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>> tomorrow the road to the white house coverage continues. donald trump speaking in tampa, florida. fortat 4:00, a rally in myers, florida, with remarks from tim kaine. , hillaryphiladelphia

clinton speaking at a rally there. also expected, katy perry. >> how the media got smarter about calling elections. thank you for being with us. in the wake of that, they put their heads together and changed a few things. the first one was that they formed the national election pool. they hired a new pollster.

they pledged before congress that they would not call in election based on election poll results before the polls have closed. 1980, the network would call elections before the polls closed. the last thing they did, instead exit poll data to leak to newsrooms, to become available to reporters, the pressure to report is huge, they chose to put it into printing. the five big -- it into quarantine. the five big news outlets all send people, data analysts, to a room with no phones, no

computers, no tablets, they look at this election data all day long. they make sure it is robust before reporting back to their individual outlets. >> this all begins at 6:00 in the morning east coast time on election day and continues throughout the day. how does edison research to determine where they send canvassers? army of an incredible people. edison research sends out a thousand surveyors. ap has their own army of , aboutrs and members 4000 more people. between the two of those outlets, there is an anonymous number of people -- there is an enormous amount of people on the ground.

edison research is hired by the nationalts in the election pool comes up with the questions. -- it is a-page one-page questionnaire with two sides, 15 or 20 questions. at byere arrived committee. out to randomly selected precincts. it is an interesting difference. they will not choose key precincts, not necessarily in swing areas. that will be whatever data they get from there, the surveyors will talk to 100,000 people leaving the polls. that will be combined with telephone poll that edison researchs has conducted in the

last week. voted ons to learn who election day, but also why they voted the way they did? >> exactly. on the questionnaire, we do not exactly know what is on there, but we know every voter who is called ahead of time or he was they will be ask who they voted for, they will be asked why, they will be asked their general feelings about the major candidate and they will be asked about which issues are important to them. there are questions about debt, marijuana,thanasia, big topline issues. sincehave come a long way

1948. >> that is right. ,he chicago tribune headline dewey defeats truman. it is the specter that hangs over the media on election night. you do not want to screw it up that badly again. there is a very robust understanding, very profound feeling that this time, they have got to get it right. if there is a question, if it is they will not call it. >> we will look for your reporting online at time.com. thank you for being with us. >> thank you for having me. c-span, watch on

the results and be part of a national conversation. victory and concession speeches. starting live at 8:00 eastern. >> is longer trump -- ivanka nrump campaign for her father i nashua, new hampshire. hi, everyone. [applause] how is it going, new hampshire? unbelievable. i wanted to stop by. i just came from michigan.

publicouring an amazing charter school this morning, spoke at a rally. i wanted to stop by this office because i hear that you are crushing it. so much enthusiasm. really thank you so much. my father says it all the time that he is just the messenger and this is your movement. i think that is why we are doing so well here in new hampshire. tell my father he gets zero credit. it is you guys. you and i wanted to come by and offer my thanks and send our love. my father wanted me to specifically tell you how much he appreciates it.

i wanted to swing by and take some pictures with you as well. i want to meet you guys. it two or three at a time. that way, it is all organized. >> back up, as we discussed. we will let in a couple at a

time but we need to give her space first, please. i know you are first. >> we need to back up, that is the point. >> all very excited, i know.

[indiscernible]

>> that is not my call. >> we are not doing any one-on-one's. >> everyone, we will do one group shot from up here. we will take in a few at a time. we will get a few shots right now. >> ready?

>> great group, thank you. >> ok. here he go, everyone -- here we go, everyone. goodness. first trip, i love it. >> go ahead.

>> thank you for everything. >> hi. >> so much enthusiasm.

>> thank you. this is what i got for doorknocking. thank you very much.

>> i love your dad. >> thank you very much.

>> thank you so much. >> here we go.

>> hello.

>> how are you?

>> it is beautiful. thank you. thank you so much. i really appreciate it.

hello.

thank you so much. nice to meet you. after. a click awesome. [laughter] we are going to do this agian. got it? thank you. >> hi, how are you? keep up the hard work, thank you. [chatter]

hello. how's it going? what is your name? hi micah. thanks so much. get in here, come on. thank you so much, good to meet you. you and your brother are here, and you are far more popular than him. [laughter] hey, how's it going? good to meet you.

ivanka hello, how is it going? good to meet you. [chatter] good to meet you. i love it. it looks great. we saw it coming in. how are you? good to meet you.

great, thank you. that is incredibly nice. chatter] looking good. thank you so much. [laughter] >> i came all the way from mississippi. ivanka: oh my goodness. i love it. are you going to be here until the end? that is amazing. thank you so much.

[chatter] ivanka: come on up. hi, thank you. hi, thank you. chatter]

ivanka: thank you. hey, how is it going? come on in. thank you. hi, how are you? good to meet you. come on in. >> i have something to say. trump supporters are different. we talk back. ivanka: thank you.

how's it going? could you do me a favor and give me a hug? ivanka: that is so sweet. how cool. thank you. >> we have one more. ivanka: come on in. we will walk across the street. thank you. good to meet you.

>> thank you. >> hello, hi neighbor.

