first, there was the terrorist attack against the indian embassy in kabul, which u.s. sources also said had -- you know, there was evidence of direct involvement of elements of pakistan security agencies in this attack. at least so the news reports in the u.s. said. then and at that stage india still took a somewhat restrained view and we were willing to give the benefit of doubt to pakistan and we continued the dialog, but after the attack after the indian embassy in kabul there was the mumbai attacks, the scale of that impact, and the impact that it had on public opinion was very, very strong. it was with great difficulty that the government continued to follow a policy of restraint because there was public pressure that india should retaliate forcefully in the light of the terrorist attack, but as you know, the indian government's response was statesman-like and we chose diplomacy and diplomatic pressure rather than a retaliatory response. in the wake of the mumbai terrorist attacks, the composite dialog has been suspended and india has stressed that it is important

general mcchrystal took command from general david mckiernan during a low-key ceremony in kabul. he was fired last month by defense secretary robert gates one year into a two-year assignment. the u.s. and south korea have been pointed 11 underground sites in north korea where it it could conduct a third nuclear test. this, and of a summit between the two allies on the north's growing atomic threat. south korean president is on his way to washington for a meeting tomorrow with president obama appeared this just in it, prime minister von brunn's office says britain will hold a long- awaited in kuwait into iraq war -- prime minister board and brown. he pledged to examine mistakes made during and after the 2003 invasion. lawmakers and anti-war protesters have called for the inquiry to be held in public and to scrutinize what they say were a wide range of errors and post-war planning. the prime minister will make

the situation for women has been made worse by a lack of security, corruption in kabul and passage of oppressive measures shutch a as the shia personal status law. every conversation i've had with commanders there, including our recent trip, assures me that the kind of gender apartheid occurring in afghanistan undermine ours national security. so we cannot sit idly by and do nothing about it if we are to stabilize this region and bring our troops home. during a recent house armed services committee hearing, the g.a.o. witness highlighted the importance of empowering women, but noted her agency had not focused on the advancement of women in afghanistan and she went on to state that, quote, investment in women is often a pivotal investment focus for returns on economic growth and economic dwoment in country, unquote. and i believe that and i also believe that this is true for political growth as well. in education, some say if you don't test it, you won't teach it. well, without these metrics, we can't know how our aid is impacting these women. we are reshaping our commitment to the afg

of afghanistan as being more unified as a nation that pakistan the afghans are always fighting for kabul and did pakistan they are always having a separatist movement. yet any number going on. i can see a way out of the afghan problem nation-building has become a dirty word in washington basically all of these committees need lot and order if we could establish governance we certainly would not get rid of the taliban and al qaeda to kill them all it is like the doritos ad they just keep making more. [laughter] but if we actually make them irrelevant by giving people a good alternative, i think that is the exit strategy for the reason. people talk about that being expensive, complex, taking years and i do not disagree but we're already spending $2 billion per month on our military operation alone and surely that is not sustainable either. even the nation-building is a dirty word it is one that i will keep saying because i think it is the only way out of that region. for me the bigger concern is the speed with which the insurgents are moving across pakistan which i do see a tremendous risk

much of afghanistan has not felt the presence that the impact of a central government in kabul, ever. and as you said, i think a large part of our goal there is to encourage the people who are now a deciding where their allegiance will be, is urging -- it's causing them to decide to place their bet with a legitimate government, whatever level that is, whether it's legitimate tribal, local, regional or a federal government. it will come down to ultimately where they place their bet. and in the absence of metrics, it will be our sense of where the people are beginning to place their bets that will lead us to understand whether or not our efforts are successful in the lands of afghanistan. that will require a careful approach. it will require a small footprint as we can get away with in the places we go with the capability of security considerations as part of that. it will require, i believe, a shift towards -- more of a shift towards true local regional knowledge, however that is obtained. we have to get beyond generalizations in afghanistan into true, deep knowledge of tribal relation

effort there with ambassador holbrooke, ambassador i can very going into -- the ambassador going into kabul with a cruel include several state department personnel -- with a crew that will include several state department personnel -- we are concentrating our strengths because it is important to win in afghanistan. general mcchrystal, do you believe this is a winnable war do you believe this is a winnable war in afghanistan? >> i believe it is winnable. i do not think it will be easily winnable. >> i think both of those points that you brought out in response to senator mccain are very important to hear from you, for members of congress and the american people to understand. it is winnable, but it will not be easy. it will probably get worse before it gets better. you are a general and not

