wolfowitz was viscerally hostile to the united nations. of arguments because he might find just about appealing enough not to become a serious obstacle to policy that would involve theñr un >> are you effectively saying that the british government's policy was changed in washington rather than london? it was in washington that our lives had changed, not that we sat down and said this would be the correct strategy? >> i would not say that it was extremely who wish. one of the things you have to remember is tony blair is a true believer about the weakness of saddam hussein, and his realization of that predates by a very long time the arrival of george bush in the white house. >> the policy of the government or himself? >> can i read you something? this is a speech, just a paragraph. this is a speech that tony blair made in january, 1998. 1998, which is early. areas, prime minister for a year. "we have a clear responsibility and long-term interest of the world to stop saddam hussein from gentrifying the world's community. he needs to be persu

wolfowitz was viscerally hostile to the united nations.ust about appealing enough not to become a serious obstacle to policy that would involve theñr un >> are you effectively saying that the british government's policy was changed in washington rather than london? it was in washington that our lives had changed, not that we sat down and said this would be the correct strategy? >> i would not say that it was extremely who wish. one of the things you have to remember is tony blair is a true believer about the weakness of saddam hussein, and his realization of that predates by a very long time the arrival of george bush in the white house. >> the policy of the government or himself? >> can i read you something? this is a speech, just a paragraph. this is a speech that tony blair made in january, 1998. 1998, which is early. areas, prime minister for a year. "we have a clear responsibility and long-term interest of the world to stop saddam hussein from gentrifying the world's community. he needs to be persuaded by diplomacy or made by forced t

and the good people turned out to be this group, called the vulcans, led condoleezza rice and paul wolfowitz secretary for defense. so my team and i folk tussed on this group. and after 2000 went by, certain policies began to take shape. and i think the most definitive account that i had of where the bush administration was likely to go -- and always bear in mind before 9/11, was a conversation with condoleezza rice at the british assembly, if i remember right, december 6, 2000, followed by a conversation with karl rove, who was president bush's chief political strategist at that time. >> i already had instructions in london to put in a few fixes on how we wanted certain things to develop. and i have to say to you that iraq and the middle east did not feature very prominently in this account of where bush's priorities would lie. there was an enormous focus on russia. not russia as russia, but on nuclear and missile defense and what was going to happen to the treaty, which she and later the president would make, i think, top foreign policy goal of the period before 9/11. on iraq, i just wante

thought a half a million troops would be necessary for the post-conflict and depurate secretary wolfowitzsaid that was ridiculous. how can you need more troops for after the conflict and for the conflict? >> if you have been asked in september of 2003 which of the two or write? -- which of the two were corrected? >> it was my view throughout this that more troops should have been allocated from the>> time is about to run out. we have benefited enormously from two rounds of testimony from a like to ask two questions about your overall view. throughout the whole process in which you were involved, do you feel that the united kingdom had a significant impact on the process of policy formation in the united states towards iraq? you have talked about one specific set out vetoes looking at it in a broader sense, did we succeed in influencing it? >> yes, we influenced it in certain detailed ways but that cannot hide the fact that we were uncomfortable about the low level of planning for the post-conflict period, had worries abou under-resourceing, and sometimes were not given an opportunity to e

thought a half a million troops would be necessary for the post-conflict and depurate secretary wolfowitzaid that was ridiculous. >> if you have been asked in september of 2003 which of the two or write? >> it was my view throughout this that more troops should have been allocated from the beginning. >> time is about to run out. we have benefited enormously from two rounds of testimony from a like to ask two questions about your overall view. throughout the whole process in which you were involved, do you feel that the united kingdom had a significant impact on the process of policy formation in the united states towards iraq? you have talked about one specific set out vetoes looking at it in a broader sense, did we succeed in influencing it? >> yes, we influenced it in certain detailed ways but that cannot hide the fact that we were uncomfortable about the low level of planning for the post- conflict period, had worries abou under-resourceing, and sometimes were not given an opportunity to explain to the americans why we thought it should be done differently. in that very major respect,