[chatter] >> alright guys, that's it. thank you. >> this was great. >> thank you. next, chelsea clinton speaking at eight hillary clinton rally in king state college in new hampshire. this is over 20 minute. s. [applause] chelsea: i want to thank keen for welcoming me so warmly. i want to thank everyone who spoke already.

think all of them demonstrate who is elected at every level of government, and why it's so important to turn up on tuesday so we can turn new hampshire blue up and down the ballot. [applause] i want to thank the more than 100 organizers, including emily, who are working so hard to do that. to support my mom, to support democrats up and down the ball ot. i want to thank the more than 12,000 people who volunteered in the state as part of my mom's campaign for knocking on over $6,000 and making you million phone calls. making 2000 doors and

million phone calls. our is done because we have -- isn't done because we have foru more days. really believe this is the most important presidential election of my lifetime. i am going to do everything i possibly can to make the case about why i think we both have to defeat donald trump and elect my mom. i think both of those are really really wasn't. -- really really important. i am deeply biased. [laughter] i make no claim to the contrary. as a mom myself, i hope my two kids are as proud to be my children as i am proud to the -- to be my mom's daughter. first and foremost this election is about my children and the country, world, and the future

that i want for them and their generation to grow up in. i want to share a few thoughts about what i think is at stake in this election. i love my mom too. and why i think we can't sit on the sidelines. goodness gracious, they can talk about whatever they want to talk about, and we will talk about whatever is actually at stake in this election. [cheering] i believe everything is at stake in this election. as you heard in the earlier speeches, everything is on the ballot. whatever it is that you care most about, it is on ballot. science is on the ballot effectively. college affordability, graduate

school affordability is on the ballot in this election. to make our own decisions is on the ballot in this election. whether or not we protect marriage equality and get to full equality is on the ballot. whether or not we raise the minimum wage is on the ballot is on the election. whether or not we finally get to equal pay for equal work. and something that matters a lot to me is that whenever my mom talks about the need to raise the minimum wage, she always talks about the need to get to equal pay for equal work for women, and also americans with disabilities. the only legalized discrimination that still exists in our country is that it is thosefor employers to pay with disabilities one third of the minimum wage. that is unconscionable in the

21st century. [applause] whether you care about any of those things that have already been talked about today, or whether you care about criminal justice reform, or gun violence profession, or addressing our heroin or opioid overdose, or the teenage suicide epidemic in a country, all of this is on the ballot in this election. my mother is the only person who has real plans to address the challenges that we face, and the only real record of working to address the challenges in those areas. sometimes i think i have a rather old-fashioned view. beyond the fact that i believe in science. and that what someone has done and stood for is a good indication of what they will stand and fight for and deliver on in the white house.

[applause] me, i'm going to do everything i can to talk to as many people possible about what is at stake in this election. forgetnever for going to the stories that bring this home to my heart. the stories that i care with me me thaty, that say to love trumps hate isn't just a slogan, and that "stronger together" isn't just a slogan. i was in pennsylvania september. in an event like this, i was urging people to vote. a woman said, can i share with you part of the reason i am supporting normal? -- supporting your mom? she says, i came from the u.s. from guatemala to graduate at

penn state. i came to go to graduate school because i thought if i got a graduate degree, i could provide a better life for my six-month-old son, maybe get a better job in guatemala, or get a job in the united states. andsays i got a job here, my son and i are proud american citizens. he was at school at the time she told me the story. he hadan two weeks ago, three people to limit his middle school "go back to mexico"or "i can't until we build a wall to keep people like you out." i was shaking hands in north carolina urging people to vote. a little girl grabbed my hand and said "your mom must win." and i agreed. [applause] but why? i have a lot more than two reasons, but what are your reasons? >> one she said, it is time for

a girl. and then she looks at me and says something that broke my heart -- she said well, she also has to win because the boys in my school says that if donald trump wins, my dad will have to go back into the closet, and there are monsters there. i said we are not going to let that happen. when we say our children mostly, that is not rhetorical. the trump effect, the rise in bullying is painfully real. i thankfully have lost count of the number of stories i have heard from them people who told me they knew they had health insurance because of the children's health insurance program,a nd that it literally saved their lives. it enabled them to have the 5 surgeries they needed. or to get the chemotherapy they needed for their leukemia. whothe young people i met

were adopted out of the foster care system because of my mom's work to overhaul adoption and to make it easier for qualified foster parents to adopt their foster children. or that young people i have met who know their parents who are 9/11 first responders are still getting health care because of my mother's work. or the government that i met -- or the young woman that i met was a graduate of headstart and hartford, and knew that my mom had led the effort to double federal funding for head start programs, and she was a recipient from the. that is the type of president that i want her children. -- i want for our children. the just of the job is, what can you do to expand opportunities for more people? i could not imagine a clear contrast. i am deeply biased towards my mom.

because i couldn't imagine a better grandmother for my children. but truly a stronger contrast between someone who has spent, with all respect to her opponent, a lot longer than 30 years in public service. a real record of delivering better schools and health care and opportunities for more people. someone who has only been interested in -- when i think about what is at stake election, i think everything is at stake. i was listening to the earlier speeches, and the underlying theme is that it is just not an option to stay on the sidelines. since we are on a college campus , you would not let someone take out what classes you are taking a semester. you would not let someone out what you are going to wear next tuesday, so why will honor would

you let someone else decide the future of our country? or the future of your state or your community? [applause] so please, whatever issue you care most about, whether that is higher education affordability, whether that is protecting and improving on the affordable care act, whether it is putting teachers back at the center of respecting education, whether that is actually recognizing that climate change is a real threat and a real opportunity. whether that is indigenous rights. my mother has had an indigenous council since-- ma'amoing to respond since you did something. she has had an indigenous council since the first day of her campaign. she absolutely believes we need to honor indigenous rights. she believes it is not only

about water rights and the environment, but fully investing in the indian health service. [applause] ensuring that communities in general are at the center of self-determination. that should be true for indigenous communities. across ouranywhere country. i argue that represents a clear difference between my mother and her opponent. in some ways i think that makes the perfect place to close. no, i don't mind. you can raise your-- oh, and i am responding yes ma'am. this can be interactive. you can shout. i'm not going to shout back because i am not a shouter. i am happy to respond. i would hope that it would matter because my mom had an

