking member carper for calling this very, very timely hearing today. i do want to thank all of our witnesses with us today and we appreciate your testimony very very much.

senator carper i think touched on a lot of the questions that i really had. i do believe there has been an issue with the lack of consistency and i think it is something that tsa has been suffering from across the various aspects of the organization and its mission for a while. referenced in all of your testimony, across the board, is varying degrees of certainty and consistency with people, processes and operations. and these problems, whether it is the morale of the organization, the personal, or the day to day operations, they are just so systemic.

you mentioned ideas on where you would like to see leadership goes and a couple suggestions for congress. but bottom line, do you think it is really more of a management issue for the admiral? hopefully we will be confirmed or are these the issues that the admiral can influence through management style? or is it something that needs to be addressed through legislation? i would like to hear the perspective that you have on that. one or the other or a combination of both. ms. grover, if you would start. >> i think it is several issues. i think there is a concern about morale at tsa as was mentioned earlier. morale at dhs as a department is very low and morale at tsa is even lower and that does affect people's engagement to their work. but there are weaknesses in the equipment tsa uses in terms of its effectiveness and challenges of having 40,000 people doing their job right every day is difficult.

it is morale, specifications of the equipment, and i would like to see tsa spending less time on standing up more programs and more time on making sure the programs they stood up are working properly. >> thank you. i appreciate that. >> a big problem with the air marshal mission is there is nothing going on. there is no arrest or case happening as you get in a border patrol station you have hundreds of thousands of arrest, hundreds of drug cases happening, so they arebuse are busy. it causes a huge ripple in the water and managers don't want to make a decision on something. i think a possible solution is to put the air marshal under the

purview of a pure law enforcement agency. a lot of -- there is a huge amount of former border patrol agencies in the air marshal service and they feel like it was when they were under the ins. it was an agency that had conflicting missions. one was to naturalize people and then at the same time catch and deport them. they feel that is a problem. and no because there is so little case work, and so little to do, which is great because no body is dying, but board managers are looking for something to do or afraid to take care of the situation until they get a phone call.

>> you would say to separate the two programs and empower those officer to do more? >> many air marshals say why don't we go under the purview of border patrol? the management is there. it could be a good transition. it happened once before. the original air marshal director put it under immigration and custom enforcement and did that because he saw the air marshals burning out. they were board. you hire these eager people and they goit there and are strapped down. it is like pressure cookers. things happen. >> very interesting. i appreciate that. overlie i want to address the

recent media reports that indicated by the inspector general that tsa failed to identify 73 people employed in the industry that were flagged under terrorist activity codes. according to the fast part of the reason is the agency is not authorized to receive all of the information under watch listing policy. i have huge concerns and most of the public as well. employees are granted special access without going through a thorough background check. if you could speak to that briefly. >> we share your concern and summary of what we found is accurate. there is the large terrorist

identity environment. and tsa by law didn't have access to some of the codes. in 2014, the administrator asked for access, but it a process that is taking some time apparently so it isn't quite there yet but i think they are moving quickly ton. >> thank you for your testimony. >> senator sasse. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for your testimony. and general, thank you for the work you and your team do. i wonder if you could unpack your work. i think you have the largest branch? >> i think we are number three. dod and social security i think. >> how many employees do you have and talk about the structure. >> 670 employees all together. it is broken into functional and audit function and investigative function. we have 220 criminal investigators doing internal

affair work. ... our auditors come from a variety of places in the inspector general community, some from private businesses and private enterprise, all of whom are covered by standards. >> do you have 18 that reports to you? >> we do not. that is a term the tsa uses but we don't have one. >> the leaked report of last week that showed there have been 70 attempts by your investigators to smuggle weapons are explosive devices onto planes -- the failure rate was 97%. the public can take some comfort in the idea that it was supposedly done by super terrorists, the red teams. they are not yours and this leaked report is yours.

>> i can't confirm or deny any specific results or the specific methodology. we don't identify ourselves as red team. these are auditors that we used of the inspector general's office.

