. >> with that in mind, do you agree with niosh, their independent panel recommendation, to conduct four complete inspections each year at underground mines as a way to reprioritize resources? would that help? >> all of those cases were shifted off to the u.s. attorney's office that were identified. so those were processed. i went to work back in the 1960s and the first time the federal inspector showed up a the the mine, it was a game changer and i can tell you from my own personal experience that the mandatory inspection has saved more miners lives than probably any single thing. if you look at 178 -- 278 miners dying on the job in 1977 when that act was passed, we're down to -- and we hope to even get to zero. but we're in the high 30s to around 40 today and that had a lot to do with protecting the miners. it's taking two brakes off of a car because we don't have as many car wrecks now. this is a fundamental protection. >> the gentle lady's time has expired. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you mr. main for being here today. we appreciate you for taking the opportunity to answer our

niosh states it could have possibly prevented the ubb explosion. there may be a number of reasons for these errors. some enforcement errors have plagued the agency for years and deadly mistakes are followed with a pledge to do better. upper big branch happened. tragedy strikes and enforcement regime goes on. administrator main, i hope you convince this committee and the nation's miners that this time it will be different, that this time we will learn from past mistakes and keep our promise to do better. i look forward to do this with our witnesses and i now recognize miss woolsey for her opening remarks. >> thank you, mr. chairman. certainly as we examine the lessons from the upper big branch mine disaster, we can never lose sight that 29 families lost their brothers, their husbands, and best friends. almost two years ago this committee traveled to west virginia where we heard chilling testimony from the families of miners about the unbelievable conditions in that mine. most of which you listed in your opening testimony. a life-long minor and grand

violations went undetected, including critical violations highlighted in the latest niosh report. only a few weeks before the ubb explosion, inspectors were underground near the source of the explosion, but the lead inspector had only 13 months experience and obviously missed a number of violations that may have prevented this accident in the first place. while inspection definitely fell short, it was not for lack of trying. they issued $1.30 million in penalties prior to the accident. they shot down parts of the mine 52 times in the previous year. but these citations did not change massey's conduct. penalties were met with litigation, not compliance. at ubb, massey contested 92% of all penalties prior to the explosion. it is clear msha was no match for an operation where corporate greed came before the health and safety of their workers. today we recognize that the entire system failed the miners at the upper bay branch. past congresses should not have slashed funding for mine inspectors. inspectors needed to do a better job, and massey exploit the weaknesses in the law and hurt