indigenous council from the beginning of her campaign, that she has a platform to address climate change, to address indigenous rights. and that can't only see indigenous rights through the prism of climate change and when rights, is important as all of those are. we have historically underfunded indian health service, schools, and we need a president who understands all about. i never heard donald trump talk about any of that. so i would say, whether this is what you care most about, or whether you care most about anything that has been discussed here, or hasn't been discussed here today, please use the to drive you to the polls. or however bike, you get to the polls. we don't want to wake up november 9 and feel that we

could have done more. this is truly the future of our country. i see so many people that are not yet old enough to vote. if you need another reason, think about the stories that i shared, and the stories you may have heard about the kids who are being bullied. think about the kids you may know in your own life, and what you hope and want for them. election, ultimately is about the future. i did not know i could care any more intensely about politics. i spent a lot of time at events like this in my life. thank you for uploading for that. -- upon for that-- advocating, participating. now as a parent, this feels so intensely personal to me. i know many of you clearly feel

the same way, otherwise you would not be there. anything you can do over the next four days, talk to your friends, families, strangers about what is at stake. whatever it is you care about, because you share today, or care in your heart. we have to win, and we have to turn in new hampshire blue from the top of the ticket. thank you for everything you have done and will do in the next four days. [applause] ♪

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[chatter] >> tomorrow, c-span's road to

the white house coverage continues in northeastern with donald trump, speaking at eight campaign rally in -- at a campaign rally in tampa, florida. a rally in fort myers, florida with remarks from senator tim kaine of virginia. 8:00 p.m. eastern, philadelphia with hillary clinton speaking at a rally there. also expected, singer katy perry. that is tomorrow on c-span. >> election night on c-span.

watch the results and be part of a national conversation about the outcome. be on location of the hillary clinton and donald trump election headquarters, a nd watch victory and consistent just starting live at 8:00 p.m. eastern and the following 24 hours. watch live on c-span, c-span.org, or listen to our live video -- live radio coverage using the c-span raido app. >> the discussion about the impact on the 20 16th elections on the fight against isis. among those speaking, the former iraqi ambassador to the united nations. this is an hour and a half. >> good afternoon, welcome to the hudson institute. my name is mike karen, i'm a senior fellow.

we welcome you today to talk about the u.s. election, and the future of iraq. i am very honored to have with us a distinguished panel. , a seniordiate left fellow at the atlantic council, and the director of the council 's future of iraq program. a former iraqi ambassador to the united nations. the founding director of the indiana university center for the study of the middle east and a fellow of the american academy of arts and sciences.

to his left is a senior fellow at hudson. he has recently returned from iraq from the front lines. mike was an intelligence officer in iraq, and has recently come back from the front lines. without further ado, i will turn it over to mike to give us a sense about what he found during his trip in iraq. mr. pregent: i told my peshmerga general in 2005 to show me the lines -- did not do it additionally, but another kurdish commander to agree to the front lines to show me what was going on. this panel is about how iraq is looking at the u.s. election. what i want to emphasize is it's not like looking at next week on

tuesday, it is what they are looking at the day after inauguration day. they are looking at january 21. what they are concerned about is what the next pdds look like. the mosul operation supposed to wrap up ahead of inauguration day. it is a political timeline set by a president obama and the prime minister of baghdad. that rush has me concerned, has the peshmerga concerned, has a lot of iraqis concerned in that ramadi was not a successful operation to defeat isis. fallujah was not a successful operation. to create was not -- tikrit was not a successful operation.y et each is touted on how to do it right. ramadi is not secured. the minimal force that iraq left behind is dealing with a resurgence, isis attacks.

look at mosul, and you look at a population center of 1.2 million, with an approaching force of 30,000, noted, part of that 37 is an unsanctioned force told not to participate by the prime minister and the united states. it is not listening to us and not listening to the prime minister. those are the shia militias controlled by the irgc. when i say that, bullseye that is not true. looking at the two commanders, one is the bonner corps commander, the second is a designated terrorist who leads hezbollah. and then you have another leader of his designated terrorist "league ofn, called

the righteous." they said that the mosul operation isn't about liberating from isis, but to avenge what happened working hundred years ago. -- happened 1400 years ago. the comparison i can make between the 2007 search and this isis strategy today. i was on the ground during the surge and i recently came back. at no time have we allowed or been part of, meaning supporting, a military force half-life sectarian flags was a sunni town. that is what happens today. when you look at the next 80 days, we should be concerned havethe parties that don't the mission of securing the population believe they have 80 days to do as much as they want. this is also in syria.

they literally believe they have 80 days to as get as much as they can, and wait and see what happens with the u.s. election. i won't go into the specifics, but we talked about that this morning. interesting polling numbers, of iraq that is not so much as they prefer, they just want somebody to do something about it. 67 percent prefer hillary trump, but% prefer both believe they will do something different from the obama administration. this current strategy is working -- is important. -- isn't working. the first priority should be defeated isis. the third should be reconciled with your iraqi sects. that is not the priority list.

right now you have competing entities in mosul. you have the turks concerned going after sunni turkmen. they are prepared for that. you have the turks concerned about kurdish expansion into mozilla. you have shia militias worried about kurdish expansion you have the iraqi government concerned about kurdish expansion. the only thing we have to worry about in the most operation is kurdish expansion. they are taking blocking positions. mr. doran: they will not be going into mozilla because they are more concerned about kirkuk. of have pmf's, a force 100,000 iraqi shia. there are some sunnis in there. are joining this movement believe they are doing

the right thing. they want to go after isis. the leadership has other intentions. the leadership is focusing on winning in 2018, getting .everage over baghdad rejectingers are abadi's call. they have threatened not only to participate, but to attack american advisers. that is concerning. ,hile i was on the front lines i saw militia flags flying into sectarian flags flying. officer fromaqi him is that ha shem al shabby and he says no, that's the iraqi army. so it's not just the militias carrying these flags, the iraqi army are carrying these flags and every organization from cnn

to bbc to al jazeera, anybody who's covering this war, every time they say the iraqi special operations forces are entering mosul and having success ignore the flags in the video they're showing, and and they should pay attention to it because baghdadi s pay attention to it. he just put out a call to everybody in mosul that the militias are coming. the sunni population is paying attention to it because they saw what happened in ramadi, in fallujah, they saw what happened. if you pull a person from ramadi, you'll find they are waiting for the reconstruction money to come in, they're waiting for their city -- at least the semblance of a beginning to rebuild the city, they distrust baghdad more than ever. they distrust united states more than ever. we are simply resetting the conditions that led to isis to begin with in this operation in that these towns aren't being liberated. they're being laid to ruins.