>> i appreciate this. i think what we hear you doing is clarifying that there are no red teams. >> correct. >> do you understand how the department's stories are out there? s for red team investigations? >> i was as disturbing as anyone by the fact that this information. we have absolutely no incident of leakage. we have started an investigation, pulmonary investigation to try to determine exactly where the source was. >> do you have any discomfort

with communication strategies of the department that appears to be echoing these media testimonies and i will quote one from the secretary johnson. the red team testing at the aviation security network has been a part of the mission for 13 years. there are red teams at the vhs you're not going to be an unclassified is a terrifying the nature of your investigation that was linked, but i think that we have heard you clearly state your employees are mostly auditors. >> that's correct. can you tell us anything more about the classified and unclassified reports that you've issued since 2004 complex >> i can't give you an exact number. approximately a dozen is the best estimate of what we have done since 2004. we did a series of testing in 2011, with penetration testing

to determine the security of the so-called sterile areas being able to just move into the area without any sort of examination, covert testing for example carry-on luggage through the screening process. we have done with penetration testing of the machine as a sort of first generation machine which is different than the ones we've done it most recently as well as testing of the checked baggage process and that report was earlier this year. >> and are all of your investigation ultimately brief to the leadership of the dhs? >> yes. >> you said they disagreed with most of the record additions to the classified report and you concluded, and i quote, we believe this represents the failure to understand the gravity of the situation. can you explain what that means? berger for and ways that you can can give screening without actually having an application

and fee. we investigated those and wrote reports and making regulations that would eliminate those older abilities. we are sort of sitting at the water heads as we speak. >> do you think that they could have understood how great the problem was before last week's length report? >> it is the risk that they face. candidly, i worry about that. do you think the regular passenger screeners have no matrix that have to do with their success or failure rate at interdicting the

weapons? >> that is correct. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator. >> i want to thank the chairman and all of you for being here. i wanted to follow up on a couple of questions. first of all, to understand that we have not been getting the workers, the work force against the fbi database. then as i understood you saying that in fact we still are not able to fully do that because of actually an access code issue. they deal with the public in a variety of contexts and cannot in this context seems just mind boggling that it wouldn't have been in place already.

john: a little context of what list we are talking about. there is sort of a large list -- the terrorist identity in a market environment, which has information of individuals but verify an unverified. it is a broader list that is cold to the terrorist watch list. what tsa did not have access to a certain codes within that larger environment. again, some of this information is not substantiated. once tsa realized, i think around 2014, that they did not have this information, director pistol signed a letter asking for that. and it is now in that very agency environment in order to do it. we were able to in the course of our audit run 900,000 names against the database. as we sit now, i think we have some comfort in understanding what that environment looks like. in other words, the 73 individuals we believe as some

entirely of what was missed. we gave those names to tsa as soon as we discover them and i think they are following up on each of those. to the extent that there was a vulnerability, i believe it hasn't been closed, but it does give you pause that the situation was allowed to continue. sen. ayotte: it does give you pause because it really only takes one versus 73 in this context. as we sit here, even the fact that there is still a bureaucratic step that is being expedited, with this request being made by director pistol already in 2014, i just can't imagine that the fbi would not have moved on this with most haste that they could possibly move given especially your recent undercover findings. so i think that is something that we should follow up on.

it is a matter that bureaucracy cannot hold this up when it comes to basic betting that needs to be done. i also want to follow-up on the conclusion on what is being done with that. i was interested also to see director roaring referred to it as a pre-check being given out like halloween candy in your written testimony. i think that pre-check is a very important program for the public. to the extent that we do have a category of individuals that has grown as financially, that is being used, it may not go through the entire vetting process. if you could share with us what you are able to share here, what you think would be better in terms of some reforms for the pre-check process properly so we really are allowing the members of the public to use it that should and still maintaining a thorough vetting of the individuals that we should.

john: the basic principle behind pre-check is great because it is this idea that if you are known traveler, we have to spend less time on you then an unknown traveler. really bringing pre-check back to its paces warm -- basic form, which as we know who you are. we wrote this report. we briefed members of congress. there is propose legislation in the house of representatives called the security expediting screening act, which basically directs tsa to bring it back to what it used to be which is somebody looks at you and knows that you are a trusted traveler. as opposed to some of these risk roles that they are now applying. sen. ayotte: i also wanted to follow-up. we heard a lot of discussion today about the vetting process, but one thing -- because they also serve as the chair of the aviation subcommittee that has

been an issue is the badges. i want to fully understand from all of your perspective on the tsa's role in issuing badges. many of them are not being kept track of. that responsibility is left to the local airports. is this -- what would you assess in terms of this issue? is that a potential mobility -- boulder ability what recommendations you have on that front? to whomever would like to answer. jennifer: let me start by saying it is the airports is possibility. and our mechanism -- there are mechanisms at the airport level to make sure that badges can be accounted for. i believe that there is a trigger, like a 5% trigger of a servant -- certain number of badges that have been lost and they will all be rigid.

