the campaign plan for kandahar anticipates increases in afghan forces in and around kandahar city toocreate a rising tide of security, but at a 1-2 ratio, one afghan soldier or policeman for every two isaf troops. that is not good enough. having afghan units in the lead is critical in kandahar since the likelihood of success there is based on popular sport. that is at the heart of the counterinsurgency strategy. the afghan army has broad public support, and even the afghan government has more than twice the support that the united states does. polling numbers from the "new york times" in the case 99% of afghans support the kabul government over the taliban, while only 40% have are favorable view of the united states. the elders we met at a local shura in southern afghanistan told us that we should train and eqqip the afghan security forces to provide for their country's security and then depart. last week, general mcchrystal announced that i sat -- isaf would slow the expansion of the afghan and coalition troop presence in canada are in order to allow time to secure the support of local tri

brigades, the 101st airborne division, deploy our round kandahar city together with afghan army brigades. we will see the introduction of additional afghan police in u.s. military police to secure the city itself along with other u.s. forces and civilians that will work together with the impressive canadian reconstruction team operating in the city. as you've heard general mcchrystal explain, the concept is to provide the kandahar is a rising tide of security, one that will expand overtime and establish the presentation of improved security on which local afghan governance can be built and improve services and other areas as well. the one they did nothing easy about any of this. -- there will be nothing easy about any of this. the going was likely to get harder before got easier. that has already been the case as we've seen recently. it is essential that we make progress in this critical southern part of the country, where in fact and 9/11 attacks were planned by al qaeda during the period when the taliban controlled it and the rest of the country. . >> and to help achieve greater equali

in afghan and forces in and around kandahar city to create a rising tide of security. at a one to two ratio, ne afghan soldier oo policeman for every two troops, that is not good enough. our partnering goal should be at least a ratio of one-one in kandahar, and afghan troops should be in the league. in many if not boot -- most operations. having afghan units in the league is critical in kandahar because the likelihood of success is based on popular support. that support is at the heart of the ounterinsurgency strategy which is so well set forth by general petraeus. the afghan army has broad public support,,and even the afghan government has more than twice the support that the united states does. polling numbers in "new york times" indicate that 90% of afghan support the kabul government over the taliban. but only 40% of afghans have a favorable view of the united states. the 100 verso elders that we met in southern afghanistan last year when we asked what they wanted the united states to do, they told us that we should train and equip the afghan security forces to pro

brigade deployed into the district of around kandahar city. we will see the introduction of additional afghan police and u.s. military police to secure the city itself, along with other foreign forces that will work together. the combination of all of these initiatives is intended to slowly, but surely, established the foundation of security that pan allow the development of viable, local, political structures, that will help local governments the chief legitimacy and greater support. relentless up -- pursuit of the taliban is important, but we know we cannot kill or capture our way out of the insurgency. clearly, as many insurgents and citizens need to be convinced to be part of the solution, rather than part of the problem. an important initiative was conducted several weeks ago, and the reintegration policy that president karzai signed today, which i spoke with him about this morning, will be critical to convince members of the insurgency to lay down their weapons. we look forward to working with our afghan and diplomatic partners in implem

brigade from the great 101st airborne division deployed into the district around kandahar city, well it will operate together with an additional army brigade. we will see the introduction of additional afghan police in u.s. military police to secure the city itself. along with other u.s. forces and civilians who will work together with the impressive canadian-led for ventura construction team that has been operating in the city. a combination of all these initiatives had been intended to slowly but surely establish the foundation of security that can allow the development of reliable, local political structures, enable the improvement of basic services, and of afghan leaders and local governments achieve greater legitimacy and support in kandahar. while relentless pursuit of the taliban will be critical in kandahar and elsewhere, we know that from iraq and other counterinsurgency experiences that we cannot kill or capture a out of our industrial-strength insurgency like afghanistan. many need to be convinced to become part of the solution rather than a continuing part of the problem.

brigade from the great 101st airborne division deployed into the distct around kandahar city, well it will operate together with an additional army brigade. we will see the introduction of additional afghan police in u.s. military police to secure the city iself. along with other u.s. forces and civilians who will work together with the impressive canadian-led for ventura construction team that has been operating in the city. a combination of all these initiatives had been intended to slowly but surely establish the foundation of security that can allow the development reliable, local political structures, enable the improvement of basic services, and of afghan leaders and local governments achieve greater legitimacy and support in kandahar. while relentless pursuit of the taliban will be critical in kandahar and elsewhere, we know that from iraq and other counterinsurgency experiences that we cannot kill or capture a out of our industrial-strength insurgency like afghanistan. many need to be convinced to becomeart of the solution rather than a continuing part of the problem. the nati

these militias significantly outnumber the afghan police force in kandahar city. find themselves competing with private security companies. recruitment.hen it comes to for the population, meanwhile, the government is in essence seen as an exclusive and predatory government. it must be kept in mind that he's not created the militias that's been around afghanistan. these were products of the civil war of the 1990's. that said, contracts have made these militias lucrative. and cutting these militias off from u.s. contracts will be necessary steps in dismantling their influence and replacing them with the afghan army and police. this step cannot be taken completely and immediately, however. what is needed is a careful strategy to unwind the conttacts, find gainful employment for the foot soldiers and ensure that our staff or the afghan army and police are available to fill the security demands the contracts are now fulfilling. the issue illegal militias in afghanistan is challenging, but it is one that our staff can solve. the u.s. troop surge has given the united sta

city as a bleeding ulcer. i feel that marjah is sending a very troubling signal. . kandahar is a success, the success of the war can be determined. the delay in our operation is not projecting an air of confidence and success. to get kandahar right, we need an integrated strategy. the political part of that strategy is not there. i hear a lot about the number of civilians being deployed in kandahar. i have not heard how we will begin to change the complex play of power in the city and the contacting practice that we are dependent on. meanwhile, it is very troubling that the president of afghanistan has decided to remove his minister of the interior and intelligence, two of our most important partners in this government. they are outstanding and effected. i do not know why the president made this decision. the explanation given by his former intelligence chief, which we read in the newspaper this weekend, seemed to have a ring of truth to it. if the president of afghanistan no longer believes the u.s. will succeed and is shifting his result to a policy of accommodation and th

city. we will establish freedom of movement along the ring road and build a bypass down to kandahar and we will better patrol access to the city itself along its main arteries. none of this will be easy. none of this will be bloodless as events last week grimly attest that all that will depend heavily on the continued growth and development of confident and well led afghan national security forces as well as tangible and achievable political outcomes. securing kandahar or rather, securing the people of kandahar is not a military objective. it is a social, political and economic objective for which other agencies and other nations are needed and for which afghan leadership will be vital. i am comfortable with the progress to date in the sequencing that we are following. i am also mindful of the need to monitor our progress continually to stay flexible and to adjust accordingly. that leads me to the second thing i would like you to consider, proper balance. wending our current wars means investment in the warfare expertise, a core competency that should be institutionalized and supported in c