the population is being expelled , and the strategy, there's such a low benchmark for success in this campaign that the strategy, to me, feels like as long as you can replace an isis flag with an iraqi flag, you're finished. as long as you can do that in city center, you are done. that's not how you defeat an organization. the united states military never went into a town one time and claimed success. we learned in fallujah in 2004 and 2005 that you cannot destroy a city and expect to kill al qaeda, we just angered it, pushed it somewhere else and it came back with a vengeance. it wasn't only when we tried to build temporary trust between the sunni population and baghdad with the u.s. being a guarantor that we were able to defeat al qaeda through sunni intelligence sunni manpower. the same thing is happening now. if you pay attention to the mosul operation, you have sunni residents sharing intelligence

with the peshmerga, with the iraqi army on isis locations, you have 300,000 sunni military people in mosul. that's a conservative number based on 1.2 million people being in mosul that have not joined isis, and that isis feels is a threat. if this operation pushes them to a position where they feel this invading force isn't there to liberate them, but to punish them much like mosul, fallujah and tikrit, then we're likely to see something very ugly that may be called success in the press, may be called success in this administration that will lead to a resurgence of some kind, whether it's isis 2.0 or isis morphing into an al qaeda model. i'm probably over time so i'll stop. mr. doran: that is great. before i pass the microphone to the ambassador i'm going to summarize what i heard you say in four points and you can tell me if i got it right or not. point number one, everybody on the ground is trying to improve their position before the new

administration comes in under the expectation that the new administration is going to do something different and they want to position themselves to influence an administration as best as possible, number two, we have -- we, the united states, have no vision for the political -- for the post-conflict order that will follow the expulsion of isis. number three, we are unwittingly handing mosul and more broadly iraq to the iranians and number four, we are alienating the sunnis in such a way that we have laid conditions for a return of isis as the defender of the sunnis. do you disagree with anything i just said? mr. pregent: no. i'm glad you summarized it that way, it makes more sense than what i just said. what you said made great sense. the thing is, i'm taking a warning position based on what i've seen in the past, indicators, and trends, and i

respectfully hope you can moderate my comments if they were too alarmist. i'm concerned this is a political timeline, not a timeline to defeat isis, but a political timeline to claim success and then move to syria. look over your left shoulder and you'll see you haven't done anything in iraq to defeat isis , you simply tell isis that it's not wise to put up an isis flag in a city and claim it as yours unless you can shoot down american aircraft. that's the biggest lesson learned so far in this campaign. mr. doran: thank you, and with that let's pass it over to the ambassador, thank you for being here, we appreciate it. well, thank you very much for moderating and i want to thank the hudson institute for the invitation to speak here again. i particularly want to thank michael prejean for organizing the imagine and as well as to thank all my colleagues on the panel. let me look at it, if i may, from the perspective of what i

think are in iraq's interests. we've been asked to speak for a relatively brief period of time. i'm a former trial lawyer and i usually can't clear my throat in 10 minutes but i'll see what i , can do. [laughter] i think one of the biggest mistakes that the united states made in circa 2011 was its complete disengagement from iraq. i don't mean necessarily the withdrawal of troops, that's a more subtle question dealing with the -- i mean, i do wish the united states had maintained troops there but i also understand it from the perspective of the iraqi government refusing to give immunity to american troops and all that. that's a discussion i don't want to have at this moment, i'll get into it in questions and answers , but i mean the intellectual disengagement and the sort of disengagement at the ground level. so that you could treat iraq as

a sort of -- the same way you might have diplomatic relations, say, switzerland. has been the strategy that, if that is the work that has , been the policy in in case for too many years since. that is to say that while iraq is an independent state, and there are certain issues you don't interfere in with respect to independent states so if the , then prime minister of iraq comes to the oval office and tells the president of the united states that i intend to proffer charges of terrorism against the highest ranking sunni in iraq, the proper response for two states dealing with one another is "well, that's an internal issue and we have no opinion on that" which is, of course, precisely what happened. it was easily predictable and

many predicted that we were going to head down the road over , although the spectacular success of isil i don't think anybody predicted. but that we were going to head down a road that would result in at least circumstances that are akin to 2005 and 2006, and that unfortunately is where we ended in the summer of 2014 with the fall of the city of mosul in half a business day, iraq's second-largest city, the population of 1.8 million. as mr. pregent said, the u.s. has not policy for the political dispensation in iraq after isil. i'm not talking about the narrower important but narrower , issue of who governs in mosul and nineveh, governed after the fall of isil, that was an important question. but i'm talking about the broader strategic question of

, what does iraq look like? the united states has been focused like a laser beam on the narrow issue of defeating isil militarily in iraq. but not for the political future of the country, and i think that's largely been through throughout the obama administration. perhaps even before the obama administration. so iraqis i think, have a fairly good sense, an excellent sense of what it is we are fighting against. i think we don't actually know what we're fighting for. and i hope that as the -- obviously within the next few days we will know who the next president of the united states will be, i hope that comes up to a very high level of importance in terms of middle east policy, iraq policy. iraqis have some decisions to make.