there are some controls in place, but i think it is an issue that wards additional attention. john: we are doing some work on that, given sort of the news that has been recently out there. sen. ayotte: we have had other incidents with the badges. it is a deep concern. john: we are doing field work right now in regards to that to be able to go to the site to figure out whether the airport authorities are appropriately and properly accounting for the badges, whether or not tsa is doing their oversight responsible be in a prudent way, and frankly doing some testing to see if we can get into secure areas and those kinds of things. jennifer: we also conduct tests

were we will call the airport and report that an employee has been terminated to determine how quickly they turned off the access according to the badges. rebecca: that was a special thing we did recently. when the badges were reported missing, the airport to turn off the access associated with a badge. sen. ayotte: i think all of you for being here. let me just say to chairman johnson's point. certainly the tsa agents that have interacted with on manchester at regular basis are very hard-working. putting together the right process for the people who art right to do this job effectively every day and making sure that they have our support, i think that's important. i think also ensuring that those agents that are doing well are empowered to do their job. i think that is part of a function here as well. so thank you all. sen. johnson: thank you, senator ayotte. senator mccaskill. sen. mccaskill: there is no evidence that you have that contracted tsa is cheaper or better, correct?

john: i do not, no. sen. mccaskill: and you are not aware that it exists? john: correct. sen. mccaskill: the magnetometer versus ait -- do we have numbers on speed of use on those two different devices? john: we have not done any work in that area. i know that tsa itself has metrics with regard to that, but i don't have that available. sen. mccaskill: i feel like i'm handcuffed because we do not have tsa here. i will request different tsa if it is available. it is very obvious to me because i'm always looking for ait. because i haven't been -- a knee. i either get someone to touch me a lot or i do a i.t.. so even if you do not know this unless you start asking, i go to the tsa pre-line and i go over to the ait machines. some airports immediately accommodate you and others say no you can't do that. every airport is a little different. some say that you get to leave

your shoes on and everything in when he go to the other live. if you have a tsa boarding pass, the tsa reporting pass with the. others are not -- you know. it is kind of a mess. i don't care as long as they get to go through this instead of this. about 50% of the time they have ait shutdown and i have to ask for them to open it. so they may have one sitting there. some airports don't even have one sitting there. it wasn't until very recently that they had some at the southwest terminal at reagan. i'm curious if your work has focused on this. maybe the marshall can speak to this, too. why aren't we keeping those ait machines going all the time at every facility? because we spent a lot of money on them. i know this is the whole thing of time versus safety.

and how quickly can we move people through, right? is that what it is? jennifer: yes. rebecca: it is much faster, but this is better security than going through a metal detector. a metal detector not detect one of the biggest threats unlike in ait. sen. mccaskill: what about those who don't know they have knees or hips and they do not know how much time the tsa will save if they go through the ait instead if they were to ask a guy ask. i am worried that they're letting me use it because in some of the airport simon, especially at home, they know who i am. and that is really wrong.

anyone with a hip or knee on to be told that they should go to the ait to save time and money and, of course, be more say. i want to keep following up on this. why can't we have more ait machines? well, because we're cutting the budget. we've got to remember as we all sit and pound the desk about how bad tsa is we keep cutting the amount of money that they have and we asked them to do more and do it better. clearly one of the issues is in fact resources and how many people are working. the times that i've gotten it to difficult conversations at people at airports about why ait is an open, they say, they don't have the staff. it takes more staff to read. we just don't have the staff to run it. i think that is also an issue. the marshals -- are you saying that now, mr. maclean, that they are preboarding marshals? have a change that -- they changed that? robert: it is hit or miss. it depends on when they are flying from. sen. mccaskill: i still see them preboarding. it is pretty obvious who they are. robert: the way it should be

done is that they should be boarded with the passengers. sen. mccaskill: by the way isn't that better security also? are they cope mingling with the passengers with more opportunities and eyes and ears to figure out who there might be on that plane who might be a problem? robert: correct. sen. mccaskill: when they get at the beginning of boarding and they go on, clearly they are not physically impaired. clearly they're not traveling with small children. now they are not in uniform, but they are usually in jeans. it's not like -- and they are sitting at strategic places on