host: you do have photos in the book in the oval office a picture here of secretary of state colin kabul and the national security adviser condoleezza rice. walz secretary rumsfeld's relationship with those to? >> guest: his relationships were strained with both. he had -- particularly on policy -- in personal terms, he could be engaging, courteous and so on. but there were tremendous tensions between rumsfeld's cantelon and powell's state department on a broad range of foreign policy and national-security issues and there was a lot of gamesmanship, a lot of need when. rumsfeld used to needle will in the national security council meetings sometimes rumsfeld for instance would pick on powell's pronunciation of the capitol of afghanistan told him he was putting the accent on the wrong symbol and how will would slash himself and try to get back at rumsfeld on his suits and so on. as for condoleezza rice, he was critical initially of her management of the national security council. >> host: did you talk to either of them for the book? >> guest: i talked to one of them. >> host: its water mar

page nine of the report you have a sidebar that talks about cracks in kabul. you have another compound where supposedly the united states forces in afghanistan quarters are going to be where the general will be sitting eckert said he won't because the structural cracks, and proper plumbing and unusable bathrooms and correctly sized sewage systems braking and leaking pipes, sinking sidewalks and other construction defect spirited how does that happen? that somebody signs off on a project like that where we end up getting tagged for the bill and having an unusual building on that? >> one of the recurring themes is accountability. how does that happen? in this particular instance united states court of engineers -- this instance the corps of engineers linebaugh this 18 million-dollar contract by a turkish construction company was adequate. and it's interesting because it talks a little bid of our methodology. when we were over there we interviewed a senior that happened to be a major individual that inherited this building. actually you talk about rework because

first, there was the terrorist attack against the indian embassy in kabul, which u.s. sources also said had -- you know, there was evidence of direct involvement of elements of pakistan security agencies in this attack. at least so the news rts

of doubt to pakistan and we continued the dialog, but after the attack after the indian embassy in kabul there was the mumbai attacks, the scale of that impact, and the impact that it had on public opinion was very, very strong. it was with great difficulty that the government continued to follow a policy of restraint because there was public pressure that india should retaliate forcefully in the light of the terrorist attack, but as you know, the indian government's response was statesman-like and we chose diplomacy and diplomatic pressure rather than a retaliatory response. in the wake of the mumbai terrorist attacks, the composite dialog has been suspended and india has stressed that it is important for pakistan to ensure that the perpetrators of the mumbai terrorist attacks are brought to book and perpetrators of earlier terrorist attacks against india and that there are tangible steps towards dismantlement of the terrorist infrastructure in pakistan. our prime minister and president zadari met on the sidelines of zadari met on the sidelines of the sco meeting in russia and6 they hav

our researcher for afghanistan has just gone back to kabul now and she's there -- i was just speakingo her -- we're working very closely with the u.s. military and different afghan groups looking at the civilian casualties issues so these people are there everyday. these are the regional experts. then we have transnational divisions. people who work on things that transcend national borders and boundaries. people who work on things such as in our arms division, the arms division works on weapons so, for example, land mines or nonlethal weapons. these are some of the things that they follow. we have a children's rights division that looks at children's rights worldwide so, for example, in burma they would follow child soldier issues working with the researchers in burma that we have. then you have other divisions such as the emergencies division which i am in. and the emergencies division we are the guys who go in a moment's notice, about 24 hours notice and we will go into a war zone and try to work in an active conflict zone. and when we're there, we're trying to research and expose

pulitzer prize winning journalist at "the times, " along with their driver, were adopted outside of kabul on november 11 -- excuse me, november 10, as mr. rohde rebel to interview a taliban commander for a book he was writing. they said they had been threatened with death by their captors. the two escaped early saturday morning. michigan, bill on our republican line. caller: good morning. i have something to say about iran. i do believe we need to back these people. i do believe if we do nothing -- if we do nothing in supporting these people they will massacre them. these people have no chance to fight. we won't give them a chance. one thing i realize, our president is a young man and he is trying to do his thing, but the ask me, he is scared to death of doing anything except attacking the white people and the white structure, he is all for the muslims and he does not care about anything else. host: greensboro, n.c., on the democrats' line. caller: calling in response to the lady who said the republicans are not interested in war. does she remember that during the campaign that senator mc

in the wise words of a colonel in kabul, without the afghan national troop, we are another invading army or stand the potential to be seen that way, unless it's seen as a national effort based through the dex direction of their government that we're in support of, if we're simply trying to do it ourselves we're pessimistic it's going to be nearly as effective. >> what type of cultural training are you doing to deal with these differences and how important would you say the continued cultural training is, like that being conducted by the center for operational culture and learning to success in afghanistan? >> it bleeds over to the question and the answer to that last question and we think it's extremely important. one of our lessons, i won't say learned, but a lesson reconfirmed in iraq, is that when you have the support and confidence of the local population, very positive things follow. you will gain intelligence. you will gain support. they will point out to you the i.e.d.'s. they will make it tough, as best they can, for the bad guys to come in and start to take root in that society.