do we, in fact, want to live in a united country? and if we do, what does that mean. do we want regionalism? do we want the kurdistan regional model multiplied throughout the country? do we want, in fact, a true federation. inherent in all of this is the kurdish question which has been raised although not lately by the president of the krg. we have multiple opportunities over the past two and a half years, the president of the krg has talked about a referendum on independence. fair enough, i think most iraqis would concede if they have a right.

the problem is not that the problem has been that the kurds have neither quite been in nor quite out of the country and , this is untenable. if they want their independence, fine, if not, i think that we need to be in a position where all factions actually begin to come together build a cohesive state, which we do not have now . and i think that is something that the united states ought to press. i have two broad voice i want to make before i get off the floor. i thinkhe priorities -- there's be something is unspoken i know that i haven't articulated yet and let me do so so expressly. former u.s. ambassador to iraq ryan croccer once said that the americans are hard wired into

the iraqi political system. and i agree with him. many positive things have occurred when the united states has engaged with the iraqi political system. too many negative things have occurred when it has not done so. there are many reasons for this that i don't have time to get into in my main remarks, but would be happy to talk about later if it comes up. so it's in that spirit that i'm making all of my remarks. one of the things i think that the new u.s. administration ought to make an issue that i think is vitally in iraq's interests and that is the management of iraq's relations with its neighbors. iran's influence and physical presence in iraq must be reduced. i know that's very easy to say, much harder to do given the histories of the governing political parties in the country.

the physical presence of turkey in iraq, a nato ally, after all, hopefully the united states still has some influence there, that simply is not acceptable. it is simply not acceptable to have a foreign head of state insisting he has a right to intervene in iraq as a protector of a group in iraq, that simply isn't tolerable, no iraqi government can tolerate that sort of interference and it's extremely destructive -- it's an interference which is extremely destructive of the ability of the iraqi political class to come to a meeting of the minds as they used to say in the law of contracts. i'm a strong believer in a line

from the poem by robert frost that strong fences make good neighbors, and at least since 2003 we've ripped down all of the fences. this is actually one of the consequences, the disillusion of the iraqi army and security forces that we have paul bremer to thank for. that particular gift continues to pay dividends. more than 12 years after ambassador brehmer left iraq. and we have to balance our relationship with saudi arabia. a policy should be -- it amuses me to put in the these terms because turkey is clearly abandoned the motto, but it has to be the motto of peace at home, peace abroad.

we must strike a balance between its three more powerful neighbors. we have tilted too far in the direction of bahrain in my view, we need to values between riyadh and uncle. ankara.n't, -- and if we don't, then our regional neighbors will continue to find ways of balancing against iran's outsized role in iraq. if the iraqi political class has not learned that lesson, there will be very little room for hope or optimism, it seems to me. iran's role in iraq will always be destructive. iran will always want a weak iraq. it doesn't matter who governs in iraq. if hamanahi's son became the prime minister of iraq it will be in iran's interest for iraq

to be weak. i'm not saying we want the chaos on their border that we have had tensed 2014. the last point i'll make -- and i have gone over my time, i apologize -- is that the pmus and militias have to be disbanded after the military operation is over. that is much, much easier said than done. i am told -- we'll see if this happens, that after mosul is liberated from isil to expect a fatwa from the grand ayatollah al sistani thanking the rank and file of the pmus and telling them they need to go home. as mr. pregent said, the leadership of the pmus have entirely different ideas, but i have to say, to the extent that we maintain sectarian and

nonconstitutionally based militias, and allow them to roam freely, i couldn't agree more when when jesus we are setting up the conditions for isil 2.0, 3.0 and 4.0, we have to look to rebuilding a state of iraq. that is probably harder to do now in 2016 than it might have been in -- first of all, there was no excuse for disbanding the state of iraq in 2003 in the first place, but i don't get to turn the clock back. it's probably harder to do now than in 2003 because there was no trust among the political elites in 2003, there is less trust now than there was then, are not toital if we continue in this cycle, this sort of vortex increasingly descending at greater and

greater speed into a morass from which it will be impossible to return. if we break apart under these circumstances we're far more likely to break into a somalia state of kurdistan, shi'a stan and sunni stan. and that should focus the minds of the planners of the next administration wonderfully. thank you and i'm sorry i went over my time. mr. doran: thank you, and at the risk of doing injustice to all that he said if i could turn it , into one piece of advice for the next, president, whoever that might be. it would be that they should see the role of the united states as fending off the external players, especially iran, but iran, turkey and saudi arabia to iraqisa space in which can work out their problems with each other without foreign intervention. that would be the number one

priority, or have a got that wrong? mr. istrabadi: no, that is the number one priority but second and very closely to it is that the united states must actually also engage the political players inside iraq to help to facilitate, not dictate the term s. but facilitate the process that notice vivendi -- modus vivendi. we have not had a modus vivendi since 2003. and certainly obviously the constitution which i think has been a failure did not provide such a modus vivendi. so we need to rethink a working, functioning state in a very, very tough neighborhood. there is the external component, but there has to be an external component. mr. doran: thank you. the floor is yours and these have put some provocative theses

on the table for you to address. ms. younis: thank you very much. one of the things that's been interesting about looking at the iraqi media coverage of the u.s. presidential elections has been that the coverage has been very, very sparse. and actually there's been a lot less interest and engagement in iraq as compared with other countries in the middle east in this election. and the reason is that iraqis don't know what to expect from either a trump or clinton presidency. they don't understand how the two possible administrations will differ from the obama administration, and how they will differ from each other. so that's kind of the first obstacle when iraqis are really looking at this election and trying to figure out what they think and what their opinion is. actually, the foreign policy platforms of these two candidates have been very, very