the airplane when they get on. i do not understand why -- is this something that anybody can speak to? why do they think this is a good idea to put these people on ahead of time? robert: we cannot dictate what the foreign countries can do. sen. mccaskill: it is here the united states. robert: i'm not aware that. i understand that the air marshals have the 100% option to board with the passengers, but most of the air marshals now are flying long, long routes to places where they are mandated preboarding. so the janitor see them. the workers on the flight see them. sen. mccaskill: typically the planes i'm going on are not longer than two hour flight and they're getting on ahead of time. are they required to cominco? if you want to walk around the airport, a perfect place would be among the airport, waiting in

line with all the passengers. is there a reason? >> i could asking get back to you. >> it's nice not to wait. >> i can only speculate. they may not want to lose their overhead bin space. that is speculating. sen. mccaskill: especially when you are traveling an airline like southwest, which i travel frequently. >> southwest airlines, it is a free-for-all. sen. mccaskill: correct. i bet we could figure it out. >> that all depends on how smart the flight attendants are going

to run that operation. sen. mccaskill: i want to stay on the contractor versus employee -- would you all be willing -- it seems to me that you all ought to start putting in the audit in the report from gao, the budget for the year for which you are doing the work compared to previous years. i think everyone needs to understand that there is a price to be paid for us continuing to cut and cut and cut the domestic side of homeland security, the domestic side of our national protections. it is a problem we are seeing this year again, where we are going to create a $40 billion slush fund in the department of defense, but we are going to shortchange port security, airport security, cyber security, cia, fbi, all in the name of holding onto a ill-conceived sequestration number.

i think you should think about doing that. thank you. >> when we talk about resourcing, i do have to throw out the word prioritization. this will be the first of a series of hearings on tsa. senator baldwin: i appreciate you holding this valuable hearing. i want to thank our witnesses for being here to share your stories and your experiences. you raised the alarm on in adequate background checks. as you are stationed at the minneapolis st. paul airport where the chairman and i know many of our constituents fly in and out of on their way to other destinations, we appreciate your leadership. i wanted to follow up on the line of questioning of a couple of previous -- the line of questioning that a couple of previous centers went down -- senators went down.

with regard to tsa access to the terrorism related information in these databases and in particular the lack of access to certain code, i thought i heard you say earlier that there was a statutory impediment and then you indicated that it is in the process of being worked out bureaucratically between agencies. i want some clarity for our committee, as to whether we need to see legislation on this pushed through in an expedited fashion or whether this is on the verge of being resolved between agencies. >> thank you for the question. my apologies for the confusion. it is an administrative process done within the government itself. there is not a need for legislation. the access to that information

is not governed by statute. only if the committee that decides whether or not tsa refuses that access, there could be a statutory fix that may be needed. sen. baldwin: while i am on the topic of legislative or policy changes that we should be aware of, i think most of the testimony that i have heard points to leadership, points to management, points to following the rules already in place -- all of which the agency would have the authority to do, as it currently stands. please highlight for me is anything in your testimony that we should highlight -- pay attention to that require statutory change.

anybody? thank you. i wanted to have you speak a little bit further about this issue of performance metrics that are skewed towards timeliness rather than accuracy. i know you touched on this briefly in response to senator carper. can you elaborate more on performance measures that track wait time versus detecting explosives and how that affects safety and tso performance. >> thank you for the question.

when there is an excessive wait time and that is currently over 20 minutes in a regular land there is coordination of a report that requires a thorough analysis of the individuals, the training, or those called off sick unscheduled absences. there is a lot of focus and information that is needed to be gathered when we have excessive wait times. in terms of our monthly testing, we brief once a month and the result of the tests -- there is no metric associated with it. the test results are shared among screening management, but there is just no metric to focus on the detection rates and whether or not that would reflect badly on the scorecard. sen. baldwin: mr. mcclean, you

have brought to our attention a lot of information about the threat of ied's. given the failed bombing attack, the shoe bomber and the the test results are shared among screening management, but there is just no metric to focus on the detection rates and whether or not that would reflect badly on the scorecard. sen. baldwin: mr. mcclean, you have brought to our attention a lot of information about the threat of ied's. and certainly given the failed bombing attack of the shoe bomber and the underwear bomber, these sort of things, the evolving ability of terrorists to assemble miniature ied's and

remotely detonate them or as you described, the increased threat of larger ied's in the airport perimeter -- these are huge concerns. you have already commented a little bit further in the questioning. but how do you believe resources should be re-prioritized to better protect against these threats and, if you could elaborate a little bit more about the things you were talking about earlier in that capacity to help address this threat? mr. maclean: i am glad you asked. i really want to talk about it. once again if the pre-check is done well it reduces the time that the screeners need to focus on nonthreatening passengers. i would like to see those tso's who participate more and then the four points that i mentioned on the physical security implementation on the aircraft so that you can get more air