unclear, and where they have been pushed they've been pushed , on the syria issue and very rarely asked about what they would do differently in iraq. this has partly been played by the obama administration with president obama trying to wrap up the liberation of mosul in a neat little bow to end his presidency with a bank, which is not really how counterinsurgency works. but he keeps giving the impression he's dealing with iraq, and iraq will be done by the time he leaves office. it's not at all the case but it has rather left the other candidates off of the hook when it comes to explaining what their plan is for stabilization and for continued counterinsurgency operation. because the liberation of mosul is not the end of this and we really haven't heard a strategy from either candidate as to what they are going to do once they

reach office. and of course the iraqis are super conflicted about this because they also don't know what they want the u.s. to do. a lot of disagreement in iraq. on the one hand, there's a lot of appreciation for the u.s. assistance in driving out isil , and there's a pretty wide consensus that iraqis do want continued u.s. assistance to drive isis out of iraq and certainly once isis is driven out of these territories, as has been our focus, you know, i think u.s. assistance will continue to be appreciated in tackling the inevitable insurgency that is likely to dominate iraqi cities after the formal liberation takes place , but beyond that, the problem in iraq is that there is an incredible iranian capture of the iraqi media.

it's less insidious than it sounds. it's just kind of -- you know people seeking to exercise soft influence over tv presenters, donations to tv channels, you know, there's a lot of relationship building that's happened, and there's a lot of persuasion that takes place and it means that the kind of iranian narrative on what u.s. intentions are in iraq is very pervasive. the united states does an absolutely terrible job of public diplomacy, of talking to the iraqi public about what its intentions are, what its goals are, what the game plan is, what it's trying to achieve, right? and the fact that it's not trying to steal iraqi oil or be in kokomo, or stay in iraq

forever, or use this as an excuse for some other nefarious geopolitical reason. we have to be able to effectively counter the kind of iranian driven narratives that come out of the iraqi media , because the iranians are engaged, and we are not. engaging with iraqi media is not that difficult. that's something we could be doing that we're not doing and as a result there's such a murkiness in the iraqi public consciousness about what level of u.s. engagement they want and how comfortable they are with it and what kind of time scale they want to see that continued engagement. i think u.s. policy could really benefit from a clear, sustained articulation of what our long-term strategy is in iraq , and i think there's very clear things that we could be doing beyond the liberation of mosul , and the next administration when it comes into office should really look at these key points.

so number one we will not defeat isis when we liberate mosul. we need to have a strategy for continuing to partner with iraqi security forces and especially with iraqi intelligence to help to train them and build their capacity to conduct long-term penetration of extremist networks. not just to show up in a sunni village and chuck everyone in prison, that's not defeating a counterinsurgency in the long term. you want to be building up real capacity to disrupt the financing networks, to disrupt the ied assembly networks and sourcing of those materials that are needed to assemble car bombs. they need to be effectively and systematically tracing the remaining networks that will go underground and that will keep

isis alive in iraq to potentially for many years to come unless we offer the kind of support to the iraqi intelligence services that will be needed to effectively defeat this group once it's disappeared back into iraqi towns and cities. that's something we can offer, those are skills that the iraqi intelligence sources know that they need, know that they're lacking and that they respect from the american side. they want those skills to be coming from the americans and that's something we can concretely offer, and say that our goal is to help support the iraqi state to eradicate terrorism. that's something we can do and that's not something that's on a presidential election timeline. as long as it takes, as long as the iraqis need that support. the other thing that's going to be needed is the united states will not to act as a buffer and it doesn't want to play this

role. but between the iraqi kurds and baghdad. during the war against isis , iraqi kurdistan has extended its territory by about a third, has seized almost all of the territories that were previously disputed between the krg and and there's a real risk that the iraqi shiite militias will once mosul is liberated , will turn their guns against , the peshmerga and try and retake kirkuk. there has to be a mediated diplomatic settlement to these territorial conflicts. we cannot afford to see iraq now having just retaken territory from isis but not tackled the root causes of the insurgency.

we can't afford then to suddenly be distracted by this kurdish iraqi war over territory. and the united states is the power with the relationships, with the clout, with the international standing to be able to prevent actors from acting in an unrestrained way in this battle over disputed territory and to initiate a credible internationally respected process for mediating these territorial disputes. that's day one after mosul is defeated. we need to make sure that we're getting -- that, you know, the peshmerga and the iraqi counterterrorism forces and the federal police and the iraqi security forces are working so eautifully together to defeat mosul/ and then the day after we need to get these forces away from each other and out of the disputed territories so that we can avoid that conflict from happening.

the other great risk is that the shiite militias have in many sections of the iraqi population , become very popular for defending iraq against terrorism and, you know, it's partly a function of how unpopular minute stream iraqi politicians are for the incorrupt -- being corrupt, and performing poorly. we have eventual elections next year and parliamentary elections that you're after, and there's a very real risk that pretty hard-line parties could do very very well in those elections and i think something else the united states could be doing is helping to support moderate accommodationist inclusive iraqi leaders who are capable of delivering some of the kind of political compromises that are needed to bring about a genuine

reconciliation in iraq, and are needed to address the root causes and drivers of extremism in iraq. to help them to better connect to their constituencies. to better deliver on what their constituencies are demanding and to remain credible political actors in the face of what promises to be a genuine political threat from a pretty hard-line set of groups that are likely to set the reconciliation agenda way back. it's something we can help to tackle just by helping moderate political actors to perform better because they're underperforming so, so woefully right now. and the final thing that the united states can do and can articulate is that they can

continue to act to rally global supporters together to help with the reconstruction of liberated areas. what we don't want to see is these liberated areas that have been devastated by air strikes and by the military campaign and by the ieds left behind by isis. we don't want to see these devastated areas, most of them are sunni areas. we don't want to see a second class or an underclass of iraqis living in very deprived economically deprived areas kind of cut off really from the political system, and creating the conditions where radicalism thrives. we want to reintegrate these areas as quickly as possible back into the rest of the country. we want to get basic infrastructure set up, economic opportunities, education and that requires resources the iraqi government is struggling to find at a time of low oil prices.

the united states has done a good job but can really continue to take a leadership role in -- invest in the sablization and reconstruction of areas liberated from isis and i think those elements constitute a real vision for medium to long-term engagement in iraq. a genuinely positive one, that's helpful, it's something a lot of iraqis could buy into and help them make sense of what an american role would look like and what it means and why it's something that would be of benefit to them. mr. doran: thank you for that. i wonder if i could ask you one question to clarify your position with respect to the other two panelists. i heard you say that the -- that the iraqi media has been penetrated by the iranians and that there's a tendency to adopt

the iranian line on what the united states is up to. but i didn't hear you wave the flag of concern about the role more broadly of iran in dominating or extending its influence over iraq that we heard from your colleagues. do you share their concern? is that a major concern of yours or are you seeing things a little differently? ms. younis: i am someone who believes that iran extends its influence where there is a vacuum and where the political costs are relatively low. we have made operating in iraq a very easy low cost high reward political exercise for the iranians iranians and once we , articulate our strategy for engagement and we offer something to our iraqi partners on the ground and say, hey, we're not just going to turn around and leave in six months

and leave you in the lurch, we're real partners who are offering a sustained alternative. you know, there are many iraqis who have great antipathy towards iran and worry about the level of iranian penetration and about what iranian interests are in iraq, but balancing against iran is very difficult when there isn't -- when you don't see a partner for balancing against iran with. and i think if we offer the united states as an alternative , and we make clear that hey, we're around not just for five minutes, we'll be here and we've got your back, you can afford to be critical, and you can afford pursue your policies without fear of iran. i think the opportunity is there. i don't think the iranian role in iran should be something that scares off the united states from engagement. mr. doran: and so you are broadly in agreement with the

ambassador that the job of the united states is to hold the ring around iraq and to help the iraqis mediate between them as they solve their own problems. ok, well thank you very much. mike, if i can come back to you, i think we've got a lot of agreement -- more agreement than i expected to hear in general picture of what the -- what the challenge is for the united states. i think there's also agreement with -- dr. younis made me realize there's broad agreement between the iraqi people and the american people, that we're completely bewildered as to what is election will hold. it seems to me that if we were to follow the average viewer, this is being broadcast by c-span and the average american watching this is going to be listening to this advice and

saying, what's the cost to the united states? what's the cost in dollars? what's the cost in military commitment? and one of the big takeaways that we have over the last decade is that the desire among the americans to shoulder these costs is much less than some of us would have expected. with that thought in mind, could you talk to us? is there a way the united states can play the role that's being outlined here without a george w. bush-style reengagement with 100,000 or 130,000 u.s. troops? mr. pregent: i think the most important thing is it's not the cost of the operation. let's say we went big and spent a lot of money on this. it would mean nothing if we announced we're leaving in six months. you can't build trust and relationships by saying you're going to do something and then

leaving in six months. so i would associate trust and belief in what we're saying. i'd weigh that higher than any cost. so to the american people if you're watching this, the if we don't address the iranian influence in iraq, we should just stop now because we're simply facilitating. i don't want to say the iranian takeover of iraq, but we are partnering with militias not but the ddrrm, process which is so important, that's disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating these factions . like sistani will call for after mosul is liberated to reintegrate the militias, they won't stand out. they're going to be brought into the iraqi security forces. i would argue that that doesn't work because that was done in 2005 when we brought in the badr core and the sixth and ninth

iraqi army divisions. the division coming from the north into most is from fact that. -- from baghdad. they don't know the neighborhoods and will be rejected by the population, and is the securing force afterwards. none of this works unless there is a commitment to be that long-lasting partner in iraq. when you look at iraq, there's three consistent foreign policies in the region. russia has the same foreign policy position it's had for 30 years, iran has the same position and the kingdom of saudi arabia has the same position. i'm sure turkey may have the same position as well. the u.s. position changes based on who is in office. i've been told multiple times talking to iraqi sunni tribal leaders and peshmerga leaders that you're in a better position to be an enemy of the united states than a friend of the united states.

you have more leverage as an enemy than as a friend. that's very concerning. as the iraqis look at the u.s. election, we should also look at the provincial elections of 2008 and of 2018 and 2017. the militias believe they have a mandate, they believe they are -- they protected baghdad, they kept baghdad from falling to isis. the media supports that narrative, they're operating outside government control. if a body criticizes them, they have been replaced. they are going into the mosul operation because they want to. they need to be part of the liberation of mosul to claim success that it was because of them that isis was defeated. we need to be watching the iraqi election, because that election is going to either get us back into iraq to defeat the second and third iteration of isis or

to basically go into northern iraq to protect the northern iraqi populations from what's coming from the militias. when i talked to a peshmerga general that said we can defeat daesh, but isis is being kept alive. they are concerned that the shi'a militias are there to areas.kirkuk and other because theyrning carry the iraqi flag so if the , peshmerga fire on them as they approach, it's treasonous. they're firing on forces carrying the iraqi flag. next to that iraqi flag is also a militia flag or a religious flag that sends a message to students, that we are coming not as liberators but we are coming to demonstrate we have primacy now.