marshals on the ground. i love that thought -- these are not teams that i want down there ripping and arresting anybody that they see. this is purely trying to build rapport from the local authorities all the way down to janitors and cooks. for instance, you might have a cook that sees something every day, the same thing, but one time he reported it to his boss -- it might be some knucklehead who says, i don't have time for this, you are not a cop, quit playing cop. i have got better things to do. so he is frustrated. he barely speaks english. he does not want to go forward with it. but if there is that uniformed fiber -- viper guy if there is

that guy who has built their rapport for him, asked him about his family, is very interested in what he sees every day, he might come to him for something that is out of that ordinary. that little thing just may be that ied that air marshals are scheduled death to be stuck flying with. sen. baldwin: thank you. sen. johnson: thank you senator baldwin, senator langford. senator langford: thank you. millions of americans fly every day and they are very dependent on security. i appreciate what you are doing to help out the american people and that is extremely important. mr. roth, you repeatedly found that human error poses significant vulnerabilities. what do you attribute that to? systemic, training, management morale? mr. roth: i think it is all of the above.

you have an enormously large workforce. you are right, it is one of these things that you have to follow the sop every time. if you do not, that is where we find the vulnerability. senator langford: there is all kind of accountability built into the system for time. if you go past five minutes or 20 minutes, there was all kinds of accountability. is it the same kind of structure built-in for someone not following protocol? mr. roth: i am not aware of that. i will leave it to other witnesses. senator langford: have other folks seen that? or is it a time-based standard at this point? ms. roering: it is a time-based standard. but if our tso's do not follow sop, the agency treats that as a conduct issue. senator langford: sure. tsa agents and the department of homeland security has been terrible for morale as a whole. these are great folks. the people that i travel with

every week are terrific folks. extremely friendly, very engaged, they understand the value of what is going on they , are great folks. the morale seems to be bad time and time again and that does not help us as the traveling public. mr. roth, there have been ongoing issues with procurement with tsa, both getting equipment that is outdated, the wrong equipment, too much equipment and it is stored in a warehouse -- this has been an ongoing problem. is it getting better? mr. roth: it is hard to determine that at this point. certainly the kind of work we are showing this is a continual problem. we just did a report with regard to tsa maintenance contracts where it is about a $1.2 billion set of contracts over a set of four years in which tsa does not have the ability to understand whether or not routine maintenance is in fact being performed or whether they are

being billed for things that actually occurred. senator langford: basic sustainment. mr. roth: correct. senator langford: what is happening on the procurement side? vendors know there is a very large market. is there a good standard of improvement to say that this piece of equipment is 2% better? is that enough for a multibillion-dollar contract? how are the standards for procurement coming out to try to increase our effectiveness? mr. roth: certainly dhs-wise this is the emphasis that the , secretary is trying to professionalize the acquisition process within dhs. i cannot speak to how it is working on current acquisition projects, but it is something that frankly remains a challenge. i will say for example the ait machines, that is a single vendor. there is no real competition within the market for what is a very significant capital

purchase. senator langford: we have had a lot of conversations about pre-check and about how pre-check, you have had a million people who have gone through that process, but we have 7 million people that are now authorized to go through it at some point through other variations. do we need to change the name from pre-check to something else? we have a large number of people that are just being expedited through this process. and i getting that correct? mr. roth: go ahead. >> yes, that is correct. and particularly for people who are selected at the airport. these are not individuals who were previously identified as low risk. tsa's premise is that they are providing real-time threat assessment through the use of behavior detection officers and explosives detection. but we have raised concerns about the lack of effectiveness data on the bdo's. during the time of our review, we found that tsa was not consistently using the explosives trace detection as

their protocols called for so there is need for more attention to that. senator langford: if i remember the report correctly, basically, when they were evaluated for behavioral detection, it did not come out any different than random chance did. ms. grover: that is right. senator langford: that is not really pre-check. it is difficult to call the pre-check line when there is no check. part of it has gone through a vetting process and part of it is just random check. my understanding is that this is a faster process because they have done a more thorough background. i understand what you were saying before. there is great benefit to be able to help separate a huge set to blow the hay off the stack to find the needle, but we can't call it pre-check if it is no check and pre-check combined. mr. maclean: it border who apply