the message is not only to sunni iraqis, but to the peshmerga and the kurds as well that we are coming to take back what we want . this is what you hear from the leadership of these militias, foot guys.the they think they are doing some thing that is noble and right. mr. doran: you think we could frustrate those aspirations with a relatively light commitment of troops? if i hear you correctly, you are saying that the key is the political commitment and political consistency. and that that alone will have a beneficial effect as to the significant commitment of troops. mr. pregent: i'm concerned about our footprint right now. 5,000 americans are in iraq and 100,000 shia militia members are in iraq, led by the same people

that targeted americans five years ago. they made these threats. i don't think we can do the leverage part where we start to curb or reign influence, try to get militias to stand down without putting our current footprint at risk of being targeted. mr. doran: so the 5,000 troops we have there are hostages in a , or potential hostages if iranian policy were to change. mr. pregent: our footprint is constraining our ability to go after isis. mr. doran: at the risk of putting you on the spot, how many troops -- mr. pregent: 30,000 iraq's and syrians. mr. doran: we're talking a commitment of 60,000 troops. mr. pregent: doesn't have to all u.s..s., just a nato-led, led force, becaus i don't think iraqe once it to be russia-led.

it instantly a strong nato-led force that has the ability to say no, to put pressure on backup, to say no to iran and actually say we're here to give you the political space to reconcile with your community so that you don't have these fanatic-type organizations to come in and unseat otah and vintage of a disenfranchised population that's being oppressed by its central government. we have that in damascus, baghdad. it's a recipe for isis, a recipe for instability. when have you a sunni population center that used to look to the left and say americans are here to help us and now look to the , west and site why are you doing -- west and say, what are you doing, turning to the position in syria and iraq? mr. doran: thank you for that. mr. ambassador, do you agree with mike that the united states can fulfill the role you would like to see it play with a

relatively modest commitment of force? mr. istrabadi: yes, i think so. first of all, i'm not a military expert obviously. he is. i'm not. but -- i think it is relatively modest. i don't think there is an appetite. i guess i'm the only one on the stage up here that doesn't live in washington or the environ. i come from the hoosier hot line as it were. i don't think there is an appetite in the rest of the country for a large, long-term sustained presence in the middle east generally. anyway, not in iraq. there has to be -- the american public will tolerate a policy -- or will support a policy that is

explained to them in terms of american interests. that i think has been absent. what are the american interests? the withdrawal of the u.s. -- again, it's a complicated matter. aside from the military, the sort of political and intellectual withdrawal from iraq in 2011 leads to the rise of isil, which turns out to have all kinds of implications for vital american interests. not least of which is the effect that the refugee crisis it is in part causing is having on the european unity project, which has been a cornerstone of american foreign policy since the days of dwight d. eisenhower. so these things are in the interest of the united states, aside from the fight against terrorism, which is a common fight to all -- to the civilized order.

i think the american people could be on board that program. iraq has not been in the election at all other than who did and didn't support and when. that's a fairly, shall i say, mundane debate. the interests, if any, and i think there are, of the united states, have not been debated at all. i think there are significant american interests ensuring that iraq does not become a sort of sustainable environment for terrorism. mr. doran: dr. younis, are you in agreement? that seems to be what you are saying. their impulses or proclivities, inclinations of the actors on the ground in iraq to work in a way that would further u.s. interest if the united states would just change its posture. is that what you -- is that your

view? ms. younis: yeah. i think saying the american people don't have an appetite for engagement has been a bit of a copout for this administration, which is really saying we don't have the appetite for engagement. actually it's about explaining to the american people what the cost of disengagement are. if you want to disengage, you need to have an honest conversation about what the risks to american interest in the world are, and what the risks are typical order we have managed to build up. htereally prepared to seed middle east -- to cede the middle east to russian leadership? are we prepared to leave iraq and syria without having achieved a genuine and sustainable defeat of isis? the other thing when you're talking about cost is a relatively modest military and diplomatic and political cost in

the short run, can actually save you incredible military cost in the long run, when you let instability take root and take extremist organizations take method that take massive swaths of territory and threaten not just regional allies but allies across the world and your self , at home. suddenly then the cost becomes much more significant. so it's about assessing the costs of disengagement and a , relatively modest investment out front can really pay dividends over the long run. mr. doran: can i ask you about the russian factor? if you were to answer those people who say -- which includes, i think donald trump that the russians broadly share our interest in defeating isis. why don't we bring them into the security architecture of the reason and work with them?

a lot of people believe that the iranian interest are broadly in alignment with hours. how would you answer that? ms. younis: the united states fundamentally disagrees with russia and iran on what the root causes of extremism are. we believe that extremism is driven by unrepresentative authoritarian political policies that exclude sections of the population that oppressed, and drive people into the arms of extremists and make the extremist narrative more and more popular and appealing. whereas the russians and iranians look at this as a problem of control. the state wasn't able to exercise sufficient violence to be able to contain this extremist population. so their entire policy for defeating isis is just bombing the hell out of aleppo.

it's just the use of force, and they have no political strategy at all for dealing with what the drivers of extremism are. that's where -- look, we've learned this lesson a really tough way. we've engaged in iraq. we've engaged in afghanistan. and you know, you cannot kill an insurgency. you have to transform an insurgency. you have to reduce the drivers that inspire people to join these groups and you have to give people political alternatives. that's why we're trying to invest in governance structures that can actually offer people the things that they demand from their politicians rather than just simply relying on violence only strategy. mr. doran: ambassador, did you have a comment? mr. istrabadi: two points.

on the last one i'm not sure it's factually correct to say russians have been focused on isil to begin with. certainly in their first intervention which began about a year ago and ended more or less in march-ish of 2016 they were, in fact, more or less targeting the opponents of the regime who are not isil. it's not even clear. it seems they bought into the strategy, russians did, of being able to say it's me or isil by allowing isil to sort of survive. the other point the doctor got absolutely right is on the question of engagement and the false dichotomy that has been created by the administration in terms of engaging in iraq, you either send in 150,000 troops or you do nothing. this was the response in zero