for century -- a border patrol agent who applied for century got denied because when he was a juvenile he got into a fight. he cannot have a century pass. maybe things are not being put together and implemented right. but i love the program. senator langford: i am good with the program. there are a lot of americans who are regular flyers. they want to to be able to go through the line faster, they -- in a pre-check type line. if it is pre-check, let us really have it pre-check. if they are a trusted traveler i have no problem with that. if we have folks randomly coming to the area and we are saying, you don't look like a terrorist -- that is not really pre-check. we have a line for that. we need to be able to evaluate. there are 73 people. and i know others have talked about this as well, 73 folks the aig reported where their code

was related to terrorism. i would assume that they would be on the no-fly list. these were individuals that tsa had allowed to go through the system as employees behind the perimeter. mr. roth: they would not necessarily be on the no-fly list. the tide list is a broad list of terrorist identities, some of which is verified or not verified. the no-fly list is a subsection of the larger list. senator langford: how quickly can that be corrected? where that record can be tied into tsa so they can have access to be able to look at both? mr. roth: i don't have that information with me. i know that the specific 73 names we did report back to tsa and they are taking action. senator langford: we don't know how fast they can take action? mr. roth: we don't. senator langford: we will follow up so we can sink all those lists together.

thank you. sen. johnson: a quick follow up on that. you are saying we do not need legislation and the authority already exists? it is just a matter of the will to do it? mr. roth: that is my understanding. sen. johnson: i want to summarize some things we have heard. we are basically trying to detect explosives or weapons. the failure with the ait's, we put those in place to try to detect explosives because metal detectors don't. we use the ait's. and now weapons are getting through. wouldn't a pretty simple solution be either two views through the ait -- i do not want to discuss where the failure is, but frontal and side view, as well as putting a metal detector on either side? that would be a relatively simple solution which would increase the rate of detection -- isn't that true? >> i would assume it would be for weapons. sen. johnson: with explosives, what work has been done with bomb sniffing dogs?

i have read some things i do not have right now that i can cite. bomb sniffing dogs are extremely effective. can anybody speak to that? mr. mclean, you are shaking your head. mr. maclean: i worked at a border patrol checkpoint. i was blown away with what a dog can sense. i have seen heroin wrapped in coffee, duct tape, saran wrap, hermetically sealed, and then dumped in a tank of gasoline and the tank is sealed and secure and the dog still hits on it. if they could do that with drugs, if they could do that with bombs, they are amazing. they are amazing creatures. miss roaring? ms. roering: currently, the regulatory program has oversight for the canine passenger screening program. i have witnessed the use of a decoy, where an individual would be carrying an explosive and the

dog was able to detect the explosive in every case with very favorable results to that program. ms. grover: tsa has about 800 canine teams total. they have been found to be effective. they are expensive. sen. johnson: so was the $7.2 billion we are expending on security theater. ms. grover: yes, sir. sen. johnson: i think security theater, to a great extent, does deter. i think we need layers, layers of defense. we need to think outside the box. we have got to think smarter. from my standpoint, if you've got a very high percentage, in terms of effectiveness of a bomb sniffing dog, i think that solution is pretty obvious isn't it? inspector general roth, can you speak to that? mr. roth: i think it is

important for tsa to look at all options and figure out exactly -- tsa to look at all options and figure out exactly what would work best. the reliance on technology has challenges. i would agree with you that they need to start looking at other things, as well. sen. johnson: as americans, we watch movies -- we always have a silver bullet, a solution, we are finding out that these technological solutions are failing at a very high rate. and so maybe we need to step back a little bit and go, what actually works? i would argue, the bomb sniffing dog -- they may be expensive but if we are not 100% effective, think of how expensive that will be. how expensive are these units? have you done a study on that? can you eliminate the community -- the committee on that? ms. grover: i believe that the startup cost is about $100,000 for the conventional canines and in the neighborhood of $220,000

for the passenger screening canines and an annual cost of about $60,000 per year for the conventional canines and about $160,000 per year for the other canine teams. sen. johnson: i would love gao to provide us with a report that takes those costs multiplies those times the number of teams we actually have to have full coverage at the u.s. airports. mr. maclean: every canine comes with an officer who has a keen sense of feeling people out, reading faces, building rapport, sometimes having a dog with you, people approach you or you become more approachable. sen. johnson: my point is what we are doing is clearly not working. and so we have got to think outside the box and look for different solutions. i do want to give you the opportunity, you are not able to tell your story of whistleblowing.